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At 1710 EDT on June 11, 2021, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated at Plant Hatch Unit 1. Technical Specification Condition 3.4.4.B unidentified LEAKAGE increase not within limits, was entered due to a greater than 2 gpm increase in unidentified LEAKAGE within the previous 24 hour period in MODE 1. This specification was entered on June 11, 2021, at 1615 EDT with a REQUIRED ACTION to restore leakage increase within limits within 4 hours. This REQUIRED ACTION could not be completed within the COMPLETION TIME; therefore, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated, and this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * RETRACTION ON 6/17/2021 AT 1309 FROM JASON BUTLER TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

Upon further review of the leakage rates, it was determined that at 1900 EDT on 6/11/2021 the drywell floor drain unidentified leakage increased greater than 2 gpm within the previous 24 hours while in MODE 1. Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.4.B was entered to reduce leakage increase to within limits within 4 hours. At 2000 EDT on 6/11/2021 unidentified leakage was reduced below the 2 gpm increase within the previous 24 hours due to actions taken to lower reactor power and pressure. Therefore, the TS required shutdown per TS 3.4.4.C was not applicable. Thus Event Report 55303 is being retracted. The NRC resident has been notified of the retraction. Notified R2DO (Miller).

Plant Hatch declared a notification of unusual event. Subsequent investigation determined the paraphernalia was related to plant drills. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1727 EST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA, NICC, and NNSA (via e-mail).

• * * RETRACTION FROM KENNETH HUNTER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ AT 1829 EST ON 2/1/2017 * * *

The event was retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Shakur), NSIR (Holian), IRD MOC (Gott), DHS SWO, FEMA, NICC, and NNSA (via e-mail).

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in four Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments. In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, RCIC (1E51C001) (Path 1) components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1203. The postulated failure described above impacts HPCI (1E41C001) (Path 2) operation. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method for high pressure injection that remains free of fire damage for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203. In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 1E 4160 Kv (1R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205. In the Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 2205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 2E 4160 Kv (2R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2205. In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same three options for Torus Water Temperature indication (1T48R072, 1T47R611 or 1T47R612). Only one of these three components is required to succeed, however, all are impacted by the postulated fire. Thus, there is no Unit 1 Torus Water Temperature Indication available for a fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. CR 10079009, 10079019, 10079022, 10079025 The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1634 EDT ON 6/17/2015 * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in two Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments. 1) In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 1 RCIC components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1105. The postulated failure would impact Path 2 (HPCI) operation. Therefore, in the current analysis for the credited safe shutdown method for high pressure injection may be affected for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1105. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1105. 2) In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same two options for Torus Water Level Indication: 2T48-R622A and 2T48-R622B. Only one of these two components is required to succeed, however both would be impacted by a postulated fire in Fire Area 2104. Consequently, both credited paths of Unit 2 Torus Water Level Indication could potentially be affected due to a fire in Fire Area 2104. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2104. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10084753, CR 10084757. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (HAAG).

• * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/24/15 AT 2114 EDT * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Generator Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in five Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve A, 1E11-F015A, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop A in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1404. RHR Loop B is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. 3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1412 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1412. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1412. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. 4) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2404. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. 5) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10088142 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (O'Donohue).

• * * UPDATE AT 1739 EDT ON 08/13/15 FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Control Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Diesel Building MCC 1C, 1R24-S027, to remain energized. Further analysis has shown that an inter-cable hot short between two conductors could cause the feeder breaker to this MCC to trip. This MCC is required to support the operation of Diesel Generator 1C, which is a credited power source in the Safe Shutdown analysis for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. CR 10108999. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Nease).

• * * UPDATE AT 1331 EDT ON 08/25/15 FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48c (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is Category 1 barrier impairment. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Station Battery Chargers 1D, 1E, and 1F to remain energized. These chargers support 125V DC Switchgear 1B which is the credited DC Switchgear for Unit 1 Path 2 Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Station Battery Chargers 2D, 2E, and 2F to remain energized. These chargers support 125V DC Switchgear 2B which is the credited DC Switchgear for Unit 2 Path 2 Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.

CR 10113740, CR 10113745 The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Rose).

• * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1717 EDT ON 8/28/2015 * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Turbine Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown (SSD) conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1105 is assessed to impact cables which are required for HPCI Steam Supply Isolation MOV, 1E41-F002, to remain open. This valve is required open in support of HPCI (SSD Path 2), which is the credited form of high pressure injection in this fire area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1105. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1104 is assessed to impact a cable required for the RCIC Vacuum Breaker Isolation MOV, 1E51-F105, to remain open. This valve is required open to ensure operability of the RCIC turbine if RCIC is required to stop and restart. Failure of this valve to remain open could cause a siphon that would impact the operability of RCIC, and thus disable Safe Shutdown Path 1 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1104. In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Reactor Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203 is assessed to impact a cable required for HPCI Steam Supply Isolation MOV, 1E41-F002, to remain open. This valve is required open to ensure steam flow to the HPCI turbine. Failure of this valve to remain open would isolate steam to the HPCI turbine, which would disable HPCI, and thus disable Safe Shutdown Path 2 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2203 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Outboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F017B, to remain open. This valve is required open to support RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited lineup for Path 2 Safe Shutdown Decay Heat Removal. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2203. 3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2203 is assessed to impact cables required for HPCI Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve, 2E41-F104, to remain open. This valve is required open in support of Safe Shutdown Path 2 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2203. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10115432, CR10115473, CR10115436, CR10115446, CR10115444 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Rose).

• * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY GUY GRIFFIS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1815 EDT ON 09/04/2015 * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Control Building and Reactor Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in Fire Area's where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown (SSD) conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0024 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Torus Suction Valve, 1E11-F065B to remain open. This valve is required to remain open in support of LPCI train B which is credited for Unit 1 Safe Shutdown in the event that the RPV has spuriously depressurized and low pressure inventory control is performed from the remote shutdown panel. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0024. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0024 is assessed to impact a cable required for Torus Suction Valve, 2E11-F065B to remain open. This valve is required to remain open in support of LPCI train B which is credited for Unit 2 Safe Shutdown in the event that the RPV has spuriously depressurized and low pressure inventory control is performed from the remote shutdown panel. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0024. 3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact all three Air Handling Units; 1Z41-B003A, 1Z41-B003B, and 1Z41-B003C. The fire impacts a cable required for MCC 1C, 1R23-S003 to remain energized. This MCC supports the operation of Air Handling Unit B, 1Z41-B003B which is required in support of Main Control Room HVAC. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014. 4) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0031 is assessed to impact all three Air Handling Units; 1Z41-B003A, 1Z41-B003B, and 1Z41-B003C. These AHUs are required in support of MCR HVAC. MCR HVAC was not required in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report, and thus these failures were not evaluated in this fire area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0031. 5) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2014 is assessed to impact a cable required for Station Battery Chargers 2A (2R42-S026) 2B (2R42-S027) and 2C (2R42-S028) to remain energized. These chargers support 125 VDC Switchgear 2A (2R22-S016), which is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 1 Safe Shutdown. Path 2 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2014. 6) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2014 is assessed to impact a cable required for 125 VDC Switchgear 2A (2R22-S016) to remain energized. This is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 1 Safe Shutdown. Path 2 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2014. 7) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact cables required for Station Battery Chargers 1D (1R42-S029), 1E (1R42-S030), and 1F (1R42-S031) to remain energized. These chargers support 125VDC Switchgear 1B (1R22-S017) which is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 2 Safe Shutdown. Path 1 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10118312, CR 10118328, CR10118333, CR10118338, CR10118345 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour)

During an inspection of a fire penetration between Fire Area 1404, Switchgear Room 1G and Fire Area 1408, Switchgear Room 1F in the diesel generator building, the penetration was determined to be non-functional as a 3 hour fire barrier. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were established in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in the fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition can be repaired. (Condition report No.) CR904013 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector

• * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY KENNY HUNTER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0915 EST ON 12/30/2014 * * *

Further investigation revealed that after removing the outermost two inches of loose silicone foam material, and taking additional measurements there remained adequate silicone foam material to provide 10 inches of silicone foam sealing the penetration. Plant design shows that the wall in question is 18 inches thick and also that 9 inches of silicone foam is required in the penetration in order maintain a 3 hour fire rating for the wall/penetration. Since there is adequate foam in the penetration to maintain the 3 hour fire rating the penetration is fully functional. Based on this information, this penetration in its 'as found' state does NOT represent a condition that seriously degrades a principal safety barrier. As such this condition has been determined to no longer meet reporting requirement 10CFR50.72(b)(3) and is therefore NOT reportable. Based on this information the previous notification for Event 50662 is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bartley)

On November 2, 2014 EST, the bus providing power to the Health Physics emergency HVAC system for climate control tripped unexpectedly and has been out of service for greater than 30 minutes. The Health Physics emergency HVAC system for climate control is required for functionality of the Operations Support Center (OSC), which is a required emergency response facility (ERF). Actions to determine the cause of loss of 1R24-S030 Load Center and to return ERF to functional status are in progress with high priority. In the interim, the backup OSC remains fully functional and capable of providing the required support as defined in the Hatch Emergency Plan and emergency implementing procedures. This notification is being made in accordance with the plant's Technical Requirements Manual Specifications to make the notification within 8 hours in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the unplanned loss of an emergency response facility. An update will be provided once the OSC has been restored to normal operation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2126 EST ON 11/2/14 * * *

Power was restored to the 1R24-S030 Load Center at 1955 EST. At 2038 EST, power to the Health Physics emergency HVAC system was restored. The OSC was returned to service at 2120 EST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

• * * RETRACTION FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1641 EST on 12/31/14 * * *

In accordance with NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Supplement 1, the NRC endorsed NEI 13-01, 'Reportable Action Levels for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities,' such that 'if a licensee has a 'backup ERF' that is capable of performing the functions of the primary facility, the licensee's emergency assessment capability is not significantly impaired if the primary facility is not available.' Based on this information this condition is not reportable. Although NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, Supplement 1 did not require an event notification report to be made, an initial notification was generated based on requirements within licensee control documents. These documents have been updated to reflect the guidance provided in the supplement to NUREG 1022. This report is therefore being retracted in accordance with NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, Supplement 1 since a backup ERF remained fully functional and capable of providing the required support during the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Hopper).

• * * UPDATE ON 05/26/15 AT 1745 EDT FROM SCOTT BRITT TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147(foot) elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional: - Gaps were identified around cables in the foam cable tray penetration seal for penetration 1Z43H006F in the floor of the Cable Spreading Room (separating Fire Areas 0024A and 1104). The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10074859 The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2017 EDT ON 6/1/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, using more intrusive tools and methods, fire barriers in the Control Building El. 112 (foot) were found not to meet acceptance criteria. The fire protection engineering staff has examined the situations and recommends that these conditions be considered NON-FUNCTIONAL. - An issue was identified with the wall separating the el. 112 (foot) Control Building Working Floor, Fire Area (FA) 0001 from the Station Battery Room 1B, FA 1005. - An issue was identified with the wall separating the Station Battery Room 2A, Fire Area (FA) 2004 from the Station Battery Room 2B, FA 2005, on el. 112 (foot). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10077573 & 10077574. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO(O'Donohue).

• * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DONG PARK AT 1704 EDT ON 6/2/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, using more intrusive tools and methods, fire barriers in the Control Building El. 112 (foot) were found not to meet acceptance criteria. The fire protection engineering staff has examined the situations and recommends that these conditions be considered NON-FUNCTIONAL: - Issues were identified with the wall separating the el. 112 (foot) Control Building Working Floor, Fire Area (FA) 0001 from the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room, FA 1008. The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10078011. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Rose).

• * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DONG PARK AT 1501 EDT ON 6/3/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, using more intrusive tools and methods, fire barriers in the Control Building El. 112 (foot) were found not to meet acceptance criteria. The fire protection engineering staff has examined the situations and recommends that these conditions be considered NON-FUNCTIONAL: - Issues were identified with the wall separating the el. 112 (foot) Control Building U2 Water Analysis Room, Fire Area (FA) 2006 from the Control Building East Corridor, FA 0007 The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10078561. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Rose).

During a fire inspection activity involving inspection of fire walls that serve as Appendix R barriers, degradation of some fire walls was identified that was sufficient to prevent these walls from meeting Appendix R requirements as 3-hour fire barriers. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on the affected unit could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be corrected. Condition Reports: 850802, 850819 In addition to automatic fire protection features, the licensee has posted fire watches as a compensatory measure. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1814 EST ON 11/24/2014 * * *

As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1023 - RPS MG Set Room and Fire Area 1015 - Annunciator Room. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. Condition Report: 898908. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

• * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1758 EST ON 11/25/2014 * * *

As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1016 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1C and Fire Area 1017 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1D. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ernstes).

• * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1706 EST ON 12/4/2014 * * *

As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, additional conditions were identified involving multiple fire barriers in the control building that affected both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and Unit 2 based on the respective inspection results. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Freeman).

• * * UPDATE AT 1842 EST ON 12/12/2014 FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls and associated penetrations for conditions similar to those reported on 08/07/2014. During this inspection, nonconformances of multiple fire barriers were identified that bring into question the functionality of the affected fire barriers that can compromise safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 based on the respective inspection results. Since additional time is required to further evaluate each nonconformance to conclusively determine if the nonconformance is sufficient to consider the barrier nonfunctional, interim conservative fire actions were taken by considering these fire barriers as nonfunctional. Based on this conservative conclusion, in the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations and fire walls in most of these same fire areas and will remain in place until the barrier(s) are repaired. Additional fire actions were taken as required to address the additional fire areas identified. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. Unit 1 is entering a planned outage due to unrelated activities. Condition Report: 10000607 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Desai).

• * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2315 EST ON 1/15/2015 * * *

As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the conditions identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity was performed of a fire wall for conditions similar to those reported on 12/12/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1008 - Unit 1 AC Inverter Room and Fire Area 0001 to consider the barrier nonfunctional. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. Condition Report: 10013077 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Musser).

• * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA AT 2025 EST ON 1/21/2015 * * *

During review and closeout of fire barrier and penetration seals work orders and surveillance procedures performed as part of the 'extent of condition' inspection activity initially described in Event # 50351, the following conditions were identified that in the event of a postulated fire in the respective fire areas listed both safe shutdown paths could be compromised.

Unit 2 Control Bldg. el. 130', gap in the grout around conduit penetration between fire areas 2013 and 2015 Unit 1 Reactor Bldg. el. 130', open conduit between fire areas 1203C and 1105 Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in the Unit 2 fire area and will remain in place until the affected barrier areas are repaired. Compensatory measures were established for the Unit 1 areas and will remain in place until the affected barriers areas are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. Subsequent similar condition(s) found when performing remaining inspections that meet the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

Condition Report 10015417 Condition Report 10015437 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

• * * UPDATE FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1714 EST ON 2/4/15 * * *

During the review of fire barrier surveillance procedures performed as part of the 'extent of condition' inspection activity for the event initially identified in EN# 50351, some degradation was observed on the east wall of fire area 2006. These nonconforming issues observed on the affected fire wall were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Therefore, in the event of a postulated fire for the affected area, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 2 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this, and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements, will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10021623 Notified R2DO (HAAG).

• * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1823 EST ON 2/18/15 * * *

During performance of work package closeouts to support the 'extent of condition' inspection activity for the event initially identified in EN# 50351, the following fire barriers were identified as failing to meet the procedure acceptance criteria: - Three penetrations separating Unit 1 Fire Areas 1013 and 0040 - A fire wall deficiency in the wall separating Unit 1 Fire Areas 1015 and 1013 These nonconforming issues observed on the affected penetrations and fire wall were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Therefore, in the event of a postulated fire for the affected area, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10028364 CR 10028366 The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Rose).

• * * UPDATE AT 2035 EST ON 02/25/15 FROM SCOTT BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

During the review and closeout of a work package performed as part of the 'extent of condition' for the inspection activity initially described in EN #50351, a fire penetration seal was identified as failing to meet the procedure acceptance criteria. This penetration seal is located in the 2C Diesel Generator (DG) room and passes between Fire Area 2407 and 2408. The nonconforming issue observed on the affected penetration was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were established for the Unit 2 Areas and will remain in place until the affected barriers areas are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10032202 The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour).

• * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2000 EST ON 3/4/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, two deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - Small imperfections and a hole through Penetration 1Z43-H116C that passes between Fire Area 1101G (Unit 1 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Room) and Fire Area 1006 (Unit 1 Water Analysis Room), and - Gaps in a civil/architectural joint at the top of the south wall leading from Fire Area 1006 (Unit 1 Water Analysis Room) to Fire Area 0007A (East Corridor in the Control Bldg.). These nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10035730 The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes).

• * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DANIEL MILLS AT 2047 EDT ON 3/16/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - Imperfections in three penetration seals (2Z43-H037C, 2Z43-H038C, and 2Z43-H177C) located in the 2A Battery Room separating Unit 2 Fire Areas 2004 and 2005 - Imperfections in fire penetration seal 2Z43-H644C located in the U2 Water Analysis Room separating Fire Area 2006 and 0007A - Imperfections in the grout between two tiers of concrete masonry wall and at the intersection of the walls in the upper northeast corner of the U2 Water Analysis Room separating Fire Areas 2006 and 0007A The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10041392, CR 10041394, and CR 10041397 The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer)

• * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1619 EDT ON 3/17/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, a fire penetration seal was observed to contain imperfections that did not meet acceptance criteria. Penetration seal 1Z43H542C is located between the U1 Corridor, Fire Area 0001, and the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room, Fire Area 1008, in the Unit 1 Control Building. The nonconforming issue observed on the affected penetration was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until all associated non-functional fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing and this, and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements, will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10041766 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).

• * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1648 EDT ON 3/18/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - Gap in the concrete masonry wall at penetration seal 1Z43-H547C located between the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room (Fire Area 1008) and the Unit 1 Corridor (Fire Area 0001) - Gap in the annulus around the 2 inch continuous run penetration seal located between the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room (Fire Area 1008) and the Unit 1 Corridor (Fire Area 0001) - Gap in penetration seal 1Z43-H059C located between the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room (Fire Area 1008) and the Unit 1 Corridor (Fire Area 0001) The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10042532; CR 10042530; CR 10042526 The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).

• * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1814 EDT ON 3/31/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, a fire wall was observed to contain a gap behind a 3 inch square plate attached to the thru-bolt anchor that did not meet acceptance criteria and caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. The affected fire barrier is located between the U2 RPS MG Set Room (Fire Area 2013) and the U2 Annunciator Room (Fire Area 2015). The nonconforming issue observed on the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until all associated non-functional fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10048449 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Walker).

• * * UPDATE FROM KEN HUNTER TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/13/15 AT 1722 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - Gap around penetration 1Z43H805D located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1D (Fire Area 1017) and the Unit 1 Transformer Room (Fire Area 1019). - Gaps in a fire barrier around a unistrut, below penetration 1Z43H012D, that are approximately 7 deep and into the CMU core located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1B (Fire Area 1020) and the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (Fire Area 0014K) - Gap in the top corner of the wall, above 1Z43H842D that protrudes into the CMU approximately 7 deep located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1B (Fire Area 1020) and the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (Fire Area 0014K) - Two anchor bolt holes east of penetration 1Z43H810D located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1B (Fire Area 1020) and the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1D (Fire Area 1017) The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Heissierer).

• * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO CHARLES TEAL ON 04/14/15 AT 1728 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - A 1/16" wide x 4" long x 5" deep gap was identified at the top of the wall, above penetration 1Z43H646D, in the west wall in Unit 1 East 600V Switchgear Room (separating Fire Area 1017 and Fire Area 1016). - A 1/16" wide x 4" long x 7" deep gap was identified at the top of the wall, above penetration 1Z43H646D, in the east wall in the Unit 1 West 600V Switchgear Room (separating Fire Area 1016 and Fire Area 1017). - A �" wide x 2" long x 7" deep gap was identified at the top of penetration 1Z43H522D located between the Unit 1 West 600 V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 1016) and U1 East 600 V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 1017). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10055316; CR 10055377 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bartley).

• * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2000 EDT ON 4/16/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - A 1" wide x 2" long x 7" deep gap was identified at the top of penetration 1Z43H622D in the west wall of the Unit 1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0014K). - A 1/4" wide x 1/4" long x 7" deep gap was identified near a ground wire, above penetration 1Z43H595D, at the top of the east wall of the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room (separating Fire Area 1020 and Fire Area 1104). - A 3" wide x 1/4" tall x 7" deep gap was identified at penetration 1Z43H617D on the south wall of the Unit 1 Working Floor (separating Fire Area 0014K and Fire Area 1013). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10056548; CR 10056555; CR 10056582 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bartley).

• * * SEE EN #50998 FOR CONTINUATION OF UPDATES * * *

While investigating a Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) room instrument sump level high alarm, condensation was observed dripping out around the HPCI turbine shaft gland seals. A steady stream of water was also observed coming out of the governor end gland seal along with a slight leak coming from the coupling end. Observation revealed that leakage through the 'closed' steam admission valve (1E41-F001) was apparently resulting in water accumulation in the HPCI turbine. A blown fuse that prevented the associated HPCI exhaust drain pot from draining in conjunction with the leakage by the steam admission valve was determined to be sufficient to impact HPCI operability. Required actions were taken in accordance with the Technical Specifications. Efforts are underway to determine the actions needed to restore the HPCI system to operable status. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM JOHN SELLERS TO CHARLES TEAL AT 0154 EDT ON 5/2/14 * * *

HPCI has been restored to an Operable but degraded nonconforming condition. Fuses replaced and automatic functions restored. Leakage confirmed to not be excessive for this condition. Compensatory actions established. Restoration time 2345 EDT 5/1/14. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ayers).