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| Discovered date | Reporting criterion | Title | Description | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 45925 | 13 May 2010 20:02:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Notification of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency Due to Exceeding Npdes Discharge Permit Value | At 1602 hrs on 5/13/2010 the Plant Shift Superintendent's (PSS) office was notified by USEC Environmental Management that NPDES (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System) permit maximum concentration limit for fecal coliform at the X-6619 (Sewage Treatment Facility) discharge (NPDES Outfall 003) was exceeded. Sample results from 5/12/2010 revealed the permit limit of 2000 colonies / 100 ml was exceeded which resulted in a notification to the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA). Procedure UE2-RA-RE1030, appendix D, Section Q (Miscellaneous) which states: 'USEC shall notify NRC of any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been made or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.' The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 45917 | 11 May 2010 21:09:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Offsite Notification | (On) May 10, 2010 at 1710 hours a USEC (United States Enrichment Corporation) Protective Force Officer entered the X-104 Police Headquarters Weapon Cleaning Area to perform cleaning maintenance on his assigned weapon. The officer began to disassemble the weapon (while) pointing the weapon in a safe direction. He pulled the trigger to release the slide and the weapon discharged (this action is required to remove the slide from this type of weapon). The officer in question was the only person in the room at the time of the incident. The officer was not struck by the discharge, however he did sustain minor powder burns to his hand. The area and weapon was immediately secured by Protective Force Management personnel. USEC Fire/EMS were summoned to the incident scene where the officers injury was evaluated at which time the officer refused treatment. Personal statements were collected from all personnel in the immediate area. A critique was conducted. The Protective Force Manager has generated a Long Term Order to provide compensatory actions to prevent recurrence of an accidental discharge of a weapon due to the same or similar circumstances. An internal investigation as well as an independent investigation are currently in progress. This event was reportable to the Department of Energy per XP2-RA-RE1001 6.2.1, which requires a formal notification. This formal notification constitutes the need to report this event to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission within four (4) Hours per criteria listed in procedure UE2-RA-RE1030, Appendix 'D', P. | |
| ENS 45752 | 8 March 2010 05:00:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Potential Release of Contaminated Materals Off-Site | At 1705 hours on 03/08/2010, the USEC-GS Plant Shift Superintendents' (PSS) Office at Portsmouth was notified of an inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials to an off-site location in Pike County, OH. The contamination was the result of a contractor neutralizing a fluorine service pipe connecting the X-326 building with the X-760 building. The X-760 building has been "de-leased" by USEC back to the Department of Energy (DOE) and is being prepared for decommission and demolition. The contaminated items consisted of five (5) 5-gallon buckets containing some rusty solution. The highest contamination levels were on one (1) bucket with 14K Beta removable and 50K Beta fixed. All other tools and personal protective equipment were monitored and found to be uncontaminated. There is a filtering unit located in Atlanta, GA that remains to be surveyed. A team of USEC health physics personnel is preparing to travel to the contractor's facility in Atlanta to complete the surveys. This event has been classified as reportable in accordance with procedure UE2-RA-RE1030, Portsmouth GDP SAR 6.9, and 10CFR76. No 10CFR20 exposure limits were reached or exceeded. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 45208 | 16 July 2009 21:15:00 | 10 CFR 76.120(a)(4) | Alert Declared Due to a Fire in an Abandoned Cooling Tower | An ALERT was declared at 1715 due to a fire lasting greater than 15 minutes. The fire is in an abandoned cooling tower (bldg X-633D) on the Department of Energy portion of the site. The fire is not in proximity to any safety related equipment. A request for assistance was made to Scioto and Adams counties Fire Departments. At 1917, the licensee reported that the fire was out and the firemen were removing siding and looking for residual hot spots.
The fire is out and the ALERT has been terminated. Recovery operations are in progress and a fire watch will be stationed throughout the night. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue), R2 Deputy RA (McCree), NMSS (Weber), NMSS EO (Kotzalas), DHS (Kettles), FEMA (Biscoe), DOE (Parsons), HHS (Nunn), USDA (Timmons), and EPA (Threatt). | |
| ENS 45188 | 7 July 2009 04:54:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | 4-Hour Report Due to Notification of Ohio Epa Because of Boiler Opacity Limit Being Exceeded | At 2130 hours, 07/06/09, the PORTS Plant Shift Superintendent's (PSS) Office was notified of an operational upset at the X-600 Steam Plant Facility due to a loss of power on the #3 (operating) Boiler. The operational upset resulted in three separate six minute periods, where the permissible opacity limit was exceeded, while power was being restored to the boiler. The PORTS PSS Office notified the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) of this incident, at 0054 hours, 07/07/09. This notification to another government agency is reportable to the NRC as a 4-hour Event, per the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) Nuclear Regulatory Event Reporting Procedure UE2-RA-RE1030, Appendix D, Section P (Miscellaneous) which states: 'USEC shall notify NRC of any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials'. The licensee notified the Paducah NRC Resident Inspector.
PORTS (Nuclear Regulatory Affairs) NRA has reviewed the basis for the above NRC event notification and recommends that event notification #45188 be retracted. The following provides the basis for this recommendation. NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 was reviewed. In essence, the following sentence from the NUREG provides sufficient clarification of the reporting criteria to assess the applicability of the steam plant opacity exceedances: 'The purpose of this criterion is to ensure the NRC is made aware of issues that will cause heightened public or government concern related to the radiological health and safety of the public or on-site personnel or protection of the environment.' The significance of opacity exceedances as they might impact the public or on-site workers was discussed with environmental compliance personnel. It was concluded that beyond any regulatory issues, opacity exceedances of limited duration pose no significant health or environmental concerns. Based on the specifics of this event and the additional guidance provided by the NRC, more specifically that NRC is most concerned about events or situations that would cause heightened public or government concern, the opacity exceedances reported to the OEPA should not trigger a 4 hour NRC report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Nease) and NMSS EO(Tschiltz) | |
| ENS 43783 | 14 November 2007 13:30:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | 24-Hr Incident Report - Safety System Actuation | At 0830 hours, Autoclave #5 in the X-343 Facility experienced a Steam Shutdown due to high condensate level alarm (B) actuating. The autoclave was in TSR applicable Mode IV 'Feeding, Transfer or Sampling' when the actuation occurred. This is considered a valid actuation of a 'Q' Safety System. The autoclave was placed in Mode VII 'Shutdown' and declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS). An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the actuation. No release of radioactive material occurred as a result of the incident. This is being reported in accordance with UE-RA-RE1030 Appendix D.J.2. 'Safety Equipment Actuations.' The licensee notified the NRC Program Manager and will notify the DOE site representative. * * * RETRACTION FROM G. SALYERS TO P. SNYDER AT 1553 ON 11/20/07 * * * Following an investigation into the circumstances surrounding this incident by PORTS Nuclear Regulatory Affairs and Engineering, a recommendation was made to the PSS Office that this event be retracted. The recommendation was based upon the determination that 'Steam Shutdown' occurred as a result of an invalid signal to 'B' condensate level alarm. The follow-up testing of the redundant 'A' condensate level probe and condensate drain system confirmed a high condensate level condition was not present when 'B' condensate level alarm actuated. Per the reporting criteria as stated in PORTS SAR section 6.9, Table 1, criteria J.2, this is not a reportable event due to the 'Q' system actuation being caused by an invalid signal. Based upon the information provided, the PORTS PSS Office is retracting this event. Notified R2DO (Henson) and FSME EO (Morell). | |
| ENS 43715 | 11 October 2007 09:40:00 | 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) | Steam Leak Past a Safety Related O-Ring | (This event occurred at) 10-11-07 at 0540 hrs in the X-342 - Feed Facility, Autoclave #1, approximately 40 minutes into the heating cycle (mode II) on a refeed cylinder. An operator encountered an audible steam leak past the Viton 'O' ring at the 12 o'clock position. The steam was secured and autoclave shell opened. Inspection of the Viton 'O' ring resulted in the discovery of a separation of the splice joint. A pressure decay was performed to determine if the O- ring would have performed its 'Q' function. The test failed resulting in a 24 hour event. The licensee has contacted the Regional NRC inspector for this facility. | |
| ENS 43671 | 28 September 2007 15:16:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Smoke from Steam Plant Startup Requiring State Notification | At 0930 hours, 09/28/07, the PORTS Plant Shift Superintendent's (PSS) Office was notified of an opacity exceedance, which had occurred at the X-600 Steam Plant on 09/18/07. The PORTS PSS Office notified the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) of this incident, at 1116 hours, 09/28/07. This notification to another government agency is reportable to the NRC as a 4-Hour Event per the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) Nuclear Regulatory Event Reporting Procedure UE2-RA-RE1030, Appendix D, Section P (Miscellaneous) which states: 'USEC shall notify NRC of any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.' The start-up of the steam boiler was completed however, problems were encountered which created smoke after the state mandated time limit for startup smoke had expired. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Department of Energy. | |
| ENS 43578 | 18 August 2007 06:10:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Feed Facility Autoclave O-Ring Failure | 08-18-07 at 0210 in the X-342 , Feed Facility, Autoclave #1, 10 minutes into the heating cycle (mode II) experienced an air leak past the Viton O-ring. The steam was secured and autoclave shell opened 30 minutes later. Inspection of the Viton O-ring resulted in the discovery of a 3/8" separation of splice joint. A pressure decay was performed to determine if the O-ring would have performed its 'Q' function. The test failed resulting in a 24 hr. event. This was reported under 10CFR76.120(c)(2)(i). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 43549 | 4 August 2007 14:25:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | X-342 Facility Containment Shutdown | On Saturday August 4th 2007 at 1025 hours, Autoclave # 1 in the X-342 Facility experienced a Containment Shutdown due to the actuation of both 'A' and 'B' EXTREME PRESSURE AUTOCLAVE alarms. The autoclave was in (applicable) TSR MODE II 'Heating' for 55 minutes when these actuations occurred. After reviewing the other autoclave operating parameters and the results of the as-found pressure loop values, it is evident that there was no release of UF6 inside this autoclave. Operations and Engineering Personnel are continuing their investigation into the circumstances surrounding this event in an attempt to identify the cause of the alarm actuations. With no evidence to suggest these alarms were caused by an invalid signal, the Plant Shift Superintendent's (PSS) Office is reporting this event as a valid actuation of a 'Q' Safety System. The autoclave was placed in MODE VII 'Shutdown' and declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS). No release of radioactive material occurred as a result of the incident. This event is being reported in accordance with UE2-RA-RE1030 Appendix D. J. 2. Safety Equipment Actuations. The licensee notified the Department of Energy and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Following a comprehensive review of the circumstances surrounding this incident by the PORTS Nuclear Regulatory Affairs (NRA) Group, a recommendation was made to the PSS Office that this event be retracted. This recommendation was based upon the determination that the 'Q' Safety function of the 'A' and 'B' EXTREME PRESSURE AUTOCLAVE alarms is to actuate when the internal autoclave shell pressure rises above the operating steam pressure (thereby indicating a UF6 release within the autoclave and placing the autoclave in containment. Since there was no UF6 release and the autoclave internal pressure was only due to steam, there was no valid signal to the 'Q' Autoclave Shell High Pressure Containment Shutdown System. Per the reporting criteria stated in PORTS SAR section 6.9, Table 1, criteria J.2, this is not a reportable event due to the 'Q' system actuation being caused by an invalid signal. Based upon the information provided, the PORTS PSS Office is retracting this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will be notifying the Department of Energy. Notified R2DO (Ogle) and FSME EO ( Flannery). | |
| ENS 43303 | 15 April 2007 13:30:00 | 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) | Safety System Actuation - Autoclave High Condensate Level Alarm Received During Heatup | At 0930 hours, Autoclave (AC) # 2 in the X-344 Facility experienced a Steam Shutdown due to high condensate level alarms (A) and (B) actuating. The AC was in applicable TSR Mode II 'Heating' for 45 minutes when the actuation occurred. This is considered a valid actuation of a 'Q' Safety System. The autoclave was placed in MODE IV 'Shutdown' and declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintended (PSS). An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the actuation. No release of radioactive material occurred as a result of the incident. This event is being reported in accordance with UE2-RA-RE1030 Appendix D. J. 2. Safety Equipment Actuation. The NRC was notified of this by the licensee. | |
| ENS 42264 | 17 January 2006 13:56:00 | 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) | Autoclave Steam Leakage During Heating Operation | On 01/17/06 at approximately 0856 hours, X-344 Operations Personnel identified visible steam out leakage on Autoclave #2. The autoclave was operating in Operational Mode II 'Heating' at time of discovery. The out leakage was determined to be a failure of the autoclave shell 'O' Ring ( 'Q' Safety System Component) which seals the autoclave enclosure. The steam was immediately valved off, autoclave placed in Non-TSR applicable Mode VII 'Shutdown', and declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent. No release of Radiological Material occurred. This incident is being reported as a Safety Equipment Failure while operating in a TSR Applicable Mode. The licensee also notified NRC Region 2 (Hartland) and the DOE Site Representative. | |
| ENS 42170 | 26 November 2005 02:20:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Oil Spill on Plant Site | On 11/25/05 at approximately 2120 hours, an oil spill occurred on plant site. During normal shift rounds, Power Operations observed oil coming from the overflow of an oil storage tank associated with the X-530 345KV under ground oil pumping station. A pump failed to shut off as required, allowing oil to be pumped to the storage tank until operator intervention shut down the pump. At 0020, 11/26/2005 hours, The Plant Shift Superintendent notified the National Response Center and the Ohio EPA that a Reportable Quantity (RQ) of insulating oil (Polybutene) was released to the ground. No material left the immediate area and clean-up of the spill is currently in progress. UE2-RA-RE1030, Appendix D, section P requires a 4 hour NRC event when other government agencies are notified. The licensee reported this event to the National Response Center as report number 780580. The licensee notified NRC Region 2 (Hartland). | |
| ENS 41623 | 22 April 2005 01:13:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Autoclave Shutdown Due to High Condensate | On 04/21/05 at 2013 hours, Autoclave #2 in the X-343 Facility experienced a Steam Shutdown due to high condensate level alarms (A) and (B) actuating. The autoclave was in an applicable TSR mode (Mode II, Heating) at the time of the alarm actuations. The autoclave was placed in Mode VII (Shutdown) and declared INOPERABLE by the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS). An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the actuations. No release of radioactive material occurred as a result of this incident. This event is being reported in accordance with UE2-RA RE1030, Appendix D. J. 2. Safety System Actuations. NRC, Region II has been notified of this event. | |
| ENS 41391 | 9 February 2005 17:03:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Offsite Notification Due to Reportable Quantity Spill Contained on Site | The following information was obtained from the regulatee via facsimile: On 2/09/05 at approximately 1025 hours (EST) , a Hazardous Material spill occurred on plant site. Utility operations was transporting a small tank (app. 320 gallon capacity) of Sodium Hypochlorite with a fork truck. The tank tipped off of the forks, hit the ground, and landed on its side causing the cap to come off. Approx. 150 gallons of Sodium Hypochlorite spilled to the ground resulting in a hazardous material spill. At 1203 hours, the Plant Shift Superintendent notified the National Response Center and the Ohio EPA that a Reportable Quantity (RQ) of hazardous material (Sodium Hypochlorite)) was released to the ground. No material left the immediate area and clean-up of the spill is currently in process. UE2-RA-RE1030, Appendix D, section P requires a 4-hour NRC event (notification) when other government agencies are notified. There were no personnel injuries or plant equipment damaged as a result of the spill. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 41171 | 2 November 2004 22:35:00 | Response | 24 Hour Bulletin 91-01 Report Involving Tanker Truck Assay Results Exceeding Values | DESCRIPTION: 11/2/04 at 1735 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) office was notified of a tanker truck located outside the east corner of the X-700 has uranium results at 322.0 +/- 64.4 PPM and 4.87 +/- 0.49 U-235 assay. No NCSA applies to this operation. This is reportable per NRCB 91-01 as a 24 hour event. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: Very Low Safety Significance. The amount and concentration of uranium involved cannot possibly achieve a critical configuration. POTENTIAL CRITICALITY: There are no criticality pathways involved due to the limited mass and concentration of material. CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: No NCSA was established for this operation, so there are no control parameters. However, the limited mass and concentration of the solution does not warrant double contingency control because a criticality is not credible. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS: No NCSA controls were established for this operation. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Upon discovery the PSS office directed entering an anomalous condition. Additional samples are being taken to confirm results. Contents of tanker are to be removed. | |
| ENS 40676 | 15 April 2004 14:30:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Hazardous Material Spill | On 4/15/04 at approximately 0315 hours, an 18 inch expansion joint on a exterior overhead steam supply line ruptured during routine utilities valving operations. The asbestos insulating the expansion joint was released to the ground resulting in a hazardous material spill of approximately 1 - 2 pounds of friable asbestos. At 1030 hours, The Plant Shift Superintendent notified the National Response Center that a Reportable Quantity (RQ) of hazardous material (friable asbestos) was released to the ground. No material left the immediate area and clean-up of the 1 to 2 pounds of asbestos is currently in (progress). UE2-RA-RE1030, Appendix D, section P requires a 4 hour NRC event when other government agencies are notified. The licensee notified NRC Region II. The Ohio EPA and the local Department of Energy office were also notified. | |
| ENS 40599 | 19 March 2004 14:10:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Safety System Actuation at Portsmouth Gdp | On 03/19/04 at 0910 hours, Autoclave #5 in the X-343 Facility experienced a Steam Shutdown due to high condensate level alarms (A) and (B) actuating. The autoclave was in an applicable TSR mode (Mode II, Heating) at the time of the alarm actuations. The autoclave was placed in Mode VII (Shutdown) and declared INOPERABLE by the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS). An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the actuations. No release of radioactive material occurred as a result of this incident. This event is being reported in accordance with UE2-RA-RE1030, Appendix D. J. 2. Safety System Actuations. | |
| ENS 40124 | 2 September 2003 01:45:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Manual Actuation of Safety Equipment for Autoclave Containment | On 09/01/03 Operations Personnel were preparing to disconnect a UF6 cylinder from Autoclave #1 in the X-344 facility. The UF6 cylinder as in the 9 O' Clock position and was being prepared to roll to the 12 O' Clock position to complete disconnecting the cylinder safety valve and pigtail from the cylinder. At approximately 2135 hours UF6 was observed smoking from the mechanical connection for the cylinder safety valve and process manifold. The Operator seeing the smoke, alerted personnel in the area, actuated the "Emergency Autoclave Shell Closure" and the building "Gas Release Alarm" that placed the Autoclave and other operational autoclaves into containment. Emergency Response Personnel Responded and performed Air Samples for HF and Uranium in the affected area. All samples were less than Minimum Detectable. The actuation of the 'Emergency Autoclave Shell Closure' and the building 'Gas Release Alarm' is considered to be the manual actuation of Safety Equipment used to mitigate (prevent) a release of UF6. Reportable to the NRC as a 24 hour report. The certificate holder notified the NRC Resident Inspector and on-site DOE Inspector.
Investigation of the incident has revealed that prior to the safety system actuation the cylinder valve had been fully closed, the sampling operation had concluded and that the leak point was between the cylinder valve and the cylinder safety valve. At this point, the safety function of isolating the UF6 leak had been performed prior to the actuation of the safety system. In addition it should be noted that based on leak location, the Pigtail Line Isolation system was not designed to protect against this plant condition. SAR Section 6.9, Table 6.9-1, criteria J.2.B (2) addresses that the J.2 reporting criteria excludes the reporting of actuations that are invalid and occur after the safety function has been completed. As noted above the actuation is invalid because the Pigtail Line Isolation system would not have mitigated this UF6 release and the safety functions that in fact did mitigate the release were taken. It should also be noted that the 'Emergency Autoclave Shell Closure' is not a credited safety system and therefore is not applicable to the stated reporting criteria The Certificate Holder has notified the NRC Resident Inspector (Bruce Bartlett) and DOE (Russ Vranicar). Notified R3DO (Roger Lanksbury) and NMSS (Doug Broaddus) |