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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5400817 April 2019 15:21:00HarrisNRC Region 2At 0812 EDT on 4/17/2019, it was discovered that both sets of turbine trip solenoids were previously unable to actuate within the allowable time frames; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). At the time of discovery, one set of turbine trip solenoids had been restored. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 534863 July 2018 23:27:00HarrisNRC Region 2At 1753 on 7/3/2018 it was discovered that both sets of turbine trip solenoids were previously unable to actuate within allowable time frames; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). At the time of discovery, one set of turbine trip solenoids had been restored. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5336626 April 2018 20:23:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because planned maintenance activities were performed on April 23rd through April 25th on the seismic monitoring system without viable compensatory measures established. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5332611 April 2018 20:56:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn April 11, 2018, while the Harris Nuclear Plant was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage, the reactor vessel head penetrations were being examined in accordance with the lnservice Inspection Program. Ultrasonic examinations identified a flaw in the head penetration nozzle number 33. The unit is in a safe and stable condition. The flaw will be repaired prior to startup from the refueling outage. The flaw and repair have no impact on the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 533187 April 2018 11:59:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn April 7, 2018 at 0451 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an auto actuation of 'A' and 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps occurred during the shutdown of Unit 1 for Harris Nuclear Plant's refueling outage. Plant Operators successfully took control of the AFW flow and noted the 'B' Main Feed pump was still running with proper suction and discharge pressures of 430 lbs. and 1000 lbs. The 'A' and 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received. The cause of the actuation is still being evaluated. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 524188 December 2016 21:05:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered on December 8, 2016, at 1330 (EST). The issue involved a loss of the ability to maintain habitability of the TSC due to a failed outside air intake fan. The repair of the equipment failure is currently being planned. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The secondary TSC has been notified that relocation may be necessary upon facility activation. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5233531 October 2016 16:39:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn October 26, 2016, the Harris Nuclear Plant was in Mode 6 with core reload complete, the reactor head removed, and reactor cavity water level greater than 23 feet. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) was less than 23.4% level as expected for the refueling conditions. During surveillance testing to adjust the eductor flow throttle position, the containment spray pump was started in recirculation mode with the discharge valve shut. With RWST level less than 23.4%, logic was satisfied to actuate Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Functional Unit 8, containment spray switchover to containment sump. The containment sump suction valve opened in accordance with the design, however the action was unexpected by the operators. Therefore, operators secured the containment spray pump and shut the containment sump suction valve. ESFAS Functional Unit 2, Containment Spray, was not actuated and water did not flow through the containment spray nozzles. This event is reported as a specified system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the opening of the containment sump suction valve. This event did not impact the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5229715 October 2016 15:46:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On October 15, 2016, while the Harris Nuclear Plant was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage, the reactor vessel head penetrations were being examined in accordance with the lnservice Inspection Program. Ultrasonic examinations identified a flaw in a head penetration nozzle. The unit is in a safe and stable condition. The flaw will be repaired prior to startup from the refueling outage. The flaw and repair have no impact on the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The flaw is located on the J groove weld of Nozzle 40. No boric acid deposits were located near the nozzle.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN CAVES TO STEVEN VITTO ON 10/16/2016 AT 1549 EDT * * *

Subsequent inspections identified an additional nozzle that will require repairs (Nozzle 51) prior to startup. Inspections continue and are expected to be completed by October 18. The additional inspection indication and repair have no impact on the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The flaw is located on the J groove weld. No boric acid deposits were located near the nozzle. Notified R2DO(Ehrhardt).

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN CAVES TO STEVEN VITTO ON 10/16/2016 AT 1844 EDT * * *

Subsequent inspections identified an additional nozzle that will require repairs (Nozzle 30) prior to startup. Inspections continue and are expected to be completed by October 18. The additional inspection indication and repair have no impact on the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO(Ehrhardt).

ENS 522918 October 2016 14:23:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

Loss of all offsite power capability, Table S-5, to 6.9kV emergency buses 1A-SA and 1B-SB for greater than or equal to 15 minutes. At 1328 EDT, while shutdown in Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown), Harris declared an Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power. Following the loss of offsite power (LOOP), the Emergency Diesel Generators started and loaded onto their respective emergency buses. The reactor remains stable and shutdown in Mode 4. The licensee is currently investigating the cause of the LOOP and the emergency buses will continue to be powered by the EDGs until the licensee has determined the cause for the LOOP. Offsite power is currently available into the switchyard. The licensee notified the state government, the local government, and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).

  • * * UPDATE FROM RALPH DOWNEY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1658 EDT ON 10/8/16 * * *

The cause (of the LOOP) is not known. Duke Energy Control Center has evaluated the grid and is comfortable with Harris connecting emergency buses back to the grid. Harris Plant is evaluating restoration. Faults were validated on the 115kV Cape Fear North and South supply lines into the Harris switchyard. This notification also addresses various valid actuations of safety systems, including the Emergency Diesel Generators, as well as, potential loss of Emergency Assessment Capabilities due to the LOOP impacting Emergency Planning equipment. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser), IRD (Grant), and NRR EO (King).

  • * * UPDATE FROM RALPH DOWNEY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1755 EDT ON 10/8/16 * * *

The cause of the LOOP has been determined to be a momentary electricity loss on the 115kV Cape Fear North and South supply lines into the Harris switchyard. This event notification also addresses the loss of safety function of the offsite power system which occurred as a result of grid perturbations. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser), IRD (Grant), and NRR EO (King).

  • * * UPDATE FROM DUSTIN MARTIN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2055 EDT ON 10/8/16 * * *

Based on the grid being stable and the 115kV Cape Fear North and South lines being available, the licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 2049 EDT on 10/8/16. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser), IRD (Grant), and NRR EO (King). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SARAH McDANIEL TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1330 EDT ON 10/9/16 * * *

10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(XI) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION At approximately 1305 EDT on October 9, 2016, Duke Energy personnel notified the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources of a spill of untreated sanitary wastewater. During a significant rainfall event associated with Hurricane Matthew, wastewater was released from the overflow of a lift station that did not function as a result of a power outage. The untreated sanitary wastewater entered the plant's storm drain system. The release has been stopped and the lift station power is restored. An investigation is in progress to further determine the cause and additional corrective actions. There is no impact to public health and safety or the environment due to this incident. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).

ENS 522898 October 2016 05:47:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn October 8, 2016, while reducing power for a planned refueling outage, the unit was taken offline by opening the main generator output breakers. With the reactor at approximately 7 percent power in MODE 1, an unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system occurred. At 0150 (EDT), an unexpected steam valve transient occurred while main turbine valve control was being transferred from throttle valve to governor valves during main turbine overspeed testing. This resulted in an automatic low steamline pressure Safety Injection and Reactor Trip. All safety systems functioned as expected. The operations staff responded to the event in accordance with applicable plant procedures. The plant stabilized at normal operating no-load reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature and pressure following the reactor trip, with decay heat being removed using steam generator power operated relief valves. Steam generator water levels are being maintained using auxiliary feedwater. All emergency core cooling system (ECCS) equipment is available. The cause of the steam valve transient is under investigation. This condition is being reported as an ECCS discharge to RCS, an unplanned reactor protection system actuation, and a specified system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Safety Injection occurred for approximately 6 minutes and Pressurizer level increased to approximately 71%. The Main Steam Isolation Valves closed as a result of the Safety Injection and Decay Heat is being removed using the Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves. There is no known primary to secondary leakage.
ENS 5219222 August 2016 06:49:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 2251 EDT on 8/21/2016, the 'A' Train of Control Room ventilation was inoperable for scheduled testing and the 'B' Train of Control Room ventilation was declared inoperable due to a thermal overload of a cooling fan. This resulted in not meeting the limiting condition for operation in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.6. No action statement exists for having two trains of Control Room Ventilation inoperable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was applied. At 2255 on 8/21/2016 the 'A' Train of Control Room Ventilation was declared operable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1355 EDT ON 09/08/16 FROM CHUCK YARLEY TO S. SANDIN * * *

Event notification 52192 is being retracted. Upon further evaluation, Harris determined that the 'A' train of Control Room Emergency Filtration was Operable at the time 'B' train became Inoperable. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Rose).

ENS 521524 August 2016 17:54:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency eight-hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation system was discovered on 8/4/16 at 1100 EDT. Repairs are complete. If an emergency would have been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC had become uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Site Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to the Alternate TSC in accordance with applicable emergency plan implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Manager and Site Emergency Coordinator were notified of the condition and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 520727 July 2016 14:39:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopDuring an evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornados, Harris Nuclear Plant personnel identified conditions in the plant design such that specific TS equipment is considered not adequately protected from tornado missiles. A tornado could generate multiple missiles capable of striking exhaust piping on multiple main steam safety valves (MSSVs), resulting in crimping of the piping that could impact flow capacity and render the MSSVs inoperable. If the tornado caused a loss of offsite power, the MSSVs are credited to remove decay heat to achieve cold shutdown. Compensatory measures have been implemented to ensure safety in the event of a tornado. Enforcement discretion per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002 and Interim Staff Guidance DSS-ISG-2016-01 has been implemented and required actions taken. Corrective actions will be documented in a follow-on licensee event report. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5162528 December 2015 22:57:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality of technical support center (TSC) ventilation system was discovered on December 28, 2015, at 1645 (EST). The issue could result in higher temperatures than normal for a working environment. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. Relocation will be considered based upon temperature and radiological conditions. Repairs will be prioritized, but a firm schedule for resolution is not available at this time. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5160113 December 2015 10:41:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in a system needed to remove decay heat and to mitigate the consequences of an accident. At approximately 0307 EST on December 13, 2015, the 'A' and 'B' trains of the essential services chilled water (ESCW) system were inoperable for a time period of 23 minutes. The 'B' train of the ESCW system was being tested at the time that the 'A' train of the ESCW system became inoperable. The 'B' train of the ESCW system was returned to operable status at approximately 0330 EST and remains operable. The ESCW system provides cooling support functions to remove decay heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident. There were no safety system actuations during this time period and the plant is stable. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The 'A' ESCW pump tripped on low lube oil pressure.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN CAVES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1756 EST ON 12/14/15 * * *

Upon further review of the condition, it was determined that the 'A' train of the ESCW system was capable of performing its safety function throughout the time period previously reported, and the 'A' train of the ESCW system was operable. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function. Event notification 51601 is retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification retraction. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie).

ENS 5147215 October 2015 20:54:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality of the TSC Ventilation system was discovered on October 15, 2015 at 1554 EDT. The issue involved a loss of heating capability of the TSC Ventilation system due to failed ventilation system components. The review of the impact of this equipment failure on the habitability of the TSC over the 30 day mission time determined that this condition was reportable as a loss of emergency assessment capability. The repair of the equipment failure is currently being planned. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 11/12/2015 AT 1453 EST FROM JOHN CAVES TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Subsequent calculations determined that the loss of heating capability of the TSC Ventilation system did not affect the TSC functionality at the time of discovery or during the 30 day mission time period. Therefore, the TSC remained functional throughout the time in question. The initial 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) report is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification retraction. Notified the R2DO (Ehrhardt).

ENS 514629 October 2015 14:04:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-supervisory, licensed employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 512128 July 2015 17:43:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality of the TSC Ventilation system was discovered on July 7, 2015 at 11:05 EDT. The issue involved a loss of cooling capability of the TSC Ventilation system due to failed ventilation system components. Maintenance started repairs immediately following the discovery of the component failures and completed repairs to restore functionality of the TSC Ventilation system on July 8, 2015 at 17:07 EDT. On July 8, 2015, at approximately 15:30 EDT, further review of the impact of this equipment failure determined that this condition was reportable as a loss of emergency assessment capability. If an emergency were declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC became uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC became necessary, the Emergency Director would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team was notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition did not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 8/27/15 AT 1445 EDT FROM INGRID NORDBY AND JOHN CAVES TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

An extent of condition review revealed three additional instances of loss of cooling capability of the Technical Support Center due to failed ventilation system components: January 7, 2015; June 20, 2015; and June 30, 2015. Functionality was restored after these conditions were identified. Each of these instances was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. Notified R2DO (Rose).

ENS 5117824 June 2015 19:29:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn June 16, 2015 at 1145 EDT while in Mode 1 at 100% power steady-state conditions, two fire doors between the Reactor Auxiliary building (RAB) and steam tunnel were opened under administrative controls to support maintenance. These doors are credited in high energy line break equipment qualification and internal flooding analyses and opening of the doors is not addressed in the analyses. A high energy line break in the steam tunnel with the doors open could result in equipment in the RAB experiencing high temperature, pressure, or humidity beyond conditions analyzed for equipment qualification which has the potential to render redundant safety-related equipment inoperable. The event was determined to be reportable on June 24, 2015 at approximately 1550 (EDT). During that reportability evaluation, it was determined that the doors may have been in a similar condition multiple times in the May-June time frame. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or system that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5114610 June 2015 20:09:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a loss of emergency assessment capability at the Harris Nuclear Plant. Between March 24, 2015, and April 28, 2015, the meteorological data transfer process from the sensors to the emergency response facilities stalled intermittently five times. The control room staff was unaware of this condition for a maximum of 6.6 hours at any given time. When the data transfer process was stalled and the control room staff was unaware of the issue, the staff may have used inappropriate information in implementing the emergency plan. There was no impact from this condition because there were no actual emergencies during this time. On June 10, 2015, at approximately 1300 (EDT), further review of the impact of this equipment failure determined that this was reportable as a loss of emergency assessment capability. The condition that caused the data transfer process to stall has been corrected. In addition, measures have been implemented to ensure that if the data transfer process stalls again, backup sources of information will be used in accordance with the emergency plan to preclude loss of the assessment capability. There was no adverse impact to the public health and safety or to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition. Until this information is captured in a plant procedure, the licensee has issued a standing instruction.
ENS 5101124 April 2015 16:13:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn April 4, 2015, during testing of the Control Room ventilation system while in Mode 5 at 0% power during shutdown for a refueling outage, the 1CZ-1 and 1CZ-2 Control Room Normal Outside Air Intake dampers lost power due to circuit breaker trips, preventing closure. Harris personnel immediately closed the dampers as required by Harris Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications. During subsequent evaluation, this event was determined to be reportable on April 24, 2015, at approximately 1200 EDT. This event is being reported under the non-emergency notification requirement of 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition,' and 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 509627 April 2015 16:38:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This is a non-emergency report. On April 7, 2015, while the Harris Nuclear Plant was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage, the reactor vessel head penetrations were being examined in accordance with Inservice Inspection Program. Ultrasonic examinations identified a flaw in a head penetration nozzle. The unit is in a safe and stable condition. The flaw will be repaired prior to startup from the refueling outage. The flaw and repair have no impact to the health or safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. An extent of condition investigation is on-going.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1644 EDT ON 4/9/15 FROM JOHN CAVES TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

During the ongoing reactor vessel head penetration examinations, two additional flaws were identified in head penetration nozzles. The unit remains in a safe and stable condition. All of the identified flaws will be repaired prior to startup from the refueling outage. The remaining examinations are in progress to determine the extent of condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Heisserer)

ENS 5082917 February 2015 16:55:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 1555 EST on February 17, 2015, Duke Energy personnel determined that the following event required notification of North Carolina state agencies for an NPDES (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System) permit event and a voluntary reporting of tritium. At approximately 2200 EST on February 16, 2015, plant personnel identified a wastewater spill of more than 100 gallons containing a low level of tritium (9,415 picocuries per liter, less than half the EPA drinking water limit of 20,000 picocuries per liter). No additional plant-related radionuclides were detected. The wastewater was released as a result of an overfilled basin and entered the plant's storm drain system. The storm drain system releases to an alternative discharge outfall. The release from the settling basin has been stopped. The report to the state of North Carolina also fulfills Harris Nuclear Plant's voluntary communication to state agencies in accordance with the NEI 07-07 Groundwater Protection Initiative. There is no impact to public health and safety or the environment due to this incident. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State of North Carolina.
ENS 505208 October 2014 17:54:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 10:40 AM on October 8, 2014, with the Harris Nuclear Plant operating at 100% power, a condition was discovered where a potential leak from a pipe supplying water to the fire suppression system in the diesel fuel oil storage tank building could result in damage to equipment in both trains of the onsite electrical power system. Neither the leak from the piping nor the damage to equipment actually occurred, so there are no actual safety consequences and no impact to public health and safety or the environment due to this condition. The condition was discovered during a Harris staff evaluation in the corrective action program. The condition will be fully investigated, including the extent of condition, and corrective actions taken to resolve the issue. Compensatory actions have been taken as interim actions to ensure safety systems are not impacted by the potential pipe leak. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5044310 September 2014 11:55:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. At approximately 0453 EDT on September 10, 2014, a fire alarm in an area near the primary Technical Support Center (TSC) triggered an automatic shutdown of the TSC ventilation system. The system was restored at 0755 EDT. The alternate TSC was available at all times. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5019712 June 2014 18:09:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopPostulated event could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment. This is a non-emergency notification. While operating at 100 percent power in mode 1, Harris plant personnel determined that inadequate cable protection exists in control cables for a DC powered main turbine lube oil pump. A short circuit could cause excessive current through affected cables, potentially resulting in overheating. The affected cables pass through the Control Room and other areas and could adversely affect safe shutdown. Compensatory measures (hourly fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant which ensures continued public safety. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 501776 June 2014 15:13:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 11:27 AM EDT on June 6, 2014, Duke Energy personnel notified the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources of a spill of treated domestic waste water. The waste water was released through a break in the discharge line from the waste water facility to the permitted discharge outfall. The treated waste water entered the plant's storm drain system. The release has been stopped and the line repaired. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause and any additional corrective actions. There is no impact to public health and safety or the environment due to this incident. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 501693 June 2014 20:06:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 4:50 PM EDT on June 3, 2014 Duke Energy personnel notified the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources of a spill of treated domestic waste water. The waste water was released through a valve onto the surrounding ground and may have entered the plant's storm drain system. The release has been stopped. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause and additional corrective actions. There is no impact to public health and safety or the environment due to this incident. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The gray water was dripping from a valve onto the ground. The total quantity of the seepage is unknown.
ENS 501029 May 2014 12:37:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-licensed contract supervisor has been found in violation of the Fitness for Duty Policy. The individual's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 499943 April 2014 13:54:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 0906 EDT, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) offsite emergency sirens were identified to be nonfunctional. Troubleshooting was initiated and the offsite emergency sirens were restored and verified to be functional at 1127 EDT. This event requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. In the event that the sirens would have been needed, the State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone would have implemented mobile route alerting, as detailed in the Emergency Plan. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was informed. There was no impact to public health and safety.
ENS 4974218 January 2014 10:47:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

(At 1016 EST, an) Alert (was declared) based on EAL # HA 2.1 Fire or explosion resulting in either: visible damage to any table H-1 structure or system/component required for safe shutdown of the plant, or control room indication of degraded performance of any safe shutdown structure, system, or component within any table H-1 area. Fire in 480V bus 1D2. Reactor was manually tripped 480 VAC safety related transformer fire in switchgear room. Plant reduced power and tripped the reactor manually. Reactor trip was uncomplicated. Fire was extinguished when the 480 VAC bus was de-energized. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of North Carolina, and other local authorities. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Operations Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC, and NuclearSSA via e-mail.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOEL DUHON TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1602 EST ON 1/18/14 * * *

Harris Nuclear Plant secured from the Alert at 1551 EST, on 1/18/14. The plant is stable, the fire is out, the TSC and EOF have been secured and plant recovery has been transferred to the outage control center. There were no personnel injuries or radiological releases. Radiation monitor RM-*1TS-3653C (Technical Support Center Radiation Monitor) is out of service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (King), R2RA (McCree), NRR (Leeds), IRD MOC (Grant), OPA (Brenner), NRR EO (Lee) Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Operations Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC, and NuclearSSA via e-mail.

ENS 4972013 January 2014 13:09:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because work activities affect the functionality of emergency response facilities. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. At approximately 1022 (EST) on January 13, 2014, planned maintenance activities began on the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system. The scope of the maintenance is to obtain samples of the charcoal filter. The planned work activity duration is expected to be approximately 20 hours ending on January 14, 2014. In addition, a multi-day (5 days) maintenance activity will begin on January 13, 2014 on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC system, involving flow-balancing the system, which may involve intrusive maintenance during certain intervals. This intrusive maintenance will render the TSC HVAC system non-functional. This planned work activity is expected to be completed on January 17, 2014. The EOF and TSC HVAC systems will be restored periodically throughout this maintenance period. If an emergency is declared requiring emergency facility activation during this period, the emergency facilities will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If relocation of the emergency facilities becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the emergency response organization to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. An update will be provided once the EOF and TSC ventilation systems have been restored to normal operation and all planned maintenance is complete. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * *UPDATE PROVIDED BY KEVIN ABELL TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1043 EST ON JANUARY 17, 2014 * * *

The planned maintenance is complete and the EOF and TSC have been restored to normal operation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (King)

ENS 4955318 November 2013 15:03:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn November 18, 2013, while the Harris Nuclear Plant was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage, the reactor vessel head penetrations were being examined in accordance with lnservice Inspection Program. Ultrasonic examinations identified a flaw in a head penetration nozzle. Bare metal visual inspection of the outer surface of the reactor vessel head revealed no indications of leakage. The unit is in a safe and stable condition and structural integrity of the reactor vessel was maintained. The flaw will be repaired prior to startup from the refueling outage. The flaw and repair have no impact to the health or safety of the public. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 495188 November 2013 09:05:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-licensed, contract, supervisory employee had a confirmed positive during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4939430 September 2013 12:52:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopHarris Nuclear Plant is following the guidance in NEI 07-07 and has initiated this Event Notification as a result of our voluntary communication to state agencies in accordance with the Groundwater Protection Initiative. On Sept. 27, 2013, at 9:15 pm EDT, plant personnel identified a leak from a temporary transfer pipe on plant property, well within the site boundary. The pipe carries secondary plant and water treatment building waste water for chemical processing. The leak is conservatively estimated to be 240 gallons of water containing a low level of tritium (3,954 picocuries per liter) leaked into the surrounding soil. The EPA drinking water standard is 20,000 picocuries per liter. The leak was stopped and the piping replaced. The health and safety of the public and employees on site are not affected by this event based on the leak location and low tritium level. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4928014 August 2013 12:41:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This is a non-emergency notification. During a routine plant inspection, plant personnel discovered a leak from a pipe on plant property on Tuesday, August 13, (2013). An isolation valve, 3WN-38, leaked causing approximately 9,900 gallons of water containing low levels of tritium (5,780 picocuries per liter) to leak onto the surrounding soil. The valve was secured and the leak stopped. Based upon the leak location and low tritium levels, there is no health or safety risk to the public or to employees on the site. There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition. Due to NPDES requirements at 0840 EDT on August 14, a report of this condition was made to the state of (North Carolina). The State has evaluated the event and classified the event as a spill-non-sewage (no environmental impact). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JUSTIN KELLY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1644 EDT ON 8/14/13 * * *

Additional voluntary notifications have been made to state agencies in accordance with the Groundwater Protection Initiative following the guidance of NEI 07-07. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Musser).

ENS 4927012 August 2013 20:56:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition. On August 12, 2013 at 1550 (EDT), during routine testing of the HVAC (Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning) system, the TSC Emergency filtration Fan, MUF-1, was observed to have high vibration levels. Maintenance is working to determine the cause of the high vibrations and to make necessary repairs. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions, the Site Emergency Coordinator - TSC will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate TSC in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the condition and the possible need to respond to or relocate to an alternate TSC during an emergency. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 8/16/13 AT 2126 EDT FROM TIM ENGLISH TO DONG PARK * * *

Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation has been returned to service on August 16, 2013 at 2100 (EDT) following bearing replacement on TSC Emergency Make-up Fan, MUF-1. Post maintenance testing has been completed and the emergency response facility is functional. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Musser).

ENS 492498 August 2013 03:15:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

The licensee reported that there was an explosion in a non-safety related electrical bus (Bus 1E2). The bus is designated as a safe shut down bus. The licensee has classified this event as an Alert based on an EAL entry condition of "an explosion of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the Protected Area." The licensee is still investigating what loads come off this bus but no safety-related loads have been identified at this time. The plant is currently stable at 92% power. Power was reduced due to the loss of moisture separator reheaters on the secondary side as a result of this event. There is no ongoing fire as a result of the bus explosion. No personnel were injured. No damage to other equipment has been identified at this time. The licensee has notified state and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, DHS NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA and NuclearSSA via email. NRC PAO (Brenner) notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0404 EDT ON 8/8/13 FROM TYLER HALYE TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Auxiliary bus 1E2 (safe shutdown equipment bus) is de-energized due to the explosion. The Alert was declared due to the explosion affecting safe shutdown equipment." The licensee also noted that the event was initially classified as an Unusual Event at 0234 EDT and then upgraded to an Alert classification at 0305 EDT when the bus was determined to supply safe shutdown equipment. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0453 EDT ON 8/8/13 FROM TYLER HALYE TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

No offsite assistance was requested during this event. The licensee verified that there was no fire. It was noted that the licensee is in Technical Specification Action Statement 3.8.1.1 for the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator being out of service. The EDG is out of service due to loss of power to the "C" and "D" air compressors. The licensee was uncertain if the loss of these air compressors was related to the event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Shaeffer) and NRR EO (Hiland) notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0546 EDT ON 8/8/13 FROM SHANNON JONES TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The licensee terminated the Alert declaration at 0533 EDT based upon no fire at Bus 1E2 and verification that Bus 1E2 is de-energized and disconnected from all electrical systems. The licensee remains at 92% power. The only noted safety related equipment that was impacted is the "1B" Emergency Diesel Generator which has been declared inoperable due to loss of power to associated air compressors "1C-SB" and "1D-SB. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Shaeffer), NRR EO (Hiland) and IRD MOC (Morris) notified. Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, DHS NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA and NuclearSSA via email. NRC PAO (Brenner) notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM TIM ENGLISH TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1347 EDT ON 8/10/13 * * *

It has been determined that operability of the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was not affected by the damage to 480 volt auxiliary bus 1E2. The 1C and 1D starting air compressors for 1B EDG did not lose power and thus the 1B EDG was operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer).

ENS 4922831 July 2013 11:40:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. At 0510 (EDT) on July 31, 2013, preplanned maintenance commenced which affects the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation and radiation monitoring systems. The scope of the maintenance is to inspect and perform functional checks on various TSC ventilation system fans and the outside air intake radiation monitor. This maintenance is scheduled to be performed and completed within approximately 20 hours. TSC functionality requires all occupied areas of the TSC be maintained between 60.8 degrees F and 82.4 degrees F. Actual TSC temperatures have been verified to be less than 78 degrees F. If an emergency should occur, the ventilation system will be restored, but potentially not within the time required for activation of the TSC. If the facility were activated with full staff, temperatures could rise above the 82.4 degree F limit. Consideration will be given to relocating the TSC to the alternate emergency facility in accordance with PEP-240. The alternate TSC has been verified to have electrical power, ventilation, and communication capability. The Technical Support Center - Site Emergency Coordinator has been notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1620 EDT ON 07/31/13 FROM RICHARD DAVIS TO S. SANDIN * * *

Preplanned maintenance was completed at 1540 EDT on 7/31/13. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (King).

ENS 4915027 June 2013 04:46:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency notification. Planned maintenance activities will be performed today which will temporarily affect Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation. The maintenance will be completed in approximately 20 hours and is scheduled to be worked to minimize out-of-service time. In the event of an emergency, specific conditions may warrant relocating the TSC to the alternate facility per existing procedures. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by the maintenance. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the scheduled maintenance affects an emergency response facility. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4913118 June 2013 16:42:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn April 27, 2012, while the Harris Nuclear Plant was shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage, the reactor vessel head penetrations were being examined in accordance with Inservice Inspection Program requirements. Examinations were being performed to identify flaws before they grow to a size that could effect the structural integrity of the reactor vessel. Those examinations identified flaws in four head penetration nozzles that exhibited characteristics of Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking. The four nozzles were repaired using the inner diameter temper bead welding process. Examinations performed following the repairs confirmed the repairs were successful. This was originally submitted as a voluntary report on May 29, 2012 at 1511 EDT. The condition has since been determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 4911514 June 2013 03:25:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 9:27 p.m. EDT June 13, 2013, the National Weather Service reported a loss of the National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitter, WXL-58 located in Chapel Hill, NC serving the northeast Piedmont on 162.550 MHz, due to damage or power failure sustained during the passage of severe thunderstorms. The National Weather Service expects the transmitter to be out of service through at least Friday morning June 14, 2013. The purpose of the National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio transmitters is a redundant means to the 83 Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Sirens to warn the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event. The 83 Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Sirens were verified at 12:05 a.m. EDT June 14, 2013 to be in service and fully functional to alert the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event should an event occur. There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4911413 June 2013 22:03:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 6:30 PM EDT on 6/13/13 an all spill was identified which resulted in approximately one quart of fuel oil spilled to the ground from a diesel powered portable light which overturned during a storm. The oil spill was outside of the dike containment in which the light unit was located and was approximately 10 feet from waters of the Harris Lake (waters of the US). No oil entered the lake. This event was reportable to the state of North Carolina because it occurred within 100 feet of the Harris Lake. At 7:03 PM EDT on 6/13/13 Harris Environmental Services Section personnel made the oil spill notification to North Carolina Emergency Management which was acting on behalf of the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The spill was cleaned up by removing the topsoil in the area. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as described in NUREG-1022, based on an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4907629 May 2013 09:59:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

Loss of one of two National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitters. This is a non-emergency notification. At 09:34 AM EDT on May 29, 2013, the National Weather Service reported that they plan to remove the National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitter, WXL-58 located in Chapel Hill, NC., serving the northeast piedmont on 162.550 MHZ, from service for maintenance. The maintenance is expected to last 4 hours. The purpose of the National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio transmitters is a redundant means to the 83 Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Sirens to warn the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event. The 83 Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Sirens are in service and fully functional to alert the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event should an event occur. Compensatory Measure is in place as a back-up route alert to the public within the 5 miles radius (affected counties; Wake, Chatham, Harnett) upon declaration of an event. There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition. The NRC Resident has been notified. This is the same NOAA Tone Alert Radio Transmitter as reported in NRC Event #49074.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RAYMOND MOORE TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/29/13 AT 1618 EDT * * *

The NOAA Tone Alert Radio Transmitter was returned to service on 5/29/13 at 1538 EDT. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

ENS 4907428 May 2013 11:36:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

Loss of one of two National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitters. This is a non-emergency notification. At 10:52 AM EDT on May 28, 2013, the National Weather Service reported that they plan to remove the National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitter, WXL-58 located in Chapel Hill, NC., serving the northeast piedmont on 162.550 MHZ, from service maintenance. The maintenance is expected to last 4 hours. The purpose of the National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio transmitters is a redundant means to the 83 Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Sirens to warn the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event. The 83 Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Sirens are in service and fully functional to alert the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event should an event occur. There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition. The NRC Resident has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RAYMOND MOORE TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1420 EDT ON 5/28/13 * * *

At 1415 EDT on 5/28/13 the Tone Alert Radio Transmitter WXL-58 was returned to service. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser).

ENS 4905822 May 2013 11:06:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopLoss of both National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitters. At 5:16 AM EDT on May 22, 2013 the National Weather Service reported a loss of the National Weather Service (NOAA) tone alert radio transmitters, WXL-58 located in Chapel Hill, NC, serving the northeast Piedmont on 162.550 MHZ, and WNG-706 located in Garner, NC, serving the eastern Piedmont and coastal plain on 162.450 MHZ. The National Weather Service expects to return both transmitters to service no earlier than 8:00 AM on May 22, 2013. The purpose of the National Weather Service (NOAA) tone alert radio transmitters is a redundant means to the 83 Harris Nuclear Plant emergency sirens to warn the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event. The 83 Harris Nuclear Plant emergency sirens are in service and fully functional to alert the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event should an event occur. There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition. The NRC Resident has been notified. The tone alert radio transmitters were returned to service at 11:30 AM.
ENS 4903815 May 2013 19:55:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn May 13, 2013, during a secondary review of ultrasonic data of the reactor vessel head penetrations performed during Harris Nuclear Plant spring 2012 refueling outage, it was determined that the results for one of the penetrations appeared to not meet the applicable acceptance criteria. Further evaluation completed on May 15, 2013, characterized the flaw as a 0.26 inch flaw an nozzle 49 that overlaps the J-grove weld and exhibits characteristics of primary water stress corrosion cracking. The original examinations were performed per NRC requirements. Initial evaluation indicates that the flaw is not through wall and there is no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head during the spring 2012 refueling outage. Operators are shutting down the unit to make the necessary repairs. There is no impact to the health and safety of employees or the public. The NRC resident inspector has been informed. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), discovery of a degraded condition, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), plant shutdown required by technical specifications, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material.
ENS 490046 May 2013 13:34:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 10:16 AM EDT on May 6, 2013, the National Weather Service (NWS-NOAA) reported a loss of the (NWS-NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitter, WXL-58 located in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, which serves the Northeast Piedmont on 162.550 MHZ. The NWS-NOAA does not have an expected return to service time. The NWS-NOAA Tone Alert Radio Transmitters are in place to provide a redundant means to alert residents within five miles to an emergency at the plant. Eighty-three Alert and Notification System (ANS) sirens are located throughout the ten mile radius of the plant. The ANS sirens have the same function as the Tone Alert Radios, but extend out to ten miles. All ANS sirens are currently in service and fully functional. Therefore, there is a means to alert the public within the 10 mile radius of the plant if an actual emergency were to occur. There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." This report was also made per a requirement of licensee procedure PLP-201.
ENS 4893216 April 2013 17:15:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

During investigation of a documentation discrepancy, a potential cable size and breaker mismatch was identified to exist in a non-safety related DC panel. Initial evaluation has shown that the cable may heat and be potentially damaged if exposed to a 'smart' high impedance fault for an extended period. This discovered condition has not been previously analyzed for NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 805 common enclosure circuit coordination. Fire watches were established as a compensatory measure immediately following identification of the issue on April 8, 2013. An initial review of fire protection analysis was completed on April 16, 2013. Fire watches remain in place until a modification which will restore coordination is complete. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN CAVES TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1400 EDT ON 6/4/13 * * * 

An analysis demonstrated that adjacent cables in the common enclosure would not be damaged, therefore, the condition does not significantly degrade plant safety. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (McCoy).

ENS 4892816 April 2013 11:20:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, based on LOSS of ASSESSMENT capability. This is a non-emergency notification. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. At approximately 0414 (EDT) on April 16, 2013, preplanned maintenance will be performed that will affect the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. The scope of the maintenance is to inspect and clean all Air Handler Units, Fans, and Outside Air Condensing Units that support TSC Ventilation. This maintenance is scheduled to be performed and completed within approximately 50 hours. TSC functionality requires all occupied areas of the TSC be maintained between 60.8 degrees F and 82.4 degrees F. Actual TSC area temperatures have been verified to be less than 78 degrees F. If an emergency condition should occur, the ventilation system will be restored, but potentially not within the time required for activation of the TSC. If the facility were activated with full staff, temperatures could rise above the 82.4 degrees F limit. Should the TSC need to be activated for an event, we have compensatory measures which would include relocating the TSC to the Alternate Emergency Facility per PEP-240. This decision would be based on the existing event conditions and coordinated with the Emergency Response Manager, Main Control Room - Site Emergency Coordinator, and Radiological Control Manager. The Alternate TSC has been verified to have electrical power, ventilation, and communication capability. The Technical Support Center - Site Emergency Coordinator has been notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.