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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 538616 February 2019 02:22:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3On February 5, 2019, at 1804 (CST), during a Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) operability surveillance, a fuse blew in the logic for the motor speed changer for the turbine. The Unit 1 HPCI system was taken out of service for planned maintenance earlier in the day. The fuse issue was not related to any maintenance activities. Had HPCI been demanded, this fuse failure would not have allowed HPCI to reach its required speed. HPCI remains inoperable pending resolution of the issue. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was confirmed operable. There were no other systems inoperable at the time of the event. HPCI had been last successfully tested on November 6, 2018. This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCI system is a single train system and the loss of HPCI could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Inoperable HPCI places the unit in a 14 day Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operability.
ENS 5369324 October 2018 17:45:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3On October 24, 2018 at 0901 CDT, during performance of the 'Functional Test of Unit 1 Second Level Undervoltage,' a loss of Bus 13-1 and Bus 18 occurred. The 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) automatically started due to a valid actuation on loss of power to Bus 13-1, but did not load due to required testing alignment. The loss of Bus 13-1 caused the loss of the 1A loop of Core Spray, both loops of Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI), and Bus 18. All equipment responded as expected. Bus 13-1 and Bus 18 were restored at 0911(CDT) on 10/24/18. Other affected systems are in the process of being restored. An investigation as to the cause of the event has been initiated. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv), 'Event or Condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B),' because the 1/2 EDG auto started due to the loss of power condition. This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), 'Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' because both loops of LPCI were inoperable for a short time period. During the ten minutes where LPCI was unavailable, Unit 1 was in Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3. Unit 1 is currently in LCO 3.8.1(b) until the EDG is restored. Unit 2 was not affected by this event. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5365710 October 2018 03:26:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3On October 9, 2018 at 2002 CDT the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Condition (CREV AC) system was in the process of being returned to service following maintenance. During the return to service, the end bell on the CREV AC Condenser developed a significant leak requiring isolation. No work was performed on the CREV AC Condenser during the work window. The CREV AC system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), "Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function " because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5362626 September 2018 23:25:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3

On September 26, 2018 at 1908 CDT. an automatic scram was received on U1 following main generator 345 kV output breaker 7-8 trip with 345 kV output breaker 6-7 already opened for maintenance on line 0401. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately minus 15 inches, which resulted in automatic Group II and Group Ill isolations (expected response). Reactor pressure rose to approximately 1083 psig, and the 3B and 3C low set relief valves opened briefly to control reactor pressure. Reactor water level and reactor pressure have been restored to their normal bands. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 remains in Mode 3, with reactor pressure being controlled on the turbine bypass valves. The cause and details of the event are under investigation.

Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)." All control rods inserted. Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5329929 March 2018 16:42:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On March 29, 2018, Exelon Generation Company, LLC notified the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) in accordance with state regulations of an unpermitted release of radionuclides at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station within the site boundary. There has been no detection of the liquid release beyond the site boundary. No impact to human health or the environment are anticipated. This notification is being made to satisfy 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), notification of the NRC for any event related to the health and safety of the public for which a notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. The source of the Tritium release was from the Rad waste system. The spill was reported to be within the protected area which is within the site boundary. The quantity of the release is unknown at this point as the investigation and spill cleanup is in progress. The Licensee Notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 532351 March 2018 13:43:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On March 1, 2018, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specifications (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornado generated missiles, Quad Cities Station identified a non-conforming condition in the plant design such that specific TS equipment is considered to not be adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. Tornado generated missiles could strike the Unit l, Unit 1/2, and Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator intake and exhaust stacks, day tank vents, and main fuel oil tank vents. This could result in crimping of the intake/exhaust stacks and vents, which would affect the ability of the Emergency Diesel Generators to perform their function if a tornado would occur. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being addressed in accordance with NRC enforcement guidance provided in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1, and DSS-ISG-2016-01, 'Clarification of Licensee Actions in Receipt of Enforcement Discretion per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002, Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1. Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with these documents. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
ENS 5318931 January 2018 18:19:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3At 1310 hours (CST) on January 31, 2018, the Unit 2B fuel pool radiation monitor spiked high due to an invalid actuation which caused the U1 and U2 reactor building ventilation system to isolate, B train standby gas treatment system (SBGTS) started, and the control room ventilation system also isolated as designed. Secondary containment vacuum was lost for approximately one minute, and then subsequently returned to an acceptable level in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, 'Secondary Containment.' As a result of this transient, secondary containment was inoperable for approximately one minute. No emergency conditions were determined to exist. Troubleshooting of the radiation monitor spike is underway. Given the temporary loss of secondary containment vacuum, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5308923 November 2017 02:54:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3

On November 22, 2017, at 2043 (CST), Unit I MCC (Motor Control Center) 18/19-5 overvoltage relay target was found actuated and would not reset. MCC 18/19-5 was powered from the normal feed, Bus 19. Bus 19 voltages were verified to be normal. The overvoltage relay actuation would result in MCC 18/19-5 being de-energized in the event of a DBA LOCA (Design Basis Accident Loss of Coolant Accident) in which the 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator fails to energize Bus 18, therefore rendering both divisions of the Low Pressure Cooling Injection (LPCI) mode of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system inoperable. Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition E was entered, requiring restoration of LPCI in 72 hours. The overvoltage target was subsequently able to be reset at 2114 (CST), restoring the LPCI function of RHR. Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition E was exited at that time. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM RONALD SNOOK TO STEVEN VITTO ON 01/11/18 AT 1913 EST * * *

The purpose of this notification today (01/11/18) is to retract the ENS Report made on November 23, 2017 at 0248 hours EST (ENS Report #53089). Upon further review, it was determined that the Unit 1 MCC 18/19-5 overvoltage relay target that was found actuated and would initially not reset was caused only by intermittent degraded DC control power. During this event, MCC 18/19-5 remained powered from the normal feed Bus 19, and Bus 19 voltages were verified to be normal. It was further determined from plant drawings that under this condition the degraded DC control power to the Unit 1 MCC 18/19-5 overvoltage relay has no impact to the Technical Specification 3.5.1 required capability to auto transfer power from the normal Bus 19 to the alternate Bus 18 should Bus 19 lose power such as during a DBA LOCA. This overvoltage relay was installed in the early 1990's only to support enhanced reliability of the power supply to the LPCI injection valves, and its actuation due to degraded DC control power would not impact the ability to auto transfer to alternate Bus 18. Therefore, both divisions of the Low Pressure Cooling Injection (LPCI) mode of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system would have remained fully operable under the as-found relay condition, and Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition E was not required to be entered. On December 6, 2017, it was determined that a loose fuse clip terminal had caused the DC control power to the overvoltage relay to become degraded which in turn caused the relay target and its reset to become erratic. This fuse clip terminal was repaired on December 6, 2017. Based on the subsequent reviews of this event, the LPCI system was not required to be declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications 3.5.1 during the period of the MCC 18/19-5 overvoltage relay actuation (i.e., 31 minutes on 11/22/17), and hence was not required to be reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. Therefore, based on this information, ENS Report #53089 is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. R3DO(Jeffers) has been notified.

ENS 530597 November 2017 22:09:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On November 7, 2017 at 1810 (CST), Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), was manually isolated following failure of the remote turbine trip pushbutton to function. Unit 1 HPCI Operability Testing was in progress to the point of securing the HPCI turbine with the remote manual pushbutton. The pushbutton failed to trip the turbine resulting in operator action to lower the flow controller setpoint and isolating the HPCI steam line. HPCI remains isolated and is Inoperable pending resolution of the Turbine Trip circuitry. This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCI system is a single train system and the loss of HPCI could impact the plant ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was confirmed operable. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5298421 September 2017 21:07:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On September 21, 2017 at 1730 (CDT) the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Condition (CREV AC) system was declared inoperable due a refrigerant leak from the air conditioning compressor. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.5 Condition A was entered for Units One and Two. The CREV AC system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system. The loss of CREV AC could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 529558 September 2017 16:45:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3

On September 8, 2017 at 1130 hours CDT, Unit Two High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Minimum Flow Valve MO 2-2301-14 flow indicating switch (FIS 2-2354) failed to meet the Technical Specification Allowable Value during calibration testing. Technical Specification Table 3.3.5.1-1 Allowable Value (3.f) requires greater than or equal to 634 gpm (3.14 inches water column as required by procedure). HPCI was subsequently declared inoperable. This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCI system is a single train system and the loss of HPCI could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was confirmed operable. Note: On September 8, 2017 at 1140 hours CDT, the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve MO 2-2301-14 flow indicating switch (FIS 2- 2354) was successfully recalibrated and HPCI was returned to Operable status. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1216 EDT ON 10/19/17 FROM RYAN DECKER TO DONG PARK * * *

The purpose of this notification today (10/19/17) is to retract the ENS Report made on September 8, 2017 at 1545 hours CDT (ENS Report #52955). Upon further investigation, it was determined that a surveillance procedure contained an overly restrictive statement that directed operators to immediately declare the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable when the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve MO 2-2301-14 flow indicating switch (FIS 2-2354) fails. This statement was in conflict with existing Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.5.1, Condition E, that allows seven days to restore the HPCI FIS (instrument channel only) to an operable status prior to entry into TS 3.3.5.1, Condition H, which requires declaring HPCI inoperable immediately. Hence, during the period of FIS inoperability (i.e., 10 minutes), the HPCI system was not required to be declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications. Therefore, based on this information, ENS Report # 52955 is being retracted. Note: On September 8, 2017 at 1140 hours CDT, the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve MO 2-2301-14 flow indicating switch (FIS 2-2354) was successfully recalibrated and HPCI was returned to Operable status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Daley).

ENS 5275816 May 2017 00:27:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On May 15, 2017 at 1918 hours (CDT), Unit Two High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Minimum Flow Valve MO 2-2301-14 failed to open as required by procedure and HPCI was declared inoperable. When the HPCI Turbine was tripped, the Minimum Flow Valve did not open when system flow reduced to the low flow setpoint. This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCI system is a single train system and the loss of HPCI could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition G, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was confirmed operable. This places the plant in a 14-day LCO action statement. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 525271 February 2017 21:22:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3

On February 1, 2017, at 1929 hours (CST), a fire was discovered on the Unit 2 Main Control Room panel 902-3 in the 3E ERV/ADS valve switch. A reactor SCRAM was not required. No automatic isolations/actuations occurred. The fire was extinguished at 1932 and the reactor remained at 100% power. An Alert was declared at 1938 (CST). The initiation of the event was attempting to change a light bulb. The cause of the event is under investigation. The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the event. The licensee entered a 14 day Technical Specification Action statement as a result of the damage to the switch. Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA, NNSA (e-mail), and NRCC SASC (e-mail).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0040 EST ON 2/2/17 FROM DAVID KNEPPER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

Notified that the Alert was terminated at 2336 CST on 2/1/17. The licensee stated that the fire was extinguished and an extent of condition walkdown did not identify any additional equipment damage as a result of the fire. The licensee will be issuing a press release. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Duncan), IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA, NNSA (e-mail), and NRCC SASC (e-mail).

ENS 5250824 January 2017 14:00:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On January 24, 2017, at 1000 hours (CST), Operations was notified that two Secondary Containment interlock doors (between the Unit 2 Reactor Building and Unit 2 Turbine Building) were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and Secondary Containment pressure remained negative. Unit 1 and Unit 2 share secondary containment. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open. As a result, entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A. was made momentarily due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of this event was due to an equipment interlock (solenoid) failure and the doors are currently blocked closed.
ENS 5236816 November 2016 14:32:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On November 16, 2016 at approximately 1010 CST, a local government agency (Whiteside County, Illinois) inadvertently activated emergency response sirens for less than one minute. The inadvertent actuation occurred during the scheduled Quad Cities Station emergency planning graded exercise while local government agencies were participating. A related news release and radio message was subsequently issued by Whiteside County to report that Whiteside County was participating in a drill in coordination with the Quad Cities Exelon Generating Station that the emergency response sirens were inadvertently activated, and that there is no emergency at this time and no action is required. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional. The site is operating normally with no emergency conditions present. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), as an inadvertent activation of emergency response sirens and news release. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5233431 October 2016 09:27:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3

On October 31, 2016, at 0239 hours (CDT), a defect (minor audible through-wall leak) was identified on the steam line drain valve 1-2301-55, HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve. The defect was identified by Operations personnel traversing through the HPCI room as part of normal rounds. HPCI was declared inoperable under Tech Specs 3.5.1, Condition G. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was verified operable. HPCI remains available (but not operable). The leak has been isolated. The 1-2301-55 is a manual valve downstream of the HPCI steam line drain trap. In a standby line-up, this line drains condensation from the HPCI steam supply line to the main condenser. During operation in an accident scenario, this line drains condensation from the HPCI steam supply line to the Torus via a drain pot. The location of the defect is in class 2 safety related piping. HPCI is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Technical Specification 3.5.1, condition G requires that HPCI be Operable within 14 days.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 12/05/2016 AT 1505 EST FROM MARK BRIDGES TO STEVEN VITTO * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS Report made on October 31, 2016, at 0239 hours CDT (ENS Report #52334). Upon further investigation, a pinhole through-wall leak was discovered in the body of the 1-2301-55 valve (HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve). The defect was characterized as a 1/32-inch rounded hole due to a manufacturing defect in the casting located on the downstream side of the valve near the piping connection. A subsequent evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station considering the defect size, location, and characterization, confirmed the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system would have performed its safety function when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report 52334 is being retracted. Note: On November 1, 2016, at 1624 hours CDT, the 1-2301-55 valve (HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve) was successfully repaired and HPCI was returned to Operable status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Stone).

ENS 5212726 July 2016 18:12:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On July 26, 2016 at 1252 hours (CDT), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to a toxic gas analyzer spurious alarm which resulted in the 'B' Air Filtration Unit (AFU) being inadvertently isolated. In this condition, Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system cannot be guaranteed to achieve required design flow rate. Tech Spec 3.7.4, Condition A was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven (7) days. The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions as well as protection of the operators from a high dose environment assumed during a design basis accident. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5209918 July 2016 22:21:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3Testing of the Everbridge ERO (Emergency Response Organization) notification system identified that the system cannot notify all ERO individuals. This constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability. The issue has subsequently been reported resolved by the vendor and both site testing and common ERF (Emergency Response Facility) (EOF (Emergency Operations Facility) at Cantera) has verified resolution. The Everbridge system capability loss for Quad Cities was identified at approximately 1450 (CDT) hours on July 18, 2016, due to an undetermined loss of system communications, which is currently being investigated. Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) capability was not lost. The Everbridge system capability loss for the common ERF (EOF at Cantera) was identified at approximately 1500 (CDT) on July 18, 2016. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of EP offsite communications capability. The NRC Resident inspector has been notified. The site was developing compensatory measures when the event was terminated.
ENS 5188025 April 2016 12:39:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On April 25, 2016, at 0607 hours (CDT), HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) was isolated via the HPCI MO 2-2301-4 (HPCI Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve) to stop a packing leak on the HPCI MO 2-2301-5 (HPCI Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve). The packing leak was causing a steam plume potentially impacting the motor operator on the 2-2301-5 valve. HPCI was declared inoperable and T.S. 3.5.1 Condition G was entered. Since HPCI is a single train safety system, this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5165916 January 2016 01:42:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On January 15, 2016 at 2038 CST, an alarm was received indicating Secondary Containment Differential Pressure rose unexpectedly above the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement, SR 3.6.4.1.1, limit of 0.10 inch of vacuum water gauge. This loss of differential pressure occurred when Operations had entered the 2A Reactor Water Cleanup Pump room. The pump room door was closed and Secondary Containment Differential Pressure returned to Technical Specification limits in approximately 4 minutes. The Standby Gas Treatment System remained in standby and fully operable. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1. As a result, entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable. Given the temporary loss of secondary containment, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." The licensee also notified the State of Illinois Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 5165012 January 2016 19:08:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On January 12, 2016, at 1340 CST, an alarm was received indicating secondary containment differential pressure rose unexpectedly above the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement, SR 3.6.4.1.1, limit of 0.10 inch of vacuum water gauge. A reactor building supply fan was immediately secured to restore differential pressure below the Technical Specification limit. The secondary containment differential pressure returned to below the Technical Specification limit within one minute. The Standby Gas Treatment System remained in standby, and fully operable. At 1341 CST, the secured reactor building supply fan was restarted to restore the normal ventilation lineup. The secondary containment differential pressure remained below the Technical Specification limit. Troubleshooting is in progress. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1. As a result, entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable. Given the temporary loss of secondary containment, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 515897 December 2015 14:02:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On December 07, 2015, at 0825 hours (CST), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to the Air Handling Unit (AHU) tripping upon attempting to swap from the non-safety related CR HVAC. Swapping was being performed to allow maintenance on the non-safety related system. Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven (7) days. Additionally, Technical Specification 3.7.5, Condition A, was entered which requires CREV AC to be restored to an operable status in 30 days. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Licensee notified the Illinois Emergency Management Association.
ENS 5150227 October 2015 17:50:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3

A planned surveillance was started on the Quad Cities Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation air filtration system. The surveillance measures the flow rate through the air filtration unit and verifies the TSC is pressurized to ensure habitability requirements. The flow rate obtained was high, outside of acceptance criteria, and the surveillance was stopped pending resolution. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing procedures. If TSC evacuation is warranted due to radiological conditions, the facility will be relocated in accordance with existing procedures. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the air filtration unit affects an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM CLIFFORD STEINER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1315 EDT ON 10/29/15 * * *

The TSC Air Filtration system was successfully tested on 10/27/15 at 2100 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

ENS 513642 September 2015 22:11:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3

Planned maintenance activities will commence today (September 2, 2015) on the Quad Cities Station TSC. The activity involves inspection and replacement of the TSC charcoal absorber trays and canisters on the filtration portion of the Air Handling Unit (AHU). Work on the charcoal absorbers affects habitability of the TSC during a declared emergency when radiological conditions require activation of the filtration portion of the AHU. The duration of maintenance is currently planned to begin on September 2, 2015 at 2100 hours (CDT) and is estimated to be completed by September 3, 2015 at 1100 hours (CDT), depending on any conditions discovered during the inspections. Since restoration from this maintenance activity is expected to take longer than the required activation time of the TSC, this notification is being made. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the maintenance activity affects an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified (and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency).

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ALAN MEURS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1625 EDT ON 09/03/2015 * * *

At 1430 CDT on September 3, 2015, the maintenance activity was completed and the TSC ventilation was restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency. Notified R3DO (Skokowski).

ENS 5127228 July 2015 01:08:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On July 27, 2015, at 1730 hours (CDT), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to the 'B' Air Filtration Unit (AFU) Booster Fan discharge damper stuck open in mid-position. In this condition, the CREV system cannot be guaranteed to achieve required design flow rate. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered. The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions as well as protection of the operators from a high dose environment assumed during a design basis accident. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV system could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident as stated in Chapter 6 of the UFSAR (Updated Final Safety Analysis Report). This event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since this condition also impacts the control room as an Emergency Response Facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Both units are in a seven day technical specification for troubleshooting and repairs. If the control room became uninhabitable, procedure "Complete Loss of Control Room HVAC" would be entered.
ENS 5116519 June 2015 10:03:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On June 19, 2015, at 0153 CDT, two Secondary Containment interlock doors (1/2 EDG (Emergency Diesel Generator) room door and the Unit 1 reactor building door) were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and secondary containment pressure remained negative. This condition represents a failure to meet surveillance requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open simultaneously. As a result entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The door has been posted to notify to restrict access. The State of Illinois Emergency Management has been notified.
ENS 5109327 May 2015 18:37:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On May 27, 2015, at 0952 CDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to opening a ventilation duct hatch to facilitate fire damper inspection without administrative controls. The hatch was opened and upon discovery was immediately shut, re-establishing the boundary of the Control Room Envelope. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition C, was entered and subsequently exited. The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions as well as protection of the operators from a high dose environment assumed during a design basis accident. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV system could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident as stated in Chapter 6 of the UFSAR. This event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since this condition also impacts the control room as an Emergency Response Facility. At 0955, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition C, for CREV System Inoperable due to inoperable Control Room Envelope was exited. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5102128 April 2015 14:50:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On April 28, 2015, at 0935 CDT, the Shift Manager was notified that two Secondary Containment interlock doors (1/2 EDG room door and the Unit 1 reactor building door) were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and secondary containment pressure remained negative. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open simultaneously. As a result entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Personnel were posted in the area as a compensatory measure. The State of Illinois Emergency Management has been notified.
ENS 509493 April 2015 01:32:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On April 2, 2015 at 2133 CDT, a manual scram was inserted on Unit 1 following discovery of a steam leak in the Turbine Building at the D-ring, near the Turbine Bypass valves. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately -2 inches, which resulted in an automatic Group II and Group III isolation (expected response). The steam leak was isolated by manual closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 remains in Mode 3, with cooldown in progress. Reactor water level is in the normal level band. The cause and details of the event are under investigation. Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100 percent power. Operators reduced reactor power to 20 percent before initiating a SCRAM. All rods fully inserted and the reactor is shutdown and stable. The electrical supply is in a normal shutdown lineup. The reactor is being supplied by normal feedwater, and decay heat is being controlled by use of the ADS valves. The licensee is currently cooling down and depressurizing the reactor in preparation for repair of the steam leak. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois Resident Inspector.
ENS 5092826 March 2015 16:36:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3

Quad Cities Station has completed a review of the station strong motion seismograph's performance. The seismograph is currently functional; however, this review identified 3 times in the past 3 years that the seismograph was non-functional such that emergency classification at the ALERT level could not be obtained with site instrumentation:

1) 02/03/2014
2) 10/07/2014
3) 10/19/2014

These unplanned non-functional conditions of the seismograph were entered into the Quad Cities Corrective Action Program when they occurred. While Exelon procedural direction allowed the use of offsite sources to obtain seismic data when the seismograph was nonfunctional, this was not explicitly referenced in the approved Emergency Action Levels. The loss of assessment capability is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This report is required per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(ii) as an event that occurred within 3 years of the date of discovery. Corrective actions are in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5088213 March 2015 08:43:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3

On March 13, 2015 at 0100 (CDT), it was identified that fuel assembly QAD224 was mis-oriented 180 degrees at core location 51-40. The intended orientation was (southeast). However the assembly was identified as being (northwest). This issue was identified during the core verification process. In the current core configuration, there is not a bounding analysis that assures adequate Shutdown Margin. This event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * EVENT RETRACTION FROM RICK MOON TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1051 EDT ON 4/7/15 * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS notification made on March 13, 2015 (ENS 50882). An evaluation has determined that Shutdown Margin was met with the mis-oriented fuel bundle. Therefore, the threshold for reporting the issue as a degraded or unanalyzed condition was not met (NUREG 1022 Revision 3 - Event Report Guidelines Section 3.2.7). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Skowkowski).

ENS 5080310 February 2015 14:09:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On February 10, 2015, at 1055 CST, the Shift Manager was notified that both (High Pressure Coolant Injection) HPCI Secondary Containment interlock doors were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and secondary containment pressure remained negative. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open simultaneously. As a result entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee reported that personnel were posted in the area as a compensatory measure. The State of Illinois Emergency Management will be notified.
ENS 5073012 January 2015 09:03:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3At 0500 (CST) today (January 12, 2015), planned maintenance activities commenced on the Reactor Building Separate Particulate Iodine and Noble Gas (SPING) monitor. Work on the SPING affects classification and assessment of the Emergency Plan for a radiological release through the Reactor Building Vents. In the case of a radiological event, the Reactor Building Ventilation will be isolated via Area Radiation Monitors (ARM) in the ducting and the Main Chimney SPING will be used for classification and assessment. This would be the normal response for a radiological event. This maintenance activity is expected to be longer than 72 hours. The Reactor Building SPING is scheduled to be restored on Friday, January 16. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the maintenance activity affects classification and assessment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5070830 December 2014 10:03:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3

Planned maintenance activities will commence today (December 30, 2014) on the Quad Cities Station TSC. The activity involves maintenance on the TSC Air Handling Unit (AHU). Work on the AHU affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation since the AHU supports habitability. The duration of maintenance is currently unknown, and is dependent on the conditions discovered during maintenance. Restoration from maintenance is expected to take longer than the required activation time of the TSC. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the maintenance activity affects an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will be notifying the onsite Illinois Emergency Management Agency representative.

* * * UPDATE FROM CHAD BRITTON TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1527 EST ON 12/30/2014 * * *

At 1230 CST on December 30, 2014, the maintenance activity was completed and the TSC ventilation was restored. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Notified R3DO (Cameron).

ENS 5067815 December 2014 13:58:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On December 15, 2014, at 0730 hours (CST) the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to a partially stuck open main control room door. The door was unable to be closed to establish the boundary of the control room envelope. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition C, was entered. A repair plan and schedule is being developed. The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions as well as protection of the operators from a high dose environment assumed during a design basis accident. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV system could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident as stated in Chapter 6 of the UFSAR. This event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since this condition also impacts the control room as an Emergency Response Facility. At 0910 (CST) exited Tech Spec 3.7.4, Condition C, for CREV System Inoperable due to inoperable Control Room Envelope (CRE). The Control Room door is now closed. Completed post maintenance smoke test, satisfactory. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5062218 November 2014 13:29:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On November 18, 2014, at 0900 (CST), the Shift Manager was notified that two Secondary Containment interlock doors were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and Secondary Containment pressure remained negative throughout the event. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open. As a result entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The State of Illinois has been notified.
ENS 505976 November 2014 04:30:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3

Six (6) U2 CRD (Control Rod Drive) HCU (Hydraulic Control Unit) accumulators were identified with riser brackets that were installed incorrectly. This issue impacts U2 CRD HCU accumulators only. The incorrect riser bracket installation could challenge the ability of the CRD hydraulic control unit to perform its design function during a seismic event. Identified U2 control rods associated with HCU accumulators that had riser brackets installed incorrectly were declared inoperable. This condition has been corrected since initial identification, restoring all control rods to operable status. Reference IR 2407342. This notification is made pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) regarding the reportability of multiple failures that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MATT SEELEY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1144 EST ON 12/22/14 * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS notification made on November 6, 2014 (ENS 50597). An Engineering Evaluation has determined that the function of the affected U2 CRD HCU Accumulators was not affected as discussed in Chapters 6 and 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, the threshold for reporting the issue as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function was not met (NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Event Report Guidelines Section 3.2.7). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Dickson).

ENS 505934 November 2014 18:00:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On November 4, 2014, at 1100 (CST), LS 2-2365 (HPCI Turbine Inlet Drain Pot Level Switch) was determined to be inoperable during planned testing. HPCI was inoperable (for the planned testing) at the time of discovery. The function of LS 2-2365 is to detect a failure of the HPCI steam trap (i.e., outlet of the HPCI inlet drain pot) by providing a control room alarm and opening an alternate drain path. HPCl is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 504275 September 2014 00:27:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3

On September 04, 2014, at 1905 hours (CDT), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to the Air Handling Unit (AHU) tripping upon restoration of Control Room Ventilation following testing of Reactor Building Ventilation instrumentation. Troubleshooting is in progress at this time. Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven (7) days. Additionally, Technical Specification 3.7.5, Condition A, was entered which requires CREV AC to be restored to an operable status in 30 days. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), '(any) event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function,' because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY MARK BRIDGES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1721 EDT ON 10/23/2014 * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS notification made on September 4, 2014 (ENS 50427). Upon further investigation it was verified that the function of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System was not affected as discussed in Chapters 6 and 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, the threshold for reporting the issue as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function was not met (NUREG 1022 Revision 3 - Event Report Guidelines Section 3.2.7). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable State authorities. Notified R3DO (Pelke)

ENS 5013223 May 2014 01:01:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On May 22, 2014, at 2150 hours, the Shift Manager was notified that both HPCI Secondary Containment interlock doors were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and Secondary Containment pressure remained negative. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open. As a result, entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 499882 April 2014 15:32:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3

Quad Cities Unit 2 Alert Classification (HA3) Due to Fire. On April 2, 2014, at 1340 CDT, an ALERT was declared due to a fire in the Unit 2 turbine building. Prior to declaring the ALERT, Unit 2 was manually scrammed at 1302 CDT. All control rods inserted and all automatic isolations actuated as designed. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were manually closed. The fire has been extinguished. Unit 2 is currently in Hot Shutdown. The cause of the event is under investigation. Unit 1 remains at 100% power. The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the event. Unit 2 is still being supplied from off-site power and is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup with the exception of Bus 29-1 (480 VAC safety bus) that was deenergized. One Unit 2 emergency diesel generator is inoperable due to the loss of power to its cooling water pump. The licensee has notified the State and local agencies. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA OPS Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and Nuclear SSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MIKE HAYES TO DONG PARK AT 2252 EDT ON 04/02/2014 * * *

At 2132 CDT on April 2, 2014, the licensee terminated the Unit 2 Alert declaration. Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown). Unit 2 is proceeding to Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) on shutdown cooling. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State emergency agencies. Notified the IRD (Gott), R3DO (Passehl), and NRR EO (McGinty). Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA OPS Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and Nuclear SSA via email.

ENS 499841 April 2014 18:39:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On April 1, 2014, at 1357 hours, the Control Room was notified that two Secondary Containment interlock doors (between the Unit 2 Reactor Building and Unit 2 Turbine Building) were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and Secondary Containment pressure remained negative. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open simultaneously. As a result entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4997731 March 2014 18:57:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On March 31, 2014, at 1302 (CDT), with Unit 2 operating in Mode 1 (coastdown), leakage was identified from the body of a one inch isolation valve associated with a Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control Unit (CRD HCU 18-27 insert valve 101). The leakage is several drops per minute; attempts to isolate the leak have been unsuccessful. The associated piping communicates with the reactor coolant system (through the CRD mechanism). Technical Specification 3.4.4 (RCS Operational Leakage), Condition C, was entered at 1302 hours. Condition C requires the unit to be placed in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) in 12 hours. At 1616 hours, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated on Unit 2. The cause and resolution of the leakage are being pursued. This condition is being reported under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) given the defect is associated with the primary coolant system pressure boundary. This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CPR 50.72(b)(2)(i) given the initiation of a plant shutdown required by the plant Technical Specifications. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4996226 March 2014 14:32:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3A supervisory licensed employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 498705 March 2014 01:37:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3At 1917 hours (CST) on March 4, 2014, the Unit 1B fuel pool radiation monitor spiked high due to an invalid actuation which caused the U1 and U2 reactor building ventilation system to isolate (the control room ventilation system also isolated as designed). The Standby Gas Treatment system was already in operation for a scheduled surveillance as of 1900 hours on March 4, 2014. During the ensuing pressure transient, the Reactor Building differential pressure momentarily went positive. As a result, Secondary Containment was declared inoperable. Given the temporary loss in secondary containment, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. After the transient, the reactor building ventilation system was shutdown for scheduled maintenance and the control room ventilation system was returned to its normal configuration. The Standby Gas Treatment system was operating to support planned reactor building ventilation system maintenance. Troubleshooting of the radiation monitor spike is underway.
ENS 4972715 January 2014 15:47:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3

At 0723 (CST) hours on January 15, 2014, the 2A Drywell Radiation Monitor was declared inoperable after exhibiting erratic performance. This monitor provides the input into one division of the primary containment isolation logic for a Group II isolation. As a result, the channel was placed in a tripped condition in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Condition B. Given both divisions are required to complete the Group II isolation logic, this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The 2A Drywell Radiation Monitor has been repaired and restored to an operable condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM JAMES BURKE TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1447 EST ON 2/7/14 * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS notification made on January 15, 2014 (ENS 49727). Upon further investigation it was verified that the Drywell Radiation Monitors do not mitigate the consequences of an accident as discussed in Chapters 6 and 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and the Technical Specifications Bases for 3.3.6.1. Therefore, the threshold for reporting the issue as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function was not met (NUREG 1022 Revision 3 - Event Report Guidelines Section 3.2.7). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Orlikowski).

ENS 4958927 November 2013 18:14:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3At approximately 1446 hours (CST) on November 27, 2013 a badged employee was discovered non-responsive inside a vehicle within the Owner Controlled Area. (The vehicle was located outside the protected area and in the parking lot). On-site and off-site emergency personnel responded to the medical issue. The individual was pronounced dead at 1604 hours. No radioactive material or contamination was involved. The death was not work-related nor the result of an occupational event. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified.
ENS 494074 October 2013 02:12:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3

On October 3, 2013, at 2045 (CDT) hours, a defect (pinhole through-wall leak) was identified on the drain line for the LS 2-2365, HPCI TURBINE INLET DRAIN POT LEVEL SWITCH. The defect was identified during investigation of leakage near LS 2-2365. The LS 2-2365, HPCI TURBINE INLET DRAIN POT LEVEL SWITCH, is provided to detect a failure of the HPCI steam trap during standby line-up. The location of the defect, is in Class 2 Safety related piping. HPCI is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The instrument isolations for LS 2-2365 have been close and the leak has been isolated. There is no increase to plant risk and RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) is available. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 11/7/13 AT 1412 EST FROM JEFFERY JACOBSON TO DONG PARK * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS report made on October 4, 2013, at 0212 EDT (ENS Report # 49407). Upon further investigation the pinhole through-wall leak discovered in the Unit 2 HPCI room was in a weld at a 'Tee' downstream of the Unit 2 HPCI turbine inlet drain pot level switch (LS 2-2365) on drain line 2-2386B-1-B. The defect was characterized as a 1/16-inch rounded hole due to gas porosity (with no evidence of cracking). A subsequent evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station considering the defect size, location, and characterization confirmed the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system would have performed its safety function when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report # 49407 is being retracted. Note: On October 3, 2013, at 1155 CDT the Unit 2 HPCI drain line leak was isolated and HPCI was declared operable. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa).

ENS 493215 September 2013 12:30:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3A licensed employee had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4913519 June 2013 10:15:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3Planned breaker maintenance activities will be performed today (Wednesday, June 19, 2013) which will temporarily remove power to the Quad Cities Station TSC. The maintenance will be completed in approximately 2 hours and is scheduled to be worked continuously to minimize out-of-service time. If TSC activation is required during this period, compensatory measures have been established to direct ERO (Emergency Response Organization) members to an alternate location. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by the breaker maintenance. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the scheduled maintenance affects an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.