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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 542058 August 2019 13:26:00WaterfordNRC Region 4This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal. On June 25, 2019, at Waterford 3, while performing an emergent replacement of relays on the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Train A that affected Shield Building Ventilation Train A and HVAC Equipment Room Supply Fan AH-1 3A, unintentional contact was made between two contacts on the relay, resulting in an inadvertent initiation of other relays in the sequencer circuit. This caused the starting of Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A, Switchgear Ventilation Fan A, and Boric Acid Makeup pumps. This was a partial actuation of Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Train A. Affected plant systems started and functioned successfully. This inadvertent actuation was caused by human error and was not a valid signal resulting from parameter inputs. The 1992 Statements of Consideration define an invalid signal to include human error. Therefore, this actuation is considered invalid. This event was entered into the Waterford 3 corrective action program for resolution. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5419131 July 2019 16:20:00WaterfordNRC Region 4On July 31, 2019, at 1206 CDT, Waterford 3 commenced initiation of a plant shutdown as required by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. Prior to this, on July 31, 2019, at 1108 CDT, the boron injection flow paths were declared inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.1.2.2, 'Flow Paths - Operating,' and the charging pumps were declared inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.1.2.4, 'Charging Pumps-Operating.' This was due to visual examination identifying that propagation had progressed on a previously identified flaw on piping upstream of the header supplying the charging pumps. TS LCO 3.0.3 was entered due to the action statements of LCOs 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.2.4 not being met. LCO 3.0.3 requires that action shall be initiated within one hour to place the unit in a mode in which the specification does not apply by placing it in hot standby within the next 6 hours and cold shutdown within the next 30 hours. At 1206 CDT, Waterford 3 commenced direct boration to the reactor coolant system. This condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to the initiation of plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and (D) due to an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident."
ENS 5413125 June 2019 11:09:00WaterfordNRC Region 4On June 25, 2019, at 0428 CDT, the Waterford 3 shift operating crew declared the control room envelope inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.6.1 due to both Broad Range Gas Monitors being inoperable. Operations entered TS 3.7.6.1 action b, which requires that with one or more control room emergency air filtration trains inoperable due to inoperable control room envelope boundary in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4, then: 1. Immediately initiate action to implement mitigating actions; 2. Within 24 hours, verify mitigating actions ensure control room envelope occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits; and 3. Within 90 days, restore the control room envelope boundary to operable status. Action b.1 was completed by placing the control room in isolate mode at time 0441 CDT. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shutdown the reactor and maintain it in shutdown condition and (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident, due to the control room envelope being inoperable. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5406816 May 2019 18:07:00WaterfordNRC Region 4This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On May 16, 2019, at 1348 CDT, Waterford 3 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to Steam Generator number 1 high level, which was the result of a Main Turbine trip and subsequent reactor power cutback which had occurred at 1345 CDT. The cause of the Main Turbine trip is currently under investigation. Subsequent to the Reactor trip, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves number 1 and number 2 closed on high Steam Generator levels. Emergency Feedwater automatically actuated for Steam Generator number 2 at 1419 CDT and Steam Generator number 1 at 1425 CDT. Main Feedwater was restored to both Steam Generators by 1629 CDT. The plant entered the Emergency Operating Procedure for an uncomplicated reactor trip and is in the process of transitioning to the normal operating shutdown procedure. The plant is currently in Mode 3 and stable with Main Feedwater feeding and maintaining both Steam Generators. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed through the main condenser. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup.
ENS 5399111 April 2019 10:28:00WaterfordNRC Region 4

On April 11, 2019, at 0200 CDT the shift operating crew declared the control room envelope inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.6.1 due to the door handle for Door 86 (H&V Airlock Access Door) being detached. Operations entered TS 3.7.6.1 action b, which requires that with one or more control room emergency air filtration trains inoperable due to inoperable control room envelope boundary in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, then: 1. Immediately initiate action to implement mitigating actions; 2. Within 24 hours, verify mitigating actions ensure control room envelope occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits; and 3. Within 90 days, restore the control room envelope boundary to OPERABLE status. Action b.1 was completed by sealing the hole in Door 86 at 0232 CDT. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'event or condition that could have prevented fulfilment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident,' due to the control room envelope being inoperable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 5/17/19 AT 1620 EDT FROM MARIA ZAMBER TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

This is a Non-Emergency Notification from Waterford 3. This is a retraction of EN 53991. This event was evaluated in accordance with the corrective action process. The original operability determination of inoperable was made based on a conservative evaluation that with the door handle for Door 86 (Heating and Ventilation Airlock Access Door) being detached, the control room envelope boundary could not perform its safety function. A more detailed engineering evaluation was subsequently performed. This shows that the condition of the door handle being detached is bounded by the most recently performed non-pressurized radiological tracer gas test, as the control room envelope differential pressure was maintained more positive with the detached door handle as compared to that observed during the test. Additionally, the control room envelope differential pressure trends showed no discernable change between the two conditions of the door handle detached or with the opening taped over (resulting in an air tight seal). This information supports the conclusion that with the door handle for Door 86 being detached, the control room envelope boundary remained operable and did not constitute a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident; therefore, this event is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Proulx).

ENS 5383718 January 2019 17:03:00WaterfordNRC Region 4This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On January 18, 2019, a relevant indication was detected in the performance of Phased Array Ultrasonic Examinations of A600 Dissimilar Metal Piping Welds during planned inspections. The indication was observed during the analysis of data recorded of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Loop 2A Reactor Coolant Pump Suction Drain Nozzle to Safe-End Butt Weld (11-007). This indication does not meet applicable acceptance criteria under American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI. The plant was in Mode 6 (Refueling) at 0 percent power for a planned refueling outage at the time of discovery. The condition will be resolved prior to plant startup. This condition has no impact to the health and safety of the public. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50 .72(b)(3)(ii)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in: (A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded,' because an indication was found that did not meet acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Section XI , IWB-3514-2 and Code Case N-770-2, 3132. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Reference: CR-WF3-2019-01041"
ENS 5383417 January 2019 23:07:00WaterfordNRC Region 4This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On January 17, 2019, a relevant indication was detected in the performance of Phased Array Ultrasonic Examinations of A600 Dissimilar Metal Piping Welds during planned inspections. The indication was observed during the analysis of data recorded of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Loop 1A Reactor Coolant Pump Suction Drain Nozzle to Safe-End Butt Weld (07-009). This indication does not meet applicable acceptance criteria under American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section Xl. The plant was in Mode 6 (Refueling) at 0 percent power for a planned refueling outage at the time of discovery. The condition will be resolved prior to plant startup. This condition has no impact to the health and safety of the public. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in: (A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded,' because an indication was found that did not meet acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Section Xl. IWB-3514-2 and Code Case N-770-2, 3132. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Reference: CR-WF3-2019-0967"
ENS 5379620 December 2018 05:32:00WaterfordNRC Region 4On December 19, 2018, at 2322 CST, the shift operating crew declared the control room envelope inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.6.1 due to valve HVC-102 exceeding its maximum allowed closed stroke time of 2.0 seconds during performing of surveillance procedure OP-903-119. Actual closed stroke time was 2.1 seconds. Valve HVC-102 is part of the control room envelope. TS 3.7.6.1 requires that two control room emergency air filtration trains shall be OPERABLE. Operations entered TS 3.7.6.1 action b, which requires that with one or more control room emergency air filtration trains inoperable due to inoperable control room envelope boundary in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, then: 1. immediately initiate action to implement mitigating actions; 2. within 24 hours, verify mitigating actions ensure control room envelope occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits; and 3. within 90 days, restore the control room envelope boundary to OPERABLE status. Actions b.1 and b.2 were completed by placing the control room ventilation system in isolate mode at 2355. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident,' due to the control room envelope being inoperable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5355923 August 2018 12:11:00WaterfordNRC Region 4This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. 10 CFR Part 21 Notification - Defect of Westinghouse 7300 Process Analog Control System circuit cards On August 14, 2018, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) completed an evaluation of a deviation at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3) which concluded the condition constitutes a defect pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21. The Waterford 3 Site Vice President was notified of the result of this evaluation on August 21, 2018. An interim report stating that an evaluation of this deviation was in progress was submitted to the NRC on July 5, 2018 (Entergy letter W3F1-2018-0040, ADAMS Accession Number ML18186A694). Three Westinghouse 7300 Process Analog Control System (PAC) circuit cards were identified to be failed due to failed hex inverter chips. Some of these cards were installed in applications which support the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) at Waterford 3. These PAC cards use Texas Instruments Part Number SN74LS04N, W113 hex inverter chips. The circuit card types of concern are Analog Comparator model number 2838A32G01, Control Board model number 2838A30G011, and Prom Logic model number 2838A33G01. Entergy concluded that this condition could have prevented the UHS from performing its safety function and thus could have created a substantial safety hazard. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 533897 May 2018 17:40:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive result for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 530577 November 2017 10:49:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn November 7, 2017, at approximately 0337 (CST) hours, Waterford 3 (WF3) Control Room received a phone call from Entergy's Load Dispatcher to inform us that the NRC was unable to call Waterford 3 by ENS (emergency notification system) phone or by PABX (private automatic branch exchange) phone. The NRC was called by the Waterford 3 Control Room using the PABX at 0339 (CST) hours. However, the ENS phone could not call the NRC. Also, outside lines were not able to call in to Waterford 3. Offsite prompt Public Warning Sirens were available at all times. State and Local notification capability was available via PABX. WF3 Emergency Response Organization notification capability was available at all times. WF3 site Emergency Response Facility intercommunications were available at all times. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of offsite communications capability. ENS communication and full PABX functionality was reestablished at 0452 (CST) on November 7, 2017. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5286317 July 2017 17:37:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

During a rain and lightning storm, plant operators observed arcing from the main transformer bus duct and notified the control room. The decision was made to trip the main generator which resulted in an automatic reactor trip. The plant entered EAL SU.1 as a result of the loss of offsite power for greater than fifteen minutes. Plant safety busses are being supplied by both emergency diesel generators while the licensee inspects the electrical system to determine any damage prior to bringing offsite power back into the facility. Offsite power is available to the facility. No offsite assistance was requested by the licensee. During the trip, all rods inserted into the core. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric dump valves with emergency feedwater supplying the steam generators. The main steam isolation valves were manually closed to protect the main condenser. There were no safeties or relief valves that actuated during the plant transient. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. Reactor cooling is via natural circulation. All safety equipment is available for the safe shutdown of the plant. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and the local Parish emergency management agencies. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 7/17/17 AT 2007 EDT FROM MARIA ZAMBER TO DONG PARK * * *

This notification is also made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On July 17, 2017 at 1606 CDT, the reactor automatically tripped due to a loss of Forced Circulation, which was the result of Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) to the electrical (safety and non-safety) buses. Both 'A' and 'B' trains of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started as designed to reenergize the 'A' and 'B' safety buses. The LOOP caused a loss of feedwater pumps, resulting in an automatic actuation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system. Prior to the reactor trip, at 1600 CDT, personnel noticed the isophase bus duct to main transformer 'B' glowing orange due to an unknown reason. Due to this, the main turbine was manually tripped at 1606 CDT. Following the turbine trip, the electrical (safety and non-safety) buses did not transfer to the startup transformers as expected due to an unknown reason. The plant entered the Emergency Operating Procedure for LOOP/Loss of Forced Circulation Recovery. At 1617 CDT, an Unusual Event was declared due to Initiating Condition (IC) SU1 - Loss of all offsite AC power to safety buses (greater than) 15 minutes. All safety systems responded as expected. The plant is currently in mode 3 and stable with the EDGs supplying both safety buses and with EFW feeding and maintaining both steam generators. Offsite power is in the process of being restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and the local Parish emergency management agencies.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ADAM TAMPLAIN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2203 EDT ON 7/17/17 * * *

The licensee terminated the Notification of Unusual Event at 2056 CDT. The basis for terminating was that offsite power was restored to the safety busses. The licensee has notified Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, St. John and St. Charles Parishes, Louisiana Homeland Security Emergency Preparedness, and will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified IRD (Stapleton), NRR (King), R4DO (Hipschman), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1724 EDT ON 7/19/17 * * *

This update is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). During the event discussed in EN# 52863, at 1642 CDT (on July 17, 2017), Condensate Storage Pool (CSP) level lowered to less than 92% resulting in entry to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.3. Level in the CSP was lowered due to feeding from both Steam Generators with EFW. Normal makeup to the CSP was temporarily unavailable due to the LOOP. Filling the CSP commenced at 1815 CDT (on July 17, 2017), and TS 3.7.1.3 was exited on July 18, 2017 at 0039 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hipschman).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1233 EDT ON 9/14/17 * * *

Waterford 3 is retracting a follow up notification made on July 19, 2017 for EN# 52863, concerning the loss of safety function associated with the Condensate Storage Pool (CSP) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The Condensate Storage Pool was performing its required safety function by providing inventory to the Emergency Feed Water pumps when the required Tech Spec level (T.S. 3.7.1.3) dropped below 92%. The Technical Specification was entered at 1624 (CDT) on July 17, 2017 and exited after filling at 0039 on July 18, 2017. The total allowed outage time allowed by Tech Spec 3.7.1.3 is 10 hours to be in Hot Shutdown if not restored. The Condensate Storage Pool level was restored to greater than 92% prior to exceeding the allowed outage time. Based on level being restored and the Condensate Storage Pool performing its required safety function, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) does not apply. Prior to the automatic reactor trip, Condensate Storage Pool level was greater than 92%. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the retraction. Notified R4DO (Groom).

ENS 5275314 May 2017 21:27:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn May 14, 2017 at time 1823 (CDT), Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station notified St. Charles Parish Emergency Services via 911 of a fire in the Generation Support Building (GSB), the Hahnville, Luling and Killona Fire Departments were dispatched. The GSB is an Administrative and Engineering Building outside the Protected Area and on the Owner Controlled Area. The fire was reported out at 1841. No personnel were injured due to the fire. The fire appeared to be from an external building exhaust fan. There was no internal or structural damage to the building. There was no radiological release. No Safety Related Systems were required to function. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 526008 March 2017 20:13:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On March 8, 2017 at 1627 (CST) Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 action 'c' was entered due to both trains of Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) being inoperable. This TS action requires one train of LPSI be restored within 1 hour or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours. It was identified that LPSI train B was inoperable due to SI-135B, Reactor Coolant Loop 1 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, being found open. At the time of discovery, LPSI train A was inoperable for pre planned maintenance, but available and awaiting operability retest. The station was in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. Maintenance workers were scheduled to work Sl-135A Reactor Coolant Loop 2 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, and inadvertently began work on Sl-135B and manually opened the valve which resulted in the LPSI Train B being inoperable. Once identified by Operations Control Room staff, the valve (SI-135B) was placed in the closed position and stroke tested to ensure operability. TS 3.5.2 action 'c' was exited at time 1705. The station remained in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 523371 November 2016 12:00:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

This 24 hour report is being made as per 10CFR72.75. On October 31, 2016, at 1100 (CDT), the Supplemental Cooling System was secured to the Dry Cask Storage Hi-Track Transfer cask, as allowed by Dry Fuel Storage T.S. 3.1.4, in preparation for moving the Hi-Track transfer cask. At approximately 1500, after moving the Hi-Track into position for downloading including securing the cleats to the mating device, the next step in the procedure was to lower the Hi-Track. When lowering the Hi-Track, a crane overload condition occurred. With the crane, attached the Supplemental Cooling System can not be operated and has remained secured. The Supplemental Cooling System is classified as 'Important to Safety Category B' and is required to be utilized, as necessary, to maintain the peak fuel cladding temperature below the allowed limits. T.S. 3.1.4 allows the Supplemental cooling system to be secured for up to 7 hours during the Hi-Track transfer process and then followed by a 7 day allowed outage time. This is being reported based on 10CFR72.75 which states in part that a 24 hour Non-emergency notification is required if; 'An event in which important to safety equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed'. The Hi-Track is presently in a safe condition with supplemental cooling still secured. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO DONG PARK AT 1111 EST ON 11/08/16 * * *

On November 1, 2016 at 1100 CDT Waterford 3 notified the NRC of a 24 hour reportable event per 10CFR72.75. The notification is documented under EN# 52337 based on the information known at that time. Follow up investigation determined that the conditions required per 10CFR72.75 were not met and should not have been reported. 10CFR72.75 states in part that a 24 hour non-emergency notification is required if, 'An event in which important to safety equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed.' It also requires that, 'The equipment is required by regulation, license condition, or certificate of compliance to be available and operable to prevent releases that could exceed regulatory limits, to prevent exposures to radiation or radioactive materials that could exceed regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' Based on a review of the bases for Certificate of Compliance, T.S. 3.1.4 thermal analysis shows that the fuel cladding temperature would not exceed the short term temperature limits applicable to an off normal condition. The bases further states that because the thermal analysis is a steady-state analysis, there is an indefinite period of time available to make repairs to the Supplemental Cooling System. The completion time of 7 days to restore the system per T.S. 3.1.4 is considered an appropriate and reasonable amount of time to plan the work and complete repairs. Based on this information there was no possibility of exceeding regulatory limits or the need to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Waterford 3 is retracting event notification EN 52337. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Campbell).

ENS 5233631 October 2016 18:07:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn October 31, 2016, an informal, voluntary communication was made to the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) and the Saint Charles Parish Emergency Operating Center concerning a spill of greater than 100 gallons (estimated 150 gallons total) of Tritium contaminated water to the storm drains located within the Protected Area. Tritium activity was 8.201E-06 micro Ci/ml and no detectable gamma activity. The spill lasted approximately 5 minutes before the pump moving the tritium contaminated water was secured. The contaminated water came from the Condensate Polisher Backwash Storage Tank and discharged from a (loose) hose connection going to a baker tank located within the protected area. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5232127 October 2016 08:26:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

At 0021 (CDT) on 10/27/16, Waterford 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of the charging and letdown systems from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered due to the loss of all three charging pumps. Charging Pump AB was restored and aligned to replace Charging Pump A and WF3 exited TS 3.0.3 at 0055 on 10/27/16. The cause of the loss of charging pumps was due to Refueling Water Storage Pool to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507, not opening as expected following a loss of Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) 014AB during electrical troubleshooting. The cause of CVC-507 not opening is being investigated. Power was restored to SUPS 014AB at 0022. WF3 is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed by the Steam Bypass Control System. Pressurizer Level was maintained throughout the event. WF3 was previously shut down for reasons unrelated to this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Valve CVC-183 closed when the power supply was lost. CVC-183 is the Volume Control Tank outlet isolation valve. Waterford 3 will remain in mode 3 until the issue has been corrected.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1005 EST ON 11/23/16 FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

This is a retraction of EN 52321 which was reported as an 8 hour Non-Emergency on October 27th at 0826 EST. At 0021 (EST) on 10/27/16, Waterford 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of the charging and letdown systems due to an electrical transient on a Static Uninterruptable Power Supply that was being worked under a maintenance work order. The cause of the loss of charging pumps was due to Refueling Water Storage Pool to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507, not opening as expected following a loss of Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) 014AB. Both operating charging pumps automatically secured due to low suction pressure trips as designed. Post event investigation determined that a relay that had failed affected only the normal suction path isolation valves to the charging pumps and did not impact the safety related flow path that is required during a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). Had an SIAS occurred during the period when no active suction path was aligned, the low pressure trip would have been blocked and the pumps selected to start on an SIAS would have auto started. The SIAS would have aligned the Boric Acid Make-up system for Emergency Boration. This would have resulted in the Charging Pumps being aligned to take suction from the Boric Acid Make-up pumps and/or Boric Acid Gravity Feed valves. A function of the charging systems is to inject concentrated boric acid into RCS upon an SIAS. As discussed in FSAR Section 6.3.3.3.1, the injection flow from the charging pumps is not credited in the small break LOCA analysis. Charging is however credited for natural circulation cooldown without letdown in order to meet the safe shutdown requirements of NRC Branch Technical Position (RSB) 5-4. This analysis assumes that the charging source is initially Boric Acid Makeup Tanks followed by Refueling Water Storage Pool. Both sources were available. The charging system was fully capable of performing its safety function following the relay failure. The charging pumps remained capable of starting on an SIAS and the flow path from the Boric Acid Management system remained operable. In addition the flow path from the RWSP was not affected since the outlet isolation valve could be manually opened. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Taylor).

ENS 5217915 August 2016 14:10:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On August 12, 2016, at 1704 CDT, the shift operating crew entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 due to both trains of Essential Services Chilled Water being inoperable. Essential Services Chilled Water Loop A had previously been declared inoperable for maintenance on August 11, 2016. On August 12, 2016, at 1704, the shift operating crew noted that Loop B Essential Services Chilled Water outlet temperature exceeded the allowed TS limit of 42 degrees Fahrenheit. Essential Chiller AB was subsequently aligned to Loop B and TS 3.0.3 was exited on August 12, 2016 at 1802 when outlet temperature was verified less than or equal to 42 degrees Fahrenheit. On August 15, 2016, subsequent review of this event determined that this event was reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident' due to both Essential Services Chilled Water Loops being inoperable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5149223 October 2015 12:04:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following is excerpted from LER 2015-007 submitted by the licensee (see related EN #51348): On October 9, 2015, Waterford 3 received information from the external evaluation concerning the Generator Differential Current Transformer. The evaluation concluded that a manufacturing defect internal to the current transformer was the cause of the failure. On October 22, 2015, engineering evaluation determined the manufacturing defect could create a substantial safety hazard, as defined in 10 CFR 21, and provided the site vice president information of the defect the same day. Additional information identified in the report is as follows: Constructor - Westinghouse Type KIR-60 current transformer, style 7524A01G16, serial number 28218571; Defect and safety hazard - There were voids found in the insulation, and the thickness of the insulation material around the fault area appeared reduced when compared to the other areas of the current transformer. There is only one transformer of this type remaining installed in the plant. Scheduled replacement is no later than November 15, 2015.
ENS 514649 October 2015 21:59:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt 1800 (CDT) on October 9, 2015 a polling test was initiated in Saint Johns Parish to test the circuitry of the installed sirens. During the polling test no sirens are expected to sound as it is only a circuitry test. Siren number SJ39 inadvertently sounded for 15 to 20 minutes, and no others. Saint Johns Parish notified the parish residents that the sounding of the siren was inadvertent via a Parish wide cable television channel and a press release. A contract vendor has disabled the siren and will troubleshoot and repair starting on October 12, 2015. All remaining sirens within Saint Johns Parish remain operational and capable of being activated when required. 0% of the population is affected by the loss of this siren due to siren overlap. Time to repair and restore siren SJ39 to service is still being investigated. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 514474 October 2015 03:51:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt 2307 CDT Waterford 3 experienced an automatic reactor trip and all Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) inserted into the core. The cause of the automatic reactor trip is currently under investigation. The plant is currently in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) and stable with Main Feedwater feeding and maintaining both Steam Generators. Main Feedwater Pump 'A' tripped subsequent to the reactor trip. Emergency Feedwater actuated following the plant trip as expected, but was not required to maintain Steam Generator level. The plant entered the Emergency Operating Procedure for an uncomplicated reactor trip and has now transitioned to the normal operating shutdown procedure. Unit 3 is in a normal post trip electrical lineup. The Main Condenser is in-service removing decay heat.. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5134826 August 2015 15:47:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On August 26, 2015, at 0111 CDT, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 'A' was declared inoperable following a trip of EDG 'A' on Generator Differential. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1 actions b. and d. were entered. EDG 'A' was being routinely run in accordance with OP-903-115, 'Train A Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator/Engineering Safety Features Test', Section 7.4, '24 hr EDG A Run with Subsequent Diesel Start' to satisfy Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2 6. EDG 'B' was subsequently started per TS 3.8.1.1 action b. (1). At 0740 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared inoperable and TS 3.8.1.1 f. was entered due to the exhaust fan not starting when the diesel engine was started. Troubleshooting determined that the EDG B exhaust fan did not start due to HVR-501B (EG B ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE DAMPER) not opening. Action was taken to isolate air and fail HVR-501B to its open safety position. At 1001 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared operable and TS 3.8.1.1.f. was exited following verification of proper operation of the EDG 'B' exhaust fan. Waterford 3 is currently in TS 3.8.1.1 actions b. and d. Actions to verify a temporary EDG is available and restore EDG 'A' to operable status are in progress. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) (A) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v) (D), 'event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition' and (D) 'mitigate the consequences of an accident due to both emergency diesel generators being inoperable.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1328 EDT ON 8/31/2015 * * *

The following is a correction to a non-emergency event notification from Waterford 3 originally made on 8/26/2015: On August 26, 2015, at 0111 CDT, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 'A' was declared inoperable following a trip of EDG 'A' on Generator Differential. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1 actions b and d were entered. EDG 'A' was being routinely run in accordance with OP-903-115, 'Train A Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator/Engineering Safety Features Test,' Section 7.4, '24 hr EDG A Run with Subsequent Diesel Start' to satisfy Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2(e)6. EDG 'B' was subsequently started per TS 3.8.1.1 action b.(1). At 0740 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared inoperable and TS 3.8.1.1 f was entered due to the room exhaust fan not starting when the diesel engine was started. Troubleshooting determined that the EDG B room exhaust fan did not start due to HVR-501B (EDG B ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE DAMPER) not opening. Action was taken to isolate air and fail HVR-501B to its open safety position. At 1001 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared operable and TS 3.8.1.1.f was exited following verification of proper operation of the EDG 'B' room exhaust fan. Waterford 3 is currently in TS 3.8.1.1 actions b and d. Actions to verify a temporary EDG is available and restore EDG 'A' to operable status are in progress. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident due to both emergency diesel generators being inoperable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Warnick)

ENS 512956 August 2015 18:47:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt 1200 CDT, on August 6th, 2015, during the monthly test of Emergency Plan sirens in Saint Charles Parish (county), all sirens failed to actuate when required. There are a total 73 sirens of which 37 sirens are in Saint Charles Parish, which covers approximately 49 percent of the total population within the Waterford 3 10-mile emergency planning zone. The siren vendor is currently investigating to repair the issue. Waterford 3 still maintains 100 percent backup notification capabilities. The Saint John the Baptist Parish Sirens remain fully operational. The Saint Charles Parish Emergency Manager has been notified. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The Waterford 3 and Saint Charles Parish Emergency Response Plans include back-up processes to provide warning to affected areas, if required, in the event of the loss of sirens. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 511163 June 2015 21:36:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. At 1705 (CDT) the reactor was manually tripped in anticipation of an automatic trip due to loss of main feedwater pump 'A'. The plant is currently in mode 3 and stable with emergency feedwater feeding and maintaining both steam generators due to an automatic emergency feed actuation signal. During the trip, the 'B' electrical safety and non safety busses did not automatically transfer from the unit auxiliary transformer to the startup transformer causing a loss of off-site power to the 'B' electrical busses. This resulted in a loss of main feedwater pump 'B'. The 'B' emergency diesel generator started as designed and reenergized the 'B' safety related buses. The plant entered the emergency operating procedure for loss of main feedwater. Off-site power has been restored to the 'B' safety and non safety busses, and the emergency diesel generator 'B' is secured.

All control rods fully inserted into the core following the trip.  Decay heat is being removed by the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves.  The electric plant is in a normal shutdown lineup.  

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5037818 August 2014 17:23:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEConditions were met that require immediate NRC notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to both trains of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) system being inoperable for approximately 83 minutes. This condition resulted from a planned system outage of train B Component Cooling Water (CCW), as a subsystem of the Train B UHS, and an unexpected trip of a Train A Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (ACCW) Wet Cooling Tower (WCT) fan, which is also a subsystem of the Train A UHS. CCW Train B was declared inoperable at 0820 CDT and removed from service for a planned relay replacement, resulting in entry of 72 hour shutdown Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.7.3, and associated cascading TS on Train B, including TS LCO 3.7.4 Action a. Subsequently, at approximately 0853 (CDT), the 6A ACCW WCT fan tripped, rendering the redundant Train A UHS inoperable, causing entry into 1 hour TS LCO 3.7.4 Action b, which states, 'With both UHS trains inoperable, restore at least one UHS train to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.' At approximately 0948 CDT the WCT Fan 6A electric motor thermal overload relays were reset, the fan restarted, and operated properly. At 1016 CDT, CCW train B had been restored from the planned maintenance and was declared operable, exiting TS LCO 3.7.3 and associated cascading TSs on Train B. Although a plant shutdown was not commenced following expiration of the one hour specified in TS LCO 3.7.4 ACTION b, Operations was preparing for a power reduction and TS required plant shutdown. During this reported condition, an outside air intake valve of the Control Room Emergency Filtration system was inoperable for planned maintenance, for which TS 3.7.6.1 mitigating actions were in place. This valve was restored to Operable at 1210 CDT. Other safety systems remained available. The plant remained stable at 100% during this time. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5019112 June 2014 09:31:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning the deviation of a basic component from manufacturing purchase specifications. On 04/18/2014, during pneumatic actuator replacement for Emergency Feedwater (EFW) valve EFW-224A (EFW to Steam Generator #1 Primary Flow Control Valve), it was identified that the fail action of the actuator was incorrect in that it was in a fail-closed instead of fail-open configuration. The actuator model, as identified in Waterford 3 site receipt/acceptance document and the actuator's name plate data, was a Masoneilan model 47 Sigma-F, which is specified as a fail-open actuator. However, the actuator was discovered to have a fail closed action, which is indicative of a Masoneilan model 48 actuator. The fail-action of these Masoneilan Sigma-F actuators can be changed in accordance with its technical manual TDM120.0565 with no additional parts; therefore, Waterford 3 corrected the fail action of EFW-224A's replacement actuator (to fail-open) and ensured the handwheel indicator was corrected prior to entering mode 4. Two of these actuators were received and accepted as Masoneilan model 47 Sigma-F (fail-open) actuators in September of 2010, both of which were labeled as such, yet configured in the fail-closed action. One of these two actuators remains in the warehouse and has been placed on hold. The vendor, Dresser Masoneilan, has been notified in writing on May 12, 2014. On 6/9/2014 at approximately 1600 CDT, Entergy concluded that for those potential applications of this valve operator model in the EFW system, had they been installed without correcting the deviation, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard in that it could have prevented fulfillment of EFW safety function, and therefore reportable under 10CFR PART 21. The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed on 06/11/2014. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5005824 April 2014 20:32:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed contract supervisor was confirmed positive for alcohol on a follow-up fitness for duty test. The supervisor's access to the facility has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4997831 March 2014 20:30:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt approximately 15:58 hours (CDT) on March 31, 2014, Waterford 3 was informed that five emergency sirens were inoperable during the performance of a monthly siren inspection. Subsequent review during preparation of this notification has identified an additional one inoperable siren, which brings the total number of inoperable sirens to six. There are a total of seventy-three sirens distributed among two parishes (counties). The loss of these six sirens for more than one hour is considered a major loss of offsite response capability and is reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The affected parish Emergency Operations Center was notified of the condition and it was confirmed that they will use the preplanned alternative method of Route Alerting for the affected areas until notified that repairs to the sirens have been completed. Waterford 3 has initiated preparations to repair the sirens, with actual repairs expected to commence tomorrow. The performance of the monthly siren inspection will continue during daylight hours today and resume tomorrow. There is no effect on the plant. This issue has been entered into the Waterford 3 Corrective Action Program and appropriate corrective actions will be developed. The NRC Resident Inspector and local agencies were notified.
ENS 4992517 March 2014 15:53:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt approximately 0737 (CDT) on March 17, 2014, Waterford 3 was informed that four emergency sirens were inoperable. One other siren had previously been determined to be inoperable on March 12, 2014. Subsequent review during preparation of this notification has identified an additional eight inoperable sirens, which brings the total number of inoperable sirens to thirteen. There are a total of seventy-three sirens distributed among two parishes (counties). The loss of these thirteen sirens for more than one hour is considered a major loss of offsite response capability and is reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The two affected parish Emergency Operations Centers were notified of the condition and it was confirmed that they will use the preplanned alternative method of Route Alerting for the affected areas until notified that repairs to the sirens have been completed. Waterford 3 is working to repair the sirens. There is no effect on the plant. This issue has been entered into the Waterford 3 Corrective Action Program and appropriate corrective actions will be developed. The NRC Resident Inspectors, local agencies, and the State of Louisiana were notified.
ENS 498755 March 2014 14:10:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

A review of industry operating experience regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the control room has determined that a similar condition is applicable to the Waterford 3 Nuclear Station resulting in a potentially unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements. The original plant wiring design and associated analysis for an ammeter measuring current from the train AB Class 1E battery to its associated power distribution panel does not include overcurrent protection features to limit the fault current and is routed through multiple fire areas. The ammeter is located on the train AB power distribution panel in the train AB switchgear room. In the postulated event, a fire could cause one of the ammeter wires to short to ground. Simultaneously, it is postulated that the fire could cause another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to ground. This could cause a ground loop through the unprotected ammeter wiring. This event could result in excessive current flow (i.e., heating) in the ammeter wiring to the point of causing a secondary fire in the raceway system. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). There is no effect on plant operation. Fire watches have been implemented for affected areas of the plant as an interim compensatory measure. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 4/16/14 AT 1814 EDT FROM MARK CARTER TO DANIEL MILLS * * *

Subsequent engineering evaluation has determined that the circuit for an ammeter measuring current from its Class 1E battery to its associated power distribution panel is not routed through multiple fire areas. Therefore, the IER 13-54 related condition is not, and was not, an unanalyzed condition at Waterford 3 that significantly degraded plant safety, and thus not required to be reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gaddy).

ENS 493266 September 2013 00:27:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. Conditions were discovered which appear to require immediate NRC notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) due to both trains of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (CCW) being inoperable several times since 7/27/2012. A deficiency was identified with Auxiliary Component Cooling Water valve ACCW-126A, which is a part of the ultimate heat sink system, associated with the inability to adequately close this valve manually, locally, in order to preserve Wet Cooling Tower A inventory during an accident. System operability requirements came into question and resulted in Operations declaring the system inoperable on 9/4/2013 at 1509 CDT, and entering Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.7.3 and associated cascading TS. As part of the review for NRC reporting requirements associated with the inoperable CCW Train A, historical information was discovered that indicated the redundant train of CCW, Train B, was declared inoperable several times, while ACCW-126A was presumably in the degraded or inoperable condition, since ACCW-126A had last been rebuilt on 7/27/2012. This condition requires immediate reporting to NRC under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. The condition was corrected and the system declared operable on 9/5/2013 at 1231 CDT, exiting the CCW TS LCO and associated cascading TS. Prior to the condition with ACCW-126A being corrected, a snubber pin (FWSR-60) was found missing on 9/5/2013 at 1228 CDT that could have adversely affected the ability to feed Steam Generator #2 with Emergency Feedwater. Less than 4 hours later, the pin was replaced, which restored the path to operable at 1609 CDT on 9/5/2013. The plant remained stable at 100% during this time. Plant risk index was 10.0 green. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 492528 August 2013 19:52:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA off-duty licensed operator was arrested while driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. This was determined to violate the Waterford Fitness for Duty program. The individual has been administratively removed from performing licensed duties pending investigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4906724 May 2013 13:44:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt 0835 CDT, the Entergy Transmission Operations Center notified the Waterford 3 control room that a crude oil tanker had struck the dolphins at the cooling water intake structure on the Mississippi River. There were 4 out of 5 dolphins damaged, with 3 of these having substantial damage. The dolphins are hard structures anchored around the cooling water intake structure (which provide) protection from river traffic. Waterford 3 operations was unaffected by this event and thermal power remains at 100%. The intake structure, including the Circulating Water System, was unaffected by this event. Possible near-term effects of the event are a loss of protective barrier between river traffic and the intake structure due to the physical damage to the dolphins and hazards to navigation due to the loss of the dolphin lights. At 1230 CDT, the United States Coast Guard was notified of this event in accordance with Waterford 3 procedures. This notification is subsequent to the notification of the United States Coast Guard per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4868721 January 2013 19:55:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

At 15:51 CST, Waterford 3 experienced an uncomplicated automatic reactor trip from 84.5% reactor power. The actuations of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Emergency Feedwater Actuation System (EFAS) resulted from Steam Generator #1 Low Level, which is at a nominal 27.4% narrow range setpoint. Safety systems responded as expected. All three (3) Emergency Feedwater Pumps started and injected into Steam Generator #1. Auxiliary Feedwater pump has been started, feeding both Steam Generators (#1 and #2) at levels above the EFAS low level setpoint. All control rods inserted by the automatic RPS actuation. Electrical power is being supplied from normal off-site power and condenser vacuum is available for Steam Generator heat removal via the Steam Dump Bypass Control system. There are no safety systems out of service or inoperable, nor any safety system TS (Technical Specification) LCO (Limiting Condition for Operation) actions entered. The cause of the Steam Generator #1 Low Level condition, and associated Reactor Trip, is under investigation. This event occurred during the initial power escalation from refuel outage RF18, after attempting to place C Heater Drain Pump (HDP), the first of three, into service. After starting, C HDP tripped for a reason not yet verified. Subsequently, based on initial Control Room operator observations, the Steam Generator #1 Main Feedwater control valve position was observed to be at 10-20% open, but with an open position demand signal of 100%. Main Feedwater response to the reactor trip (Reactor Trip Override) was as expected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

* * * UPDATE FROM WILLIAM HARDIN TO PETE SNYDER AT 1645 EST ON 3/7/13 * * * 

The original reactor power level stated in the report should be 91% in lieu of 84.5%. This information has been changed in the event heading. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Werner).

ENS 4835728 September 2012 17:49:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

This message is notification to the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) requirements, that the Vice President Operations at Waterford 3 was notified on September 28, 2012 at 14:10 CDT of a condition which will be conservatively reported as a defect under the rule. A written report to the NRC will follow within 30 days. The basic component that is subject to reporting is the Masoneilan I/P (current to pneumatic) Transducer Model 8005N. These transducers are utilized in safety related applications at Waterford 3. This condition has been corrected in the plant. Waterford has identified that the subject transducer fails to calibrate at the high end of its span. No defective components are currently installed. Waterford 3 is operating normally at 100% power. This identified condition caused no loss of safety function and had no impact on public health and safety.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 4825530 August 2012 14:13:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a non-emergency notification being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of emergency preparedness capabilities due to the effects of hurricane Isaac. At approximately 0735, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) diesel generator was discovered to be tripped and not available, leaving the primary EOF without AC electrical power and, therefore, unavailable since normal AC power was also lost due to weather conditions. Efforts to repair the EOF diesel generator have been initiated and personnel have verified the Alternate EOF is functional. State, local and federal agencies have been informed of the plan to use the alternate EOF in case of an emergency preparedness activation. With essential personnel being sequestered at the Waterford 3 power block, the critical EOF functions can be performed from the on-site Technical Support Center (TSC), which is housed within the Control Room ventilated envelope. At approximately 0620 CDT, Entergy Operations, Inc. Emergency Preparedness staff discovered that the NRC Emergency Notification Systems (ENS) was not working. NRC Headquarters was notified at approximately 0715 CDT and was given an alternate phone number to contact Waterford 3. The ENS phone had previously been verified functional at approximately 0330 CDT. The NRC Health Physics Network (HPN) telephone line was verified to be functional at 0922 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4825129 August 2012 23:15:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a non-emergency notification being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of emergency preparedness capabilities. At approximately 1530 CDT, Entergy Operations, Inc. was informed of a road closure which could impact the ability to perform a potential evacuation required by the Waterford 3 Emergency Plan. Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) reported that US Highway 51 to Interstate 10 was closed due to flooding from elevated water levels in Lake Pontchartrain resulting from Hurricane Isaac. Alternate evacuation routes remain available. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4819215 August 2012 10:51:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4804522 June 2012 18:38:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis report is submitted pursuant 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to a notification that was made to the National Response Center. At 1345 CDT on June 22, 2012, Waterford 3 was informed by NRC Region IV that there was a government report concerning a Waterford 3 radioactive waste shipment. A follow-up review determined that the receiver of the shipment (Energy Solutions) had notified the National Response Center of a condition stating that a shipment received at their facility in Tennessee on June 21, 2012 was spilling water. The notification was identified as Incident Report number 1015375. The container held UN 2910, Limited Quantity, low specific activity, ion exchange resin and did not exceed any reportable quantities. Waterford 3 is sending shipping personnel to Energy Solutions to validate the state of the shipment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4795724 May 2012 15:21:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn May 23, 2012, at approximately 1700 hours, a beer bottle was discovered in a trash can inside the protected area. The bottle was discovered during trash collection by housekeeping personnel who reported the discovery to their supervision. The bottle was determined to contain remnants of moisture and had an odor of beer, constituting the potential presence of alcohol. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719 (b)(1) based on the presence of alcohol in the protected area. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. We do not know if it was consumed in the Protected Area. It was found in the Construction Support Building, not in a Vital Area. This has been entered into the Corrective Action Program and investigation has been in progress".
ENS 478973 May 2012 21:07:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

This is a non-emergency 8 hour notification being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) Prevented Safety Function. Both trains of the Controlled Ventilation Area System (CVAS) were considered inoperable from 1613 to 1641 CDT on 5/3/2012. Waterford 3 was performing planned maintenance on CVAS Train A with the train declared inoperable. Operations supervision was informed by maintenance personnel that an electrical conduit near the work area and not related to the work in progress had been found with a conduit connection unthreaded and separated. The contained wires could be seen and appeared intact. Investigation by engineering personnel determined that the conduit was associated with CVAS Train B. Operations declared CVAS Train B inoperable and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 at 1613 hours. Operations personnel were already restoring CVAS Train A following completion of maintenance. After performing the planned retest, Operations declared CVAS Train A operable and exited TS 3.0.3 at 1641 hours. No actions were taken to commence a power reduction or reactor shutdown. The CVAS is required following a design basis accident to draw all exhaust air from the CVAS areas of the Reactor Auxiliary Building through HEPA and charcoal filters before discharge to the atmosphere. The CVAS areas contain equipment such as the shutdown cooling heat exchangers, safety injection pumps and other areas with containment penetrations. The CVAS is credited in accident analysis for limiting the radiological release under a Loss of Coolant Accident condition. Following repair of the conduit connection, Operations declared CVAS Train B operable at 1956 hours. Waterford 3 remained stable at 100% power during the condition. Both trains of offsite and onsite electrical sources, ECCS, and Containment Cooling safety systems remained operable during the condition. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM WILLIAM HARDIN TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/29/2012 AT 1515 EDT * * *

This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 retracting a previous notification. On 5/3/2012 at 2107 EDT, Waterford 3 communicated Notification Message EN 47897, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Prevented Safety Function, stating that both trains of the Controlled Ventilation Area System (CVAS) were considered inoperable from 1613 to 1641 CDT on 5/3/2012. Subsequent engineering evaluation has determined that the as-found condition would not cause the inoperability of CVAS Train B. With one train operable, the plant remained within analyzed conditions and capable of fulfilling safety functions. As such, no condition existed which required reporting. Based on this information, Waterford 3 is retracting notification message EN 47897. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Clark).

ENS 476529 February 2012 09:37:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during random testing. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated and his badge deactivated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4736120 October 2011 14:32:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt 08:00 CDT on 10/20/2011 Essential Chilled Water Loop B was declared inoperable while turbine driven Emergency Feedwater Pump AB was out of service for planned maintenance. Operability of Essential Chilled Water Loop B was restored at 08:50. During this time period, the application of cascading technical specifications rendered motor driven Emergency Feedwater Pump B inoperable. The remaining operable Emergency Feedwater Pump A is a design rated 50 percent pump; therefore, this event could have prevented fulfillment of the Residual Heat Removal safety function. Offsite power and Train A safety related equipment and systems were verified operable. Essential Chilled Water Loop B was declared inoperable because Essential Chiller B failed to automatically restart from a load recycle. The shift crew took action to align Essential Chiller AB to restore operability to Essential Chilled Water Loop B. The cause for the failure of Essential Chiller B is not yet known. Restoration of operability to Essential Chilled Water Loop B concurrently restored operability to Emergency Feedwater Pump B. No plant transient or safety system actuations occurred. Plant operation continues stable at 100 percent power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 468246 May 2011 04:07:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOperators were making preparations to fill the Containment Spray System riser to support outage activities. At 0204 CDT, when Containment Spray Riser Isolation Valve CS-125A was opened, pressurizer level began to lower. The licensee suspects leak by of a valve in the Shutdown Cooling System. At 0214 CDT, the leak was stopped. Pressurizer level was lowered by 2.6%. After reviewing the event, the licensee determined that the leak rate was greater than 25 gpm which would have resulted in a declaration of an Unusual Event under EAL CU1. Since the event had concluded, no declaration was made. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 463084 October 2010 19:40:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a Non-Emergency 4 hour notification being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an Offsite Notification. On October 4, 2010, at 1500 CDT, the Waterford 3 Operations supervision was notified by the Outside Operations watchstander that there appeared to be a diesel oil film from upstream of the Mississippi River collecting on the upstream side of the Waterford 3 non-safety related Circulating Water intake weir. The Chemistry Department environmental expert went to investigate with the Outside watch and verified that a diesel film was washed upon the north wall of the weir at the shore line forming about a 50 square foot sheen of diesel. Safety systems are not impacted by this condition. At 1609, the National Response Center was notified of the discovery of the sheen at our intake from an unknown source upstream. The incident report number was 956006. The Coast Guard was notified and the Waterford 3 environmental chemist received a call from the Coast Guard requesting information. The information was confirmed that a diesel film was washed upon the north wall of the intake structure weir at the shore line forming about a 50 square foot sheen of what appears to be red colored diesel. At 1734, Louisiana Hazardous Materials Hotline was notified (IR# 10-05779). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 460778 July 2010 12:23:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEPursuant to Fitness For Duty and Fatigue Rule reporting requirements of 10CFR26.719(b)(2)(ii), Entergy is making this notification associated with violation of Waterford 3 working hour policy. This is a conservative report to proactively document the identified working hour issues. The site assembled a team for the purpose of reviewing working hours within the Waterford 3 Security Department to determine if the department is in compliance with procedure EN-OM-123 (Fatigue Management Program) and 10 CFR 26 Subpart I (Managing Fatigue). While this comprehensive review is still in progress, two examples have been identified associated with supervisory violations of the Fatigue Rule 'Working Hours.' This report is intended to capture these examples and to encompass any other examples that may be identified during this review process. The two examples of procedural violations are: Security supervisor had exceeded the 26 hours maximum in any 48 hour period by working 16 hours on 6/1/2010 and 11.5 hours on 6/2/2010 with no waiver in effect (10CFR26(d)(1)(ii)). Security supervisor had exceeded a 9 day period without a 34 hour break during the period of 5/16/2010 to 5/24/2010 with no waiver in effect (10CFR26(d)(2)(ii)). Security has verified the current watch bill meets the procedural and regulatory requirements. Security has implemented interim measures for the supervisors to perform a documented validation of work hour management system (PQ&S) data. Condition Report CR-WF3-2010-4156 has been initiated and entered into the Waterford 3 corrective action program. The ongoing comprehensive review will be completed. Waterford 3 has communicated this issue with the Waterford 3 NRC Senior Resident (Inspector), the NRC Region IV Security Branch Chief, and the NRC NRR Project Manager. (During) the week of July 26, a follow up call is planned with NRC Region IV associated with the working hour issues.
ENS 4593920 May 2010 20:30:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a Non-Emergency 4 hour notification being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an Offsite Notification. On May 20, 2010, at approximately 1535 CDT Waterford 3 was notified by the Louisiana (LA) State Police that a transportation accident occurred involving a low level radioactive shipping container that was being carried by a tractor trailer truck located at mile marker 22 East on interstate highway I-12 near Walker, LA in Livingston Parish. The surface contaminated object (SCO) metal shipment container was being used by Miller Transfer Houston to transport a used Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) motor from Waterford 3 nuclear plant in Killona, LA to Westinghouse Waltz Mill in Madison, PA. The shipment weighing approximately 145,000 pounds departed Waterford 3 at approximately 1230 CDT with identification number of 10-3044 and pre-shipment radiological survey information of contamination levels of less than or equal to 15,000 dpm/100cm2 and dose rates of less than or equal to 0.4 mR/Hr. The tractor trailer is on its side, just off the interstate, on the grass. The shipping container boxed cover lid has opened, exposing the RCP motor, showing that it is still wrapped with contamination protective covering and still fastened to the container base and trailer. The initial, basic radiological assessment performed by the LA State Police Hazmat technician supervisor resulted in no indication of hazardous levels of radiation dose rates. Waterford 3 dispatched a Radiation Protection field team who arrived at approximately 1840 CDT and surveyed the container and the contents. The survey results indicate no radiological breach, with smear results of contaminations no higher than background and radiation dose rates of no higher than 0.5 mR/Hr. There was no report of other vehicles involved. The driver was contacted by cell phone, who reported that he has been transported to the hospital emergency room for a CAT scan. The failure mode has yet to be determined. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 456722 February 2010 20:37:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn February 2, 2010, at approximately 1400 CST, Entergy personnel manually switched the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Ventilation System Panel to the isolation mode. This manual switching to the isolation mode will cause the isolation dampers to close and the movement of the dampers closing can normally be heard. An indication light on the ventilation panel will illuminate when the dampers close. For the manual isolation on February 2, 2010, these indications did not occur. Waterford 3 personnel have made a judgment that the isolation dampers may not be closed due the lack of the aforementioned indications. The EOF ventilation system is not able to perform its isolation function if the dampers are not closed. The ventilation system and associated dampers are designed to provide protection from radiological and toxic chemical release. This report is being made because the time to restore the ventilation system to functional status is indeterminate at this time, until the actual condition of the ventilation system can be established. The back up EOF facility is judged to be functional based on January 12, 2010 communications check and facility readiness verifications on January 28, 2010. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 456701 February 2010 21:05:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
ENS 4552629 November 2009 05:08:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

10CFR50 Appendix J Local Leak Rate Testing determined the total 'as-found' containment minimum pathway leak rate exceeded the maximum allowable containment leak rate per the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This was primarily due to three penetrations that could not be pressurized to full test pressure. The maximum allowable leakage was assigned to both valves in each penetration since the valves can not be tested individually. This condition is reportable as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The condition was discovered with the plant in Mode 5. Corrective actions have already been completed and all penetrations, as well as total containment leakage, is well within limits established by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM JIM POLLOCK TO PETE SNYDER AT 1711 EST ON 12/2/09 * * * 

On November 29, 2009, Waterford 3 reported that the total as-found containment minimum pathway leak rate exceeded the maximum allowable containment leak rate per the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This was primarily due to three penetrations that could not be pressurized to full test pressure. The maximum allowable leakage was assigned to both valves in each penetration since the valves could not be tested individually. This condition was determined to be reportable as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded per 10CFR72(b)(3)(ii). Subsequently, Waterford 3 has evaluated the leak rates for all three penetrations and determined that as-found leakage rates assigned to the penetrations should not have been recorded at 630,000 sccm each, but should have been recorded at lower values. After one valve was re-worked in Penetration number 48, a Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) was completed. With the new information from the second LLRT, a revised as-found leak rate of 97 sccm was assigned to the un-worked valve. For Penetration number 10, an Engineering evaluation of the test results was completed. The evaluation determined that the as-found leakage from this penetration was 191,000 sccm. This was based on calculating the maximum air flow capacity that could be obtained from the Leak Rate Monitor test equipment and using the first LLRT's penetration only reaching a test pressure of 43 psig instead of the 44 psig full test pressure. For Penetration number 11, troubleshooting activities determined that one of the valves had no detectable leakage; however, a leak rate of 9,100 sccm was assigned based on its previous as-left leakage value. With the lower leakage rates, the total as-found containment minimum pathway leak rate is calculated to be 230,682 sccm, which is within the limit of 630,000 SCCM. Since Waterford 3 had not exceeded the maximum allowable containment leak rate, EN #45526 is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Deese).