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	Entered date	Site	Region	Reactor type	Event description
ENS 56864	19 November 2023 00:53:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 2138 EST on November 18, 2023, Harris Nuclear Plant notified the National Response Center of a biodegradable oil leak that entered the Harris Lake. The North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality will also be notified of this condition on November 19, 2023. The oil leak was less than one gallon and came from a temporary pump. The leak has stopped, and spill cleanup is underway. This condition did not violate any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a notification to another government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 56190	31 October 2022 00:40:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2057 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System occurred during an attempt to start the 'B' Main Feed Pump. The reason for the AFW system auto-start was due to the 'A' electrical bus being under clearance and the 'B' Main Feed Pump not starting, resulting in a valid actuation signal for loss of both Main Feedwater pumps. The 'A' and 'B' motor-driven AFW (MDAFW) pumps were running prior to the attempted start of the B Main Feedwater pump and continued to run. The MDAFW Flow Control Valves (FCVs) went full open automatically as designed when the MDAFW actuation signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 56189	30 October 2022 09:43:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0653 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1, at 16 percent power, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to an under-voltage condition on the 'A' reactor coolant pump (RCP) and the 'C' RCP. Power was lost from the 'A' auxiliary bus while performing an operating procedure to transfer power from the 'A' start-up transformer to the 'A' unit auxiliary transformer. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the main steam system to the atmosphere using the steam generator power-operated relief valves. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 56186	28 October 2022 02:24:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2050 EDT (on October 27, 2022), with Unit 1 in Mode 3, it was discovered that all auxiliary feedwater pumps were simultaneously inoperable and the capability to supply the 'B' steam generator was not maintained; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The function of the auxiliary feedwater pumps to supply the 'A' steam generator and 'C' steam generator was maintained. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 56075	28 August 2022 07:08:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	The following information was provided by the licensee via email: (On 8/28/2022) at 0329 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a 'B' train main feedwater pump trip. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip. The auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system started automatically as expected. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Steam generator levels are being maintained by AFW through the AFW flow control valves. Decay heat is being removed by using the steam generator power-operated relief valves. The reason for the 'B' train main feedwater pump trip is under investigation. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The cause of the 'B' train main feedwater pump trip is suspected to be the result of an electrical transient due to the alarms that the operators received. In addition, the 'A' train main feedwater pump also tripped subsequent to the reactor trip and that cause is still under investigation.
ENS 55868	29 April 2022 07:49:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0405 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The Auxiliary Feedwater System started automatically as expected. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam System to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: No Tech Spec limits were exceeded. Offsite power is available. The suspected cause for the loss of condenser vacuum is when performing the scheduled monthly swap of condenser vacuum pumps, a suction valve failed to shut.
ENS 55674	27 December 2021 16:49:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On December 27, 2021, at 1014 EST, a system error in the site's Alert and Notification Siren System was identified, indicating a loss of the siren system affecting a greater than 25% of the emergency planning zone population. Review of the system's data logger indicates the system error has been present within the system since December 22, 2021, at 1245 EST. The fleet's telecommunications department has been contacted and is aware of the issue. In the event that a radiological emergency should occur at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Primary Route Alerting procedures will be put in use by the local jurisdictions. This condition is reportable as a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident, state and local agencies have been notified. * * RETRACTION ON 12/29/21 AT 1630 EST FROM SARAH MCDANIEL TO KAREN COTTON * * * The following information was provided by the Licensee via email: Further troubleshooting efforts identified that the Chatham County EOC Siren Activation Point remained capable of sending an alert signal to the sirens for the duration of the event described above. This ensures siren activation would be performed in a timely manner in the event of a radiological emergency. This Event Notification is therefore retracted, as no loss of emergency preparedness capabilities has occurred. The NRC Resident and local agencies have been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller)
ENS 55649	15 December 2021 16:45:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0927 EST on December 15, 2021, it was determined that a non-licensed employee supervisor failed a test specified by the fitness for duty (FFD) testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 55213	25 April 2021 11:50:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	At 1200 EDT on April 25, 2021, planned maintenance activities on the Harris Nuclear Plant Seismic Monitoring System will be performed. The work includes performance of preventive maintenance and system upgrades. The work duration is approximately 10 days and compensatory measures will be in place for seismic monitoring. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a planned loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 55040	17 December 2020 22:03:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	On December 17, 2020 at 1539 EST, with Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 preparing for entry into Mode 4, the Reactor Coolant System was pressurized greater than 1000 psig for approximately 15 minutes with all three Cold Leg Injection Accumulator Discharge Valves closed. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Both Low Head and High Head Safety Injection Systems were operable at this time. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 55038	16 December 2020 12:19:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	On December 16, 2020 at 0851 EST, with Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 80 percent power, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to lockout of the main generator. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The initial assessment of this event indicates that there was a ground fault on the 'B' train of the non-safety electrical distribution system that caused the main generator lockout. Steam generator levels are being maintained by normal feedwater through the feedwater regulator bypass valves. Decay heat is being removed by using the condenser steam dump flow path. Due to the unplanned Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All rods inserted into the core during the trip. The electrical grid is stable and all safe shutdown equipment is available for service. No reliefs lifted during the transient.
ENS 55017	1 December 2020 17:00:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	On December 1, 2020 at 1116 EST, a condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered during surveillance testing. The issue resulted in a loss of TSC functionality due to a high flow rate measured on outside air intake fans. The cause of the high flow rate is under investigation. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with site procedures. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 54934	6 October 2020 20:16:00	Harris	NRC Region 2		A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 54834	13 August 2020 13:24:00	Harris	NRC Region 2		On August 13, 2020, at 0938 EDT, with Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, a control rod dropped during control rod testing. This is considered to be an unanalyzed condition and requires a manual reactor trip in accordance with plant procedure. All safety systems functioned as expected. Auxiliary Feedwater started as designed and was secured. Steam generator levels are being maintained by Main Feedwater through the feedwater regulator bypass valves. Decay heat is being removed by using the condenser steam dump flow path. Due to the RPS actuation, this event is being reported as a four hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the unanalyzed condition and unplanned Auxiliary Feedwater actuation, this event is also being reported as an eight hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 54773	10 July 2020 08:30:00	Harris	NRC Region 2		At 900 EDT on July 10, 2020, Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson Nuclear Sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at Harris Nuclear Plant, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the McGuire Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 54651	8 April 2020 17:23:00	Harris	NRC Region 2		On April 8, 2020, at 0945 EDT, a condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered. The issue involved a loss of TSC habitability due to failure of outside air intake fans. These fans were returned to service at 1237 EDT and the TSC is currently functional. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified.
ENS 54599	23 March 2020 13:36:00	Harris	NRC Region 2		On March 23, 2020, at 1013 EDT, with Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 in Mode 1, at 100 percent power, an unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system occurred. This resulted in an automatic reactor trip. The trip occurred during the restoration of the auto-stop turbine trip function during a planned maintenance evolution. All safety systems functioned as expected. Auxiliary Feedwater started as designed and was secured. Steam generator levels are being maintained by normal feedwater through the feedwater regulator bypass valves. Decay heat is being removed by using the condenser steam dump flow path. Due to the unplanned Reactor Protection System actuation while critical and the expected Auxiliary Feedwater actuation, this event is being reported as a four hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 54378	9 November 2019 13:28:00	Harris	NRC Region 2		At November 9, 2019, at 0635 EST, it was discovered that both source range instrumentation channels were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The neutron flux monitoring system was OPERABLE during this time period. NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. It was determined that with one of two source range instruments out of service for planned maintenance, an operator found the other operable source range instrument out-of-calibration. Upon further investigation, the out-of-calibration instrument had a bad potentiometer with its power supply, thus rendering both instruments inoperable.
ENS 54333	16 October 2019 14:28:00	Harris	NRC Region 2		On October 16, 2019, at 0829 (EDT), an individual was transported for treatment to an offsite facility to address a personal medical issue. Due to the nature of the medical condition, only a partial survey could be completed prior to transport. Follow-up surveys performed by radiation protection technicians identified no radiological contamination of the worker or of the ambulance and response personnel. This event is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii), 'Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.' The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified.
ENS 54008	17 April 2019 15:21:00	Harris	NRC Region 2		At 0812 EDT on 4/17/2019, it was discovered that both sets of turbine trip solenoids were previously unable to actuate within the allowable time frames; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). At the time of discovery, one set of turbine trip solenoids had been restored. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 53590	8 September 2018 01:38:00	Harris	NRC Region 2		At 2210 EDT on September 7, 2018, Duke Energy personnel determined that the following event required notification of a federal agency, North Carolina State agency and a local agency for a chemical spill exceedance. At 2140 EDT on September 7, 2018, plant personnel identified a sodium hypochlorite spill of more than the reportable quantity of 75.9 gallons. This notification is being made as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agencies. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 53486	3 July 2018 23:27:00	Harris	NRC Region 2		At 1753 on 7/3/2018 it was discovered that both sets of turbine trip solenoids were previously unable to actuate within allowable time frames; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). At the time of discovery, one set of turbine trip solenoids had been restored. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 53366	26 April 2018 20:23:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because planned maintenance activities were performed on April 23rd through April 25th on the seismic monitoring system without viable compensatory measures established. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 53326	11 April 2018 20:56:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	On April 11, 2018, while the Harris Nuclear Plant was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage, the reactor vessel head penetrations were being examined in accordance with the lnservice Inspection Program. Ultrasonic examinations identified a flaw in the head penetration nozzle number 33. The unit is in a safe and stable condition. The flaw will be repaired prior to startup from the refueling outage. The flaw and repair have no impact on the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 53318	7 April 2018 11:59:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	On April 7, 2018 at 0451 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an auto actuation of 'A' and 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps occurred during the shutdown of Unit 1 for Harris Nuclear Plant's refueling outage. Plant Operators successfully took control of the AFW flow and noted the 'B' Main Feed pump was still running with proper suction and discharge pressures of 430 lbs. and 1000 lbs. The 'A' and 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received. The cause of the actuation is still being evaluated. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 52418	8 December 2016 21:05:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered on December 8, 2016, at 1330 (EST). The issue involved a loss of the ability to maintain habitability of the TSC due to a failed outside air intake fan. The repair of the equipment failure is currently being planned. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The secondary TSC has been notified that relocation may be necessary upon facility activation. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 52335	31 October 2016 16:39:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	On October 26, 2016, the Harris Nuclear Plant was in Mode 6 with core reload complete, the reactor head removed, and reactor cavity water level greater than 23 feet. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) was less than 23.4% level as expected for the refueling conditions. During surveillance testing to adjust the eductor flow throttle position, the containment spray pump was started in recirculation mode with the discharge valve shut. With RWST level less than 23.4%, logic was satisfied to actuate Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Functional Unit 8, containment spray switchover to containment sump. The containment sump suction valve opened in accordance with the design, however the action was unexpected by the operators. Therefore, operators secured the containment spray pump and shut the containment sump suction valve. ESFAS Functional Unit 2, Containment Spray, was not actuated and water did not flow through the containment spray nozzles. This event is reported as a specified system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the opening of the containment sump suction valve. This event did not impact the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 52297	15 October 2016 15:46:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	On October 15, 2016, while the Harris Nuclear Plant was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage, the reactor vessel head penetrations were being examined in accordance with the lnservice Inspection Program. Ultrasonic examinations identified a flaw in a head penetration nozzle. The unit is in a safe and stable condition. The flaw will be repaired prior to startup from the refueling outage. The flaw and repair have no impact on the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The flaw is located on the J groove weld of Nozzle 40. No boric acid deposits were located near the nozzle. * * UPDATE FROM JOHN CAVES TO STEVEN VITTO ON 10/16/2016 AT 1549 EDT * * * Subsequent inspections identified an additional nozzle that will require repairs (Nozzle 51) prior to startup. Inspections continue and are expected to be completed by October 18. The additional inspection indication and repair have no impact on the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The flaw is located on the J groove weld. No boric acid deposits were located near the nozzle. Notified R2DO(Ehrhardt). * * UPDATE FROM JOHN CAVES TO STEVEN VITTO ON 10/16/2016 AT 1844 EDT * * * Subsequent inspections identified an additional nozzle that will require repairs (Nozzle 30) prior to startup. Inspections continue and are expected to be completed by October 18. The additional inspection indication and repair have no impact on the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO(Ehrhardt).
ENS 52291	8 October 2016 14:23:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	Loss of all offsite power capability, Table S-5, to 6.9kV emergency buses 1A-SA and 1B-SB for greater than or equal to 15 minutes. At 1328 EDT, while shutdown in Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown), Harris declared an Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power. Following the loss of offsite power (LOOP), the Emergency Diesel Generators started and loaded onto their respective emergency buses. The reactor remains stable and shutdown in Mode 4. The licensee is currently investigating the cause of the LOOP and the emergency buses will continue to be powered by the EDGs until the licensee has determined the cause for the LOOP. Offsite power is currently available into the switchyard. The licensee notified the state government, the local government, and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only). * * UPDATE FROM RALPH DOWNEY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1658 EDT ON 10/8/16 * * * The cause (of the LOOP) is not known. Duke Energy Control Center has evaluated the grid and is comfortable with Harris connecting emergency buses back to the grid. Harris Plant is evaluating restoration. Faults were validated on the 115kV Cape Fear North and South supply lines into the Harris switchyard. This notification also addresses various valid actuations of safety systems, including the Emergency Diesel Generators, as well as, potential loss of Emergency Assessment Capabilities due to the LOOP impacting Emergency Planning equipment. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser), IRD (Grant), and NRR EO (King). * * UPDATE FROM RALPH DOWNEY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1755 EDT ON 10/8/16 * * * The cause of the LOOP has been determined to be a momentary electricity loss on the 115kV Cape Fear North and South supply lines into the Harris switchyard. This event notification also addresses the loss of safety function of the offsite power system which occurred as a result of grid perturbations. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser), IRD (Grant), and NRR EO (King). * * UPDATE FROM DUSTIN MARTIN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2055 EDT ON 10/8/16 * * * Based on the grid being stable and the 115kV Cape Fear North and South lines being available, the licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 2049 EDT on 10/8/16. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser), IRD (Grant), and NRR EO (King). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only). * * UPDATE FROM SARAH McDANIEL TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1330 EDT ON 10/9/16 * * * 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(XI) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION At approximately 1305 EDT on October 9, 2016, Duke Energy personnel notified the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources of a spill of untreated sanitary wastewater. During a significant rainfall event associated with Hurricane Matthew, wastewater was released from the overflow of a lift station that did not function as a result of a power outage. The untreated sanitary wastewater entered the plant's storm drain system. The release has been stopped and the lift station power is restored. An investigation is in progress to further determine the cause and additional corrective actions. There is no impact to public health and safety or the environment due to this incident. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).
ENS 52289	8 October 2016 05:47:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	On October 8, 2016, while reducing power for a planned refueling outage, the unit was taken offline by opening the main generator output breakers. With the reactor at approximately 7 percent power in MODE 1, an unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system occurred. At 0150 (EDT), an unexpected steam valve transient occurred while main turbine valve control was being transferred from throttle valve to governor valves during main turbine overspeed testing. This resulted in an automatic low steamline pressure Safety Injection and Reactor Trip. All safety systems functioned as expected. The operations staff responded to the event in accordance with applicable plant procedures. The plant stabilized at normal operating no-load reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature and pressure following the reactor trip, with decay heat being removed using steam generator power operated relief valves. Steam generator water levels are being maintained using auxiliary feedwater. All emergency core cooling system (ECCS) equipment is available. The cause of the steam valve transient is under investigation. This condition is being reported as an ECCS discharge to RCS, an unplanned reactor protection system actuation, and a specified system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Safety Injection occurred for approximately 6 minutes and Pressurizer level increased to approximately 71%. The Main Steam Isolation Valves closed as a result of the Safety Injection and Decay Heat is being removed using the Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves. There is no known primary to secondary leakage.
ENS 52192	22 August 2016 06:49:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	At 2251 EDT on 8/21/2016, the 'A' Train of Control Room ventilation was inoperable for scheduled testing and the 'B' Train of Control Room ventilation was declared inoperable due to a thermal overload of a cooling fan. This resulted in not meeting the limiting condition for operation in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.6. No action statement exists for having two trains of Control Room Ventilation inoperable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was applied. At 2255 on 8/21/2016 the 'A' Train of Control Room Ventilation was declared operable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * UPDATE AT 1355 EDT ON 09/08/16 FROM CHUCK YARLEY TO S. SANDIN * * * Event notification 52192 is being retracted. Upon further evaluation, Harris determined that the 'A' train of Control Room Emergency Filtration was Operable at the time 'B' train became Inoperable. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Rose).
ENS 52152	4 August 2016 17:54:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	This is a non-emergency eight-hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation system was discovered on 8/4/16 at 1100 EDT. Repairs are complete. If an emergency would have been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC had become uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Site Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to the Alternate TSC in accordance with applicable emergency plan implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Manager and Site Emergency Coordinator were notified of the condition and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 52072	7 July 2016 14:39:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	During an evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornados, Harris Nuclear Plant personnel identified conditions in the plant design such that specific TS equipment is considered not adequately protected from tornado missiles. A tornado could generate multiple missiles capable of striking exhaust piping on multiple main steam safety valves (MSSVs), resulting in crimping of the piping that could impact flow capacity and render the MSSVs inoperable. If the tornado caused a loss of offsite power, the MSSVs are credited to remove decay heat to achieve cold shutdown. Compensatory measures have been implemented to ensure safety in the event of a tornado. Enforcement discretion per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002 and Interim Staff Guidance DSS-ISG-2016-01 has been implemented and required actions taken. Corrective actions will be documented in a follow-on licensee event report. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 51625	28 December 2015 22:57:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality of technical support center (TSC) ventilation system was discovered on December 28, 2015, at 1645 (EST). The issue could result in higher temperatures than normal for a working environment. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. Relocation will be considered based upon temperature and radiological conditions. Repairs will be prioritized, but a firm schedule for resolution is not available at this time. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 51601	13 December 2015 10:41:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in a system needed to remove decay heat and to mitigate the consequences of an accident. At approximately 0307 EST on December 13, 2015, the 'A' and 'B' trains of the essential services chilled water (ESCW) system were inoperable for a time period of 23 minutes. The 'B' train of the ESCW system was being tested at the time that the 'A' train of the ESCW system became inoperable. The 'B' train of the ESCW system was returned to operable status at approximately 0330 EST and remains operable. The ESCW system provides cooling support functions to remove decay heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident. There were no safety system actuations during this time period and the plant is stable. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The 'A' ESCW pump tripped on low lube oil pressure. * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN CAVES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1756 EST ON 12/14/15 * * * Upon further review of the condition, it was determined that the 'A' train of the ESCW system was capable of performing its safety function throughout the time period previously reported, and the 'A' train of the ESCW system was operable. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function. Event notification 51601 is retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification retraction. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie).
ENS 51472	15 October 2015 20:54:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality of the TSC Ventilation system was discovered on October 15, 2015 at 1554 EDT. The issue involved a loss of heating capability of the TSC Ventilation system due to failed ventilation system components. The review of the impact of this equipment failure on the habitability of the TSC over the 30 day mission time determined that this condition was reportable as a loss of emergency assessment capability. The repair of the equipment failure is currently being planned. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. * * RETRACTION ON 11/12/2015 AT 1453 EST FROM JOHN CAVES TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * * Subsequent calculations determined that the loss of heating capability of the TSC Ventilation system did not affect the TSC functionality at the time of discovery or during the 30 day mission time period. Therefore, the TSC remained functional throughout the time in question. The initial 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) report is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification retraction. Notified the R2DO (Ehrhardt).
ENS 51462	9 October 2015 14:04:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	A non-supervisory, licensed employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 51212	8 July 2015 17:43:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality of the TSC Ventilation system was discovered on July 7, 2015 at 11:05 EDT. The issue involved a loss of cooling capability of the TSC Ventilation system due to failed ventilation system components. Maintenance started repairs immediately following the discovery of the component failures and completed repairs to restore functionality of the TSC Ventilation system on July 8, 2015 at 17:07 EDT. On July 8, 2015, at approximately 15:30 EDT, further review of the impact of this equipment failure determined that this condition was reportable as a loss of emergency assessment capability. If an emergency were declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC became uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC became necessary, the Emergency Director would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team was notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition did not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. * * UPDATE ON 8/27/15 AT 1445 EDT FROM INGRID NORDBY AND JOHN CAVES TO HOWIE CROUCH * * * An extent of condition review revealed three additional instances of loss of cooling capability of the Technical Support Center due to failed ventilation system components: January 7, 2015; June 20, 2015; and June 30, 2015. Functionality was restored after these conditions were identified. Each of these instances was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. Notified R2DO (Rose).
ENS 51178	24 June 2015 19:29:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	On June 16, 2015 at 1145 EDT while in Mode 1 at 100% power steady-state conditions, two fire doors between the Reactor Auxiliary building (RAB) and steam tunnel were opened under administrative controls to support maintenance. These doors are credited in high energy line break equipment qualification and internal flooding analyses and opening of the doors is not addressed in the analyses. A high energy line break in the steam tunnel with the doors open could result in equipment in the RAB experiencing high temperature, pressure, or humidity beyond conditions analyzed for equipment qualification which has the potential to render redundant safety-related equipment inoperable. The event was determined to be reportable on June 24, 2015 at approximately 1550 (EDT). During that reportability evaluation, it was determined that the doors may have been in a similar condition multiple times in the May-June time frame. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or system that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 51146	10 June 2015 20:09:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a loss of emergency assessment capability at the Harris Nuclear Plant. Between March 24, 2015, and April 28, 2015, the meteorological data transfer process from the sensors to the emergency response facilities stalled intermittently five times. The control room staff was unaware of this condition for a maximum of 6.6 hours at any given time. When the data transfer process was stalled and the control room staff was unaware of the issue, the staff may have used inappropriate information in implementing the emergency plan. There was no impact from this condition because there were no actual emergencies during this time. On June 10, 2015, at approximately 1300 (EDT), further review of the impact of this equipment failure determined that this was reportable as a loss of emergency assessment capability. The condition that caused the data transfer process to stall has been corrected. In addition, measures have been implemented to ensure that if the data transfer process stalls again, backup sources of information will be used in accordance with the emergency plan to preclude loss of the assessment capability. There was no adverse impact to the public health and safety or to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition. Until this information is captured in a plant procedure, the licensee has issued a standing instruction.
ENS 51011	24 April 2015 16:13:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	On April 4, 2015, during testing of the Control Room ventilation system while in Mode 5 at 0% power during shutdown for a refueling outage, the 1CZ-1 and 1CZ-2 Control Room Normal Outside Air Intake dampers lost power due to circuit breaker trips, preventing closure. Harris personnel immediately closed the dampers as required by Harris Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications. During subsequent evaluation, this event was determined to be reportable on April 24, 2015, at approximately 1200 EDT. This event is being reported under the non-emergency notification requirement of 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition,' and 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 50962	7 April 2015 16:38:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	This is a non-emergency report. On April 7, 2015, while the Harris Nuclear Plant was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage, the reactor vessel head penetrations were being examined in accordance with Inservice Inspection Program. Ultrasonic examinations identified a flaw in a head penetration nozzle. The unit is in a safe and stable condition. The flaw will be repaired prior to startup from the refueling outage. The flaw and repair have no impact to the health or safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. An extent of condition investigation is on-going. * * UPDATE AT 1644 EDT ON 4/9/15 FROM JOHN CAVES TO JEFF HERRERA * * * During the ongoing reactor vessel head penetration examinations, two additional flaws were identified in head penetration nozzles. The unit remains in a safe and stable condition. All of the identified flaws will be repaired prior to startup from the refueling outage. The remaining examinations are in progress to determine the extent of condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Heisserer)
ENS 50829	17 February 2015 16:55:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	At approximately 1555 EST on February 17, 2015, Duke Energy personnel determined that the following event required notification of North Carolina state agencies for an NPDES (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System) permit event and a voluntary reporting of tritium. At approximately 2200 EST on February 16, 2015, plant personnel identified a wastewater spill of more than 100 gallons containing a low level of tritium (9,415 picocuries per liter, less than half the EPA drinking water limit of 20,000 picocuries per liter). No additional plant-related radionuclides were detected. The wastewater was released as a result of an overfilled basin and entered the plant's storm drain system. The storm drain system releases to an alternative discharge outfall. The release from the settling basin has been stopped. The report to the state of North Carolina also fulfills Harris Nuclear Plant's voluntary communication to state agencies in accordance with the NEI 07-07 Groundwater Protection Initiative. There is no impact to public health and safety or the environment due to this incident. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State of North Carolina.
ENS 50520	8 October 2014 17:54:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 10:40 AM on October 8, 2014, with the Harris Nuclear Plant operating at 100% power, a condition was discovered where a potential leak from a pipe supplying water to the fire suppression system in the diesel fuel oil storage tank building could result in damage to equipment in both trains of the onsite electrical power system. Neither the leak from the piping nor the damage to equipment actually occurred, so there are no actual safety consequences and no impact to public health and safety or the environment due to this condition. The condition was discovered during a Harris staff evaluation in the corrective action program. The condition will be fully investigated, including the extent of condition, and corrective actions taken to resolve the issue. Compensatory actions have been taken as interim actions to ensure safety systems are not impacted by the potential pipe leak. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 50443	10 September 2014 11:55:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. At approximately 0453 EDT on September 10, 2014, a fire alarm in an area near the primary Technical Support Center (TSC) triggered an automatic shutdown of the TSC ventilation system. The system was restored at 0755 EDT. The alternate TSC was available at all times. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 50197	12 June 2014 18:09:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	Postulated event could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment. This is a non-emergency notification. While operating at 100 percent power in mode 1, Harris plant personnel determined that inadequate cable protection exists in control cables for a DC powered main turbine lube oil pump. A short circuit could cause excessive current through affected cables, potentially resulting in overheating. The affected cables pass through the Control Room and other areas and could adversely affect safe shutdown. Compensatory measures (hourly fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant which ensures continued public safety. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 50177	6 June 2014 15:13:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	At approximately 11:27 AM EDT on June 6, 2014, Duke Energy personnel notified the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources of a spill of treated domestic waste water. The waste water was released through a break in the discharge line from the waste water facility to the permitted discharge outfall. The treated waste water entered the plant's storm drain system. The release has been stopped and the line repaired. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause and any additional corrective actions. There is no impact to public health and safety or the environment due to this incident. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 50169	3 June 2014 20:06:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	At approximately 4:50 PM EDT on June 3, 2014 Duke Energy personnel notified the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources of a spill of treated domestic waste water. The waste water was released through a valve onto the surrounding ground and may have entered the plant's storm drain system. The release has been stopped. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause and additional corrective actions. There is no impact to public health and safety or the environment due to this incident. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The gray water was dripping from a valve onto the ground. The total quantity of the seepage is unknown.
ENS 50102	9 May 2014 12:37:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	A non-licensed contract supervisor has been found in violation of the Fitness for Duty Policy. The individual's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 49994	3 April 2014 13:54:00	Harris	NRC Region 2	Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop	At approximately 0906 EDT, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) offsite emergency sirens were identified to be nonfunctional. Troubleshooting was initiated and the offsite emergency sirens were restored and verified to be functional at 1127 EDT. This event requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. In the event that the sirens would have been needed, the State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone would have implemented mobile route alerting, as detailed in the Emergency Plan. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was informed. There was no impact to public health and safety.

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