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The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1127 CDT on 5/16/2023, during the reperformance of test procedure 'STS PE-006, Charcoal Adsorber In-Place Leak Test' due to a failure from the previous day, both trains of emergency exhaust were rendered inoperable due to incorrect performance of the procedure. Performers incorrectly de-energized the humidity control heating coil for the unit not under test, rendering it inoperable. This issue was identified and rectified at 1138 CDT on 5/16/2023, exiting the LCO (limiting condition of operation) for both trains inoperable at that time. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public.

• * * RETRACTION ON 6/5/2023 AT 1132 EDT FROM JASON KNUST TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

The initial failure of the STS PE-006 test was caused by a malfunction of the test equipment which initially injected excessive amounts of tracer gas and caused saturation of the charcoal. Using test equipment sourced from Callaway, and following guidance from the vendor, STS PE-006 test was successfully passed on 5/17/2023. No maintenance or intrusive testing was performed on the unit between initial test failure and satisfactory completion of the test. Because this train of emergency exhaust was not actually inoperable at the time the second train was rendered inoperable due to incorrect procedure performance, there was no loss of safety function. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gepford).

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: While operating at 100 percent reactor power, the Control Room received indications of a feedwater transient, and indications of decreasing level on Steam Generator `B.' Reactor Trip occurred approximately 30 seconds after initial indications of transient at 1803 CDT on 7/18/22. All Safety Related Equipment responded as expected, including actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater. Control Room responded properly and progressed through Emergency Operating Procedures. The Unit is Stable in Mode 3. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up. Wolf Creek intends to make a press release.

• * * UPDATE FROM JOSHUA TURNER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1538 EDT ON 7/19/2022 * * *

The original event notification inadvertently indicated that a media / press release would be provided. However, no media / press release is planned. Notified R4DO (Gaddy).

At 1608 CDT on 10/27/2020, Wolf Creek Unit 1, operating at 100 percent rated thermal power in Mode-1, experienced a loss of the on-site wired corporate network. During actions to restore, it was discovered the ability to access the dose assessment software was compromised due to a security program. Access to the program was established after some time using Wi-Fi connectivity, but was not able to be accessed without network access. Actions are being taken to rectify. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee believes this was not a cyber-event and that the Emergency Response Data System was available, but couldn't verify. Should the Wi-Fi network access be lost, there's no capability to perform a dose assessment. Standalone laptops are being provided but have not been placed onsite yet. That should restore the ability to have dose assessment capability at all times.

• * * UPDATE ON 10/27/2020 AT 2220 FROM JOHN WEBER TO OSSY FONT * * *

The licensee notified the NRC that the network has been restored to the Technical Support Center building and the emergency plan dose assessment group was capable of performing dose assessment. The licensee also noted that the group is able to perform dose assessment without the network, if needed. The network is still unavailable in the control room. The licensee confirmed that ERDS is available. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Pick).

(On) Monday, 11/20/17, (the licensee) received a call from the MRO (Medical Review Officer) staff that the Opiate blind submitted on 11/14/17 did not test as expected. The confirmatory test was positive for codeine and morphine but negative for 6-acetylmorphine. (The licensee) requested a retest by the MRO to the laboratory. The MRO staff contacted the provider of the blind specimens for documentation of the blind analysis. The lab was requested on 11/21/17 to perform the retest by the MRO. (On) 11/27/17, the results from the lab on the retest were virtually the same as the original test result. The lab's Certifying Scientist provided a letter documenting their findings. The MRO staff informed us (Wolf Creek) and we requested copies of all documentation from the provider of the blinds, the lab and any notes from the MRO staff. Informed Superintendent Access Screening of the test results. (The licensee) contacted two plants to verify reportability under 10 CFR 26.719. (The licensee) initiated CR 00117707 to document the occurrence. Superintendent contacted licensing and management. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector and R4 NRC Security Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION ON 12/6/17 AT 1559 EST FROM LARRY HAUTH TO DONG PARK * * *

This event was reported under 10 CFR 26.719(c)(3). Further review shows that this event should have been reported under 10 CFR 26.719(c)(1), which only required a Licensee Event Report, not an Event Notification. This notification is retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hipschman) and FFD Group via email.

Class 1E A/C Unit SGK05A cools safety related electrical train 'A' and was found tripped at 2148 (CDT). As a result, the following supported safety related electrical equipment were declared inoperable: 4.16 KV Bus NB01, 480 Volt Buses NG01 and NG03, 120 volt Instrument AC Inverters and Buses NN11, NN13, NN01 and NN03, 125 VDC Chargers and Buses NK11, NK13, NK01 and NK03. T/S 3.0.3 was entered from T/S 3.8.7 due to two out of four 120 volt AC Inverters (NN11 and NN13) being inoperable. All electrical systems listed above remain available but are declared inoperable due to inadequate room cooling capability. Plant shutdown to mode 5 commenced at 2244 (CDT). No major equipment is out-of-service. All systems have functioned normally. Plant is currently at 99% with power ramping down. Plant must be in mode 3 by 0448 CDT. No compensatory measures have been established. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. See EN #51071 for an earlier T/S required shutdown required at 0436 CDT on 5/15/15, due to the same conditions.

• * * UPDATE FROM BRET DAVIS TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/18/15 AT 1600 EDT * * *

For both EN 51071 and 51074, the low lube oil pressure switch tripped the SGK05A unit. Oil pressures were verified to be normal and the SGK05A unit was successfully started. The plant shutdown each time was terminated. A fault in the Electronic Oil Pressure control which monitors the low lube oil pressure switch was identified. A jumper has been installed that bypasses the oil switch while maintenance is being conducted. The unit was declared functional but degraded. Indication of low oil pressure is still provided. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Okeefe).

Wolf Creek Generating Station performed a planned shutdown for the start of a refueling outage. As part of the procedure GEN 00-005, Minimum Load to Hot Standby, a planned manual reactor trip was initiated from 25 percent power level with the plant in Mode 1. As part of this planned shut down sequence, an anticipated automatic Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) actuation signal was generated. This is a non-emergency event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to preplanned manual actuation of the reactor protection system and auto-initiation of auxiliary feed water system. All systems and components operated as designed with the exception of the main generator output breakers. They did not open as designed. They were manually opened using the main control room hand switches as directed by EMG ES-02, Reactor Trip Response. The plant is stable in Mode 3 with AFW secured, with plans to cool down and enter Mode 5 for the planned refueling outage. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * EVENT RETRACTED ON 03/11/15 AT 13:05 EDT FROM BRET DAVIS TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

WCNOC (Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation) is retracting the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) notification based on further review of the event. A valid AFAS (Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation signal) actuation occurred during the planned shutdown as a result of SG (Steam Generator) water level reaching the lo lo level setpoint. The AFAS actuation was an expected actuation that occurred due to preplanned activities covered by GEN 00-005. On-shift control room personnel were aware that an AFAS actuation would occur as a result of tripping the plant between 30% and 25% power. The AFAS actuated consistent with the planned shutdown with no anomalies. This is consistent with NUREG-1022, Rev. 3, Section 3.2.6 that states, in part: 'With regard to preplanned actuations, operation of a system as part of a planned test or operational evolution need not be reported. Preplanned actuations are those that are expected to actually occur due to preplanned activities covered by procedures. Such actuations are those for which a procedural step or other appropriate documentation indicates that the specific actuation is actually expected to occur. Control room personnel are aware of the specific signal generation before its occurrence or indication in the control room.' The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Notified R4DO(Okeefe).

The missile door (door 33012) protecting Class 1E Engineered Safety Features (ESF) buses NB01/NB02 switchgear rooms was discovered misaligned on its hinge and stuck partially open and not capable of being closed. The missile door has since been repaired and closed. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.9, 'Distribution Systems- Operating,' was declared not met and Condition F entered when the immediate operability determination identified that buses NB01 and NB02 were inoperable. Condition F of TS 3.8.9 requires immediate entry into Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. LCO 3.0.3 was entered at 1100 CST and subsequently exited when the missile door was repaired at 1118 CST. The unit was in and still is in MODE 1 at 100% power. No actions were initiated to commence a unit shut down. The NRC resident inspector was contacted regarding this event. All systems functioned as expected.

• * * RETRACTION FROM TRAVIS ROHLFING TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1458 EDT ON 3/16/15 * * *

The licensee is retracting this event based on the following: An engineering evaluation concluded that the weather conditions during the period of the event did not result in the threat of a tornado. Given that the weather during the event would not have presented a valid threat of a tornado, the stuck open missile door would not have prevented the ESF busses and the DGs (Diesel Generators) from performing their specified safety function. The ESF busses and the DGs were considered OPERABLE but degraded. This is analogous to Example 4 in RIS 2001-09, 'Control of Hazard Barriers', with the exception that this event did not occur as a result of planned maintenance or a plant modification. As such, this event has been determined to not be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gepford).

At 1336 CDT, Wolf Creek declared an Alert due to a fire. The fire in the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator potential transformer was extinguished using a portable CO2 fire extinguisher. Plant personnel were exposed to the smoke and were evaluated with no injuries noted. The plant continued to operate at 100% power throughout the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State of Kansas Division of Emergency Management, and the Coffey County Sheriff Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA OPS Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and Nuclear SSA via email.

• * * UPDATE AT 1648 EDT ON 10/6/2014 FROM AARON LUCAS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The Alert was terminated at 1542 CDT because the fire had been terminated within fifteen minutes and a walkdown of the area was clear. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Allen), IRD (Grant), NRR (Lee), DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA OPS Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and Nuclear SSA via email..

Wolf Creek has commenced a plant shutdown in accordance with Technical Specifications. The A Train Class 1E Electrical Equipment Air Conditioning unit was declared non-functional due to a possible failed compressor cylinder, as indicated by increased vibration. This failure could prevent the unit from performing its required function over its required mission time, as required by Technical Specifications 3.8.4, 3.8.7, and 3.8.9. The following safety related electrical equipment was declared inoperable: 4.16KV Bus NB01; 480 Volt AC buses NG01 and NG03; 120 Volt Instrument AC inverters and buses NN11, NN13, NN01 and NN03; 125 VDC chargers and buses NK11, NK13, NN01 and NN03. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered at 1645 CDT on 9/11/2013 from Technical Specification 3.8.7 due to two out of four 120 VAC inverters (NN11 and NN13) being inoperable. Plant shutdown to Mode 5 commenced at 1731 CDT. The unit is currently at approximately 50% power. All electrical systems listed above remain available but are declared inoperable due to inadequate room cooling capability. No major equipment is out of service. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. No switchgear room temperature limits were challenged. See EN #49008 (May 6, 2013) and EN #49126 (June 17, 2013) for similar events.

• * * UPDATE ON 9/12/13 AT 0215 EDT FROM MARCY BLOW TO HUFFMAN * * *

At 00:36 CDT 9/12/13, Wolf Creek had an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation during a plant shutdown in accordance with Technical Specifications. The plant was in Mode 3, all control rods inserted, with reactor trip breakers closed when low steam generator levels prompted a manual reactor trip. A Valid Auxiliary Feed Actuation signal was received due to low steam generator levels. All Auxiliary Feedwater pumps started and operated as expected. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Hay) notified.

The fire started at 1455 CDT in the turbine building southeast stairwell and on the auxiliary boiler room roof. Fire fighting efforts continue as fire exists inside the wall between the turbine building and the auxiliary boiler room. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local governments. Notified DHS, FEMA, and the NICC.

* * * UPDATE FROM WARREN BRANDT TO PETE SNYDER AT 0100 EDT ON 4/12/13 * * * 

Wolf Creek declared a NOUE at 15:10 CDT on 4/11/13 due to a fire that started at 14:55 (CDT) in the Turbine Building SE stairwell and on the Auxiliary Boiler room roof. The fire was extinguished at 15:19 (CDT), and cool to the touch at 16:48 (CDT). No offsite fire response support was required. The fire did not impact any safety related equipment. The NOUE was terminated at 17:03 CDT 4/11/13. The cause of the fire is under investigation. Notified R4DO (Deese), NRR EO (Monninger), IRD (Marshall), DHS, FEMA and NICC (via email).

• * * UPDATE FROM PIERCE MOORE TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1400 EDT ON 4/12/13 * * *

Update to Termination of NOUE due to Fire on roof of Auxiliary Boiler. Wolf Creek declared a NOUE at 15:10 CDT on 4/11/13 due to a fire that started at 14:55 (CDT) in the Turbine Building SE stairwell and on the Auxiliary Boiler room roof. The fire was extinguished at 15:19 (CDT), and cool to the touch at 16:48 (CDT). The Offsite Fire Department was called and responded but their support in fire suppression was not required, they did assist in clean up and fire investigation efforts. The fire did not impact any safety related equipment. The NOUE was terminated at 17:03 CDT 4/11/13. The cause of the fire is under investigation. Notified R4DO (Deese), NRR EO (Monninger), IRD (Marshall) via email.

On 3/1/2013 at 2242 CST, Wolf Creek Unit 1 declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) due to both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) being unavailable: With the 'A' EDG out of service for planned maintenance, the 'B' EDG was discovered to have high governor oil level and was declared inoperable at 2235 CST. The governor oil level was adjusted and the 'B' EDG was declared operable at 2307 CST. The NOUE was terminated on 3/21/2013 at 2321 CST. Normal offsite power was maintained to the plant and no offsite assistance was requested. The licensee notified state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA (email).

• * * RETRACTION FROM JIM KURAS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 04/18/13 AT 1322 EDT * * *

Further evaluation by the Engineering department determined that the 'B' EDG was available with the high governor oil level. Testing was performed at an offsite facility, which confirmed that the 'B' EDG was capable of performing its specified safety function with the as-found oil level. As a result, the condition has been determined to not be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Drake), NRR EO (Skeen) and IRD MOC (Grant).