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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 56095 | 7 September 2022 13:22:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty Report | A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. Unescorted access for the individual has been denied at all Dominion Energy sites. | ||
| ENS 55828 | 7 April 2022 13:09:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | FITNESS-FOR-DUTY Report - Failed FITNESS-FOR-DUTY Test | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone call: At 0909 EDT on 4/7/2022, it was determined that a security officer tested positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 55459 | 13 September 2021 22:22:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Unanalyzed Condition of Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment | On September 13, 2021, at 1822 EDT, an apparent non-compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2 (separation of redundant fire safe shutdown equipment) was identified. Specifically, it was determined that some Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) cables may be susceptible to a hot short/spurious operation to the close circuit. A spurious closure of the emergency bus normal supply breakers after the EDG is powering the bus could result in non-synchronous paralleling, EDG overloading, or EDG output breaker tripping due to faulted power cable from normal supply breaker. The spurious closure of the normal supply breakers is not currently addressed in the Appendix R Report or previous Multiple Spurious Operations (MSO) analysis. This condition is associated with the Appendix R safe-shutdown function of the Emergency Power System. The Emergency Power System is considered operable but not fully qualified for its safety-related design function. The following fire areas are impacted: 1) Fire Area 13, Unit 1 Normal Switchgear Room 2) Fire Area 46, Unit 1 Cable Tray Room 3) Fire Area 3, Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room 4) Fire Area 2, Unit 2 Cable Vault and Tunnel Until this condition is analyzed, Surry has implemented mitigating actions in the above fire areas. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This is also reportable as a 60-day written report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as CR (condition report) 1180502. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. Mitigating actions include posting fire watches in the affected areas. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 55299 | 9 June 2021 15:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Loss of Capability to Activate Emergency Sirens and Offsite Notification of Same | At 1115 EDT on June 9, 2021, during a siren activation test, a loss of the capability to activate the sirens from both Surry local activation sites was identified. The Virginia EOC was participating in the activation test and is aware of the issue and notified the local government authorities in the Surry EPZ of the situation. The NRC Resident has been notified of this issue. The station telecommunications department has been contacted and is aware of the issue. In the event that a radiological emergency should occur at the Surry Power Station, Primary Route Alerting procedures will be put in use by the local jurisdictions. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to notification of other state and local government agencies of the failure of the Alert & Notification system for Surry.
Surry Power Station Event Notification 55299 is being retracted based upon further evaluation. Surry has three localities (State SAU, James City, and Surry County) with access to the redundant activation trains (primary and backup systems). The actuation tests only one primary and one backup activation panel at two localities, only primary at the State SAU (Situational Awareness Unit) and back up at James City County were tested. Follow-up telecom and vendor investigation revealed that the primary server was functional from James City County that would have actuated all 71 sirens; Consequently, it was concluded that all of the sirens were fully functional from the James City primary system and there was no loss of all sirens as originally reported on 6/9/2021 (EN 55299). EN 55299 also contained a 4-hour Offsite Notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) that is unaffected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller). | ||
| ENS 55035 | 13 December 2020 03:14:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Tritium Leakage to the Ground | At 2214 EST on 12/12/20, Surry Power Station personnel identified leakage from the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Cooling System to the ground. Leakage was estimated to be greater than 100 gallons and tritium concentration determined to be 4.5E07 picocuries per liter (pCi/L), requiring report in accordance with the industry voluntary groundwater protection program. As such, at 1450 EST on 12/14/2020, the Surry County Administrator, NRC Resident, Virginia Department of Health, Virginia Department of Emergency Management, and Virginia Department of Environmental Quality were notified of this release to the environment. Due to the offsite agency notifications, this 4-hour, non-emergency report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54727 | 25 May 2020 23:38:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty (Ffd) Positive Test | A contract foreman had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 54437 | 11 December 2019 18:56:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Potential Tornado Missile Vulnerabilities | On December 11, 2019, at 1356 EST, it was concluded that certain safety-related equipment is vulnerable to design basis tornado missiles which could render the equipment inoperable and not able to perform its design function. This applies to the following Technical Specification equipment: 1. Component cooling water piping for the 'A' spent fuel cooling water system heat exchanger. This heat exchanger is vulnerable to a horizontal missile traveling through the roll-up door, which would challenge operability of the Technical Specification required component cooling system equipment. 2. All three (3) emergency service water pumps and their diesel fuel oil supply tank. The emergency service water pumps and diesel fuel oil tank are vulnerable to a horizontal missile penetrating the missile screens. 3. Certain component cooling water system pump discharge piping is vulnerable from a vertical missile penetrating the auxiliary building roof. 4. The Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system pumps and the pump suction and discharge piping are vulnerable to a missile traveling through the screens on the sides and roof of the main steam valve house. This vulnerability also exists for the Unit 2 AFW. This condition puts Unit 1 and 2 into Technical Specification 3.01 which requires the units to be in hot shutdown within 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Service water Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam | |
| ENS 54401 | 21 November 2019 02:44:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Unit 2 Auxiliary Feed Pumps Inoperable | At 2144 EST, on 11/20/2019, all three auxiliary feedwater pumps for Unit 2 were declared Inoperable due to check valve leakage causing the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump to rotate backwards and subsequently trip. At this time, two of the Unit 1 motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were still able to provide cross-tied feedwater in the event of a design basis accident. At 2203 EST, the two motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps on Unit 2 were declared operable once the discharge isolation valves for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump were closed, thus preventing backflow through the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump and ensuring forward flow of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 is in a 72-hour LCO 3.6.F.1 for turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump inoperability. | Feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater | |
| ENS 53741 | 16 November 2018 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii), Transport of a Contaminated Person Offsite | Transport of Potentially Contaminated Worker and Subsequent Fatality | On November 16, 2018 at 0202 EST, a potentially contaminated Dominion worker was transported offsite for medical attention. The individual was initially found unresponsive in a contaminated area. A partial survey was performed prior to the individual being transported offsite, and no contamination was found. The individual passed away in transit to the hospital. Follow-up surveys to verify no contamination are ongoing. A notification to OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) is planned. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to notification of an offsite organization and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) due to a potentially contaminated worker transported offsite. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Follow-up radiological surveys were performed and determined that there was no contamination on the worker, response personnel, or ambulance. The Occupation Safety and Health Administration was notified on 11/16/18. No media release is planned. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Notified the R2DO (Sandal) and via E-mail the NRR EO (Miller) and IRD MOC (Gott). | ||
| ENS 53736 | 12 November 2018 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Specified System Actuation | On November 12, 2018, at 1636 EST, with Surry Unit 1 at 100 percent power and Surry Unit 2 defueled, the 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST) pilot wire lockout actuated during restoration of the 'C' RSST following transformer replacement. This resulted in electrical isolation of the 'C' RSST, the 'F' Transfer Bus, the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus, and the Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus. The #1 and #3 Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and loaded onto the 1H and 2J emergency buses, respectively, as designed. Operations entered the appropriate abnormal procedures and stabilized both units. This equipment operated as expected during the event. The Surry electrical distribution system was in an off-normal alignment to support 'C' RSST replacement with the dependable alternate power supply from Unit 2 station service backfeed supplying the 1H and 2J emergency buses. The 'C' RSST pilot wire lockout tripped and locked out the station service supply tie breaker to the 'F' Transfer Bus. The organization is reviewing the 'C' RSST pilot wire lockout and the required actions for recovery. Surry Unit 1 entered a 6-hour action statement to place the unit in Hot Shutdown due to this partial loss of offsite power. This clock was exited upon reset of the pilot wire lockout, restoring backfeed as a dependable offsite power source. Unit 1 remained at 100 percent power throughout the event. No radiological consequences resulted from this event. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to actuation of the #1 and #3 Emergency Diesel Generators. The NRC Resident was notified. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 53690 | 23 October 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification to Osha Due to Supplemental Employee Fatality | On October 23, 2018 at 1510 EDT, a notification to OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) was initiated due to a supplemental employee experiencing a non-work related medical event that resulted in the supplemental employee passing. When the issue was identified, the station first aid team responded to administer first aid. The supplemental employee was transported to a local hospital for additional medical support. Subsequent to the employee passing, a report was made to OSHA in accordance with federal requirements. This event is reportable to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) since another governmental agency was notified of this employer medical event. The supplemental employee was in a building within the owner controlled area and was not contaminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 53662 | 11 October 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Transformer Trip | On 10/11/18 at 2304, with both Surry Units at 100% power, the 'A' Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST) tripped on a pilot wire lockout. This resulted in electrical isolation of the 'A' RSST, the 'D' Transfer Bus and the Unit 1 'J' Emergency Bus. The #3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started and loaded on the Emergency Bus, as designed. Operations entered the appropriate Abnormal Procedures and stabilized the unit. All equipment operated as expected during the event. A report of a flash at the 'A' RSST was received (at approximately the time of the initiating event) but there were no reports of visible damage, smoke or fire from the RSST or any associated breakers on subsequent investigation. The #3 EDG is running with normal parameters. There was heavy wind/rain in the area associated with Tropical Storm Michael. All other electrical distribution systems are in a normal alignment. The organization is staffing to evaluate the lockout and required actions for recovery. No radiological consequences resulted from this event. This event is being reported IAW (in accordance with) 10 CFR 50.52(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the actuation of the #3 EDG. The NRC Resident (Inspector) was notified | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 53210 | 14 February 2018 14:41:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty | A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 53170 | 17 January 2018 14:52:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Transformer Fuses Being Disconnected | At 0952 EST on 01/17/2018 with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100 percent, the normal supply breaker to the Unit 1J Emergency Bus tripped open due to an under-voltage condition when the potential transformer fuses were inadvertently disconnected. This resulted in a loss of power to the Unit 1J Emergency Bus from its normal off-site power supply. Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started on an under-voltage signal and loaded onto the Unit 1J Emergency Bus, as designed. All equipment performed as expected during the event and there were no unexplained occurrences. Maintenance has verified the fuses have been reconnected and at 1221 EST, off-site power was restored to Unit 1J Emergency Bus. At 1254 EST Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator was secured in accordance with Station Operating procedures. All Electrical distribution systems have been restored to a normal alignment. There were no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the auto start of Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 53107 | 7 December 2017 18:01:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification of Groundwater Results to State and Local Agencies | This non-emergency notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), any event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies has been made. Dominion Energy is in the process of informing the Virginia Department of Health, Department of Environmental Quality, Department of Emergency Management, and the Surry County Administrator of recent groundwater monitoring results at Surry Power Station in accordance with NEI 07-07, Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI). On December 6, 2017 at 1138 EST, Surry Power Station received analysis results of recent samples from the on-site groundwater monitoring program. As part of the program, 10 new groundwater monitoring wells were recently placed in service within the Protected Area to provide early detection, to better define the site's hydrology, and if necessary, to mitigate any potential leaks. The analysis results from one of the new wells indicated tritium activity level above the GPI communication threshold. Samples were re-analyzed, resulting in different values, with the highest result of 59,300 picoCuries per liter. Since each result was above the voluntary reporting threshold, Surry stakeholder communication was implemented in accordance with the NEI GPI Voluntary Communication Protocol, Criterion 2.2. There are no known active leaks at this location; however, Dominion Energy is continuing to investigate the source of the tritium and the reason for the variability in the sample results. Tritium was not detected in the on-site monitoring locations outside of the Protected Area. No tritium has been detected in the on-site and off-site drinking water wells. Since the activity is contained within the site restricted area, the health and safety of on-site personnel and members of the public are not affected. A 30-day report will be submitted to the NRC in accordance with NEI 07-07. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 52894 | 9 August 2017 20:06:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Technical Specification Required Shutdown for Reactor Coolant System Leakage | On 8/9/17, a Unit 1 containment entry was made in order to investigate increased Reactor Coolant System (RCS) unidentified leakage. The team noted a through-wall leak from the tubing/socket weld area of 'C' Hot Leg Sample Valve. The sample valve and RCS pressure boundary were declared inoperable, and a 6-hour action statement to place Unit 1 in Hot Shutdown was entered at 1338 (EDT) hours as required by Technical Specification 3.1.C.3. At 1606 (EDT) hours on 8/9/17, Unit 1 shutdown was commenced, and at 1637 (EDT), Unit 1 was at Hot Shutdown. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as a result of power reduction required by Technical Specifications. Further, this report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified of this event and is on site. There was no radiation release associated with this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events. | Reactor Coolant System | |
| ENS 52639 | 25 March 2017 00:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Virginia Deq Notified of Small Glycol Release to James River | On 03/24/2017 at approximately 1500 hours (EDT), a hydraulic line on vendor supplied cleaning equipment failed and leaked approximately 8 gallons of 65% glycol solution into the Surry Power Station Unit 2 D intake bay. Since the intake bay communicates with the James River, the State of Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) was notified of the discharge at 2000 hours. The glycol solution is water soluble and dispersed quickly. All work stopped while the issue is being investigated and corrective actions implemented. No sheen was observed and no impact to state waters is expected to result from this issue. This non-emergency notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), any event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies has been made. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 52292 | 9 October 2016 06:54:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Trip Following Main Generator Differential Lockout Turbine Trip | Surry Unit 2 reactor automatically tripped at 0254 hours on 10/09/2016, due to a Main Generator Differential Lockout Turbine Trip. The cause of the generator differential lockout is under investigation at this time. Reactor Coolant System temperature is currently being maintained at 547 degrees Fahrenheit on the main steam dump valves. All three Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps automatically started as designed on Low-Low Steam Generator Water Level following the trip. Auxiliary feedwater pumps have since been secured and Main Feedwater is in use. All systems operated as required. The source range nuclear instruments had to be manually reinstated following the reactor trip due to indications of undercompensation on Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument channel N-36. Off site power remains available. There is no impact on Surry Unit 1. This notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4-hour notification of Reactor Protection System activation and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for 8-hour notification of automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and is responding to the site. There were no radiation releases, personnel injuries, or contamination events due to this event. All control rods fully inserted. Secondary reliefs lifted and reseated as expected following a reactor trip from 100% power. | Steam Generator Reactor Coolant System Feedwater Reactor Protection System Auxiliary Feedwater Control Rod Main Steam | |
| ENS 51561 | 23 November 2015 14:30:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test | A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 51467 | 13 October 2015 22:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Reactor Trip After a Turbine Trip | Surry Unit 1 Reactor automatically tripped at 1815 hours (EDT) on 10/13/2015 due to a Generator Differential Lockout Turbine trip. The cause of the Generator Differential Lockout is under investigation at this time. Reactor Coolant System is currently being maintained at 548 degrees F on the Steam Generator PORVs due to closing Main Steam Trip Valves manually. All three Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started automatically as designed on Low-Low Steam Generator Water Level following the trip. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps have since been secured and Main Feedwater is in use. All systems operated as required. Off-site power remains available. There is no impact on Surry Unit 2. This notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4 hour notification of Reactor Protection System activation and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for 8 hour notification of automatic actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and is on site. There were no radiation releases, personnel injuries, or contamination events due to this event. All control rods fully inserted during the reactor trip. The Main Steam Trip Valves were shut due to excessive cooldown. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. There is no steam generator tube leakage. | Steam Generator Reactor Coolant System Feedwater Reactor Protection System Auxiliary Feedwater Control Rod Main Steam | |
| ENS 51402 | 17 September 2015 00:14:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Start and Loading of the #2 Emergency Diesel Generator | While performing degraded voltage/under voltage Instrumentation & Control testing with both Units at 100%, the Unit 2 'H' Emergency Bus was lost when an inadvertent under voltage matrix was satisfied. The #2 Emergency Diesel Generator auto-started and assumed the 2H Emergency Bus as designed. The cause of the under voltage matrix coincidence is currently being investigated by station personnel. All testing activities have been terminated and recovery efforts are in progress in accordance with station procedures. Current status is both Units stable at 100% with the #2 Emergency Diesel Generator carrying the 2H Emergency Bus. The loss of the bus places the Unit in a 7-day action statement for the loss of offsite power to the 2H bus and a 14-day action statement for the auxiliary feed cross tie to Unit 1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 51244 | 21 July 2015 09:04:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Surry Unit 2 Trip During Reactor Startup | Unit 2 Reactor automatically tripped during Unit start up following a maintenance outage. The first indication of the reactor trip was the annunciator Reactor Trip by Turbine Trip. There were no complications following the trip and Unit 2 is stable at Hot Shut Down. Decay Heat Removal is being maintained by dumping steam to the Main Condenser. Steam Generator water level is being maintained by the Main Feedwater system. At the time of the Reactor Trip, Overspeed Protection Circuitry (OPC) Test was being performed on the Unit 2 Main Turbine. The SOV Turbine Trip annunciator was received. The cause of the reactor trip is under investigation. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4-hour notification of Reactor Protection System activation. The Plant responded as expected for the trip. The NRC resident has been notified of the event. There was no radiation release due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Steam Generator Feedwater Reactor Protection System Main Turbine Decay Heat Removal Main Condenser | |
| ENS 50809 | 10 February 2015 18:00:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Confirmed Positive Test for Controlled Substance | On February 10, 2015, at approximately 1300 EST, the Dominion Medical Review Officer determined that a licensed operator had a confirmed positive follow up test for a controlled substance. The individual's unescorted access has been denied at all of the Dominion sites. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 50529 | 13 October 2014 11:58:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Trip Due to a Spurious Overpower / Delta Temperature Signal | Unit 2 reactor automatically tripped at 0758 (EDT) hours on 10/13/2014, due to a spurious overpower/delta temperature signal on all three channels. The cause of the spurious signal is unknown at this time. Currently, reactor coolant system temperature is being maintained stable at 546 (F) degrees. All three auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically initiated as designed on low-low steam generator level following the trip. All systems responded as expected with the exception (both) of the intermediate range neutron indication(s), which was determined to be under-compensated. The source range indication did not automatically energize and was energized manually. All other systems operated as required. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4-hour notification of reactor protection system activation and 10 CFR 50. 72(b )(3)(iv)(A) for 8-hour notification of automatic actuation of auxiliary feedwater. The NRC resident has been notified of this event and is on site. There were no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events. There was no testing in progress when the reactor trip occurred. The reactor trip was considered uncomplicated. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being released via main feedwater and the condenser steam dumps. Normal offsite power is available. There was no effect on Surry Unit 1 which continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee is investigating the cause of the overpower/delta temperature actuation. | Steam Generator Reactor Coolant System Feedwater Reactor Protection System Auxiliary Feedwater Control Rod | |
| ENS 50449 | 11 September 2014 18:00:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty - Programmatic Failure | On September 11, 2014, at 1400 hours, it was determined that four (4) personnel in the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) were not subject to random testing requirements of the Fitness for Duty (FFD) Program. The personnel involved do not have unescorted access to the Protected Area, but they do respond and perform duties as a member of the ERO. The affected individuals are now included in the random FFD testing pool. 10CFR26.4(c) requires all persons who are required by a licensee in 10CFR26.3(a) and, as applicable, (c) to physically report to the licensee's Technical Support Center or Emergency Operations Facility by licensee emergency plans and procedures shall be subject to an FFD program that meets all of the requirements of this part. This event is a 24-hour reportable event per 10CFR26.719(b)(4) - Any programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within the protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program. | ||
| ENS 50418 | 29 August 2014 18:57:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Notification to State of Virginia Required by Site Discharge Permit | On 08/29/2014 at 1457 hours (EDT), Surry Power Station notified the State of Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) that two of the three turbine building sumps, required to be sampled by the discharge permit VA00004090, indicated an out of specification condition for oil and grease parameters. The laboratory supervisor reviewed the analysis and found no discrepancies. Sample methods and sample locations were reviewed and were unchanged from previous samples. A review of the operation of the sump oil skimmers indicated that they have been operating properly. In addition, there have been no oil spills or maintenance that would cause elevated readings in the sumps. Backup samples of both sumps were obtained on 08/27/14 and 08/28/14. The results of the backup samples were received on 08/29/2014 and all samples indicated a less than the detectable levels. Based upon an initial review of the issue, the results of the backup samples, and at least 5-year history of less than detectable oil and grease levels in the sump, the original samples for the sumps are considered anomalous. The results, however, are being reported in accordance with the permit requirements. This report is being issued in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), any event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies has been made. The Surry NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 50286 | 18 July 2014 00:50:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty Report Involving a Non-Licensed Supervisory Contract Employee | A non-licensed supervisory contract employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 49673 | 23 December 2013 13:28:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Communications with Virginia State Eoc Due to Power Outage | At 0828 EST on 12/23/2013, the Surry Power Station control room was notified that the Virginia State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) had lost all power and all offsite communications. This included commercial phone lines, automatic ring downs, and the State ringdown loop (lnsta-phone). At 0900 EST, all communications were restored once emergency generators were placed in service at Virginia State EOC. The Virginia State EOC initially lost offsite power and all communications were supplied by an Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS). Subsequently, the UPS batteries depleted and all communications were lost. At that time, (0828 EST) the Virginia State EOC personnel notified the Surry control room and supplied individual cellular phone numbers as an alternative method of contacting the Virginia State EOC. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of offsite communications capability, (e.g., Emergency Notification System). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 49630 | 13 December 2013 21:00:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Eleven Individuals Not Properly Subjected to the Random Fitness for Duty Program | In 2010, changes within the Dominion FFD (Fitness for Duty) program resulted in 11 supplemental personnel not being included in the current random FFD testing program. Two individuals are actively badged at Surry Power Station (SPS) and North Anna Power Station (NAPS). Both individuals accessed the protected area at SPS recently. The other nine individuals were not badged but perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program. The affected individuals are now included in the random testing program. An extent of condition was performed and no other contractor records were found to be affected. This event is reportable per 10CFR26.719(b)(4), 'Any programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program. The error occurred when, in 2010, it was decided that contract employees would no longer be placed in a select labor pool. When this occurred, FFD personnel no longer monitored that particular labor pool in the belief that it no longer existed. Upon discovery that the labor pool did, in fact, still exist the licensee determined that the eleven personnel should have been included in the random testing program. See similar North Anna report EN #49629. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 49456 | 20 October 2013 03:20:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Licensed Operator Tested Positive for Alcohol on a For-Cause Fitness for Duty Test | A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been placed on hold. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48860 | 28 March 2013 02:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | One Emergency Warning Siren Energized for a Short Time | At 2245 (EDT) on 3/27/2013, Surry Power Station (SPS) Operations Department received a report from Virginia State Emergency Operations Center (VEOC) that a concerned citizen had called James City County (JCC) law enforcement to report that an Early Warning System (EWS) siren, #62 in James City County NW side of Route 682, was sounding. VEOC reported JCC police received call at 2240 (EDT) from a concerned citizen that an EWS siren was sounding. SPS Security contacted JCC police and subsequently reported that JCC police responded approximately 10 minutes later to the site of the siren, but the siren was no longer sounding. Maintenance will investigate in the morning. All plant conditions/parameters are normal and no releases to the environment have occurred. The site NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. This notification is being transmitted due to notification of other Government Agencies in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee also notified the state and local governments.
This report is being retracted based upon the following: On 3/28/13, an activation verification test was performed. The results of the test indicated EWS siren #62 did not activate. In addition, when a siren activates, the battery voltage decreases. A review of the battery voltage trend for siren #62 found no such decrease, verifying no activation occurred. Maintenance staff reported to the siren location and confirmed the siren did not activate. They also found no indication of tampering or intrusion. Three local homeowners were interviewed and stated they did not hear any siren activation. By all available indications, EWS siren #62 was functional and did not activate on 03/27/13. NRC Site Resident Inspectors have been notified of the retraction." Notified R2DO (McCoy). | ||
| ENS 48638 | 29 December 2012 13:03:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Emergency Diesel Generator Auto-Start and Load Upon Trip of Reserve Station Transformer | At 0803 EST on 12/29/2012 With Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100%, the Supply breaker to 'B' Reserve Station Transformer (RSST), 0-EP-BKR-252 tripped on an instantaneous over current of the B-C phases due to a Pelican contacting the lines. This resulted in a lockout of the 'B' RSST and loss of power to the Unit 2 'H' Emergency Bus from its normal off site power supply. #2 Emergency Diesel Generator auto started on under voltage and loaded onto the Unit 2 'H' Emergency Bus. The Operations staff entered abnormal operating procedure 2-AP-10.07, Loss of Unit 2 Power, to recover from the electrical transient. All equipment performed as expected during the event and there were no unexplained occurrences. Maintenance has verified there is no damage to the line, breaker or 'B' RSST and at 1242 EST offsite power was restored to Unit 2 'H' Emergency Bus. At 1501, #2 Emergency Diesel Generator was secured in accordance with Station Operating procedures. Currently Unit 1 is operating at 100%, 922 MWE. Currently Unit 2 is operating at 100%, 915 MWE. All electrical distribution systems were restored to a normal alignment. No adverse radiological consequences resulted from this event. There were no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the auto start of #2 Emergency Diesel Generator. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 48662 | 30 November 2012 03:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | 60-Day Optional Telephonic Notification of Invalid System Actuation | This telephone notification is being made for an invalid actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) following the reporting guidance of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and is not considered a Licensee Event Report. With Unit 2 at Cold Shutdown (about 105?F and depressurized), an invalid actuation of the Main Feedwater (FW) isolation occurred at 2200 (EST) during removal of the 'A' Train Hi Consequence Limiting Safeguards (CLS) fuses. This action caused the 'A' train FW isolation relay to actuate and, as designed, tripped the operating 'B' Main Feed Pump (MFP) and the Main Turbine, which was latched for testing. The 'A' MFP was not in operation at the time of the event. This was a partial actuation of the SI system. SI signals were inhibited prior to removal of the Hi CLS fuses by the tagging of the lead connecting the Hi CLS relay to the SI master relay. Although FW isolation occurs with SI actuation, the relay associated with the FW isolation circuitry is separately actuated and had not been tagged out. When the Hi CLS fuses were removed, the FW isolation relay was energized. Plant systems and components responding to the signal started and functioned as designed with the exception of those inhibited by tag out. The affected components were restored to their pre-event configuration, The action to determine and initiate corrective actions is complete, and the necessary procedures are under revision. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Feedwater Main Turbine | |
| ENS 48661 | 29 November 2012 04:05:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | 60-Day Optional Telephonic Notification of Invalid System Actuation | This telephone notification is being made for an invalid actuation under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) following the reporting guidance of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and is not considered a Licensee Event Report. With Unit 2 at Cold Shutdown (about 105?F and depressurized), an invalid actuation of the Unit 2 'A' train of the High High Consequence Limiting Safeguards (Hi-Hi CLS) system occurred at 2305 (EST) during reinstallation of fuses in preparation for return to service testing. The fuses were pulled to implement a design modification to replace existing relays with a new design. The 'A' train of the High High CLS actuated as soon as the fuses were installed. Plant systems and components responding to the Hi-Hi CLS 'A' train signals started and functioned successfully as designed with the exception of those systems and components procedurally rendered inoperable due to the RCS being below 350?F and 450 psig. Shutdown cooling was not lost due to safety injection leads being tagged out. The signal could not be reset from the Main Control Room due to system design in this configuration requiring manual local manipulations to address affected components. The relays on both trains were replaced with the original design and the fuses reinstalled. The affected systems were restored to their pre-event configuration. Specific trains and systems that actuated as a result of the "A" train of Hi-Hi CLS signal are described below: -- Component Cooling from the A Reactor Coolant Pump isolated. -- Containment Spray realigned and gravity flowed the Refueling Water Storage Tank and Caustic Addition Tank to the Containment Sump. The level did not reach the point where any components in the containment basement were affected. -- Service Water flowed to the A and C Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers. -- Containment Instrument Air isolated. -- Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) No.2 started but did not load since its associated Emergency Bus remained energized by offsite power. The EDG was stopped and returned to automatic. A root cause evaluation is in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector | Service water Emergency Diesel Generator Shutdown Cooling Containment Spray | |
| ENS 48342 | 25 September 2012 19:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Tritium in Overflow | At 1215 hours on September 24, 2012, Surry Power Station personnel confirmed the presence of tritium at a level of 1,450 picoCuries/Liter (pCi/L) in a Unit 2 Turbine Building heating steam drain receiver (HSDR) tank. This tank collects condensate from steam which is used to heat buildings. A sample of the condensate was analyzed following failure of the pump (used to control level) which resulted in the tank overflowing to a drain line on September 17 and 23. The sample was taken because the drain line was degraded and the overflow resulted in a release to the environment. The normal inputs into this drain line had been isolated from use in August when the degraded pipe was discovered. Currently, the tank contents are being diverted to a sump until repairs to the drain line and pump are complete. These are expected to complete in the next couple of weeks. Both releases were estimated to be greater than 100 gallons. The location of the leak was within the Protected Area of Surry Power Station. There has been no tritium detected in any monitoring wells in the vicinity of the degraded drain line, nor in any monitoring wells outside the Protected Area. Because the leak remained onsite, no offsite impact to ground water is expected. Furthermore, the leak posed no threat to employees or the public. Because there was a detectable amount of licensed material in the water, Surry implemented communication to offsite agencies as part of (licensee) commitment to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Ground Water Protection Initiative. This notification is being transmitted due to Notification of Other Government Agencies under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, Virginia Department of Health, Virginia Department of Emergency Management, NRC Senior Resident Inspector and Surry County Administrator were notified. | ||
| ENS 48239 | 27 August 2012 13:00:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Discovery of After-The-Fact Emergency Condition - Alert - High Co2 Concentration in a Safe Shutdown Area | At 0927 EDT on 08/28/2012, it was identified that access to a table H-1 Safe Shutdown Area had been prohibited and that an ALERT had not been declared as required by Surry EPIP-1.01, EAL HA 3.1. At 0900 EDT on 08/27/2012, Electrical Maintenance was performing a surveillance on the Unit 2 Cable Vault and Cable Tunnel Low Pressure CO2 System. A high CO2 level was observed using portable gas detection equipment and access to the space was prohibited for a period of approximately 20 minutes. This report is being made in compliance of VPAP-2802, section 6.3.3(h), which states that a one hour report is required if an Emergency Action Level (EAL) is exceeded, the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of discovery, and no other reasons exist for an emergency declaration. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and Virginia Emergency Management Agency.
Based upon initial air monitor readings, EN #48239 reported that an oxygen deficient condition existed in a Table H-1 area for approximately 20 minutes. When the initial information was presented to the Shift Manager on 08/28/2012, it was determined that a one-hour report should have been declared in accordance with EPIP-1.01, Emergency Action Level HA 3.1, which states that an ALERT condition exists if 'access to a Table H-1 area is prohibited due to toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases which jeopardize operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the reactor.' Since the ALERT condition was not recognized on 08/27/2012, a one-hour report was deemed necessary. A root cause evaluation reviewed the oxygen monitor data and determined that the maximum time of oxygen deficiency was approximately 8 minutes. Operator Time Critical Actions were reviewed to determine whether prohibition of access to the Cable Vault and Cable Tunnel for approximately 8 minutes would jeopardize operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the reactor. No specific references to activities within this area were identified. Therefore, this event was determined not to be an Alert. The root cause evaluation also noted that Operations was notified of the test, administrative control was established for the CO2 Tank shutoff valve, an Electrician was posted in the control room to notify Operations of alarms associated with the test, a fire watch posted, and the test areas were posted and evacuated. The brief period of time the condition existed did not result in a threat to safe plant operation or the health of plant personnel. Therefore, this event was determined not to be an Unusual Event in accordance with EPIP-1.01, Emergency Action Level HU 3.1, which states, 'report or detection of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases that have or could enter the Owner Controlled Area in amounts that can affect normal plant operations.' This notification is being made to retract the report made on 08/28/12 based on the above discussion. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified. Notified R2DO (Nease). | ||
| ENS 48194 | 15 August 2012 19:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Tritium in Degraded Drain Line | At 1000 hours (EDT) on 8/14/12, Surry Power Station personnel confirmed the presence of tritium at a level of 1,250 picoCuries/liter (pCi/l) in the #3 Turbine Building sump. The sump water had been tested upon discovery of a degraded drain line on the sump discharge that resulted in a leak to the environment. The exact volume could not be determined, but it is estimated to be greater than the 100 gallon reporting criteria. The location of the leak is within the Protected Area of Surry Power Station. To prevent additional releases, water from the #3 Turbine Building sump has been redirected to another turbine building sump. There is no Indication that this water has migrated offsite. Because there was a detectable amount of licensed material in the water, Surry has implemented our voluntary communication protocols to the state and Surry County as per our commitment to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Ground Water Protection Initiative. An adjacent ground water monitoring well was sampled, and no tritium activity was detected in the well water. There has been no tritium detected in any monitoring wells in the vicinity of the drain line, nor in any monitoring wells outside the Protected Area. The activity of the leak was approximately 6% of the criteria for reporting actual ground water activity (20,000 pCi/l). Because the leak remained on site, no offsite impact to ground water is expected. Furthermore, the leak posed no threat to employees or the public. The degraded drain pipe is currently being repaired. This notification Is being transmitted due to Notification of Other Government Agencies under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, Virginia Department of Health, and Virginia Department of Emergency Management were notified. The NRC Senior Resident (Inspector) and Surry County Administrator will be notified. | ||
| ENS 47866 | 26 April 2012 13:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Death of a Bald Eagle | At 0955 (EDT) on April 26, 2012, a bald eagle (bird of prey) caused a phase to phase fault on the Station's 428 power line (power to buildings outside the protected area). The fault temporarily de-energized the 428 line. The bald eagle was found dead beneath the power lines. Two outside agencies, The Virginia Department of Game and Inland Fisheries and The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service will be notified. This is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for an event that required notification of other government agencies. The NRC Resident has been informed. | ||
| ENS 47421 | 8 November 2011 12:55:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty Report Involving a Non-Licensed Supervisor | A non-licensed supervisor (contractor) tested positive for alcohol. The contractor had not entered the protected area after reporting to work. The contractor had his badge pulled and his access to the site was terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 47189 | 23 August 2011 18:04:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Notification of an Unusual Event Due to a Seismic Event | The licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event under EAL HU1.1 for seismic activity felt by station personnel. Both units will remain at 100% power. No equipment failures have been identified. No Reactor Coolant System or Steam Generator leakage identified. The licensee will upgrade this event if damage to safety-related equipment is identified. The plant is accessible. Engineering walkdowns have been initiated in the station, switchyard and intake structures. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and state and local authorities.
License terminated the Unusual Event. Notified R2 IRC (Franke), IRD (Gott), DHS (Bean), FEMA (Via), USDA (Kraus), and DOE (Turner). | Steam Generator Reactor Coolant System | |
| ENS 47072 | 19 July 2011 15:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Inadvertent Actuation of Emergency Sirens During Exercise | At 1113 (EDT) on 7/19/2011, the emergency sirens surrounding the Surry Power Station actuated during an annual exercise being conducted at the local and state levels. The state was planning to simulate the actuation, but the sirens were inadvertently activated. The Virginia Department of Emergency Management made a news release regarding the actuation, notifying the public that there is no emergency at Surry Power Station. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to notification of Surry Power Station by state agencies of an inadvertent activation of the public notification system. The site NRC resident inspectors have been notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 47077 | 5 June 2011 09:01:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Discovery of After-The-Fact Emergency Condition - Unusual Event | At 1650 (EDT) on 7/20/2011 it was determined that a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was not declared for an event on 6/5/2011. The event occurred at 0501 (EDT) on 6/5/2011 when a low oxygen atmosphere condition was measured in the Unit 2 reactor containment building. The NOUE should have been declared in accordance with Surry Power Station Emergency Action Level HU3.1 (Report or detection of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant, or flammable gases that have or could enter the Owner Controlled Area in amounts that can affect normal plant operations). This condition occurred during a refueling outage with maintenance being performed using a liquid nitrogen supplied freeze seal. The freeze seal activity released nitrogen, which slowly caused the low oxygen atmosphere (<19.5%). In accordance with guidance provided in NUREG-1022, a one hour ENS notification is being made due to discovery of an undeclared condition that exceeded an Emergency Action Level. The licensee will inform Surry County, the State of Virginia and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 46905 | 30 May 2011 12:08:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Specified System Actuation - Afw Initiation | Surry Unit 2 is in Intermediate Shutdown and was supplying steam generators with a main feed pump. The second main feed pump is tagged out for maintenance. The running main feed pump exhibited a low oil flow condition. The operating team took the deliberate action to secure the running main feed pump to prevent bearing damage with the knowledge that an Auxiliary Feedwater actuation signal would be generated. The plant was realigned to flow to the steam generators with the condensate pumps and the auxiliary feed pumps were then secured (at) 0821. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for 8-hour notification of automatic actuation of AFW. Plant responded as expected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event and is on site. There were no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events. Offsite power is normal and emergency diesel generators are operable and available. There was no increase in plant risk as a result of this event. | Steam Generator Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliary Feedwater | |
| ENS 46866 | 20 May 2011 16:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Media Concern About Boat Near the Site | On 05/20/2011 at approximately 0728, an unidentified man was reported to be floating on a raft in the James River offshore of the Hog Island Wildlife Management Area. The individual had chains wrapped around his body and a suitcase and duffel bag in the raft. Station Security responded to facilitate local law enforcement actions. The individual in the raft was pulled to the shore and taken into custody. At no time was the operation of Surry Power Station threatened by the man's actions. The site NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This notification is being transmitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) to ensure that the NRC is made aware of issues that may cause heightened public concern for the safety of the station. The man was approximately a mile offshore during this incident. | ||
| ENS 46761 | 16 April 2011 22:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Unusual Event Declared Due to Loss of All Offsite Power from Tornado Damage | At 1849 hrs, Surry Power Station (SPS) Unit 1 and Unit 2 experienced an automatic Reactor Trip from a Loss of Offsite Power, as a result of a tornado touching down in the station's switchyard. Unit 1 reactor tripped as a result of a Loss of Coolant Flow > P-8 (35% power), and the Unit 2 reactor tripped as a result of a 500 kV Leads Differential Turbine-Generator trip. Both units responded as designed. Unit 1 electrical power is being provided by Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to the 1H emergency bus, with the Station Blackout (SBO) diesel loaded on to the 1J emergency bus. Unit 2 electrical power is being supplied by the number 2 EDG to the 2H emergency bus, with the number 3 EDG loaded on to the 2J emergency bus. All Unit 1 control rods inserted on the reactor trip, and all Unit 2 control rods inserted on its respective reactor trip. The Low Level Intake Structure (LLIS) is without power. All three Emergency Service Water Pumps are running to supply the intake canal. Efforts are underway to restore Bus 7, which will give each unit an emergency bus powered by offsite power (Unit 1 1J, Unit 2 2H) and restore power to the LLIS. Decay heat is being removed by auxiliary feedwater on both units and atmospheric steam release via the steam generator PORVs. Both units are currently on natural circulation. All other system parameters are normal and stable. At 1855 hrs a NOUE was declared due to a loss of offsite power (applicable to U1 and U2). Additionally, due to an estimated 100 gallon fuel oil spill from an above ground storage tank near the station's garage, the Virginia State Department of Environmental Quality was notified at 2041 and the Surry County Local Emergency Planning Coordinator was notified at 2114. At 2334, the Virginia State Department of Environmental Quality was notified and the Surry County Local Emergency Planning Coordinator was notified at 2336, due to an estimated 200 gallon oil leak to the ground from a station switchyard transformer damaged during the tornado. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and is on-site. Notified DHS (Rickerson), FEMA (Boscoe), DOE (Turner), HHS (Hoskins), and USDA (Russell). See related EN #46762
The licensee exited the emergency condition at 0745 EDT on 4/19/11. Offsite power has been restored, and the plant is shutdown and cooled down. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue), NRR EO (Thorpe) and IRD (Gott). Informed the following Federal Agencies via Blast Dial: DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS and DOE. | Steam Generator Service water Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Control Rod | |
| ENS 46698 | 25 March 2011 04:00:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Non-Compliance with Nuhoms Technical Specification | This 24-hour report is being issued in accordance with the requirements of NRC Certificate of Compliance 1030, Amendment 0, for the NUHOMS Storage System, Technical Specification (TS) 2.2, Functional Operating Limit Violations. During a review of historical Surry NUHOMS Dry Storage Canister (DSC) loading certification documents, a discrepancy was identified. The NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance 1030 Amendment 0 Technical Specifications include a Figure 2, 'Heat Load Zones' which specifies the maximum decay heat load for each of the 32 assembly locations in a DSC. The figure includes limits for two zone '1b' locations and two zone '1a' locations in the four center locations of the DSC. The zone '1b' decay heat limit of 0.800 kw is specified for the two 'upper compartments' and zone '1a' decay heat limit of 1.05 kw is specified for the two 'lower compartments' on the figure. Contrary to this, the loading certifications for 6 of 12 DSCs already loaded at Surry were not developed to maintain this orientation when loaded in the horizontal storage module (HSM). As a result, the DSC zone '1b' heat load limits were exceeded in some cases for these 4 DSCs. The heat load limit for all other zones in the DSCs are symmetric, and those assemblies were verified to the correct limit and are unaffected by this error. In addition the total heat load limit for the sum of the center assemblies was met for all DSCs. The maximum heat load of any zone '1b' assembly at the time of loading was 0.806 kw, which is slightly higher than the 0.800 kw limit. The lower heat load of assemblies in the other compartments offset the slightly higher heat load effects, and it is expected that the thermal analysis acceptance criteria would still have been met at the time of loading. The decay heat of the assemblies has continued to decrease since their initial loading and all assemblies currently meet the upper central compartment limits. The affected fuel assemblies are in a safe condition as required by NUHOMS TS 2.2.1. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. | ||
| ENS 46584 | 2 February 2011 10:33:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Rcs Coolant Flow in One Loop | Unit 2 Reactor automatically tripped at 0533 EST. This was due to loss of coolant flow in the 'C' RCS Loop. The first indication of the reactor trip was the annunciator for 'Loss of Coolant Flow > P8.' The 'C' RCP is running with motor current indicating normal. 'C' LOOP RCS flow is approximately 25% on all three channels with 'A' & 'B' RCS LOOP FLOW approximately 104%. All three auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps automatically initiated as designed on low-low steam generator level following the trip. Currently, RCS temperature is being maintained stable at no load temperature. All systems responded as expected with the exception of the Intermediate Range Neutron Indication. N36 indication was undercompensated and Source Range indication did not automatically energize, but was subsequently manually energized. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4-hour notification of RPS Activation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for 8-hour notification of actuation of AFW. Plant responded as expected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event and is on site. There were no radiation releases due this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events. This was an uncomplicated reactor trip and all control rods fully inserted. The plant is in a normal electrical alignment. AFW has been secured and the steam generators are being feed from main feedwater. Decay heat is being released through the main condenser steam dumps. Estimated time for repair and re-start is not known. | Steam Generator Feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater Main Condenser Control Rod | |
| ENS 46434 | 27 October 2010 03:56:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Invalid Actuation of High Consequence Limiting Safeguards and Safety Injection Systems | This telephone notification is being made for an invalid actuation under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) following the reporting guidance of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). With Unit 1 at cold shutdown (about 105 degrees Fahrenheight and depressurized), an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 'A' train of the High Consequence Limiting Safeguards (HI CLS) system and Unit 1 'A' train of the Safety Injection (SI) system occurred at 23:56 during setup for 'H' Bus Logic Testing. Plant systems and components responding to the HI CLS and SI 'A' train signals started and functioned successfully as designed (with the exception of those systems and components procedurally rendered inoperable due to the RCS being below 350 degrees Fahrenheight and 450 psig). The HI CLS and SI 'A' trains were reset and the affected systems were restored to their pre-event configurations. Specific trains and systems that actuated for the 'A' train of HI CLS and SI are described below: - With the unit at cold shutdown, one high head pump was running (the two redundant pump controls were in the pull to lock position in compliance with Technical Specifications). The 'A' train High Head Safety Injection motor operated valves re-aligned such that the running high head pump provided flow to the RCS cold legs from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). During this time the pressurizer level increased from approximately 23 percent to about 42 percent. - Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump motor operated valves opened but no flow was delivered to the steam generators since the AFW pumps were in pull to lock. - The 'A' train containment isolation valves closed, isolating the 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchanger. However, shutdown cooling was previously aligned to the 'B' train RHR and therefore shutdown cooling was uninterrupted. Containment isolation valves were later restored to a normal alignment. - One train of Auxiliary Ventilation actuated and was restored to normal after the Safety Injection signal was reset. - Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) No. 1 started but did not load since its associated Emergency Bus remained energized by offsite power. The EDG was stopped and returned to automatic. An apparent cause evaluation is in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Steam Generator Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Shutdown Cooling Residual Heat Removal | |
| ENS 45986 | 8 June 2010 13:48:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation - ECCS Discharge | Automatic Reactor Trip with Safety Injection Due to Loss of Vital Ac Bus | At 0948 hours (EDT) on 6/8/10, a Unit 1 vital AC bus was lost when the uninterruptible power supply inverter failed while the alternate AC source was out of service for scheduled maintenance. The loss of the vital bus inverter caused a loss of 120 VAC vital bus 1-III. The loss of this vital bus caused the 'A' main feed pump recirculation valve to fail open and also caused 2 of the 3 main feedwater regulating valves to fail to automatic-hold mode of operation. This combination of as designed failures resulted in a reduction in main feedwater flow and resulted in an automatic reactor trip due to a feed flow steam flow mismatch in conjunction with low steam generator level. The loss of vital bus 1-III also resulted in initiation of safety injection due to loss of vital bus 1-III instrumentation in conjunction with the expected momentary RCS cooldown below 543 DEG-F. The safety injection resulted from the high steam flow in conjunction with low RCS T-ave actuation signal. The safety injection actuation also resulted in automatic start of the #1 Emergency Diesel and the #3 Emergency Diesel Generators. Neither EDG was required to load since off-site power remained operable. The loss of vital bus 1-III also resulted in loss of numerous field inputs to the Plant Computer System (PCS) and resulted in non-functionality of the SPDS (Safety Parameter Display System). The PCS itself remains functional along with MCR (Main Control Room) annunciators and sufficient MCR instrumentation to monitor critical safety functions. All three auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically initiated as designed on low-low steam generator level following the trip. Currently, RCS temperature is being maintained stable at 547 degrees. All systems functioned as required following the reactor trip. During the post-trip transient, pressurizer PORV (Power Operated Relief Valve), PCV-1455C, cycled as required to maintain RCS pressure due to the safety injection and the loss of normal letdown. There were no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event. During the trip, all rods inserted into the core. In addition to the pressurizer PORV lifting, a secondary main steam relief valve lifted. All relief valves properly reseated and there is no known primary to secondary leakage. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. Main steam trip valves were isolated during the transient. Decay heat is being removed via main steam bypasses to the condenser and steam generator power operated relief valves. | Steam Generator Feedwater Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Main Steam | |
| ENS 45871 | 25 April 2010 22:05:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | One Alarm Siren Initiated Spuriously | At 1805 on 4/25/2010, Surry Power Station (SPS) Operations department began receiving reports from individuals in Surry County that at least one Early Warning System (EWS) siren was sounding. A subsequent review has confirmed that, at a minimum, Siren # 18 spuriously sounded six times over a period of approximately 20 minutes. Station personnel contacted the Virginia State Emergency Operations Center (EOC), in addition to Surry County dispatch for confirmation. Surry County dispatch reported that a number of calls were received for a sounding EWS siren. Neither the Virginia State EOC nor SPS Security received an alarm indicating that the siren was spuriously sounding. The Virginia State EOC has notified its Public Information Officer of the spuriously sounding siren. All plant conditions/parameters are normal, and-no releases to the environment have occurred. The site NRC Resident Inspector has been notified". The emergency siren was on for approximately three hours before being locally disabled. There is still 100% coverage in the areas requiring siren notification. |