|Entered date||Site||Region||Reactor type||Event description|
|ENS 53771||3 December 2018 19:56:00||Reed College||NRC Region 0||Violation of Technical Specification 6.1.3, which requires the minimum staffing when the reactor is not secured to be a licensed reactor operator, and another individual. The key was inserted at 1316 PST and removed at 1325 PST and reinserted at 1327 PST and removed at 1331 PST on December 1, 2018. The reactor operator was trying to complete the reactor startup checklist, but was alone. No rods were withdrawn during this period.|
|ENS 53725||8 November 2018 16:51:00||Reed College||NRC Region 0||The following is a synopsis of a notification received from Reed College: The licensee made an official notification of a violation of technical specification (TS) 6.1.3 a 1 as well as TS 1, which defines the reactor as operating when it is not shutdown or secured. The Reactor Operator (RO) left the control room for approximately 30 seconds while the reactor was subcritical but not secured. Per the TS definition, the reactor is not secured if the reactor console key is in the console. The RO immediately returned to the control room and removed the key and ensured the reactor scrammed. The Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) was in the next room and was informed. Another SRO was in the control room but was not requalified.|
|ENS 52896||10 August 2017 16:40:00||Reed College||NRC Region 0||I'm calling under Technical Specification 126.96.36.199 to report a potential Technical Specification violation. The relevant Technical Specifications are 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, specifically related to a non-operational power monitoring channel. Because this channel was inoperable at low powers, the source interlock was not capable of performing its intended function. Potential violations occurred an August 1st, 3rd, and 4th. The condition was identified on August 9th. The licensee notified the NRC Project Manager (Wertz).|
|ENS 52306||19 October 2016 16:27:00||Reed College||NRC Region 0||On October 18th, 2016, the logarithmic channel was rendered inoperable when a ground wire became detached from the log pre-amp. This, in combination with the pre-amps close proximity to other electrical wires, created enough noise to make the log channel reading unreliable. The reactor was operated for over an hour before the malfunction was identified. At that point, the reactor was scrammed and secured. The compromised ground was discovered and replaced, and the pre-amp was placed on a platform away from the interference of the other electrical components. This log channel reading returned to normal, but operations were still suspended until the channel could be more thoroughly tested. A Corrective Action Report (CAR) was initiated. This is a violation of Technical Specifications 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 4.2(e). This report to the NRC Operations Center is required by Technical Specification 6.2.2. The licensee has notified the NRC Project Manager (Wertz).|
|ENS 49554||18 November 2013 16:24:00||Reed College||NRC Region 4|
At 12:11 pm on 11/16/2013, the console key was found inserted and unattended in the console. Based on the log book, the key had been unattended since 11:00 am 11/16/2013. The relevant Technical Specification is: 6.1.3 (Staffing): the minimum staffing when the reactor is operating shall be: a licensed reactor operator in the control room. The control room was locked. There was no unauthorized access while the key was unattended. There was no reactivity manipulation while the key was unattended. We (the licensee) have started a corrective action report.
(The licensee notified NRC) Project Manager Geoff Wertz.
|ENS 44840||8 February 2009 20:18:00||Reed College||NRC Region 4|
Performing routine thermal power calibration of nuclear instruments at indicated power of 230 kW per SOP-33. Calculation indicated actual power of 263 kW after collecting data. Licensed power limit is 250 kW. No apparent cause for the calibration error. (The previous) calibration was successfully done on January 16, 2009. The reactor was shutdown. All systems functioned as required. The licensee noted that the pool temperature was about 7 degrees Celsius cooler than the historical pool temperature. The licensee will notify the NRR Project Manager and the State of Oregon.
The licensee re-performed the thermal calibration per SOP-33 to check results obtained on 2-08-09. The difference this time is the licensee extended the calibration for a much longer period (approximately 7 hours). The licensee has determined that data obtained during the first 30 to 60 minutes of calibration indicated erratic information. (The licensee has) concluded that when (the reactor was) operating on 2-08-09 at an indicated power of 230 KW, actual power was 245 KW. (This power) is less than (the reactor's) licensed limit of 250 KW. Thus Reed did not violate its licensed power limit on 2-08-09 as previously reported. SOP-33 will be revised to avoid this error in the future. Notified the NRR PM (Hughes via e-mail) and NRR EO (Lee). R4DO (Miller) was notified for information.
|ENS 44372||29 July 2008 14:30:00||Reed College||NRC Region 4||Performing calorimetric power calibration of nuclear instruments with a new fuel element installed per SOP-44. Indicated power was 230kW. Calculated power after 70 minutes was 281kW, in excess of licensed power of 250kW. Also, due to miscalibration the 110% scrams on linear and percent power would not occur until an actual power of 124%. Reactor power was lowered and another calibration confirmed the error. The reactor was shutdown and the NRR Project Manager (Dan Hughes) was called.|