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A non-licensed contract employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol following a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. This information will be sent to the NRC Region 4 Office as San Onofre no longer has a resident.

• * * RETRACTION ON 4/18/2018 AT 1308 EDT FROM TIM CUSICK TO STEVEN VITTO * * *

In the event report, the individual was described as a contract supervisor, thus meeting the reporting threshold. (the violation of the FFD policy was that he failed a for-cause test for alcohol). Recently, an NRC review of SONGS' 2016 Annual Fitness for Duty report found that SONGS described that test failure as 'not reportable' and that the labor category was 'Maintenance (Craft).' After reviewing the data, Access Authorization confirmed that the individual was a Union Maintenance Foreman (not a supervisor). The event was not reportable." SONGS will be notifying NRC Region 4. Notified R4DO (O'KEEFE) and FFD E-mail Group.

On October 19, 2010, at about 1515 PDT, SONGS Unit 3 RPS channels 'B' and 'D' were tested for maintenance. During this testing, both channels were powered off, which brought in LPD/DNBR (local power density/departure from nucleate boiling) trips on both channels. There are no applicable Technical Specifications required for these RPS channels in Mode 5. Southern California Edison(SCE) is reporting this occurrence as a valid actuation of RPS in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(a). SCE has taken actions to restore both channels 'B' and 'D' of RPS and cleared the RPS trip signal. At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 was at approximately 100% power and Unit 3 was in a Steam Generator Replacement Outage, Mode 5, shutdown and cooldown with the RCS open, proceeding to Mode 6." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * RETRACTION FROM DENNIS MORRIS TO PETE SNYDER AT 0045 EDT ON 10/21/10 * * * 

On October 19, 2010, SCE reported (Event No. 46346) a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Upon further review, SCE determined the actuation was invalid and is retracting the notification. Maintenance and surveillance testing was being conducted by Computer Technicians on the Core Protection Calculator (CPC) Channels 'A' and 'D', respectively, following station procedures. De-energizing the CPC channels was expected to bring in an RPS trip signal. The process to disable the control room RPS alarms had not as yet, been completed by the Instrument and Controls group when the CPCs were de-energized by procedure, actuating the RPS logic and causing the control room alarms. The actuation is considered invalid, as the equipment that would have been actuated by the trip safety function was previously de-energized and removed from service for the refueling outage. The Unit 3 reactor was in Mode 5, with the reactor trip breakers open, and control rods inserted. Unit 2 reactor remains at 100% power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (V.Campbell).

On January 13, 2010, at about 1125 PST, Train A suction piping from the SONGS Unit 3 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) was determined to be inoperable following detection of weld flaw indications during ultrasonic testing. Due to miscommunication, operators mistakenly declared the Train B Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) header inoperable at about 1125 and removed DC control power to the Train B ECCS pumps. This resulted in both trains of Unit 3 ECCS being inoperable and entry into the Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 one-hour shut down action. At 1140 PST, the DC control power was restored to the Train B ECCS pumps, Train B ECCS was declared operable, and TS 3.0.3 was exited. SCE is reporting this in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. SCE is further evaluating the indications found on Train A piping to determine if the piping is capable of performing its safety function. At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 was in a Steam Generator Replacement Outage, and Unit 3 was at approximately 100% power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY LEE KELLY TO DONG PARK AT 1402 EST ON 1/19/10 * * *

On January 13, 2010, SCE reported that both trains of Unit 3 Emergency Core Cooling System were inoperable for approximately 15 minutes because Train B ECCS was mistakenly taken out of service when weld flaw indications were found on Train A ECCS piping. This resulted in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Consequently, both trains of ECCS in Unit 3 were declared inoperable and the unit entered into Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 1134 PST (Time of Discovery). At 1140 PST, Train B ECCS was declared operable and TS 3.0.3 was exited. Event Notification 45628 was conservatively made because, although Train A ECCS piping remained capable of performing its safety function, this was not yet formally documented at the time the 8-hour report was due. Subsequently, an engineering evaluation was completed at 2308 PST on January 13, 2010, that demonstrates the as-found condition of the Train A ECCS piping was operable because the flaw meets the evaluation criteria of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Case N-513-2. Since Train A ECCS piping was operable, this event did not constitute a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function and is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Consequently, SCE is retracting the phone report to the NRC on January 13, 2010. The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this report. Notified R4DO (Werner).

On March 27, 2006, with Unit 2 in Mode 4 while starting up from a refueling outage, (Southern California Edison (SCE)) discovered that the gasket used to seal the manway cover for Safety Injection Tank (SIT) T-008 had become partially dislodged. The gasket is a 'flexitalic' type gasket which consists of a long section of crushable wire that is coiled and compressed between the manway cover and the safety injection tank flange. For SIT T-008, the flexitalic gasket had uncoiled and extended down into the SIT and prevented SIT outlet check valve MU040 from fully sealing in the closed position. On March 28, SCE inspected the remaining three SITs (SITs # 007, 009 and 010) and found the flexitalic gaskets degraded but intact and not interfering with other components.

When this condition was discovered at Unit 2, San Onofre Unit 3 was operating at approximately 100 percent power. Similar flexitalic gaskets are also used for the manway covers on the four SITs at Unit 3. At 0001 PST on March 29, 2006, SCE conservatively declared both trains of the emergency core cooling system at Unit 3 inoperable. This placed Unit 3 in a TS 3.0.3 shutdown action statement. Plant Operators began the required Unit 3 shutdown at about 0050 on March 29, 2006. SCE is providing this phone notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) for the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications. The electric grid in the area is stable and Emergency Diesel Generators are available on Unit 3. There is no maintenance being performed on systems required for shutdown on Unit 3. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION AT 12:14 ON 5/30/2006 FROM L. CONKLIN TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On March 29, 2006, SCE reported the initiation of the shutdown to the NRC Operations Center (Event Log No. 42451). At the time, SCE was concerned that if the gaskets were uncoiled they might have interfered with operation of the ECCS. After completing the plant shutdown, SCE inspected and found the gaskets degraded but not extending into the SIT and its discharge piping. In addition, subsequent evaluations by the SONGS NSSS vendor Combustion Engineering (now Westinghouse) determined the degraded gaskets (even if uncoiled and interfering with SIT outlet check valve from fully closing) would not have prevented the ECCS from performing its required safety function. Consequently, SCE was not required to declare Unit 3 ECCS inoperable and SCE is retracting the phone report to the NRC (Event Log No. 42451). SCE will submit a voluntary LER to document this condition. At the time of this report, Unit 2 and Unit 3 are in Mode 1 at approximately 100% power. The San Onofre Resident Inspector has been notified of this event and will be provided with a copy of this report. Notified the R4DO (Spitzberg).

On June 25, 2005, at about 1335 PDT, during a test of Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 3G003, Emergency Supply Fan 3A276 did not start. SCE's investigation found a loose electrical connection at the thermal overload auxiliary switch contact for that fan. A similar condition was found on Emergency Supply Fan 3A277. SCE declared 3G003 inoperable and initiated a common cause investigation required by the EDG Technical Specifications. SCE tightened the affected electrical connections and after successfully start testing 3G003, declared 3G003 operable at 0406 PDT on June 26, 2005. On June 26, 2005, at about 0417 PDT, SCE found similar loose connections for EDG 3G002. Components affected were the EDG radiator fan and an EDG Emergency Supply Fan. Because SCE could not conclusively determine if the loose connections would have caused 3G002 to be inoperable, SCE conservatively declared 3G002 inoperable. (SCE currently plans to start test the Unit 2 EDGs today to confirm the Unit 2 EDGs remain operable.) Because it appears that both Unit 3 EDGs could have been inoperable at the same time, SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 was operating at about 99 percent power and Unit 3 was at about 100 percent power. SCE has notified the NRC Resident Inspectors about this occurrence and will provide them with a copy of this report.

• * * RETRACTION FROM LICENSEE (HOLT) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 1850 EDT ON 8/23/05 * * *

On June 26, 2005, SCE reported to the NRC that both Unit 3 emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were conservatively declared inoperable at the same time. SCE reported that occurrence to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for the loss of a safety function. SCE has since determined that both EDGs were operable in the as found condition and that a report to the NRC was not required and SCE is retracting that report. For EDG 3G003, even though one of two emergency supply fans did not function, SCE confirmed by calculation that the remaining emergency supply fan was sufficient. That is, 3G003 was capable of performing its specified safety function with only one emergency supply fan operating. For EDG 3G002, the electrical connections that were reported to be 'loose' did not prevent circuit continuity and did not degrade the operability of the EDG. 3G002, therefore remained operable. Because the EDGs were operable, no report was required. SCE is retracting the June 26, 2005 report. SCE will, however, submit a voluntary licensee event report to document this event and inform the NRC of the corrective actions taken. At the time of this phone call, Unit 2 was operating at about 99 percent power and Unit 3 was at about 100 percent power. SCE has notified the NRC resident inspectors about this retraction and will provide them with a copy of this report. R4DO (Smith) was notified.