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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 540994 June 2019 11:39:00CooperNRC Region 4

On 06/04/2019, Nebraska Public Power District will issue a press release concerning the spurious actuation of emergency sirens near Cooper Nuclear Station and Indian Cave State Park. This is a four hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for any event or situation for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made which is related to heightened public or government concern. The cause of the siren actuation is still under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM TERRELL HIGGINS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1301 EDT ON 6/4/19 * * *

During this event, State & local government agencies (Nemaha County, Atchison County, Richardson County, and Indian Cave State Park) were contacted regarding the spurious actuation of emergency sirens. This is an update to the original Event Notification # 54099. Notified R4DO (Kellar).

ENS 540495 May 2019 20:41:00CooperNRC Region 4

EN Revision Text: SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO POTENTIAL EQUIPMENT FAILURE At 1405 CDT, Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specification limit due to a potential equipment failure. This required entry into (Limiting Condition of Operation) LCO 3.6.4.1 Condition A for Secondary Containment inoperability. An event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function requires an 8 hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) for Control of Rad Release. Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored to greater than or equal to 0.25 inches vacuum, water gauge in accordance with plant procedures. Secondary Containment was declared operable at 1600 CDT. The issue has been entered in the Corrective Action Program and investigation of the cause is in progress. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1759 EDT ON 5/30/2019 FROM ROY GILES TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

CNS (Cooper Nuclear Station) is retracting the 8-hour notification made for event 54049 which occurred on May 5, 2019 at 1405 CDT. Subsequent evaluation determined that no equipment failure occurred. In addition, there were no procedure inadequacies or human performance issues identified. The indications observed were expected and part of a pre-planned evolution which included entry into a planned LCO for the Secondary Containment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Kozal).

ENS 5394116 March 2019 13:42:00CooperNRC Region 4At approximately 1100 CDT on March 15, 2019, Cooper Nuclear Station was notified by the National Weather Service that the Shubert radio transmission tower was not functioning due to evacuating their office in Omaha as a result of local flooding. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in event of an emergency condition. Loss of function of this tower is reportable at 1100 CDT on March 16, 2019, when the tower could not be restored within 24 hours of the loss. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A backup notification method is available and will be utilized for notifications if needed. A return to service time for the Shubert tower is not currently available. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
ENS 5393415 March 2019 07:08:00CooperNRC Region 4

EN Revision Text: UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVEL At 0546 CDT, Cooper Nuclear Station declared an Unusual Event due to the Missouri River level reaching 899.05 feet above mean sea level (MSL), which is above the Emergency Action Level (EAL) HU 1.5 elevation of 899 feet above MSL. The river is expected to crest above 901 feet above MSL within the next day, and remain above 899 feet above MSL for the next several days. Declaration of an Unusual Event is a 1 hour report, and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72.a.1.1. Actions are in progress in accordance with site flooding procedure, including strategic placement of barriers at building entrances and important facilities. There is no major plant equipment out of service at this time. Personnel access to the site is not presently impeded and emergency evacuation routes remain available. A press release is planned for this event, which is a four hour report, reportable under 10 CFR 50.72.b.2.11. If the Missouri River were to reach 901.5 feet above MSL, Cooper would initiate a unit shutdown in accordance with their procedures. If the Missouri River were to rise greater than 902 feet above MSL, Cooper will declare an Alert. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1742 EDT ON 3/24/2019 FROM KLINTON BEHRENDS AND CURTIS MARTIN TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1601 CDT due to lowering Missouri River water levels. River water level is currently at 896.0 feet MSL and lowering. A press release will be issued to inform the public of Cooper Nuclear Station's exit from the Notification of Unusual Event regarding high Missouri River level. The initial entry into the Notification of Unusual Event occurred on 03/15/2019 and was exited on 03/24/2019 at 1601 CDT. The press release is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (O'Keefe), NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Gott), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5380929 December 2018 10:27:00CooperNRC Region 4

At 0904 CST, on December 29, 2018, Cooper declared a Notice of Unusual Event under emergency action level HU 3.1. The emergency declaration was due to a toxic gas asphyxiant as a result of a fire. The fire is contained and the fire brigade continues to extinguishing the fire. Offsite support has not been requested. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Additionally, State and Local government agencies were also notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 12/29/2018 AT 1655 EST FROM JIM FLORENCE TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

At 1544 CST, on December 29, 2018, Cooper terminated the Notice of Unusual Event under emergency action level HU 3.1. The fire was verified to be extinguished and the flammable material was removed. The plant remained at 100% power for the duration of the event. The licensee issued a press release regarding the event at 1202 CST, on December 29, 2018. The license notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Taylor), NRR EO (Groom), IRD MOC (Gott), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 537765 December 2018 11:24:00CooperNRC Region 4This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 1 for Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), Group 3 for Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU), Group 6 for Secondary Containment isolation, Group 7 for Reactor Water Sampling, Diesel Generator, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System logic, and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) logic. Group 1, Group 6, Diesel Generator actuation, RCIC actuation and RHR actuation are within scope of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). Group 3 and Group 7 are not within scope as they affect only one system. Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) was shut down in Mode 5 at the time of the event with the reactor cavity flooded. On October 13, 2018, at 0028 Central Daylight Time, CNS received full PCIS Groups 1, 3, and 6, and a half Group 7 on the Division 1 side. The MSIVs and RWCU isolation valves were already closed for maintenance. The Secondary Containment isolated. Control Room Emergency Filter and the Standby Gas Treatment Systems initiated. The inboard Reactor Water Sample valve isolated. Diesel Generator #1 started but was not required to connect to the critical bus. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System logic actuated with no expected response due to being isolated for shutdown conditions. Division 1 RHR pump logic actuated. Division 1 RHR system was operating in shutdown cooling mode. The actuation caused the Division 1 RHR outboard injection and heat exchanger bypass valves to open. Shutdown cooling was unaffected and remained in service throughout the event. The plant systems responded as expected with no Emergency Core Cooling System injection. At the time of the event, an in-service inspection of welds inside the reactor vessel was taking place using a robot scanner that uses two vortex thrusters to hold the robot to the vessel wall. The robot inadvertently passed over an instrument penetration, drawing suction on the process leg, resulting in low reactor water level indications and the subsequent invalid Level 1 and 2 system actuations. Actual reactor vessel water level remained steady at cavity flooded conditions. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
ENS 5366816 October 2018 00:21:00CooperNRC Region 4In accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii), this notification reports a licensed Reactor Operator tested positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 536506 October 2018 05:56:00CooperNRC Region 4On 10/5/2018, at 2219 CDT, the Control Room Emergency Filter (CREF) System was determined to be inoperable during a required condition of applicability due to being aligned to a Division 2 power source with its associated emergency power supply (Diesel Generator #2) removed from service earlier in the day. The power supply alignment was not identified at the time Diesel Generator #2 was removed from service (Diesel Generator #2 was rendered inoperable on 10/5/2018 at 1728 CDT). Movement of lately irradiated fuel assemblies in the Secondary Containment was in progress at the time of discovery of this condition. This condition represents an unplanned loss of safety function for a single train system during its specified condition of applicability. Movement of irradiated fuel was suspended until the power supplies to CREFs could be realigned to Division 1 which was completed at 0004 CDT on 10/6/2018. This represents a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of CREFs needed to mitigate the consequences of a fuel handling accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 536465 October 2018 09:52:00CooperNRC Region 4

EN Revision Text: MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES EXCEEDED PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LOCAL LEAK RATE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA At 0520 (CDT), on October 05, 2018, it was discovered that a Primary Containment local leak rate test performed on Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) exceeded its acceptance criteria.

During Mode 1, 2, and 3, Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 requires MSIV leakage for a single MSIV line to be less than or equal to 106 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) when tested at 29 psig and Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.12 requires the combined leakage rate for all MSIV leakage paths to be less than or equal to 212 scfh when tested at 29 psig.

As-found for the 'C' MSIV line leakage results were unquantifiable and gave a (minimum) path value greeter than 160 scfh. This leakage rate lead to Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 and 3.6.1.3.12 limits to be exceeded. This event is being reported as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the Primary Containment Isolation Valves leakage limits for MSIVs were exceeded. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 2320 EDT ON 10/24/2018 FROM THOMAS FORLAND TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

CNS (Cooper Nuclear Station) is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on October 5, 2018 at 0520 CDT (EN# 53646). Subsequent evaluation concluded that overall as-found 'C' MSIV leakage rate was not at a level that exceeded the surveillance requirement 3.6.1.3.10 and 3.6.1.3.12 limits and thus the Primary Containment Isolation Valve leakage rate limits for the MSIVs were not exceeded. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Drake).

ENS 5347626 June 2018 23:29:00CooperNRC Region 4

EN Revision Text: CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE On June 26, 2018, at 1630 CDT, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) was declared inoperable when Main Control Room Supply Fan SF-C-1B was discovered to have elevated vibrations that brought into question the ability to meet its mission time. CREFS is a single train safety system. Per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an 8 hour report is required due to the fact that at the time of discovery this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of an SSC (System Structure or Component) that is required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM THOMAS FORLAND TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/13/18 AT 1024 EDT * * *

The following retraction was received from Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) via facsimile and phone call: CNS is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on June 26, 2018 at 1630 CDT (EN# 53476). Subsequent evaluation concluded that overall vibration levels were not at a level that would impact the ability of the Main Control Room Supply Fan SF-C-18 to perform its safety function for its required mission time and the CREFS therefore, was operable. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Deese).

ENS 5326115 March 2018 01:39:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4

At approximately 1711 CDT on 14 MAR 2018, Cooper Nuclear Station was notified by the National Weather Service that the Shubert radio transmission tower was not functioning. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in event of an emergency condition. This condition is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A backup notification method is available and will be utilized for notifications if needed. The local telephone company is providing troubleshooting and repair services. A return to service time for the Shubert tower is not currently available. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. The issue was identified during periodic maintenance. The licensee notified all counties within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone.

  • * * UPDATE ON 3/19/2018 AT 1720 EDT FROM STEVE WHEELER TO DONG PARK * * *

This is a follow up notification to update the status of the Shubert radio transmission tower that was reported to be out of service on March 14th per EN53261. The tower was restored to service and determined to be functional at 0759 (CDT) on March 19th, 2018. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Groom).

ENS 5325310 March 2018 13:54:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) was removed from service (unplanned) on 3/10/2018 at time 0709 (CST) by closing HPCI-MO-15, STEAM SUPPLY INBOARD ISOLATION. The inboard steam supply isolation valve is inside Primary Containment. The steam supply valve was closed in an effort to isolate (unidentified) leakage to Primary Containment from a suspected packing leak from HPCI-MO-15. After closing the HPCI-MO-15, Reactor Coolant System Leakage parameters returned to within Technical Specification (TS) LCO (Limiting Condition of Operations) 3.4.4 limits. Entered into Technical Specification LCO 3.5.1 Condition C - HPCI System Inoperable. Required Actions for Condition 'C' are to verify by administrative means RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) System is operable within 1 hour and restore HPCI System to operable status within 14 days. RCIC was verified operable by administrative means concurrent with declaration of HPCI inoperable. Normal plant shutdown activities are being planned (for 03/11/2018 at 1200 CDT) to support entry into Primary Containment to initiate any necessary repairs. HPCI is a single train safety system. This report is submitted as a condition that at time of discovery could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC (System, Structure, or Component) needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition has been entered into the CNS (Cooper Nuclear Station) Corrective Action Program. CR-CNS-2018-01346 LCO 3.4.4 was entered during unplanned maintenance of the HPCI system. When the HPCI-MO-15 was cycled from closed to open, unidentified leakage in the containment increased above 2 gallons per minute (gpm) in less than a 24 hour period. Also, total unidentified leakage exceeded 5 gpm. The licensee closed the HPCI-MO-15 valve resulting in a decrease in unidentified leakage below TS shutdown limit. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5313320 December 2017 21:22:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4During review of the documentation for the 11/16/17 outage of the NOAA/NWS (National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration/National Weather Service) tower, it was identified that there was also record of a trouble ticket being issued on 11/19/17 for the NOAA/NWS tower. Further discussions with the National Weather Service determined that the tower did experience an outage on 11/19/17 which affected the ability to activate EAS (Emergency Alert System)/Tone Alert Radios. Final determination that the EAS/Tone Alert Radios were affected during this outage was made at 1559 (CST), which was the time that the National Weather Service sent the e-mail to the EP (Emergency Planning) Manager and EP Offsite Coordinator with notification that activation of the EAS/Tone Alert Radios was affected during the outage. This is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification System capability, and is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The transmission outage was on 11/19/2017 0853 until 1100 but CNS (Cooper Nuclear Station) was not notified until 1559 on 12/20/2017. The NRC Senior Resident has been informed
ENS 5312819 December 2017 17:17:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4

During regular power operations at 100% power, DG#1 and DG#2 were declared inoperable due to a common issue associated with indicating lights and the associated sockets installed in various control and auxiliary circuits for both DG's. The indicating lights in question are incandescent 120V AC style 120MB bulbs in a socket with a 550 ohm resistor. Style 120MB light bulbs have a failure mechanism where the bulb can cause a short circuit rather than the more common open circuit that is expected when an incandescent bulb filament fails. Cooper originally believed that the socket's integral resistor was sufficient to protect the circuit. In testing performed by an outside laboratory and confirmed on-site using warehouse stock, it was determined that the integral resistor may not have the power dissipation capability to protect the circuit ln which the light and socket are installed if a bulb fails in short circuit. This condition resulted in both DG's being declared inoperable at 1340 (CST) due to a loss of reasonable expectation that they would meet their safety function required action to start, load and run to support loads required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This is a loss of safety function under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) subject to an 8 hour report. As a result of both DG's being inoperable, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System is also inoperable. This is also a loss of safety function subject to an 8 hour report for the same criterion. The Senior Resident has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 0942 EST ON 02/14/2018 FROM DAVID VAN DERKAMP TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

CNS is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on December 19, 2017 at 1340 CST (EN# 53128). Subsequent evaluation concluded a postulated lamp short circuit failure in any of the affected circuits would not impact the ability of the Diesel Generators to perform their safety function and therefore, were operable. With DG operability not affected, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System also remained operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Werner).

ENS 5307416 November 2017 08:17:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At 0008 CST on 11/16/2017, Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) was notified by Omaha Weather that the NOAA broadcast and the Shubert radio tower for this area is off. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in event of an emergency condition. This is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification System capability, and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The transmission outage actually began at 2007 (CST), 11/15/2017, but CNS was not notified until 0008 (CST), 11/16/2017. Backup notification methods remained available throughout the period. At time 0447 CST on 11/16/2017, Cooper Nuclear Station was notified that the NOAA broadcast and Shubert radio transmission tower was returned to service. Nemaha County, NE, Richardson County, NE, and Atchison County, MO authorities within the 10 mile EPZ were notified by Cooper Nuclear Station of the condition and the effect on the tone alert radios at 0642 (CST), 11/16/2017. This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a 4 hour report. The NRC Senior Resident has been informed.
ENS 5306914 November 2017 12:42:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4

At 1118 CST on 11/14/17, Cooper Nuclear Generating Station declared an Unusual Event due to a hydrogen leak on a main generator purge line. The leak was reported to be caused by Maintenance cutting into a one inch line. The total size of the leak is unknown, however, it is estimated to be depressurizing in the main generator at approximately 1lb per hour. The current pressure is 52 to 53 lbs. pressure and is stable. The operations staff have entered their abnormal procedure and are taking actions to isolate the leak. Operators have isolated the source of hydrogen and have opened the exterior roll up doors to increase the airflow and minimize the concentration of hydrogen in the area. The area has been evacuated and hot work has been stopped. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC and NNSA (via email).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1433 EST ON 11/14/2017 FROM ROY GILES TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On 11/14/2017, Nebraska Public Power District will issue a press release concerning the declaration of a Notification of Unusual Event (EN#53069) declared today at 1118 (CST) for a small hydrogen leak in the turbine building. This is a four hour report per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for any event or situation for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made which is related to heightened public or government concern. Notified the R4DO (Kozal).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1904 EST ON 11/14/17 FROM TRENT SYDOW TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

At 1744 CST the licensee exited from the Unusual Event. The leak was patched under a temporary repair. The patch was tested to verify the leak has stopped. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Notified the R4DO (Kozal), IRDMOC (Gott), NRR EO (Miller), DHS, FEMA, NICC and NNSA (via email).

ENS 5302218 October 2017 05:27:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4

Eight hour report due to HPCl (High Pressure Coolant Injection) inoperability. HPCl valve operability testing was performed on October 18, 2017. Following satisfactory completion of opening stroke timing, the control switch for HPCI-MOV-MO19, HPCI Injection Valve, was taken to close. The valve indicates that it moved to an intermediate position, but it has not indicated that it has fully closed. This resulted in the valve being declared inoperable. This valve is normally closed and automatically opens on a HPCI initiation signal. HPCl was previously declared inoperable at time 0136 (CDT) on October 18 for surveillance testing. Entry was made into Tech Spec LCO 3.5.1 Condition C - HPCI System Inoperable at that time. Required Actions for Condition C are to verify by administrative means RCIC System is operable within 1 hour and restore HPCI System to operable status within 14 days. RClC was verified operable by administrative means concurrent with declaration of HPCI inoperable. Troubleshooting activities for HPCI are being planned. HPCI is a single train safety system. This report is submitted as a condition that at time of discovery could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC (structures, systems, and components) needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition has been entered into the CNS Corrective Action Program. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 11/14/17 AT 0849 EST FROM DAVID VAN DER KAMP TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

CNS is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on October 18, 2017 at 0209 CDT (EN# 53022). Subsequent evaluation concluded HPCI-MOV-MO19 was still capable of performing its safety function with the failed torque switch identified during troubleshooting and would have supported the operability of the HPCI system. HPCI-MOV-MO19 only has a safety function to open to support HPCI safety function. The failed torque switch only affects the close function of the valve; therefore the HPCI system remained fully capable of performing its required safety function and was operable with the identified condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Haire).

ENS 5293428 August 2017 14:47:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4Pursuant to 10 CFR 21, this is a non-emergency notification by Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) concerning a defect in an Allen-Bradley 700DC-P220Z2 relay received at Cooper Nuclear Station. On August 28, 2017, NPPD completed a 10 CFR 21 evaluation of a condition that was identified on April 25, 2016, associated with an Allen-Bradley 700DC-P220Z2 relay delivered by NuTherm. The evaluation was performed to determine the applications where the relays were approved for installation, where they were installed in the plant, and determine if the failure of the relays could result in a Substantial Safety Hazard as defined in 10 CFR 21. A model 700DC-P220Z2 relay failed after 133 hours of service. An independent laboratory determined the relay contained a wound wire fault at the beginning of the spool near the spool edge. The wire that faulted was connected to the right coil terminal. The fault was at a stress point where the wire came out of the insulating material channel and started onto the spool. Continuity testing indicated that the wire was open between the fault area and the terminal, within the potting material. The relay failure was a case of component infant mortality. It appeared the fault was caused by a manufacturing flaw that likely occurred due to a tensioning issue at the start of the coil wire winding process. This deviation presents a Substantial Safety Hazard as defined in 10 CFR 21, as this relay model was approved for use in safety related applications. The relay that failed was installed in the starter for the HPCI auxiliary lube oil pump and caused the HPCI system to be inoperable. This was reported to the NRC in ENS Notification 51882 at 0154 EDT on April 26, 2016 as a loss of safety function, but was not characterized as a 10 CFR Part 21 issue at that time. The relay model was approved for use in numerous HPCI starters and the Recirculation Pump discharge valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5281320 June 2017 03:31:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' At time 2115 CDT on June 19, 2017, one torus to drywell vacuum breaker failed to indicate that it was closed after being cycled for surveillance testing. The vacuum breaker had been cycled open and then closed to satisfy SR 3.6.1.8.2 - Perform a functional test of each required vacuum breaker. Failure of the vacuum breaker to indicate closed after the control switch was taken to the closed position represents a failure to satisfy SR 3.6.1.8.2 and SR 3.6.1.8.1 - Verify each vacuum breaker is closed. Primary containment is allowed to have a bypass area between the drywell and suppression chamber less than or equivalent to a one inch diameter hole. The are of bypass was indeterminate while the vacuum breaker did not indicate fully closed. Primary containment was declared inoperable during the time the vacuum breaker did not indicate fully closed. The vacuum breaker control switch was subsequently cycled open and closed one additional time. At time 2311 CDT, the vacuum breaker indicated fully closed. At that time, primary containment was declared operable. Currently, all twelve Drywell to Suppression Chamber vacuum relief valves are closed and in the normal line-up. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5277126 May 2017 12:11:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4On May 26, 2017 at 0321 (CDT), Control Room staff questioned air flow and differential pressure in the Main Control Room. The CREFS (control room emergency filtration system) booster fan discharges to the Control Room supply fan suctions. With supply fan flows questionable, reasonable assurance that CREFS would fulfill its safety function could not be established. Engineering confirmed CREFS system flow rate by testing and determined the actual flow was 802 cfm, below the required flow of 810 cfm. Based on this information, CREFS was declared inoperable. CREFS is a single train system. Per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), an 8-hour report is required due to the fact that, at the time of discovery, this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC that is required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector will be informed. CREFS being out of service places the plant in a 7-day LCO shutdown action statement.
ENS 5276823 May 2017 15:57:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). On (May, 23, 2017) at 0830 (CDT), the meteorological tower primary and backup communication equipment failed, which resulted in a loss of meteorological data to the plant. Information technology and communications personnel investigated and restored the primary system to service. Meteorological data to the plant was restored at 0925 on (May 23, 2017). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5276519 May 2017 11:25:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At approximately 0805 CDT on 05/19/2017, Cooper Nuclear Station was notified by the National Weather Service that the Shubert radio transmission tower was not functioning. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in event of an emergency condition. This is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification System capability, and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Nemaha County, NE, Richardson County, NE, and Atchison County, MO authorities within the 10 mile EPZ (Emergency Planning Zone) were notified by Cooper Nuclear Station of the condition and the affect on the tone alert radios. The first county was notified at 0834 CDT and the last was notified at 0836 CDT. Backup notification method will be utilized. Notification of other government agencies makes this condition reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). At time 1007 CDT on 5/19/2017, Cooper Nuclear Station was notified by the National Weather Service that the Shubert radio transmission tower was returned to service. The NRC Senior Resident (Inspector) has been informed.
ENS 5243615 December 2016 10:23:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4This telephone notification is being made in lieu of a Licensee Event Report in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to notify the NRC of on invalid actuation of a group isolation, reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On October 28, at 0139 Central Daylight Time, electricians were removing a test jack from a terminal on a primary containment isolation system relay due to the test jack being installed on the wrong relay. During removal of the test jack, a neutral wire came out of the terminal causing multiple relay actuations resulting in a half Group 2 isolation signal on the Division 2 side. Because of the plant being in Mode 5, refueling, the only isolation valves that closed because of the invalid isolation signal were the Division 2 isolation valves associated with the drywell ventilation monitor and the drywell floor and equipment sumps. The specific train and system actuated was the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Division 2 portion of the Group 2 isolation circuit (i.e. half group isolation). This was a partial actuation affecting only half of the logic and causing isolation of two systems. Based on the inadvertent actuation of the affected PCIS relays, the system isolated and functioned as expected. The isolation signal was reset at 0230 and the affected systems restored to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 524168 December 2016 02:29:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At 2240 (CST), December 16, 2016, it was identified that HV-SW-(SF-C-1A)(CS), control switch for supply fan SF-C-1A for HV-FAN-(SF-C-1A), main control room A/C unit supply fan had been inadvertently been placed to OFF, leaving no supply fan running as required to maintain CREFS (Control Room Emergency Filtration System) operable. This was discovered following the performance of 6.1HV.302 Essential Control Building Ventilation Functional Test (DIV 1). It is estimated that the control switch was placed in OFF at approximately 2220 during preparation of 6.1HV.302 per S.O.P. 2.2.38. Time of discovery was 2240. This resulted in an unplanned LCO entry for the CREFS. CREFS was subsequently declared inoperable and LCO 3.7.4 Condition A was entered, with required action A.1 to restore CREFS to operable status within 7 days. The switch was restored to its required position at 2247 and CREFS was subsequently declared operable and the referenced LCO was exited. CR-CNS-2016-08744 was written to document the unplanned inoperability." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5232728 October 2016 17:14:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At 0851 (EDT) on October 28, 2016, Division 1 RHR was started in shutdown cooling (SDC) mode of operation. Prior to starting the RHR system, the Alternate Decay Heat Removal (ADHR) system was maintaining RPV and Spent Fuel Pool temperature. At 0924 on October 28, 2016, RHR (pump A) tripped due to RHR-MOV-17 (SDC suction valve) closing. This is considered to be an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). RHR SDC subsystem A was declared inoperable. CNS (Cooper Nuclear Station) entered LCO 3.9.7, Condition A - Required Action A.1: Verify an alternate method of decay heat removal is available within 1 hour and once per 24 hours thereafter; Condition C - Required Action C.1: Verify reactor coolant circulation by an alternate method within 1 hour from discovery of no reactor coolant circulation and once per 12 hours thereafter, and Required Action C.2: Monitor reactor coolant temperature hourly. All LCO conditions specified have been met. ADHR remained in service throughout the event and the plant remained aligned for natural circulation. Spent fuel pool weir temperature monitoring was commenced to verify natural circulation. No increase in RPV (reactor pressure vessel) temperature has been observed. There was no impact to plant operations. Initial investigation indicates that installation of PCIS relay K27 during a maintenance activity physically agitated the adjacent relay, K30, which actuated and caused RHR-MOV-17 to close. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed.
ENS 5231523 October 2016 23:41:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At 1908 CDT on 10/23/16, elevated vibration readings were identified on Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS), Control Room Emergency Filter System (CREFS) supply fan A. Vibration readings were evaluated by Engineering and were determined to be indicative of bearing failure on supply fan A. The Control Room declared CREFS inoperable and entered LCO 3.7.4, Condition A, which requires restoration of CREFS to operable status in 7 days. Repair activities have been initiated for this condition. The plant is currently in Mode 5, with refueling activities and OPDRVs (Operation with Potential to Drain Reactor Vessel) in progress. CNS is not currently in the mode of applicability for a USAR defined accident. This condition is being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a single train safety system that is required to be OPERABLE during situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 522794 October 2016 18:16:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At 1530 CDT on I0/4/20l6, Cooper Nuclear Station was notified by the National Weather Service that the Shubert radio transmission tower was not functioning. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in the event of an emergency condition. This is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification System capability, and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Nemaha County, NE, Richardson County, NE, and Atchison County, MO authorities within the 10 mile EPZ (Emergency Planning Zone) were notified by Cooper Nuclear Station of the condition and the effect on the tone alert radios. The first county was notified at 1540 CDT and the last was notified at 1550 CDT. A backup notification method will be utilized. Notification of other government agencies makes this condition reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). Estimated return to service time is unknown. The cause of failure is unknown. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5226225 September 2016 12:58:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At 0915 CDT on 9/25/2016, Cooper Nuclear Station was notified by the National Weather Service that the Shubert radio transmission tower was not functioning. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in the event of an emergency condition. This is considered to be a major loss of the public prompt notification system capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Nemaha, NE, Richardson, NE, and Atchison, MO county authorities within the 10 mile EPZ were notified by Cooper Nuclear Station of the condition and the effect on the tone alert radios and will utilize the backup notification method making this condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification of other government agencies. Estimated return to service time is unknown. The cause of the failure is unknown. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition.
ENS 5226125 September 2016 04:23:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At 0103 CDT a Group 1 Isolation signal was received on Main Steam Line (MSL) A High Flow while attempting to un-isolate MSL A. During plant cooldown for refueling outage, all inboard MSIV's were closed to minimize steam flow to control cooldown rate. With all inboard MSIV's closed and all outboard MSIV's open, MSL drains in-service, and reactor pressure at approximately 330 psig, an attempt was made to un-isolate MSL A by opening A inboard MSIV. This resulted in a MSL high flow signal on MSL A as the valve was being opened, resulting in a Group I Isolation and closure of all MSIV's and MSL Drain Valves. Pressure was equalized to less than 200 psid across MSIV A prior to attempting to open the valve in accordance with plant procedures. All valves actuated as expected and the cause of the event is under investigation. There are no indications of a leak. The Group I Isolation has been reset. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 522213 September 2016 08:44:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4

At 0710 CDT, Cooper Nuclear Station declared a Notification of Unusual Event under EAL HU1.1 due to the station seismic event alarm registering a response to an earthquake (epicenter near Pawnee, OK). The reactor was not affected by the earthquake and remains at 93 percent power. The licensee is performing walkdowns of structures and equipment to verify that the site is unaffected. Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (E-mail) and Nuclear SSA (E-mail).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ZACH HYDE TO STEVEN VITTO AT 1704 EDT ON 9/3/2016 * * *

At 1547 CDT, Cooper Nuclear Station terminated the Notice of Unusual Event. All inspections and walkdowns of the plant have been completed. No damage or injuries were reported. The seismic event caused no impact to the plant. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Warnick), NRR EO (Miller), IRDMOC (Stapleton), DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (E-mail) and Nuclear SSA (E-mail).

ENS 520707 July 2016 09:48:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At 0610 CDT on 7/7/2016, Cooper Nuclear Station confirmed that the Shubert radio transmission tower was not functioning. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in the event of an emergency condition. This is considered to be a major loss of the public prompt notification system capability and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Nemaha, Richardson and Atchison county authorities within the 10 mile EPZ were notified of the condition and the effect on the tone alert radios and will utilize the backup notification method making this condition reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification of other government agencies. Estimated return to service time is unknown. The cause of the failure is unknown. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition.
ENS 5188727 April 2016 12:25:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At 0823 CDT on 4/27/2016, Cooper Nuclear Station was notified by the National Weather Service that the Shubert radio transmission tower was not functioning. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in the event of an emergency condition. This is considered to be a major loss of the public prompt notification system capability and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Nemaha, Richardson and Atchison county authorities within the 10 mile EPZ (Emergency Planning Zone) were notified of the condition and the effect on the tone alert radios and will utilize local route notification (backup notification method) making this condition reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification of other government agencies. Estimated return to service time is unknown. The cause of the failure is a loss of communication with the tower. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition.
ENS 5188627 April 2016 01:17:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At 1736 (CDT) on 26 April 2016, a licensed operator performing a control room panel walkdown noted the green standby light for the HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) Auxiliary Oil Pump (AOP) was not illuminated. The bulb was replaced and the replacement bulb did not illuminate. A non-licensed operator (NLO) was dispatched to the local 250VDC starter rack. The NLO discovered the green standby light on the 250VDC starter rack had failed. An attempt was made to start the AOP with the control switch. The pump did not start. The AOP is required to start in order to open the steam admission valves for the HPCI turbine. HPCI was declared inoperable at time 1754 (CDT) on 26 April 2016. Tech Spec LCO Conditions were entered and required actions completed. HPCI is a single train system. This report is submitted as a condition that at time of discovery could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC (Structure, System, and Component) needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. A similar condition was discovered on 25 April 2016 (see NRC Event #51882). Corrective maintenance was performed and HPCI was declared operable following satisfactory completion of post work testing of the AOP. Initial investigation indicates that the fault which occurred on 26 April is not the same as that which occurred 25 April. Investigation is on going. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5188226 April 2016 01:54:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-48-hour report due to HPCI inoperability. At approximately 2109 (CDT) on 04/25/16, a licensed operator performing a control room panel walkdown noted the green light for HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump (AOP) was not illuminated. The bulb was replaced and the replacement bulb did not illuminate. A non-licensed operator was dispatched to the local 250VDC starter rack. Both the green and red power indicating lights on the starter rack were found extinguished. An attempt was made to start the AOP with the control switch. The pump did not start. The AOP is required to start in order to open the steam admission valves for the HPCI turbine. HPCI was declared inoperable at time 2117 (CDT), resulting in entry into Tech Spec LCO 3.5.1 Condition C - HPCI System Inoperable. Required Actions for Condition C are to verify by administrative means RCIC System is operable within 1 hour and restore HPCI System to operable status within 14 days. RCIC was verified operable by administrative means concurrent with HPCl declaration. Troubleshooting activities for HPCI are being planned. HPCI is a single train system. This report is submitted as a condition that at time of discovery could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of an SSC (Structures, Systems, and Components) needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5161721 December 2015 22:44:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At 1955 CST on 12/21/2015, Cooper Nuclear Station was notified by the National Weather Service that the Shubert radio transmission tower was not functioning. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in the event of an emergency condition. This is considered to be a major loss of the public prompt notification system capability and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 2017 CST, Nemaha, Richardson and Atchison county authorities within the 10 mile EPZ were notified of the condition and the effect on the tone alert radios and will utilize local route notification (backup notification method) making this condition reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification of other government agencies. Estimated return to service time is unknown. The cause of the failure is a loss of communication with the tower. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition.
ENS 5155820 November 2015 21:49:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4On (11/20/2015 at 1808) CST it was noted that the MET tower (both primary and backup) was offline and not communicating with the Plant Management Information System(PMIS). This results in a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities with respect to meteorological conditions and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Communications technicians responded to the plant and the MET Tower communications were restored to PMIS on (11/20/2015 at 1937). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5134726 August 2015 13:20:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4On 8/26/2015, it was determined that a report to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) may have been missed. The station is making this report due to the station making a courtesy call to a State agency regarding release of radioactive waste from the site as non-radioactive material. The original event involved a release of 14 bags of debris from the Administration Building roof prior to survey results being obtained. The bags were recovered from the local landfill and a determination was made that the amount of material temporarily removed from the Protected Area was below NRC reporting limits per 10 CFR 20.2201 'Reports of theft or loss of licensed material.' On 5/29/13 a courtesy phone call was made to the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (Radiation Control Program) informing the authority of the event. There were no state notification requirements based on the low level of licensed material released (and then recovered) from the site. This is a four hour report made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' There was no overexposure to a member of the public. The NRC Resident and State of Nebraska have been informed.
ENS 5124018 July 2015 18:39:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4

At 1214 CDT on 7/18/2015, during normal surveillance testing of Z sump, Z2 sump pump run time was found to exceed its upper Augmented IST limit, rendering it non-functional. Operators continued with the surveillance, opening the power supply breaker to Z1 sump pump, rendering it non-functional also. When this was identified, station personnel backed out of testing and restored power to Z1 sump pump. Z sump functions to limit condensation buildup in the common Standby Gas Treatment System (SGT) discharge line to support SGT operability. One sump pump is required to be functional to support SGT operability. With both Z sump pumps non-functional, operability of both trains of SGT is not assured. Loss of both trains of SGT constitutes a loss of safety function for control of rad release and accident mitigation per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) functions (C) and (D). The breaker for Z1 sump pump was reclosed at 1225 CDT, restoring functionality to Z1 sump pump and operability to both trains of SGT. Both Z sump pumps were considered non-functional and unable to support SGT operability for a period of 11 minutes. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 8/18/2015 AT 1347 EDT FROM DAVID VAN DER KAMP TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on July 18, 2015 at 1839 EDT (EN# 51240). The notification on July 18, 2015 reported a condition where the two Z Sump Pumps were considered non-functional and unable to support the operability of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGT). Subsequent evaluation concluded that Z2 Sump Pump was functional with the run time identified and would have supported the operability of SGT during the time the Z1 Sump Pump breaker was open for surveillance testing. A loss of safety function did not exist. A modification had been previously installed at CNS that prevents the buildup of significant amounts of water in a hold-up line. This volume of water was the basis for the original Z Sump Pump IST (in-service-testing) run times. With the buildup of water previously resolved, the calculated Z Sump Pump IST run times are much longer than measured on July 18, 2015. Notified the R4DO (Hagar).

ENS 5123616 July 2015 04:41:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 2332 (CDT), on 07/15/2015, the meteorological tower computer system software failed which resulted in a loss of meteorological data to the plant. Proceduralized compensatory measures for dose assessment include use of National Weather Service followed by historically determined default values. Information Technology personnel reported to the plant and successfully reset the software. Meteorological data to the plant was restored at 0216 (CDT) on 07/16/2015. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5110430 May 2015 11:58:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4

At 0458 CDT on 05/30/2015, with Cooper Nuclear Station Unit 1 in Mode 4 (cold shutdown), an inadvertent trip of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump B was experienced which resulted in a loss of shutdown cooling. The cause of the trip is currently not known and is under investigation. Shutdown cooling was restored with B RHR Pump at 0520 on 05/30/2015, and there have been no other issues with the system. During the loss of shutdown cooling, forced circulation of the core was not lost due to the Reactor Recirculation System remaining in service. Based on indication from the in-service Reactor Recirculation System A loop, reactor coolant temperature experienced a 7 (seven) degree Fahrenheit increase during the event. Reactor coolant temperature did not exceed 212 degrees Fahrenheit during the event. This condition is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) - any event or condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: B) remove residual heat. The NRC Senior Resident inspector has been notified of this event.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY DAVID VANDERKAMP TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1646 EDT ON 06/03/2015 * * *

After further evaluation of the reported transient, it was determined that the Reactor Recirculation System A Loop increased from 186 degrees F to 204 degrees F for a heatup of 18 degrees during the loss of Shutdown Cooling. The Vessel Drain temperature increased from 190 degrees F to 210 degrees F for a heatup of 20 degrees during the same time frame. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Whitten)

ENS 509472 April 2015 10:48:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At 0149 CDT on 4/2/2015, Cooper Nuclear Station received an alarm indication that the primary and backup Meteorological System (MET) had gone off-line as a result of a lightning strike on the MET tower. This resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities in regard to meteorological conditions. Technicians responded to the plant and restored the system at 0418 CDT. Loss of the MET system is considered a major loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5092425 March 2015 21:33:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At time 1719 CDT it was determined that notification of the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality (NDEQ) was required based on the results of a quarterly sample drawn at 1632 CDT on 3/25/2015 from the headwall effluent flow 002C sample point identifying a Ph of 4.4 which is below the allowable levels of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) requirements for Ph of 6.5-9.0. Notification of NDEQ will be made within 24 hours in-accordance with the requirements of NPDES Permit NE0001244. The notification to the NDEQ will be made during normal business hours 3/26/15. This sample point is supplied by floor drains in Auxiliary Steam Boiler room, Turbine Building HVAC Fan room and DG (Diesel Generator) Building sumps. Discharge from this line is approximately 76 gallons per day. All flow from this sample point was isolated at 2008 CDT. Investigation of the cause of the low Ph levels is on-going. No indications of environmental impact were reported by the licensee. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5085428 February 2015 01:20:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4

Cooper Nuclear Station became aware of the installation of two 12,000 gallon anhydrous ammonia tanks approximately 1.5 miles from the site. This amount of anhydrous ammonia at that distance exceeds the control room habitability hazardous chemical analysis previously evaluated for the nuclear station. The control room staff has been informed of the condition and have reviewed the appropriate abnormal procedures for actions to take in the case of a leak. This potentially represents an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1153 EDT ON 4/16/2015 FROM DAVE VANDERKAMP TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Subsequently it was determined that the Control Room Habitability Analysis that was performed in response to the NRC's post-TMI requirements bounds the identified condition. This analysis includes the potential of a toxic chemical leak from a 725-ton tank on a river barge carrying anhydrous ammonia. The volume of chemical, and distance from the control room, included in the post-TMI habitability analysis bounds the conditions found with the newly constructed anhydrous ammonia tanks. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Farnholtz).

ENS 5053013 October 2014 15:39:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At 1530 CDT on 10/13/14, Cooper Nuclear Station will make a press release to the local media. This press release is with regards to the control rod blade which was dropped over the core during refueling operations when the control rod blade fell from the lifting tool and came to rest on the reactor vessel top guide in a section that contained no fuel. This press release was authorized at 1327 CDT. The control rod was dropped on 10/11/2014. There was no damage to the reactor fuel. The control rod is being replaced and is in the spent fuel pool. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5052512 October 2014 10:29:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4At 0426 CST (on 10/12/14), a potentially contaminated individual (contract employee) was transported off-site for medical attention at Nemaha County Hospital. The individual had been working in a contaminated area in the main condenser. When the Incident Commander (IC) and Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) arrived on station the individual was no longer in the contaminated area but was still in the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA). Radiological Protection personnel were dispatched with the individual in the ambulance and surveyed him in route. At 0445 CST, prior to arrival at the hospital, it was confirmed that the individual was not contaminated. The individual was suffering from a heat related medical condition. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5039222 August 2014 13:37:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0645 (CDT), on 8/22/2014, the meteorological tower computer system failed which resulted in a loss of meteorological data to the plant for greater than 1 hour. Proceduralized compensatory measures for dose assessment include use of National Weather Service followed by historically determined default values. Information Technology personnel have reported to the plant for investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The issue has been put into the corrective action process for further evaluation.
ENS 503383 August 2014 20:01:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4

This event is being reported per 50.72(b)(2)(xi), 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' At 1549 CDT, August 3, 2014, the National Weather Service inadvertently issued a Civil Emergency Message over their pager notification system during preparations for an upcoming (Cooper Nuclear Station) Emergency Drill. A follow up message was issued by the National Weather Service at 1601 CDT stating that the Civil Emergency Message was a test message and should be disregarded. A media/press release is planned.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local authorities.

ENS 5030524 July 2014 15:38:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4This event is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' During troubleshooting activities, a pre-recorded message was inadvertently transmitted from one of eight speakers associated with an emergency response siren. At 1213 CDT, Nemaha County Officials were informed that the message transmission was a spurious actuation. A media/press release is planned. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5016131 May 2014 14:28:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4

At time 1136 CDT, 5/31/14 Cooper Nuclear Station was informed by the National Weather Service that the Shubert radio transmission tower was not functioning. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in the event of an emergency condition. This is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification System capability and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Nemaha, Richardson and Atchison county authorities within the 10 mile EPZ have been notified of the condition and the affect on the tone alert radios and will utilize Local Route Notification (backup notification method). Estimated return to service time is unknown. The cause of the failure is a severed communication line. The licensee also found FTS 2001 lines to be non-functional. The communications line was severed during road construction. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1530 EDT ON 6/1/2014 FROM KYLE SAYLOR TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

At 2232 CDT on 5/31/2014, the licensee was notified that the tone alert system had been returned to service. At 1230 CDT on 6/1/2014, the FTS 2001 phone system testing was completed verifying the normal status of these phones. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Vasquez).

ENS 5010511 May 2014 16:00:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0802 (CDT), on 05/11/2014, the meteorological tower computer system failed which resulted in a loss of meteorological data to the plant. Information Technology personnel have reported to the plant for investigation. Proceduralized compensatory measures for dose assessment include use of National Weather Service followed by historically determined default values. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.