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During a rain and lightning storm, plant operators observed arcing from the main transformer bus duct and notified the control room. The decision was made to trip the main generator which resulted in an automatic reactor trip. The plant entered EAL SU.1 as a result of the loss of offsite power for greater than fifteen minutes. Plant safety busses are being supplied by both emergency diesel generators while the licensee inspects the electrical system to determine any damage prior to bringing offsite power back into the facility. Offsite power is available to the facility. No offsite assistance was requested by the licensee. During the trip, all rods inserted into the core. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric dump valves with emergency feedwater supplying the steam generators. The main steam isolation valves were manually closed to protect the main condenser. There were no safeties or relief valves that actuated during the plant transient. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. Reactor cooling is via natural circulation. All safety equipment is available for the safe shutdown of the plant. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and the local Parish emergency management agencies. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).

• * * UPDATE ON 7/17/17 AT 2007 EDT FROM MARIA ZAMBER TO DONG PARK * * *

This notification is also made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On July 17, 2017 at 1606 CDT, the reactor automatically tripped due to a loss of Forced Circulation, which was the result of Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) to the electrical (safety and non-safety) buses. Both 'A' and 'B' trains of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started as designed to reenergize the 'A' and 'B' safety buses. The LOOP caused a loss of feedwater pumps, resulting in an automatic actuation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system. Prior to the reactor trip, at 1600 CDT, personnel noticed the isophase bus duct to main transformer 'B' glowing orange due to an unknown reason. Due to this, the main turbine was manually tripped at 1606 CDT. Following the turbine trip, the electrical (safety and non-safety) buses did not transfer to the startup transformers as expected due to an unknown reason. The plant entered the Emergency Operating Procedure for LOOP/Loss of Forced Circulation Recovery. At 1617 CDT, an Unusual Event was declared due to Initiating Condition (IC) SU1 - Loss of all offsite AC power to safety buses (greater than) 15 minutes. All safety systems responded as expected. The plant is currently in mode 3 and stable with the EDGs supplying both safety buses and with EFW feeding and maintaining both steam generators. Offsite power is in the process of being restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and the local Parish emergency management agencies.

• * * UPDATE FROM ADAM TAMPLAIN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2203 EDT ON 7/17/17 * * *

The licensee terminated the Notification of Unusual Event at 2056 CDT. The basis for terminating was that offsite power was restored to the safety busses. The licensee has notified Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, St. John and St. Charles Parishes, Louisiana Homeland Security Emergency Preparedness, and will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified IRD (Stapleton), NRR (King), R4DO (Hipschman), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).

• * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1724 EDT ON 7/19/17 * * *

This update is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). During the event discussed in EN# 52863, at 1642 CDT (on July 17, 2017), Condensate Storage Pool (CSP) level lowered to less than 92% resulting in entry to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.3. Level in the CSP was lowered due to feeding from both Steam Generators with EFW. Normal makeup to the CSP was temporarily unavailable due to the LOOP. Filling the CSP commenced at 1815 CDT (on July 17, 2017), and TS 3.7.1.3 was exited on July 18, 2017 at 0039 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hipschman).

• * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1233 EDT ON 9/14/17 * * *

Waterford 3 is retracting a follow up notification made on July 19, 2017 for EN# 52863, concerning the loss of safety function associated with the Condensate Storage Pool (CSP) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The Condensate Storage Pool was performing its required safety function by providing inventory to the Emergency Feed Water pumps when the required Tech Spec level (T.S. 3.7.1.3) dropped below 92%. The Technical Specification was entered at 1624 (CDT) on July 17, 2017 and exited after filling at 0039 on July 18, 2017. The total allowed outage time allowed by Tech Spec 3.7.1.3 is 10 hours to be in Hot Shutdown if not restored. The Condensate Storage Pool level was restored to greater than 92% prior to exceeding the allowed outage time. Based on level being restored and the Condensate Storage Pool performing its required safety function, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) does not apply. Prior to the automatic reactor trip, Condensate Storage Pool level was greater than 92%. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the retraction. Notified R4DO (Groom).

At 2204 CDT, an Unusual Event was declared due to a Hurricane warning in St Charles Parish, LA. The licensee does not have any Limiting Conditions for Operation on safety related equipment. No electrical grid disturbances currently exist. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee notified the State and Local government agencies.

• * * UPDATE FROM J. PIERCE TO M. RIPLEY 1144 EDT 08/28/05 * * *

Waterford 3 will commence a plant shutdown to Mode 4 on August 28, 2005 at 1100 CDT. The goal is to be approximately 325 deg F reactor coolant system temperature with both trains of Shutdown Cooling in service (expected at approximately 0100 CDT 08/29/05) . This is approximately 2 hours before hurricane force winds are expected on site. Notified R4DO (Jones), NRR EO (Kuo), IRD Mgr. (Wilson), DHS (York), and FEMA (Canupp).

• * * UPDATE FROM J. PIERCE TO J. ROTTON 1131 EDT 08/29/05 * * *

As a result of Hurricane Katrina, all offsite power was lost at 0800 CDT. The emergency diesel generators successfully started and loaded. Notified R4DO (R. Bywater), NSIR (Leach, Wilson), NRR EO (Kuo, Jung), FEMA (Kuzia), DHS (Stransky).

• * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (LEWIS) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 2302 EDT ON 8/29/05 * * *

The Hurricane warning for St Charles Parish, LA, has been discontinued by the National Weather Service. Initiating condition, D UE-5, is no longer applicable. Waterford 3 remains in an Unusual Event for initiating condition C UE-1, loss of all offsite power. An agreement to relax 60 minute notification updates to State and local authorities remains in effect. The licensee has notified State and local authorities as well as the NRC Resident Inspector. Offsite power is available to the licensee switchyard. However, the voltage is too high for plant specification and the licensee remains disconnected from offsite power and on the emergency diesel generators.

• * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (LEWIS) TO NRC (KNOKE) AT 0001 EDT ON 8/31/05 * * *

Waterford 3 remains in an Unusual Event for initiating condition C UE-1, loss of all offsite power. An agreement to relax 60 minute notification updates to State and local authorities remains in effect. The communications system for Public Automatic Branch Exchange (PABX) is working internally, but not externally. Other areas where communications are lost are Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Operations hotline, Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB), and the Emergency Notification System (ENS). Waterford has use of an industrial hotline to a circuit in the Parish of St Charles, however, this is very limited in its capability. The Civil Defense communication system is still inoperable.

• * * UPDATE AT 1903 ON 9/6/05 FROM WAIG TO GOULD * * *

NRC exited monitoring mode at 1800 CDT on 9/6/05. Notified R4 IRC (Waig), R4DO (Powers), IRD (Leach), DHS (Cartlidge), FEMA (Kuzia).

• * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (LEWIS) TO NRC (KNOKE) AT 19:12 EDT ON 09/07/05 * * *

At 17:57 CDT the licensee exited from the Unusual Event. Offsite power was restored and communications were reestablished with (1) a functional operational hotline, (2) a dedicated open line to NRC Headquarters Operations Center, and (3) having the plant PABX circuits routed through Little Rock, AK area code. The plant is holding in Mode 5 until further notice, however, this may change when the decision to (or not to) repair a check valve in the Safety Injection system is made. Notified R4DO (Powers), IRD (McGinty), NRR EO (Hackett), DHS (Sullivan), and FEMA (Kuzia).

• * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE AT 08:45 EDT ON 09/08/05 * * *

This report has been updated to reflect the correct time of the licensee exiting their unusual event classification. Unusual event was exited at 1740 CDT not 1757 CDT. Notified R4DO (Powers), IRD (McGinty), NRR EO (Jung).