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 Start dateReporting criterionTitleEvent descriptionSystemLER
ENS 5621610 November 2022 12:44:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Trip and Auxiliary Feedwater System ActuationThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0744 EST on November 10, 2022, DC Cook Unit 2 tripped automatically on high-high level of number 23 steam generator (SG). The reason for the high-high level in SG 23 is under investigation. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. The DC Cook NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. All Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started properly. Decay heat is being removed via the Steam Dump System. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the reactor trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the post trip review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event.Steam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
ENS 5607628 August 2022 17:48:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Reactor Coolant Pump TripThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: On August 28, 2022 at 1348 EDT, DC Cook Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped due to a trip of the #13 Reactor Coolant Pump. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. Unit 1 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. All Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started properly. Decay heat is being removed via the Steam Dump System. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 1 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the Post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event. Unit 2 remains stable at 100% power / Mode 1.Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
ENS 5591024 May 2022 08:14:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Reactor Trip Following Manual Turbine Trip from High Vibrations on Main TurbineThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On May 24, 2022, at 0414 EDT, while rolling the Unit 1 main turbine during the Unit 1 Cycle 31 refueling outage, the Unit 1 main turbine experienced high vibrations and the main turbine was manually tripped with reactor power at 12 percent. Main turbine vibrations persisted and the reactor was manually tripped, Main Steam Stop Valves were closed, and main condenser vacuum was broken. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. Unit 1 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started properly. Decay heat is being removed via Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 1 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the Post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event.Steam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Turbine
Main Condenser
Control Rod
Main Steam
ENS 5532223 June 2021 03:31:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationManual Rx Trip Due to Steam Leak in Moisture Separator Re-Heater Crossover PipeOn June 22, 2021, at 2331 EDT, DC Cook Unit 2 Reactor was manually tripped due to a large steam leak in a crossover pipe of the Moisture Separator Re-heater (MSR) to the low pressure turbine. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. All Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started properly. Decay heat is being removed via the Steam Dump System. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the Post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event. Unit 1 was not affected.Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
ENS 5494412 October 2020 04:26:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System ActuationAutomatic Reactor TripAt 0026 (EDT) on October 12, 2020, D.C. Cook Unit 2 tripped automatically on low-low level of #24 steam generator which occurred after a lowering of main condenser vacuum. The reason for the lowering main condenser vacuum and the reason for the low steam generator #24 level is under investigation. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation as a four (4) hour report. Notification is also being made as an eight (8) hour report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW). The D.C. Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started as required and are operating properly. Decay heat is being removed via steam generator power operated relief valves (PORVs) due to condenser steam dump unavailability from low main condenser vacuum. All four Reactor Coolant Pumps remain running. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the reactor trip. D.C. Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event.Steam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Condenser
Control Rod
ENS 546871 May 2020 07:54:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required ShutdownTechnical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage

At 1000 EDT on May 1 2020, Operations commenced a shutdown of DC Cook Unit 2 to comply with LCO 3.4.13, Condition B Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leakage. At 0354 EDT on May 1, 2020, Operations detected an estimated 8 gpm Reactor Coolant System leak. The source of the leak could not be identified and Tech Spec 3.4.13, Condition A was entered for unidentified RCS leakage in excess of the 0.8 gpm limit. At 0745 EDT on May 1, 2020, Unit 2 entered LCO 3.4.13, Condition B when the 4-hour limit to complete the required actions of Condition A could not be met. At 0945 EDT on May 1, 2020, Unit 2 entered LCO 3.4.13, Condition B when the 4-hour limit to complete the required actions of Condition A could not be met. At 0945 EDT on May 1, 2020, inspections inside containment identified the leak as pressure boundary leakage from a pressurizer spray line which also requires entry into LCO 3.4.13, Condition B. At 1059 EDT on May 1, Unit 2 was tripped from 15 percent power. All systems functioned normally. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications as a 4-hour report and under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A), degraded condition, as an 8-hour report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * PARTIAL RETRACTION ON 5/15/2020 AT 1442 EDT FROM BUD HINCKLEY TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *

The condition identified in EN #54687, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(a) has been evaluated, and has been determined not to be RCS pressure boundary leakage. As such, the 8-hour report is being retracted, as it is not an event or condition that results in, 'the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.' The leakage was subsequently determined to be from the tell-tale nipple of a pressurizer spray valve, not from the pressurizer spray line piping as previously reported. The Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) is formed by the valve body, plug, seat, body to bonnet extension, and bonnet of the pressurizer spray valve. Therefore, the leakage is not RCPB leakage. There is no change to the 4-hour report made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction. Notified R3DO (Stone).

Reactor Coolant System
ENS 5417621 July 2019 12:26:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Reactor Trip Due Non-Essential Service Water System Degraded ConditionOn July 19, 2019, DC Cook Unit 2 started experiencing degraded performance on the Unit 2 Non-Essential Service Water System (NESW) which affected one (1) NESW pump. On July 21, 2019, a second NESW pump on Unit 2 experienced degradation. On July 21, 2019, DC Cook Unit 2 elected to do a rapid downpower over approximately 40 minutes and perform a Manual Reactor Trip from 17 percent (rated thermal power) to repair the condition before any threshold was exceeded. The manual reactor trip was completed at 0826 EDT on July 21, 2019. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), Reactor Protection System (RPS), as an eight (8) hour report. The DC Cook NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Aux Feedwater pumps were started as required and are operating properly. Decay heat is being removed via the Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves following breaking Main Condenser Vacuum for expedited cooldown of the Main Turbine. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the reactor trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event. Unit 1 was not affected.Steam Generator
Feedwater
Service water
Reactor Protection System
Main Turbine
Main Condenser
Control Rod
ENS 533877 May 2018 07:36:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Rx Trip Due to High-High Level in Moisture Separator Drain TankOn May 7, 2018 at 0336 (EDT), DC Cook Unit 2 Reactor was manually tripped due to a high-high level experienced in the East Moisture Separator Drain Tank (MSDT) of the Moisture Separator Reheater (MSR). This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. All Aux Feedwater Pumps started properly. Decay heat is being removed via the Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves following Main Steam Stop Valve closure at 0431 due to a slow RCS (Reactor Coolant System) cooldown. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the Post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event.Steam Generator
Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
Main Steam
ENS 5333413 April 2018 19:55:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationValid Emergency Diesel Generator Start During TestingAt 1555 EDT, the Unit 2 'CD' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) automatically started and loaded to 4kV Safeguards bus T21C. Testing was in-progress and the start was unplanned. Unit 2 is currently defueled. Unit 1 remains stable at 100 percent power. The South Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Train lost power due to a load shed. The South Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Pump was restarted on 2 'CD' EDG at 1614 EDT. The North Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Train remained in-service the entire time. There was no observable change in Spent Fuel Pool temperature. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of an emergency diesel generator, as an eight (8) hour report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.Emergency Diesel Generator
ENS 520656 July 2016 04:38:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Reactor Trip and Unusual Event Declaration Due to Steam Leak in Turbine BuildingOn July 6, 2016, at 0038 (EDT), DC Cook Unit 2 Reactor was manually tripped and at 0050 (EDT) an Unusual Event (N-7 'Unanticipated Explosion') Emergency Declaration was made due to steam leak and associated damage to the turbine building. In accordance with Emergency Plan procedures, notifications of Berrien County and State of Michigan were completed. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. The Unusual Event was terminated at 0207 (EDT). This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (a)(1)(i) due to declaration of an emergency class. Original notification to NRC made at 0100 EDT via ENS. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) Offsite Notification, as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. The DC Cook NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A press release is planned. Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via Steam Generator PORVs (Power Operated Relief Valve). Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the reactor trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the Post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC. Notified FEMA National Watch and Nuclear SSA via email.Steam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
ENS 5110631 May 2015 20:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required ShutdownTechnical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Failure of an Emergency Diesel Generator

At 1600 (EDT) on May 31, 2015, (DC Cook) operations commenced a shutdown of DC Cook Unit 1 to comply with LCO 3.8.1 Condition G, when the 14 day limit to complete Condition B Required Action could not be met. At 0010 (EDT) on May 18, 2015, Unit 1 AB Emergency Diesel Generator was removed from service for planned maintenance. LCO 3.8.1 Condition B was entered which allows 14 days to restore diesel to operable. At 1049 (EDT) on May 21, 2015, Unit 1 AB Emergency Diesel Generator tripped during post maintenance testing due to high bearing temperatures. Subsequent actions to repair and restore the diesel to operable status have been unsuccessful. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications, as a four (4) hour report. The DC Cook Sr. Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. Unit 1 is expected to be in Mode 5 by 2030 EDT on June 1, 2015. There is no impact on Unit 2.

  • * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS PEAK TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 6/1/15 AT 1704 EDT * * *

This update is to correct the information contained in the block titled 'Power/Mode After'. The power and mode after the event requiring notification (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INABILITY TO RESTORE UNIT 1 AB EDG WITHIN THE COMPLETION TIME PRESCRIBED IN LCO 3.8.1 CONDITION B) was 99% power and mode 1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. D.C. Cook Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3 and conducting a normal cooldown to Mode 4. Notified R3DO (Passehl).

  • * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS PEAK TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0734 EDT ON 6/2/15 * * *

DC Cook Unit 1 reactor was shut down (Mode 3) at 0231 hours (EDT) June 01, 2015 and achieved Mode 5 at 0410 hours (EDT) June 02, 2015 to comply with LCO 3.8.1 Condition G with all systems operating normally. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Passehl).

Emergency Diesel Generator05000315/LER-2015-001
ENS 5100423 April 2015 06:10:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown
Manual Reactor Trip Due to a Secondary Plant TransientOn April 23, 2015 DC Cook Unit 2 Reactor was manually tripped due to an uncontrolled cooldown due to two (2) failed open steam dump valves. The cause of the failure is still under investigation. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) Tech Spec Required Shutdown, as a four (4) hour report; 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, as a four (4) hour report; and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), as an eight (8) hour report. The electrical grid is stable and Unit 2 continues to be supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via steam generator Power Operated Relief Valves due to steam dump valves being manually isolated. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event. The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. There is no indication of primary to secondary leakage and there is no impact on Unit 1.Steam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Control Rod
05000316/LER-2015-001
ENS 505871 November 2014 06:48:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Dual Unit Manual Reactor Trips Due to Lowering Condenser Vacuum and Degraded Forebay

On November 1, 2014, at 0249 (EDT), DC Cook Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped and at 0248 (EDT) DC Cook Unit 2 was manually tripped due lowering condenser vacuum caused by degraded forebay conditions (observed thick grass and sand). U-1 and U-2 entered Abnormal Operating Procedure for Degraded Forebay on November 1, 2014 at 0153 (EDT). Conditions degraded in U-1 and U-2 until all but 2 screens in each unit were tripped on overload and main condenser vacuum was lowering. U-1 and U-2 met criteria in the Degraded Forebay procedure to remove the units from service and remove all circulating water pumps from service. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. The electrical grid is stable. Unit 1 and Unit 2 are being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted in both units. Decay heat is being removed by steam generator PORVs. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the reactor trip with the exception of U-1 turbine driven auxiliary feed pump. DC Cook Unit 1 and Unit 2 remain stable in Mode 3 while conducting the post trip review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event. Additional information received determined the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump tripped for unknown reasons. Feedwater flow to all steam generators was maintained by the U-1 east and west motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. U-2 reactor power was lowered from 100 percent to 50 percent over the hour prior to the trip in accordance with the Degraded Forebay Procedure. The DC Cook NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY RICHARD HARRIS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0945 EDT ON 11/01/2014 * * *

At 0921 EDT, DC Cook issued a press release regarding the event described earlier. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa)

Steam Generator
Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Condenser
Control Rod
ENS 4922028 July 2013 14:18:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Reactor Trip Following Secondary Plant Transient

On July 28, 2013, at 1018 EDT, DC Cook Unit 2 Reactor was manually tripped due to lowering steam generator level caused by an automatic trip of the west main feed pump. The west main feed pump tripped on low suction pressure resulting from a secondary plant transient. The cause of the secondary transient is still under investigation. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an (8) hour report. The DC Cook Sr. Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. The electrical grid is stable and Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the main condenser. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the post trip review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event. There was no affect on Unit 1.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DEAN BRUCK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1753 EDT ON 7/29/13 * * *

Additional information received determined the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump discharge valve to Steam Generator #2 did not position, as required, following the reactor trip. The affected discharge valve opened as expected during pump start. The valve closed instead of throttling to the intermediate position upon subsequent high flow demand. Feedwater flow to Steam Generator #2 was maintained by the East Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this update. Notified R3DO (Orth).

Steam Generator
Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Condenser
Control Rod
05000316/LER-2013-001
ENS 4896424 April 2013 18:11:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationValid Actuation of an Emergency Diesel Generator Due to a Loss of Train a Reserve Feed to the SiteOn 4/24/13 at 1411 EDT, a fault occurred on the Unit 1 101 CD Reserve Auxiliary Transformer causing the 12 CD 34kV Reserve Feed Breaker to open resulting in a loss of Train A Reserve Feed to Unit 1 and Unit 2. The cause of the fault is still under investigation. Unit 2 remains stable in 100% power. Unit 2 entered LCO 3.8.1, AC Source - Operating, Condition A, one required offsite circuit inoperable Restore Unit 2 reserve feed to operable status within 72 hours. Unit 1 is currently in a refueling outage and offline. Unit 1 CD Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) automatically started and loaded as expected. North Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Train lost power due to a load shed, which resulted in a 2 degree Fahrenheit rise in the Spent Fuel Pool Temperature. The North Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Pump was restarted on 1 CD EDG at 1447 EDT. South Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Train remained in-service the entire time. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Emergency Diesel Generator05000315/LER-2013-002
ENS 4812019 July 2012 19:30:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required ShutdownTech Spec Required Shutdown Due to Inability to Restore Main Steam Isolation Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays within the Required TimeAt 1530 on July 19, 2012, operators commenced shutdown of DC Cook Unit 1 to comply with LCO 3.3.2, Condition I when the 6 hour time limit to complete Condition C Required Action could not be completed. At 0734 on July 19, 2012, operators identified that power had been lost to two of four Steam Generator Stop Valve Dump Valves (Dump Valves) on one of the two trains. DC Cook entered LCO 3.3.2 Condition B for Function 4a, manual initiation: 'restore required channel or train to operable within 48 hours.' DC Cook also entered LCO 3.3.2 Condition C for Function 4b, automatic actuation logic and actuation relays: 'restore required channel or train to operable within 6 hours.' Power was restored to one Dump Valve which was then declared operable at 1030. Efforts continue to restore power to the remaining Dump Valve. Enforcement Discretion was verbally granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 1736 on July 19, 2012 to begin at 1934 and end at 1934 on July 20, 2012. Upon receiving the Enforcement Discretion, the power reduction was stopped at 1738 at 50% power. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications,' as a four (4) hour report. The DC Cook Sr. Resident NRC Inspector has been notified.Steam Generator
Main Steam
ENS 478811 May 2012 03:28:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Turbine TripOn 30 April, 2012, at 2328 (EDT), DC Cook Unit 2 Reactor automatically tripped due to a trip of the main turbine. The cause of the main turbine trip is still under investigation. The electrical grid is stable and Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via Steam Generator PORVs to atmosphere. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the reactor trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the post trip review. No radioactive releases were experienced as a result of this event. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. The licensee stated that the trip was uncomplicated and the reactor is stable in mode 3 at no load temperature and pressure. The unit is on steam generator atmospheric relief valves because the secondary steam load on the plant was causing too much of a cool down. There is no primary to secondary steam generator leakage for the unit. The trip had no impact on Unit 1 which continues to operate at full power.Steam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Turbine
Control Rod
ENS 4747725 November 2011 10:23:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationAux Feedwater Pump Start After Main Feedwater Pump TripAt 0522 EST on November 25, 2011, operators manually started all Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps in response to a manual trip of the Unit 1 East Main Feedwater Pump due to bearing failure. Operators were responding to increasing vibrations on the East Main Feedwater Pump and reducing turbine load when the East Main Feedwater Pump was manually tripped (at approximately 90% power) due to high vibrations. Operators entered the abnormal operating procedure for Loss of One Main Feedwater Pump, which directs starting all three AFW pumps. Plant power was stabilized at approximately 58%. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the valid actuation of the AFW system in response to equipment failure.Feedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
05000315/LER-2011-002
ENS 472477 September 2011 12:54:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Trip Following Main Turbine Trip from 100% PowerOn Sept 7, 2011, at 0854, DC Cook Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped due to a trip of the main turbine. The cause of the main turbine trip is still under investigation. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. The DC Cook Sr. Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. The electrical grid is stable and Unit 1 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the main condenser. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the reactor trip. DC Cook Unit 1 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the post trip review.Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Turbine
Main Condenser
Control Rod
ENS 4647714 December 2010 02:19:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationManual Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System in Response to Loss of One Main Feedwater PumpAt 2119 EST on December 13, 2010, operators manually started all Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps in response to a loss of the Unit 1 East Main Feedwater Pump. Operators were responding to decreasing condenser vacuum on the East Main Feedwater Pump and reducing turbine load when the East Main Feedwater Pump was manually tripped at approximately 21 inches of vacuum Hg. Operators entered the abnormal operating procedure for Loss of One Main Feedwater Pump, which directs starting all three AFW pumps. Plant power was stabilized at approximately 49%. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the valid actuation of the AFW system in response to equipment failure. No maintenance was in progress, and the cause of the decreasing condenser vacuum in the MFP was due to debris in the traveling water screen.Feedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
05000315/LER-2010-003
ENS 463116 October 2010 04:08:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationValid Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System in Response to Valid Steam Generator Low-Low Level SignalsAt 0008 on Wednesday, October 6, 2010, Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Unit 2 had a Valid Automatic Actuation of the Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Reactor had been manually tripped at 0001 from 14% power per normal operating procedures in preparation for the Unit 2 refueling outage. Following the reactor trip, water level in steam generators 23 and 24 lowered to 21% causing an automatic start of the Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. Manual operator actions were in progress to restore steam generator water levels at the time of the actuation. The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump operated normally to provide auxiliary feedwater flow to all four Unit 2 steam generators, and steam generator levels were restored to normal post trip values. Prior to the trip of Unit 2 reactor, the Unit 2 East and West Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps were manually started per procedure, as part of the pre-planned reactor trip, to control steam generator water levels. The cause of the low steam generator levels is still under investigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Steam Generator
Auxiliary Feedwater
05000316/LER-2010-001
ENS 458932 May 2010 12:58:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationManual Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System in Response to Loss of One Main Feedwater PumpAt 0858 (EDT) on Sunday, May 2, 2010, operators manually started all Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps in response to a loss of the East Main Feedwater Pump (EMFP). Operators were responding to high bearing temperatures on the EMFP, and had entered the Rapid Power Reduction Procedure, when they received EMFP Hi and Hi-Hi vibration alarms and reports of oil leaking from the EMFP. Operators entered the procedure for Loss of One Main Feed Pump, which directs starting the AFW pumps, and removed the EMFP from service. The plant was stabilized at approximately 49% power. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the valid actuation of the AFW system in response to equipment failure.Feedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
05000315/LER-2010-002
ENS 4522826 July 2009 19:06:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Reactor Trip Due to a Reactor Coolant Pump Seal MalfunctionAt 1506 on Sunday, July 26, 2009, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped after the control room staff concluded that the #22 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) needed to be promptly secured due to a RCP seal malfunction as indicated by lowering #1 seal leakoff flows and rising #1 seal return and pump radial bearing temperature. This requires a 4-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Both motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps automatically started due to the reactor trip and trip of both Main Feedwater Pumps. The Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP) started automatically due to low-low water levels in at least two steam generators, which is expected for a reactor trip from approximately full power. The automatic actuation of the reactor protection system and the TDAFP require an 8-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). All systems functioned as expected after the trip, and no major components were out of service at the time except for the Moisture Separator Reheaters which were not in service since the beginning of the current power cycle. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. All control rods fully inserted as required. Electrical system is in normal post-trip lineup. Plant cooldown is via Condenser Steam Dumps using Auxiliary Feedwater pumps. Plant cooldown will continue to Mode 5 (cold shutdown).Steam Generator
Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
ENS 4450721 September 2008 00:18:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Unit 1 Manual Reactor Trip from 100% Power Due to a Fire in the Main Turbine

D.C. Cook Unit 1 declared an Unusual Event (EAL H4 & H5) due to a fire in the Main Turbine. The reactor was manually tripped from 100 percent. The fire occurred at the upper level of the turbine building (Level 633), and was extinguished by the fire suppression system and local fire brigade. Three fire pumps are running at this time. No injuries were reported. All rods fully inserted, auxiliary feed water initiated and decay heat is being removed via atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 is currently shutdown and stable in Mode 3, Hot Standby. Main steam stop valves are closed. Main condenser vacuum was broke. Unit 2 was not affected. All Unit 1 safety-related equipment is in-service and available. The licensee is currently assessing the extent of damage. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DOE (Morrone), USDA (Shaf) and HHS (Mammarelli) that the NRC entered Monitoring Mode at 2045 EDT.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0005 EDT ON 09/21/08 FROM BRADDOCK LEWIS TO V. KLCO * * *

On September 20, 2008 at 20:05 the DC Cook Unit 1 Reactor was manually tripped after a malfunction occurred on the main turbine generator causing high vibration. A fire in the Unit 1 Main Generator resulted from this malfunction. A Notification of Unusual Event was declared September 20, 2008 at 20:18 due to Event classifications H-4, Fire within the protected area not extinguished within 15 minutes and H-5, Toxic or Flammable gas release affecting plant operation. The Unit 1 Main Generator Fire was reported extinguished at September 20, 2008 at 20:28. The Unit 1 plant trip was uncomplicated and all Automatic Control systems functioned as expected. All control rods inserted on the Reactor trip. The Turbine and both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps automatically started and fed all four Steam Generators as designed. The Steam Generator Stop Valves were manually closed to arrest plant cooldown. The cause of the Main Generator fire has not yet been determined, but the investigation is ongoing. No radiological release resulted from this event. This event is being reported as a four hour report required by 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to the Reactor Protection System automatic actuation and as an eight hour report required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system. The Notification of Unusual Event was reported separately. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3. Shutdown Margin was satisfactorily verified. The main condenser was isolated as the primary heat sink. Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves are removing core decay heat in automatic control due to breaking main condenser vacuum. Main condenser vacuum was broken to stop the Unit 1 main turbine generator due to high vibration. Preparations are in progress to cooldown Unit 1 to Mode 5, Cold Shutdown. The Fire Suppression Water System was actuated and one of two 565,000 gallon tanks was drained. The second 565,000 gallon Fire Suppression Water tank was placed in service to restore the Fire Suppression Water system function. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, local and state authorities. The licensee will likely make a press release. Notified R3RA (Caldwell), R3DO (Stone), NRR (Leeds and Galloway) IRD (McDermott), DHS (Gomez) and FEMA (Kuzia).

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY PAUL LEONARD TO JASON KOZAL AT 0414 ON 09/21/08 * * *

At 0409 the licensee terminated from the Notice of Unusual Event. The licensee has established the forced outage recovery team. No fires exist and no conditions conducive to fires exist due to the event. The licensee has established the integrity of the fire protection system. Notified R3RA (Caldwell), R3DO (Stone), NRR (Galloway), IRD (Grant), DHS (Jason), DOE (Maroni), FEMA (Sweetser), USDA (Phillip), and HHS (Nathan).

Steam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Turbine
Main Condenser
Control Rod
Main Steam
ENS 439562 February 2008 10:30:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Manual Reactor Trip Due to High Turbine VibrationsThe DC Cook Unit 1 Reactor was manually tripped from 93% power due to high vibrations on main turbine bearings #5 and 6. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS actuation, as a four (4) hour report and under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 1 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event. The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector was notified 02/02/08 at approximately 0535 EST. The electrical grid is stable and Unit 1 is being supplied by offsite power. Unit 2 is not affected. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the main condenser.Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Turbine
Main Condenser
Control Rod
ENS 4360528 August 2007 17:54:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Trip After Digital Feedwater System FailureAt 13:54 on 8/28/07, DC Cook Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to low steam generator water level coincident with low feedwater flow on #11 steam generator. The cause was a malfunction of the Main Feedwater Pump Digital Control System, which remains under investigation. This requires a 4-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Both Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps automatically started due to the reactor trip. The Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP) started automatically due to low-low water levels in at least two steam generators, which is expected for a reactor trip from 100% power. The automatic actuation of the reactor protection system and the TDAFP start require an 8-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). All systems functioned as expected after the trip, and no major components were out of service at the time of the trip. This is a non-complicated trip. The NRC resident has been notified. The reactor tripped at 15% steam generator level and then level went off scale low as expected. All control rods fully inserted. No primary or secondary safeties or relief valves lifted with the exception of a feed heater relief valve. The plant is feeding steam generators with the motor driven auxiliary feed water pumps and dumping decay heat to the main condenser. The plant is in the normal shutdown electrical lineup.Steam Generator
Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Condenser
Control Rod
ENS 4273930 July 2006 11:30:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required ShutdownTechnical Specification Shutdown for High Containment Air TemperatureOn July 30, 2006, at 0730, a plant shutdown was initiated in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) Action 3.6.5.B.1. This action requires that the unit be placed in Mode 3 within six hours if containment air temperature is not restored to within limits during the previous eight hours. On July 29, 2006, at 2026 TS Action 3.6.5.A was entered due to containment lower compartment average air temperature exceeding the TS Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.5.B limit of 120 degrees Fahrenheit. Efforts to reduce the containment temperature during the eight hour completion time of Action 3.6.5.A were unsuccessful. In accordance with normal plant operating procedures, the unit shutdown was completed by initiating a manual reactor trip from 16.5% Reactor Power following a controlled plant shutdown on July 20, 2006, at 1014. All safety systems and plant equipment used in the shutdown functioned as designed. All rods inserted fully without incident. No PORV/safety valves lifted. Decay heat is being removed with AFW. Unit 2 containment air temperature is 117 degrees Fahrenheit. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4253127 April 2006 06:07:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationLow Pressure Steam Line Pressure Safety Injection Signal Inadvertently InitiatedOn 4/27/06 at 02:00, with D.C. Cook Unit 2 in Mode 5 and the Control Rod Drive System de-energized under clearance and incapable of withdrawal, Instrumentation and Controls Technicians were beginning Instrumentation Channel Operational Test and Trip Actuating Device Operational Tests. The block for Main Steam Line Low Pressure Safety Injection was inadvertently removed. This allowed the existing low steam generator pressure (0 psig) and low RCS temperature (186 degrees F) to initiate a Low Steam Line Pressure Safety Injection and a Steam Line Isolation signal. At 02:07 Unit 2 had a Main Steam Line Low Pressure Safety Injection signal on both Trains. The following components automatically started: Unit 2 West Centrifugal Charging Pump (on minimum flow recirc path with injection path isolated for LTOP -- no injection to RCS) Unit 2 South Safety Injection Pump (on minimum flow recirc path with injection path isolated for LTOP - no injection to RCS) Unit 2 East Residual Heat Removal Pump Unit 2 East Component Cooling Water Pump Unit 2 CD Emergency Diesel Generator Both Trains of Unit 2 Control Room Pressurization Both Trains of Unit 2 Phase A Containment Isolation signal Both Trains of Unit 2 Containment Ventilation Isolation. Both Trains of Unit 1 Control Room Pressurization Fans Unit 1 West Essential Service Water Pump All available equipment actuated as expected for this condition. (The Unit 2 Boron Injection Tank was isolated under clearance for LTOP. The Unit 2 East Centrifugal Charging Pump, Unit 2 West Residual Heat Removal Pump, and Unit 2 West Component Cooling Water Pump were already running. The Unit 2 AB Emergency Diesel Generator was under a clearance for maintenance. The Unit 2 North Safety Injection Pump was under an administrative clearance for LTOP. The Unit 1 East Essential Service Water Pump was already running.) After diagnosing the event, operators manually blocked the Steam Line Isolation and manually reset Safety Injection signals for both trains. Components were returned to normal status for plant conditions. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Steam Generator
Service water
Emergency Diesel Generator
Residual Heat Removal
Main Steam Line
Control Rod
ENS 421258 November 2005 08:58:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Reactor Trip Due to Reactor Coolant Pump Bus UndervoltageAt 03:58 on 11-08-05, D.C. Cook Unit 2 experienced an automatic, reactor trip due to Reactor Coolant Pump Bus Undervoltage. The cause of the reactor trip its under investigation. This requires a 4-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). All four reactor coolant pumps have remained running. The Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Rump (TDAFP) started automatically due to low-low levels in at least two steam generators which is expected for a reactor trip from 100% power. The 'B' train Emergency Diesel Generator (2AB EDG) automatically started and loaded "B" train emergency bus T21A. These automatic actuations of the reactor protection system, TDAFP start, and 2A13 EDG start require an 8-hour report under I OCFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). 'B' train emergency bus T21B was declared inoperable after it failed to be energized automatically on the start of the 2AB EDG. The cause of this failure is under investigation. The 'A' train Emergency Diesel Generator (2CD EDG) had been inoperable for scheduled maintenance during the time of the event. It was restored to operable status at 06:06. All control rods fully inserted. Steam generators are discharging steam to the main condenser using steam dumps. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Steam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Emergency Diesel Generator
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Condenser
Control Rod
ENS 4163926 April 2005 04:02:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Trip with Afw ActuationThe DC Cook Unit 1 Reactor automatically tripped during normal plant startup preparations to synchronize the Main Generator with the offsite electrical GRID. Indicated Reactor power at the time of trip was 8 % power and stable. Preliminary review indicates the trip was caused by an Intermediate Range high flux reactor trip signal. The Intermediate Range High Flux Reactor trip occurred below the Reactor Protection System actuation setpoint. This is a one-out-of-two logic and the trip is active below interlock Permissive P-10 (10% reactor power). The cause of the Reactor Trip is under investigation. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS actuation, as a four (4) hour report and under 10CFR50,72(b)(3)(iv)(A), Specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 1 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the Post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event. The DC Cook Senior Resident NRC Inspector was notified 04/26/05 at approximately 00:30 (hrs. EDT). The electrical grid is stable and Unit 1 is being supplied by offsite power. Unit 2 is not affected. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the main condenser.Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Condenser
Control Rod
ENS 406609 April 2004 02:16:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Trip Due to a Feedwater Flow TransientOn April 8, 2004, at about 2215, Cook Unit 2 experienced a feedwater flow transient resulting in oscillating flows to Nr. 22, 23, & 24 steam generators. At 2216, the high level turbine trip setpoint was reached in Nr. 24 steam generator resulting in (a) main turbine trip signal. The main turbine trip signal caused a turbine trip resulting in an RPS (Reactor Protection System) actuation (reactor trip). At the time of the RPS actuation, Cook Unit 2 was at about 50 percent power and lowering power to facilitate turbine control maintenance. The cause of (the) feedwater transient is unknown and under investigation at this time. Following the RPS actuation, the Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started on low-low Steam Generator levels. This constituted a valid unplanned actuation of the Engineered Safeguards Feature (ESF). Operators stabilized the Plant using Condenser Steam Dumps and Auxiliary Feedwater. Unit 2 is currently in Mode 3 with Reactor Coolant System conditions stable at normal operating temperature and pressure. No other ESF systems actuated. During the response to the RPS actuation by the operating crew, it was noted that the Main generator output breaker remained closed requiring a manual trip signal to open the output breakers. Another condition identified was a leak from a crack in the side of the 'C' South condenser near the condensate booster pumps' recirculation line inlet. The operating crew removed the condensate booster pumps from service to stop condenser hotwell outleakage; the main condenser remains in service. The causes for the above items are unknown and (are) under investigation at this time. All control rods fully inserted into the core in response to the automatic reactor trip and heat sink is currently been maintained using Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and the Main Steam Dumps. Except as noted, all other systems functioned as required. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Steam Generator
Reactor Coolant System
Feedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Condenser
Control Rod
Main Steam
05000316/LER-2004-002
ENS 4062229 March 2004 19:04:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Automatic Reactor Trip During Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker Manipulation TestOn March 29, 2004 at 1404 hours (EST), Unit 2 received an automatic actuation of the Reactor Protection (RPS). The RPS actuation occurred when the train B Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker was manipulated during the conduct of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). Testing the Bypass Breaker had been racked in and closed, but correct indication was not received earlier during the test. The decision was made to restore from the testing and the Bypass Breaker was being racked out when the actuation occurred. The Unit was at full power with all system in normal alignment. Initial indication is that the actuation signal was a Power Range Rate Trip. The RPS actuation is believed to be related to the manipulation of the Bypass Breaker. Cause is under investigation. Following the RPS actuation, the Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started on low-low Steam Generator levels. This constituted a valid unplanned actuation of the Engineered Safeguards Feature (ESF). Operators stabilized the Plant using Condenser Steam Dumps and Auxiliary Feedwater. No other ESF systems actuated. All other Plant systems responded normally. All control rods fully inserted into the core. The Plant is currently stable in Mode 3, and Steam Generator levels are being maintained using the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Steam Generator
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
05000316/LER-2004-001
ENS 4041930 December 2003 18:30:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Reactor Tripped from 100% Power Due to Low Steam GeneratorCook unit 2 automatically tripped from 100% power due to low steam generator level coincident with feed flow less than steam flow. The cause of this condition is under investigation, but it is suspected that unplanned closure of the steam generator 2 & 3 feedwater isolation valves led to the initiating signal. It is believed that the feedwater isolation valve closure originated from an abnormality in the Control Room Instrument Distribution(CRID) 120VAC power system. Technicians were landing leads on a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System flow transmitter which was fed from the suspected CRID supply at the time of the event. An arc was observed during the lead landing procedure. The main generator also required a manual trip signal by control room operators due to sticking of the main stop valve which is also being investigated. All other systems responded as expected. All rods fully inserted, no ECCS actuation occurred, and no relief valves lifted. The unit is stable in mode 3 with aux feedwater providing heat sink supply. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.Steam Generator
Feedwater
Residual Heat Removal