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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 539093 March 2019 09:54:00North AnnaNRC Region 2At 0916 EST on March 3, 2019, North Anna Unit 2 declared a Notice of Unusual Event under Emergency Action Level HU 2.1 (fire in/or restricting access to any table H-1 area not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room alarm). At 0906 the control room received a heat sensor alarm for the Unit 2, Reactor Coolant Pump motor cube. The fire brigade was dispatched to the scene where they found no indication of fire, no smoke and no fire damage. There were no actuations associated with the alarm and no redundant indications of fire. There was no effect on plant equipment and no indications of RCS leaks. The site determined that the alarm was invalid and terminated the NOUE. Unit 2 is in a stable condition and in a normal electrical lineup. Offsite support was not requested. The NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local authorities have been notified by the licensee. Notified R2RA (Haney), DNRR (Evans), IRD MOC (Grant), R4RDO (Rose), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
ENS 539083 March 2019 00:13:00North AnnaNRC Region 2On March 2, 2019 at 2237 EST, North Anna Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped, while operating at approximately 12 percent power, due to degrading vacuum in the main condenser. The unit was in the process of a planned shutdown for refueling when condenser vacuum degraded to greater than 3.5 inches of mercury absolute. The operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized the unit in Mode 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. The reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There were no ESF system actuations. Decay heat is being removed by the Steam Generator Pressure Operated Relief valves. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. The Louisa County Administrator will be notified."
ENS 535793 September 2018 15:20:00North AnnaNRC Region 2

At 1045 (EDT) on 9/3/18, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 at 100% power, off-site power feed to the 'A' Reserve Station Transformer was lost which resulted in a loss of power to Unit 1'J' Emergency Bus. As a result of the power loss, the 1'J' Emergency Diesel Generator started as designed and restored power to the Emergency Bus. During this event, the Unit 1 'A' Charging Pump, 1-CH-P-1A automatically started as designed due to the loss of power event.

The valid actuation of these ESF (Engineered Safety Features) components due to the loss of power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A).

The Unit 1 'J' Emergency bus off-site power source was restored via the Unit 2 'B' Station Service bus and the 1 'J' Emergency Diesel was secured and returned to Automatic. The Unit 1 'A' Charging pump has been stopped and returned to Automatic. Both Units are in a stable condition. The apparent cause for the loss of power appears to be a bird strike to the 'A' RSST (Reserve Station Service Transformer) Overhead Cable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5326818 March 2018 12:34:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 2007 (EDT) on 3/17/18, a security Officer reported finding a container of herbal tea (Kombucha) on a platform in the Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear Room, which is located inside the Protected Area. Kombucha tea is a fermented tea containing trace amounts of alcohol, and is legally sold without restrictions. Dominion had previously notified its workforce that Kombucha tea was prohibited from being consumed or carried on-site. This is considered an alcoholic beverage and is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 26.719. The individual who brought the beverage on-site was identified and escorted out of the Protected Area. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will also be contacting the County Administrator for Louisa County, Virginia.
ENS 5243815 December 2016 13:50:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On 12/14/16 at 1206 (EST), 0-PT-89.9K (underground fuel-oil piping pressure test), was performed UNSAT after a failed attempt to maintain pressure in the supply line to the Unit 2 'H' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Day Tank. The exact source of the leakage is unknown at this time but is reasonable to believe some fuel oil was released underground. The associated Fuel Oil line is currently tagged out and isolated. This condition is reportable to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (VA DEQ) as part of the Underground Storage Tank Program. Pressure tasting of the other EDG fuel oil supply lines has been previously completed satisfactorily. The 2H EDG remains Operable as the redundant fuel oil transfer pump and its fuel oil piping are Operable and capable of maintaining adequate day tank level. The VA DEQ was notified of this condition at 1130 (EST) on 12/15/16. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify Louisa County.

  • * * UPDATE ON 12/28/16 AT 1659 EST FROM JAY LEBERSTIEN TO DONG PARK * * *

This is a follow-up report to Event Number 52438, made on 12/15/2016, regarding offsite notification to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality for potential fuel oil leakage from the supply line to the Unit 2H Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Day Tank. During investigation of the potential fuel oil leak from the 2HB EDG Day Tank supply line (as previously reported in EN 52438), the 2HA fuel oil line, which runs close to the 2HB line, was disturbed and began to leak a mist of fuel oil. The fuel oil was contained in the area and was being cleaned via vacuum truck as it was leaking. Personnel at the scene noted the soil was not contaminated with fuel oil initially and saw the leak start on 2HA line. It has been estimated that less than one gallon of fuel oil was released to the surrounding soil during troubleshooting of the leak. The fuel oil was immediately vacuumed. The 2HA line was isolated and the leakage was stopped. The 2HA line is to be repaired and tested. The 2H EDG remains available, however, it is considered inoperable at this time. Investigation of the 2HB fuel oil line continues. The condition of the 2HA fuel oil line was reported to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (VA DEQ) as part of the Underground Storage Tank Program on 12/28/16. Therefore, this event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify Louisa County. Notified R2DO (Rose).

ENS 5213730 July 2016 15:17:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn July 30, 2016 at 1152 hours (EDT) following a containment walkdown to investigate an increase in RCS unidentified leakage to 0.15 gpm, a leak was identified on the seal return line from 2-RC-P-1C, 'C' Reactor Coolant Pump. The source of the leakage cannot be isolated and is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage. (Technical Specification) LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B for the existence of pressure boundary leakage was entered. Technical Requirement TR 3.4.6, ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Components is also applicable. Unit 2 is projected to be taken to Mode 5 for repair. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) for 'the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications' and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for 'any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear plant including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.' The licensee will be notifying the Louisa County Administrator and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5189230 April 2016 00:48:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 2214 (EDT) on 4/29/16, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100 (percent) power, the North Anna 34.5 kV Bus 5, off site power feed to the 'A' Reserve Station Service Transformer, was lost which resulted in the loss of power to the Unit 1 'J' Emergency Bus. Loss of Bus 5 is still undergoing investigation. As a result of the power loss, the 1J Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started as designed and restored power to the 1J Emergency bus. During the event, the Unit 1 'A' Charging Pump (1-CH-P-1A) automatically started as designed due to the loss of power event. The valid actuation of these ESF components due to the loss of electrical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The Unit 1 'J' Emergency Bus off-site power source was restored to service and the 1J Emergency Diesel Generator was secured and returned to automatic. Restoration of offsite power to Operable is complete. The Unit 1 'A' Charging Pump has been secured and returned to automatic. Both units are currently stable. An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the Bus 5 loss of power. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5167823 January 2016 19:48:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1703 (EST) on 1/23/16, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% power, the North Anna 34.5 kv Bus 3, off-site power feed to the 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer, was lost which resulted in the loss of power to the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus and the Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus. Loss of 34.5kV Bus 3 resulted from feeder breaker L102 opening. As a result of the power loss, the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator and the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started as designed and restored power to the associated emergency bus. During this event, the Unit 1 'B' Charging Pump, 1-CH-P-18 automatically started as designed due to the loss of power event. The valid actuation of these ESF components due to the loss of electrical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). The Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus off-site power source was restored to service and the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator was secured and returned to Automatic. The Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus power feed continues to be from the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator. Restoration of offsite power to operable status is currently being pursued. The Unit 1 'B' Charging Pump has been secured and returned to automatic. Both units are in a stable condition. An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the L102 feeder breaker opening resulting in the 34.5 kv Bus 3 loss of power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
ENS 5155720 November 2015 15:34:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 0823 EST on 11/17/2015, the Unit 1 'A' Vent Stack radiation monitor, 1-VG-RI-179, was declared non-functional due to a faulty heat trace circuit. Compensatory measure to perform grab samples every 6 hours was implemented. At 0823 EST on 11/20/2015, the Unit 1 'A' Vent Stack radiation monitor, 1-VG-RI-179, had been out-of-service for 72 hours. The loss of 1-VG-RI-179 is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. Corrective actions continue to be pursued to restore 1-VG-Ri-179 to functional status. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PATRICK FRENCH TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0931 EST ON 11/22/15 * * *

The Unit 1 'A' Vent Stack radiation monitor, 1-VG-RI-179, was returned to service at 1440 EST on 11/21/15. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ernstes).

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MICHAEL WHALEN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1509 EST ON 1/11/2016 * * *

The purpose of this report is to retract the event notification report made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) on November 20, 2015 at 1534 EST (EN# 51557). After further review it has been determined that the performance of grab samples is an approved back-up method for radiological assessment capabilities as described in the North Anna Emergency Plan implementing procedure EPIP-4.24 Gaseous Effluent Sampling During Emergency. During non-emergencies, VPAP-2103N Offsite Dose Calculation Manual governs grab sampling and is tracked by Operations using 1-LOG-14 Non-Routine Surveillance Log. As such, a loss of radiological assessment capability did not exist and the ability to assess EAL RU1.4 was not affected. This is consistent with NUREG 1022, Rev.3, Supplement 1 and NEI 13-01, Rev. 0. The action was cleared at 1440 hours on 11/21/15 and the Unit 1 'A' Vent Stack radiation monitor, 1-VG-RI-179, was returned to functional status. The NRC Senior Resident lnspector has been informed of this event notification retraction. Notified R2DO (Masters).

ENS 514608 October 2015 18:23:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 2147 EDT on October 7, 2015, a high energy line break (HELB) door between the Turbine Building (TB) and the safety related Emergency Switchgear Room (ESGR) was determined to be unlatched. The door was immediately closed (latched). Investigation determined the door was unlatched for approximately 47 minutes. At 1617 EDT on October 8, 2015, it was determined the Unit 2 ESGR was outside of the design analysis for a Unit 1 HELB. A high energy line break in the TB with the door open could result in equipment in the Unit 2 ESGR experiencing high temperature, pressure, or humidity beyond conditions analyzed for equipment qualification which has the potential to render redundant safety-related equipment inoperable. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) & (B) & (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of safety functions to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat, and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 509462 April 2015 06:55:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn April 2, 2015 at 0426 EDT, the Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped while operating at 100 percent power due to a failure of the main generator voltage regulator. This also resulted in a turbine trip. The operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized the unit in Mode 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. This reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated as designed and provided makeup flow to the steam generators. The automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were subsequently secured and returned to automatic. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. The Louisa County Administrator will be notified. There was no effect on Unit 2 as a result of this trip.
ENS 5088413 March 2015 12:48:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn March 13, 2015 at 0928 EDT, a notification to OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) was initiated due to an employee experiencing a non-work related medical event that resulted in the employee passing. When the issue was identified, the station first aid team responded to administer first aid. Subsequent to the employee passing, a report was made to OSHA in accordance with federal requirements. This event is reportable to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) since another governmental agency was notified of this employer referral medical event. The plant employee was in a building within the protected area and was not contaminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the local government of the event.
ENS 5085126 February 2015 16:39:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn February 26, 2015, at 1511 EST, with Unit 1 operating at 95% power in an end of cycle coastdown, the 'B' Main Feedwater Reg Valve failed closed which resulted in a Unit 1 automatic reactor trip due to 'B' Steam Generator low/low level. The operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized Unit 1 in Mode 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. This reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The Auxiliary Feedwater pumps actuated as designed as a result of the reactor trip and provided makeup flow to the steam generators. The automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater system is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the valid actuation of an ESF system. The Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were subsequently secured and returned to automatic. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified and are in the Control Room. The Louisa County Administrator will be notified.
ENS 5070023 December 2014 00:57:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn December 22, 2014 at 2230 hours (EST) while performing a containment walkdown due to increased RCS (Reactor Coolant System) unidentified leakage, a leak was identified upstream of 1-RC-68, B Loop Cold Leg Drain Isolation Valve. The source of this leakage cannot be isolated and is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage. (Unit 1) Entered TS LCO 3.4.13 RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B for the existence of pressure boundary leakage. TS 3.4.4 RCS Loops - Modes 1 and 2 condition A, TR 3.4.6 ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components, Condition B. Unit 1 will be taken to Mode 5 for repair. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) for "initiation of plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications" and 10 CFR 50.72(b )(3)(ii)(A) for "any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded. The RCS leakage has been quantified as 0.053 gallons per minute from a containment sump in-leakage calculation. The exact location of the leak has not been identified due to the installation of lagging on the RCS components. The licensee anticipates entering Mode 3 (Hot Standby) within the next 30 minutes. There is no safety-related equipment out-of-service at this time. The licensee will inform Louisa County and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5066610 December 2014 17:13:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn December 10, 2014, at 1344 (EST), channel 1 of Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level indication failed low during maintenance activities on channel 2. At that time, operators entered abnormal procedure 1-AP-3, 'Loss of Vital Indication, on Unit 1.' Additionally, Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered due to 2 channels inoperable that affect Recirculation Spray (RS) pump auto-start capability. Had a Containment Depressurization Actuation (CDA) occurred during the time that both channels were inoperable, accident mitigation would have been adversely impacted. At 1356, both level indications returned to normal. At 1417, channel 2 was declared Operable and TS 3.0.3 was cleared. At 1439, channel 1 was declared Operable. Therefore, this 8-hour report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function due to the RS pump auto-start concern. Technicians inadvertently went to the incorrect channel (Channel 1) during planned maintenance activity of Channel 2, causing the loss of both channels simultaneously for a short period of time. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the Louisa County Administrator.
ENS 5045715 September 2014 14:54:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

With North Anna Unit 2 in Mode 6 during a scheduled refueling outage, discharged assembly 4Z9 was identified as a failed fuel assembly by In-Mast Sipping. The fuel assembly was located in core location B11. Initial inspection of the fuel assembly identified two (2) visibly split fuel pins of eight (8) to ten (10) inches long with visible damage to the top of the pins. The internals of the affected pins are visible and the springs from the top of each pellet stack are touching the top nozzle. The fuel assembly has been placed into its designated location in the Spent Fuel Pool. No abnormal increase was noted on any radiation monitor either after or during fuel assembly movement. This fuel assembly had been used during three (3) previous operating cycles and is not scheduled for reuse. On September 15, 2014, at 0900 (EDT), subsequent video inspection of the fuel assembly identified that the top springs of the two (2) fuel pins were dislodged. Video inspection of the reactor vessel identified debris that has the potential to be fragments of fuel pellets resting on the core plate. Additional investigations are in progress. Due to the fact that the failure exceeded expected conditions, this event is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), as any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify local county authorities.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAGE KEMP TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1227 EDT ON 9/30/14 * * *

Event Notification #50457 was provided on September 15, 2014, at 1454 hours, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), to provide notification that North Anna Unit 2 discharged assembly 4Z9 had two visibly split fuel pins and debris on the core plate that had the potential to be fuel pellet fragments. Detailed video inspections estimated that fifteen (15) fuel pellets were dislodged from fuel assembly 4Z9. For reference, the reactor core contains approximately 15 million fuel pellets. Efforts to identify and recover the fuel pellets were performed. Debris fragments, estimated to represent five (5) fuel pellets, were located within the damaged fuel assembly that is currently in the spent fuel pool. In addition, an estimated three (3) pellets worth of material was retrieved by the foreign object search and retrieval (FOSAR) efforts in the reactor vessel. The remaining seven (7) fuel pellets have already or are expected to granulate into fine particles that will remain in low flow areas of the primary plant systems or be removed by normal purification processes. However, since the specific location of the seven (7) fuel pellets is undesignated, a report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 74.11(a) for the loss of special nuclear material. The seven (7) fuel pellets contain licensed material in a quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in Appendix C of 10 CFR 20; therefore a report is also being made pursuant to 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(ii). The cause of the fuel clad degradation is understood and is being addressed. It has been evaluated that the dispersion of fuel pellet material will pose no threat to the integrity or operation of the reactor fuel and primary system components. Reactor Coolant System activity will remain below Technical Specification limits during power operation. In addition, there are no adverse radiological consequences to the public as a result of this issue. The licensee will be notifying the state of Virginia, local authorities in Louisa County and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Vias) and IRD (Stapleton).

ENS 5044811 September 2014 18:00:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn September 11, 2014, at 1400 hours, it was determined that four (4) personnel in the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) were not subject to random testing requirements of the Fitness for Duty (FFD) Program. The personnel involved do not have unescorted access to the Protected Area, but they do respond and perform duties as a member of the ERO. The affected individuals are now included in the random FFD testing pool. 10CFR26.4(c) requires all persons who are required by a licensee in 10CFR26.3(a) and, as applicable, (c) to physically report to the licensee's Technical Support Center or Emergency Operations Facility by licensee emergency plans and procedures shall be subject to an FFD program that meets all of the requirements of this part. This event is a 24-hour reportable event per 10CFR26.719(b)(4) - Any programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within the protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program.
ENS 5011615 May 2014 23:10:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 5-15-2014 at 1920 hours (EDT), with Unit 1 & 2 operating at 100% power, the North Anna 34.5 kV Bus 5, offsite power feed to the 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer, was lost which resulted in the loss of power to the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus and the Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus. As a result of the power loss, the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator and the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started as designed and restored power to the associated emergency bus. During this event, the Unit 2 'A' Charging Pump, 2-CH-P-1A, automatically started as designed due to the loss of power event. The valid actuation of these ESF (Engineered Safety Feature) components due to the loss of electrical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). The Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus off-site power source was restored to service and the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator was secured and returned to automatic. The Unit 1 Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.8.1 was cleared at 2115 hours on 5-15-2014. The Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus power feed continues to be from the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator and this line-up will remain until the off-site power source can be restored to operable status. The Unit 2 'A' Charging Pump has been secured and returned to automatic. Both Units are in a stable condition. An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the 34.5 kV Bus 5 loss of power. Power was returned to the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus via the Unit 1 'B' Reserve Station Service Transformer. The licensee will be notifying local Louisa County officials and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 497842 February 2014 11:01:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 2-2-2014 at 0859 (EST), with Unit 2 operating at 100% power, a manual reactor trip was initiated by the control room staff following a trip of the 'A' main feedwater pump and automatic start of the 'C' feedwater pump due to crew concerns that both motors of the 'C' feedwater pump had not actuated. When the 'C' feedwater pump auto started, the running indicator light for one of the 'C' feedwater pump motors failed to illuminate. Both motors of the 'C' feedwater pump had started as designed. Following the reactor trip, all control rods fully inserted into the core and Unit 2 was stabilized in Mode 3 at normal reactor coolant system temperature and pressure. Decay heat is being removed using the normal condenser steam dump system. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical alignment with power being supplied from the Reserve Station Service Transformers. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for actuation of the reactor protection system. Following the reactor trip, the auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started as designed and provided makeup flow to the steam generators. The steam generator levels were returned to normal operating level and the auxiliary feedwater pumps were returned to the normal standby automatic alignment. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for actuation of an ESF system. Unit 1 is operating at 100% power and was not affected by the event. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and will inform the Louisa County Administrator.
ENS 4967223 December 2013 13:00:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0828 EST on 12/23/2013, the North Anna control room was notified that the Virginia State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) had lost all power and all offsite communications. This included commercial phone lines, automatic ring downs, and the State ring down loop (lnsta-phone). At 0900 EST, all communications were restored once emergency generators were placed in service at Virginia State EOC. The Virginia State EOC initially lost offsite power only but all communications were supplied power by an Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS). Subsequently, the UPS batteries depleted and all communications were lost. At that time (0828 EST) Virginia State EOC personnel notified the North Anna control room and supplied individual cellular phone numbers as an alternative method of contacting the Virginia State EOC. This report is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of offsite communications capability, (e.g. Emergency Notification System). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Louisa County.
ENS 4962913 December 2013 16:43:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopIn 2010, changes within the Dominion FFD (Fitness for Duty) program resulted in currently 11 individuals not being subjected to random FFD testing although required. Two individuals are actively badged at Surry Power Station and North Anna Power Station (NAPS). Both individuals accessed the protected area at NAPS recently. The other nine individuals were not badged but perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program. The affected individuals are now within the random testing program. This event is reportable per 10CFR26.719(b)(4), 'Any programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program.'" A work review will be conducted for the two actively badged individuals. The program error has been corrected. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Louisa County Administrator. See similar Surry report EN #49630.
ENS 4957121 November 2013 21:41:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe Casing Cooling system at North Anna Power Station (NAPS) Units 1 and 2 provides cold, borated water to the suction of the Outside Recirculation Spray (ORS) pumps to increase net positive suction head (NPSH) following the initiation of a Containment Depressurization Actuation (CDA). As Casing Cooling tank level decreases to the isolation setpoint, it has been determined that vortexing/air entrainment may occur. This air would then enter the suction of the ORS pumps and potentially cause degradation in design flow and/or loss of NPSH. As a result, this constitutes an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function and is reportable per 50.72(b)(3)(v). A prompt operability determination is in progress that should restore the function of the recirculation spray system. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will be notifying the Louisa County Administration in the morning.
ENS 4942911 October 2013 15:07:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1317 hours on 10/11/2013, Unit 1 experienced an automatic turbine and reactor trip from 48% power. Unit 1 was in the process of increasing power level following a refueling outage when the 1C Station Service Transformer Lockout Relay actuated as the 'C' Condensate Pump was started. The 1C Station Service Transformer Lockout resulted in the turbine trip which subsequently tripped the reactor. All three station service electrical buses transferred to the Reserve Station Service Transformers. The 1C Station Service Transformer does not have any visible exterior damage. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. The actuation of the Reactor Protection System is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps actuated as designed following the trip and provided makeup flow to the steam generators. The steam generator levels were returned to normal operating level and the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps were returned to automatic. The actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Due to low decay heat loads, the Main Steam Trip Valves were closed as the Reactor Coolant Tavg temperature decreased, as directed by the reactor trip response procedure and decay heat is being removed using the atmospheric steam dumps. Decay heat control will be transferred to the main condenser steam dump system. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 at normal Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure. Unit 2 is operating at 100% power and was not affected by this event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the local government.
ENS 4907528 May 2013 18:09:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn May 28, 2013, at 1507 (EDT), Unit 2 was manually tripped from approximately 98 percent power due to decreasing steam generator levels as a result of a main feedwater system transient. The main feedwater system transient was initiated when the 'C' Main Feedwater Pump Discharge Motor-Operated Valve, 2-FW-MOV-250C, spuriously closed. The cause of the spurious closure of 2-FW-MOV-250C is unknown at this time. The Operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized Unit 2 in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. The reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps actuated as designed as a result of the reactor trip and provided makeup flow to the steam generators. The automatic start of the AFW system is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid actuation of an ESF system. The AFW pumps were subsequently secured and returned to automatic. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system. Unit 2 is in the normal shutdown electrical line-up. Unit 1 was not affected by this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4907227 May 2013 18:49:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1545 hours on 05/27/2013, the North Anna Control Room was notified by local authorities that a potential drowning had taken place at the number 3 Dike in Lake Anna. This incident has been reported to the FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) Regional Engineer under FERC requirements. Therefore, this is reportable to the NRC under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). In addition, this incident has received significant media interest. The identity of the victim is not known at this time. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Louisa County Administrator.
ENS 4902010 May 2013 08:20:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn May 10, 2013 at 0612 hours (EDT), Unit 2 was manually tripped from 60% power due to increased vibrations and a report of arcing on bearing #9 of the main turbine. Unit 2 was in the process of increasing power following a refueling outage when this event occurred. The Operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized Unit 2 in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. This reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The Auxiliary Feedwater pumps actuated as designed as a result of the reactor trip and provided makeup flow to the steam generators. The automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater system is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid actuation of an ESF system. The Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were subsequently secured and returned to automatic. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. The #9 bearing is on the main generator exciter. There was no effect on Unit 1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying local government agencies.
ENS 4894017 April 2013 23:19:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On April 17, 2013 at 1600 (EDT), while performing a valve inspection/repair of the Unit 2 'A' Reactor Coolant Loop Fill Valve (2- RC-HCV-2556A), the as-found inspection results identified evidence of a suspected flaw causing leakage from the valve body to the threads of a stud housing of the valve. This valve is a 2 (inch) 316 SS (Stainless Steel) cast ASME XI (Class 1) 1500 psi valve body of a globe style design. Due to this design and the installed orientation, the RCS pressure medium fills the upper portion of the valve bonnet where the leak is located during normal plant operations. Therefore, this leakage would be considered pressure boundary leakage. 2-RC-HCV-2556A is currently isolated from the Reactor Vessel and is at atmospheric pressure. This inspection was performed in response to dry discolored boric acid identified during the normal operating pressure boric acid accumulation inspection procedure during the Spring 2013 Unit 2 refueling outage shutdown. An engineering evaluation of the suspected defect will be performed and corrective actions implemented. This event is reportable in accordance to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for, 'Any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded'. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and local County Commissioners.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM BOB PAGE TO CHARLES TEAL ON 6/12/13 AT 1109 EDT * * *

Event Number 48940 was made on April 17, 2013 in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) to document a suspected flaw resulting in RCS pressure boundary leakage on Unit 2 'A' Reactor Coolant Loop Fill Valve (2-RC-HCV-2556A). North Anna Power Station is retracting this notification following completion of a cause analysis and metallurgical examination. The analysis determined that the valve leakage was due to the body-to-bonnet gasket joint. The original valve body was especially susceptible to gasket creep, which lead to a loss of sufficient sealing stress. This resulted in body-to-bonnet leakage, not a through-wall leak. Based on this analysis, the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) are not met and this event report is being retracted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

ENS 4843624 October 2012 02:40:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On 10/24/12 at 0147, North Anna Unit 2 reactor tripped automatically. The reactor first out is the 'C' steam generator lo-lo level. The turbine first out is reactor tripped, turbine trip. The event was apparently initiated by a loss of load on the secondary side. The cause of the loss of load is still being investigated. All systems responded as expected. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to actuation of the Reactor Protection System. The Auxiliary Feedwater pumps received an automatic start signal due to low-low level in all steam generators at the time of the trip, Steam generator levels have been restored to normal operating level. The Auxiliary Feedwater System operated as designed with no abnormalities noted. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to actuation of an ESF system. All control rods inserted into the core at the time of the trip and decay heat is being removed via the main condenser steam dumps. Several secondary (feedwater) relief valves lifted and reseated during the event. North Anna Unit 2 is currently stable at no load temperature and pressure in mode 3. At 0147 EDT, the Unit 2 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) , 2-RC-PCV-2455C, opened during an automatic reactor trip of Unit 2. The valve indicated open for less than 1 second. During this time, the identified leakage threshold for EAL SU6.1 (25 gpm) was exceeded. The cause of the loss of secondary load, which is believed to have caused the low steam generator water level and the lifting of the pressurizer PORV, is still under investigation. The licensee is focusing on the high pressure to low pressure turbine intercept valves or reheat valves going shut for reasons unknown at this time. The licensee's data shows that a pressurizer PORV opened momentarily. The instantaneous leak rate exceeded the unusual event threshold leak rate of 25 gpm. The PORV reseated and no ongoing leakage occurred during the transient. The rest of the transient was characterized as uncomplicated. The unit is in a normal post-trip electrical configuration. All systems functioned as required. There was no impact on Unit 1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1346 EDT ON 10/24/12 FROM PAGE KEMP TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is updating their report to RETRACT the portion related to the after-the-fact entry into EAL SU6. At 0147 hours EDT on 10-24-12, a Unit 2 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve, 2-RC-PCV-2455C, opened during automatic reactor trip. The valve indicated open for less than 1 second. 2-RC-PCV-2455C opened as designed in response to the plant trip and allowed a small amount of water to transfer to the Pressurizer Relief Tank, as designed. The Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve subsequently re-closed and remains available for automatic operation, if needed. Initially, this issue was reported to the NRC at 0240 hours on 10-24-12 as an After-The-Fact Unusual Event for EAL SU6.1. Subsequent review has determined that the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve functioned as designed and the small amount of inventory was transferred to the Pressurizer Relief Tank as designed and therefore does not meet the criteria for an Unusual Event and this notification is being retracted. NEI 99-01, Rev. 5 provides additional guidance that relief valve normal operation should be excluded from this Initiating Condition. However, a relief valve that operates and fails to close per design should be considered applicable to this Initiating Condition if the relief valve cannot be isolated. In this case, the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve operated as designed and returned to automatic operation. The licensee informed state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Musser).

ENS 4776925 March 2012 23:58:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On March 25, 2012 at 2336 EDT, an Unusual Event was declared due to an earthquake felt on site. The site entered EAL HU1.1. No plant systems were affected. The National Earthquake Information Center reported a magnitude 3.1 seismic event 6 miles south-south west of Mineral, Virginia. A plant inspection is on-going to determine any plant issues related to the seismic event. Unit 1 is in a refueling outage and containment integrity was maintained. Unit 2 continues in full power operation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local agencies. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, NICC and Nuclear SSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM TED WEBNER TO VINCE KLCO ON 3/26/2012 AT 0417 EDT * * *

On March 26, 2012 at 0410 EDT, the Unusual Event was terminated. The basis for the termination was that all equipment walkdowns are complete with no damage discovered. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Haag), NRR EO (Brown), IRD (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA, NICC and the Nuclear SSA via email.

ENS 4776725 March 2012 01:44:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn March 24, 2012, at 1855 (EDT) during the performance of work activities to support Alloy 600 dissimilar metal weld overlay work on the 'B' Reactor Coolant loop hot leg to the 'B' Steam Generator nozzle weld, two through-wall defects were identified. The workers noted a small amount of water seeping from the indications in the nozzle weld area. The indications are in the area of excavation that was being performed for the weld overlay project. Approximately 1 (inch) of weld material had been removed prior to the seepage being identified. Entered Technical Requirement 3.4 .6, 'ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 Components' and immediately initiated actions to isolate the 'B' Reactor Coolant loop. The 'B' Reactor Coolant loop stop valves were closed at 2312 hours on March 24, 2012, which isolated the defects from the reactor coolant system . An engineering evaluation of the defects will be performed and corrective actions implemented. This event is reportable in accordance to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for 'any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded'. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify Louisa County.
ENS 4768221 February 2012 13:57:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn February 17, 2012, North Anna Power Station (NAPS) was notified by its vendor laboratory that a water sample, taken from an onsite ground water sample point, was confirmed to contain tritium above the voluntary reporting threshold of 20,000 picocuries per liter(pCi/L). The water sample, measuring 53,300 pCi/L, was obtained as a part of ongoing activities to determine the source of tritium previously reported to the state and NRC on October 29, 2010 (Event Notification - 46377). Current hydrological studies have determined the ground water in the area migrates to the station power block which is in the opposite direction from the lake. The ground water at the power block is collected in building subsurface drains and transported to a clarifier for processing. Clarifier discharge is accounted for as a monitored liquid effluent release pathway under the radiological effluent control program in accordance with the station's Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. As such, there is no increase to the projected annual dose to a member of the public. There are also no sources of drinking water in this area. Sampling of eight (8) ground water sample points outside the station protected area show no detectable levels of tritium confirming there is no migration offsite. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A 30 day written report will be submitted to the NRC in accordance with NEI 07-07, Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative - Final Guidance Document. The licensee will inform both state and local agencies.
ENS 4766515 February 2012 15:33:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 12:44 on 2/15/2012, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality was notified of a sewage system release that had the potential to reach state waters. On 2/14/2012, it was identified that water was flowing from a manhole cover near the North Anna training building. Further review identified the training building sewage lift station had lost power and that the water line in the manhole discharges to the lift station. It was estimated that approximately 120-200 gallons of untreated water reached the ground around the manhole before power was restored to the lift station. Upon further investigation, the station could not confirm whether untreated water reached Lake Anna. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4762630 January 2012 19:15:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1856 EST, North Anna, Units 1 and 2, experienced an onsite seismic event. This was confirmed by the National Earthquake Information Center to be a magnitude 3.2. Based on these 2 indications the licensee declared an Unusual Event per EAL HU 1.1. The earthquake did not impact operations or equipment, and both units remain at 100% power. To exit the Unusual Event the licensee will need to verify that no damage was sustained to any systems or equipment. Presently the licensee is conducting a walkdown to verify no damage was incurred. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also notified the state and other government agencies.

* * * UPDATE AT 0048 EST ON 1/31/12 FROM ROGER SMUTHERS TO PETE SNYDER * * * 

The NOUE declared at 1856 EST on 1/30/12 has been terminated (at 0035 EST). The event has been terminated after completion of AP-36, which is the procedure used when seismic activity is experienced. The abnormal procedure included engineering and operations inspections of various systems throughout the station, all of which were completed satisfactorily with no damage found relating to the seismic event. None of the stations seismic instrumentation actuated during the event due to low seismic activity felt at the station. The newly installed Free Field Seismic Instrumentation did not actuate which has a trigger point of 0.1 g's further demonstrating the low level of the seismic activity experienced at the station. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser), NRR (Lund), IRD (Grant), DHS (Gates), and FEMA (Biscoe).

ENS 474975 December 2011 09:35:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 0847 EST, Unit 1 Letdown Pressure Control Valve, 1-CH-PCV-1145, began acting erratically which resulted in the Letdown Relief Valve, 1-CH-RV-1203, lifting and flowing to the Pressurizer Relief Tank. At 0848 EST, the relief valve reseated and the leakage stopped. Approximately 42 gpm leakage resulted from the relief valve lifting. This identified flow rate exceeded the threshold for entry into a Notice of Unusual Event under EAL tab SU6.1 due to identified leakage greater than 25 gpm. The licensee is troubleshooting the Letdown Pressure Control Valve. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify State and local agencies.
ENS 4744616 November 2011 11:35:00North AnnaNRC Region 2On August 23, 2011, an earthquake occurred with an epicenter 11 miles from the North Anna Unit 3 site. Instruments recorded earthquake data at the North Anna Unit 1 containment structure base mat. Certified data regarding the earthquake was received on September 13, 2011 and a Condition Report was initiated. This best available earthquake data exceeded at low frequencies the Safe-Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) response spectra established in the North Anna Early Site Permit (ESP-003). The event data also exceeded the site 250 foot elevation Ground Motion Response Spectra (GMRS) and the hard rock SSE developed for the North Anna Unit 3 Combined Operating License Application (COLA) based on the ESP SSE spectra. The US-APWR standard plant (i.e., Reactor Building Complex and Power Source Building) Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra (CSDRS) envelops the actual seismic response recorded on August 23, 2011. However, the site-specific Seismic Category I Ultimate Heat Sink Related Structures, Essential Service Water Pipe Tunnel and Power Source Fuel Storage Vault use design inputs presented in the ESP. The recorded seismic response on August 23, 2011 exceeded the seismic design spectra presented in the ESP and COLA. As defined in 10 CFR 21, this condition represents a 'deviation' in the seismic design information contained in the ESP and a 'defect' in that it involves a 'basic component' that could result in a major design deficiency that has safety implications, if it were to remain uncorrected. Therefore, NRC notification of this condition is required pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(1). The basis for this conclusion is discussed in the following paragraph. In August 2007, the NRC amended the regulations applicable to the licensing and approval processes for nuclear power plants (e.g., ESP, COLA) to clarify various requirements, and made conforming amendments to other related regulations, including 10 CFR21. The discussion of changes to 10 CFR 21 (Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 166, Page 49424) states that: 'services that are required to support an early site permit application (e.g., geologic or seismic analyses, etc.) that are safety-related and could be relied upon in the siting, design, and construction of a nuclear power plant, are to be treated as basic components as defined in part 21.' The discussion also states: 'if the ESP holder becomes aware of a significant safety concern with respect to its site (e.g., that the specified site characteristics for seismic acceleration is less than the projected acceleration due to new information), the concern should be reported to the NRC so that it may be considered in the review of any future application referencing the ESP.' Based on these statements of consideration, the analyses supporting the seismic design information in the ESP would be considered a 'basic component' and the recorded response data from the August 23, 2011 seismic event represents new information that impacts the seismic analyses. This defect resulted from new data, not an error in the performance of the seismic analyses for the ESP. While there was no error in the performance of the seismic analyses, Dominion is assessing whether any changes should be made to the North Anna Unit 3 COLA. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4734514 October 2011 15:30:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 10/14/2011 at 0322 (EDT), Operations identified during operator rounds that the bearing cooling tower basin was overflowing. Earlier in the night the control room had received a bearing cooling basin high level alarm, verified that the bearing cooling tower basin was not overflowing and was monitoring the level from control room indications. The Control Room indications of bearing cooling basin level had remained steady. The overflow condition was due to leak by from a motor operated valve (MOV) which had been used earlier to add water to the bearing cooling basin. The leaking MOV was manually torqued shut which isolated the overflow discharge. Investigation of the inaccurate level indication is ongoing. Samples of the bearing cooling water were analyzed by Chemistry. All chemical parameters analyzed were within VPDES (Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System) limits. Bearing Cooling chemistry is maintained to ensure compliance with the North Anna VPDES permit. It is estimated that 272 gallons may have been discharged to the lake. At 1440 hours on October 14, 2011, a 24-hour notification of the unusual discharge was made to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality In accordance with the North Anna VPDES permit. This issue is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event where notification of other government agencies has been made. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 472281 September 2011 05:40:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 0518 EDT, North Anna Power Station declared an Unusual Event due to seismic activity onsite (EAL HU 1.1). Both units are currently shutdown and electrical power is being supplied from offsite. There were no personnel injuries. There was no radiological release. Site structure and system inspections are in progress. No damage has been identified. The NRC Resident Inspector and state and local authorities have been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1232 EDT ON 9/01/11 FROM DIEDERICHS TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The licensee has exited from its unusual event at 1223 EDT on 9/01/11 based on completion of plant walk downs and equipment checks, after the latest 3.4 magnitude earthquake, and no damage noted. The licensee has notified appropriate state and local authorities and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes) , NRR (King) , IRD (Gott) , FEMA (Blankenship), DHS (Gates)

ENS 4720126 August 2011 16:23:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On August 23, 2011 at 1351 hours, North Anna Power Station experienced a seismic activity event which resulted in a loss of offsite power and automatic reactor trip of both units. At 1403 hours, an Alert was declared, based on Shift Manager judgment, due to significant seismic activity on the site. Subsequent to the earthquake, both units were stabilized and offsite power was restored. Following the event, seismic data was retrieved from the installed monitoring system and shipped to the vendor to determine the response spectrum for the event. On August 26, 2011 at 1340 hours, initial reviews of the data determined that the seismic activity potentially exceeded the Design Basis Earthquake magnitude value above 5 Hz. Therefore, this is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) (B) for the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. North Anna Unit 1 is currently in Cold Shutdown with the Residual Heat Removal System providing core cooling. North Anna Unit 2 is currently in Hot Shutdown and will be taken to Cold Shutdown with the Residual Heat Removal System providing core cooling. No significant equipment damage to Safety Related system (including Class 1 Structures) has been identified through site walk-downs nor has equipment degradation been detected through plant performance and surveillance testing following the earthquake. Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that the Safety Related systems are fully functional. The Spent Fuel Pit cooling system also remains fully functional and the temperature of the Spent Fuel Pit remained unchanged during the event. The vendor will complete the analysis of the seismic data and this information will be utilized to address the long term actions following the earthquake. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM DON TAYLOR TO PETE SNYDER AT 1739 EDT ON 9/9/11 * * * 

This is an update to EN 47201 reported on 8/26/2011 where It was reported that North Anna potentially exceeded the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) magnitude value above 5 Hz. The vibratory motion from the 5.8 magnitude earthquake were recorded in all three orientations at several locations in the plant using two types of instruments: the Engdahl scratch plates that record 12 discrete spectral accelerations between 2 and 25.4 Hz, and the Kinemetrics analog recorders that recorded time histories of the accelerations. Based on evaluation of recorded plant data, it is concluded that the Central Virginia earthquake of 8/23/2011 exceeded the spectral accelerations for the Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE) and DBE of North Anna Plant. Extensive actions are underway to inspect. evaluate, test, and repair if necessary. systems and components to ensure they are capable of performing their required functions. To date, no significant damage to safety related structures, systems or components (SSC) has been identified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Rich).

ENS 4719825 August 2011 17:14:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1610 EDT on August 25, 2011 the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality was notified of an oil spill that occurred at 1900 EDT on August 24, 2011. The spill was approximately 150 gallons to the gravel outside the North Anna Unit 2 Turbine Building. The event occurred while purging CO2 from the Unit 2 Main Generator with air. Standing oil from the gravel was pumped to barrels and oil soaks were applied to the remaining oil. Clean up of the gravel areas continued. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified in addition to the state and local authorities.
ENS 4719625 August 2011 01:48:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On August 25th at 0118 EDT, North Anna Power Station declared an Unusual Event due to seismic activity onsite (EAL HU 1.1). Both units are currently shutdown and electrical power is being supplied from offsite. There were no personnel injuries. There was no radiological release. Site structure and system inspections are in progress. No damage has been identified. The NRC Resident Inspector and state and local authorities have been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN BALTOR TO ERIC SIMPSON AT 1215 EDT ON 8/25/11 * * *

At 1149 EDT another minor tremor was felt at the station. No geological information is available at this time. There is no immediate indication of any equipment damage. Walkdowns are being performed at this time. North Anna Emergency Management indicated that there was currently no plan to secure from the Notification of Unusual Event until there is sufficient indication that the station will not experience any additional aftershocks to prevent having to re-enter an emergency status once exited. The current status of North Anna, Unit 1 is Mode 5. Unit 2 is in Mode 3 in preparation for cool down. The licensee will verify that the NRC Resident Inspector is notified. Notified IRD (Marshall), NRR (Thorp), and R2DO (Widmann).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1546 EDT ON 8/28/11 FROM LINDNER TO HUFFMAN * * *

The licensee has exited from its unusual event at 1536 EDT on 8/28/11 based on the cessation of any further seismic activity. The licensee has notified appropriate state and local authorities and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Widmann), NRR (Bahadur), IRD (Marshall), FEMA (Vitale) and DHS (Hill).

ENS 4718123 August 2011 14:24:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1403 hrs. EDT, North Anna Power Station declared an Alert due to significant seismic activity onsite. The Alert was declared under EAL HA6.1. Both units experienced automatic reactor trips from 100% power and are currently stable in Mode 3. All offsite electrical power to the site was lost. All four emergency diesel generators (EDG) automatically started and loaded and provided power to the emergency buses. While operating, the 2H EDG developed a coolant leak and was shutdown. As a result, the licensee added EAL SA1.1 to their declaration. All control rods inserted into the core. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to atmosphere. No personnel injuries were reported.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT RINK TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1116 EDT ON 8/24/11 * * *

The licensee has downgraded the Alert to a Notification of Unusual Event based on equipment alignments and inspection results. The licensee notified R2 IRC. Notified IRD (Marshall), NRR (Thorp), FEMA (Hollis), DHS (Inzer), USDA (Ferezan), HHS (Willis) and DOE (Parsons).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT RINK TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1317 EDT ON 8/24/11 * * *

The licensee has exited the Notification of Unusual Event at 1315 EDT. The exit criteria was that all inspections and walkdowns were completed and plant conditions no longer meet the criteria for a NOUE. Notified R2DO (Widmann), IRD (Marshall), NRR (Thorp), FEMA (Hollis), DHS (Inzer), USDA (Ferezan), HHS (Willis) and DOE (Jackson).

  • * * UPDATE FROM DON TAYLOR TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1405 EDT ON 8/26/11 * * *

This notification is to report new information identified post event that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but was not declared. On August 23 at 1403 EDT, North Anna Power Station declared an Alert due to seismic activity onsite. The Alert was declared under Emergency Action Level (EAL) HA6.1 "Other conditions existing which in the judgment of the SM warrant declaration of an alert. Initial review of seismic response data from the earthquake on 8/23/11 (1348 hours) indicates that design spectrum input assumptions (i.e. Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) limits) may have been exceeded above 5 HZ. This would have resulted in classification of an Alert under EAL HA1.1. No significant equipment damage to safety related systems (including class I structures) has been identified through site walk-downs nor has equipment degradation been detected through plant performance and surveillance testing following the earthquake. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also plans on notifying the State Emergency Operations Center and the Louisa County County Administrator. Notified R2DO (Widmann) and NRR EO (Bahadur).

ENS 4675113 April 2011 16:15:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This is a voluntary notification for planned maintenance that affects the TSC ventilation system. At approximately 0400 EDT an April 14, 2011 the North Anna TSC (Technical Support Center) air conditioning and filtration systems will be rendered non-functional to perform preventive maintenance on electrical buses supplying power. This condition has the potential to render the TSC unavailable due to the inability of the ventilation and filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Temporary ventilation is being established for the TSC computer room. The maintenance is expected to last less than 24 hours. Compensatory measures exist to relocate the TSC to alternate locations, if needed. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PATRICK FRENCH TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1738 EDT ON 4/15/11 * * *

The maintenance on the TSC ventilation system has been completed and the TSC has been returned to service. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).

ENS 4669725 March 2011 11:14:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis 24-hour report is being issued in accordance with the requirements of NRC Certificate of Compliance 1030, Amendment 0, for the NUHOMS Storage System, Technical Specification (TS) 2.2, Functional Operating Limit Violations. During a review of historical North Anna NUHOMS dry storage canister (DSC) loading certification documents, a discrepancy was identified. The NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance 1030 Amendment 0 Technical Specifications include a Figure 2, "Heat Load Zones" which specifies the maximum decay heat load for each of the 32 assembly locations in a DSC. The figure includes limits for two zone '1b' locations and two zone '1a' locations in the four center locations of the DSC. The zone '1b' decay heat limit of 0.8 kw is specified for the two 'upper compartments' and zone '1a' decay heat limit of 1.05 kw is specified for the two 'lower compartments' on the figure. Contrary to this, the loading certifications for 7 of 10 DSCs already loaded at NAPS (North Anna Power Station) were not developed to maintain this orientation when loaded in the horizontal storage module (HSM). As a result, the DSC zone '1b' heat load limits were exceeded in some cases for these 7 DSCs. The heat load limit for all other zones in the DSCs are symmetric, and those assemblies were verified to the correct limit and are unaffected by this error. In addition the total heat load limit for the sum of the center assemblies was met for all DSCs. The maximum heat load of any zone '1b' assembly at the time of loading was 0.859 kw, which is slightly higher than the 0.8 kw limit. The lower heat load of assemblies in the other compartments offset the slightly higher heat load effects, and it is expected that the thermal analysis acceptance criteria would still have been met at the time of loading. The decay heat of the assemblies has continued to decrease since their initial loading and it was confirmed that 12 of the 13 assemblies that initially exceeded the 0.8 kw limit currently meet the zone '1b' heat load limits. The current decay heat of the remaining assembly is slightly above the 0.8 kw limit. Based on the offsetting margins identified above all of the affected DSCs are currently in a safe condition as loaded in the HSMs. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 4667615 March 2011 17:38:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 03/15/2011 at 1131 EDT, the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was rendered nonfunctional as a result of loss of power to the system. System power was lost approximately one hour after returning the normal power supply to service following maintenance. This condition has the potential to render the TSC unavailable due to the inability of the ventilation and filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate the TSC to alternate locations. On 03/15/2011 at 1545 EDT, after verifying the bus supplying the TSC ventilation was satisfactory for return to service, power was restored using an alternate feed. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 4637729 October 2010 14:11:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification to other government agencies. Dominion North Anna Power Station intends to voluntarily notify state and local agencies regarding an increase in tritium levels in one (1) onsite ground water monitoring sample point. This increase in tritium levels has not exceeded any NRC regulatory dose limits nor has it exceeded the voluntary reporting limits (i.e., 20,000 picoCuries per liter) specified in NEI 07-07 Industry Ground Water Protection - Final Guidance Document. Two (2) adjacent onsite ground water monitoring sample points have not shown a similar increase. None of the eight (8) ground water monitoring sample points surrounding the station have shown any detectable levels of tritium. All indications show that the tritium in the one (1) onsite ground water monitoring sample point has not migrated to the lake or any drinking water sources. The station continues to monitor, sample and investigate the source of the tritium anomaly. This condition does not present a health hazard to station employees or the general public. Normal tritium levels at the particular sample point are 3-4000 picoCuries per liter. One sample read 16,500 picoCuries per liter. Samples afterwards have return to normal readings. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4635222 October 2010 09:46:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 10/22/2010 at 0636 hours, North Anna Unit-1 reactor was manually tripped during physics testing and 1-E-0 was entered due to problems with the Rod Control In Hold Out Switch. The out direction of the switch was not functioning properly and the reactor was tripped to put the plant in a condition to perform maintenance. All control rods fully inserted into the reactor core. This was an uncomplicated reactor trip with no automatic ESF actuation required. Unit 1 is currently stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in MODE 3 (Hot Standby). The plant electrical line-up is normal. Decay heat removal is via the steam dumps. Notification will be made to the local county administrator's office. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4629430 September 2010 15:36:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn September 12, North Anna Power Station Unit 1 entered a scheduled refueling outage. During the outage while performing reviews for a design change, it was determined that some uncontrolled plant drawings indicated that Microtherm insulation may have been installed on some piping locations inside the containment. The Microtherm insulation impacts the new containment sump strainers installed to address NRC GSI-191 requirements. It was subsequently confirmed via walk downs that the Unit 1 containment contained some Microtherm insulation. Based on conflicting information on the possible installation of Microtherm inside Unit 2 containment and the identification of Microtherm insulation on Unit 1, a conservative decision was made to shutdown Unit 2 on September 29, and the Unit was cooled down to Mode 5 to allow a detailed inspection to be performed. The areas where the Microtherm insulation was potentially installed could not be inspected with the Unit at power. Subsequent inspections have confirmed that the Microtherm insulation was installed in some areas of the Unit 2 containment. These locations include the reactor vessel nozzles and reactor coolant pump casings. Plans are being developed to remove this insulation on both units. The overall impact of the Microtherm insulation on the containment sump operation is being evaluated by engineering. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Louisa County Administrator.
ENS 461535 August 2010 14:53:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1345 EDT, following maintenance on 1--1115A, VCT divert valve, testing was commenced. At 1355 EDT, the valve failed to the full divert position and could not be repositioned from the normal control system, resulting in 75 gpm letdown flow being diverted to the gas stripper. At 1401 EDT, the normal letdown flowpath was isolated in accordance with plant procedures and the leakage isolated. The identified flow rate exceeded the threshold for entry into a Notice of Unusual Event under EAL tab SU6.1 due to identified leakage greater than 25 gpm. The licensee will inform State and local agencies and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4609414 July 2010 19:53:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1834 hours on 7/14/10, the Unit 1 'C' Reactor Coolant Loop was declared inoperable due to small unisolable leaks on the 'C' Steam Generator secondary side surface sample line. Two small through-wall flaws were identified in the piping upstream of 1 -SS-217, 'C' Steam Generator surface sample line manual isolation valve. The piping is Class 2 and the non-conforming condition could not be evaluated with the steam generator pressurized. Based on the condition of the piping and the inability to evaluate the flaw, the 'C' Steam Generator was declared inoperable per Technical Requirements Manual 3.4.6, ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 Components. Subsequently, Technical Specification 3.4.4 was entered to place Unit 1 in Mode 3 within 6 hours. At 1934 hours on 7/14/10, North Anna Unit 1 initiated a shutdown in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.4. The unit will be shutdown and the line will be evaluated and repaired. The licensee is presently at 82% power and coasting down in power. All safety systems are fully operable. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL TRENT TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0015 HRS ON 7/15/2010 * * *

North Anna Unit 1 entered mode 3 at 2353 hrs. There were no complications during shutdown. One source range monitor failed downscale low. The other source range monitor is operating correctly. The failure of this source range monitor did not affect shutdown capabilities. Notified R2DO (Seymour).

ENS 4603923 June 2010 15:19:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopNorth Anna experienced a severe storm the night of June 22, 2010. At 0910 hours on June 23, 2010, the telecommunications group polled the Early Warning System (EWS) sirens to check operability. The first siren did not respond. It was determined the back-up base radio was not transmitting the audio signal to the sirens. Therefore, activation of the EWS by the state or local agencies would not have been possible. It was possible to activate the EWS sirens locally from North Anna off a separate radio system. At 1040 hours the back-up radio was replaced and tested satisfactory for proper radio function. The primary base radio was also replaced and tested satisfactorily. The polling function test was performed with all 68 sirens responding as designed. The EWS sirens are currently operating off of the primary base radio with the back-up radio available for operation. The EWS was initially on the backup radio. This radio has been replaced. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state government and will notify local government. The licensee will contact local media concerning this event.