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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5421111 August 2019 11:40:00SalemNRC Region 1At 0814 EDT on 8/11/19, with Unit 2 at 83 percent power during a planned load reduction, the reactor was manually tripped due to degraded feedwater flow control to the 23 Steam Generator caused by a malfunction of the associated Feedwater Regulating Valve, 23BF19. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post trip. An actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system occurred following the manual reactor trip as expected due to low level in the steam generators. The unit is stable in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam Dumps and Auxiliary Feedwater System. Due to the actuation of the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the State of New Jersey. Unit 1 remains at 100 percent power.
ENS 5385231 January 2019 04:23:00SalemNRC Region 1At 0301 (EST) on 1/31/19, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor was manually tripped due to icing conditions requiring the removal of 4 Circulating Water Pumps from service. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. 21 CFCU (Containment Fan Cooler Unit) was inoperable prior to the event for a planned maintenance window and did not contribute to the cause of the event and did not adversely impact the plant response to the trip. An actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System occurred following the manual reactor trip. The reason for the Auxiliary Feed Water System auto-start was due to low level in a steam generator. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam Dumps and Auxiliary Feedwater System. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feed Water System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The icing condition was described as frazil ice. Unit-1 reduced power to 88% because one circulating water pump was shutdown.
ENS 5378611 December 2018 15:09:00SalemNRC Region 1This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The successful, complete train actuation of the 22 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was initiated by an invalid signal during testing. The Auxiliary Feedwater System was not impacted in its ability to perform its function. There were no safety consequences or impacts to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5369123 October 2018 19:24:00SalemNRC Region 1At 1616 EDT on 10/23/18, Salem reported to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection a sheen on ground water discovered during excavation in the Salem Switchyard. This discovery did not violate any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify Lower Alloway Creek Township.
ENS 5360614 September 2018 16:28:00SalemNRC Region 1At 1323 (EDT) on 9/14/18, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 90% power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a failure of 23BF19, 23 Steam Generator (SG) Feed Regulating Valve. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. No equipment was inoperable prior to the event. An actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system occurred following the automatic reactor trip. The reason for the auxiliary feed water system auto-start was due to low level in the steam generator. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the main steam dumps and auxiliary feedwater system. Unit 1 is not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non- emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feed water system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified."
ENS 534381 June 2018 14:42:00SalemNRC Region 1

During the period of evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and the potential impacts to technical specification (TS) plant equipment, it was determined that the power cables to a safety related motor control center (MCC) in the service water (SW) intake structure are not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. During walk downs, it was identified that the installed SW pipe tunnel barrier is not adequate. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the power cables and rendering a SW MCC inoperable. These conditions are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This condition is being addressed in accordance with NRC enforcement guidance provided in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1, and DSS-ISG-2016-01, 'Clarification of Licensee Actions in Receipt of Enforcement Discretion per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002, Enforcement Discretion for Tornado- Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1. Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with these documents. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Creek Township.

  • * * UPDATE ON 6/18/2018 AT 1604 EDT FROM JUSTIN HARGRAVE TO RICHARD SMITH * * *

During subsequent walk downs, PSEG (Public Service Enterprise Group) identified that both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are also not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. The steam exhaust pipe could be potentially impacted and cause crimping that could reduce steam exhaust flow and pump capacity. EN 53438 is updated to include both Salem units and these additional components. This condition is being addressed in accordance with NRC enforcement guidance provided in enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1, and DSS-ISG-2016-01, 'Clarification of Licensee Actions in Receipt of Enforcement Discretion per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002, Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1. Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with these documents." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Creek Township. Notified R1DO (Burritt).

ENS 533867 May 2018 05:23:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis 4 and 8 hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 initiated a manual reactor trip and subsequent automatic Auxiliary Feedwater system actuation. The trip was initiated due to a 21 Reactor Coolant Pump reaching its procedural limit for motor winding temperature of 302F. Salem Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3. Reactor Coolant system pressure is 2235 PSIG and Reactor Coolant System temperature is 547 F with decay heat removal via the Main Steam Dump and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. Unit 2 has no active shutdown technical specification action statements in effect. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS (emergency core cooling systems) and ESF (emergency safety function) systems functioned as expected. No safety related equipment or major secondary equipment was tagged for maintenance prior to this event. No personnel were injured during this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified.
ENS 5309930 November 2017 17:17:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

An Unusual Event was declared at 1657 EST due to an earthquake detected onsite. The Unusual Event was declared under EAL HU1.1. There is no release in progress due to this event. There are no protective actions recommended at this time. The Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Note: See also EN #53101 for Hope Creek Unusual Event.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOSHUA MYERS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1742 EST ON 11/30/2017 * * *

An earthquake was felt onsite at time 1645 EST. Multiple phone calls were made to the Control Room confirming the earthquake. It was verified there was an earthquake felt in Delaware with a magnitude of 4.4. Neither seismic monitor at Salem Unit 1, Salem Unit 2, and Hope Creek actuated. There is no indication of any damage to any systems or plant structures. Plant walk-downs have been initiated in accordance with plant operating procedures for a seismic event. No injuries have been reported to the Control Room. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies. Notified R1DO (Gray), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM THOMAS CLARK TO DAVID AIRD AT 2137 EST ON 11/30/2017 * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 2125 EST on 11/30/2017 following plant walkdowns that revealed no damage to plant structures, systems, or components. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Gray), IRD (Grant), and NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

ENS 5280515 June 2017 11:32:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis is to report the Salem Unit 2, 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) actuation due to an invalid signal. This report is being made per paragraphs 10CFR50.73(a)(1) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address the invalid actuation of the 2C EDG on April 16, 2017, while performing the 2C Safeguards Equipment Controller (SEC) Mode OPS Surveillance test. Plant conditions: Salem Unit 2 was in mode 5 at the time of the invalid actuation. On April 16, 2017, at approximately 1053 (EDT) while performing Solid State Protection System (SSPS) testing of the 2C SEC, the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) output breaker was manually opened per the associated procedure step. The EDG output breaker unexpectedly reclosed and the 2C 4kV vital bus loaded onto the EDG in SEC Mode 2. The cause of the 2C EDG output breaker reclosure and 2C 4kV Vital bus loading during testing was determined to be two faulty input block switches in the 2C SEC. When Step 5.2.27 of the test procedure was performed, the 2C SEC 'input block' switches failed to block a 'blackout' actuation signal. This resulted in the breaker reclosure and loading of the 2C Vital Bus onto the EDG. Trouble shooting identified that the two failed switches exhibited high resistance across the switch contacts which is indicative of being in a 'fail to block' (the input signal) condition. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will also notify the States of New Jersey and Delaware.
ENS 5269920 April 2017 21:36:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 2110 EDT, Salem control room received data that supported unacceptable levels of hydrazine concentration in the U2 Containment atmosphere based on Site Protection atmospheric sampling. The high hydrazine levels were caused due to Steam Generator (S/G) venting into the Containment atmosphere in support of maintenance for the current Salem Unit 2 Refueling Outage (2R22). The NIOSH habitability limit for hydrazine is 0.03 ppm (2 hour limit). Area samples indicated concentrations as high as 0.25 ppm. Salem Unit 2 Containment has been evacuated while a mitigation plan is being developed. There were no personnel injuries as a result of this occurrence. Salem Unit 2 defueling activities were in progress during this event. All fuel assemblies have been placed in a safe condition. All Salem Unit 2 Containment activities are currently on hold. There has been no impact to the equipment in the Unit 2 Containment, no adverse impact to any equipment located in the vicinity of the high hydrazine concentration, and no operational impact to the plant including Shutdown Cooling which is currently on RHR. The Unusual Event was declared under EAL HU3.1, Toxic/Flammable Gas Release Affecting Plant Operations. The licensee plans to issue a press release. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Lower Alloways Creek Township, State of New Jersey and State of Delaware. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATED FROM JOHN COOK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1305 EDT ON 4/21/2017 * * *

Salem Unit 2 terminated the Unusual Event at 1258 EDT on 4/21/17. The basis for termination was no longer restricting access to the containment after getting two sets of satisfactory air sample results. With the access restored, normal plant operations can resume and EAL HU3.1 is no longer applicable. The details of the sample results are: Fire Protection performed satisfactory results of no detectable Hydrazine (0.01 ppm with a NIOSH limit of 0.03 ppm) completed both at 1001 EDT and 1247 EDT at the following locations: - (3) at 130 ft. elevation - at 78 ft. in the bioshield - at 78 ft. outside the bioshield. Additional mitigating actions taken following U2 Containment evacuation were as follows: - FME screen installed on open manways for 21/23 S/G with additional plastic covering and tape to prevent further gas release into containment. - Modified Containment Purge in service to maximize ventilation in Containment. - 21/24 S/G draining to support filling and draining evolutions to reduce Hydrazine concentrations in the S/G's. - Releasing tags on the AFWST to commence filling and further support filling and draining evolutions on the U2 S/G's. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Arner), NRR EO (King), and IRD (Stapleton). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5268114 April 2017 16:45:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1357 (EDT) on April 14, 2017, an unplanned automatic start signal was generated for the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The station was in the process of transferring the 2C 4160 volt vital bus from the 24 Station Power Transformer (SPT) to the 23 SPT, which are the offsite power in-feeds for the 2C 4160 volt vital bus. The 24 SPT infeed breaker opened as expected; however, the 23 SPT infeed breaker failed to close. The failure to swap from the 24 SPT to 23 SPT resulted in a momentary loss of power to the 2C 4160 volt vital bus generating the automatic start signal for the 2C EDG. The 2C 4160 volt vital bus was automatically re-energized by the 2C EDG as expected. Abnormal operating procedures were entered for loss of the 2C 4160 volt vital bus. Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 1 operating at 100% power. All equipment operated as expected. At 1555 (EDT), 2C 4160 volt vital bus was reenergized from 24 SPT, and the 2C EDG was secured in accordance with station implementing procedures. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public. The Resident Inspector has been notified. The Lower Alloways Creek Township, State of New Jersey, and State of Delaware will be notified.
ENS 5258128 February 2017 16:24:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

On February 28, 2017 at 0930 (EST), a containment visual inspection was performed to identify the source of elevated RCS (Reactor Coolant System) leakage. A leak was identified between 13RC6 and 13SS661, 13 RCS hot leg sample isolation valves at 1000 (EST). These valves are manual isolation valves in the reactor coolant hot leg sample line. Leak isolation could not be initially verified and is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage. Salem Unit 1 entered Technical Specification 3.4.6.2a, RCS operational leakage, for the existence of pressure boundary leakage. This event is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) for 'The initiation of a plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications' and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) or 'Any event of condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers being seriously degraded.' The unit was placed in mode 3 at 1554 (EST) on 02/28/2017. This condition has no impact on public health and safety. Per Technical Specifications, the unit is proceeding to mode 5. The leak rate at the time of shutdown was 0.33 gpm. This event has no effect on Unit 2. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Creek Township, the State of New Jersey and the State of Delaware.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MATT MOG TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1144 EDT ON 4/14/17 * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract event report number 52581 made on 2/28/2017 at 1624 (EST). Previously, PSEG notified the NRC that Salem Unit 1 initiated a shutdown required by Technical Specifications (TS) for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure Boundary Leakage. Subsequent to the initial report, PSEG has determined that the leak occurred in tubing downstream of the design specification break between Safety Related, Nuclear Class 1, Seismic Class1 and Non-Safety-Related, Nuclear Class 2, Seismic Class 2. Therefore, the observed leakage is not RCS pressure boundary leakage as defined in the Salem Unit 1 Technical Specifications and in the tubing design classification specification. At the time of the event, during initial entry into the containment, the volume of steam present and the height of the break above the floor made it difficult to ascertain the location of the steam source with certainty. The initial judgment of RCS Pressure Boundary Leakage was conservative under these circumstances. The plant was taken offline to minimize radiation exposure when personnel operated the isolation valves. Following the shutdown, the leak was isolated. Based on an observed reduction in RCS leak rate and visual verification of leakage isolation, the TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was exited and the unit remained in Mode 3, Hot Standby, to affect repairs. The condition did not meet the Technical Specification Pressure Boundary Leakage definition of leakage through a non-isolable fault in a RCS component body, pipe wall or vessel wall. The leakage did not impact the ability to shut down the unit and no TS limits were exceeded during this event. Therefore, the plant shutdown to investigate and correct leakage from flawed sample system tubing does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and PSEG is retracting the notifications made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Jackson).

ENS 524712 January 2017 15:21:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a "for cause" fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5229411 October 2016 16:48:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 0938 (EDT), the watertight door in the Unit 1 Inboard Service Water Penetration Area was unable to be closed. The watertight door serves as a High Energy Line Break (HELB) and Medium Energy Line Break (MELB) barrier between the mechanical penetration room and the service water penetration room. A HELB/MELB event occurring in a room with its barrier door open could adversely affect equipment in an adjacent room. Consequently, a HELB/MELB event could have rendered equipment in the adjacent room inoperable. At 1005, station maintenance was able to successfully close and latch the door restoring the barrier. This event is being reported under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as, 'the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' An ENS notification is required if an unanalyzed condition occurred within 3 years of the date of discovery even if the event is not on-going at the time of discovery. The licensee notified Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN OSBORNE TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1545 EST ON 12/12/16 * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract event report number 52294 made on 10/11/2016 at 1648 (ET). Previously PSEG reported that Salem Unit 1 was determined to be in an unanalyzed condition due to being unable to close the Unit 1 Inboard Service Water Penetration Area Water Tight Door. The watertight door was reported to serve as a High Energy Line Break (HELB) and Medium Energy Line Break (MELB) barrier between the mechanical penetration room and the service water penetration room. Subsequent review identified that the condition did not meet the reporting criterion. Engineering evaluation determined that the service water penetration room had been previously evaluated for the impact due to a HELB event occurring in the adjacent mechanical penetration area with the watertight door open and that the event would not impact the operability of the service system. Engineering evaluation also determined that the Salem Unit 1 Design Basis does not require analysis of a MELB event occurring in the service water penetration room. This is due to the timing of the Unit 1 operating license issue date. At the time of the issuance of the Unit 1 operating license analysis of a MELB event was not required. Therefore an unanalyzed condition for a MELB event did not exist. Additionally while the door was difficult to close, it was able to be closed and dogged in a reasonable time interval (27 minutes), therefore, any potential internal flooding which would have been detected immediately by the attendant with required actions taken to close the door and isolate the leak rapidly. Therefore PSEG is retracting the notification made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Schroeder).

ENS 5224516 September 2016 12:17:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0858 (EDT) on September 16th, 2016, approximately 3 ounces of hydraulic fluid (fish oil) was spilled in front of the Unit Two Circulating Water System (CWS) Intake trash racks at the Salem Generating Station. The spill of hydraulic fluid (fish oil) was caused by a leak from the crane used to rake debris from the Unit Two trash racks. The crane was stopped and the leak terminated at the time of discovery. Nuclear Environmental Affairs Department determined a 4 hr report to the NRC, under RAL 11.8.2.a, was warranted due to the 15 minute notification to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection at 0913 (EDT). Nuclear Environmental Affairs Department intends to retract the report to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection based on the fluid remained within the Circulating Water System (CWS) Intake Structure. The licensee has notified the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the NRC Resident Inspector, and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
ENS 522223 September 2016 12:47:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 0902 EDT, on September 3, 2016, a leak developed from 13 Charging Pump seals that resulted in an unidentified leak rate of 1.3 gpm. Salem Unit 1 entered Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.b for unidentified leakage greater than 1 gpm. The Technical Specification requires the leak rate to be restored to below 1 gpm in a 4 hour period or place the Unit in Hot Standby in the next 6 hours and Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours. In addition there is an allowable total ECCS leakage outside of Containment value of 0.45 gpm associated with Control Room habitability to comply with GDC-19 (General Design Criteria) limits. 12 Charging Pump was placed in service and 13 Charging Pump was removed from service and isolated. The unidentified leak rate lowered to below the 0.45gpm requirement for the total ECCS leakage outside of containment and the Technical Specification value of 1 gpm. This event is being reported under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as 'the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety' for exceeding the 0.45gpm total ECCS leakage allowable in accordance with GDC-19 limitations. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MATT MOG TO STEVEN VITTO ON 11/02/2016 AT 0916 EDT * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract event report number 52222 made on 09/03/2016 at 1247 (EDT). Previously PSEG reported that Salem Unit 1 was in an unanalyzed condition due to a leak from the 13 Charging Pump seals exceeding the 0.45 gpm limit for total ECCS leakage outside containment associated with the Control Room Habitability analysis. A subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the post-accident ECCS leak rate from the 13 Charging Pump seals that would have existed is 0.33 gpm. This is within the limits of the existing Control Room Habitability analysis and no unanalyzed condition existed. Therefore, PSEG is retracting the notification made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Schroeder).

ENS 5221331 August 2016 18:12:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis 4-hour and 8-hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 had an unplanned automatic reactor trip and automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. The trip occurred due to the loss of the 21 reactor coolant pump (RCP) resulting in a reactor trip on low reactor coolant flow. The 21 RCP remains unavailable. The cause of the loss of the 21 reactor coolant pump is unknown at this time. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. All emergency core cooling systems and engineered safety feature systems functioned as expected. The auxiliary feed pumps started as expected. Salem Unit 2 is currently in Mode 3. Reactor coolant system pressure is at 2235 psig and temperature is 547 degrees Fahrenheit with decay heat removal via the main steam dumps and auxiliary feedwater systems. Unit 2 has no active technical specification action statements in effect requiring a lower mode of operation due to the transient. The 21 and 22 containment fan coil units (CFCU) were out of service for surveillance testing prior to the event. There was no major secondary equipment tagged for maintenance prior to the event. There were no personnel injuries as a result of this event. Normal offsite power is available to the site. There is no effect on Unit 1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5212928 July 2016 09:25:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

This four and eight hour notification is being made to report that at 0541 (EDT) on 7/28/16, Salem Unit 1 initiated a shutdown to comply with Technical Specifications due to the inoperability of both source range nuclear instruments. During a reactor startup, with Unit 1 in Mode 2, both source range instruments were reading approximately one decade lower than expected compared to intermediate range and Gamma-Metric instruments and due to the proximity to the estimated critical condition. The condition could also have prevented the fulfilment of the source range instruments safety function to trip the reactor when required. Salem Unit 1 is currently stable in Mode 3. Reactor Coolant system pressure is 2235 psig and reactor coolant system temperature is 547 F with decay heat removal via the main steam dump and auxiliary feedwater systems. Unit 1 has one active shutdown tech spec action statement in effect due to the inoperability of the containment radiation monitor 1R11A. The inoperability of this radiation monitor had no effect on the event. All control rods were manually inserted to place Unit 1 in Hot Standby (Mode 3). No ECCS (emergency core cooling system) or ESF (emergency safety features) systems were required to function during this event. No major secondary equipment was tagged for maintenance prior to this event. No personnel were injured during this event. The reactor was manually shut down and a shutdown margin calculation verified sufficient margin. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the local township.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MATT MOG TO VINCE KLCO ON 9/26/16 AT 1519 EDT * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract event report number 52129 made on 7/28/2016 at 0925 (EDT). Previously PSEG reported that Salem Unit 1 initiated a shutdown to comply with Technical Specifications (TS) due to the inoperability of both source range nuclear instruments. Additionally PSEG reported that the condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function needed to, 'Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.' Subsequent review identified that the condition did not meet either reporting criteria. Maintenance and Engineering evaluation of the source range nuclear instruments determined that the instruments were fully operable at the time of the event. TS 3.3.1.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation remained met, no TS shutdown was required and the instruments were capable of performing their required function. Therefore PSEG is retracting the notifications made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. Notified the R1DO (Cook).

ENS 5204828 June 2016 06:58:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis 4 and 8 hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 suffered an unplanned automatic reactor trip and subsequent automatic auxiliary feedwater system actuation. The trip was initiated due to a Main Turbine Trip above P-9 (49% power). The Main Turbine trip was caused by a Main Generator Protection signal. Salem unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3. Reactor coolant system pressure is 2235 psig and Reactor Coolant System temperature is 547 F with decay heat removal via the main steam dump and auxiliary feedwater systems. Unit 2 has no active shutdown tech spec action statements in effect. All control rods (fully) inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) and ESF (Emergency Safety Features) systems functioned as expected. No safety related equipment or major secondary equipment was tagged for maintenance prior to this event. No personnel were injured during this event. The main generator protection signal was either a ground fault or a differential current trip. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. No safeties or relief valves lifted during this event. Unit 1 is defueled and was not affected by this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
ENS 5200715 June 2016 15:14:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis is to report the Salem Unit 1, 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) actuation due to an invalid signal. This report is being made per paragraphs 10CFR50.73 (a)(1) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address the invalid actuation of the 1B EDG on April 17, 2016, during replacement of an indicating bulb. Plant conditions; Salem Unit 1 was in mode 6 at the time of the invalid actuation. On April 17, 2016, at approximately 2055 (EDT) while performing Solid State Protection System (SSPS) testing of the 1B Safeguards Equipment Cabinet (SEC), operators identified that an input test light was not lit as expected. At approximately 2104 (EDT) while attempting to replace the light bulb, the 1B EDG unexpectedly automatically started. The 1B EDG responded properly to the auto start signal and started in SEC Mode 1, accident only, and did not load. The cause of the inadvertent start was determined to be a loss of the block circuit which allowed an output to the logic module which then caused the EDG to auto start. Subsequent testing of the input block switches demonstrated that, due to switch degradation, slight pressure applied to the switch was enough to allow the block signal to be momentarily interrupted, even without repositioning of the switch. It was determined that the loss of the block was most likely due to the operators finger coming in contact with the switch during the bulb replacement. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify the State of New Jersey and Delaware.
ENS 519023 May 2016 16:04:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopWith Salem Unit One in a defueled condition during a planned refueling outage, anomalies were identified on baffle-former bolts while conducting a scheduled visual inspection of reactor vessel internals. Due to the visual anomalies, PSEG commenced ultrasonic inspection of the baffle-former bolts to determine the extent of condition and determine a repair plan. Based on initial results of ultrasonic inspections received on May 03, 2016, this condition was determined to be reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), since the as-found conditions were not previously analyzed. Additional details regarding the extent of condition will be supplied in the 60 day report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The licensee will notify State and local government agencies as appropriate.
ENS 519013 May 2016 15:40:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed employee supervisor violated the fitness-for-duty policy during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been denied. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5173816 February 2016 13:44:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0827 (EST), the 21 and 22 Aux Feedwater pumps auto started due to a trip of the running Steam Generator Feed pump (22). The 22 Steam Generator Feed pump tripped while swapping from heating steam to main steam in accordance with normal operating procedures. The cause of the 22 Steam Generator Feed pump trip is being investigated at this time. The auto start of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater pumps is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any system listed in Technical Basis 11.3.3 except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
ENS 5173414 February 2016 23:13:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis 4-hour and 8-hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 had an unplanned automatic reactor trip. The trip occurred because the Unit 2 main generator tripped on generator protection with reactor power greater than P-9 (49%). The cause of the generator protection trip that resulted in the reactor trip is unknown at this time. A troubleshooting team is being assembled to determine the exact cause for the generator protection actuation. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS and ESF systems functioned as expected. The motor driven and steam driven auxiliary feed pumps started as expected on steam generator low level. Salem Unit 2 is currently in mode 3. Reactor Coolant System pressure is at 2235 psig and temperature is 547 degrees Fahrenheit with decay heat removal via the main steam dumps and auxiliary feedwater systems. Unit 2 has no active technical specification action statement in effect requiring a lower mode of operation. No safety related equipment or major secondary plant equipment was tagged for maintenance prior to the event. There were no personnel injuries as a result of this event. There was no impact on Salem Unit 1. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and will inform the Lower Alloways Creek Township (LAC).
ENS 517084 February 2016 13:33:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis 4 and 8 hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 suffered an unplanned automatic reactor trip and subsequent automatic Auxiliary Feedwater system actuation. The trip was initiated due to a Main Turbine trip above P-9 (49% power). The Main Turbine trip was caused by a Main Generator Protection signal. Salem Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3. Reactor Coolant system pressure is 2235 PSIG and Reactor Coolant system temperature is 547 F with decay heat removal via the Main Steam Dump and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. Unit 2 has no active shutdown tech spec action statements in effect. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS and ESF systems functioned as expected. No major secondary equipment was tagged for maintenance prior to this event. The 24 Service Water pump is tagged for scheduled preventive maintenance and did not affect post trip plant response. No personnel were injured during this event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloway Creek Township.
ENS 5166319 January 2016 17:42:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

On January 19, 2016, while reviewing outage data, plant staff recognized that anomalous data collected in October, 2015, for the 21 Auxiliary Feed Pump time response loop resulted in an unanalyzed condition. Preliminary investigation has revealed that the condition most likely existed since April 20, 2015, when maintenance activities were performed on the auxiliary feedwater pump discharge pressure transmitter. Consequently, there were multiple instances when one of the other auxiliary feedwater pumps was removed from service, thus creating a condition which did not meet the accident analysis assumptions for auxiliary feedwater flow initial response. This event is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as 'the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' This condition was corrected on November 20, 2015. The auxiliary feedwater pump discharge pressure transmitter instrument isolation valve was inadvertently left closed after the April 20, 2015 maintenance. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the State of New Jersey, State of Delaware, and the local township.

  • * * RETRACTED ON 3/10/16 AT 1647 EST FROM JACK OSBORNE TO DONG PARK * * *

This event is being retracted. An engineering review determined that while the auxiliary feedwater flow loop response time test results did not meet the procedural acceptance criteria, the accident analysis assumptions remained valid. The ATWS (Anticipated Transient Without Scram) was the limiting accident, and the loop response time results were still bounded by the existing analyses. The failed loop response time did result in a condition prohibited by TS which will be reported in a Licensee Event Report (LER). This condition has been documented in the licensee's Corrective Action Program. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis).

ENS 5162428 December 2015 08:38:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis is to report the Salem Unit 2, 2C Safeguards Equipment Cabinet (SEC) actuation due to an invalid signal. This report is being made per paragraphs 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address the invalid actuation of the 2C SEC on October 29, 2015, during performance of maintenance on the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). Plant conditions: Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 6 at the time of the invalid actuation. On October 29, 2015, at approximately 1112 (EDT) during performance of maintenance to replace slave relays in the SSPS output test panel 131, the maintenance technician inadvertently made contact with the relay plunger for the 2C SEC. This caused a signal to be sent to the 2C SEC which actuated the equipment associated with it. The 2C SEC train responded to the signal as required. The equipment associated with the 2C SEC that was not previously removed from service for outage related activities or already in service responded as required. As a result of the actuation, the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started but did not load (no undervoltage condition existed on the associated vital bus requiring loading), the Unit 2 Emergency Control Air Compressor (ECAC) started. The 22 Charging Pump (CVC) started, and the 22 Safety Injection Pump (SI) started (the Sl pump did not inject as it was isolated and in the process of being tagged out of service at the time of the invalid signal). The cause of the invalid actuation signal was a human performance error. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5156323 November 2015 22:41:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 2148 EST on November 23, 2015, Salem Unit 2 declared an Unusual Event due to reactor coolant system leakage greater than 10 gallons per minute. While performing troubleshooting to determine the source of leakage from the Emergency Core Cooling System high head safety injection piping, a motor operated valve was opened and the high head piping relief valve lifted. Indications in the control room calculated the leak rate at 16 gallons per minute based on the change in Pressurizer level. The leak was terminated when the motor operated valve was closed and the relief valve reseated. The time (duration) of the leak was about one minute." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, and NICC Watch Officer. E-mailed FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0105 EST ON 11/24/15 FROM BILLY MOWER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0100 EST on 11/24/15. The licensee will be cooling down and depressurizing to mode 5 in order to replace the affected valve. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector as well as the New Jersey State police, Delaware State Police and local emergency dispatch. Notified the R1DO (Dwyer), NRR EO (Morris), IRD MOC (Stapleton), DHS SWO, FEMA Ops enter, and NICC Watch Officer. E-mailed FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN OSBORNE TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0341 EST ON 11/24/15 * * *

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). 'Any event of condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident,' due to inoperability of both trains of the Emergency Core Cooling System high head safety injection systems. The unusual event was exited at 0100 (EST) on November 24th, 2015, when the Emergency Core Cooling System high head safety injection piping inlet valves were closed, ensuring isolation of the relief valve. The criteria for exit was leakage rate was below the 10 GPM rate. The plant is in mode 3 cooling down to mode 5. The licensee notified the states of New Jersey and Delaware, Lower Alloways Township, and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Dwyer).

ENS 5150428 October 2015 13:26:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0628 (EDT) on 10/28/15, the Salem Unit 1 Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System (CREACS) train was declared inoperable due to the results of charcoal filter testing not meeting the surveillance requirement. Prior to declaring the Unit 1 train inoperable, the system was operating in the single train filtration operation mode due to refueling outage activities being performed on Unit 2 with the Unit 2 CREACS train inoperable. This resulted in both units' CREACS trains being inoperable. Prior to the event on 10/28/15, Salem Unit 1 was operating in Mode 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 was in Mode 6 with fuel movement in progress. At 0628, Unit 1 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3, and Unit 2 suspended fuel movement to comply with Technical Specification 3.7.6 (Modes 5 and 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies), action c. The Unit 2 train was placed in service at 0755, allowing Unit 1 to exit Technical Specification 3.0.3. Operators continued to align the Unit 2 CREACS to single train filtration operation to comply with Unit 1 Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.6.1, Action a. Actions to place the Unit 2 CREACS in single train filtration operation were completed at 0950. This 8 hour notification is being made pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for 'any condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to : (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.' The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5134926 August 2015 16:30:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn 8/26/2015 at 1215 (EDT), a review of the Salem Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis in response to the Byron Event Notification #51334 and Braidwood Event Notification #51335, identified a fire scenario that could cause spurious operation of the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) (PR1 and PR2) and also prevent the ability to close the PORV block valves (PR6 and PR7) until AC power is restored to close the block valves. This scenario would result in the loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory and pressure control that is not accounted for in safe shutdown analysis. The above fire scenario is applicable to a fire in the Control Room and Relay Room fire areas. Hourly fire watches of the Relay Room have been implemented. In addition, the Control Room is continuously staffed by the Operating Shift. In addition, the Relay Room is equipped with automatic detection and suppression. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), for 'any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Township, the State of New Jersey and the State of Delaware.
ENS 512905 August 2015 18:51:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis 4-hour and 8-hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 had an unplanned automatic reactor trip. The trip occurred because the 2H 4kV infeed breaker tripped on over current protection which deenergized the 2H 4kV group bus resulting in a reactor trip on reactor coolant flow due to the loss of the 21 reactor coolant pump (RCP). The 21 RCP remains unavailable. The cause of the over current protection trip on the 2H 4kV infeed breaker is unknown at this time. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS (emergency core cooling systems) and ESF (engineered safety feature) systems functioned as expected. The auxiliary feed pumps started as expected. Salem Unit 2 is currently in Mode 3. Reactor coolant system pressure is at 2235 psig and temperature is 547 degrees Fahrenheit with decay heat removal via the main steam dumps and auxiliary feedwater systems. Unit 2 has no active technical specification action statements in effect requiring a lower mode of operation due to the transient. The 22 auxiliary building supply fan was tagged for maintenance prior to this event and has no adverse impact of the post trip plant response or stabilization. There was no major secondary equipment tagged for maintenance prior to the event. There were no personnel injuries as a result of this event. There is no physical evidence of damage to the 2H 4kV bus based on visual observations and thermography. Normal offsite power is available to the site. There is no effect on Unit 1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township Police Department.
ENS 5122211 July 2015 18:46:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 1810 (EDT), the Salem unit 1 control room received an alarm that a CO2 discharge occurred in the Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Rooms on the 84 foot elevation in the Auxiliary Building. The control room referred to the OHA (Overhead Annunciator) response procedure S1.OP-AR.ZZ.0001 for OHA A-8, 'Fire Prot CO2/Halon Disch.' The ARP (Alarm Response Procedure) directed implementation of the S1.OP-AB.Fire-0001 procedure and control room ventilation was shifted to the 'fire outside' mode of operation. The on site fire protection team responded to the area and confirmed the CO2 discharge. The (on site) fire department determined that there was no fire and no smoke in the area of the discharge. The Fire Brigade Liaison inspected the equipment and determined that there was no adverse impact to any equipment located in the vicinity of the discharge and no operational impact on the plant. All systems responded as expected. There were no personnel injuries as a result of the discharge. Atmosphere in the area of the discharge has been verified normal and no restrictions to the area are in place. The cause of the discharge was determined to be a faulty detector. No off site response was requested and an hourly firewatch will be initiated until the detector is repaired. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified the states of Delaware and New Jersey. Notified DHS, FEMA Operations Center, and NICC and e-mailed Nuclear SSA and FEMA National Watch Center.

  • * * UPDATE AT 2206 ON 7/11/15 FROM MARK FIOCCO TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The Unusual Event was terminated at 2154 EDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the states of Delaware and New Jersey. Notified IRD (Stapleton), R1DO (Cahill), NRR (Morris), DHS, FEMA Operations Center, and NICC and e-mailed Nuclear SSA and FEMA National Watch Center.

ENS 5117022 June 2015 20:55:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1406 (EDT) on 6/22/15, the chemistry sample results for the Salem Unit 1 Containment Spray Additive tank were below the minimum Technical Specification requirement for NaOH (Sodium Hydroxide) concentration. The Containment Spray Additive tank was declared inoperable at that time in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.2.2.a. Based on the fact that there is no redundant equipment for the Containment Spray Additive tank, this condition could have prevented this Safety System from Controlling the Release of Radioactive Material and Mitigating the consequences of an accident. This event is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to Control the Release of Radioactive Material and Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident.' Actions are being taken to restore the NaOH concentration to within the Technical Specification limits. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident. No one was injured as a result of the event. The licensee will notify the Lower Alloways Township.
ENS 5089615 March 2015 13:29:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

This 4 hour notification is being made pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), for 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications'. Salem Unit 1 has initiated a unit shutdown at 1227 (EDT) in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.2.3, Action A, for inoperability of the 14 Containment Fan Cooler Unit. Technical Specification 3.6.2.3, Action A requires that with one or two Containment Fan Cooler Units inoperable, operability must be restored within 7 days, or be in at least Hot Standby (Mode 3) within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) within the following 30 hours. The 14 Containment Fan Cooler Unit was declared inoperable on March 8, 2015, at 1158 EDT, following a trip of its low speed breaker on thermal overload during a scheduled surveillance test.

13 Chiller is tagged for scheduled maintenance. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 1 is proceeding to Mode 5. There is no effect on Unit 2. The licensee will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township, the State of New Jersey, and the State of Delaware.

ENS 5057329 October 2014 13:54:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 0711 EDT, Salem Unit 2 entered TSAS (Technical Specification Action Statement) 3.0.3 due to the Salem Unit 1 - 1B Vital instrument bus inverter failing which resulted in a loss of the Unit 1 - 1B Vital instrument bus. The loss of power to the 1B Vital instrument bus resulted in Salem Unit 2 initiating the accident pressurized mode of control room ventilation. All dampers and fans repositioned correctly with the exception of the Unit 1 Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System (CREACS) intake dampers, 1CAA48, 50, and 51. The 1CAA48 was pinned closed to support Unit 1 - 1A125VDC scheduled maintenance. The 1CAA50 and 51 failed to move to the open position (required for Unit 2 accident pressurized mode) due to the loss of power to the 1B Vital Instrument Bus. With the 1CAA48, 50 and 51 dampers closed, this isolated the Unit 1 CREACS intake in the closed position. For an accident in Unit 2, the CREACS intake for Unit 1 is required to open. Salem Unit 2 exited TSAS 3.0.3 at 0822 EDT when the 1CAA50 and 51 were pinned in the open position to implement accident pressurized mode for Salem Unit 2 in accordance with S1/S2.OP-SO.CAV-0001, Control Area Ventilation Operation. Salem Unit One is Defueled. This event is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to perform mitigation of the consequences of an accident.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. No one was injured as a result of the failure of 1B Vital instrument inverter. The licensee notified Lower Alloways Township.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM BILL MUFFLEY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1529 EST ON 12/22/14 * * *

A subsequent review of the condition reported on 10/29/2014 in EN 50573 determined that the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System (CREACS) was operable and capable of performing its safety function. Therefore, there was no reportable condition. Circuit analysis identified that the Unit 2 Control Room Intake Isolation (CRIX) Train B circuit remained fully functional and able to respond to a Unit 2 Safety Injection (SI) signal or actuation from radiation monitor 2R1B Channel 1 (radiation levels in the Unit 2 normal Control Area Ventilation intake). The loss of the 1B vital instrument bus did not affect the normal actuation circuitry. The appropriate Unit 1 dampers would have received an open signal and the appropriate Unit 2 dampers would have received a closed signal, thereby isolating the Unit 2 CREACS intake and opening the Unit 1 CREACS intake. Thus, the CREACS would have been capable of mitigating the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Ferdas).

ENS 5055020 October 2014 01:36:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

This is an 8-hour notification being made to report that a valid ESF (emergency safety features) auxiliary feed water system actuation occurred. Salem Unit 1 was in mode 1 at 19% reactor power and executed a planned manual reactor trip to begin a scheduled refueling outage (1R23). The 11, 12, and 13 AFW (auxiliary feedwater) pumps were not in service prior to the reactor trip and as a result, narrow range levels in 12, 13, and 14 steam generators reached 14% before recovering. This resulted in a valid ESF actuation for low steam generator water level. Steam generator water levels were restored to normal post trip values as part of the procedurally directed response to a reactor trip. All safety related equipment was operational before the reactor trip and AFW actuation and responded as required. There were no equipment failures that contributed to this event. There were no personnel injuries as a result of' this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. A transformer alarm caused the operators to trip the reactor prior to reaching the step in the procedure to start the AFW pumps.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN OSBORNE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1555 EST ON 11/24/2014 * * *

On October 20, 2014 at 0136 EDT, Salem Unit 1 reported an 8 hour notification of a valid ESF Auxiliary Feed Water System actuation following a manual reactor trip at the start of the S1R23 refueling outage. After additional review it was determined that the manual reactor trip met the criteria for a four hour report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical...'. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Noggle).

ENS 5052712 October 2014 13:07:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 0226 (EDT on 10/12/14), the 25 Service Water Pump Traveling Screen differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV was discovered closed while performing the monthly bubbler blow down activity. The associated 25 Service Water Pump was operable at this time. The differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV, in the closed/discovered position would have prevented the operation of the 25 Service Water Traveling Screen due to high differential pressure. The 25 Service Water Traveling Screen needs to be operable to support 25 Service Water Pump operability. 25 Service Water Pump Traveling Water Screen was restored to operable after differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV was reopened. The station subsequently verified all Unit 1 and 2 high side and low side differential pressure transmitter valves positions were correct. At 0600 (EDT on 10/12/14), it was identified that the last manipulation of differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV was on 9/7/14. Based on the last known manipulation it is assumed that differential pressure transmitter high side valve, 2LD2729-HIV remained closed from that time until the condition was discovered. Review of other activities performed from 9/7/2014 to present determined that surveillance testing of 21 Service Water Pump resulted in 21, 22, and 23 Service Water Pumps being inoperable on 9/18/2014 for several hours. During that surveillance, combined with the mis-positioned instrument valve on 25 Service Water Pump, five of the six Service Water Pumps would have been inoperable which may have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. This event is being reported under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to remove residual heat.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. No one was injured as a result of the failure of 25 Service Water Traveling Screen inoperability.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM ROBERT CORDREY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1543 EST ON 12/2/2014 * * *

The purpose of this call is to retract event number 50527. On October 12, 2014, at 1307 EDT, notification was made to the NRC Operations Center by Salem Unit 2 reporting a condition under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: ...(D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.' Subsequent to this report, Salem Unit 2 determined that the condition in which the 25 Service Water (SW) pump may have been considered inoperable, in conjunction with the other SW loop being out of service, was not occurring at the time of discovery and was thus not reportable under the reporting requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Further analysis of the event determined that the valve mis-positioning of the 25 SW pump traveling screen differential pressure transmitter which defeated the auto-start function of the traveling screen, did not impair the safety function of the traveling screen to minimize carryover of debris to the suction of the 25 SW pump. Thus, during the time in question, the 25 SW pump remained operable which maintained one loop of SW operable during the period of time the other service water loop was removed from service for pump testing. One loop of SW with two pumps operable from different safety related buses is capable of performing the safety function of the SW system during a design basis accident. This event is not considered a safety system functional failure and is not reportable to the NRC under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) or 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Dentel)

ENS 505083 October 2014 17:44:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA Supplemental Supervisor failed a random Fitness For Duty test as determined by the Medical Review Officer. Unescorted access has been revoked pending review. Work performance investigation will be conducted. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(2)(i). The licensee will notify the State of New Jersey and Delaware. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5040527 August 2014 09:13:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0243 (EDT on 8/27/14) the '11' Safety Injection pump breaker was tagged for scheduled maintenance on the 11SJ34, and the control room entered TSAS 3.5.2.b, action 'A' - a 72 hr LCO. The control room recognized the time line for the repair would require filling the '14' SI Accumulator prior to work completion. The CRS (Control Room Supervisor) decided to perform the '14' SI Accumulator makeup prior to commencing work on the 11SJ34, and directed the NCOs (Nuclear Control Operators) to start the '12' SI pump and make up to the '14' SI Accumulator in accordance with procedure SI.OP-SO.SJ-0002. At 0248, TSAS 3.0.3 was entered when the '12' Safety Injection pump failed to start on demand. At 0301, the '11' Safety Injection pump was restored to service and declared operable and TSAS 3.0.3 was exited. TSAS 3.5.2.b, action 'A' remains in effect due to the '12' Safety Injection pump being inoperable. This event is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to perform mitigation of the consequences of an accident. Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. No one was injured as a result of the failure of the '12' Safety Injection pump breaker. The licensee will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
ENS 501766 June 2014 12:50:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSalem Unit 2 has early vintage Model 93A Reactor Coolant Pumps (twenty, one-inch bolt configuration). The Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) have been removed and are being inspected to resolve issues associated with the failure of bolts which secure the turning vane assembly to the thermal barrier. Inspections have identified turning vane assembly detachment and dropping of the reactor coolant pump turning vane diffuser on the 23 RCP. The inspections identified evidence of slight contact between the impeller and the diffuser. Salem Unit 2 has had no indications to date of adverse operating conditions of any RCPs due to turning vane assembly detachment which would compromise plant safety. This condition has been evaluated against the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. It has been determined that the condition does not rise to the significance necessitating a report under any specific requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. PSEG is voluntarily reporting this condition IAW with NUREG 1022, Section 4.2.2 so that the NRC and the industry will be informed. The other three RCPs in Unit 2 are currently undergoing evaluation to determine if the same condition exists on them. Based on the findings of those evaluations, the licensee will determine whether reporting under 10 CFR 21 is warranted. Salem Unit 1 has the same model RCPs but they have a different bolt configuration (1.5 inch versus 1 inch) and they have not exhibited the bolt failures exhibited by the Unit 2 pumps. The licensee has notified the State of New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering and will be notifying the Lower Alloways Creek township and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5011414 May 2014 17:58:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1705 (EDT) on May13th, 2014, approximately 5 gallons of diesel fuel oil was spilled onto the ground on the south side of the Service Water Intake structure at the Salem Generating Station. The spill of diesel fuel was caused by a leak from the fuel supply line to the service water hot air furnace. The leak was isolated at the time of discovery and the spill terminated. The diesel fuel oil cleanup is in progress by Clean Harbors personnel and will continue until the spill has been remediated. Nuclear Environmental Affairs Department determined a 4 hr report to the NRC under RAL 11.8.2.a. was warranted due to the 15 minute notification to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection at 1651 (EDT) on May 14, 2014. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 500927 May 2014 07:45:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis 4 and 8 hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 1 experienced an unplanned automatic reactor trip and subsequent Auxiliary Feedwater System actuation. The automatic trip was initiated from a generator protection relay. A troubleshooting team is being assembled to determine the exact cause for the generator protection actuation. 11, 12 and 13 Aux Feedwater Pumps automatically started as expected on low Steam Generator water level following the reactor trip. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS and ESF systems functioned as expected. Salem Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3. Reactor Coolant system pressure is at 2235 PSIG and temperature is 547 F with decay heat removal via the Main Steam Dumps and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. Condenser vacuum was available for the duration of the event. The 12 Chiller was tagged for maintenance prior to this event and had no adverse impact on the post trip plant response or stabilization. No personnel were injured during this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
ENS 5003916 April 2014 10:48:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0908 EDT on April 16th, 2014, approximately one pint of hydraulic fluid was spilled into the Delaware River in front of the Unit One Circulating Water System (CWS) Intake trash racks at the Salem Generating Station. The spill of hydraulic fluid was caused by a leak from the crane used to rake debris from the Unit One trash racks. The crane was stopped and the leak terminated at the time of discovery. The oil was cleaned up by onsite personnel at 0930 EDT. Nuclear Environmental Affairs Department determined a 4 hr report to the NRC under RAL 11.8.2.a. was warranted due to the 15 minute notification to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection at 0922 EDT. Additionally, a report of the spill was made to the National Response Center at 1034 EDT. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5003213 April 2014 23:49:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis 4 and 8 hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 1 experienced an unplanned automatic reactor trip and subsequent Auxiliary Feedwater system actuation. The automatic trip was initiated from a generator protection relay. A walkdown of the main generator and all protection circuitry has been completed with no visible problems identified. A troubleshooting team is being assembled to determine the exact cause for the generator protection actuation. 11, 12, and 13 Aux Feedwater Pumps automatically started as expected on low Steam Generator water level following the reactor trip. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS and ESF systems functioned as expected. Salem Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3. Reactor Coolant System pressure is at 2235 psig and temperature is 547 degrees F with decay heat removal via the main steam dumps and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. There was no major primary or secondary equipment tagged for maintenance prior to this event. Condenser vacuum and Steam Generator Feed Pumps were available for the duration of the event. No personnel were injured during this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Unit 2 is in a refueling outage and was unaffected by the Unit 1 trip.
ENS 500128 April 2014 23:13:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis 4 and 8 hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 1 has performed an unplanned manual reactor trip and subsequent Auxiliary Feedwater system actuation. The trip was initiated due to loss of Steam Generator water level (SGWL) following the loss of one of the running SGFPs (#11 Steam Generator Feed Pump). The reactor was manually tripped prior to reaching the automatic SGWL low setpoints. #11/12/13 Aux Feedwater Pumps automatically started following the reactor trip on low Steam Generator water level. Salem Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3. Reactor Coolant system pressure is at 2235 PSIG and temperature is 547 degrees Fahrenheit with decay heat removal via the Main Steam Dumps and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. Unit 1 has no active shutdown technical specification action statements in effect. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) and ESF (Engineered Safety Feature) systems functioned as expected. There was no major primary or secondary equipment tagged for maintenance prior to this event. No personnel were injured during this event. The licensee will inform the Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 498725 March 2014 11:10:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA licensed employee had a confirmed positive for cocaine during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been restricted. Notified R1DO (Bower).
ENS 4982714 February 2014 08:12:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn February 14, 2014 at 0113 EST, all Meteorological Tower data for wind direction was lost for Hope Creek and Salem Units 1 and 2. The loss of wind direction data occurred from environmental conditions during a period of heavy snowfall and ice accumulation. Valid wind direction from Meteorological Tower data input to the Hope Creek Safety Parameter Display System was observed to return at 0246 EST, and was confirmed by visual observation of wind direction onsite. The loss of Meteorological Tower data had no effect on plant operations and all units (Hope Creek and Salem Units 1 and 2) remain at 100% power. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The NRC Resident Inspectors has been notified.
ENS 4978031 January 2014 11:44:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis 4-hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 has performed an unplanned manual reactor trip. The trip was initiated due to reactor coolant temperature approaching the minimum temperature for criticality, 543 degree F, due to boration to achieve shutdown margin requirements following identification of a misaligned control rod. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) and ESF (Engineered Safety Features) systems functioned as expected with no equipment actuated. The 21 safety injection pump was out of service for scheduled maintenance during the event as was the 2R41 plant vent radiation monitor. Salem Unit 2 is currently in Mode 3. Reactor coolant system pressure is at 2235 psig and temperature is 547 degrees F with decay heat removal via the main steam dump and auxiliary feedwater systems. Unit 2 has no active shutdown technical specification action statements in effect. There was no major secondary equipment tagged for maintenance prior to the event. Prior to the event, the licensee was conducting their monthly control rod surveillance. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted during the transient. The electrical grid is stable and the plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. There was no effect on Unit 1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of New Jersey, the State of Delaware and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
ENS 496997 January 2014 13:12:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt approximately 0745 on January 7, 2014, a review of maintenance activities performed on October 3, 2013 on Salem Unit 2, identified an instance in which a High Energy Line Break (HELB) barrier access door was not properly controlled during a Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump room maintenance activity. A HELB event occurring in a room with its barrier door open could adversely affect equipment in an adjacent room. The steam supply to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was not isolated in support of the maintenance activities and the room HELB barrier door was not properly controlled during maintenance in the room. Consequently, a HELB event occurring in the Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump room with the impaired barrier door, could have rendered the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed water Pump and both of the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps in the adjacent room inoperable. This event is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as "the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety." An ENS notification is required if an unanalyzed condition occurred within 3 years of the date of discovery even if the event is not on-going at the time of discovery. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident. The licensee also will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
ENS 4953914 November 2013 16:08:00SalemNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA review of industry operating experience regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits has determined the described condition is applicable to the Salem Nuclear Power Plant resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. The original plant wiring design and associated analysis for ammeters associated with the station batteries are not provided with overcurrent protection features to limit the fault current. A postulated fire that results in a short to ground concurrent with an opposite polarity short from the same battery could result in excessive current flow (i.e., heating) in the ammeter wiring. This excessive current could result in a secondary fire in another fire area. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and cause loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. The areas affected are the Control Room, Relay Rooms and 460 Volt Switchgear Rooms. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures (i.e., fire watches) have been implemented for the affected areas of the plant. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.