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| Entered date | Site | Region | Scram | Reactor type | Event description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 48341 | 25 September 2012 15:11:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | Automatic Scram | GE-3 | During maintenance on 4160V Bus 12 ammeter, a Bus 12 lockout occurred. The station power was from 1R Reserve transformer for work on the 2R Auxiliary transformer. Net effect was Bus 12 locked out, removing power from 12 Reactor Feed Pump and 12 Reactor Recirculation pump. Reactor level lowered to +23 inches then began to rise. With both Main Feed Reg Valves in AUTO, the level transient reached +48 inches, the Reactor Water Level Hi Hi setpoint. The Main Turbine and 11 Reactor Feed Pump tripped as designed, and a Reactor SCRAM occurred. Reactor water level began to drop, and C.4.A Abnormal Procedure for SCRAM was used to restart 11 Reactor Feed Pump and recover water level. Minimum water level reached was -26 inches. Reactor Low Level SCRAM signal and Group 2 Primary Containment isolation occurred at +9 inches as designed, No Safety Relief valves lifted during this transient. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) did not receive an initiation signal due to not reaching their setpoints. There were no Emergency Core Cooling Systems initiation setpoints reached. Prior to the event, both divisions of Standby Liquid Control were inoperable as part of planned maintenance. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed through the turbine bypass to the main condenser. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup and stable in Mode 3. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the State and local governments. |
| ENS 47460 | 20 November 2011 02:10:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | Automatic Scram | GE-3 | While performing a regularly scheduled Turbine Bypass Valve surveillance, prior to Turbine Bypass Valve movement, a 'B' half scram (signal) was received. Operators immediately suspended testing. Approximately 10 seconds later, a full Reactor Protection System actuation occurred. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level lowered below the Group II isolation initiation setpoint of +9 inches, (resulting in containment valve isolations). There were no radioactive releases associated with this event. No other alarms were received prior to the RPS actuation. The cause of the reactor scram is under investigation at this time. Also, due to the reactor scram, discharge canal temperature rate of change exceeded plant requirements. As a result, the State of Minnesota, and appropriate local agencies will be notified. All control rods inserted and the scram is considered uncomplicated. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical configuration. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 47364 | 21 October 2011 16:42:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | Automatic Scram | GE-3 | The station experienced a lockout of the 2R Auxiliary Power Transformer. The resulting transient caused an automatic actuation of the RPS system. All control rods fully inserted. A Group 2 Primary Containment isolation occurred. Both 11 and 12 Emergency Diesel Generators started on a loss of voltage signal. Equipment response was that the 11 ESW (Emergency Service Water) pump (cooling for the #11 Emergency Diesel) failed to develop required pressure. The #13-4160V non-safety related bus failed to restore after the transient (and feed the Division 1 Essential Bus). Additionally, the #15 bus transferred to the 1AR transformer (and is feeding the Essential Bus). The #11 Emergency Diesel Generator is currently tagged out of service. Electrical supply is being provided by offsite power. Reactor heat is being removed through the main steam line to the main condenser and reactor water inventory is being provided by the feedwater system. The SRVs lifted and reseated. The HPCI system was manually place into a pressure control mode. The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency is being notified due to the licensee violating the site discharge canal temperature rate of change limit. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Prior to this event the 'B' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) and 'B' Control Room Ventilation (CRV) Systems were inoperable for planned maintenance. On 10-21-11 at 1325 CDT, the #11 EDG ESW Pump was declared inoperable due to low cooling water pump flow, resulting in the #11 EDG being inoperable, which in turn resulted in the 'A' CREF and 'A' CRV being inoperable. Contrary to reporting requirements this condition was not identified and reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as required within 8-hours in the previous event notification. This condition resulted in a loss of safety function for both divisions of CREF and CRV. This update amends the 10-21-11 event notification to include this as an 8-hour non-emergency event pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Nick Valos) |
| ENS 43114 | 23 January 2007 14:27:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | Automatic Scram | GE-3 | The purpose of this notification is to inform the NRC that Nuclear Management Company (NMC) will be issuing a press release approximately two hours (CST) after this notification to the NRC on January 23, 2007, concerning an event previously reported to the NRC on January 10, 2007, via EN# 43088. The event in question involved an automatic reactor scram at 3:26 PM on January 10, 2007. As reported in that notification, all safety systems operated correctly. The scram occurred following the unexpected opening of the main turbine control valves. There was no release of radioactivity during the event. The purpose of the press release is to provide information to the media and the public regarding the results of NMC's investigation as to the cause of the January 10 event and the status of remedial actions. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify State and Local authorities. |
| ENS 42301 | 2 February 2006 04:51:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | Automatic Scram | GE-3 | Train "A" of the Emergency Filtration Train (EFT) Unit, which services the control room ventilation system, tripped off line due to a low flow condition. The cause was determined to be a rip in the rubber boot at the suction of the fan, thus causing an automatic trip of the EFT system from a low flow condition through the filter where flow is sensed. Both the "A" and "B" trains were declared inoperable due to the amount of leakage the "B" EFT was having through the ripped boot in the "A" EFT, and the condition found on "B" EFT rubber boot. Upon further evaluation of the "B" EFT boot condition, the "B" train was declared operable at 03:02 CST on 02/02/06. The "A" EFT will remain in a 7 day LCO until the rubber boot is replaced. The 8 hour notification was issued due to both EFT Units being declared inoperable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |