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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 540473 May 2019 19:00:00McGuireNRC Region 2At 1554 EDT on 5/3/19, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped on Over Temperature Delta Temperature following a pressure transient in the Reactor Coolant System. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations manually started the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and has stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser. Unit 2 is not affected. Due to Reactor Protection System actuation while critical and actuation of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 1 is in a normal electrical lineup. Prior to the automatic trip, the backup pressurizer heaters were in service as is normal during power ascension. The pressure transient started when the backup heaters were in the process of being removed from service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 534989 July 2018 18:23:00McGuireNRC Region 2On July 9, 2018, at 1155 hours (EDT), while testing the TSC Ventilation System, an equipment malfunction occurred that resulted in an unplanned loss of TSC ventilation functionality/habitability for greater than seventy-five minutes. If an emergency had been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The TSC ventilation system has been placed in an interim configuration that restored functionality and habitability. Additional maintenance is planned to promptly resolve the malfunctioning equipment. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the equipment malfunction affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The equipment malfunction (a failed solenoid valve) resulted in the loss of the ability to pressurize and filter the air in the TSC.
ENS 533072 April 2018 11:20:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A planned modification to the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system started on April 2, 2018. The work activity includes replacement of the air conditioning system. The work duration is approximately three weeks. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the TSC modifications and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 532401 March 2018 20:34:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Due to the discovery of a breaker coordination issue during an NRC Inspection, the power supply breakers to the Technical Support Center (TSC), including the ventilation system, has been opened to address the condition. This will make the TSC non-functional. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the Alternate TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified to respond to the Alternate TSC in the event of an ERO (Emergency Response Organization) activation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5321716 February 2018 13:58:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1014 (EST) hours on 2/16/18, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped when the Reactor Trip Breakers opened during Train B Solid State Protection System (SSPS) testing. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations manually started the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDCAP) auto-started on low steam generator level. A Feedwater Isolation occurred as designed due to the Reactor Trip and Lo Tave condition. Operations stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser. Unit 2 is not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, actuation of the TDCAP and motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps along with the Feedwater Isolation, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8 hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5316010 January 2018 02:13:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

During normal power operations at 100 percent power on Unit 2, both trains of Containment Air Return Fans (CARF) were declared inoperable at 19:28 (EST) on January 9, 2018 due to a common issue with control power fuses. The fuses potentially could not handle the in-rush current upon re-energizing the circuits. This condition resulted in a loss of a reasonable expectation that the Unit 2 Containment Air Return Fans would meet their design safety function and mitigate an accident. This loss of safety function is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 8 hour report. The site entered T.S. 3.0.3 at 19:28 and exited at 20:54 when repairs to 2B CARF were completed. 2A CARF repairs are complete. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee verified this problem does not affect unit-1.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 0939 EST ON 03/08/2018 FROM JUSTIN BLACK TO TOM KENDZIA * * *

A subsequent evaluation determined that the fuses for the Containment Air Return Fans (CARFs) would be able to perform their safety function and were operable at the time of discovery. The limiting safety condition for the fuses is the return to power following a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). The evaluation determined that the fuses would satisfy their safety function upon re-energizing the circuits if a LOOP occurred and would not impact the ability of the CARFs to perform their safety function. The subject fuses were replaced on January 9, 2018." The Licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Musser).

ENS 530618 November 2017 11:52:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0824 EST on 11/8/17, a Switchyard Autotransformer began to burn due to an equipment failure. The autotransformer supports interconnectivity between each side of the switchyard and is not required for switchyard operation. There was no work in progress on the associated autotransformer at the time of the event. The autotransformer and the switchyard are outside the protected area approximately one mile away. The fire was contained to the autotransformer only. The fault has been electrically isolated and there was no effect on either MNS (McGuire Nuclear Site) Unit 1 or Unit 2 operations. No personnel were injured as a result of the fire. Local Fire Department responded and has contained the fire. MNS fire brigade leader along with switchyard maintenance have confirmed no effects to the MNS bus lines, power availability, or the ability for the site to generate power. Environmental personnel have made a notification to the National Response Center due to the oil and foam mixture occurring as a result of the fire response. McGuire hazmat personnel are currently working to contain this oil and foam mixture. Environmental personnel are also submitting a report to the NC (North Carolina) Department of Environmental Water Quality within 24 hours. There is no impact to the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5257323 February 2017 22:01:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn February 23, 2017, a containment visual inspection was performed to identify the source of elevated RCS (Reactor Coolant System) leakage. A leak was identified at the nozzle connection of the boron injection line to 2D RCS cold leg at 1922 (EST). It was determined that the leak cannot be isolated and is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage. Unit 2 entered TS LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B, for the existence of pressure boundary leakage. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) (4 hours) for 'initiation of plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications' and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) (8 hours) for 'any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.' The unit will shutdown and repairs will be performed in Mode 5. This condition has no impact on public health and safety. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. At the time of the event notification, Unit 2 was at 33 percent power. Unidentified RCS leakage is estimated at 0.28 gpm. Unit 2 is expected to be in Mode 3 by 0122 EST on 02/24/2017. Unit 1 is not affected by this event.
ENS 5224819 September 2016 12:21:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis is a non-emergency facsimile notification required by 10 CPR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days. Duke Energy McGuire Nuclear Station (McGuire) has determined there is evidence of a departure from technical requirements, a Deviation, associated with Joslyn Clark overload heater element Part Number (PIN) 2455. This part was procured in accordance with the Duke Energy Commercial Grade Program (CGP) and dedicated for use in safety related applications. Three of 18 overload heater elements, purchased as a lot, had insufficient top weld material. One failed in-service during a post maintenance test, the second and third failed during a visual and mechanical inspection. An extent of condition review inspected over 500 similar Joslyn Clark overload heater elements. No other inventory was found with a top weld issue. These overload heater elements are used in motor starters for the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) ventilation fans. This condition was discovered during post maintenance testing of the 2A EDG on July 27, 2016. None of the suspect overload heater elements were installed in Operable EDG ventilation fan motor starters. The dedicated overload heater elements, from this lot, were not transferred or sold to any third party customers. Specialty Product Technologies, manufacturer of the Joslyn Clark overload heater elements, has been notified of the deviation and is investigating their welding process. The Evaluation of the deviation determined that a Substantial Safety Hazard would have been created if the overload heater elements were installed and left uncorrected. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 522192 September 2016 23:33:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Area Radiation Monitor (1EMF17) lost signal resulting in off scale high indications. Subject EMF provides alarm functions and indication which are used for assessment of EAL classifications. Failure response conducted per applicable Alarm Response Procedures and subsequent actions performed per applicable license commitment required actions. Temporary dose rate monitor has been set up for area monitoring with alarm setpoint commensurate with subject EMF. Issue entered into corrective action program and prioritized to restore subject EMF to functional status within required 30 days. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM PHILIP BALES TO STEVEN VITTO AT 2323 EDT ON 9/4/2016 * * *

This notification is being made to retract event EN 52219, which was reported on September 2, 2016. Upon further investigation, the loss of radiation monitor 1EMF17 did not prevent the evaluation of all EALs (Emergency Action Level) for the associated emergency initiating conditions. Additionally, it has been determined 1EMF17 is not utilized for performing radiological assessments. Therefore, no actual or potential major loss of emergency assessment capability existed per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This is consistent with NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, Supplement 1 and NEI 13-01, Rev. 0. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of the retraction. Notified R2DO (Bartley).

ENS 5218015 August 2016 15:32:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. The Technical Support Center (TSC) was removed from service on 08/15/2016 at 1030 (EDT) for a scheduled facility upgrade project, which will improve the overall functionality of the facility. The duration of the upgrade is expected to be 26 days. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as the TSC will be unavailable for greater than 72 hours. In the event of an emergency, McGuire's alternate TSC will be used while the TSC is upgraded. During this period, the alternate TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified that the TSC will be unavailable during the upgrade and to report to the alternate TSC in the event of an emergency. This upgrade does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 521452 August 2016 14:22:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis is a non-emergency eight-hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the TSC (Technical Support Center) Ventilation system was discovered on 8/2/16 at 0630 EDT. Repairs are complete at 1030 EDT on 08/02/16. If an emergency would have been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC had become uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable emergency plan implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team was notified of the condition and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5182829 March 2016 16:31:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At approximately 1900 EDT on March 28, 2016, an unplanned loss of retail power to the McGuire Meteorological tower occurred. This loss of power impacted communication between the Meteorological tower and the control room, which resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Compensatory measures existed within the site's emergency planning procedures to obtain meteorological data from the National Weather Service. Meteorological information could have been provided via the emergency notification system to the NRC operations center. Power was restored at 2245 EDT on March 28, 2016. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There was no impact to the public.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1423 EDT ON 4/19/2016 FROM SCOTT SLIETER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

This notification is being made to retract event EN 51828 that was reported March 29, 2016. Based on further investigation, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures provide acceptable alternative methods to perform emergency assessment that are in addition to the control room indications from the meteorological tower. Furthermore, it was determined that the meteorological tower data was valid and available in the control room during the applicable period. It was therefore determined that no actual or potential major loss of emergency assessment capability existed per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This is consistent with NUREG 1022, rev 3, supplement 1 and NEI 13-01, rev 0. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the retraction. Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

ENS 5181722 March 2016 23:33:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn Tuesday, March 22, 2016, while performing planned inspections of Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System piping welds, a flaw indication was identified on a 3 inch Charging Line connection to the Reactor Coolant System piping. NDE (Non-Destructive Evaluation) results showed a change in the flaw since the previous outage inspection and the condition is now determined as not meeting the acceptance criteria specified in ASME Code Section XI. As such, this indication is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) as a degraded condition. An action plan is being developed. There is no impact on current Unit 1 refueling operations. This condition and the action plan have no impact to the health and safety of the public or employees. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified.
ENS 5181121 March 2016 17:28:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1152 EDT, a contractor employee working in the Containment Building in a potentially contaminated area was found passed out and unresponsive. At 1210 EDT, the individual was transported to Carolinas Medical Center, Charlotte, NC. Radiation Protection had not yet fully determined if the individual was contaminated. At 1300 EDT, Radiation Protection determined the individual was not contaminated. The determination was made after arrival to the hospital. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5160214 December 2015 12:30:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed supervisor tested positive for drugs on a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's access to the facility has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5147415 October 2015 22:18:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn October 7, 2015, with McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 2 in Mode 4, operators were testing the main turbine and main feedwater pump turbines, 2A safety injection (SI) train trip functions. At the time of the test, the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps were in operation to provide make-up to the steam generators. The main feedwater system was not in service. During realignment activities from the 2A Sl test, the 2A AFW train actuation signal was unblocked when the '2A AFW auto start defeat' switch was returned to 'reset.' This caused the 2A AFW train control valves to fully open, and the associated steam generator sampling and blowdown valves to close. The actuation occurred as designed and there was no adverse impact to the Unit. Public health and safety were not impacted by this event. Based on a review of the Event Reporting Guidelines and the plant licensing basis, this event was initially determined to be an invalid actuation. However, after further review and discussions with the NRC, Duke Energy concluded the event should be reported as an 8-hour non-emergency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. A Nuclear Condition Report was initiated for the late notification. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5140617 September 2015 21:32:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA miniature alcohol bottle, containing trace amounts of liquid, was discovered inside the protected area. Site security took possession of the bottle and removed it from the protected area. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5138510 September 2015 11:35:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA contract supervisory employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 512078 July 2015 11:13:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis notification is being reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification of a fatality of an employee. Station personnel intend to notify OSHA of the individual fatality. At approximately 0629 (EDT) on July 8th, 2015, Control Room personnel received an emergency call requiring station medical first responders. The individual was transported offsite via ambulance. The site has been notified of the individual fatality. The fatality was due to an apparent personal medical issue and not work related. The individual was not contaminated. A press release is not planned at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The individual was inside the Protected Area but not within a Radioactive Control Area.
ENS 5116317 June 2015 16:04:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA licensed (non-supervisor) operator was found in violation of the fitness-for-duty policy. The employee's access to the plant has been revoked. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 507207 January 2015 12:27:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis 60-day telephone notification is being made under the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of the 1A EDG. The 1A EDG start resulted from a degraded component during the testing of the 1A Emergency Load Sequencer. At 2355 (EST) on November 15, 2014, the 1A EDG auto started during performance of the monthly 1A Emergency Load Sequencer test. The test was terminated by personnel prior to a full actuation of the Emergency Load Sequencer due to the unexpected response of the sequencer. The 1A EDG started and functioned normally. Troubleshooting identified a degraded relay downstream of the under voltage sensing circuit which made up the invalid 2/3 logic necessary to start the EDG. There were NO actual plant conditions or parameters (i.e. under voltage, degraded voltage, safety injection or manual initiation) involved in this actuation. The degraded relay would NOT have prevented the 1A Emergency Load Sequencer or the EDG from performing their safety related functions. Following troubleshooting, replacement of the relay and an evaluation for extent of condition, the 1A Emergency Load Sequencer and EDG were returned to service. The health and safety of the public was not affected by this issue. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5063120 November 2014 17:29:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA supervisory licensed employee had a confirmed positive test for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5049727 September 2014 20:09:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn Friday, September 26, 2014, while performing planned inspections of Reactor Coolant System piping welds, one flaw indication was identified on each of two 1.5 inch Safety Injection Line connections to the Reactor Coolant System piping. On Saturday, September 27, 2014, after confirmatory inspections and evaluation, both of the flaw indications were determined to not meet the acceptance criteria specified in ASME Code Section XI. As such, these indications are reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as a Degraded Condition. A repair plan is being developed. There is no impact on current Unit 1 refueling operations while defueled and in No Mode. This condition and repair have no impact to the health and safety of the public or employees. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5023026 June 2014 15:29:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to both the McGuire and Oconee plants has been restricted. The NRC Resident Inspectors at both the McGuire and Oconee sites have been notified.
ENS 5014728 May 2014 23:57:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOne emergency siren was making noise (siren 27). Huntersville Fire Department was contacted by someone in the area of the siren. No siren was activated. Initial investigation shows power loss to this one siren around the time of occurrence. Local news media contacted Duke Energy representative to question if sirens were set off. Continue to investigate to determine the issue with this one siren. Emergency Planning notified Mecklenburg County of failure of siren #27. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 500958 May 2014 12:17:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At approximately 0429 hours (EDT) on May 8, 2014, McGuire was informed that 34 emergency sirens were incapable of activation from the primary location. The loss of these 34 sirens for more than one hour is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Until repairs are complete, backup route alerting is in place. Troubleshooting is in progress. During troubleshooting, an inadvertent actuation of emergency sirens occurred at 1030 hours (EDT) on May 8, 2014. Mecklenburg County Emergency Management was notified of this inadvertent actuation which is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). Although these sirens were activated there was no incident at McGuire. This event does not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector and local agencies were notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM NICHOLAS BARTSCHER TO DANIEL MILLS ON 5/08/2014 AT 1603 EDT * * *

The emergency sirens have been repaired and are functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).

ENS 5006227 April 2014 17:44:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

The Technical Support Center (TSC) cooling system is not operating properly. The temperature of the TSC is currently 80 degrees F. The TSC is still capable of being pressurized. If needed, facilities in the Admin building are available for use as the back-up TSC. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1133 EDT ON 04/28/14 FROM SHAUGHN RICE TO S. SANDIN * * *

TSC Ventilation (VH) System is out-of-service. TSC is not capable of being pressurized, filtered or cooled. This is planned maintenance for work to repair leak reported on 04/27/14. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (King).

ENS 499913 April 2014 02:44:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn Tuesday, April 1, 2014, while performing planned inspections of Reactor Coolant System piping welds, two flaw indications were identified on a 1.5 inch Safety Injection Line connection to the Reactor Coolant System piping. On Wednesday, April 2, 2014, after confirmatory inspections and evaluation, one of the two flaw indications was determined to not meet the acceptance criteria specified in ASME Code Section XI. As such, this indication is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as a degraded condition. A repair plan is being developed. There is no impact on current Unit 2 refueling operations. This condition and repair have no impact to the health and safety of the public or employees. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 4953814 November 2013 16:03:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

On November 14, 2013, at 1313 Eastern Standard Time, Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% power due to indications of (four) dropped control rods. This manual reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The cause of the dropped rods is not confirmed at this time, but may be related to maintenance in a Rod Control Power Cabinet ongoing at the time of the event. The Operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized Unit 1 in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip and all plant systems operated as designed. The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system (1A and 1B motor-driven pumps) was manually started for steam generator level control following reactor trip. The start of the AFW system is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid system actuation. Decay heat is being removed via the steam generators (via steam dumps to the main condenser). This event does not impact public health and safety. Unit 2 was not affected by this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM WARREN MOORE TO DANIEL MILLS ON 11/18/13 AT 0950 EST * * *
A subsequent licensee evaluation determined that there were ten dropped control rods. 

Notified the R1DO (Desai).

ENS 4915729 June 2013 03:12:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

Notification is to be made to an offsite agency: North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources (NCDENR). Due to heavy rains on site, a holdup pond overflowed to the Catawba River. Holdup pond overflow included chemicals (Rotenone) used to treat macro fouling in the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond. Notification to NCDENR will be made by telephone Saturday morning 6/29/13. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 7/2/13 AT 1139 EDT FROM BRENT BARE TO DONG PARK * * *

Due to continued rains on site, the holdup pond continues to overflow to the Catawba River. The overflow includes a new chemical, Potassium Permanganate, used to neutralize the Rotenone treatment of the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond. This new chemical has the potential to initially turn water purple, which is normal when applied. The North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources (NCDENR) has been updated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Freeman).

ENS 4877521 February 2013 12:49:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0957 EST on 02/21/13, Unit 1 Reactor automatically tripped from 100% power, due to a turbine trip. The turbine trip was caused by a loss of both main feedwater (MFW) pumps. The 1A motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump auto started to feed the "A" and "B" Steam Generators (S/G). The 1B motor driven AFW pump was unavailable due to planned maintenance, so the turbine driven AFW pump was manually started to feed the "C" and "D" S/Gs. The reactor trip was uncomplicated. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat removal is to the main condenser via the turbine bypass valves. There was no primary to secondary leakage. Electrical buses are being supplied via offsite power. Steam generator levels are being returned to normal and MFW has been reset and is available. All other plant systems functioned as designed during and after the reactor trip. There is no impact on Unit 2. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public. The loss of the MFW pumps is still under investigation. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4870328 January 2013 17:38:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA fire was reported within the Owner Controlled Area but outside the Protected Area. The fire was located in an air conditioning unit for a small building. The fire was extinguished within 15 minutes by the offsite fire department. The plant did not sustain any damage. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 4867917 January 2013 16:27:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopFailure of Unit 2 McGuire switchyard Power Circuit Breaker (PCB) 55 resulted in a fire and damage to the PCB. PCB 55 and the McGuire switchyard are located outside of the protected area. The fire was confined to the PCB only and extinguished by offsite municipal fire department in 33 minutes. This breaker affects the offsite transmission supply to Rock Springs and South Mountain. The Unit 2 plant breakers connecting offsite to onsite power were not affected and remain in service. The failure of PCB 55 did not damage any plant equipment nor did this event cause a plant transient. An estimated 50 gallons of oil has spilled from the damaged equipment which is contained to the immediate area. The spilled oil cleanup efforts are underway at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed.
ENS 485502 December 2012 14:06:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

The Unit-2 AMSAC (Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigation Actuation Circuitry) actuation generated a Unit-2 turbine trip signal. The Unit-2 turbine was already tripped, but the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater and 2B Nuclear Service Water pump started. AMSAC actuation occurred during calibration of AMSAC actuation pressure switches. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM TIM JOHNSON TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/11/12 AT 1550 EST * * *

This notification retracts an eight (8) hour notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) which was made December 2, 2012 and documented as NRC Event Notification (EN) # 48550. The December 2, 2012 actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System was initially reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system as listed in paragraph 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6). McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) has subsequently determined that the actuation signal, which was caused by a test signal during calibration of the AMSAC (Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigation Actuation Circuitry) actuation pressure switches, constitutes an invalid actuation as described in Revision 2 of NUREG-1022 (Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73). Specifically, valid actuations result from signals initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function of the system. A test signal is not representative of an actual plant condition and was therefore an invalid actuation signal and does not meet the NRC 8-hour reporting criteria under paragraph 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6). In addition to retracting the 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6) notification, MNS is notifying the NRC Operations Center that the December 2, 2012 event met the reporting criteria specified in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). Specifically, an invalid actuation of the auxiliary feed water system occurred while the systems was in service. The event did not involve an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor was critical; therefore, MNS is opting to notify the NRC Operations Center within 60 days in lieu of a 60 day written licensee Event Report (LER), as allowed by 10CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). This notification satisfies 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) reporting requirements in lieu of a written LER. The 2A and 2B trains of the auxiliary feed water were actuated by an invalid signal. Each train's actuation was complete and systems operated as designed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Sykes).

ENS 485492 December 2012 03:05:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) caused a Unit 2 turbine trip with reactor power at 31%. The 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater pumps automatically started. The 2B Nuclear Service Water pump started as a result of 2B Auxiliary Feedwater pump automatically starting. The Main Feedwater Regulating valves and the Main Feedwater Bypass valves were in the correct position for corresponding power level and turbine inlet pressure, but AMSAC actuated earlier than design (290 psig vs. 360 psig). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4846231 October 2012 13:34:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis non-emergency event report is being made per 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(ii) which requires reporting events that occurred within three years of the date of discovery. Based on operating experience, Engineering personnel reviewed past maintenance activities involving the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system (VH system) and identified four (4) occasions between August 2009 and October 2012 (three years) where the VH system functions could not have been restored within the required facility activation time. The specific instances have been documented in our corrective action program. If an emergency had been declared during these period and TSC ERO activation was required, the TSC would have been staffed and activated unless the TSC came uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff was necessary, the Station Emergency Coordinator would relocate the staff to the alternate TSC location. Practices and processes have been revised to improve control of TSC maintenance activities and to improve facility availability going forward. In addition, site reporting guidance has been revised to assure timely reporting for these types of events if required. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since the maintenance activities affected an Emergency Response Facility. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4844325 October 2012 14:17:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn September 29, 2012, McGuire Nuclear Station experienced an inadvertent alignment of the Nuclear Service Water (RN) system suction and discharge to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP). This event occurred when a Unit 2 'B' Train blackout signal was inadvertently generated as a result of a tagging restoration/coordination error. This error resulted in the Unit 2 Train 'B' load sequencer sensing an under-voltage condition on 4160V Essential Switchgear 2ETB, which was de-energized at the time for maintenance activities. Further evaluation determined that the blackout signal which automatically aligned RN to the SNSWP was not in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of a blackout signal or the SNSWP safety function. Since alignment of RN to the SNSWP was not in response to a valid signal, this represented an invalid actuation reportable per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). As allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), McGuire is providing a telephone notification of this invalid actuation in lieu of submitting a written LER. The following additional information is being provided as part of the telephone notification of this event: 'B' Train of RN actuated to align Unit 1 and Unit 2 RN to the SNSWP. 'B' Train actuation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 RN to the SNSWP functioned successfully and was complete. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 482765 September 2012 10:54:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis (report) is being issued in advance of a planned activity. Today, 9/5/2012, the (TSC) Technical Support Center Emergency Ventilation System will be removed from service to support preventative maintenance activities. The Emergency Ventilation System will not be available and cannot be restored within the time period (75 minutes) required to staff and activate the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). This work is scheduled to complete today. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological conditions, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 482662 September 2012 08:52:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAs part of preparation for the upcoming Democratic National Convention (DNC), contingencies are in place associated with the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations. The common EOF is located in Charlotte, NC. Because of the potential for event security to delay staffing of the facility within the prescribed time frame, Duke Energy is implementing its business continuity plan for the EOF during the period from 12:00 PM (noon) on September 2nd until 24:00 (midnight) on September 6th. If a declared emergency were to occur at McGuire Nuclear Station, the EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location. This facility is used as a backup location for the Catawba TSC as specified in station procedures. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii), and in accordance with NUREG-1022, Revision 2, as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4818513 August 2012 19:10:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopDuke Energy notified the NC Wildlife Resource Commission of dead catfish in the vicinity of the McGuire low level intake. Notification was made on 8/13/12 at 1630 EDT. In addition, the NC Dept. of Environment and Natural Resources will be notified. The dead fish are suspected to have been caused by increasing lake temperature and decreased oxygen levels, which is common during the late summer. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
ENS 4814430 July 2012 14:29:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopDuke Energy notified the NC Wildlife Resource Commission of dead striped bass in the vicinity of the McGuire low level intake. Notification was made 7/30/12 at 1350 EDT. In addition, the NC Dept. of Environment and Natural Resources will be notified. Dead fish are suspected to have been caused by increasing lake temperature and decreased oxygen levels, which is common during the late summer. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified both R2DO (Franke).
ENS 4785419 April 2012 22:07:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn March 22, 2012, McGuire Nuclear Station notified the NRC of a condition which could result in fire induced spurious operation of the block valves for the Unit 2 Steam Generator (SG) Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs). This potential condition could adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown of Unit 2. This represented a condition reportable as per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Reference Event #47764 (for Unit-2). In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(c)(2)(i), McGuire is reporting results of ensuing cause and extent of condition evaluation of Event #47764, which has identified a similar condition on McGuire Unit 1. This condition could result in a fire induced spurious operation of the block valves for the Unit 1 SG PORVs. This spurious operation could potentially damage these valves and render them inoperable. Since these valves are unisolable, they could not be repaired to allow the Unit 1 SGs to be used for Unit cool down if needed. This potential condition could adversely affect the ability of the plant to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown of Unit 1. This represents a condition reportable as per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This potential condition is mitigated by existing compensatory measures (i.e. fire watches) which have been in place as part of McGuire's transition to NFPA 805. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4776422 March 2012 22:53:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn February 28, 2005, Duke Energy notified the NRC of McGuire Nuclear Station's (MNS) intent to adopt NFPA 805 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c). On April 18, 2006, Duke Energy notified the NRC that MNS had begun the process of transitioning to NFPA 805. For licensees transitioning to NFPA 805, assuming specific criteria are met, the NRC will exercise enforcement discretion for Appendix R non-compliances identified during the transition process and for existing Appendix R non-compliances that could reasonably be corrected under 10 CFR 50.48(c). As per NRC guidance and policy, enforcement discretion does not relieve the licensee of the requirement to make a required report to the NRC. As part of the NFPA 805 transition process, MNS has identified Appendix R related noncompliances which are being evaluated for appropriate dispositioning under NFPA 805. The evaluation of the non-compliances has recently identified a condition which could result in fire induced spurious operation of the block valves for the Unit 2 Steam Generator (SG) Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs). This spurious operation could potentially damage these valves and render them inoperable. Since these valves are unisolable, they could not be repaired to allow the Unit 2 SGs to be used for Unit cool down if needed. This potential condition could adversely affect the ability of the plant to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown of Unit 2. This represents a condition reportable as per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This potential condition is mitigated by existing compensatory measures (i.e. fire watches) which have been in place as part of the NFPA 805 transition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4768923 February 2012 01:29:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOffsite notification to law enforcement agencies was made by the licensee due to an individual making threats against personnel and security at the site. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
ENS 4767317 February 2012 14:04:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn 02/17/12, McGuire Environmental Management notified the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources located in Mooresville, NC of a failed toxicity test on our waste water discharge point 002 (WC Pond). This test is required quarterly by our NPDES (wastewater) Permit. Discharge was stopped yesterday (02/16/12) afternoon and we are currently pulling toxicity tests on the WC Pond and Initial Holdup Pond to determine if we still have toxicity. No WC Pond release will occur until toxicity results are known to be within acceptable limits. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 475651 January 2012 05:00:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt approximately 0335 EST security observed an unauthorized individual climb over the owner controlled area fence. Site security responded and contacted local law enforcement. At 0406 EST, the site declared a Notice of Unusual Event. After turning the individual over to law enforcement and conducting a complete check of the area, the Unusual Event was terminated at 0502 EST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4722230 August 2011 14:15:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn April 16, 2011, a suspected buried pipe leak was identified in the plant yard. Subsequent investigation revealed that the source of the water was a leak in the Unit 1 Condenser Circulation Water (RC) intake pipe. In order to perform a repair, the ground in the vicinity of the pipe, including the toe of the dike berm, required excavation. McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) site personnel recognized that excavating into the dike would require Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) involvement. Duke Hydro was contacted, and confirmed that the dike across the MNS intake is an extension of the Cowans Ford Dam and would require FERC authorization to dig into it. On the morning of April 20, 2011, Duke Hydro personnel contacted the FERC engineer assigned to Duke Energy's Cowans Ford Hydroelectric Development to seek FERC authorization for the excavation. Duke Hydro hosted a conference call later that same morning between FERC's Atlanta Regional Office and MNS site personnel to discuss the details of the situation and planned repairs. FERC later dispatched their personnel to the site to observe the repair effort. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) requires a 4-hour notification to be made for any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on- Although a phone call to an outside government agency (FERC) was made, Duke Energy made the decision at the time to not make a 4-hour notification to the NRC. This decision was based on the belief that 1) the RC leak and impact on the dike had no safety significance, 2) there were no concerns regarding protection of the environment, and 3) the situation did not involve an on-site fatality or an inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials. However, based upon how the matter was characterized in discussions between NRC and FERC, the NRC is not in agreement with the Duke Energy position. Therefore, the purpose of this phone call is to provide the necessary 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) notification retroactively.
ENS 4710929 July 2011 17:35:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopDuke Energy Scientific Services group notified the NC (North Carolina) Wildlife Resources Commission that we (Duke Energy) had identified some striper fish mortalities in and around Cowan's Ford Dam on Lake Norman. We also notified North Carolina Department of Environmental and Natural Resources in Mooresville, N.C. about the Striper mortalities. (Duke Energy personnel) collected 49 stripers in various stages of decay today (Friday, 7-29-2011). The fish collected were around the Cowan's Ford Dam and up to 1 mile North of Darn on Lake Norman. The Duke Energy Scientific Services group representative also notified the NC Wildlife Resources Commission that the McGuire Nuclear Station had been operating their Low Level Intake (LLI) Pumps to support compliance with our NPDES Permit average monthly temperature limit of 99 degrees Fahrenheit. July has been unusually hot and plant management has felt the need to run the LLI approximately 5 days to achieve compliance with our temperature limit. The LLI Pumps were secured July 25th at 2015. During the operation of the LLI pumps, Duke Energy's Scientific Services group was monitoring water quality and fish in the lake via the following activities. 1) Around-the-clock monitoring of fish behavior in the immediate vicinity of the LLI via a Didson Camera. The Didson Camera sits atop the LLI (25 meters deep) and records hourly video of areas both above the LLI and in front of the LLI. These videos are monitored remotely by (personnel) throughout the day and night. 2) Periodic water quality monitoring including dissolved oxygen and temperature profiles at every meter to the bottom of the lake. These profiles occur in the fore bay and at multiple locations up the lake channel. 3) Surveys for dead striped bass by boat up the major tributaries of the lake. Lengths, weights and condition of both dead and dying stripers are recorded before disposing of them. 4) Hourly MNS discharge temperature monitoring. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4707820 July 2011 17:30:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopDuke Energy Scientific Services group representative notified the NC Wildlife Resources Commission at 1555 hours that MNS was operating their LLI Pumps to maintain discharge temperatures within the NPDES permit average monthly temperature limit. Based on the elevated lake temperatures, action to align circulating water to the LLI (cooler water) is necessary to prevent exceeding discharge temperature limits. Operation of the LLI pumps is sometimes needed during this time of year to comply with the water permit. Substantial effort is taken to avoid this alignment due to the potential to accelerate the natural phenomenon of oxygen depletion in the lower depths of Lake Norman that occurs as water temperature increases. The normal seasonal oxygen level changes can stress the fish population in that depth of the lake. During the operation of the LLI pumps, Duke Energy's Scientific Services group monitors water quality and fish in the lake via the following activities, 1) Hydro acoustic surveys of the Cowan's Ford Dam fore-bay both immediate to the dam and also an approximate 2 mile run up the Catawba River channel. 2) Monitoring of fish behavior in the immediate vicinity of the LLI. A DIDSON camera sits atop the LLI (25 meter deep). 3) Water quality monitoring including dissolved oxygen and temperature profiles at every meter to the bottom of the lake. These profiles occur in the fore-bay and at multiple locations up the channel. 4) Hourly MNS discharge temperature monitoring. These activities will continue to be exercised until the LLI pumps are turned off or the natural cycle of oxygen depletion has ended. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.