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The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1045 EST, on 2/19/2024, during a maintenance activity, a loss of all reactor building ventilation occurred on Unit 2. With no flow past the ventilation radiation monitors, the radiation monitors were inoperable to support their ability to perform primary and secondary containment isolation functions or start the standby gas treatment system. Reactor building ventilation was restored within 15 minutes. Due to this inoperability, the radiation monitor system was in a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.

• * * RETRACTION ON 3/15/24 AT 1315 EDT FROM BILL LINNELL TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

Upon further investigation, it was verified that the reactor building and the refueling floor radiation monitors are not needed to control the release of radiation for events described in chapter 14 of the updated Final Safety Analysis Report. For the analyzed loss of coolant accident (LOCA), the primary and secondary signals for this purpose were available and unaffected by this event. The radiation monitors provide a tertiary redundant method that is not credited within the station analysis. For all other analyzed accidents, the signal provided by the radiation monitors is not needed, as the secondary containment isolation function and start of the standby gas treatment system are not credited. Additionally, the fuel handling accident was not credible during the time of the event because no activities were in progress on the refueling floor. Therefore, the threshold for reporting the issue as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function was not met. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Jackson)

On 10/15/19 at 1210 (EDT) Peach Bottom discovered a degraded spring hanger (23DBN-H39) associated with Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. The hanger is located downstream of MO-3-23-14 HPCI Steam Supply Valve before the HO-3-23-4513 Turbine Stop Valve. A review of the piping and support design analysis were performed and concluded the U3 HPCI turbine inlet nozzle would potentially exceed its allowable stresses. Following Engineering review, U3 HPCI was declared inoperable at 1743 (EDT). This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * RETRACTION ON 11/22/19 AT 0851 EST FROM DAN DULLUM TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Additional evaluation by Engineering personnel determined that the degraded spring hanger would have no adverse effect on the subject piping or HPCI turbine nozzle structural integrity. Pressure, deadweight, and seismic stresses were within allowable limits. Non-destructive examination (NDE) of the piping and nozzle was performed to identify any signs of cracking, yielding, or defects. NDE results were satisfactory. The degraded spring hanger did not effect the Unit 3 HPCI system operability and this call is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Cahill).

On 06/26/11, at 0030 (hrs. EDT), Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 3 declared the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable for an ASME class 2 exempt piping leak found during operator rounds. Piping on the steam line pressure indication sensing line downstream of a sensing line root valve had an approximate 5 drop per minute leak. The leak has been isolated and the Unit 3 HPCI system was restored to an operable condition as of 0347 on 06/26/11. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION ON 08/08/2011 AT 1432 EDT FROM DAVE FOSS TO RYAN ALEXANDER * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 06/26/11 at 0525 (EDT) (EN# 46987). Notification of this event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable on 06/26/11 at 0030 (EDT) when a small leak on an instrument sensing line was found during performance of routine operator rounds. Specifically, it was observed that the 1/2 inch instrument piping for the non-safety related HPCI steam supply pressure indicator was leaking at approximately 5 drops per minute. The location of the leak was downstream of the instrument line root valve. The leak was isolated and the Unit 3 HPCI system was considered operable at approximately 0347 (EDT) on 06/26/11. The ENS report on 06/26/11 was originally submitted to report a potential loss of safety function involving the Unit 3 HPCI system due to this leak. Since the initial report, engineering has determined that HPCI was capable of performing its safety function at the time the instrument sensing line was leaking. The evaluation determined that the small sensing line leak would not have resulted in any significant equipment qualification, internal flooding or other equipment concerns that could have affected the HPCI system capability during any postulated design basis events. The pressure indicating instrument supplied by the sensing line is not safety related and is not required for any HPCI function or HPCI operability. Therefore, HPCI was determined to have maintained its operability during the time period that the HPCI sensing line was leaking. The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction. Notified R1DO (Powell).

The Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable at 12:07 on March 21. 2009 when HPCI Outboard Suppression Pool Suction Valve, MO-3-23-057, failed to fully open during testing. At this time the cause of the failure of MO-3-23-057 to stroke fully open is unknown. Investigation is in progress. This places Unit 3 in two (2) Tech Spec LCO Action Statements; 3.5.1 (14 day restoration with HPCI inop) and 3.6.1.3, Condition A (4 hour immediate action with verification every 31 days of Primary Containment Isolation Valves). Actions required by both have been completed. The failure occurred during performance of the quarterly surveillance test. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION FROM DAVE FOSS TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0824 ON 5/6/09 * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 3/21/09 at 1815 hours (EN# 44926). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable when unexpected conditions were found during performance of routine surveillance testing of HPCI. Specifically, it was noted that a motor-operated Suppression Pool suction valve for HPCI (MO-57) did not complete its stroke in the open direction during testing. The HPCI system was not operating at the time of the discovery. Since the initial report, Engineering has determined that HPCI was capable of performing its safety function. The evaluation determined that the MO-57 valve was capable of opening to a position sufficient to ensure that the HPCI safety function was met for design basis conditions. Additionally, since the torque switch is bypassed during actual design events, full motor torque would have been available which was sufficient to allow the valve to reach its full open position. It has also been determined that the valve was capable of closing on a signal to close automatically. During resolution of the HPCI MO-57 concern, the suction source from the Suppression Pool was isolated in accordance with Technical Specifications since MO-57 is listed as a Primary Containment Isolation Valve. This action was performed in accordance with station procedures and is considered planned maintenance. The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction.

During performance of a Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) Pump, Valve, Flow and Unit Cooler Functional and In-service Test, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable. The inoperability is due to failure of AO-2-23-042 "HPCI Steam Line Drain Inboard Isolation to Main Condenser" to open. The AO-2-23-042 is normally open and its passive safety function is to remove any steam condensation from the HPCI pump turbine steam supply line. HPCI is a single train safety system rendered inoperable by this condition. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION RECEIVED FROM DAVID FOSS TO JOE O'HARA AT 1431 ON 4/13/07 * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 3/14/07 at 2036 hours (EN# 43238). Notification of this issue to the NRC on 3/14/07 was initially made as a result of the discovery of a failure of AO-2-23-042 'HPCI Steam Line Drain Inboard Isolation to Main Condenser' to open. This condition was discovered during performance of a routine Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) Pump, Valve, Flow and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test. Failure of this valve to open results in water condensing in the HPCI steam supply line. HPCI had already been considered inoperable since approximately 0934 hours on 3/14/07 as a result of the performance of the test. Repairs were made to the AO-2-23-042 valve and HPCI was returned to an operable status by 2205 hours (IR 603918). Since the initial report, it has been determined that this condition is not reportable. HPCI was declared inoperable as a result of the performance of the surveillance test and therefore, the HPCI system inoperability was considered a planned evolution. In accordance with NUREG-1022, reporting of planned inoperabilities are not required to be reported unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its function. Water entering the HPCI steam supply piping only occurred as a result of the performance of the surveillance test and could not have caused HPCI to be inoperable during non-test conditions. The AO-2-23-042 is normally open when HPCI is required to be operable and its passive open safety function is to remove any steam condensation from the HPCI pump turbine steam supply line. The active safety function of the valve is to close on design basis events involving the initiation of HPCI. The passive open safety function is not required when the HPCI system is inoperable for testing. The active safety function was unaffected by this condition. The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction. Notified the R1DO(Krohn).

This non-emergency 8-hour report is pursuant, to 10CFR50.72(b)(3). On 05/06/05 at 21:36, (High Pressure Coolant Injection) HPCI was declared inoperable based on a degraded pipe restraint and a degraded snubber associated with the Unit 3 HPCI discharge piping. The degraded pipe restraint and snubber were discovered on 05/05/05 at 17:05. The subsequent engineering evaluation determined that HPCI is inoperable until the supports are repaired. Reactor operation is unaffected and Unit 3 remains at 100% power. The inoperability of the HPCI system places the plant in a 14 day Limiting Condition of Operation, per (Technical Specification) TS 3.5.1. Further investigation of the cause is in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION ON 6/14/05 AT 1659 EDT FROM D. FOSS TO A. COSTA * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 5/7/05 at 0016 hours (EN# 41676). Notification of this issue to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable on 5/6/05 at 2136 hours. This declaration was based on a preliminary Engineering evaluation concerning degraded pipe supports associated with the Unit 3 HPCI discharge piping. Since the initial report, it was determined that two HPCI discharge pipe supports required additional Engineering analysis to assess the as-found condition of the pipe supports. One support (S300) had loose base plate bolts while the other support (S46) had cracked welds. Engineering has determined that the S46 HPCI pipe support in the as-found condition was capable of performing its design function. A piping stress analysis was performed to address the as-found condition of the S300 pipe support. This analysis determined that the HPCI system would remain operable with the S300 support out of service. Therefore, during the period of pipe support degradation, the HPCI system was considered as available and capable of performing its safety function. Maintenance was planned and repairs were performed to HPCI system pipe supports. These repairs were complete and the HPCI system was restored to full compliance on 5/9/05 by approximately 0430 hours. A root cause evaluation is being performed in accordance with the Corrective Action Program (CR 332355). The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction. Notified R1DO (Krohn).

U2 HPCI was declared inoperable to fulfill its safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. U2 HPCI torus suction valve MO-2-23-058 failed to fully open, during performance of ST-O-023-301-2 'HPCI Pump, Valve, Flow, and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test.' The valve stopped in a mid-position. HPCI flow path from Condensate Storage Tank remains available for HPCI injection. Investigation into cause is continuing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION PROVIDED AT 1509 ET ON 4/20/04 BY D. FOSS TO J. ROTTON * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 3/8/04 at 1130 hours (EN# 40576). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable when unexpected conditions were found during performance of routine surveillance testing of HPCI. Specifically, it was noted that a motor-operated Suppression Pool suction valve for HPCI (MO-58) did not complete its stroke in the open direction during testing. The HPCI system was not operating at the time of the discovery. Since the initial report, Engineering has determined that HPCI was capable of performing its safety function. The evaluation has determined that the MO-58 valve was operable for continued operations. The MO-58 stopped in the mid-stroke position due to motor operator torque switch operation. During design events, the torque switch is bypassed and would not have interrupted valve operation. The torque switch is only in the valve logic for remote manual valve operations (e.g. testing). The torque switch was adjusted and HPCI was returned to service on 3/10/04 by approximately 1500 hours (ET). During adjustments to the HPCI MO-58 motor operator, the suction source from the Suppression Pool was isolated in accordance with Technical Specifications since MO-58 is considered as a Primary Containment Isolation Valve. This occurred on 3/8/04 by approximately 1340 hours. This action was performed in accordance with station procedures and is considered planned maintenance. Throughout the time period of repairs to the MO-58, HPCI was available for operations with its suction source from the normally aligned Condensate Storage Tank. The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction. Notified R1 DO (D. Silk).