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In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in four Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments. In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, RCIC (1E51C001) (Path 1) components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1203. The postulated failure described above impacts HPCI (1E41C001) (Path 2) operation. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method for high pressure injection that remains free of fire damage for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203. In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 1E 4160 Kv (1R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205. In the Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 2205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 2E 4160 Kv (2R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2205. In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same three options for Torus Water Temperature indication (1T48R072, 1T47R611 or 1T47R612). Only one of these three components is required to succeed, however, all are impacted by the postulated fire. Thus, there is no Unit 1 Torus Water Temperature Indication available for a fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. CR 10079009, 10079019, 10079022, 10079025 The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1634 EDT ON 6/17/2015 * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in two Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments. 1) In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 1 RCIC components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1105. The postulated failure would impact Path 2 (HPCI) operation. Therefore, in the current analysis for the credited safe shutdown method for high pressure injection may be affected for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1105. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1105. 2) In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same two options for Torus Water Level Indication: 2T48-R622A and 2T48-R622B. Only one of these two components is required to succeed, however both would be impacted by a postulated fire in Fire Area 2104. Consequently, both credited paths of Unit 2 Torus Water Level Indication could potentially be affected due to a fire in Fire Area 2104. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2104. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10084753, CR 10084757. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (HAAG).

• * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/24/15 AT 2114 EDT * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Generator Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in five Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve A, 1E11-F015A, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop A in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1404. RHR Loop B is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. 3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1412 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1412. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1412. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. 4) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2404. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. 5) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10088142 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (O'Donohue).

• * * UPDATE AT 1739 EDT ON 08/13/15 FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Control Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Diesel Building MCC 1C, 1R24-S027, to remain energized. Further analysis has shown that an inter-cable hot short between two conductors could cause the feeder breaker to this MCC to trip. This MCC is required to support the operation of Diesel Generator 1C, which is a credited power source in the Safe Shutdown analysis for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. CR 10108999. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Nease).

• * * UPDATE AT 1331 EDT ON 08/25/15 FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48c (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is Category 1 barrier impairment. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Station Battery Chargers 1D, 1E, and 1F to remain energized. These chargers support 125V DC Switchgear 1B which is the credited DC Switchgear for Unit 1 Path 2 Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Station Battery Chargers 2D, 2E, and 2F to remain energized. These chargers support 125V DC Switchgear 2B which is the credited DC Switchgear for Unit 2 Path 2 Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.

CR 10113740, CR 10113745 The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Rose).

• * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1717 EDT ON 8/28/2015 * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Turbine Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown (SSD) conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1105 is assessed to impact cables which are required for HPCI Steam Supply Isolation MOV, 1E41-F002, to remain open. This valve is required open in support of HPCI (SSD Path 2), which is the credited form of high pressure injection in this fire area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1105. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1104 is assessed to impact a cable required for the RCIC Vacuum Breaker Isolation MOV, 1E51-F105, to remain open. This valve is required open to ensure operability of the RCIC turbine if RCIC is required to stop and restart. Failure of this valve to remain open could cause a siphon that would impact the operability of RCIC, and thus disable Safe Shutdown Path 1 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1104. In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Reactor Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203 is assessed to impact a cable required for HPCI Steam Supply Isolation MOV, 1E41-F002, to remain open. This valve is required open to ensure steam flow to the HPCI turbine. Failure of this valve to remain open would isolate steam to the HPCI turbine, which would disable HPCI, and thus disable Safe Shutdown Path 2 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2203 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Outboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F017B, to remain open. This valve is required open to support RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited lineup for Path 2 Safe Shutdown Decay Heat Removal. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2203. 3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2203 is assessed to impact cables required for HPCI Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve, 2E41-F104, to remain open. This valve is required open in support of Safe Shutdown Path 2 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2203. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10115432, CR10115473, CR10115436, CR10115446, CR10115444 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Rose).

• * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY GUY GRIFFIS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1815 EDT ON 09/04/2015 * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Control Building and Reactor Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in Fire Area's where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown (SSD) conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0024 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Torus Suction Valve, 1E11-F065B to remain open. This valve is required to remain open in support of LPCI train B which is credited for Unit 1 Safe Shutdown in the event that the RPV has spuriously depressurized and low pressure inventory control is performed from the remote shutdown panel. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0024. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0024 is assessed to impact a cable required for Torus Suction Valve, 2E11-F065B to remain open. This valve is required to remain open in support of LPCI train B which is credited for Unit 2 Safe Shutdown in the event that the RPV has spuriously depressurized and low pressure inventory control is performed from the remote shutdown panel. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0024. 3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact all three Air Handling Units; 1Z41-B003A, 1Z41-B003B, and 1Z41-B003C. The fire impacts a cable required for MCC 1C, 1R23-S003 to remain energized. This MCC supports the operation of Air Handling Unit B, 1Z41-B003B which is required in support of Main Control Room HVAC. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014. 4) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0031 is assessed to impact all three Air Handling Units; 1Z41-B003A, 1Z41-B003B, and 1Z41-B003C. These AHUs are required in support of MCR HVAC. MCR HVAC was not required in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report, and thus these failures were not evaluated in this fire area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0031. 5) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2014 is assessed to impact a cable required for Station Battery Chargers 2A (2R42-S026) 2B (2R42-S027) and 2C (2R42-S028) to remain energized. These chargers support 125 VDC Switchgear 2A (2R22-S016), which is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 1 Safe Shutdown. Path 2 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2014. 6) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2014 is assessed to impact a cable required for 125 VDC Switchgear 2A (2R22-S016) to remain energized. This is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 1 Safe Shutdown. Path 2 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2014. 7) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact cables required for Station Battery Chargers 1D (1R42-S029), 1E (1R42-S030), and 1F (1R42-S031) to remain energized. These chargers support 125VDC Switchgear 1B (1R22-S017) which is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 2 Safe Shutdown. Path 1 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10118312, CR 10118328, CR10118333, CR10118338, CR10118345 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour)

During an inspection of a fire penetration between Fire Area 1404, Switchgear Room 1G and Fire Area 1408, Switchgear Room 1F in the diesel generator building, the penetration was determined to be non-functional as a 3 hour fire barrier. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were established in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in the fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition can be repaired. (Condition report No.) CR904013 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector

• * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY KENNY HUNTER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0915 EST ON 12/30/2014 * * *

Further investigation revealed that after removing the outermost two inches of loose silicone foam material, and taking additional measurements there remained adequate silicone foam material to provide 10 inches of silicone foam sealing the penetration. Plant design shows that the wall in question is 18 inches thick and also that 9 inches of silicone foam is required in the penetration in order maintain a 3 hour fire rating for the wall/penetration. Since there is adequate foam in the penetration to maintain the 3 hour fire rating the penetration is fully functional. Based on this information, this penetration in its 'as found' state does NOT represent a condition that seriously degrades a principal safety barrier. As such this condition has been determined to no longer meet reporting requirement 10CFR50.72(b)(3) and is therefore NOT reportable. Based on this information the previous notification for Event 50662 is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bartley)

• * * UPDATE FROM STEVE BRUNSON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/20/15 AT 2126 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H594D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020) - Near penetration 1Z43J837D, and approximately 12" south and above 1Z43H837D, gaps were observed in the mortar joint between CMU on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020) - A triangular gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H592D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020) - A gap 4" tall and 3" wide was found behind Turn Box TB1-1272 which covers penetrations 1Z43H590D, 1Z43H589D, 1Z43H588, and 1Z43H587D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020) - At the architectural joint between the vertical wall to the horizontal floor/ceiling assembly above door 1C-22, above and to the south of 1Z43H1105D, a gap was observed approximately 1/4" tall, 3" wide, and 6" deep on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway Foyer (separating Fire Area 1105 and Fire Area 0014K) - Gap between the grout and the conduit of penetration 1Z43H778D approximately 1/4" tall x 1.5" wide x 6" deep on the east wall of the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (separating Fire Area 0014K and Fire Area 1105) The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensure the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. CR 10058276; CR 10058278 The following deficiencies were also observed causing the affected penetrations to be considered nonfunctional: - A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H532D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 0014M) - A gap 1/8" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H780D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M) - A gap 1/2" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H781D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M). A 1/4" x 1/2" defect was also identified at penetration 1Z43H781D on the east wall of the Men's Restroom in the Control Building (separating Fire Area 0014M and Fire Area 1104) The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until degraded conditions are repaired. CR 10058277 The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

• * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONG PARK ON 4/23/15 AT 1654 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040). No seal material was seen between the sleeve and the cinderblock on the north side of penetration. - A void 1" tall, 1" wide, and 7" deep was found in the south upper corner under a concrete beam at column line T12 above penetration 1Z43H941D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040). - At penetration 1Z43H1139D, it appears that combustible neoprene insulation is used around the pipe within the plane of the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013). Combustible materials would not be part of a rated pen seal. - A gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was observed at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10060228 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

• * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONG PARK ON 4/27/15 AT 2047 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: -An opening in the grout 1/4" wide, 1/2" tall and over 7" deep was found between the wall and the outside sleeve for penetration 2Z43H028D on the west wall of the U2 Transformer Room (separating Fire Area 2019 and Fire Area 2016). -A 1/4" diameter hole in the grout approximately 2.5" deep was found above conduit 2MI2128 on the west wall of the U2 Transformer Room (separating Fire Area 2019 and Fire Area 2016). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10061830 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

• * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DONG PARK ON 4/28/15 AT 1640 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers in the Unit 2 Control Building 130' elevation to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway - Fire Area 2014, from the U2 West 600 V Switchgear Room - Fire Area 2016. The following conditions were located on the south wall of the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014). 1. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 2" long and probed to be at least 2 1/2" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H668D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall in Fire Area 2016. 2. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 3" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H667D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall in Fire Area 2016. The following conditions were located on the opposite side of the same wall. This is the north wall of the U2 West 600V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 2016): 3. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/8" wide, 1" long and probed to be at least 4" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H668D. 4. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/8" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 3" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H667D. 5. An opening between the conduit and the wall 2 1/2" wide, 2 1/2" long and probed to be at least 4" deep was identified around the 2" continuous run conduit located above cable tray penetration 2Z43H031D. 6. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 3/4" long and probed to be at least 6" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (first of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE. 7. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 6" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (second of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE. 8. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 3/4" long and probed to be at least 5" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (third of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE. The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10062254 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

• * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DANIEL MILLS ON 4/29/15 AT 1804 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Unit 2 Control Building 130 foot elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 West DC Switchgear Room 2A (Fire Area 2018) and the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014). The following conditions were located on the west wall of the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014). 1. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be greater than 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H673D. 2. There is insufficient masonry material to fill the full depth of the wall above the ductwork that passes through penetration 2Z43H032D. This deficiency affects a small area on the south side of the ductwork and penetrations 2Z43H789D, 2Z43H790D, and 2Z43H791D. 3. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be 4 inch deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H671D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall (see Item 5 below). The following conditions were located on the east wall of the Unit 2 West DC Switchgear Room 2A (Fire Area 2018). 4. There are openings between the conduits and the wall 1/2 inch wide and 1 inch long for penetrations 2Z43H789D, 2Z43H790D, and 2Z43H791D. These penetrations are affected in Item 2 above. 5. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be greater than 6 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H671D. 6. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be at least 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H673D. 7. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be at least 2 1/2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H676D. The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10062955 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

• * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2137 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 130' elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of the following penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104) and the Health Physics Hallway and Counting Room (Fire Areas 0014B and 0014G). - Penetration 2Z43H783D terminates open within a foot of the east wall of the Health Physics Counting Room (Fire Area 0014G) - Penetration 2Z43H603D contains no visible seal material and is located on the east wall of the Health Physics Hallway (Fire Area 0014B). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Deficiencies were also observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded condition of the wall separating the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104) from the common East Cableway Foyer (Fire Area 1105). - Gap near penetration 2Z43H170D between a conduit and the concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall located on the south wall of the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104).

The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas but were modified based on the nature of the degradations noted in the condition report and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10063642 Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

• * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1638 EDT ON 5/7/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147' elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional. These deficiencies represented degraded conditions of the following penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room (Fire Area 0025) and the Computer Room (Fire Areas 0024B) as well as a discrepancy in the affected wall.

   - In Fire Area 0024B, a small gap in the foam, approximately 6 (inch) deep was identified in Penetration 1Z43H592F.  The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025.
   - In Fire Area 0024B, penetration 1Z43H325F was identified with no sealant for the penetration sleeve.  The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025.
   - In Fire Area 0024B, foam sealant was missing in cable-tray, 1Z43H061F. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025
   - In Fire Area 0024B, a gap was identified in a concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall joint, directly above 1Z43H062F.

The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10066678 The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

• * * UPDATE AT 2151 EDT ON 05/07/15 FROM SCOTT BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, a deficiency in the Control Building 147 ft. elevation was observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. This deficiency represented degraded conditions of the following fire barrier separating the Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room (Fire Area 0025) and the Cable Spreading Room (Fire Areas 0024A). - A 1/4 inch x 2 inch x approximately 4 inch deep gap in the east CMU wall of Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room above penetration 1Z43H046F. The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10066844 The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sandal).

• * * UPDATE AT 2029 EDT ON 05/08/15 FROM SCOTT A. BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147 ft. elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. These deficiencies represent degraded conditions of the following fire barrier separating the Cable Spreading Room (FA 0024A) and the CO2 Tank Room (FA 0025). - Multiple gaps in the caulk at the top of the ceiling of the west wall of the Cable Spreading Room (separating FA 0024A and FA 0025). The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10067163 The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sandal).

• * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DANIEL MILLS ON 5/11/15 AT 1711 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection activity, multiple fire penetrations on the Control Building El. 130' elevation were identified that resulted in the affected barriers being considered NON-FUNCTIONAL. An issue was identified with the wall separating the Vertical Cable Chase, Fire Area 0040, from the Unit 2 RPS MG Set Room, Fire Area 2013. - A 1/4" wide x 1/2" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of a 2" continuous run conduit, 6" away from 2Z43H581D was identified. - A 1/4" wide x 3" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of penetration 2Z43H581D was identified. - A 1/2" wide x 2" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of penetration 2Z43H580D was identified. The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10068138 The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).

• * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO DANIEL MILLS ON 5/12/15 AT 2151 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection activity, a fire barrier on the Control Building El. 164' elevation was identified as being NON-FUNCTIONAL as follows; - A discrepancy was identified with the fire barrier separating the Unit 1 Turbine Building Main Floor Area, Fire Area 0101A from the Main Control Room, Fire Area 0024C. The condition consists of a small gap 1/4" wide, 3" long and probed to be greater than 6" deep between the wall and conduit at penetration 1Z43H605J on the Turbine Building side of the wall. The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10068842 The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).

• * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/14/15 AT 2121 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 164' elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional: - A 1/4 inch x 1/2 inch x approximately 6 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H602J was identified in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A). - A 1/4 inch wide x 8 inch long vertical crack, approximately 6 inch deep was identified in the CMU below penetration 1Z43H602J was identified in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A). - Three abandoned anchor holes, 1/2 inch in diameter and approximately 4 inch deep, were identified below penetration 1Z43H604J in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A). - A 1 inch diameter abandoned anchor hole, approximately 6 inch deep, was identified directly above a 1/4 inch pipe penetration in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A). - A 1/2 inch to 3/4 inch gap exists between the top of each of the 3 concrete block (CMU) walls enclosing the HVAC chase and the underside of the floor/ceiling assembly separating the Main Control Room (Fire Area 0024C) and the HVAC Room Chase (Fire Area 0014L). - A 1/2 inch diameter hole exists in the CMU at the upper right corner of penetration 1Z43H1184J separating the Main Control Room (Fire Area 0024C) and the HVAC Room Chase (Fire Area 0014L). The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10069898; CR 10069995 The licensee will notify NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

• * * UPDATE FROM R.S. STONE TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/15/15 AT 1807 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, the following discrepancies were identified with the wall separating the Unit 1 Working Floor, Fire Area 0001, from the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room, Fire Area 1008 that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

A 1/4 inch x 1 inch x approximately 2 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H553C.

A 1/4 inch x 1 inch x approximately 2 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H546C.

A 1/8 inch wide x 1/2 inch tall x approximately 6 inch deep gap in the foam block out, below penetration 1Z43H546C.

A 3 inch x 3 inch x 10 inch deep gap in the grout around a 2-1/2 inch continuous run conduit.

A 1/4 inch x 1 inch x 10 inch deep gap in the grout around 1-1/2 inch continuous run and 1-1/4 inch continuous run conduits.

2 inch deep gaps in the grout around 1-1/2 inch and 2-1/2 inch continuous run conduits.

A 1/4 inch hole x 1 inch deep gap in the grout around penetration 1Z43H060C.

A 1/4 inch x 1/4 inch x 2 inch deep gap around the annulus of a 1-1/4 inch continuous run and 2 inch continuous run conduits. The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10070439 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

• * * UPDATE ON 1638 EDT ON 05/21/15 FROM GUY S. GRIFFIS TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, the following discrepancies were identified in the Unit 1 Control Building 130(foot) elevation that caused the affected fire barrier to be considered nonfunctional: - Six 3(inch) x 3(inch) holes in the wall of the Men's Rest Room (separating Fire Areas 0014M and 1104). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Deficiencies were also observed in the Diesel Generator Building 130(foot) elevation that caused the affected fire barrier to be considered nonfunctional: - Through-wall gap around the conduit that passes through penetration 2Y43H511D on the south wall of the U2 Diesel Generator Switchgear Room 2F (separating Fire Areas 2408 and 2409). The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10073041; CR10073187 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Ernestes).

Unit two reduced power to 90% to perform monthly turbine testing surveillance on 2/18/08. All tests were completed satisfactorily with the exception of the main turbine #2 Bypass Valve (BPV). At 0120 hours, the #2 BPV stroked fully open per procedure, but the last 10% of travel to full open did not yield the expected response of BPV fast open from 90% to 100%. The fast acting solenoid did indicate expected state change to 'energized' at 90% valve open, but the BPV did not indicate fast open. Therefore the Main Turbine Bypass System has been declared inoperable and associated actions of Tech Spec 3.7.7 have been invoked. This spec requires compliance with LCO 3 .2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) limits for an inoperable main turbine bypass system as specified in the COLR (Core Operating Limit Report), are made applicable (within 2 hours) or reduce THERMAL POWER to <24% RTP within the following 4 hours. The MCPR limits were calculated by reactor engineering and installed in the process computer at 0347 hours. A decrease in reactor power was not required once the MCPR limit was installed. The COLR (ref.: TRM Appendix A) states Unit Two can be operated with EITHER the End- of- Cycle Recirc Pump Trips (EOC-RPTs) out of service OR the Turbine Bypass Valves inoperable, but not both. The EOC-RPTs were already out of service as allowed for current conditions of the operating cycle. Upon discovery of the inoperable Bypass Valve, it was recognized that this placed Unit Two in an unanalyzed condition for fuel thermal limit. The shift crew took immediate actions to confirm the surveillance was current for EOC-RPTs and placed them in service per approved plant procedures. This was accomplished at 0315 hours, which returned the unit to an analyzed condition. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM J. ANDERSON TO P. SNYDER ON 3/20/08 AT 0943 * * * 

During the surveillance testing of the main turbine bypass valves, one of the three main turbine bypass valves did not function as expected. The function of the main turbine bypass system was degraded but not lost. Upon discovery the required action statement (RAS) in Technical Specifications 3.7.7 and 3.2.2 were properly entered, and the required actions were taken within the allowed out of service time of two hours. Based on the initial review of the condition and the fact that the core operating limits report (COLR) described operation in the condition with the EOC-RPT out of service concurrent with loss of the main turbine bypass capability as an unanalyzed condition, a notification was made in accordance with the following reporting requirement: '10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) The nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' The initial notification was a conservative action taken shortly after the condition was discovered. The condition was immediately identified during surveillance testing of the main turbine bypass valves, the required Technical Specifications RAS was entered and the actions completed within the allowed two hour time frame of 0120 - 0315 EST on 2/28/08. This prompt action prevented continued operation with EOC-RPT out of service and main turbine bypass inoperable and eliminated this potential to be in a condition where the design basis may not have been met. A more detailed review was subsequently performed which determined that the minimum critical power ratio thermal limit for having EOC-RPT out of service and main turbine bypass inoperable as calculated during the reload analysis was 1.42. At the time of the event the actual MCPR at that point in core life was 1.57. Even though prompt actions were taken as required, there was actual margin to the calculated MCPR limit of 1.42. Had a design basis transient occurred, the MCPR Safety Limit would not have been exceeded. Based on this information the determination has been made that the unit was not in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. This notification serves to retract the previous event notification # 43992 made on 2/18/2008 at 0508 EST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

During a review of the temporary repair of the steam line drain bypass line in the Unit 1 Reactor Building Steam Chase, two storage gangboxes were noted to be on the grated opening in the floor of the Steam Chase (elevation 129 ft). These grated openings are designed to be open to provide pressure and temperature relief between the steam chase and the torus room for high energy steam line breaks. Appendix N to the Unit 1 FSAR credits the openings for venting the steam chase to the torus room through the openings for a main steam line break, and for venting the torus room to the steam chase for a HPCI steam line break in the torus room. The most limiting event is the HPCI steam line break in the torus room and the vent path associated with that event. Original assumptions used in the calculation for the vent opening did not adequately account for the grating itself and for louvers installed in a previous plant modification. As a result the vent area was further reduced. Upon further review of the above condition, it has been determined that a non-conforming and unanalyzed condition exists In that the vent area between the torus room and main steam chase in the reactor building is less than the area assumed in the analysis, even without gangboxes covering a portion of the grating. As such, for a HPCI steam line break in the torus room, the short term pressure between the torus room and the corner rooms (diagonals) is greater than 2 psid, which is the stated limit in Appendix N of the Unit 1 FSAR. The corner rooms contain ECCS components in the RHR and core spray systems. Based on engineering judgment there is reasonable assurance that the present nonconforming condition does not prevent safety systems and structures from fulfilling their safety function. This is based on the following information: Structural Steel floor elevation platforms do not appear to have been credited in the structural design capability of the walls. These platforms should act to help maintain the wall intact with increased pressure. The increased pressure transient is a very short term transient, approximately 2-3 seconds in duration, after which the pressure will return to within 2 psid. It is expected that the wall would withstand this transient without degrading the performance of the low pressure ECCS systems or other structures and components. Lastly, the probability of occurrence of a steam leak leading to an instantaneous line break is very small. There is currently no report of steam leaks from the HPCI line, and although a probability evaluation has not been performed, it is likely that the probability of occurrence of such a break is very small. Thus, there is no known immediate threat that would prevent safety systems from performing their safety function. More detailed review is continuing at this point. Short term corrective action will be required to increase the open 'vent' area between the torus room and the reactor building 130 ft elevation and restore at least the assumed vent path from the torus room. This can be accomplished by removing the gangboxes over the vent area in the steam chase and/or completing a floor plug evaluation of vent area needed between the torus room and the reactor building 130 ft elevation which will restore compliance with the 2 psid criteria. Analysis is currently underway to assess the pressure and temperature effects on the safety related structures and equipment by these short term actions. Regarding reportability, based on engineering judgment as previously discussed, the unanalyzed condition does not represent a condition that significantly degraded plant safety; however, additional information is needed in order to more conclusively determine this. For this reason this condition is being conservatively reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) until such time as more conclusive information is provided to make the final determination. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION FROM GORLEY TO HUFFMAN AT 1435 EDT ON 8/30/07 * * *

Upon further review of the above 'as found' conditions, it has been determined that there are existing conservatisms in the current analysis which bound the flow restriction caused by the gang boxes on the grating. The evaluation concluded that the gang boxes found on the grated opening in the floor of the steam chase would not increase the pressures in the Unit 1 reactor building as a result of HELB conditions. Thus the pressure between the torus room and the corner rooms (diagonals) which is limited to 2 psid as stated limit in Appendix N of the Unit 1 FSAR is not affected. In addition, an additional open floor plug (the 3 ft by 3 ft floor plugs between Elevation 130 and the torus room below found to be covered by a hinged metal plate) is acceptable since it causes less differential pressure across reactor building compartments during the HELB's evaluated. The results of this additional review confirmed the original engineering judgment that there was reasonable assurance that the as found nonconforming condition did not prevent safety systems and structures from fulfilling their safety function. Short term corrective actions were completed upon discovery of he 'as found' condition to further increase the open 'vent' area between the torus room and the reactor building 130 ft elevation and restore at least the assumed vent path from the torus room. This was accomplished by removing the gang boxes over the vent area in the steam chase. Based on this review of the design calculations white taking the 'as found' conditions into consideration, the conclusion reached is that the nonconforming 'as found' conditions did not represent a condition that significantly degraded plant safety. For this reason this condition that was initially reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) is being retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Shaeffer) notified.