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The query [[Category:ENS Notification]] [[Site::Nine Mile Point]] [[Reporting criterion::10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation||10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation]] was answered by the SMWSQLStore3 in 0.2181 seconds.


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 Start dateReporting criterionTitleEvent descriptionSystemLER
ENS 5399814 April 2019 04:03:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Scram and Specified System ActuationOn April 14, 2019 at 0003 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram during reactor startup. The cause of the automatic scram was due to high (Reactor Pressure Vessel) pressure following closure of the turbine stop valves. All control rods fully inserted and all plant systems responded per design following the scram. Following the automatic scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 0004, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation set point and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the Turbine Bypass Valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to this scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Licensee will notify the State of New York.High Pressure Coolant Injection
Reactor Pressure Vessel
Feedwater
ENS 5356527 August 2018 04:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationEn Revision Imported Date 8/29/2018

EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC SCRAM DUE TO A GENERATOR TRIP At 0033 EDT Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an automatic scram on high reactor pressure due to a turbine trip. The cause of the turbine trip was due to a generator trip. All control rods inserted. There were no safety system actuations. The cause of the generator trip is being investigated. This is a 4-Hour report for 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser. Reactor vessel water level is being maintained by the condensate and feedwater systems. The licensee will be notifying the state of New York.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DANIEL CIFONELLI TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1653 EDT ON 8/28/18 * * *

After further review, the licensee has determined that the cause of automatic scram was due to turbine control valve fast closure as a result of the turbine trip, not high reactor pressure, as originally reported. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl).

Feedwater
ENS 5339510 May 2018 06:48:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationValid Emergency Diesel Start on Partial Loss of Offsite PowerAt 0248 (EDT), with the plant shutdown in Mode 4, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced a partial loss of off-site power during relay testing that resulted in an automatic start of the Division 2 Emergency Diesel Generator. All systems responded as expected for the event. The cause is being investigated. The station responded in accordance with appropriate Special Operating Procedures and restored impacted systems. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) At the time of the report, the emergency diesel generators are loaded and supplying plant safety equipment. The licensee has notified the state of New York Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector.Emergency Diesel Generator
ENS 529506 September 2017 15:57:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Scram on Low Reactor Vessel Water LevelOn September 6, 2017 at 1157 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram with a Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) and Containment isolation. The scram was due to reactor vessel low water level. The cause of the reactor vessel low water level is under investigation. All control rods fully inserted. Following the scram, pressure was momentarily controlled through the use of the Emergency Condenser (EC) system. At 1205, pressure control was established through the main steam lines to the condenser through the turbine bypass valves. All plant systems responded per design following the scram. The reactor scram is a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The following systems automatically actuated after the scram as expected. These system actuations are an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A): 1. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. HPCI initiated at 1157 and was reset at 1158 when RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. 2. The Core Spray system actuated, but did not discharge to the Reactor Coolant system. The Core Spray system was secured at 1216. 3. Containment and MSIV isolation on reactor vessel low-low water level signal. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor vessel water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. No safety relief valves lifted during the transient. The main steam isolation valves were opened after the isolation signal cleared to facilitate decay heat removal. Offsite power is supplying all plant loads. There was no effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified New York State Department of Environmental Protection and will be issuing a press release.Main Steam Isolation Valve
High Pressure Coolant Injection
Feedwater
Core Spray
Reactor Coolant System
05000220/LER-2017-003
ENS 528896 August 2017 02:35:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationAutomatic Reactor Scram During TestingAt 2235 (EDT) Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an automatic scram on high reactor pressure. Turbine stop valve testing was in progress at the time of the scram. All control rods inserted. Pressure control is via the turbine bypass valves. The cause of the scram is being investigated. This is a 4-Hour report for 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS (Reactor Protection System) Actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Reactor water level is being maintained with normal feedwater flow. No safety or relief valves lifted. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.Feedwater
ENS 5262420 March 2017 06:27:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationManual Scram Due to Pressure OscillationsOn March 20, 2017 at 0227, Nine Mile Point Unit1 was manually scrammed due to pressure oscillations. The Unit was offline and reactor shutdown was in-progress at the time of the scram. The scram was inserted at approximately 4% reactor power when pressure oscillations occurred exceeding the procedurally required limit for pressure oscillations. The cause of the scram was due to Operators manually inserting the scram. The cause of the pressure oscillations is being investigated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Gray).05000220/LER-2017-002
ENS 5242510 December 2016 13:48:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Reactor Scram Due to High Main Turbine VibrationsOn December 10, 2016 at 0848 EST, (operators at) Nine Mile Point Unit 1 manually scrammed the reactor due to high vibrations on the Main Turbine. Cause of the high vibrations is being investigated. Following the scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI system actuation signal on low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater system and is not an emergency core cooling system. At 0849, RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point and the HPCI system initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the turbine bypass valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic relief valves actuated due to this scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. The licensee has notified the state of New York Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector.Main Turbine
High Pressure Coolant Injection
Reactor Pressure Vessel
Feedwater
05000220/LER-2017-001
ENS 513694 September 2015 13:16:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Unplanned Automatic Scram and Specified System Actuations Due to Msiv ClosureOn September 4, 2015, at 0916 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram following Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure and isolation of both main steam lines. The cause of the MSIV closure is not known at this time. All control rods fully inserted. Following the scram, pressure was momentarily controlled through the use of the Emergency Condenser system. At 0950, pressure control was established through the main steam lines to the condenser through Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) 01-02 and 01-04. MSIV 01-03 would not reopen. All other plant systems responded per design following the scram. The reactor scram is a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)." The following systems automatically actuated after the scram as expected. These system actuations are an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). 1. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. HPCI initiated at 0916 and reset at 0917 when RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point. HPCI initiated and was reset a second time at 0922. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. 2. The Core Spray system actuated, but did not discharge to the Reactor Coolant system. The Core Spray system was secured at 1033. 3. The Emergency Condenser (EC) system actuated to control pressure. EC-11 was secured at 0917. EC-12 was secured at 0921 . The maximum shell temperature of EC system was 193 degrees Fahrenheit. 4. Containment Isolation actuation. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Since the scram, there have been no anomalies observed with feedwater system operation. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The Reactor is being supplied by the normal feedwater system and there was indication of a partial lift/reset on one Electrometric Relief Valve (ERV). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York Public Service Commission.Main Steam Isolation Valve
High Pressure Coolant Injection
Feedwater
Core Spray
Reactor Coolant System
05000220/LER-2015-004
ENS 5083018 February 2015 19:06:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationManual Scram Due to Rapidly Rising Reactor Water LevelAt 1406 (EST) Nine Mile Point Unit 2 inserted a manual scram due to rapidly rising reactor water level. The cause of the rapidly rising water prior to the manual scram is unknown and under investigation. Reactor water level is currently being maintained in normal control band post scram. The reactor scram is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as, 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.' The NRC Resident has been notified. All rods fully inserted. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 is in a normal electrical shutdown configuration. The licensee reported no impact on Unit 1. The New York State Public Service Commission was also notified.Reactor Protection System05000410/LER-2015-002
ENS 4988810 March 2014 20:28:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationReactor Scram Due to Actuation of the Alternate Rod Insertion SystemAt 1628 EDT Nine Mile Point (NMP) Unit 2 experienced an actuation of the Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) system which resulted in a reactor scram. Coincident with the scram, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system initiated. Prior to the event, maintenance personnel were working in the vicinity of a reactor vessel level instrumentation rack and may have agitated the common drain line of the transmitters. A prompt investigation is underway to investigate the incident. The actuation signal for the RCIC system was invalid because reactor vessel level did not reach level two and the actuation was not in response to actual plant conditions or parameters. The reactor scram is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as, 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.' The event has been entered into the NMP corrective action program as CR-2014-001963. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee has notified the State of New York. The reactor is shutdown with all rods inserted. Decay heat is being rejected to the condenser and reactor water level is being maintained by condensate, feedwater, reactor water clean up, and control rod drive systems.Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Reactor Protection System
Feedwater
05000410/LER-2014-004
ENS 498684 March 2014 06:43:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness
Unit 2 Manual Reactor Scram Following Loss of a Uninterruptible Power Supply (Ups)At 0137 EST Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced a loss of an uninterruptible power supply 2VBB-UPS3B which resulted in a half scram and half isolations. This caused a loss of cooling water to the Reactor Recirculation Pumps and other indications for the loss of power. At 0143 EST a Manual Reactor Scram was inserted due to the rise of temperatures on the Reactor Recirculation Pump seal cavity temperature and motor winding temperature. The reactor building ventilation radiation monitor went non-functional when the reactor building isolated on the loss of UPS power. The standby gas treatment system was started as required and restored the reactor building differential pressure. This is a 4-Hour report for 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation and 8-Hour report for 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. The NRC Resident inspector has been notified. All systems functioned as required following the manual scram. All control rods fully inserted. The cause of the loss of the UPS is under investigation.Reactor Building Ventilation
Standby Gas Treatment System
05000410/LER-2014-003
ENS 4983216 February 2014 17:16:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness
Unit 2 Experienced a Partial Loss of Offsite Power with Autostart of Division I and Iii Edgs

An automatic initiation of Emergency Diesel Generators was received due to a loss of one of two off-site power sources. On February 16, 2014 at 1216 (EST), Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an automatic initiation of the Division 1 and 3 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) due to a loss of Line 5. Line 5 is one of the two 115KV offsite power sources. Line 5 was lost due to an offsite event that is currently being evaluated by the grid operator. During the electrical transient, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 also experienced a feedwater level control lockup, requiring manual control. No Emergency Core Cooling Systems actuated, and feedwater level control was returned to automatic. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 remained at 100% power during the loss of Line 5, one of the offsite power sources. The NRC resident has been notified. The licensee also notified the State of New York. Unit 2 is currently in a 24-hour Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation (TS LCO) Action Statement 3.8.1.A3. Once Division III is realigned to the "B" side Line 6 offsite power, Unit 2 will be in a 72-hour LCO. Both EDGs are currently running. There was no effect on Unit 1.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY MARK GREER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1727 EST ON 2/17/2014 * * *

In addition to the initiation of Division 1 and 3 Emergency Diesel Generators, Service Water Radiation Monitor 2SWP*RE146A and Radwaste/Reactor Building Vent Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Systems were also lost. Compensatory actions were established as required by station procedures and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. The loss of these instruments is reportable as a major loss of Emergency Assessment Capability per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The Service Water Radiation Monitor 2SWP*RE146A was restored to service on February 16, 2014 at 1450 EST. The Radwaste/Reactor Building Vent Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Systems were restored to service on February 17, 2014 at 0240. It is recognized that this notification is not within eight hours of the event. Line 5 is restored to OPERABLE February 17, 2014 at 1628. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this additional reportable condition (and the update on the lost off-site power source). The condition has been entered into the corrective action program. The licensee also notified the State of New York Public Service Commission. The licensee exited the 72-hour LCO for the lost off-site power at 1628 on February 17, 2014. Notified R1DO(Krohn), NRREO (Monninger) and ILTAB (Whitney).

Emergency Diesel Generator
Feedwater
Service water
05000410/LER-2014-001
ENS 495932 December 2013 14:04:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationManual Scram Following Trip of Both Reactor Recirculation PumpsAt 0904 (EST) on Monday, December 2, 2013, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was manually scrammed from approximately 40% thermal power due to the loss of both reactor recirculation pumps during a planned downpower evolution. Manual scram of the unit is procedurally required upon loss of both recirculation pumps to avoid potential power/flow oscillations. The reactor recirculation pumps failed to transfer to the low frequency motor generators when downshifted from fast speed. The cause of the loss of both reactor recirculation pumps is not known at this time. (Nine Mile Point Unit 2) NMP2 has commenced cooldown in preparation for the forced outage to investigate and commence repairs. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) requires reporting within 4 hours of any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. All control rods fully inserted. No safety systems actuated. Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser. The "A" recirculation pump was restarted in low speed at 1045 EST. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and will inform the New York State Public Services Commission.Reactor Protection System05000410/LER-2013-004
ENS 4859013 December 2012 21:30:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Primary Containment System Declared Inoperable

An increased usage of Nitrogen to maintain Primary Containment pressure within specification was noticed during steady state operation. Investigation into the extra Nitrogen usage revealed that Primary Containment Leakage was in excess of that allowed per Technical Specification 3.3.3.a. No action statement is provided for leakage in excess of Technical Specification 3.3.3.a; therefore in accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.1, the reactor shall be placed in an operational condition in which the specification is not applicable. This requires the plant to be shutdown and cooled down to less than 216 degrees F. Additionally, this is reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of a system needed to control the release of radioactive material. The primary containment was declared inoperable at 1630 EST and a normal orderly plant shutdown was commenced at 1645 EST and will be less than 215 degrees F within 10 hours. Investigation of containment leakage is in progress. An update will be provided when the plant is in an operational condition in which Technical Specification 3.3.3.a is not applicable. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Licensee has notified the State of New York.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0011 EST ON 12/14/12 FROM CHRISTOPHER GRAPES TO BILL HUFFMAN * * *

As of 2333 EST on 12/13/2012, the reactor is below 215 degrees F, and containment is no longer required to be operable by Technical Specification 3.3.3. As part of the shutdown, a manual reactor scram was initiated as part of the pre-planned shutdown sequence and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 1913 EST, RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point and the HPCI system initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the turbine bypass valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to the scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Cold Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via shutdown cooling (SDC). The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect." The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State authorities. Notified R1DO (Holody) and NRR EO (Lund).

Primary containment
High Pressure Coolant Injection
Reactor Pressure Vessel
Feedwater
Shutdown Cooling
05000220/LER-2012-006
ENS 484816 November 2012 05:06:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationHigh Pressure Coolant Injection Actuation Signal

On Tuesday, November 06, 2012, at 00:06 EST, during the application of a tag-out associated with feedwater level control, the 12 feedwater flow control valve (FCV-29-137) unexpectedly partially opened. As a result, reactor vessel water level rose to the high level turbine trip set point causing the main turbine to trip. The turbine trip signal then resulted in the initiation of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) channels 11 and 12 logic. No actual system component starts or actuations occurred as a result of the logic initiation and no actual HPCI injection occurred due to the system configuration, nor was injection required. Actions were taken to manually isolate the 12 feedwater flow control valve and reactor vessel water level was restored to normal. This meets NRC 8-Hour reporting criteria per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to a valid actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM JERRY HELKER TO CHARLES TEAL ON 12/17/12 AT 1543 EST * * *

This notification is being made to retract Event Notification (EN) #48481, which reported an automatic actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system initiation logic. The HPCI system is automatically initiated based on conditions representing a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The initiation signals are: - Low reactor water level - This is a direct indication of a potential loss of adequate core cooling. - Turbine trip - During a LOCA within the drywell, high drywell pressure due to the line break will cause a reactor scram, which causes a turbine trip, which then by design initiates the HPCI system. The event occurred with the reactor in the cold shutdown condition, with the main turbine and main turbine shaft-driven feedwater pump (#13) out of service. In the cold shutdown condition, the probability of a LOCA is low and the HPCI system is not required by the Technical Specifications to be operable. Neither of the conditions requiring actuation of the safety function of the HPCI system (high drywell pressure or low reactor water level) was present. Although the turbine trip signal was in response to an actual sensed high reactor water level condition, high reactor water level is not a plant condition satisfying the requirement for actuation of the safety function of the HPCI system. With reactor vessel water level high, the safety function of the HPCI system (i.e. to provide adequate core cooling) was already completed. Thus, the HPCI initiation signal was invalid, and the event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified the R1DO (Hunegs).

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN APRIL TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/24/13 AT 0158 EDT * * *

Upon further review, it has been determined the event did constitute a valid actuation of the HPCI system and is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(4)(A). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Joustra).

High Pressure Coolant Injection
Feedwater
Main Turbine
05000220/LER-2012-007
ENS 484773 November 2012 12:23:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Scram on Low Reactor Water LevelOn November 3, 2012 at 0823 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram on low reactor water level. All control rods fully inserted and all plant systems responded per design following the scram. Prior to the automatic scram, an unexpected high Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level was experienced, followed by a turbine trip and subsequent lowering of RPV water level to the RPV low level scram set point. The cause of the water level transient is unknown. Following the automatic scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 0824 EDT, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation set point and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the Turbine Bypass Valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to this scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Since the scram, there have been no anomalies observed with feedwater system operation. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Unit 2 was not affected during this event.Reactor Pressure Vessel
High Pressure Coolant Injection
Feedwater
05000220/LER-2012-005
ENS 4845630 October 2012 01:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationAutomatic Initiation of Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Loss of One Off-Site Power SourceOn October 29, 2012 at 2100 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an automatic initiation of the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator due to a loss of line 5. Line 5 is one of the 115KV offsite power sources. Line 5 was lost due to a lightening arrestor falling onto electrical components in the Scriba switchyard during high winds. During the electrical transient, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 also experienced a feedwater level control lockup, requiring manual control. No Emergency Core Cooling Systems actuated and feedwater level control was returned to automatic. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 remained at 100% power during the loss of line 5. The off-site power source, line 5, was restored on October 30, 2012 at 0326 EDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Emergency Diesel Generator
Feedwater
05000410/LER-2012-005
ENS 4845329 October 2012 04:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Rps Actuation While Critical Due to Generator Load RejectOn October 29, 2012 at 2100 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram due to a generator load reject. The cause of the load reject is currently under investigation. All control rods fully inserted and all plant systems responded per design following the scram. Following the automatic scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 2101 EDT, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation set point and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the Turbine Bypass Valves, the preferred system. Three Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to this scram and re-closed automatically. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using bypass valves. Both Reserve Station Transformers are in service and being supplied by their normal power sources. Both Emergency Diesel Generators are operable and in standby. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Caruso).High Pressure Coolant Injection
Reactor Pressure Vessel
Feedwater
Emergency Diesel Generator
ENS 4832320 September 2012 13:23:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Scram and High Pressure Coolant Injection System InitiationOn September 20, 2012 at 0923 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram due to a turbine trip at power. The cause of the turbine trip is currently under investigation. All control rods fully inserted and all plant systems responded per design following the scram. Following the automatic scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 0924 EDT, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation set point and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the Turbine Bypass Valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to this scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. One 115kv off site power source (Line 4) is unavailable for planned maintenance at the James A Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Both Reserve Station Transformers are in service and being supplied by the other 115kv offsite power source (Line 1). Both Emergency Diesel Generators are operable and in standby. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Licensee has notified the state.High Pressure Coolant Injection
Reactor Pressure Vessel
Feedwater
Emergency Diesel Generator
05000220/LER-2012-002
ENS 4811017 July 2012 15:18:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Scram Due to High Neutron FluxOn July 17 2012, at 1118 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram due to high neutron flux as measured by the Average Power Range Monitoring system. The cause is currently under investigation. All control rods fully inserted and all plant systems responded per design following the scram. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, which is an operating mode of the feedwater system, initiated as expected. There were no planned activities in progress at the time which could have contributed to the event. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. All emergency power sources are available in standby. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. This was an uncomplicated Reactor Scram and the plant is stable with normal levels, temperature, and pressure. Offsite power is in a normal alignment. HPCI has been secured and returned to normal alignment. The cause to the high neutron flux is still under investigation. This event had no impact on Unit 2. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector and State Authorities.High Pressure Coolant Injection
Feedwater
05000220/LER-2012-001
ENS 4809712 July 2012 06:20:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationManual Reactor Scram Due to Lowering Condenser VacuumOn July 12, 2012, at 0200 EDT, clean steam reboiler 'B' failed, causing a loss of sealing steam. This resulted in degrading condenser vacuum and rising off gas system pressure. The main steam backup supply for sealing steam also failed, and condenser vacuum and off gas system pressure continued to degrade. In response to rising off gas system pressure and lowering condenser vacuum, reactor power was lowered to 85% in accordance with Special Operating Procedures. With off gas system pressure approaching the procedural limit and condenser vacuum degrading rapidly, a manual reactor scram was inserted at 0220 EDT. All control rods fully inserted and all systems functioned as expected on the scram. Plant is currently shutdown and parameters are stable. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures and plant cooldown is in progress. The cause of the loss of both the primary and backup sources of sealing steam is under investigation. The shutdown electrical lineup is normal and decay heat is being removed via steam bypass valves to the main condenser. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Public Service Commission.05000410/LER-2012-004
ENS 4714111 August 2011 04:16:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationManual Reactor Scram Inserted Due to a Feedwater Leak on a Min Flow Line

NMP2 inserted a manual reactor scram due to a through wall leak on feedwater pump 2FWS-P1A minimum flow line. 2FWS-P1A has been removed from service to minimize the leak. All control rods inserted and all systems functioned as designed. The unit will remain in hot shutdown until plant startup. All systems functioned as required and the scram was uncomplicated. The licensee plans to issue a press release and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the New York State Public Service Commission.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1035 EDT ON 8/11/11 FROM MANLEY TO HUFFMAN * * *

The licensee will not be issuing a press release regarding this manual scram. R1DO (Powell) notified.

Feedwater05000410/LER-2011-003
ENS 468083 May 2011 00:51:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor ScramNine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic RPS actuation (scram) on Monday, May 02, 2011 at 2051. Cause of the RPS actuation is not understood at this time. All control rods inserted to position 00. N1-EOP-2 entered due to low reactor water level following trip (expected plant response). Reactor pressure stabilized 800 to 1000 psig, reactor water level restored and maintained 53 to 95 inches. Automatic initiation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection system occurred following plant trip (normal actuation). The reactor is stable in Hot Shutdown. The licensee characterized the scram as uncomplicated. All rods fully inserted, normal feed water is supplying the reactor with decay heat being removed to the condenser. The unit is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup and the scram had no impact on Unit 2. All systems functioned as required. The unit was operating at 47% power at the time of the event due to feed pump maintenance. The licensee does not have a first-out indication for the reactor scram and is still investigating the cause of the scram. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.High Pressure Coolant Injection
ENS 4640910 November 2010 15:56:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Unplanned Automatic Scram and High Pressure Coolant Injection System Initiation During TestingAt 10:56 (EST) on Wednesday, November 10, 2010, Nine Mile Point Unit (1) One automatically scrammed from rated power. The cause of the scram was Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure. The MSIV closure occurred during Instrument and Control Lo-Lo Level Surveillance Testing. The Lo-Lo Surveillance Test has been secured and all Reactor Protection System (RPS) Level Signals returned to normal. Two of four MSIVs went closed; troubleshooting to follow to determine the cause of the equipment malfunction (unexpected MSIV closure). Following the automatic scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated. At Nine Mile Point Unit One, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. At 10:58, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation set point and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was initially established on the Emergency Condensers (ECS). The MSIVs have been re-opened and the normal heat removal capability has been re-established (to the Main Condensers). All off-site power sources remain available (with a normal electrical alignment). 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) requires reporting within 4 hours when a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System occurs. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires reporting within 8 hours when a valid actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System occurs. There are no other adverse impacts to the station based on this event. All control rods inserted and the unit is stable in Mode 3 with reactor pressure and temperature approximately 600 psig and 480 degrees. All other safety systems operated as expected. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the New York State Public Service Commission.High Pressure Coolant Injection
Main Steam Isolation Valve
Reactor Protection System
Reactor Pressure Vessel
ENS 456127 January 2010 06:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationAutomatic Reactor Scram During Transmitter VentingAt 0100, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 reactor scrammed (on low reactor water level). The cause is currently under investigation. Maintenance activities were in progress on Residual Heat Removal (RHR) B & C systems. It is suspected that transmitter venting is the most probable cause of the trip. Reactor core isolation system (RCIC) injected on invalid level 2 signal. No safety relief valves (SRV's) actuated. B and C Residual Heat Removal systems (RHR) remain inoperable. All other ECCS systems and Emergency Diesel Generator are currently operable. Reactor water level is normal. No emergency core cooling system injection was required. The plant is currently in the hot shutdown condition. No emergency plan activation is required. Activation of forced outage plan is in progress. Lowest reactor water level reached during the transient was 140 inches. This is less than the reactor water level scram set point of 159.3 inches. Reactor pressure before scram was 1020 psig, current reactor pressure is 530 psig and reactor coolant temperature is 470 degrees F. Plant stack monitor is not available. Last grab sample reading at time 0257 is 857 micro-curies/sec. All systems functioned as required. All rods fully inserted on trip. Decay heat is being removed by steaming to the main condenser. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Residual Heat Removal
Emergency Diesel Generator
ENS 454125 October 2009 15:58:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Scram and High Pressure Coolant Injection Following a Loss of Feedwater Level Control

At 1158 on Monday, October 5, 2009, Nine Mile Point Unit One was manually scrammed from approximately 100% rated power due to failure of the Feedwater Level Control System, in anticipation of a reactor scram. Following the manual scram insertion at 11:58, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated on low Reactor Vessel (RPV) level. At 11:59, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation setpoint, and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. At Nine Mile Point Unit One, a HPCI System actuation signal on low RPV level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. Unit 1 has commenced cooldown, in preparation for the forced outage to commence repairs. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal operating band; reactor temperature is 450?F and reactor pressure is approximately 500 psig.

10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) requires reporting within 4 hours when any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires reporting within 8 hours when a valid actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System occurs. All control rods fully inserted. All systems functioned as required following the reactor scram. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. HPCI has been secured. Makeup water is being provided by the Reactor Feedwater System and decay heat removal is through the bypass valves to the condenser. There was no impact on Unit 2 and the plant is in a normal post-scram electrical lineup. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

High Pressure Coolant Injection
Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
ENS 4498210 April 2009 09:38:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationHigh Pressure Coolant Injection Automatic Initiation Due to Turbine TripAt 0538 on Friday, April 10, 2009, Nine Mile Point Unit One manually tripped the turbine at approximately 28% rated power in response to rising turbine bearing vibrations. Following the manual turbine trip, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system automatically initiated on the turbine trip signal. The HPCI system initiation signal was reset immediately following the turbine trip. Reactor water level was maintained in the normal operating range throughout the transient. At Nine Mile Point Unit One the HPCI system is a mode of operation of the feedwater and condensate system. It is not an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). A HPCI system actuation signal on a turbine trip is an expected response of the HPCI system. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 remains at power since the turbine was tripped at a power level that is within the capacity of the turbine bypass valves. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires reporting within 8 hours when a valid actuation of the feedwaler coolant injection system occurs. The event has been entered into the corrective action program. There are no other adverse impacts to the station based on this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.High Pressure Coolant Injection
Feedwater
ENS 4492321 March 2009 05:21:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationHigh Pressure Coolant Injection System Initiation Following Planned Manual Scram

At 0121 on Saturday, March 21, 2009, Nine Mile Point Unit One was manually scrammed from approximately 18% rated power in preparation for Refueling Outage 20. The plant scram was a planned evolution. Following the manual scram insertion at 0121, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level. At 0123, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation setpoint, and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. At Nine Mile Point Unit One the HPCI system is a mode of operation of the feedwater and condensate system. It is not an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). A HPCI System actuation signal on low RPV level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires reporting within 8 hours when a valid actuation of the feedwater coolant injection system occurs. The event has been entered into the corrective action program. There are no other adverse impacts to the station based on this event. All control rods fully inserted. Electrical lineup is normal and there are no safety equipment out of service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector

  • * * UPDATE FROM BRIAN FINCH TO JOE O'HARA AT 1611 ON 5/15/09 * * *

Event notification 44923 is being retracted after further evaluation because it has been determined that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system initiation was part of a pre-planned sequence. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) requires that any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in this section, including a feedwater injection system, must be reported within 8 hours. Except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The HPCI actuation that occurred after the manual scram from 18% Rated Thermal Power (RTP) was part of a pre-planned sequence in accordance with an operating procedure on plant shutdown. The HPCI initiation was also discussed during Just-in-Time training for the operating crew prior to performance of the soft shutdown. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, the HPCI system is a mode of operation of the feedwater and condensate systems. The HPCI system is not an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). A HPCI system actuation signal on low reactor water level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to reactor water level shrink. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Holody).

High Pressure Coolant Injection
Reactor Pressure Vessel
Feedwater
ENS 4459824 October 2008 01:26:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Reactor Scram Due to Loss of the Electronic Pressure RegulatorControl Room Operators observed slight (reactor) pressure rise during panel walk down. Investigation of pressure indication led Control room staff to determine that (the) EPR (Electronic Pressure Regulator) was not functioning properly (noise in the output signal). Control Room Staff entered Special Operating Procedure for failed pressure regulator. EPR could not be moved and this was confirmed by operators in the field. Control Room Staff (then) inserted a manual scram. Immediately after the scram reactor water level reached a low of 36", Emergency Operating Procedures for Level (EOP-2) were entered. HPCI initiated on the turbine trip to control water level. After the turbine tripped, all turbine bypass valves failed open; MSIVs (main steam isolation valve) were manually shut to control pressure. (The) EPR eventually disengaged from control, allowing the operator control of the turbine bypass valves. MSIVs were then reopened. (The) Scram has been reset. (The) turbine driven shaft pump did not initially disengage, pump (was) manually tripped after turbine speed reduced to 1500 rpm. All other systems responded correctly. (The) plant is not currently in any SOPs or EOPs and is proceeding to cold shutdown using normal operating procedures. All control rods fully inserted as expected. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. At the time of the event, containment spray loop 1-12 was out of service for routine surveillance. The plant is currently cooling down and is at 365 psi. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Main Steam Isolation Valve
ENS 4420613 May 2008 12:25:0010 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
Unusual Event Declared Due to Loss of Offsite Power

At 0806 EDT, a loss of offsite power occurred when the 115 KV line #4 was lost combined with the unavailability of 115 KV line #1 which was out of service at the time for planned maintenance. Both EDGs started and loaded on the safety busses as expected. The licensee declared an Unusual Event at 0825 EDT per EAL 6.1.1 based on loss of offsite power for greater than 15 minutes. The Unit 1 recirc pump #13 tripped as a result of the event and spent fuel pool cooling was also lost. The licensee remained at power and there was no impact on Nine Mile Unit 2. Power for 115 KV line #1 was restored at 0845 EDT. Cause of the loss of Line #4 is still under investigation. The reactor is stable and the safety busses continue to be power by the EDGs. Restoration of a normal electrical power lineup and termination of the UE is still under review. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State, and local authorities.

  • * * UPDATE AT 10:29 EDT ON 5/13/08 FROM HELKER TO HUFFMAN * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 10:22 EDT based on restoration of offsite power to safety bus 103 from line #1. Bus 102 still remains energized by the EDG at this time. Investigation into the loss of line #4 continues. The loss of line #4 has been attributed to a Fitzpatrick protective relay 87B actuation for the B phase differential current. Investigation continues. The NRC Resident has been notified by the licensee. NRR EO (Thorp), Rg 1 (Dentel), IRD (McDermott), R1DO (Krohn), DHS (Dwight) and FEMA (McKentry) notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 12:53 EDT ON 5/13/08 FROM HELKER TO SNYDER * * *

This condition is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' Specifically, both offsite power 115 KV lines were not available. The second paragraph which applies is 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) 'Any event or condition that results in the valid actuation of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B).' Specifically, the auto start of the Emergency Diesel Generators on a valid loss of offsite power signal. The cause of the loss of line 4 is still being investigated. Offsite power has been restored to onsite buses including PB 102, 103 and 101. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector of this update. Notified R1DO (Krohn).

Emergency Diesel Generator05000220/LER-2008-001
ENS 4263312 June 2006 17:02:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationHpci Inititation Signal Due to Turbine Trip Signal During StartupFeedwater was being place into long path recirculation mode in accordance with N1-OP-16 to support a chemistry sample. During this evolution, reactor water level rose high enough such that the High Level Annunciator (92.2") was received, the turbine tripped (off of the turning gear) and a HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) initiation signal was received as per design. HPCI system did not initiate flow and no pumps started because the Feedwater Booster Pumps were not in service (pull-to-lock). HPCI was reset and Reactor Water level (was) restored to the operating band 65" - 83". A copy of this Notification Worksheet will be provided to the Resident Inspector. This event has been captured on Condition Report 2006-2703. A prompt investigation has been performed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Feedwater
ENS 4240310 March 2006 03:14:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationAutomatic Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Turbine Trip

This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) for Nine Mile Point Unit 2 which states 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' On 03/09/2006 at 2214 while operating at approximately 85 % reactor power (coast down to refueling) a condenser low vacuum condition resulted in a turbine trip and a subsequent reactor scram. A loss of sealing steam most probably caused the loss of condenser vacuum and an investigation is in progress. Special Operating procedure N2-SOP-101 C was entered. All control rods inserted (fully) as expected. Condenser vacuum has been stabilized and the main steam isolation valves are open. The plant is stable and recovery actions are in progress. Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. The condensate and feedwater system is in operation maintaining reactor vessel level. The electric plant is in a normal shutdown lineup and there was no effect from this transient on Unit 1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0035 EST ON 3/14/06 FROM P. WALSH TO W. GOTT * * *

This update is being made to provide additional information to EN# 42403 which was communicated via ENS on 3/10/06 at 0058 hours. During the scram that occurred at Nine Mile Point Unit 2 on 3/9/06 at 2214 hours, a primary containment isolation signal to RHR Shutdown Cooling, RHR Head Spray and RHR sample valves was received as designed. No components repositioned as the valves are normally closed during plant operations. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (P. Krohn).

Reactor Protection System
Main Steam Isolation Valve
Feedwater
Primary containment
Shutdown Cooling
ENS 4192718 August 2005 13:49:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Scram Due to Loss of a Power BoardUnit 1 scrammed from 100% power due to a loss of power board 11 coincident with 1/2 scram present already on RPS channel 12 due to (instrumentation and control) (I&C) testing. A loss of power board 11 causes a loss of 11 RPS trip bus which in turn produces a 1/2 scram. Loss of power board 11 is currently under investigation. In addition during the scram, HPCI injected into the reactor vessel on a turbine trip signal to maintain reactor water level. Currently, the reactor is in hot shutdown with reactor water levels being maintained in the normal level band at 74 inches with feedwater in automatic. Reactor pressure is currently 920 psig and being maintained in automatic with turbine bypass valves. Plan is to stay in hot shutdown and complete scram recovery procedures. All control rods fully inserted. No safety relief valves actuated. Electrical busses were being supplied by normal offsite power. Emergency diesel generators are available. The decay heat removal path is currently normal feedwater to the reactor vessel through the turbine bypass valves to the condenser. There was no impact on Unit 2. The licensee is going to suspend any high risk maintenance activities on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Feedwater
Emergency Diesel Generator
ENS 4158410 April 2005 10:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationScram Signal Resulting from Failure of a Supply Valve to the Scram Air Header

Nine Mile Point Unit 1 received a valid RPS SCRAM signal from high water level in the SCRAM Dump Volume (SDV). While restoring the Hydraulic Control Rod Unit (HCU) for control rod 02-35 to service, the internals to the plug valve for the Instrument Air Supply (116 Valve) to the SCRAM Inlet and Outlet valves failed. This failure caused an approximate 1/2" hole in the SCRAM Air Header, which resulted in the SCRAM Air Header pressure lowering rapidly due to the leak. Operators at the HCU recommended isolating the SCRAM Air Header. The Shift Manager was contacted by the job supervisor and received permission to isolate the SCRAM Air Header. SCRAM inlet and outlet valves opened, SDV vents and drains closed due to the loss of SCRAM Air Header pressure. Approximately 3 minutes after SCRAM Air Header depressurization, a full SCRAM signal occurred as expected due to the water level in the SDV. There was no fuel in the Reactor Vessel (RPV). No Control Rod motion occurred due to all Control Rods being inserted or isolated for maintenance. Immediate (8 Hour Non-Emergency) notification of this event being made as a result of the requirements of 10CRF50.72(b)3(iv)(A). The licensee stated that more information on the event can be found in Nine Mile Point Internal document DER - NM-2005-1565. The license will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY LICENSEE (SHEEHAN) TO NRC (HELD) AT 1739 EDT ON 5/19/05 * * *

The scram event that occurred on April 10, 2005 was not initiated from a "valid" scram initiation signal (i.e., none of the instrumentation signals identified in Technical Specification Table 3.6.2a triggered the scram). To the contrary, a valve on a CRD hydraulic control unit (HCU) failed and Operations took action to isolate instrument air from the scram air header. This operator action had the identical effect that a scram signal would have had - the scram air header completely vented through the broken valve and caused the scram inlet and outlet valves on the HCUs to open and the scram discharge volume vents and drains to close. At the time, the reactor was defueled and all control rods were either already inserted or properly removed from service for maintenance, thus, the event did not result in any control rod movement (i.e., the system had been properly removed from service and the safety function had already been performed). Subsequent to the initiating event, as per the design of the CRD and RPS systems, the scram discharge volume filled and a full RPS scram signal was generated. Conclusion: The scram event that occurred on April 10, 2005, resulted from an invalid scram initiation signal. At the time, the reactor was defueled, the CRD system had been properly removed from service and the safety function had been properly performed (no control rods moved). Thus, pursuant to the guidance in NUREG-1022, it is appropriate to conclude that the event is not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv) or 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). As such, the 8-hour ENS notification that was made at 11:46 on 4/10/05 (reference Event Number #41584) is being retracted The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Bellamy) was contacted.

ENS 414647 March 2005 09:37:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation - ECCS Discharge
Automatic Turbine Trip/ Reactor ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee (text in quotes): At 0437 Unit 1 scrammed. The initiating event appears to be a turbine tripped initiated by a High level in 122 moisture separator drain tank. Investigating (the cause) of the scram will determine the actual cause. All control rods fully inserted into the core. HPCI initiated. Three relief valves lifted and reseated normally. The Reactor water clean up system is removing decay heat. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.05000220/LER-2005-001
ENS 4099830 August 2004 12:35:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Unit 1 Manually Scrammed Due to Oscillating Reactor Vessel Water Level

Nine Mile Point, Unit One is initiating a 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (iv) (B) 4-Hour Non-Emergency notification based upon insertion of a 'MANUAL' scram that occurred at 08:35 on Monday, August 30, 2004. At time of transient, plant was operating in Mode 1, Power Operating Condition, at 99.7% of rated power. At 08:25 on Monday, August 30, 2004, Operators noted oscillations on 13 Feedwater flow control valve (FCV) while in 'AUTOMATIC' mode of operation (normal mode of operation for this equipment). Operators took "MANUAL" control of 13 FCV per Plant Operating Procedures. 13 FCV oscillations continued while in the 'MANUAL' mode, and a decision was made to insert a 'MANUAL' scram at 08:35. All control rods fully inserted and the plant responded as designed to the scram. At 08:44, the scram signal was reset per procedure. Currently, plant is in Mode 2, Hot Shutdown Condition with cooldown in progress. Plant is transitioning to Mode 3, Cold Shutdown Condition, per Plant Operating Procedures. At the time the manual scram was inserted, Reactor Vessel Water Level (RVWL) was 67 inches and decreasing (automatic scram setpoint is 53 inches). The 13 FCV is on the discharge of the turbine-driven feedwater pump. Decay heat is currently being removed by the main condenser via the steam bypass valves. All ECCS and safety-related equipment is available, if needed. At the time of the transient there was no plant maintenance on-going which could have been a contributing factor. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 8/30/04 AT 2358 EDT FROM M. MINNICK TO J. ROTTON * * *

The notification sent to the NRC on 8/30/04 at 11:42 was found to be incomplete. As a normal and expected response to a manual scram at high power, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (feedwater) automatically initiated during the transient following the manual scram. This should have been reported as an 8 hour Non-Emergency 10CFR50. 72 (b) (3) (iv) (A) notification. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Henderson).

Feedwater
High Pressure Coolant Injection
05000220/LER-2004-004
ENS 407192 May 2004 06:17:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Scram Due to Rising Torus Temperature Due to Stuck Open ErvOperators inserted a manual scram at 0217 (EDT) in anticipation of torus bulk temperature approaching 110 degrees F following an Electromatic Relief Valve (ERV) failing to close during ERV testing. Technical Specification 3.3.2.e requires the insertion of a manual scram prior to torus bulk temperature reaching 110 degrees F. The maximum average torus temperature was 104 degrees F. Operators opened ERV 123 at 0209 for post maintenance testing from approximately 19% power. The ERV subsequently stuck open. Operators performed the off-normal procedure for a stuck open ERV, but this failed to shut the valve. This ported steam from the reactor vessel to the torus resulting in an uncontrolled torus temperature rise. Operators placed torus cooling in service but this did not stop the rising torus temperature. Following the manual scram, cooldown, and depressurization, shutdown cooling is being placed in service. Immediately following the manual scram, a turbine trip signal actuated the logic for high pressure coolant injection. High pressure coolant injection actuated and operators controlled level above 53 inches. With the ERV stuck open, the cooldown rate could not be controlled. The cooldown rate was approximately 190 degrees F during the first hour following the scram. All control rods fully inserted into the core. Decay heat is being removed by shutdown cooling (in service at the time of the report). The operators intend to cooldown to cold shutdown. The electrical buses are stable. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was not affected. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Shutdown Cooling
High Pressure Coolant Injection
ENS 4068418 April 2004 22:30:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationResidual Heat Removal System Isolation Due to a Rise in Reactor Pressure

At 1830 hours on 18 April 2004, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was restoring from reactor pressure vessel leakage test. Reactor pressure was ~82 psi, temperature ~178 degrees, reactor level was solid with both reactor recirculation pumps running in slow speed per the leak test procedure.

'B' residual heat removal system was being warmed up in preparation for going in to service.  Reactor water cleanup reject from the vessel was secured to maintain RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) pressure stable in order to provide driving head for flow through the residual heat removal discharge line to radwaste.  The line is warmed up from the reactor, back through the Shutdown cooling isolation valve, to radwaste prior to placing shutdown cooling in service.  When warm-up criteria are met, the operating procedure directs securing flow. 

When flow was secured, this effectively isolated the solid reactor vessel, resulting in a rise in reactor pressure. Pressure peaked at ~146 psi before operators established reactor water cleanup reject flow. When RPV pressure reached 128 psi, the residual heat removal system isolation was automatically initiated as designed. The shutdown cooling injection valve, which was open to support piping warm-up, closed as designed. All other shutdown cooling valves were closed prior to the event per the warm-up lineup. RPV is currently depressurized with shutdown cooling in service. All systems are functioning as expected. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * Retraction on 06/01/04 at 1512 EDT from Chris Skinner to John MacKinnon * * *

The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #40684: On April 18, 2004, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 reported Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Cooling System isolated due to a pressure spike while warming up the piping. The shutdown cooling injection valve, which was open to support piping warm-up, closed as designed. All other shutdown cooling valves were closed prior to the event per the warm-up lineup. Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) in response to the valid containment isolation signal. Subsequent analysis has concluded that, although the isolation signal was valid, it was not a general containment isolation signal (i.e., the isolation signal only involved the shutdown cooling system) and the shutdown cooling function of the Residual Heat Removal System is not listed under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) as a system that is required to be reportable. This system isolation does not meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Therefore, this notification made on April 18, 2004, is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

 NRC R1DO (Ron Bellamy) notified.
Residual Heat Removal
Reactor Pressure Vessel
Shutdown Cooling
Reactor Water Cleanup
ENS 4032214 November 2003 02:49:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationLoss of 115 Kv Line Results in Emergency Diesel Generator Auto-StartAuto initiation of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 103 and re-energizing of PB 103 from EDG due to loss of off-site 115 KV line #4. Line #4 was momentarily lost, then re-energized. The loss of power also resulted in a trip of Reactor Recirculating Pump 13. Power reduced to approximately 80% rated. Recovery operations are in progress. All systems functioned as required and there was not anything unusual or not understood. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.Emergency Diesel Generator