Semantic search

Jump to: navigation, search
Search

Edit query Show embed code

The query [[Category:ENS Notification]] [[Site::Point Beach]] was answered by the SMWSQLStore3 in 0.3627 seconds.


Results 1 – 50    (Previous 50 | Next 50)   (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)   (JSON | CSV | RSS | RDF)
 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 537795 December 2018 20:07:00Point BeachNRC Region 3At 1539 (CST) December 5, 2018, with Unit 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally, post-trip. An actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system occurred during the manual trip. The auxiliary feedwater system automatically started as designed when the valid actuation signal was received. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3 (hot standby). Decay heat is being removed by atmospheric dump valves. Unit 2 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The loss of condenser vacuum resulted because one of two circulating water pumps was running and its discharge valve shut. The cause for the valve shutting is under investigation. There is no primary to secondary leakage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
ENS 532391 March 2018 20:05:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopDuring review of protection of equipment from damaging effects of tornados, Point Beach Nuclear Plant identified a potential vulnerability for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps due to steam supply piping that is not routed through a Class 1 structure. Immediate compensatory measures were taken to mitigate the potential consequences of a tornado generated missile impact. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and (D). The identified vulnerability is being addressed in accordance with EGM 15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01, enforcement discretion memorandum and interim guidance document for resolution of noncompliance with tornado-generated missile protection. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5304230 October 2017 12:48:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopDuring a scheduled refueling outage, an inspection of components inside containment revealed a suspected weld defect on 1CV-309B, 1P-1B RCP Labyrinth Seal 1PT-124 Upper Root. 10 CFR 50.2 (2)(i) defines the reactor coolant pressure boundary as being connected to the reactor coolant system, up to and including the outermost containment isolation valve in system piping which penetrates primary reactor containment. The weld defect is located on the transmitter side of 1CV-309B. This can be isolated from the RCS by shutting 1CV-309B and 1CV-308B, 1P-1B RCP Labyrinth Seal 1PT-124 Lower Root. Based on the definition provided in 10 CFR 50.2, the condition is considered reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii). Unit 1 is currently in mode 3. Repairs for the condition are being determined. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 530049 October 2017 09:15:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

At 0737 CDT on 10/9/17, Point Beach declared an Unusual Event with Emergency Action Level HU 3.1 due to report of toxic gas from a spill in a service building within the protected area. The spill is contained and cleanup operations are in progress. The spill was not in a contaminated area or vital area. The janitorial worker injured while mixing cleaning chemicals in a closet was taken to the hospital. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/9/17 AT 1111 EDT FROM DENNY SMITH TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Point Beach has terminated the Unusual Event at 0944 (CDT) on 10/9/2017. The Unusual Event condition is no longer warranted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Hills), NRR EO (King), IRD (Stapleton), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5297619 September 2017 00:01:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopAt 1724 (CDT) on 9/18/17 during Control Room Ventilation testing Door-61, South Control Room Door, became wedged against its door stop and stuck open. Door-61 is a credited High Energy Line Break (HELB) / Fire / Flood Barrier in addition to its function to maintain the Control Room envelope. The door stop was subsequently unbolted from the floor and the door was free to close. Door-61, South Control Room Door, has since been inspected, and at 1750 (CDT), was declared functional as a HELB / Fire / Flood Barrier and Operational for purposes of maintaining the Control Room Envelope. During the 26 minutes the door was stuck open, the Control Room was in an unanalyzed condition with regards to protection from a High Energy Line Break. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5263623 March 2017 21:06:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopOn 3/23/17, at 0325 hours CDT, it was discovered that a prohibited item was present in the protected area from 0508-1718 hours on 3/22/17, which resulted in a reportable condition pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5262720 March 2017 17:53:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

At 1620 (CDT), an unusual event was declared due to a smoke detector alarm in Unit 1 containment. (There were) no indications of any other detector alarms, no abnormal equipment indications, and containment parameters are normal (temperature, humidity). At 1631 (CDT), visual inspection (of the) 66 ft. hatch indicated no smoke or abnormal smell. At 1640 (CDT), local inspection of Unit 1 containment verified no fire or hot spots. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC. Notified FEMA National Watch and Nuclear SSA via E-mail.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RYAN RODE TO DONG PARK AT 2208 EDT ON 3/20/2017 * * *

Event transmitted under ENS # 52627 is terminated at 2022 (CDT on) 3/20/17." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD (Stapleton). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC. Notified FEMA National Watch and Nuclear SSA via E-mail.

ENS 519085 May 2016 11:36:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopAn individual failed to comply with the NextEra Energy fitness-for-duty policy during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the plant has been terminated. This is reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5179215 March 2016 15:14:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopDuring a scheduled refueling outage, an inspection of containment components revealed a suspected through wall leak on 1CV-200B, Letdown Orifice 'B' Outlet Control. Non-destructive engineering inspection has been completed and determined that an indication exists. 10 CFR 50.2(2)(i) defines the reactor coolant pressure boundary as being connected to the reactor coolant system, up to and including the outermost containment isolation valve in system piping which penetrates primary reactor containment. 1CV-200B is isolable from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by a single motor operated valve, 1RC-427, Reactor Coolant Loop 'B' Leg to CVCS Letdown Isolation valve. 1CV-200B is located inside of containment between 1RC-427 and the two containment isolation valves for the letdown line, 1CV-371 and 1CV-371A. Based on the definition provided in 10 CFR 50.2, the condition is considered pressure boundary leakage and is considered reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii). Unit 1 is currently in Mode 6. Repairs for the condition are being determined. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5157028 November 2015 23:54:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopUnit 1 automatic reactor trip actuated due to an automatic voltage regulator (AVR) malfunction which caused a generator lockout and turbine trip. The cause of the AVR malfunction is unknown at this time. All control rods fully inserted. The RCS is being cooled by forced flow (reactor coolant pumps). Secondary heat sink is being provided by the condenser steam dumps utilizing the main feed water system. The auxiliary feed water system actuated based on low steam generator level, but since has been secured. Off-site power remains available. No release is occurring and emergency core cooling systems did not actuate. Emergency plan entry was not required. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup at normal operating temperature and pressure. Unit 2 was not affected by the Unit 1 transient. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector
ENS 5150629 October 2015 10:38:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopAt 0348 CDT, while Point Beach Unit 2 was performing outage activities, it experienced a Main Power Transformer lockout and associated loss of busses (2A-01, 2A-02, 2B-01 and 2B-02). The loss of the two non-vital 4160 V buses resulted in actuation of the Unit 2 undervoltage logic which resulted in actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The Auxiliary Feedwater System functioned normally upon actuation. This condition was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)(6), PWR auxiliary or emergency feedwater system actuation. This event did not affect the operating Unit 1. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5119430 June 2015 20:05:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopThis notification is being made in accordance with NUREG-1022, Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 Section 3.2.12, News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency. On June 30, 2015 at 1256 (CDT) an employee was injured while conducting a work activity and a non-contaminated hospital transport was completed. 29 CFR 1904.39(a) requires a report to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), US Department of Labor within twenty four (24) hours after the in-patient hospitalization of one or more employees as a result of a work-related incident. At 1635 CDT, it was determined that this is a 24-hour OSHA reportable occurrence. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5074015 January 2015 19:12:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopOn November 19, 2014, inadequately sealed piping penetrations were discovered in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) piping and valve gallery walls that could have allowed a postulated flooding event to potentially impact both RHR pumps. The same configuration was identified on both Units. Following analysis of the postulated flooding leakage sources and flow paths, it was discovered that there was a time when an unacceptable volume of flood water could have entered the pipe and valve gallery areas. This condition was found to have been previously corrected on 12/16/14, following changes to Operations flood mitigation strategies and installation of seals in upstream pipeway trenches. Therefore, this issue is reported as an unanalyzed past condition that had the potential to adversely impact the RHR pumps. This condition was determined to be reportable per 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 506493 December 2014 01:10:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopInitiated a manual Unit 1 reactor trip due to imminent failure of 1P-25B Condensate Pump. Unit 1 had commenced a rapid down power due to the degradation of the pump. The event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a manual actuation of the reactor protection system when the reactor is critical and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an actuation of specified system (6) PWR auxiliary feedwater system. Auxiliary feedwater system actuation was due to low steam generator water levels in both 'A' and 'B' Steam Generators, an expected system response during a reactor trip. Decay heat removal is by forced circulation and is being controlled by auxiliary feedwater system and condenser steam dumps. After the trip, both main steam generator feedwater pumps were secured due to feed pump suction pressure remaining low post trip. All other plant systems functioned as required. All control rods fully inserted in the core due to the manual trip. There was no ECCS actuation. Off-site power has been maintained throughout the event. No primary or secondary safety relief valves lifted during the reactor trip. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. There was no effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5039624 August 2014 03:23:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

At 0039 (CDT) on 8/19/14, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 identified that 2TE-451A and 2TE-451C Cold Leg Temperature RTDs were out of service. Technical Specification 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, Action Condition C for one or more functions with two required channels inoperable was entered. Action Condition C requires one channel to be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. If completion time in Action Condition C cannot be met, Action Condition D will be entered, which requires entry into Action Condition E. Action Condition E would require Unit 2 to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 4 in 12 hours thereafter. Unit 2 is being shut down to effect repairs within the 7 day required action completion time for Action Condition C. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications. The Resident Inspector has been informed.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM ALEX RIVAS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2337 EDT ON 10/1/14 * * *

Point Beach is retracting EN# 50396 made on August 24, 2014 at 0323 EDT. Technical Specification 3.3.3. Post-Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, Action Condition C for one or more functions with two required channels inoperable was entered. Action Condition C requires one channel to be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Unit 2 TE-451A and TE-451C Cold Leg Temperature RTDs inoperable condition was corrected and the plant returned to power before expiration of the 7 day period specified in Condition C of Technical Specification 3.3.3. Reference example (3) Failure that was or could have been corrected before shutdown was required, of Section 3.2.1, Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications of NUREG-1022, Rev. 3, Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (McCraw).

ENS 502628 July 2014 07:28:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

At 0024 CDT on 7/8/2014, Unit 2 Spray Addition was declared inoperable and LCO 3.6.7 (Spray Additive System) not being met, which resulted in a condition reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The inoperability was caused by Unit 2 Sodium Hydroxide Tank level indication greater than 67%, at 67.5%. This exceeds a current Prompt Operability Determination compensatory action requirement stating 'level shall be maintained no higher than 67%.' At 0104 CDT on 7/8/2014, Unit 2 Sodium Hydroxide Tank level was restored to an acceptable level, less than 67%. TSAC 3.6.7B was exited and LCO 3.6.7 met. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY BRADLEY DERINGTON TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1710 EDT ON 09/05/2014 * * *

Point Beach is retracting EN# 50262 made on July 8, 2014 at 0628 CDT. The Operability Determination for this condition has been revised based upon engineering analysis. The event notification is being retracted based upon the subsequent Operability Determination revision that shows the NaOH Injection System was capable of performing its safety function at an observed Spray Additive Tank level of no higher than 77.2 percent. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa).

ENS 4984419 February 2014 20:31:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopA licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a for cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4943313 October 2013 11:34:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO CIRCULATING WATER PUMP HOUSE FLOODING

Point Beach declared an Unusual Event based on HU 1.6 Uncontrolled Flooding in the Circulating Water Pump house that has the potential to affect safety related equipment needed for the current operating mode.

The leak was from the North main Zurn Service Water strainer. Operations entered the appropriate abnormal operating procedure and secured and isolated the affected strainer. The leak is now isolated.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA and DHS NICC and via E-mail the Nuclear SSA.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ANDREW RADOSEVIC TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1427 EDT ON 10/13/13 * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1245 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Skokowski), R3RA (Pederson), NRR ET (Uhle), IRD (Morris), NRR EO (Evans), and R3 (Shear). Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA and DHS NICC and via E-mail the Nuclear SSA.

ENS 4929522 August 2013 01:28:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopPoint Beach was notified via our EP (emergency plan) manager that emergency plan siren K 5 actuated inadvertently at 2100 (CDT) on 8/21/13, during severe weather. Initial notification of this occurrence was made by Kewaunee County Emergency Management to the Kewaunee Nuclear Plant EP manager. The Kewaunee EP manager in turn notified the Point Beach EP manager. The siren stopped sounding at 2125 on 8/21/13, and was removed from service to prevent additional inadvertent actuations before it is repaired. The loss of coverage for siren K-5, which is the only Point Beach siren out of service at this time, is 1.9%, which is below the 50% loss of coverage requiring additional notifications. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 492467 August 2013 09:01:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

At approximately 0100 (CDT) on 7 August, 2013, severe thunderstorms and high winds in the area resulted in a loss of power to the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and to Alert and Notification System (ANS) sirens. Loss of ANS sirens resulted in a loss of greater than 50% of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population coverage (14 out of 22 lost). Note: PBNP has installed a new siren system that is currently in operational acceptance testing and remained fully functional on backup battery power. During the loss of power to the EOF, station personnel verified that power remained available to the Alternate Emergency Operations Facility (AEOF). At approximately 0545 CDT, station personnel verified that power to the EOF was restored. Efforts are ongoing to restore power to sirens. The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. See related EN #49247.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JERRY STRHARSKY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1654 EDT ON 8/7/13 * * *

At 1525 CDT on 8/7/13, the licensee returned 9 of 14 emergency sirens to service which brings the percentage of population covered by the sirens below the reporting threshold. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lara).

ENS 4892114 April 2013 13:24:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopAt 0620 CDT on 4/14/13, the Unit 1 Sodium Hydroxide Tank outlet valve was found to be shut. This valve isolated the flow path for both trains of containment spray chemical addition and resulted in LCO 3.6.7 (Spray Additive System) not being met, which resulted in a condition reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). At 0651 CDT on 4/14/13, the Unit 1 Sodium Hydroxide Tank outlet valve was restored to its required locked open position and TSAC (Technical Specification Action Conditions) 3.6.7.8 was exited. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 487226 February 2013 13:27:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

At 1132 CST on 2/6/13, Point Beach Unit 1 experienced a loss of all offsite power due to the loss of 1X-03 High Voltage Station Aux Transformer. The high side circuit switcher opened. However, the 1X-03 transformer did not lock out resulting in G-01 and G-03 Emergency Diesels energizing the 1A-05 and 1A-06 4160 VAC busses (safety related). The cause of the loss of offsite power is being investigated. In order to exit the event, the plant requires either 345 kV power to be restored or cross-tie plant power between the units. If cross-tied, Technical Specifications require the gas turbine to be placed on the cross-tie within 24 hours. The plant remained at 100% power and there was no effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and the Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1500 ON 2/6/2013 FROM JAMIE WEIGANDT TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

There were specified system actuations with the original event. Emergency diesel generators (EDG) G-01, 2, 3, and 4 started on the undervoltage conditions with G-01 and G-03 loading onto their respective buses. 1P-53, motor driven aux feed pump started as designed on the EDG breaker closures. Offsite power has been restored to safeguards buses and the EDGs have been removed from the buses. Troubleshooting continues on the initial fault. All other systems functioned as designed. The unusual event has been terminated as of 1340 CST on 2/6/13. The safeguards buses are being powered from Unit 2 through the electrical cross-tie. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Kunowsky), NRR EO (Evans), IRD (Marshall), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and the Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).

ENS 4840212 October 2012 11:29:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

On 10/12/12 at 0420 CDT the Unit 2 Steam Generator B Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve (ADV) spuriously opened while in automatic control. This resulted in indicated reactor power exceeding the FSAR analyzed value of 1810.8 MWt. Prompt operator action was taken and reactor power was restored to within limits in approximately four minutes. The operators placed the Atmospheric Steam Dump Controller to manual and closed the ADV successfully. This event is being reported under the criteria in 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B). All other plant systems responded as expected. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MARY SIPIORSKI TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/04/12 AT 1544 EST * * *

This notification is being made to retract Event Notification EN #48402 which reported power exceeding the FSAR analyzed value of 1810.8 MWt due to a spurious opening of an Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve. While 1810.8 MWt is the normal PBNP (Point Beach Nuclear Plant) full power value without consideration to uncertainties, subsequent reviews show that the peak power level reached during the event was bounded by FSAR analyzed events. Additionally, the opening of the valve is an Anticipated Operational Occurrence, described and analyzed in the FSAR. The power excursion during the event was below excursions evaluated in the FSAR. The event was analyzed and plant safety was not significantly degraded. Therefore, the event does not meet the criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3) and NextEra Energy Point Beach retracts Event Notification EN #48402. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Pelke).

ENS 4830513 September 2012 19:36:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

The Technical Support Center (TSC) at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) is non-functional as a result of conservatively securing an exhaust fan that exhibited an abnormal noise in the TSC Ventilation system. The fan is currently in service and being monitored as part of the troubleshooting, with maintenance repair plans being conducted in parallel. Functional alternate locations described in the emergency plan procedures for events resulting in radiological conditions affecting habitability will be used and are currently available. The Control Room or EOF will be selected as the alternate facility. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using the procedure and functional facilities selected. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation system has been restored to normal operation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MARY SIPIORSKI TO CHARLES TEAL ON 9/14/12 AT 1942 EDT * * *

At 1737 on 9/14/12, maintenance activities are complete on the TSC ventilation system. The TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation and the TSC (has been) returned to fully functional. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Kunowski).

ENS 4818915 August 2012 00:02:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopUnit 1 Manual Reactor Trip was initiated in anticipation of an auto turbine trip due to operators noticing the turbine governor valves closing in response to an Electro-Hydraulic Control System signal. All Control Rods are fully inserted. The RCS is being cooled by forced flow (reactor coolant pumps). Secondary heat sink is being provided by the condenser steam dumps utilizing the main feedwater system. The auxiliary feedwater system actuated based on low steam generator level, but has since been secured. There were no unexpected (inconsistent with nature of trip) pressure or level transients. Offsite power remains available. No release occurred nor is ongoing. Emergency Core Cooling did not actuate. No unexpected isolations occurred. Emergency Plan entry was not required. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4805328 June 2012 01:06:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip was actuated due to indications of a 100% Load Rejection. The cause of the Load Rejection is not known at this time. All Control Rods are fully inserted. The RCS is being cooled by forced flow (reactor coolant pumps). Secondary heat sink is being provided by the condenser steam dumps utilizing the main feedwater system. The auxiliary feedwater system actuated based on low steam generator level, but has since been secured. There were no unexpected (inconsistent with nature of trip) pressure or level transients. Off site power remains available. No release occurred nor is ongoing. Emergency Core Cooling Systems did not actuate. No unexpected isolations occurred. Emergency Plan entry was not required. The plant is stable at normal temperature and pressure. The electrical system is in a normal offsite power alignment. The Unit 2 Reactor Trip had no effect on Unit 1 which continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ERIC SONNENBERG TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2337 EDT ON 7/6/12 * * *

On June 27, 2012 at 2046 CDT, a Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip was initiated in anticipation of an automatic turbine trip due to operators noticing the turbine governor valves closing and turbine load reduction. It was originally reported that the cause was not known. This notification is updated to provide information to the cause of the load reduction. Troubleshooting has shown that the reduction of turbine load was due to a turbine speed channel card failing in the turbine control system. The card failure resulted in sending the auxiliary governor in the turbine control system an incorrect indicated overspeed condition and throttling the turbine governor valves to reduce the turbine speed. There was no actual turbine overspeed condition. The auxiliary governor is not part of the reactor protection system. No reactor protection setpoints were exceeded. All other plant systems functioned as required, including the Reactor Protection System. All control rods fully inserted into the core due to the manual reactor trip. There was no Emergency Core Cooling System actuation. No Emergency Diesel Generators were started and power continued to be supplied from off site. The reactor coolant system had forced circulation and the condenser steam dumps were used for decay heat removal from the steam generators. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Daley).

ENS 478963 May 2012 18:12:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopA licensed operating supervisor tested positive in a for-cause test for alcohol. The operator was not on shift during the day of the test. The operator's access to the plant has been suspended. A review of the operators work is being performed. The license has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4786325 April 2012 22:42:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

On April 25, 2012 at 2106 CDT, Point Beach Nuclear Plant declared an Alert under EAL HA3.1 due to toxic gas in a vital area. During a maintenance run on the plant's emergency diesel generator, diesel exhaust caused the concentration of carbon monoxide in an adjacent vital area room (Plant Instrument Air Compressor Room) to exceed OSHA IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health) levels. The diesel was immediately secured and the room was ventilated. There were no personnel injuries and no public health and safety issues associated with this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, DOE, DHS NICC, HHS AND EPA.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN RODGERS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0022 EDT ON 04/26/12 * * *

The Alert at Point Beach was terminated at 2314 CDT on 04/25/12. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lara), NRR EO (Lubinski), IRD (Scott via email only). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, DOE, DHS NICC, HHS, EPA, and Nuclear SSA (email only).

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MARY SIPIORSKI TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1650 EDT ON 8/2/2012 * * *

On April 25, 2012, at 2106 CDT, Point Beach Nuclear Plant declared an Alert under EAL HA3.1 (EN #47863) due to toxic gas in a vital area. During a maintenance run on the plant's emergency diesel generator, diesel exhaust caused the concentration of carbon monoxide in an adjacent vital area room (Plant Instrument Air Compressor Room) to exceed OSHA IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health) levels. The diesel was immediately secured and the room was ventilated. There were no personnel injuries and no public health and safety issues associated with this event. This retraction is based on the fact that station personnel incorrectly used an Alert trigger value for toxic gas concentration that was well below the actual value which would pose an immediate danger to life and health. In a subsequent evaluation, NextEra concluded that the station used the carbon monoxide (CO) OSHA limits (OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit 8-hour time weighted average of 50 ppm to 200 ppm short term exposure limit) that are normally monitored for confined spaces. The recommended CO limit value of 1200 ppm was determined to be the correct IDLH for the plant air compressor room, the actual reading in the room was 124 ppm. The plant air compressor room is not a confined space, and is not required to be monitored to the same limits as a confined space. Therefore, the Emergency Notification made on April 25, 2012, documenting an Alert due to toxic gas in a vital area is retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Kunowski).

ENS 4747827 November 2011 04:22:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

At 0238, Point Beach Unit 1, classified an Unusual Event based on CU3.1, loss of power to or from the 1X-04 transformer that results in a loss of all offsite power to both safety-related busses 1A-05 and 1A-06 for greater than 15 minutes and at least one emergency (diesel) generator is supplying power to an emergency bus. The 1X-04 transformer converts 345 kV to 13.8 kV. Both Emergency Diesel Generators are running supplying the safety-related busses. The licensee notified State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM KARL COSSEY TO JOHN KNOKE AT 0843 EST ON 11/27/11 * * *

Off-site power to Unit 1A-05 and 1A-06 Safeguards Busses has been restored via Unit 2 2X-03 High Voltage Station Transformer and 1X-04 Low Voltage Station Transformer. During the transient, all four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started as expected with G-01 EDG supplying the Unit 1 1A-05 Safeguards Bus and G-03 EDG supplying 1A-06 Safeguards Bus. Off-site power to the Unit 2 Safeguards Buses was not affected. The start of the EDGs is also reportable under 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). All systems responded as designed during the transient and operators performed in accordance with procedures and their training. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 5 within normal operating bands. Unit 2 remains operating at 100% power. The Unusual Event was terminated at 0700 (CST) on November 27, 2011. A press release is planned. The licensee has notified State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Julio Lara), IRD MOC (Jane Marshall), NRR EO (Sher Bahadur), DHS (Rickerson), and FEMA (Hollis).

ENS 4695713 June 2011 23:29:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

On June 13, 2011 at 1924 CDT, an automatic reactor trip was actuated during Shutdown Bank Insertion for Beginning of Life Physics Testing. Neutron flux lowered from the intermediate range to the point of automatic energization of the Source Range Nuclear Instruments. Energization of the Source Range Nuclear Instruments during this step is anticipated and permissible per the test procedure. When it energized, the N-31 Source Range Nuclear Instrument (Red Channel) failed high which initiated an automatic reactor trip. All plant systems functioned as required, including the Reactor Protection System. All control rods fully inserted into the core. There was no Emergency Core Cooling System or Auxiliary Feedwater System actuation. No Emergency Diesel Generators were started and power continues to be supplied from off site. The reactor coolant system has forced circulation and the atmospheric steam dumps are currently being used for decay heat removal from the steam generators. There was no radiological release and emergency plan implementation was not required. An investigation of the failure of the N-31 Source Range Nuclear Instrument is in progress There is no known primary to secondary leakage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RUSS PARKER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2155 EDT ON 6/14/11 * * *

At the time of the trip, the reactor was subcritical. This notification is updated to reflect reporting in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). An investigation of the failure of the N-31 source range nuclear instrument continues. This event was initially reported by the licensee as a four-hour report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Kozak).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ALEX RIVAS TO HUFFMAN ON 10/12/11 AT 1502 EDT * * *

'On June 14, 2011 at 2055 EDT, EN 46957 was amended to state the reactor was subcritical at the time of the trip. Subsequent review of this situation by the licensee resulted in a determination that at the time the test sequence was initiated, the reactor was critical and in MODE 2. Accordingly, this non-emergency report is amended to reflect EN 46957 as originally submitted on 06/13/11 at 2229 CDT. LER 301/2011-004-01 (submitted on July 25, 2011) will be revised accordingly.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Peterson) notified.

ENS 4677722 April 2011 14:21:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopA non-licensed contractor supervisor tested positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4664628 February 2011 03:45:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopAt 2159 CST on 2/27/2011, during the testing of the 'A' Train Safety Injection System, an Auxiliary Operator in the field identified that the oiler for 2P-15B, 'B' Train Safety Injection Pump, had rotated and the oil had drained out of the oiler. The Auxiliary Operator immediately reported this condition to control room personnel. The 'B' train safety injection pump was declared inoperable and LCO 3.0.3 was entered based upon the condition of both trains of safety injection being out of service. The Unit 2 'A' Train Safety Injection System was being tested in accordance with inservice testing procedure IT-535C, Leakage Reduction and Preventive Maintenance Program Train 'A' HHSI and RHR Piggyback Test Mode 1,5,6 (Refueling) Unit 2, which placed the Unit 2 ECCS in TSAC (Technical Specification Action Condition) 3.5.2.A, One ECCS Train Inoperable. Unit 2 exited LCO 3.0.3 at 2211 CST, upon completion of the 'A' train inservice test. The 2P-151B safety injection pump remains inoperable in accordance with TSAC 3.5.2.A, One ECCS Train Inoperable for troubleshooting and repair. This condition is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) Accident Mitigation. There was no impact on Unit 1 and the licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4649420 December 2010 10:48:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopOn 12/20/10 at approximately 0624 CST, the control room received notification that a vehicle/pedestrian accident had occurred on plant property near the south office building complex outside of the protected area. An emergency medical technician from the station's security department immediately responded to the scene of the accident to render emergency medical treatment. A 911 call was placed to local authorities to obtain response by appropriate agencies. Local fire department and ambulance services responded to the site. The individual was transported via helicopter to a trauma center in Green Bay, Wisconsin. The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. A press release is not planned at this time, however, the station will respond to media inquiries as needed. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).
ENS 4648215 December 2010 05:40:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopOn 12/15/10 at 0148 (CST) Control room personnel initiated a manual reactor trip in order to abort a startup in progress with the Unit 2 Reactor subcritical. During the performance of OP-1B, Reactor Startup for Unit 2 both Rod Control System Urgent and Non-Urgent alarms were received. Shortly after receiving the alarms multiple groups of control rods fell into the core as indicated by Individual Rod Position Indicators (IRPl's) and rod bottom lights. Based on these indications a manual reactor trip was initiated. All systems functioned as expected, with all control rods fully inserting. The plant is currently in Mode 3 and operating in accordance with normal plant procedures. The cause of the control rod alarms is under investigation. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4647513 December 2010 15:07:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

On 12/13/10 at 1210 CST a Technical Specification (TS) required shutdown was initiated on Unit 2. TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, was not met as a result of Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.4.2 not being met. TS Action Condition (TSAC) 3.1.4.A was entered which requires the shutdown margin to be within the limits of the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) or boration be initiated to restore shutdown margin to within the limits within one hour and that the reactor to be in MODE 3 within 6 hours. Shutdown margin has been verified to be within the limits specified in the COLR and a reactor shutdown has been initiated. On 12/10/10 at 1350 (CST), during performance of Technical Specification surveillance procedure TS-06 Rod Exercise Test, rod control urgent and non-urgent failure alarms occurred while stepping Control Bank B rods out. These alarms were verified locally in the Unit 2 rod drive room. On 12/10/10 at 2212 (CST), the test recommenced and control bank B was stepped out one step as procedurally required with no alarms. When control bank B was subsequently stepped inward one step, both rod control urgent and non-urgent failure alarms were received. Both of the times that Control Bank B rods failed to move, the movable gripper coil power supply fuse blew for control rod F-6. On 12/12/10 at 2143 CST, the surveillance procedure for Control Banks A, C, and D and Shutdown Banks A and B were completed satisfactorily, however, the failure of the Control Bank B rods to step in correctly resulted in the inability to satisfy SR 3.1.4.2, and entry into TSAC 3.1.4.A being required. During continuation of the surveillance on 12/12/10, it was not recognized that troubleshooting and repairs could not be conducted satisfactorily prior to the expiration of the surveillance interval. Therefore, a TS-required shutdown in accordance was not initiated.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and Region III have been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PLESSAS TO KLCO ON 12/15/10 AT 1736 * * *

On 12/13/10 at 1210 CST, a Technical Specifications (TS) required shutdown was initiated on the Unit 2 reactor. TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits was not met due to exceeding the specified Frequency and Grace Period for Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.4.2, which required a verification of the freedom of movement (trippability) of each control rod not fully inserted into the core. TS LCO 3.1.4 is not met, and TS Action Condition 3.1.4.A was entered which requires the shutdown margin to be within the limits of the Core Operating Limits Report or boration be initiated to restore shutdown margin to within the limits within one hour as well as requiring that the reactor to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours. Shutdown margin has been verified to be within the limits specified in the Core Operating Limits Report and a reactor shutdown has been initiated. On 12/10/10 at 1350 CST, during performance of TS Surveillance-6 (TS-6) Rod Exercise Test, Rod Control Urgent and Non-Urgent failure alarms occurred while stepping Control Bank B rods out. These alarms were verified locally in the Unit 2 rod drive room. On 12/10/10 at 2212 CST, TS-6 recommenced and Control Bank B was stepped out one step as procedurally required with no alarms. When control bank B was subsequently stepped inward one step, both Rod Control Urgent and Non-Urgent failure alarms were received again. Both of the times that the Control Bank B rods failed to move, the movable gripper coil power supply fuse blew for control rod F-6. On 12/12/10 at 2143 CST, TS-6 for control banks A, C, & D and Shutdown Banks A & B was completed satisfactorily. Troubleshooting is continuing and a repair plan has been developed. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Kozak), IRD (Grant), NRR (Evans)

ENS 462409 September 2010 20:25:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

At 1520 (CDT), Point Beach was notified by Manitowoc County Sheriff's Department (MCSD) and citizens of audible EP Siren actuation in the City of Two Rivers and the Town of Two Creeks, WI. System troubleshooting was in progress at the time of actuation. Alert and Notification System Siren configuration was restored to normal at approximately 1630 (CDT). All required ANS sirens were 'Poll tested' and are fully functional. Further reviews indicated that Sirens P-001 through P-013 (13 sirens) had each simultaneously received a 180 second activation. At this time the cause of the activation signal is unknown. All troubleshooting and testing are currently suspended; event investigation has commenced. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RIVAS TO KLCO ON 9/12/10 AT 1156 * * *

This notification is an update to ENS notification #46240 made by Point Beach. Notification #46240 was submitted September 9 at 2025 EDT regarding Point Beach notification by Manitowoc County Sheriff's Department (MCSD) and citizens of audible EP Siren actuation in the City of Two Rivers and the town of Two Creeks, WI. System troubleshooting was in progress at the time of actuation. This notification is to inform (the NRC) of the planned press release to inform the citizens of the affected communities of the event. At 0834 CDT 9/12/2010 Point Beach issued a letter to the Editor of Manitowoc Times Herald Times Reporter Newspaper regarding inadvertent Siren Activation. Corrective actions have been taken in the (Point Beach) EP siren maintenance program to avoid a recurrence and the Site Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Lipa).

ENS 4612926 July 2010 22:45:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopOn 7/26/2010 at 2001 (hrs. CDT), Control Room personnel initiated a manual reactor trip from approximately 19% reactor power. Unit 1 was in the process of coming off-line to support Main Generator repair. The generator breaker had just been opened and load transferred to condenser steam dumps when a loss of condenser vacuum occurred. The reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of main condenser vacuum with reactor power above P-10 permissive. All systems functioned as expected. All control rods fully inserted. Main Steam Isolation valves were manually shut. All reactor coolant system parameters are as expected, with reactor coolant temperature being maintained by atmospheric steam dumps. Currently, the plant is at normal operating temperature and pressure with the steam generators being fed by the main feed pumps. Feedwater is being supplied via the condenser and condensate storage tank. There were no lifts of safeties or reliefs during the transient. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical line-up with no effect on Unit 2. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. The cause of the loss of vacuum is under investigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 460809 July 2010 10:44:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopOn 07/09/10 at 0647 (CDT) hours, control room personnel initiated a manual reactor trip of Unit 2 from approximately 64% power as a result of a failure of the "A" feedwater regulating valve (FRV). All (other) systems functioned as expected. All rods fully inserted into the core. The unit is stable in MODE 3 at normal RCS (Reactor Coolant System) pressure and temperature. The cause of the FRV failure is being investigated. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The unit electrical power is lined up to offsite power in a normal configuration. Decay heat is being removed from the steam generator through the steam dumps to the main condenser. The FRV failed open and the valve controller was unable to place the FRV into the correct position. The steam generator HI-Hi level provided a feedwater isolation signal and a high level lockout of the FRV. Currently, the feedwater bypass valve is controlling steam generator level. There was no impact on Unit 1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4605329 June 2010 13:55:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopA non-supervisory licensed employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been denied. The individual had not entered the protected area and had not performed any licensed duties prior to the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector at 1053 hours.
ENS 4603219 June 2010 11:25:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopAt 0636 hours, control room personnel initiated a manual reactor trip of Unit 2 from MODE 2 at 0% power. Just prior to the initiation of the manual reactor trip, an automatic turbine trip had occurred as a result of the receipt of a generator lockout signal. Prior to the automatic turbine trip, an orderly power reduction to 44% power had been completed and the unit was being maintained in a stable condition in MODE 1. At the time of the turbine trip, two sets of condenser steam dump valves were isolated, in preparation for scheduled condenser waterbox tube cleaning. Following the manual reactor trip, all safety systems and equipment operated as expected. The cause of the turbine trip, including receipt of the generator lockout signal, is under investigation. The unit is stable in MODE 3 at normal RCS temperature and pressure. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) t and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Just prior to the trip, the unit was critical in Mode 2. All rods are fully inserted into the core.
ENS 455539 December 2009 16:22:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopAt 1231 emergency siren P-007 located in the Mishicot, WI area inadvertently actuated. The siren covers 0.9% of total EPZ population. Severe weather, snow, ice and wind is occurring at this time. At 1340 siren actuation was verified and Manitowoc County Sheriff was notified of the sounding siren. At 1350, Point Beach performed a siren test, reset the siren and it is no longer alarming. Repair team has been dispatched to the siren location to troubleshoot and determine the cause of the actuation. The population coverage for siren P-007 is 0.9% and the siren malfunction is not reportable due to loss of population coverage. However, based on actuation and notification of the Manitowoc County Sheriffs Department, the event is reportable. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 453379 September 2009 17:15:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopAt 1523 CDT, on September 9, 2009, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) was notified via electronic mail that laboratory analyses of soil samples collected from the catch basins surrounding the Unit 1 and 2 Main Power Transformers, 1X01, and 2X01, revealed polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) levels in excess of Wisconsin Administrative Code requirements. Remediation will be performed in accordance with Wisconsin Administrative Code requirements. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 453294 September 2009 14:46:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopA licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4435116 July 2008 23:15:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopA potential exists for a fire in the South Area of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) room to propagate to the Vital Switchgear (VSG) room. A fire 4 in the South Area of the AFW room could cause a short circuit in a cable that traverses the AFW room and the VSG room, causing ignition of the cable. The Point Beach Safe Shutdown Analysis assumes afire in a single fire area. A fire in South Area of the AFW Room, credits AFW pumps P-38B & 2P-29 for providing AFW to both unit's steam generators. A fire in the VSG Room, credits AFW pumps 1 P-29 & 2P-29 for providing AFW to both unit's steam generators. A fire in both the South Area of the AFW room and VSG room could potentially cause three of the four AFW pumps to be unavailable, which does not meet the requirements for Appendix R safe shutdown. The potential for a fire affecting two fire areas is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures have been implemented. Licensee investigations are continuing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 443363 July 2008 21:42:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

At 1945 Point Beach declared a UE based on HU 3.1, 'Report or detection of toxic or flammable gases that has or could enter the site area boundary in amounts that can affect NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.' This Emergency Action Level (EAL) was entered based on a confirmed Sodium Hypochlorite tank leak to the tanks diked area. The leak is located below the current tank level and will continue to drain to the dike until equilibrium level is reached. The dike is designed to contain the entire tank contents. There are no signs of any leakage outside of the dike. The vapors in the immediate area are not significant at this time and extra ventilation has been provided by opening an overhead roll up door in the area. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The sodium hypochlorite is used in the screen house to chlorinate the service water and circulating water systems to eliminate Zebra Mussels. The concrete diked area is designed to contain the entire contents of the tank.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0831EDT ON 7/4/08 FROM KILE HESS TO S. SANDIN * * *

At 0646 (CDT) on 7/4/08 Point Beach terminated the UE that was declared at 1945 CDT on 7/3/08, based on HU 3.1. The leaking Sodium Hypochlorite tank and leak control dike have been drained and the over flow leak control area cleaned. The hazard no longer exists and the area has been released to normal access. The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Kozak), EO (Brown), IRD (Gott), FEMA (Canupp) and DEHS (Inzer).

ENS 4431926 June 2008 21:34:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopA random FFD drug and alcohol test on a licensee supervisor indicated the presence of alcohol, although the blood alcohol content was below the limit of a positive test. As a prudent measure the Medical Review Officer recommended that the individual be further evaluated. The individual's site access to the plant has been suspended pending completion of that evaluation. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4390715 January 2008 16:14:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

At 1404 1/15/2008, Central time, Point Beach experienced a loss of Unit 1X-04, Low Voltage Station Auxiliary Transformer. This loss has caused Point Beach to declare an Unusual Event (SU 1.1, Loss of all Offsite Power to essential busses for greater than 15 minutes.) The loss of Unit 1X-04 transformer is under investigation. All equipment operated properly with the exception of 1B-04, 'B' train 480 VAC Safeguards Bus, supply breaker opened for unknown reasons. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Preparations are underway for a Unit 1 shutdown. Both Unit 1 EDGs are running and supplying Unit 1 safeguard buses. Non-safety buses are powered from an auto transfer that occurred after the loss of 1X-04. No impact on Unit 2 due to the Unit 1 electrical transient. Licensee notified state and local emergency management agencies.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DENNY SMITH TO JEFF ROTTON AT 2300 ON 1/15/08 * * *

On 1/15/08 at 1941 central time, FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC issued a press release concerning the Unusual Event at Point Beach that was declared on 1/15/08 at 1415 central time. The Unusual Event was reported under EN# 43907 and occurred due to the loss of all offsite power to essential busses for greater than 15 minutes from the failure of the Unit 1 X-04, Low Voltage Station Auxiliary Transformer. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the press release and this subsequent notification.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RICK ROBBINS TO JOE O'HARA AT 1816 EST ON 1/16/08 * * *

At 1404 on 1/15/08 central time, Point Beach experienced a loss of Unit 1 X-04, Low Voltage Station Auxiliary Transformer. This loss caused Point Beach to declare an Unusual Event and that was reported under EN# 43907. Technical Specification 3.8.1.B, Associated unit's 13.8/4.16 kv (X04) transformer inoperable, was not met as of 1404 on 1/15/08 and this LCO has a Required Action to restore the (X04) transformer to Operable status with a Completion time of 24 hours. At 1404 1/16/08 the LCO was still not met and Unit 1 entered Technical Specification 3.8.1.H Required Action and associated Completion Time Not met, with a required action to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours. This Event Notification Worksheet is for the initiation of the Technical Specification Required reactor shutdown that commenced at 1549 on 1/16/08, per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO(Stone), NRR EO(Evans), and IRD(Blount).

  • * * UPDATE FROM RICK ROBBINS TO JOE O'HARA AT 2222 EST ON 1/16/08 * * *

Update: At 1947 CST on 01/16/08, the Unit 1 reactor reached MODE 3, completing the required Technical Specification Shutdown. Offsite power has been restored to the essential busses by paralleling from Unit 2 4160 V buses and the Emergency Diesel Generators G-01 and G-03 have been placed back to a normal standby alignment. The unit is being taken to MODE 5 in accordance with plant TS requirements. This update to EN #43907 also reports the termination of the Unusual Event (AT 2035 CST) SU1.1, Loss of all offsite power to essential buses for greater than 15 minutes initially reported via EN #43907. The State of Wisconsin and the counties of Kewaunee and Manitowoc were notified of the termination via the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) at 2041 on 1/16/08. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO(Stone), NRR EO(Evans), NRR ET(Dyer), DHS(Gray), FEMA(Dunker), and IRD(Blount).

  • * * UPDATE FROM KILE HESS TO BILL HUFFMAN AT 1019 EST ON 1/17/08 * * *

Update: At 0702 CST on 01/17/08, FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC issued a press release regarding the termination of the Unusual Event and the shutdown of Unit 1 for repair of 1- X04 transformer. The NRC resident inspector was notified of the press release." R3DO (Stone) notified.

ENS 4375026 October 2007 14:19:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

This 8 hour report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). On 10/25/2007 at 1930 CDT Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Unit 1 and Unit 2 low temperature overpressure protection systems (LTOP) were declared inoperable as a result of the determination that the current LTOP actuation setpoint was non-conservative based on updated calculations. Specifically, 1) The mass input from the Safety Injection Pumps has significantly increased based on the use of a Point Beach Nuclear Plant specific system flow model. 2) The setpoint calculation does not consider instrument delay times during (PORV) Pilot Operated Relief Valve actuation. 3) The updated Calculation changes instrument uncertainties. LCO 3.4.12 for the LTOP system is not applicable at this time for either unit (both units in Mode 1/100% power). LCO 3.4.12 is only applicable in Mode 5, Mode 6 when the reactor vessel head is on, and Mode 4 when any cold leg temperature is at or below the temperature specified in the Pressure Temperature Limits Report (270 deg F). Changes to operating procedures to delineate operation of reactor coolant pumps and charging pumps during low temperature conditions are in progress. Implementation of these procedure changes will permit LTOP to be returned to service. The licensee stated that this issue was discovered as part of the on going calculation reconstitution initiative at the plant. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY RYAN RODE TO JASON KOZAL AT 2135 ON 10/26/07 * * *

The following is an update to the 8 hr report made to the NRC via EN#43750: On 10/26/07 at 17:51 procedure changes which identify requirements for operation of reactor coolant pumps and charging pumps during low temperature conditions have been made. These procedures provide the guidance required to ensure that the current LTOP setpoints remain conservative. Based on the issuance of these procedures with the required guidance, LTOP is returned to service for both Unit-1 and Unit-2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Hills).

ENS 4364918 September 2007 11:37:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

At 0043 on 9/18/07, during performance of Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.4.1, the 2T-13 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) was found to be at 105 degrees F. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.4 A was therefore not met due to temperature being above the parametric value limit of 97 degrees F (100F technical specification value). The cause of the elevated temperatures of 2T-13 is currently under investigation. At 0843 an orderly shutdown of Unit 2 was commenced because of the continued elevated temperature of the Refueling Water Storage Tank. Troubleshooting to identify the cause of the problem and take remedial actions continues. Unit 1 RWST temperature is 77 F. Licensee is taking action to lower Unit 2 RWST temperature. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY RICK ROBBINS TO JASON KOZAL ON 9/18/07 AT 1901 * * *

Unit 2 RWST temperature was verified at 97 degrees F at 1421 CDT. The 2T-13 RWST is operable and LCO 3.5.4.is now met. The Unit 2 power reduction was terminated at 20% reactor power. Current plans are to continue to cool down the RWST using station procedures that place the RWST on recirculation through the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger with component cooling water (CCW) to cool the heat exchanger. Plans are in progress to return Unit 2 to full power on 09/18/07. A root cause evaluation is in progress to determine the specific cause of the event; however, preliminary investigations have determined that the heaters were on with an improper setpoint. The power supply to the heaters have been turned off and temperatures are being monitored on an hourly basis while the RWST is on recirculation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Peterson)

ENS 4348712 July 2007 18:35:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopDuring a review of abnormal operating procedure (AOP) 10A, Safe Shutdown-Local Control, by the NRC triennial fire inspection team, it was identified that fire damage to the reactor coolant system (RCS) power-operated relief valve (PORV) and block valve circuits as a result of a fire in the cable spreading room could also result in simultaneous damage to a block valve circuit and spurious actuation of a PORV. While the actions included in abnormal operating procedure (AOP)-10A provide reasonable assurance that positive control of RCS Inventory is maintained, these steps do not ensure that simultaneous failure of the block valve circuit and spurious operation of a PORV will not result in RCS depressurization. Therefore, a postulated fire may potentially remove the ability to fully implement the Safe Shutdown Strategy. Compensatory measures in the form of twice-per-shift fire rounds in the cable spreading room have been implemented. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.