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 Start dateReporting criterionTitleEvent descriptionSystemLER
ENS 5426711 September 2019 14:01:00Part 70 App A (C)Offsite Notification Due to Waste Treatment Lagoon Discharge to the SoilIn preparation for Hurricane Dorian, the Waste Treatment Operator in Responsible Charge (ORC) decided to lower the level in the Waste Treatment Central Lagoon by treating and transferring to Process Lagoons. Piping was damaged and not noticed during a walkdown prior to pumping from waste treatment to the process lagoons. This resulted in water being discharged to the soil. Upon discovery, the water was contained and sampled. Sample results were all below regulatory limits. The pipe was repaired. The NPDES permit requires a report to North Carolina Division of Water Resources (NC DWR). This report was made at 10:01 am on 9/11/2019. Because NC DWR was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The Licensee will be notifying the Region II office.
ENS 5416616 July 2019 15:33:00Part 70 App A (C)Concurrent Notification Due to Sprinkler MaintenanceAt 1133 EDT on July 16, 2019, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system for the Fuel Manufacturing Operation Shop Support Areas was taken offline for planned maintenance to modify sprinkler piping. Compensatory measures were enacted. The system was taken offline at approximately 0800 EDT and was returned to service at approximately 1400. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will be notifying the North Carolina Emergency Management Agency and NRC Region 2.
ENS 541423 July 2019 13:15:00Part 70 App A (C)Offsite Notification Due to Fire Sprinkler MaintenanceAt 0915 EST on July 3, 2019, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system for the Fuel Manufacturing Operation Shop Support Areas was taken offline for planned maintenance to modify sprinkler piping. Compensatory measures were enacted. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will be notifying the state of North Carolina and the NRC Regional Office.
ENS 5374417 November 2018 05:00:0010 CFR 70.50(b)(1)Unplanned Contamination Due to Kiln Seal LeakOn 11/17/2018, at approximately 1445 EST, it was discovered that the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Dry Conversion Line 1 kiln seal began to leak and caused an alarm on the Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) room detection system. This manufacturing process equipment is within an established FMO contamination-controlled area which is designed to contain and control this type of release. The area was not occupied at the time, there were no personnel exposures or releases from the area and the affected process was shut-down. As a precautionary measure consistent with current NRC radiation protection requirements, an appropriate, additional radiological control was imposed by requiring respiratory protection for entry into the room to keep personnel exposures as low as reasonably achievable until the area could be decontaminated in a safe and timely manner. Although the affected equipment remains shutdown, this additional radiological control remained in place for more than 24 hours. NRC Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards staff recently clarified its position for this type of reportability determination in a letter sent to the Nuclear Energy Institute dated October 5, 2018. Because of this letter, this event is conservatively being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.50 (b)(1). The NRC region will be notified. Additionally, the North Carolina Radiation Protection Commission and New Hanover County Emergency Management will also be notified.
ENS 5373512 November 2018 05:00:00Part 70 App A (C)Offsite Notification to Fire Marshall for Fire Suppression System Inspection

At 0930 (EST) on November 12th, 2018, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system (Fire Riser 617) for the FMO (Fuel Manufacturing Operations) oil storage warehouse will be taken offline to replace sprinkler heads and conduct the required 5 year inspection. This impairment will begin Tuesday, November 13th. This building is normally unoccupied. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(c). The system will be offline for approximately 8 hours and the NRC will be notified once work is complete. The licensee will notify the NRC Region and the State of North Carolina

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/14/18 AT 1547 FROM PHILLIP OLLIS TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Fire Riser 617 and the supporting system was restored to service at approximately 1300 EST, 11/14/18. The NHC Deputy Fire Marshall was notified via telephone of the return to service. Notified R2DO (Sandal) and NMSS Events Notification (by email).

ENS 536371 October 2018 04:00:00Part 70 App A (C)En Revision Imported Date 10/5/2018

EN Revision Text: CONCURRENT NOTIFICATION At approximately 1525 (EDT) on October 1st, 2018, Fire Riser 318 which serves both non-contaminated and contaminated areas in (Fuel Manufacturing Operations) (FMO), was taken out of service due to a pin hole leak in the pipe. Water was contained and surveys were completed to ensure no contamination was released into non-contaminated areas. The New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified at 1655 (EDT) on October 1st, 2018, per State code requirements. An hourly fire watch was implemented for surveillance of the affected areas. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and the State of North Carolina Radiation Protection Section.

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/4/18 AT 1335 EDT FROM PHILLIP TO OLLIS * * *

The leaking sprinkler pipe fitting was replaced this morning and the system was restored to service at approximately 11 AM, 10/4/18. The NHC (New Hanover County) Deputy Fire Marshal was notified via telephone of the return to service at 11:50 AM, 10/4/18. Notified the R2DO (Lopez), NMSS Events Notification via email.

ENS 5333112 April 2018 23:00:00Part 70 App A (B)(2)Potentially Degraded Items Relied on for SafetyGNF-A's (Global Nuclear Fuels - Americas) Fuel Manufacturing Operation maintains a safe geometry Radwaste accumulation tank to receive certain liquid discharges from operations. During the annual shutdown work activities and routine inspections, an accumulation of material was identified in a safe geometry Radwaste accumulation tank. The accumulation appears to have occurred due to reduced recirculation flow, an engineered feature that mixes the contents of the tank as part of a density control. The accumulation of material is an indication that the tank density control had degraded. Plant operations attempted to remove and quantify the material per normal requirements. On 4/12/18 at approximately 1900 (EDT), GNF-A determined that the material could not be quantified in a timely manner. In the absence of quantification, GNF-A has conservatively determined that this condition is a failure to meet performance requirements and is therefore reporting it within 24 hours of discovery pursuant to Part 70 Appendix A (b)(2). Additional controls on the tank geometry remained intact and at no time was an unsafe condition present. In addition, there are no sources that could result in a rapid addition of uranium to the system. Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being investigated. The licensee will be notifying their NRC Program Manager (Vukovinsky), the Radiation Protection Section at North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, and Hanover County Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 5329528 March 2018 17:30:00Part 70 App A (C)Concurrent Report Due to Damaged Tritium Exit Sign

At approximately 1330 EDT, 3/28/2018, a report was sent to the State of North Carolina Department of Radiation Protection. The report is below: 'Pursuant to 10A NCAC 15.0309, Global Nuclear Fuel Americas, LLC (GNF-A) is providing this report for discovery of a damaged self illuminated exit sign in the Fuel Manufacturing Operations (FMO) building. On February 26, 2018, it was discovered that one tube out of the twelve originally installed tubes in a generally licensed exit sign was damaged. The sign was in storage and not being used at the time and there was no significant exposure as a result of the event. The sign is believed to be a model number 101 or 201, originally containing a maximum of 25 Ci of tritium manufactured and distributed by:

Evenlite, Inc., 220 VFW Avenue.,Grasonville, MD 21638.

Arrangements were made to properly dispose of the sign. It was shipped offsite for recovery or disposal on March 23, 2018 to SRB Technologies (NC Radioactive Material License 034-0534-2).' This report to NRC is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (c) - Concurrent Reports (... notifications to other government agencies has been or will be made, shall be reported to the NRC Operations Center concurrent to the news release or other notification.) The Licensee has notified NRC Region 2. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ENS 5327922 March 2018 04:00:00Part 70 App A (C)Concurrent Report Due to Lost Tritium Exit Sign TubeAt approximately 1645 EDT on 3/22/2018, a report was made to the State of North Carolina Department of Radiation Protection. The report is below: At approximately 1600 EDT on 3/22/2018 it was determined that a tube from an Everglo Tritium Exit sign was missing. The other three tubes were in the sign. The discovery was made as the sign was being prepared for shipment to disposal. This report is being made in accordance with 10A NCAC 15.1645(a). There is no suspected excessive exposure to employees or members of the public. This report to NRC is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(c) - Concurrent Reports, '... notification to other government agencies has been or will be made, shall be reported to the NRC Operations Center concurrent to the news release or other notification.' See EN 53282 for corresponding report from the State of North Carolina. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5303524 October 2017 14:30:0010 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirementsFitness for Duty ReportGE Hitachi Security became aware of Potentially Disqualifying Information regarding a contract worker who was approved for access to two plant sites by the GEH Access Authorization Unit (AAU). As part of the initial review of this information, it was further discovered that the requisite employment verification performed by the AAU failed to properly verify employment for at least one year of the required scope. Affected plant sites have been notified and the individual's access terminated pending further investigation.
ENS 5281116 June 2017 21:00:00Part 70 App A (B)(1)Unanalyzed Condition IdentifiedAt 1700 EDT on June 16, 2017 it was determined that an unanalyzed condition was identified that failed to meet performance criteria. This report is conservatively being made in accordance with 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1). In the powder process, a non-radioactive additive is added to a can of uranium in a hood. A previous process hazard analysis (PHA) determined that a criticality in the associated HEPA filters was not credible during this step. A recent update to a criticality analysis identified a potential condition where small amounts of uranium could build up in the HEPA filter over decades. The ISA (Integrated Safety Analysis) team met and decided that current safety controls will need to be implemented as IROFS (items relied on for safety) to assure that performance criteria are met. The operation is currently shut down and no unsafe condition existed. Safety Significance of Events: At no time was an unsafe condition present. Safety Equipment Status: The operation was shutdown. Status of Corrective Actions: Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being investigated.
ENS 5314029 September 2016 16:00:0010 CFR 20.1906(d)(1)Package Received with Removable Surface Contamination Exceeding Applicable LimitsConsistent with paragraphs 111.1 and V.1 of the NRC Confirmatory Order of December 14, 2017 in EA-17-090, GNF-A makes the following report. GNF-A (Global Nuclear Fuels - Americas) is making this report to the NRC Operations Center, pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1) to state that the NRC has concluded GNF-A received a package on September 29, 2016, which had removable radioactive surface contamination on its external surfaces that exceeded the applicable limits set forth in 10 CFR 71.87(i). This report is solely for the purposes of reaching resolution from an October 25, 2017 alternative dispute resolution because GNF-A maintains that the removable radioactive surface contamination on the external surfaces of the package (an open metal dumpster) and the removable surface contamination on scrap pipes contained in the dumpster did not exceed the applicable limits set forth in 10 CFR 71.87(i). Safety Significance of Event: At no time was an unsafe condition. Status of Corrective Action: Issue resolved during Alternative Dispute Resolution. The licensee will inform the NRC Region II Project Manager, State of North Carolina and New Hanover County Emergency Management.
ENS 5225119 September 2016 10:00:00Part 70 App A (B)(2)Uf6 Scrubber Exhaust System Not Operating as RequiredEVENT DESCRIPTION: It was determined at approximately 6 AM today (Eastern) that an Item Relied on for Safety (IROFS) associated with a Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) exhaust system was not operating as required. An FMO scrubber exhaust system blower was determined to be not operating and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements. The safety function of the scrubber exhaust system is to limit the release of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and its byproducts to the environment in the unlikely event of an accidental airborne release in a process area. Other upstream controls remained available and reliable and prevented significant quantities of UF6 and its byproducts from being released into the scrubber exhaust system. There was no release of material and at no time was an unsafe condition present. The Dry Conversion Process has been shutdown. An investigation is continuing which will provide additional corrective actions and extent of condition. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, the event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(2) within 24 hours of discovery. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: At no time was an unsafe condition present SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS: The Dry Conversion Process (DCP) was shutdown. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being investigated. There was no offsite release of UF6 as a result of the IROF failure. The licensee will inform the State of North Carolina, New Hanover County and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5166219 January 2016 02:00:00Part 70 App A (B)(2)Accumulation of Uranium Oxide Powder in the Dry Scrap Recycle Furnace Off-Gas SystemIt was discovered on 1/18/16, that an accumulation of uranium oxide existed that indicated a degradation of an IROFS (Item Relied On For Safety) in the dry scrap recycle furnace off-gas system. Approximately 42 kg of uranium oxide powder was removed from the favorable geometry off-gas dropout. The degraded IROFS resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements in the event of a fire. The dry scrap recycle operation had been shut down on 1/14/16 and was not in operation at the time. Additional controls on combustibles, geometry and moderation remained intact and at no time was an unsafe condition present. Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being investigated. This event is being communicated to meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR70, Appendix A(b)(2). The licensee will inform State and local agencies and NRC Region II.
ENS 5075021 January 2015 20:00:00Part 70 App A (B)(1)Dry Conversion Process Improperly Analyzed in the Current Integrated Safety AnalysisDuring a GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was determined at approximately 3:00 PM (EST) yesterday (1/21/15) that a quantitative risk assessment associated with the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) cylinder cold trap operation was improperly analyzed in the current ISA. The item relied on for safety (IROFS) and other controls associated with preventing overfilling the cold trap system remained available and reliable. However, the initiating event frequency for a particular accident sequence was determined to be higher than that documented resulting in a failure to meet performance requirements. At no time was the postulated condition present; therefore no potential unsafe condition occurred. The affected equipment has been shut down and an investigation is underway to provide additional corrective actions and determine extent of condition. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will be notifying the State of North Carolina Radiation Protection Division and the New Hanover City of Environmental Management. The NRC Region II office and NRC Project Manager will be notified.
ENS 5027612 July 2014 21:30:00Part 70 App A (B)(1)Items Relied on for Safety Associated with the Dry Scrap Recycle Operations Not Meeting RequirementsIt was determined at 1200 (EDT) on 7/13/14, that one of the Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) associated with the Dry Scrap Recycle operation failed to meet performance requirements. At approximately 1730 (EDT) on July 12, 2014, a potable water line (1/2 inch poly) failed and resulted in a release of approximately 10 gallons of water into the area. The leak was contained and cleaned up. However, this water release is a failure of IROFS 900-03 for Moderation Restriction. Although the second IROFS (Process Equipment Barriers IROFS 301) prevented moderation intrusion into equipment and containers, it alone was not sufficient to meet performance requirements. The affected equipment has been shut down. At no time was an unsafe condition present. Special Nuclear Material (SNM) was not impacted by the leak. No water escaped the area or travelled to non-contaminated areas. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, the event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and the cause of the failure are being determined. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2, State of North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County Emergency Management.
ENS 4996928 March 2014 17:30:00Part 70 App A (B)(2)
Part 70 App A (A)(4)
Items Relied on for Safety Not Operable

It was determined at 1:30PM today (3/28/14) that one of the Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) associated with the Dry Conversion Process recycle operation was inoperable. Although the second IROFS preventing moderation intrusion to the recycle container continued to operate within its allowable parameters, it alone was not sufficient to meet performance requirements. The affected equipment has been shut down and at no time was an unsafe condition present. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, the event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(2) within 24 hours of discovery. Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and the cause of the failure are being determined. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2, State of North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County Emergency Management.

  • * *UPDATE PROVIDED BY SCOTT MURRAY TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1219 EDT ON 03/31/2014 * * *

After further review, it was determined, at approximately 1125 EDT on 3/31/2014, that the second IROFS (mentioned in the initial report) was not reliable to meet performance requirements. As a result, the report is amended as follows: The second IROFS preventing significant moderator intrusion to the recycle container was available, but its reliability could not be confirmed. The control continued to limit significant moderator intrusion and an unsafe condition did not exist. The remaining IROFS was not sufficient to meet performance requirements. As a result, the event report is being conservatively amended pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (a)(4) within 1 hour of discovery. The IROFS that was inoperable in the initial report was a process flow moisture probe. The second IROFS that was believed to be available in the initial report but later determined to not be reliable was a set of process control valves used to prevent moderation intrusion to the recycle container. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2, State of North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County Emergency Management. Notified R2DO (Sykes) and NMSS EO (Rahimi)

ENS 498786 March 2014 15:26:00Part 70 App A (A)(5)Feed Tube Level Sensor Failed as an Item Relied on for Safety

Feed tube level sensor was found to be in a state such that it has failed as an IROFS (Item Relied On For Safety) for a fire accident sequence leading to the loss of a criticality control. Another IROFS is in place and the accident sequence continues to meet performance requirements. Less than a safe mass was always maintained. This event is being reported because only one item relied on for safety, as documented in the Integrated Safety Analysis summary, remains available and reliable to prevent a nuclear criticality accident, and has been in this state for greater than eight hours. Portion of the plant affected: FMO (Fuel Manufacturing Operation) Press. The licensee notified the North Carolina State Radiation Protection Branch, New Hanover County Emergency Management, and NRC Region II.

  • * * UPDATE ON 4/3/14 AT 1457 EDT FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO DONG PARK * * *

On 3/6/14, GNF-A (Global Nuclear Fuels - America) conservatively made a 1 hour event notification (EN 49878) due to a discovery that a feed tube level sensor had failed. After further review, it has been determined that a second control remained available, reliable, and the remaining IROFS was sufficient to meet performance requirements. As a result, the event notification is retracted. Notified R2DO (Vias) and NMSS EO (Lombard).

ENS 4975922 January 2014 18:15:0010 CFR 70.50(b)(2)Inoperable Criticality Warning System Local Alarm in Wilmington Field Services Center Building Number 1On 1/22/14 at 1:15 PM (EST), it was discovered during routine testing on an outdoor Criticality Warning System (CWS) Data Acquisition Module (DAM #21), that the module had inadequate voltage to properly sound a portion of the local alarm horns in the Wilmington Field Services Center (WFSC) building #1. While another module provides overlapping detector coverage, it does not provide overlapping horn audibility in the affected areas. The cause of the event is believed to be related to a battery component failure. Personnel were immediately removed from the affected areas and repairs initiated to restore normal operation of the system. The module was repaired and the system returned to normal on 1/22/14 at approximately 3:00 PM. The affected outdoor CWS horns were retested to ensure proper system operability. There are no active fissile material operations at the WFSC, thus no unsafe condition existed. Longer term preventive actions are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(2). The licensee will be notifying NRC NMSS Licensing Project Manager, NRC Region II Inspection Coordinator, State of North Carolina Radiation Protection Branch, and the New Hanover Emergency Response Branch.
ENS 4934113 September 2013 14:45:00Part 70 App A (A)(4)Item Relied on for Safety May Not Be Reliable

At about 1045 EDT on 9/13/13, it was discovered that the feed tube level sensor on a press operation is not fail safe upon loss of signal. The sensor is a sole IROFS (Item Relied On For Safety) for a particular sequence. Criticality controls remained in place. Affected equipment has been shut down. No unsafe condition exists. Feed tube level sensor is in place for the sequence to limit mass. At no time was the mass limit exceeded. We are reporting under Part 70, Appendix A, (a)(4) which states that credited IROFS must remain available and reliable. We cannot evaluate reliability in the time required for a 1 hour report. In addition, the affected equipment has been secured. An investigation is underway to determine corrective actions and extent of condition. The license will notify NRC Region 2.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO DANIEL MILLS ON 9/27/2013 AT 1003 EDT * * *

On 9/13/13, GNF-A conservatively made a 1 hour event notification (EN 49341) due to a discovery that a feed tube level sensor is not fail safe upon loss of signal. After further review, it has been determined that the control remained available, reliable and continued to meet performance requirements. As a result, the event notification is retracted. The licensee has notified NRC Region 2. Notified R2DO (Sykes), NMSS EO (Rubenstone), and IRD (Grant).

ENS 488075 March 2013 13:45:00Part 70 App A (A)(4)Sole Irofs Pressure Mat Did Not Function as DesignedDuring a post maintenance test of a sole IROFS (Item Relied On For Safety) in the scrap press area, it was discovered that a sole IROFS of a pressure mat did not function as designed. The pressure mat is designed to ensure operator presence. The clutch that would be disengaged when the pressure switch is not active failed to do so. The press was immediately shut down. Similar presses have also been shut down. Double contingency was maintained (Moderation and Mass). The sole IROFS is designed for prevention of a fire scenario. At no time was an unsafe condition present. There were no radiological or chemical hazards resulting from this event. The licensee is conducting an investigation to determine the cause of the failure. The licensee has notified NRC R2 Inspectors and State and Local Agencies.
ENS 4870930 January 2013 20:30:00Part 70 App A (B)(1)Completion of Integrated Safety Analysis Action Plan Balance of Plant MilestoneIn response to a Notice of Violation (NOV) (VIO 70-1113/2010-003), Global Nuclear Fuel Americas, LLC (GNF-A) committed to perform a review of the existing Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). An ISA action plan and schedule for performing the ISA review was described in GNF-A's response to the NOV and the third milestone (balance of plant) was scheduled for completion by January 31, 2013. On January 30, 2013, GNF-A completed the ISA reviews for the balance of plant and has identified an additional 110 items relied on for safety (IROFS) for these areas which were existing safety controls. Implementation of the revised safety basis, IROFS, and application of management measures to the IROFS will be completed by March 31, 2013 per the current ISA action plan schedule. Because the revised ISA has designated existing safety controls as additional IROFS, GNF-A is making a report of this completion pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours. There was no event or plant condition that resulted in a degraded safety condition. Existing balance of plant area safety controls have been identified as IROFS per ISA action plan controls (continue to) perform their intended safety function. Balance of Plant Area milestone complete per ISA action plan. The licensee will notify the R2 NRC Inspector (Thomas), North Carolina Division of Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County.
ENS 4869522 January 2013 20:30:00Part 70 App A (B)(1)Unanalyzed Condition - Based on Ongoing Integrated Analysis ReviewDuring the ongoing Integrated Analysis (ISA) review, it was identified that a fire in labs adjacent to the Dry Scrap Recovery (DSR) area could impact the DSR. The existing masonry wall between DSR and the lab has several openings that are closed with plywood. With plywood in place, unicones (uranium storage containers) stored against the wall in DSR would not meet performance criteria for the accident sequence of a fire in the adjacent lab. The uranium containers have been removed from the storage area until the wall is upgraded to meet performance requirements. Other processes remain operational. A review has begun which will provide additional corrective actions, if required, and extent of condition.
ENS 485543 December 2012 18:30:00Part 70 App A (B)(1)Items Relied on for Safety Associated with the Dry Scrap Recycle Furnace Improperly Analyzed

During a (Global Nuclear Fuels) GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was determined at 1:30 PM yesterday (12/3/12) that Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) associated with the Dry Scrap Recycle furnace operation were improperly analyzed in the ISA. Although criticality controls associated with preventing moderation intrusion exist and these controls remained in place, they were not sufficiently independent to meet performance requirements. At no time was an unsafe condition present. The affected equipment has been shut down. An investigation is continuing which will provide additional corrective actions and extent of condition. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will notify state and local governmental agencies and has notified the onsite NRC Inspectors.

* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO PETE SNYDER AT 1600 EST ON 12/5/12 * * * 

An extent of condition review determined there are three more areas with IROFS that are not sufficiently independent. These areas are vaporization/conversion of the Dry Conversion Process, an area used to pack material for recovery and a hood that is used to transition to a moderation restricted area in the gadolinia shop. The affected equipment in these areas has also been shut down and the investigation continues to identify additional corrective actions. The licensee notified the onsite NRC Inspectors. Notified R2DO (Blamey) and NMSS (Rahimi).

ENS 484979 November 2012 16:00:00Part 70 App A (B)(1)Unanalyzed Condition - System As-Found Condition Not Fully Described in IsaAs part of the ongoing GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), an accident sequence associated with hydrogen piping in the laboratory area was being evaluated. As part of this evaluation, a configuration that had not been properly analyzed was identified. Based on a review of this as-found condition, it was determined at approximately 11 AM (EST) on November 9, 2012 that the system was not fully described in the ISA and resulted in a failure to demonstrate performance requirements were met. Hydrogen supply to the affected piping system has been isolated. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee determined the as-found condition is of minimal safety significance. The licensee will be notifying NRC Region 2, State, and local authorities.
ENS 4820217 August 2012 16:39:00Part 70 App A (A)(5)Only One Irofs Available for a Spill in the Ceramics Area

At 12:39 PM (EDT) it was discovered that only one Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS) remained in place to prevent a Criticality Event in the ceramics area of the Fuel Manufacturing Operations facility. The failed IROFS was Fuel Business System (FBS) Control of Mass of Uranium Transportable Container (IROFS 900-01), due to an overweight pellet boat. The IROFS that remained in place at all times was Spill Identification and Cleanup (IROFS 900-11). The initiating event for the accident sequences (spill of a pellet boat) did not occur. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1456 EDT ON 8/17/2012 FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The pellets have been removed from the overweight boat and placed into an approved container; the IROFS for these accident sequences have been restored. The extent of condition is being evaluated and at this time no other overweight boats have been identified. Region II and NMSS HQ and other notifications have been completed. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie) and NMSS (Waters).

ENS 4810011 July 2012 21:40:0010 CFR 70.50(b)(2)Criticality Horns Rendered Inoperable Due to Lightning StrikeAt approximately 1740 EDT on 7/11/12, lightning strikes near the Wilmington Field Service Center (WFSC) rendered several alarm annunciators (horns) of the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) inoperable. There are no active fissile material operations in WFSC, thus no unsafe condition existed. Until the system is repaired, personnel have either been removed from the affected area or other compensatory measures have been established. Longer term preventative actions are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50(b)(2). The licensee will notify NRC R2 (Thomas), and the State and Hanover County Emergency Management Agencies.
ENS 4803819 June 2012 21:00:00Part 70 App A (B)(2)Degradation of Safety Equipment

It was discovered at approximately 1700 EDT on 6/19/2012 that the moderation control in the gadolinia pellet press operation had been degraded. An operator error allowed a can containing approximately 14 kg of uranium powder to be processed without the required material move transaction, a process control that ensures the container and material type are allowed at the designated location. This resulted in a temporary degraded item relied on for safety (IROFS) condition involving a criticality control. The press moderation control is one of four IROFS to prevent a criticality accident. The gadolinia press station material control system functioned as designed and prompted the operator of an error. The other criticality controls on geometry were maintained at all times. At no time was an unsafe condition present. The gadolinia pellet press operation has been shut down and additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being evaluated. This event is being conservatively reported pursuant to 10 CFR 70, Appendix A (b) (2).

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1359 EDT ON 7/11/12 * * *

On 6/20/12, GNF-A conservatively made a 24 hour event notification (EN 48038) due to a single missed Fuel Business System (FBS) transaction on 6/19/12 at the gadolinia press operation. After further review of the identified condition, it has been determined to be not reportable to NRC and the event notification can be retracted. Notified R2DO (Blamey) and NMSS EO (Silva).

ENS 4785118 April 2012 17:45:0010 CFR 70.50(b)(2)Local Alarm Horn Was Found to Be Inaudible During Routine Testing

At approximately 1345 EDT on 4/18/12, during routine testing on an outdoor Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Data Acquisition Module (DAM #22), the local alarm horn in the Wilmington Field Services Center (WFSC) building #3 inspection records area was found to be inaudible. The cause and extent of the condition is under investigation. Personnel were removed from the inspection records area until compensatory measures were established. There are no active fissile material operations impacted by this discovery, thus no unsafe condition existed. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(2). The licensee notified the NC Division of Radiation Protection and the New Hanover County Emergency Response Center.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 05/17/2012 AT 1641 EDT * * *

Upon further review, GNF-A has determined that the reported condition (EN 47851) was not required to be reported by the plain letter of the regulation (10 CFR 70.50(b)(2)) and the filing of the report was inconsistent with industry practice. As such, this report is being retracted. GNF-A has entered the condition identified in the course of the monthly tests (i.e., areas where audibility of the CAAS should be enhanced) into its corrective action program and is addressing them accordingly. The licensee will notify NRC Region II (Thomas). Notified R2DO (Shaeffer) and NMSS (Stablein).

ENS 4782912 April 2012 12:00:00Other Unspec ReqmntInternal Reporting Requirement for Criticality Safety ControlsAt approximately 8:00 am on April 12, 2012, a criticality safety engineer was notified that waste in the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) area was improperly placed into a designated storage location. Upon investigation, it was determined that waste in the designated location contained materials with a total of less than 5 kg of uranium. As a result, no unsafe condition existed. An operator placed a bag of waste adjacent to a partially filled receptacle instead of placing the bag into the receptacle. This resulted in a portion of one of the documented administrative controls for criticality safety, requiring 24 inches separation between waste storage locations, to be degraded. This event is being conservatively reported per internal procedural requirements. As an immediate corrective action, the material was removed and transferred to the waste processing area. In addition, a shop wide communication to Fuel Manufacturing Operations is underway to inform operators of the issue. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. At no time was an unsafe condition present. Notifications were sent to state and local agencies and NRC Region II.
ENS 477247 March 2012 18:15:0010 CFR 70.50(b)(2)Local Alarm Horn Was Found to Be Inaudible During Routine TestingAt approximately 1315 EST on 3/7/12, it was discovered during routine testing on an outdoor Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Data Acquisition Module (DAM #21), that the local alarm horn in the Wilmington Field Services Center (WFSC) building #1 in-vessel tooling refurbishment area was inaudible. The cause of the condition is under investigation. Personnel were removed from the in-vessel tooling refurbishment area until compensatory measures were established. There are not active fissile material operations impacted by this discovery, thus no unsafe condition existed. The licensee notified the NC Division of Radiation Protection and New Hanover County.
ENS 4770527 February 2012 19:30:00Part 70 App A (B)(1)Unanalyzed Piping Configuration DiscoveredDuring a GNF-A ongoing review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), facility walk-downs of the process gas piping were performed that identified a configuration that was different than previously analyzed. Based on a review of this as-found condition, it was discovered at 1430 EST February 27, 2012 that the system was different than analyzed in the ISA. Production operations in the affected area have been suspended pending an administrative update of the ISA to reflect current conditions. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. At no time did an unsafe condition exist. While this discovery did not result in an unsafe condition, it is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours. The licensee notified the NC Division of Radiation Protection and New Hanover County.
ENS 4805713 February 2012 13:20:00Part 70 App A (B)(2)Mass Control Limit ExceededIt was discovered on 2/13/12 that the mass control limit in the gadolinia pellet press operation was exceeded. An improperly installed valve allowed a total of 43 kg of uranium powder into the favorable geometry press feed tube, exceeding the 36 kg limit. This resulted in a failed item relied on for safety (IROFS) < 1 hour condition where a criticality control was not maintained. The press feed mass control is a sole IROFS for a fire accident sequence. Control indications functioned as designed and provided notification of the malfunction to the operator and the operation was secured. The other controls on geometry and moderation were maintained at all times. At no time was an unsafe condition present. The gadolinia pellet press operation was shut down and the powder was removed by 1000 on 2/13/2012. Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause have been documented. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: At no time was an unsafe condition present SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS: Equipment was shut down and powder removed STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause have been documented. This event is being communicated in order to administratively meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR70, Appendix A. The licensee has spoken with Region 2 (Thomas) regarding this issue, and discussed the issue in a Reply to Notice of Violation dated 6/29/2012 letter book number SPM12-030.
ENS 4738026 October 2011 19:00:00Other Unspec ReqmntLoss of Double ContingencyOn October 26, 2011 at approximately 3:00 p.m., a deficiency was identified during a routine criticality safety review of a proposed revision to an operating procedure for transporting and storing 3-gallon cans. One of the controls needed to meet double contingency was not available to restrict the movement of cans that exceed the specified mass limit for these storage locations. This resulted in a condition where the mass control documented in the criticality safety analysis had not been maintained. The second control, geometry, was maintained. There are no uranium cans of this particular material type currently in these storage locations and no unsafe condition is present. All movement of this material type to these designated storage locations has been suspended. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to GNF-A internal procedure reporting requirements due to a loss of double contingency. The licensee will notify Region 2, North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County Emergency Management.
ENS 473255 October 2011 18:00:00Part 70 App A (B)(1)Item Relied on for Safety Not as Described in the Integrated Safety AnalysisDuring a review of the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) for a 3-gallon can elevator used in the Dry Scrap Recycle (DSR) area, it was determined that the ISA incorrectly describes the IROFS used to control movement of SNM. The system is composed of two sequential can elevators that are used to move SNM to different floors. A Fuel Business System (FBS) automated control and associated gate controls are designated as one of the Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS). In the ISA, this IROFS is incorrectly attributed to the 2nd can elevator instead of the 1st can elevator. Based on a review of this condition, determined at approximately 1400 on October 5, 2011, it was determined that the system was different than analyzed in the ISA and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements. The FBS and associated gate control were in place at all times on the 1st can elevator, was operating correctly, and supported by management measures. No unsafe condition existed. The ISA and associated documentation are being updated to designate the correct can elevator and associated controls. Operation of the equipment has been suspended pending additional review and implementation of corrective actions. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and State and local authorities.
ENS 4730829 September 2011 15:20:00Part 70 App A (B)(5)Equipment Configuration Different than Analyzed in the IsaDuring a review of Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and criticality evaluation assumptions for a floor cleaning scrubber used in the Dry Conversion Process facility, it was determined that an equipment configuration was different than that analyzed in the ISA. Field verification of the floor cleaning scrubber recovery tank determined that its capacity was greater than the safe volume limit referenced in the analysis. The tank volume is credited as an IROFS (Items Relied On For Safety) in the ISA summary. Based on a review of this as-found condition, discovered at approximately 1120 EDT on September 29, 2011, it was determined that the system was different than analyzed in the ISA and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements. The tanks for the floor cleaning scrubbers were inspected and no unsafe condition existed. Operation of the equipment has been suspended pending additional review and implementation of corrective actions. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will notify the NRC Region 2, North Carolina Radiation Protection Agency and New Hanover County Emergency Management.
ENS 4726914 September 2011 19:30:00Other Unspec Reqmnt
10 CFR 70.74 APP. A
24 Hour Report Due to Double Contingency Not Maintained

During a GNF-A Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) team walk-down of HVAC systems in the decontamination facility area, it was observed that a log entry for a waste-oil can mass was greater than the limit specified in procedural requirements. Upon further investigation it was determined at 3:30PM on September 14, 2011 that an operator had incorrectly processed a waste oil can with a gross weight in excess of the limit specified by criticality safety requirements. This resulted in a condition where one of the two controls on mass documented as being necessary to meet double contingency had not been maintained. The second criticality control on mass was maintained at all times. At no time was an unsafe condition present, however the decontamination oil processing area was shut down until necessary controls were available. This event is being conservatively reported pursuant to GNF-A internal procedure reporting requirements within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will inform the state and local agencies and the NRC Region II Office of this incident.

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1832 EDT ON 9/16/2011 * * *

The incorrect processing of the waste oil can as reported on 9/15/11 resulted in a failure to meet the performance requirement of 10CFR70.61 and as a result, met the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(2) (and 10CFR70.74). Notified R2DO (Guthrie) and NMSS EO (McCartin).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1100 EDT ON 09/23/11 FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO S. SANDIN * * *

An extent of condition review has identified two additional cans that were improperly processed with a gross weight over the 9.58 kg gross weight limit specified in procedural requirements. March 2, 2011 9.66 kg July 13, 2009 9.65 kg At no time was an unsafe condition present. The decontamination oil processing area remains shutdown. Notified R2DO (Lesser) and NMSS (Benner).

HVAC
ENS 4726513 September 2011 18:45:00Other Unspec Reqmnt24-Hour Report Involving Potential Failure to Maintain Double Contingency CriteriaAs part of the ongoing GNF-A Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) project, reviews of documentation for scrap accumulation hoods were performed that identified procedural actions that were different than described in the criticality safety analysis. It was determined at approximately 2:45 PM on September 13, 2011 that uranium mixed with small amounts of moderator were not prevented from movement into these hoods. This resulted in a condition where the moderation criticality control documented as being necessary to meet double contingency may not have been maintained. The other criticality control on geometry was maintained at all times. At no time was an unsafe condition present, however the accumulation hoods were shut down until necessary controls were available. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. This event is being conservatively reported pursuant to GNF-A internal procedure reporting requirements within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will inform state and local agencies and the NRC Region II Office of this incident.
ENS 4722530 August 2011 20:00:0010 CFR 70.74 APP. ACompletion of Action Plan (Fabrication) MilestoneIn response to a Notice of Violation (NOV), Global Nuclear Fuels - America (GNFA) committed to perform a review of the existing Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). An ISA Action Plan and schedule for performing the ISA review was described in GNF-A's response to the NOV and the second milestone (fabrication) was scheduled for completion by July 31, 2011. This milestone was subsequently extended by approximately 30 days. On 8/30/11, GNF-A completed the ISA review for the fabrication area and has identified 125 existing safety controls that are now being designated as Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS). Implementation of the revised safety basis, IROFS and application of management measures to the new IROFS will be completed within 90 days per the ISA Action Plan. Because the revised ISA has designated existing safety controls as additional IROFS, GNF-A is making a report of this completion pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours. The NOV inspection report (70-1113/2010-013) was dated June 9, 2010 with an NOV response on July 23, 2010. Milestone #1 was reported in EN #46710 on March 30, 2011. This report concerns milestone #2 of 3. The licensee will notify the NRC Region 2 Project Manager, the State of North Carolina, and Hanover County.
ENS 4722029 August 2011 17:00:0010 CFR 70.50(b)(2)Criticality Accident Alarm System Horn Discovered InoperableOn 8/29/11, it was discovered during troubleshooting on an outdoor Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Data Acquisition Module (DAM #21), that the module had inadequate voltage to properly sound its local alarm horn. The module has been repaired and the system was returned to normal on 8/29/2011. An investigation into the cause of the failure has been initiated. There are indications that the apparent cause of the failure is an AC to DC converter that had a component short circuit. There were no active fissile material operations impacted by this failure. Consequently, no unsafe condition existed. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(2). The licensee stated that the system had been tested satisfactorily within the last month. The licensee will notify state and local authorities. The licensee also plans to notify NRC Region 2 (Sykes).
ENS 4716116 August 2011 16:00:00Other Unspec ReqmntImproper Criticality Safety EvaluationAs part of the ongoing GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), facility walk downs of the UO2 sinter furnace area were performed that identified a configuration that had not been properly analyzed. Based on a review of this as-found condition, it was determined at approximately 12 p.m. on August 16, 2011 that a floor trench in the furnace area was improperly analyzed in a criticality safety evaluation. This resulted in a condition in which criticality controls that were documented as being necessary to meet double contingency were not maintained or available because the geometry of the trench was not properly modeled. There was not an actual loss of double contingency. The floor trench does not normally contain uranium, and has removable covers in place to prevent material accumulation and per procedure, is routinely inspected. It was inspected during the spring maintenance shut down and was inspected again today. These inspections confirmed that no visible uranium accumulation was present. At no time was an unsafe condition present. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. This event is being conservatively reported pursuant to GNF-A internal procedure reporting requirements within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will notify North Carolina State Radiation Protection agency and the New Hanover County Emergency Coordinator.
ENS 4715212 August 2011 16:00:00Part 70 App A (B)(5)Integrated Safety Analysis (Isa) - Unanalyzed Condition

As part of the ongoing GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis, accident sequences associated with hydrogen piping are being evaluated. As part of this evaluation, facility walk downs of the piping were performed that identified a configuration that had not previously been analyzed. Based on a review of this as found condition, it was determined at approximately 12 p.m. on August 12, 2011 that the system was improperly analyzed in the ISA and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements. Hydrogen supply to the affected piping system inside the building has been isolated. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and appropriate state and local authorities.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PHILLIP OLLIS TO ERIC SIMPSON AT 1228 EDT ON 8/24/11 * * *

Unnecessary piping branches have been removed and caps welded in place. The new piping configuration has been analyzed for ISA accident sequences. Based upon this, hydrogen supplies to affected equipment will resume and normal operations will commence. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2. Notified R2DO (Widmann) and NMSS EO (Campbell).

ENS 4706114 July 2011 20:55:0010 CFR 70.50(b)(2)Inoperable Criticality Accident Alarm System Warning Horns

As part of the corrective actions for the event reported on 7/13/11 (EN #47047), GNF-A performed a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) audibility test covering the Controlled Access Area (CAA) at approximately 1655 on 7/14/11. The subsequent test revealed that the installed CAAS system failed to immediately activate the horn signal generators as expected. Activation of the associated warning horns was delayed approximately 3 minutes. This response time to activate horns did not meet the design requirement. Additionally, a review determined an approximately 3 minute horn signal delay was noted in a previous test on 7/12/11. An investigation into these matters is ongoing. The FMO (Fuel Manufacturing Operations) complex fissile material process operations were suspended on 7/14/11 and personnel evacuated. The emergency organization was activated and efforts to troubleshoot the root cause in the horn signal activation circuit delay initiated. All production activities involving Special Nuclear Material are shut down. The installed CAAS is a safety-significant system and is maintained through routine response checks and scheduled functional tests conducted in accordance with internal procedures. These events are being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50(b)(2). The licensee notified NRC Region 2 personnel (Sykes), State of North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County EMA.

  • * * UPDATE ON 7/17/11 AT 1826 EDT FROM OLLIS TO HUFFMAN * * *

The cause of the inoperable Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) has been identified as a hardware failure - specifically a capacitor on a circuit board. The CAAS has been repaired and a comprehensive testing plan is under development. The licensee continues to withhold personnel from the Controlled Access Area and all production activities remain shut down. A root cause analysis and recovery plan are underway. The licensee has contacted R2 (Sykes) and will be notifying state and local authorities. R2DO (Freeman notified). See related Events #47047 and #47066.

ENS 4704712 July 2011 21:30:0010 CFR 70.50(b)(2)Inaudible Criticality Warning SirenThe licensee notified Region 2(Coovert) and will notify the state radiation protection agency and New Hanover Emergency Management.
ENS 470661 May 2011 16:00:0010 CFR 70.50(b)(2)Previous Inoperability of Criticality Accident Alarm System Warning Circuit Not IdentifiedAs part of the corrective actions for the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) events reported on 7/13/11 (EN #47047) and 7/15/11 (EN #47061), GNF-A is performing an investigation into the cause of the delayed audible alarm actuation. The investigation has determined that this delay existed at the time of the May and June 2011 functional tests and was not adequately identified and thus not reported. The response time to activate the horns did not meet the design requirement for CAAS. These events are being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(2). The licensee states that the delay in the alarm actuation existed during surveillance testing in May and June of 2011 but the delay was not recognized at the time. This condition rendered the system inoperable since May 2011. The licensee has notified R2 (Sykes) and will notify state and local authorities. R2DO (Freeman) notified.
ENS 4674913 April 2011 12:30:00Part 70 App A (B)(3)Acute Chemical Exposure from Hydrogen Fluoride to a Maintenance Worker

A maintenance employee was involved in a pipe replacement project in the Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) Building. The employee was leaning on a pipe and received a HF exposure through his PPE (personal protective equipment and clothing) onto his abdomen. The employee was immediately placed under a safety shower and an on-site emergency response was initiated. EMT's applied calcium gluconate and the employee was transported to on-site medical clinic. The employee was not contaminated with any radioactive material. The employee was later transferred to off-site medical. The employee's abdomen was reddened and had some blistering, but exposure is not considered life threatening. AII work in the HF building has been stopped pending the completion of an investigation. The licensee stated that the pipe had been flushed with water and steam prior to starting the maintenance evolution. The amount of fluid in the pipe was described as residual. There was no ongoing release of HF and no other employees were involved. The licensee is providing this as a notification under 10CFR70 App A (a) and 10CFR70.61(b)(4). The licensee plans to notify the NRC Regional Staff (Thomas).

  • * * UPDATE FROM PHILLIP OLLIS VIA FAX TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1226 EDT ON 4/13/11 * * *

The employee was released from the hospital with no restrictions. As such, the event classification is being amended to 10 CFR 70.61(c)(4)." Notified NMSS (King Stablein), R2DO (Kathleen O'Donohue)

  • * * UPDATE FROM PHILLIP OLLIS (VIA FAX) TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1548 EDT ON 4/15/11 * * *

As a result of the root cause analysis, additional IROFS (Items Relied On For Safety) are needed and will be declared. Additional reporting for this event to include 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(b)(1) as the GNF (Global Nuclear Fuels) ISA (Integrated Safety Analysis) did not consider HF as a high consequence event. Notified NMSS (Stablein) and R2DO (O'Donohue).

ENS 4671029 March 2011 14:00:00Part 70 App A (B)(1)Completion of Isa Action Plan Conversion MilestoneIn response to a Notice of Violation (NOV), Global Nuclear Fuels - America (GNFA) committed to perform a review of the existing Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). An ISA Action Plan and schedule for performing the ISA review was described in GNF-A's response to the NOV and the first milestone (conversion) was scheduled for completion by January 31, 2011. This milestone was subsequently extended by approximately 60 days. On 3/29/11, GNF-A completed the ISA review for the conversion area and has identified 87 existing safety controls that are now being designated as items relied on for safety (IROFS). Implementation of the revised safety basis, IROFS and application of management measures to the new IROFS will be completed within 90 days per the ISA Action Plan. Because the revised ISA has designated existing safety controls as additional IROFS, GNF-A is making a report of this completion pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours. Safety Significance of Events: There was no event or plant condition that resulted in a degraded safety condition. Safety Equipment Status: Existing conversion area safety controls have now been designated as IROFS per ISA Action Plan. Controls are available to perform their safety function. Status of Corrective Actions: Conversion Area milestone complete. ISA Action Plan continues. The licensee intends to discuss this issue further with the State of North Carolina, New Hanover County, and the NRC Region 2 office.
ENS 4666910 March 2011 14:15:00Part 70 App A (B)(2)Malfunctioning Valve Leads to a Loss of Defense in DepthDuring a performance of temporary operating procedure on a laser optical device, it was identified that one of two valves used to isolate the device failed to operate. The valves are operated as a pair and the valves are redundant to provide defense in depth. One valve shut as expected. The second valve did not shut. The valves are identified as an Item Relied on For Safety (IROFS). The system was not operating and one of the valves operated as designed. No unsafe condition existed. Operability of both valves is required to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(2) within 24 hours. The affected device will remain shutdown pending further investigation and implementation of associated corrective actions. (This event is of) low safety significance - the discovery did not result in an unsafe condition.
ENS 466638 March 2011 05:00:00Other Unspec ReqmntGnf Procedure 40-32 Loss of a Single Material Control TransactionAt approximately 7:00 a.m. on Monday, March 7th, it was reported that a can of powder was present on a conveyor in the UO2 press feed area without the required material control transaction. At approximately 10:10 a.m. it was discovered that the can contained three vacuum bags of powder. The transaction is one criticality control for the conveyor to ensure only authorized dry materials are stored. The second controlled parameter (mass of uranium in each can) was maintained at all times. As a result, no unsafe condition existed. The total amount of UO2 powder in the improperly stored can was approximately 13.6 kg. The material control transactions have been properly performed and the can has been transferred to an approved storage location. As a result, SNM movements have been ceased pending investigation and implementation of additional corrective actions. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident (Thomas), New Hanover County Emergency Management, and North Carolina of Environment and Natural Resources.
ENS 466501 March 2011 20:00:00Other Unspec ReqmntFailure to Maintain Mass Control of Uo2 PowderAt approximately 3:00 pm (EST) on Tuesday, March 1st, it was reported that 15.3kg of UO2 powder was removed from the UO2 Sinter Test Grinding Station (High Efficiency Particulate Air) HEPA filter housing transition. This clean-out was performed as a response to routine radiological surveys that indicated the presence of uranium. It was determined that this material was present during prior filter replacement in early February in which 30.9 kg of UO2 powder was removed. The total amount of UO2 powder present in the housing was therefore approximately 46 kg, which is greater than a safe mass. The Sinter Test Grinding Station and associated equipment was already shut down because of the HEPA filter housing clean-out and remained down pending investigation and implementation of corrective actions. Failure to maintain mass control resulted in a loss of double contingency for the filter housing. The double contingency controls required include (1) mass control and (2) moderation control. Moderation control, the 2nd leg of double contingency remained in place, was effective, and was not challenged. As a result, no unsafe condition existed. The UO2 in the HEPA housing was transferred into (a) favorable geometry (of) 3-gallon cans per procedure. An investigation is ongoing. At no time did an unsafe condition exist as the moderation control was in place, was effective, and was not challenged. Immediate corrective actions (are) complete (transfer of material into 3-gallons cans). Investigation of (the) event and implementation of long term corrective actions (are) pending. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Region II, State, and Local Authorities.