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| Entered date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 57004 | 3 March 2024 22:15:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 3/3/24 at 1942 EST, while performing a plant shutdown in preparation for a refuel outage, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced a reactor scram due to a main turbine trip on low condenser vacuum. The plant was at approximately 55 percent power at the time of the reactor scram. Additionally, following the scram a low RPV (reactor pressure vessel) level scram and containment isolation signal on level 3 was received, as expected. The containment isolation signal impacted RHR (residual heat removal) shutdown cooling, RHR letdown to radwaste, and RHR sampling. All impacted valves were closed at the time the isolation occurred. All control rods were fully inserted. Plant response was as expected. Post scram, the main turbine bypass valves are being used to control decay heat, and normal post scram level control is via the feed / condensate system. This is being report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'RPS Actuation', and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Specified System Actuation'. Unit 1 is not affected. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The cause of the low condenser vacuum was a momentary loss of sealing steam. The condenser remained viable for decay heat removal. All safety equipment is available. The grid is stable with the plant in its normal shutdown electrical configuration. |
| ENS 56810 | 22 October 2023 01:43:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On October 21, 2023, at 2048 EDT, reactor recirculation pump (RRP) 12 tripped. The cause for the trip is under investigation. Following the RRP trip, the average power range monitors (APRMs) flow bias trips were inoperable due to reverse flow through RRP 12. The APRMs were restored to operable on October 21, 2023, at 2058 EDT, when the RRP 12 discharge blocking valve was closed. This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) which states: "Licensee shall notify the NRC of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56710 | 2 September 2023 09:46:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 9/2/2023 at 0632 EDT, a feedwater transient occurred resulting in an reactor protection system (RPS) automatic reactor scram on low level (Level 3, 159.3 inches). Following the scram, reactor water level dropped below Level 2 (108.8 inches) resulting in a Group 2 recirculation sample system isolation, Group 3 traveling in-core probe (TIP) isolation valve isolation, Group 6 and 7 reactor water cleanup isolation, and Group 9 containment purge isolations. All control rods inserted as expected. High pressure core spray and reactor core isolation cooling initiated and injected as expected. ECCS systems have been secured and normal reactor pressure and level control has been established for hot shutdown. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 is stable and in Mode 3. These 4 hour and 8 hour non-emergency reports are being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) (iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident was informed. There was no impact on Unit 1. |
| ENS 56652 | 3 August 2023 16:58:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 56421 | 18 March 2023 19:07:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 3/18/2023 at 1410 EDT, with Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 in a planned refueling outage, the main control room was notified of the results of an automated examination of a dissimilar metal weld on reactor penetration N2E. The results indicate a defect present which cannot be found acceptable under ASME Section XI, IWB-3600. This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) which states, `The licensee shall notify the NRC ... of the occurrence of ... any event or condition that results in: (A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.' The NRC Senior Resident was informed. A repair plan is being developed. |
| ENS 56359 | 6 February 2023 13:26:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 GE-2 | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. |
| ENS 56089 | 4 September 2022 21:31:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: On September 4, 2022 with Unit 2 in Mode 3, an (Reactor Protection System) RPS actuation and Containment Isolation occurred on (Reactor Pressure Vessel) RPV Low Level (Level 3) of 159.3 inches due to issues with the normal feedwater level control system during plant cooldown. The RPS actuation occurred with control rods already inserted and a containment isolation on Level 3. The containment isolation signal impacted (Residual Heat Removal) RHR Shutdown Cooling, RHR letdown to radwaste, and RHR sampling. All impacted valves were closed at the time the isolation occurred. Operators took manual control of RPV level and restored level to the normal operating band shortly after the low level was received. This is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 55821 | 5 April 2022 06:08:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 | The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone and email: On 4/5/2022, at time 0223, during maintenance on Feedwater Level Control Valve 2FWS-LV10B, a Feedwater transient occurred resulting in an RPS Automatic Reactor Scram on Low Level (Level 3, 159.3 inches). Following the scram, reactor water level dropped below Level 2 (108.8 inches) resulting in a Group 2 Recirculation Sample System Isolation, Group 3 TIP ((Traversing Incore Probe)) Isolation Valve Isolation, Group 6 and 7 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation and Group 9 Containment Purge Isolations. All control rods inserted as expected. High Pressure Core Spray and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling initiated and injected as expected. ECCS Systems have been secured and normal reactor pressure and level control has been established for hot shutdown. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3. These 4 hour and 8-hour non-emergency ENS ((Emergency Notification System)) reports are being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident was informed. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: There was no impact on Unit 1. |
| ENS 55492 | 25 September 2021 09:16:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | On 9/25/2021 at 0342 EDT, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 experienced a loss of the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS), UPS 162A, which resulted in a loss of Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus 11. This resulted in an isolation of both No. 11 and No. 12 Emergency Condensers. Emergency Condenser No. 11 was returned to standby on 9/25/2021 at 0420 EDT and Emergency Condenser No. 12 was returned to standby on 9/25/2021 at 0429 EDT. This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) which states: 'Licensee shall notify the NRC of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (B) remove residual heat.' The NRC Senior Resident was informed. |
| ENS 55363 | 19 July 2021 18:27:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 | On July 19, 2021 at 1316 EDT, an individual experienced a non-work related medical emergency. The onsite fire brigade and emergency medical technicians administered first aid, but the individual was unresponsive. The individual was transported to the local hospital. At 1458 EDT, the local hospital notified the station that the individual was deceased. The individual was outside of the radiological controlled area and was not contaminated. |
| ENS 55137 | 13 March 2021 01:11:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | On March 12, 2021, at 2102 (EST), Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP) 13 tripped. The cause for the trip is under investigation. Following the RRP trip, the Average Power Ranger Monitors (APRMs) flow bias trips are inoperable due to reverse flow through RRP 13. The APRMs were restored to operable on March 12, 2021, at 2110 (EST) when the RRP 13 Discharge Blocking Valve was closed. This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) which states: 'Licensee shall notify the NRC of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 55106 | 17 February 2021 11:30:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 GE-2 | A new, not qualified security officer self reported illegal drug use and resigned following a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC resident inspectors and R1 security inspector were notified. |
| ENS 54874 | 1 September 2020 14:48:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | The following is a synopsis of information received from the licensee: On March 6, 2020, while at zero percent power and in Cold Shutdown - Mode 4, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) determined through surveillance testing that three Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) did not meet their Technical Specification closure time. The cause of the MSIV failures has been determined to be delayed Air Pack response. The delay was caused by a buildup of corrosion product and waxy foreign material believed to be dried pipe thread sealant or O-ring assembly lube that accumulated on the internal surfaces of the Air Pack during refurbishment by the vendor Trillium (previously Hiller). The following is action taken or planned to be taken to prevent recurrence: A note will be added to the procurement requirement evaluation form and purchase order for MSIV Air Pack refurbishments to minimize use of O-ring lubricant and thread sealant to limit likelihood of capturing foreign material on Air Pack valve internals. The Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) component function identifier and system name of each component or system referred to above is: Component - Main Steam Isolation Valves, Air Pack. IEEE 803 Function Identifier - VOP. IEEE805 System Identification - SB. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. For further information contact: Todd Tierney Plant Manager Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Exelon Generation Company, LLC Brandon Shultz Site Regulatory Assurance Manager Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (315) 349-7012 . | |
| ENS 54692 | 3 May 2020 22:28:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | On 5/3/2020 at 1100 EDT, Operations identified a step change in the Main Control Room ambient noise. The cause of the noise was a rise in vibrations on the Number 11 fan motor of the Main Control Room Ventilation Circulating Fan. Another step change in noise occurred and Operations swapped from the Number 11 fan motor to its redundant Number 12 fan motor, but the noise and vibrations did not improve. The two independent motors are connected to the blower shaft with belts on either end of the shaft. This entire fan and motor assembly is contained within the Main Control Room ventilation ducting and is not visible. At 1118 EDT, Operations shut off the Main Control Room Ventilation Circulating Fan due to Number 11 fan motor vibrations, declared the Main Control Room Air Treatment System inoperable, and entered the Technical Specification 3.4.5.e, 7-day action statement. At 1750 EDT, Maintenance entered the ductwork and informed Operations that the Number 11 fan bearing had catastrophically failed and because of the extent of damage and close physical proximity to the Number 12 fan motor, jeopardized its continued operation. As a result, Operations also declared the Number 12 fan motor inoperable and determined the event was reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 54562 | 4 March 2020 15:35:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | At 1205 EST, on March 4, 2020, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 initiated a manual reactor scram due to lowering Electrohydraulic Control System (EHC) level in the turbine control system. The cause of the lowering level was a leak in the EHC system piping. All control rods inserted. There were no safety system actuations. The cause of the EHC leak is being investigated. The NRC Resident has been notified. Additionally, the licensee notified the New York State Public Service Commission. | |
| ENS 54364 | 1 November 2019 10:03:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | On November 1, 2019 at 0316 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) received Control Room annunciation for HPCS SYSTEM INOPERABLE and inoperable status light indication for TRIP UNITS OUT OF FILE/POWER FAIL. Initial investigation has identified a potential failed 24 vdc power supply which supplies power to the HPCS trip units for system initiation and control. The HPCS system has been declared inoperable per TS 3.5.1 resulting in an unplanned 14 day LCO. All other plant systems functioned as required. NMP2 is currently at 100 percent power in Mode 1. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as, 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.' The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 54199 | 5 August 2019 01:28:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | On August 4, 2019 at 1745 (EDT), Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP) 11 tripped. The cause for the trip is under investigation. Following the RRP trip, the Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs) flow bias trips are inoperable due to reverse flow through RRP 11. The APRMs were restored to operable on August 4, 2019 at 1807, when the RRP 11 Discharge Blocking Valve was closed. This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) which states: 'Licensee shall notify the NRC of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 54089 | 25 May 2019 00:30:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | A licensed employee was determined to be under the influence of alcohol during a random (fitness-for-duty) test. The employee's access to the plant has been canceled. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 54035 | 29 April 2019 20:01:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | During power ascension on April 29, 2019, at 1630 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 1 power and pressure oscillations were observed with reactor power at approximately 82 (percent). At time 1633 (EDT), the reactor was manually scrammed when the scram criteria of greater than 4 (percent) APRM power oscillations were observed in accordance with special operating procedures. All control rods fully inserted and all plant systems responded per design following the scram. Following the manual scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI system actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 1633 (50 seconds after the reactor scram), RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation setpoint and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the Turbine Bypass Valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to this scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The cause of the power oscillations is currently under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The New York State public service commission was notified. | |
| ENS 53998 | 14 April 2019 03:21:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | On April 14, 2019 at 0003 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram during reactor startup. The cause of the automatic scram was due to high (Reactor Pressure Vessel) pressure following closure of the turbine stop valves. All control rods fully inserted and all plant systems responded per design following the scram. Following the automatic scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 0004, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation set point and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the Turbine Bypass Valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to this scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Licensee will notify the State of New York. | |
| ENS 53765 | 2 December 2018 06:17:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | During the post-maintenance testing run of the Division III Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), (a field operator) reported smoke coming from the diesel and an emergency shutdown was required. After the EDG was shutdown, significant damage (thrown rod) to the EDG was observed. Emergency Action Level HA 2.1 (an Alert) was declared at 0530 (EST). Currently, the plant is stable and operating at 100 percent power. All safety systems are available. The damage occurred approximately 20 minutes into the required 1 hour run. The licensee's emergency response organization has been activated. No offsite assistance was required or requested. There is a 14-day shutdown limiting condition for operation (LCO) in effect under technical specification 3.5.1 for the high pressure core spray system. Notified DHS Senior Watch Officer, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, HHS Operations Center, DOE Operations Center, EPA Emergency Operations Center, FDA EOC (email), FEMA NWC (email) and DHS Nuclear SSA (email). The licensee has notified state and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee terminated the Alert at 0731 EST on 12/2/18. The basis for termination was that the licensee has met all procedural requirements to terminate the emergency and on-shift personnel can operate the unit without further assistance. Notified R1DO (Burritt), NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Gott), HQPAO (Couret), ERDS Activation Group, DHS Senior Watch Officer, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, HHS Operations Center, DOE Operations Center, EPA Emergency Operations Center, FDA EOC (email), FEMA NWC (email) and DHS Nuclear SSA (email). | |
| ENS 53584 | 6 September 2018 17:18:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | Pursuant to 50.73(a)(1) the following information is provided as a sixty (60) day telephone notification to the NRC. This notification, reported under 50.73(a)(2)(iv), is being provided in lieu of the submittal of a written LER (Licensee Event Report) to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI). At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater system and is not an emergency core cooling system. On March 19, 2018 Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) was at 0 percent power and in cold shutdown in support of a planned maintenance outage. At approximately 0118 (EDT), a reactor water level transient initiated by the fill and vent of 12 Reactor Recirculation Pump (12 RRP) occurred. During the fill and vent, Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level lowered quickly from the initial level of 68 inches and a low level alarm was received. Control Room Operators reduced Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) reject flow to turn the level trend and clear the low level alarm generated off of the compensated, GEMAC, level instrumentation. RWCU reject flow was reduced by 50 percent which caused RPV level to start to rise. RPV level was raised to approximately 72 inches at which time the Reactor Operator began to raise reject flow to reestablish the normal level band. During the RPV level transient, with actual water level at 74 inches on the GEMAC, the Yarway level instrumentation, which is not density compensated and therefore invalid, reached 92 inches causing an invalid high RPV water level turbine trip signal and associated invalid HPCI initiation signal. At no point in time did actual RPV water level reach the high RPV water level turbine trip set point of 92 inches. The potential for a turbine trip signal to occur due to shutdown activities was understood and tags were hung to lockout the Feedwater Pumps to prevent the HPCI start signal. Therefore, no HPCI injection occurred. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 53565 | 27 August 2018 03:12:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC SCRAM DUE TO A GENERATOR TRIP At 0033 EDT Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an automatic scram on high reactor pressure due to a turbine trip. The cause of the turbine trip was due to a generator trip. All control rods inserted. There were no safety system actuations. The cause of the generator trip is being investigated. This is a 4-Hour report for 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser. Reactor vessel water level is being maintained by the condensate and feedwater systems. The licensee will be notifying the state of New York.
After further review, the licensee has determined that the cause of automatic scram was due to turbine control valve fast closure as a result of the turbine trip, not high reactor pressure, as originally reported. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl). | |
| ENS 53395 | 10 May 2018 08:59:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 | At 0248 (EDT), with the plant shutdown in Mode 4, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced a partial loss of off-site power during relay testing that resulted in an automatic start of the Division 2 Emergency Diesel Generator. All systems responded as expected for the event. The cause is being investigated. The station responded in accordance with appropriate Special Operating Procedures and restored impacted systems. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) At the time of the report, the emergency diesel generators are loaded and supplying plant safety equipment. The licensee has notified the state of New York Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 53190 | 1 February 2018 11:59:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 | Nine Mile Point unit 2 experienced an unusual event due to a small fire in the turbine building that was immediately extinguished and then reflashed. The fire was declared out at 1119 (EST), 2/1/18. The fire was caused when steam leak repair injection equipment failed and leaked onto hot piping. There was no equipment damage or impact to plant operation. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade. Offsite assistance was not required. The fire resulted from Furmanite repair of a Moisture Separator Reheater inlet flow control valve. The unusual event will be terminated when sufficient lagging is removed to verify the extent of leaked fluid. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and NNSA (via e-mail).
The unusual event was terminated at 1211 EST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Janda), NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and NNSA (via e-mail). |
| ENS 52996 | 30 September 2017 09:06:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 | At 0134 (EDT) on September 30, 2017, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 entered Tech Spec 3.6.4.1 when secondary containment was declared inoperable due to secondary containment differential pressure being above the Tech Spec Surveillance Requirement of -0.25 inches vacuum water gauge. The Division II Standby Gas Treatment System was started to restore differential pressure at 0135 (EDT) on September 30, 2017 the differential pressure was restored, the secondary containment was declared operable and the Tech Spec3.6.4.1 exited. Secondary containment being inoperable is a 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The cause of this condition is being investigated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will also inform the State of New York. |
| ENS 52950 | 6 September 2017 15:41:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | On September 6, 2017 at 1157 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram with a Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) and Containment isolation. The scram was due to reactor vessel low water level. The cause of the reactor vessel low water level is under investigation. All control rods fully inserted. Following the scram, pressure was momentarily controlled through the use of the Emergency Condenser (EC) system. At 1205, pressure control was established through the main steam lines to the condenser through the turbine bypass valves. All plant systems responded per design following the scram. The reactor scram is a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The following systems automatically actuated after the scram as expected. These system actuations are an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A): 1. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. HPCI initiated at 1157 and was reset at 1158 when RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. 2. The Core Spray system actuated, but did not discharge to the Reactor Coolant system. The Core Spray system was secured at 1216. 3. Containment and MSIV isolation on reactor vessel low-low water level signal. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor vessel water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. No safety relief valves lifted during the transient. The main steam isolation valves were opened after the isolation signal cleared to facilitate decay heat removal. Offsite power is supplying all plant loads. There was no effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified New York State Department of Environmental Protection and will be issuing a press release. |
| ENS 52889 | 6 August 2017 00:26:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 | At 2235 (EDT) Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an automatic scram on high reactor pressure. Turbine stop valve testing was in progress at the time of the scram. All control rods inserted. Pressure control is via the turbine bypass valves. The cause of the scram is being investigated. This is a 4-Hour report for 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS (Reactor Protection System) Actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Reactor water level is being maintained with normal feedwater flow. No safety or relief valves lifted. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. |
| ENS 52747 | 11 May 2017 13:21:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | Pursuant to 50.73(a)(1) the following information is provided as a sixty (60) day telephone notification to the NRC. This notification, reported under 50.73(a)(2)(iv), is being provided in lieu of the submittal of a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI). At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater system and is not an emergency core cooling system. On March 20, 2017 at 0216 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 reactor shutdown was in progress. The Unit 1 generator was off line, the 100 percent capacity 13 feedwater pump (13 FW) was removed from service, and the Unit 1 main turbine had been tripped appropriately per procedure while entering a planned refueling outage. At approximately 4 percent reactor power, a clearance tagging evolution was in progress to support shutdown activities. During this evolution a tag was applied that caused an unanticipated activation of a lock out (86) relay due to the failure to bypass this relay prior to the tag application. This 86 relay activation in turn resulted in a generator trip signal followed by a turbine trip signal. With the generator off line and the turbine already tripped there was no actual change in any plant parameter or condition that would have created a valid turbine trip signal and the associated HPCI initiation. The plant configuration at the time of the main turbine trip signal had one motor operated feedwater pump, 12 Feedwater Pump (12 FW), in service and providing normal reactor level control. HPCI did initiate as designed upon receiving the generator and main turbine trip signals caused by the activation of the 86 relay. The 12 FW pump, which was providing normal reactor level control, transitioned the level control from automatic mode into HPCI mode of operation. Per design, the 11 FW pump automatically started but was not required to and did not flow water since 12 FW pump was in operation. The 11 FW pump was subsequently secured by operations. At no point in time did the HPCI system receive a valid initiation signal (due to high DW pressure, low reactor water level, or a valid turbine trip with loss of the turbine driven 13 FW pump). Operators reset HPCI and returned water level to Automatic Control at 0218. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 52624 | 20 March 2017 04:40:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | On March 20, 2017 at 0227, Nine Mile Point Unit1 was manually scrammed due to pressure oscillations. The Unit was offline and reactor shutdown was in-progress at the time of the scram. The scram was inserted at approximately 4% reactor power when pressure oscillations occurred exceeding the procedurally required limit for pressure oscillations. The cause of the scram was due to Operators manually inserting the scram. The cause of the pressure oscillations is being investigated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Gray). |
| ENS 52425 | 10 December 2016 12:31:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | On December 10, 2016 at 0848 EST, (operators at) Nine Mile Point Unit 1 manually scrammed the reactor due to high vibrations on the Main Turbine. Cause of the high vibrations is being investigated. Following the scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI system actuation signal on low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater system and is not an emergency core cooling system. At 0849, RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point and the HPCI system initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the turbine bypass valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic relief valves actuated due to this scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. The licensee has notified the state of New York Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 52133 | 29 July 2016 06:51:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | On 7/28/2016 at 2357 EDT, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 experienced a fault in the in-service 11 RPS UPS (Reactor Protective System Ultimate Power Supply), resulting in an isolation of both emergency condensers. Emergency condenser 12 was returned to standby on 7/29/2016 at 0041 EDT and emergency condenser 11 was returned to standby on 7/29/2016 at 0045 EDT. This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) which states, 'Licensee shall notify the NRC of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (B) Remove residual heat.' The state of New York and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector were informed. |
| ENS 52096 | 18 July 2016 14:48:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 GE-2 | This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which states, 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' On 07-18-2016 at 0730 (EDT), both Control Rooms were notified by the Emergency Preparedness Manager, that the Everbridge Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification System may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. This constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability. The Everbridge vendor is working to resolve the issue. Compensatory measures are in place. All ERO personnel received the page but not all received the notification within the required ten minutes. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State.
The Everbridge System was restored and retested at 1930 EDT on 7-19-2016 to provide offsite communications capability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state. Notified the R1DO (DeFrancisco). |
| ENS 51969 | 1 June 2016 14:33:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) experienced a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building (RB) airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 1046 (EDT) on 06/01/16, both RB airlock doors were opened simultaneously for less than 5 seconds. This resulted in Secondary Containment being declared Inoperable (TS 3.4.3). The airlock doors were closed and Secondary Containment was restored to Operable. The event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the State of New York. |
| ENS 51896 | 1 May 2016 12:25:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 GE-2 | On May 1, 2016, at 0847 (EDT), an individual experienced a personal medical emergency during a break. The onsite fire brigade and emergency medical technicians administered first aid, but the individual was unresponsive. The individual was transported to the local hospital. The station was notified at 1008 that the hospital has declared the individual deceased. The individual was outside of the radiological controlled area and not contaminated. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 is shut down for the scheduled refueling outage. The individual was a contractor employee. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The State of New York will be notified. |
| ENS 51856 | 7 April 2016 22:32:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 | Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) experienced a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building (RB) airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 1730 (EDT) on 04/07/16, both RB airlock doors were opened simultaneously for less than 5 seconds. This resulted in Secondary Containment being declared Inoperable (TS 3.6.4.1). Secondary Containment was restored to Operable when the doors were closed. The event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There is no interlock on these doors, just lights to verify the opposite door is open or shut. An Operator was entering secondary containment as another Operator was leaving. |
| ENS 51723 | 10 February 2016 06:29:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 GE-2 | At approximately 0354 (EST) on 2/10/2016, the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Control Room was notified by Exelon Emergency Preparedness of the inadvertent actuation of one Oswego County Notification Siren at approximately 0247 on 2/10/2016. It is unknown at this time why the inadvertent alarm occurred. Siren repair personnel (ANS Services) have been dispatched to isolate the siren and begin repair work. The siren has been silenced. Alternate notification of the public in the area is through Hyper Reach. The Oswego County Emergency Management Office has issued a news release identifying the inadvertent actuation of the emergency siren. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 51369 | 4 September 2015 12:58:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | On September 4, 2015, at 0916 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram following Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure and isolation of both main steam lines. The cause of the MSIV closure is not known at this time. All control rods fully inserted. Following the scram, pressure was momentarily controlled through the use of the Emergency Condenser system. At 0950, pressure control was established through the main steam lines to the condenser through Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) 01-02 and 01-04. MSIV 01-03 would not reopen. All other plant systems responded per design following the scram. The reactor scram is a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)." The following systems automatically actuated after the scram as expected. These system actuations are an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). 1. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. HPCI initiated at 0916 and reset at 0917 when RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point. HPCI initiated and was reset a second time at 0922. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. 2. The Core Spray system actuated, but did not discharge to the Reactor Coolant system. The Core Spray system was secured at 1033. 3. The Emergency Condenser (EC) system actuated to control pressure. EC-11 was secured at 0917. EC-12 was secured at 0921 . The maximum shell temperature of EC system was 193 degrees Fahrenheit. 4. Containment Isolation actuation. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Since the scram, there have been no anomalies observed with feedwater system operation. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The Reactor is being supplied by the normal feedwater system and there was indication of a partial lift/reset on one Electrometric Relief Valve (ERV). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York Public Service Commission. |
| ENS 51289 | 5 August 2015 16:22:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) experienced a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building (RB) airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 1252 (EDT) on 08/05/15, both RB airlock doors were opened simultaneously for less than 5 seconds. This resulted in Secondary Containment being declared inoperable (TS 3.4.3). Secondary Containment was restored to operable when the doors were closed. The event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee also notified the State of New York Public Service Commission. |
| ENS 50909 | 19 March 2015 22:45:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | This 60-Day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves. On January 21, 2015, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) received a partial primary containment isolation signal which resulted in the closure of primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in the following systems: Containment Monitoring System Drywell floor drain sump and Drywell equipment drain sump All affected PCIVs responded as designed. The containment isolation signal was generated due to the failure of a relay for Hi Drywell Pressure on Channel 11 during surveillance testing of the same relay on Channel 12. Drywell pressure was reading normal at the time of the relay failure. Since the isolation signal was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation, the isolation signal was determined to be invalid. The event was entered into the corrective action program as Issue Report 02440213. The moveable contacts on the failed relay were replaced and retested satisfactorily. There were no safety consequences and no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 50860 | 3 March 2015 15:18:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building Airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 0837 (EST) on 03/03/2015, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were opened simultaneously for approximately 2 seconds. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored. Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the Senior Resident NRC Inspector was notified. The licensee notified the State of New York. |
| ENS 50830 | 18 February 2015 16:01:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 | At 1406 (EST) Nine Mile Point Unit 2 inserted a manual scram due to rapidly rising reactor water level. The cause of the rapidly rising water prior to the manual scram is unknown and under investigation. Reactor water level is currently being maintained in normal control band post scram. The reactor scram is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as, 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.' The NRC Resident has been notified. All rods fully inserted. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 is in a normal electrical shutdown configuration. The licensee reported no impact on Unit 1. The New York State Public Service Commission was also notified. |
| ENS 50813 | 11 February 2015 23:15:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building Airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 1941 EST on 02/11/2015, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were opened simultaneously for approximately 1 second. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored. Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the Senior Resident NRC Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 50732 | 12 January 2015 23:17:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 | At 1939 (EST) on January 12, 2015, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 entered Tech Spec 3.6.4.1 when secondary containment was declared inoperable due to secondary containment differential pressure being above the Tech Spec Surveillance Requirement of -0.25 inches vacuum water gauge. This condition is related to sustained high winds. At 1956 on January 12, 2015 the differential pressure was restored, the secondary containment was declared operable and the Tech Spec 3.6.4.1 exited. Secondary containment being inoperable is a 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident'. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the New York Public Service Commission. |
| ENS 50606 | 12 November 2014 14:42:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 GE-2 | A non-licensed supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. His access to the facility was terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 50553 | 20 October 2014 16:32:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | At 1353 EDT on 10/20/2014, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were opened simultaneously for a few seconds. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored. Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10CFR50.73(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 50542 | 16 October 2014 13:14:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 1042 EDT on 10/16/2014, both Reactor Building airlock doors at NMP1 were opened simultaneously for less than 5 seconds. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored. Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. The licensee will be notifying the State of New York Public Service Commission. |
| ENS 50390 | 21 August 2014 12:04:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | One of the 37 Prompt Notification System sirens surrounding the James A Fitzpatrick (JAF) / Nine Mile Point (NMP) sites spuriously activated at 0850 EDT. The Oswego County Emergency Operations Center notified Nine Mile Point via RECS (Radiological Emergency Communications System) that siren #13 had inadvertently activated. Repair technicians have de-activated and silenced the faulty siren as of 0943 EDT. Siren #13 is currently out of service and the backup method for siren #13 has been verified to be functional. The cause of the inadvertent siren activation is believed to be a lightning strike. The issue has been entered into the site's Corrective Action Program. The Oswego County Emergency Management Office issued a News Release identifying the inadvertent actuation of the emergency siren. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
As of 0928 EDT on 08/23/2014, siren #13 has been repaired and returned to service. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R1DO (McKinley). |
| ENS 50363 | 14 August 2014 01:16:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-2 | Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) had a momentary loss of Secondary Containment due to both Reactor Building Airlock doors being opened at the same time. At 2318 (EDT) on 8/13/2014, both Reactor Building Airlock doors at NMP1 were open simultaneously for less than 5 seconds. This results in a momentary loss of Secondary Containment operability (TS 3.4.3). The doors were closed and operability was restored. Secondary Containment being inoperable is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 50296 | 22 July 2014 21:36:00 | Nine Mile Point | NRC Region 1 | GE-5 | This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. During the conduct of the Unit 2 Division 3 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Diesel Generator (DG) surveillance test, one of 2 Cooling Water Outlet Valves failed to automatically open. The Division 3 Diesel is supplied by two redundant trains of cooling water one from each Service Water Divisional Header. Although the redundant cooling water supply was fully available and supplied adequate cooling to the diesel generator, the DG was at reduced margin to have adequate cooling water supply, if required during a loss of offsite power. Due to this loss of margin and inoperable condition, it has been determined that this failure could potentially affect the safety function of this system, and is being reported as an 8 hour ENS notification. The licensee has attributed the failure to high resistance in a relay which is currently being replaced. This places Unit 2 in the Technical Specification Action Statement 3.8.1, which requires restoration of Diesel Generator within 72 hours or commence a Reactor Shutdown. All other ECCS Systems have been verified operable. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and will inform the State of New York.
This update retracts Event Notification #50296, which reported an event or condition that could have potentially prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Upon further review, it was determined that the ability of the HPCS system (single supported train) remained operable and capable of performing its safety function as evaluated by the NMP Unit 2 Safety Function Determination Process (TS 5.5.11). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R1DO (Ferdas). |