Semantic search

Jump to: navigation, search
Search

Edit query Show embed code

The query [[Category:ENS Notification]] [[Site::Brunswick]] was answered by the SMWSQLStore3 in 0.2577 seconds.


Results 1 – 50    (Previous 50 | Next 50)   (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)   (JSON | CSV | RSS | RDF)
 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 541443 July 2019 12:42:00BrunswickNRC Region 2This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). At approximately 2000 EDT on May 9, 2019, an invalid actuation of emergency diesel generator (EDG) 1 occurred. At the time, EDG 1 was removed from service for planned maintenance. The invalid actuation occurred when the starting air clearance was being lifted while simultaneously performing a Post Maintenance Test (PMT) where an external DC power source was applied to a relay that provided continuity directly to the starting air solenoids. As a result, the air start solenoids were energized causing EDG 1 to start. EDG 1 started and functioned successfully. The actuation was complete; EDG 1 successfully started and ran unloaded. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5411613 June 2019 03:59:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 2127 EDT on June 12, 2019, during routine testing, the HPCI turbine experienced an overspeed trip and then subsequently restarted and ramped to the required speed. As a result, the response time of the system exceeded the 60-second acceptance criteria, thereby rendering the system inoperable. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System and Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) are operable. The safety significance of this event is minimal. Troubleshooting activities are in progress. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 540526 May 2019 22:49:00BrunswickNRC Region 2

At 2204 EDT on 5/6/19, a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared due to a fire lasting greater than 15 minutes. The fire occurred in the '2B' Heater Drain Pump motor located in the turbine building. The fire was extinguished following initial Emergency Declaration. There were no releases to the environment. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remains in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 5/7/19 AT 0002 EDT FROM MICHAEL BRADEN TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The NOUE was terminated as of 2359 EDT on 5/6/19. No off-site resources were required to extinguish the fire. The turbine building is now free of smoke. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, State of North Carolina, Brunswick County, New Hanover County, and the Coast Guard. Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD (Gott). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5401622 April 2019 01:51:00BrunswickNRC Region 2

At 2307 EDT on April 21, 2019, in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent reactor power, Unit 1 automatically tripped due to a Main Turbine Trip. The Main Turbine Trip was a result of two out of three level instruments sensing a false high reactor water level. All control rods inserted as expected during the scram. Safety Relief Valves G and K lifted per design. The same level instruments that failed also tripped both Reactor Feed Pumps. As a result, reactor water level dropped below the Low Level 1 and 2 actuation setpoints. Per design, the Low Level 1 signal resulted in Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The Low Level 2 signals resulted in Group 3 (i.e. Reactor Water Cleanup) isolation, a secondary containment isolation signal, and an auto start of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. Also, the Low Level 2 resulted in (high pressure coolant injection) HPCI and (reactor core isolation cooling system) RCIC automatically starting and injecting into the vessel. All systems responded as designed. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in valid actuations of the Primary Containment Isolation System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Decay heat is currently being removed via the turbine bypass valves. Condensate and feed water are maintaining water level. The reactor is still at saturation temperature and 475 psi, lowering slowly. The reactor is still in a normal electrical lineup. There was no impact to Unit 2 as a result of this event.

  • * * UPDATE ON 04/22/19 AT 0220 EDT FROM ALAN SCHULTZ TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

The licensee updated the event report to include a 4-Hr Non-Emergency Notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) for Emergency Core Cooling System, HPCI, Discharge to the Reactor Coolant System. Notified R2DO (Dickson), NRR EO (Miller) and IR MOC (Gott).

ENS 5396630 March 2019 21:06:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 17:47 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on March 30, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at approximately 23 percent reactor power and main turbine startup in progress coming out of a refuel outage, a high temperature was sensed at main turbine bearing #9. As a result of and to arrest the high temperature condition, the main control room inserted a manual reactor scram. All control rods inserted as expected during the scram. When the scram was inserted, reactor water level dropped below the Low Level 1 actuation setpoint. Per design, the Low Level 1 signal resulted in Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The main control room manually closed all Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), in anticipation of a low vacuum prior to the Group 1 automatic closure signal being received. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) was aligned for pressure control and Reactor Coolant Isolation System (RCIC) was aligned for level control. The Reactor Coolant Sample Line Isolation valves closed as expected on low main condenser vacuum. All systems responded as designed. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in valid actuations of the Primary Containment Isolation System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. At the time of notification, decay heat was being removed by the condenser through one open MSIV and a feedwater pump running.
ENS 5396228 March 2019 20:55:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 1654 EDT on March 28, 2019, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System occurred, closing the outboard Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) due to a low condenser vacuum signal. The MSIVs had been manually closed, per procedure, during the shutdown evolution to address drywell leakage. The inboard MSIVs had not been reopened when the isolation occurred. Subsequently, at 1658 EDT a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation occurred due to reactor water level dropping below the actuation setpoint. All control rods were inserted at the time of the actuation. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in valid actuations of the Primary Containment Isolation System and the Reactor Protection System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The safety function of both the MSIVs and the RPS had already been completed at the time of the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5396128 March 2019 15:07:00BrunswickNRC Region 2

At 1450 EDT on March 28, 2019, the licensee observed that the Unit 1 unidentified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage was greater than 10 gallons per minute (gpm) for greater than or equal to 15 minutes. The licensee declared an Unusual Event in accordance with their EAL SU 5.1. The licensee initiated a unit shutdown in accordance with their procedures and the unit was approximately 58 percent reactor power at 1507 EDT, with unit shutdown in progress. The licensee also received an alarm due to increasing Drywell Pressure at 1.7 pounds drywell pressure. At 1600 EDT the licensee called with an update. Unit 1 was still in an Unusual Event with the unit at 37 percent power with the shutdown continuing. Drywell Pressure had decreased to 0.8 pounds. At 1603 the licensee scrammed Unit 1. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 3/28/2019 AT 1808 EDT FROM MARK TURKAL TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

At 1437 EDT on March 28, 2019, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, a Technical Specification-required shutdown was initiated due to indication of a leak in the drywell. Technical Specification Action 3.4.4.A, Unidentified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage increase not within limit, requires RCS leakage to be reduced to within limits within 8 hours. It is expected that the leakage would not have been reduced to within limits within the required Technical Specification completion time; therefore, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 03/29/19 AT 0302 EDT FROM TOM FIENO TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

At 0259 EDT on March 29, 2019, the Unusual Event was terminated because RCS leakage was reduced to less than 10 gallons per minute. The most recent leakage rate measured at 0225 EDT was 3.9 gpm. The source of the leak will be identified when plant conditions allow containment entry. No elevated radiation levels were observed during this event. Drywell pressure is currently 0.0 psig. Unit 1 is in Mode 4. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser), NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5395525 March 2019 11:14:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 0402 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on March 25, 2019, an actuation of the four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) occurred. At the time of the event, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at approximately 100% power and Unit 2 was in Mode 4 at 0% power. Unit 2 was in the process of aligning the electrical distribution system to power the emergency buses via the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) in accordance with plant procedures. It was determined that a fault occurred on the power path between the 230 KV switchyard and the UAT. This caused a main generator differential lockout relay to actuate; thereby starting the EDGs. All emergency buses remained energized from offsite power via the Startup Auxiliary Transformer and, therefore, the EDGs did not tie to their respective buses. The EDGs responded per design to this event. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in valid actuation of the EDGs. Due to the shared configuration of the Brunswick electrical system, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are affected. The Unit 2 main generator lockout was reset and the EDGs have been restored to standby condition. Troubleshooting activities to determine the cause of the fault are in progress. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 539115 March 2019 12:46:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 05:35 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on March 5, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0% power, an actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System occurred during hydrolazing of the reactor water level variable leg instrumentation line nozzle N011B in the reactor cavity. The hydrolazing activity caused low reactor water level to be sensed on Division II of the shutdown range level instrumentation. Per design, the low level 1 signal resulted in Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The Group 8 was reset and shutdown cooling was restored at approximately 05:45 EST. The safety significance of this event was minimal. Although there was a brief interruption of the shutdown cooling, the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling system operation was restored in approximately 10 minutes without extensive troubleshooting or maintenance, and remained operable. The RHR shutdown cooling system is not credited in any Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Chapter 6 or 15 accidents or transients. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5360915 September 2018 15:45:00BrunswickNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO SITE CONDITIONS PREVENTING PLANT ACCESS A hazardous event has resulted in on site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles due to flooding of local roads by Tropical Storm Florence. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS, and DHS NICC. Notified FEMA NWC, NuclearSSA, and FEMA NRCC via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BRUCE HARTSCOK TO VINCE KLCO ON 9/28/2018 AT 1414 EDT * * *

On 9/18/2018 at 1400 EDT, the Unusual Event at Brunswick was terminated due to the ability to transport personnel to the site. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspectors. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie), NRR EO (Miller) and the IRD MOC (Grant). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS, and DHS NICC. Notified FEMA NWC, NuclearSSA, and FEMA NRCC via email.

ENS 533197 April 2018 12:10:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4

On April 7, 2018, at 0836 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped during testing of the stator cooling system. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally. No safety-related equipment was inoperable at the time of the event. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

Operations responded using Emergency Operating Procedures and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Reactor water level being maintained via normal feedwater system. Decay heat is being removed through the bypass valves.

Reactor water level reached low level 1 (LL1) as a result of the reactor trip. The LL1 signal causes a Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The LL1 isolations occurred as designed; the Group 8 valves were closed at the time of the event. Due to the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation, this event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the PCIS. Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The safety significance of this event is minimal. The automatic reactor trip was not complicated and all safety-related systems operated as designed. Investigation of the cause of the Reactor Protection System actuation is in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5312317 December 2017 05:48:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4

On December 17, 2017 at 0316 EST, the Unit 2 HPCI system was isolated and declared inoperable due to a packing failure of the HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve (i.e., 2-E41-F001). Isolation of the HPCI system due to the packing failure prevents the HPCI system from performing its design safety function. As such, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Unit 2 HPCI system has been isolated and depressurized. The HPCI system will remain inoperable until the valve can be repaired. The safety significance of this condition is minimal. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 1/29/18 AT 1514 EST FROM MARK TURKAL TO DONG PARK * * *

Based upon further evaluation, Duke Energy is retracting Event Notification 53123. Engineering has determined that the packing failure of the HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve did not prevent the HPCI system from performing its safety function. Environmental conditions resulting from the steam leak would not have caused automatic HPCI isolation or otherwise have degraded HPCI operation. Additionally, the amount of steam diverted through the packing leak was negligible with respect to total steam flow and did not affect HPCI system performance. HPCI would have remained operable throughout its entire mission time. Therefore, this condition does not represent an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Heisserer).

ENS 5297417 September 2017 16:49:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4On September 17, 2017, during planned surveillance activities involving Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 4, unexpected voltage and frequency indications were noted when EDG 4 was synchronized to Emergency Bus E4. With EDG 4 in manual mode, the Operator responded by lowering load to reopen the EDG 4 output breaker. Opening of the EDG 4 output breaker with the breakers from Balance of Plant (BOP) Bus 2C, which normally feeds the Emergency Bus E4, opened; resulted in de-energizing Emergency Bus E4. The EDG 4 voltage regulator and governor automatically reverted to auto control, and EDG 4 reconnected to Emergency Bus E4. Normal frequency and voltage were restored with EDG 4 in auto control. The momentary power interruption to Emergency Bus E4 resulted in Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems), and Group 10 (i.e., air isolation to the drywell) isolations. The actuations of Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVS) were completed and the affected equipment responded as designed. Per design, no Unit 1 safety system group isolations or actuations occurred. These actuations are being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Additional Unit 2 actuations included PCIS Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation), and the automatic start of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System subsystems A and B. These systems functioned as designed. This event did not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The safety significance of this event is minimal. Safety systems functioned as designed following the power perturbation on E4. Plant systems responded as designed. The cause of the event is under investigation.
ENS 528884 August 2017 17:25:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4

On August 4, 2017, at 1511 EDT, Unit 1 Secondary Containment was declared inoperable due to a small (i.e., approximately 0.75 inch diameter) hole in Service Water system piping which was found during ultrasonic testing activities. The affected portion of piping penetrates Secondary Containment and flow in the piping creates a vacuum condition; thus bypassing Secondary Containment. The identified hole is being evaluated with respect to its impact on operability of the Service Water system. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. Initial Safety Significance Evaluation: The initial safety significance of this event is minimal. At the time of discovery, Unit 1 was at 100% steady state conditions. Reactor Building Ventilation was in service in a normal alignment. No abnormal radioactivity conditions existed within Secondary Containment. Corrective Actions: Temporary repair of the affected Unit 1 Service Water piping has been completed. This repair was evaluated by Engineering and it has been determined that the repair meets the requirements to maintain Secondary Containment operable. Unit 1 Secondary Containment operability was restored at 1704 EDT on August 4, 2017. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MIKE BRADEN TO RICHARD SMITH AT 1447 EDT ON 9/27/17 * * *

Based upon further evaluation, Duke Energy is retracting Event Notification 52888. The safety objective of Secondary Containment is to limit the release of radioactivity to the environment after an accident so that the resulting exposures are kept to a practical minimum and are within regulatory limits. A bounding engineering evaluation was performed which demonstrates that potential releases from Secondary Containment could not have resulted in offsite or control room doses exceeding regulatory limits. Furthermore, the condition did not impact Technical Specification operability of Secondary Containment in that the ability of Secondary Containment to maintain the required vacuum was not impacted. Therefore, this condition does not represent an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), and the event notification is being retracted. The NRC Senior Resident was notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (A. Masters).

ENS 5284510 July 2017 19:26:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4At approximately 14:10 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), the Control Room was notified of a contract employee experiencing a non-work related medical emergency within the protected area in the service building. First responders were immediately dispatched. Off-site assistance was requested. The individual was transported to the New Hanover Regional Medical Center. No radioactive material or contamination was involved. At 16:02 EDT, hospital officials notified plant personnel that the patient was declared deceased. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for a situation related to the health of on-site personnel for which a notification to other government agencies is planned. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) will be notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 527885 June 2017 19:40:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4At 1352 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on June 5, 2017, during control building damper inspection activities, a control building instrument air line was disconnected. This resulted in the inoperability of the three Control Room Air Conditioning subsystems required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, 'Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System', and the two Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystems required by TS 3.7.3, 'Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System. As a result, this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function for these systems. Control Room AC and CREV system operability was restored at 1407 hours with restoration of control building instrument air. Because Brunswick has a shared control room, this report applies to both Units 1 and 2 and is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This event did not impact public health and safety. INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The condition existed for approximately 15 minutes. Plant staff took immediate actions to return the equipment to service. For the brief time the Control Room AC and CREV systems were inoperable, performance of plant personnel and equipment in the Control Room was not adversely affected. The maximum Control Room back panel temperature during this event was approximately 70 degrees F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Control Room AC and CREV system operability was restored at 1407 hours with restoration of control building instrument air. During subsequent investigation of the event, it was determined that at approximately 0930 hours on June 5, 2017, both subsystems of CREV were similarity rendered inoperable due to isolation of control building instrument air. Control Room AC was not affected. Operability of CREV was restored at approximately 1009 hours. This loss of the CREV system was not apparent to Operations personnel at the time of the event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5277831 May 2017 07:50:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). On April 6, 2017, at 1212 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), an invalid actuation of emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 1, 2. 3. and 4 occurred. In support of maintenance associated with the onsite electrical distribution system, activities were in progress to power the 2C balance-of-plant (BOP) bus from the startup auxiliary transformer (SAT) followed by de-energization of the 2D BOP bus. However, flexible links between the SAT and the 2D BOP bus had not been installed. As a result, under voltage sensing relay (27SX) was not energized and an invalid SAT secondary side under voltage EDG auto start signal was generated. There was no actual under voltage on the SAT, no loss of power, and all emergency buses continued to be powered by the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT). The EDGs responded properly to the auto-start signal. The actuation was complete, in that the EDGs successfully started and ran unloaded. The EDGs were returned to standby status by 1415 EDT. Since no actual under voltage condition existed which required the EDGs to start, and the start was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for initiation, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5268317 April 2017 07:40:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4On April 17, 2017, at 0004 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), an automatic actuation of the four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) was received. At the time of the event, Unit 2 was in the process of starting the main turbine following a refueling outage. Operations personnel tripped the main turbine due to elevated bearing vibrations. When the main turbine was tripped, Power Circuit Breakers (PCBs) 29A and 29B failed to open. This caused a main generator primary lockout due to generator reverse power and the subsequent automatic actuation of all four EDGs. All emergency buses remained energized from offsite power and therefore, the EDGs did not tie to their respective buses. The protective relaying and EDGs responded per design to this event. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the EDGs. Due to the shared configuration of the Brunswick electrical system, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are affected. This event did not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified.
ENS 5267914 April 2017 07:37:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4On April 14, 2017, at approximately 0015 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), during a control board walk-down, it was discovered that the drywell and the suppression chamber were simultaneously aligned for venting. This alignment created a flow path from the drywell to the suppression chamber, which would have bypassed the pressure suppression function of the suppression chamber water volume during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). This condition existed tor approximately 43 minutes, from 2347 EDT on April 13, 2017, when Unit 2 transitioned from Mode 4 to Mode 2, until 0030 on April 14, 2017, when the proper alignment was restored. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Additionally, the change from Mode 4 to Mode 2 with primary containment inoperable constitutes operation prohibited by Technical Specifications (i.e., reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)). The condition did not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 entered Technical Specification 3.6.1.1, Primary Containment, Condition A, which requires Primary Containment to be restored to operable within 2 hours. Unit 2 exited Condition A within 43 minutes when the proper alignment was restored.
ENS 5208212 July 2016 21:08:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4

At approximately 2039 EDT, there was smoke in the Service Water Building with the trip of the 2C service water pump. In accordance with plant procedures, unit-2 was ramped down to 70 percent power and the "Alert" was declared. EAL (emergency action level) SA8.1 was entered for damage with degraded performance including visible damage to the service water pump. Service water pressure was eventually restored by running both the 2A and 2B service water pumps. At 2118 EDT, the site exited the "Alert" because service water pressure had been restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FEMA National Watch Center (email), FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 7/14/16 AT 1456 EDT FROM LEE GRZECK TO DONG PARK * * *

The initial notification should read: At approximately 2035 EDT, there was smoke in the Service Water Building with the trip of the 2C conventional service water pump. In accordance with plant procedures, unit-2 was ramped down to 70 percent power and the 'Alert' was declared at 2039 EDT. EAL (emergency action level) SA8.1 was entered for fire/smoke damage with degraded performance including visible damage to the service water pump. Service water pressure was eventually restored and the plant was stabilized. At 2118 EDT, the site exited the 'Alert' when service water pressure had been restored, and the fire was confirmed out (i.e., no reflash within 30 minutes). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Rich).

ENS 5208011 July 2016 19:53:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4At approximately 1614 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), the Main Control Room was notified of a contracted employee experiencing a non-work related medical issue near the Discharge Weir. First Responders were immediately dispatched and present at the scene in minutes. Off-site assistance was requested and arrived on-site at approximately 1641. Dosher Memorial Hospital officials notified the plant at approximately 1745 that the patient was declared deceased at 1710. The individual was outside of the protected area (within the owner controlled area), and no radioactive material or contamination was involved. The cause of death has not yet been determined. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for situation related to the health of on-site personnel for which a notification to other government agencies is planned. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) will be notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee completed their notification to OSHA at 1835 hours.
ENS 520696 July 2016 21:33:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Duke Energy is notifying the NRC of a report made to the Department of Transportation concerning the identification of removable contamination in excess of 49 CFR 173.443(a) limits. This report was made at 1807 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). On July 6, 2016, an EnergySolutions 3-60B Transportation Package was received onsite. As a result of receipt surveys, Brunswick Health Physics personnel confirmed removable surface contamination on the transportation package in excess of 49 CFR 173.443(a) limits. The package was shipped as UN2910, Radioactive material, excepted package-limited quantity of material, 7, and was consigned as a non-exclusive use shipment. Surveys identified mixed beta/gamma contamination ranging from approximately 2500 to 4500 dpm/100 sq cm on the surface of the transportation package. All other smears taken on the cask raincover, trailer bed and tires were less than minimum detectable activity for removable contamination. The transportation package is located in a radiological controlled area and access is controlled by Radiation Protection. Surveys have confirmed that the contamination is limited to the surface of the cask. In addition, no personnel contamination events have been attributed to the contamination found on the transportation package. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified. The safety significance of this condition is minimal. There is no indication of onsite or personnel contamination as a result of this event. The transportation package is controlled in a radiological controlled area and access is controlled by Radiation Protection. The originator of the empty cask arriving at the site (Westinghouse-Pittsburgh) was notified of the contamination. The cask is used for control rod blades and local power range neutron monitoring string shipping.
ENS 520645 July 2016 20:01:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4On July 5, 2016, at 1640 Eastern Daylight Savings Time (EDT) the Unit 2 HPCI system was declared inoperable due to apparent failure of the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump after the 'HPCI Aux Oil Pump Motor Overload' control room annunciator was received. Failure of the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump prevents the HPCI system from performing its design safety function. As such, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The safety significance of this condition is minimal. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. Troubleshooting activities are in progress. The HPCI system will remain inoperable until the cause of the failure has been corrected.
ENS 5205129 June 2016 12:30:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4This 60-day telephone notification is being made in lieu of a Licensee Event Report (LER) submittal in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to notify the NRC of an invalid actuation of PCIVs, reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On May 9, 2016, at 0626 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), an unexpected trip of the Unit 1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus A occurred, resulting in closure of several PCIVs on loss of power, per design. In addition, the following actuations also occurred per design: - insertion of a half reactor scram signal. - initiation of the standby gas treatment (SBGT) system . - isolation of the secondary containment. - initiation of the control room emergency ventilation (CREV) system smoke and radiation mode. - trip of the operating reactor water cleanup system (RWCU) pump due to closure of its isolation valve. The event resulted from a failed relay coil in the drive motor run logic for the RPS power supply motor-generator (MG) set. The failed relay blew a fuse, which de-energized the RPS drive motor contactor and MG set. This resulted in de-energizing the RPS power supply in the 'A' channel and produced the actuations listed previously, per design. Affected systems and components were restored to their normal configurations by 1000 EDT on May 9, 2016. Since no plant or process conditions existed that required the PCIV isolations (e.g., high drywell pressure or low reactor water level), this event is being reported per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) as an invalid actuation. This issue has been entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CR 2027653) for evaluation and implementation of further corrective actions. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 518485 April 2016 12:54:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4This is a non-emergency four hour notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). At approximately 0908 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on April 5, 2016, an employee developed a personal medical condition in the Protected Area at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant. The Brunswick County Sherriff and local Emergency Medical Services were notified and they responded and attempted to resuscitate the unresponsive employee. These efforts were unsuccessful and the individual was declared deceased at approximately 0950 EDT on April 5, 2016. The fatality was not work related and the individual was inside of the Radiological Controlled Area and was not contaminated. No news release by Duke Energy is planned. Notifications to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration are planned. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 517694 March 2016 20:02:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4On March 3, 2016, during restoration of power to a Unit 1 electrical bus following planned work, an error in the restoration sequence resulted in an invalid auto-start signal to Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) 1, 2, 3 and 4. EDG 1 was out-of-service under clearance to support Unit 1 refueling outage modifications and maintenance and, as such, did not start. EDGs 2 and 4 auto-started as designed. However, EDG 3 failed to auto-start. At 1235 EST on March 4, 2016, EDG 3 was declared inoperable when troubleshooting identified a broken fuse block connection in the EDG 3 auto-start circuitry, which would have prevented a Technical Specification (TS) required auto-start of EDG 3. This condition concurrent with EDG 1 out-of-service would have precluded emergency power supply to emergency busses needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Technical Specification 3.8.1, Required Action D.3, requires declaring the required features supported by the inoperable EDG 3 inoperable when the redundant required features are inoperable. As a result, both required Conventional Service Water (CSW) pumps were declared inoperable at 1635 EST on March 4, 2016. This also required declaring both Control Building Instrument Air Compressors inoperable. As a result, both Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystems and all three Control Building Air Conditioners were declared inoperable at 1635 EST on March 4, 2016. The above conditions are reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The risk significance of this event is considered to be low. Both EDG 2 and EDG 4 were available and protected, along with the supplemental diesel generator and offsite electrical sources. Except for the periods of time for repair activities and post-repair testing, EDG 3 remained available via manual start. Actions were taken to protect other redundant safety systems and additional defense-in-depth was provided. EDG 3 was restored to Operable status March 4, 2016 at 1834 EST and this has restored the safety functions of the above mentioned systems. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5173917 February 2016 10:36:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). On January 9, 2016, at 0946 Eastern Standard Time (EST), an invalid actuation of EDG 2 occurred. During the performance of procedure 0PT-12.2.1B, 'ECCS D/G #2 Logic Test,' procedure steps were performed out of sequence. As a result, the EDG 2 control logic was not properly defeated to prevent the auto-start prior to testing portions of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) EDG 2 logic. EDG 2 responded properly to the auto-start signal. The actuation was complete, in that the EDG started and ran unloaded. EDG 2 was returned to standby status at 1130 EST. Since no actual bus under voltage condition existed which required the EDG to start, and the start was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for initiation, this event has been classified as an invalid actuation. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 517157 February 2016 13:46:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4

At 1346 EST the licensee reported that at 1326, Brunswick Unit 1 declared an Alert under EAL HA 2.1 due to an explosion/fire in the Balance of Plant 4 kV switchgear bus area. Prior to the Alert declaration, the operators initiated a manual SCRAM due to an unexpected power decrease from 88% to 40%. The licensee has visually verified that there is no ongoing fire and is investigating the initial cause of the event. Offsite power is available to the site, but EDGs 1 and 2 are running and supplying Unit 1 loads. The MSIVs shut and HPCI/RCIC are being used to maintain vessel level. At 1412 EST, NRC decided to remain in Normal Mode. At 1704 EST the licensee reported the following: At 1313 hours Eastern Standard Time (EST) a manual reactor scram was initiated due to loss of both recirculation system variable speed drives as a result of an electrical fault. At this time, a Startup Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) experienced a lockout fault; interrupting offsite power to emergency buses 1 and 2. Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) 1, 2, 3, and 4 automatically started and EDGs 1 and 2 synchronized to emergency buses 1 and 2 per design. The power interruption resulted in closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves, per design. The manual scram also resulted in closure of Group 2, 6, and 6 Containment Isolation Valves. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was manually started and is being used to control reactor water level. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was manually started and is being used for pressure control. The Plant response to the event was per design. Unit 2 is not directly affected by the event, however, due to the shared electrical distribution system is in a Technical Specification Action statement due to the Inoperable Unit 1 SAT. The public health and safety is not impacted by this event. At 1751 EST, the licensee reported that the emergency declaration had been downgraded to an Unusual Event at 1730 because the plant no longer meets the criteria for an Alert, but does meet the criteria for an Unusual Event due to a "loss of all offsite power to Emergency 4 kV buses E1 (E3) and E2 (E4) for greater than or equal to 15 minutes." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee has notified the State and Local governments. Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA EOC, FEMA NWC (via email), FDA EOC (via email) and Nuclear SSA (via email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM MARTY IRWIN TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1825 ON 2/07/16 * * *

At 1814 EST the emergency declaration was terminated because offsite power was restored. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee has notified the State and Local governments. Notified R2DO (Musser), NRR EO (Morris), IRD MOC (Stapleton), R2RA (Haney), NRR ET (Lubinski), NRR ET (Dean), DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA EOC, FEMA NWC (via email), FDA EOC (via email) and Nuclear SSA (via email).

ENS 5150528 October 2015 13:26:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe invalid actuation containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. On September 9, 2015 at 2103 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Unit 1 experienced a loss of electrical power to motor control center 1CB when the substation E6 feeder breaker tripped. The loss of power resulted in closure of primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in Unit 1 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e. Drywell Equipment and Floor Drains, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, RHR Process Sample, and Traversing lncore Probe), Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), and Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems). It has been determined that affected PCIVs appropriately closed. However, the limit switch within the motor operator of the inboard RWCU PCIV (i.e. 1-G31-F001) malfunctioned; resulting in an inaccurate remote position indication. Testing has confirmed that 1-G31-F001 properly closed and can perform its intended safety function. These PCIV isolations were the result of a substation E6 feeder breaker trip to motor control center 1CB and not in response to actual plant conditions (i.e., to mitigate the consequences of an event) and, therefore, were invalid. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5109528 May 2015 13:18:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4This is a non-emergency notification, required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). Brunswick has determined that Allen Bradley relays, base model 700RTC, contain an unevaluated Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD). This was an unpublished design change that was implemented to replace an obsolete integrated circuit chip. The undocumented design change did not result in a part number change from Allen Bradley. There was no change to the external appearance of the relay that would indicate that a design change had been made to the relay configuration. Therefore, qualification/dedication of the modified relays have not included additional testing for the new CPLD component. Testing, performed by Duke Energy, has demonstrated that this CPLD can be affected by electrical noise from operation of nearby relays which can reset the timing of the relay. This condition was discovered as a result of a post-maintenance test of an emergency diesel generator. Additional details associated with the discovery of this condition are contained in Brunswick Licensee Event Report 1-2015-002, dated May 20, 2015. Brunswick purchased, as commercial grade, 25 of the modified Allen Bradley 700RTC relays beginning in October, 2008. Duke Energy dedicated these relays for use in safety related applications at Brunswick. The dedicated relays were not provided to any third party customers. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Brunswick has taken applicable compensatory measures to insure no equipment is inoperable because of these relays. This problem was previously reported by AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics, Inc. in EN #51030.
ENS 5089013 March 2015 17:12:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4A contract employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5081612 February 2015 20:45:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4EVENT DESCRIPTION: On February 12, 2015, at 1336 Eastern Standard Time (EST) the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to a failure of the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump. During performance of a routine HPCI weekly inspection, the auxiliary oil pump was started and subsequently experienced a loss of discharge oil pressure. The HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump provides hydraulic pressure required to open the HPCI Turbine Stop Valve and the HPCI Turbine Control Valve during initial HPCI startup. Failure of the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump prevents the HPCI system from performing its design safety function. As such, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: The safety significance of this condition is minimal. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable (per the requirements of 14-day LCO (Limiting Condition of Operation) 3.5.1). CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Troubleshooting activities are in progress. The HPCI system will remain inoperable until the cause of the failure has been corrected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5075323 January 2015 09:34:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4At approximately 0531 EST on January 23, 2015, the Brunswick Nuclear Plant main control room received an emergency call for a contract employee experiencing a non-work related medical issue. Site first responders were dispatched in conjunction with a request for off-site medical assistance. At approximately 0613 EST, the responding off-site paramedics determined that the efforts to revive the patient were unsuccessful. The individual was outside of the protected area (within the owner controlled area), and no radioactive material or contamination was involved. The cause of death has not been determined. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for situation related to the health of on-site personnel for which a notification to other government agencies is planned. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) will be notified. A press release is not planned at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5075122 January 2015 18:31:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4

At 1801 EST, the control room received multiple fire alarms in the control room. At 1803, site security notified the control room of the presence of smoke in the security diesel building. At 1813, the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event due to the presence of toxic gas in the security diesel building on the battery/UPS side of the building. The fire suppression (NOVEC) system had discharged. Both the Technical Support Center and the Operations Support Center were fully manned. The site fire brigade made entry into the building and saw no evidence of fire but they did see and smell an acrid odor from an apparent electrical fire as well as the presence of the NOVEC fire suppressant. Offsite assistance was requested but not required to mitigate the event. Investigation of the cause of the toxic gas is under investigation. At this time, no security equipment is affected. Both the Technical Support Center and the Operations Support Center were fully manned. The licensee notified the State of North Carolina, New Hanover and Brunswick counties, and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM BRUCE HARTSOCK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ AT 1936 EST ON 1/22/15 * * *

At time 1923 EST, the Notification of Unusual Event was terminated after normal access to the security diesel building was restored. The cause of the event is under investigation. The licensee notified the State of North Carolina, New Hanover and Brunswick counties, and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (McCoy), IRD (Stapleton), NRR (Evans), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).

ENS 5067111 December 2014 17:11:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4A non-licensed contract employee working in a supervisory role had a confirmed positive finding for illegal drugs resulting from a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been revoked. The licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
ENS 5045915 September 2014 17:57:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4At 1309 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on September 15, 2014, it was determined that the ability to activate the thirty-eight (38) emergency sirens within the 10 mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) radius of the plant was lost. Subsequently, activation capability was restored when a loose modem cable was discovered and remedied. By approximately 1450 EDT, the ability to activate the emergency sirens had been satisfactorily tested. Activation capability of the emergency sirens was restored in approximately 1 hour and 41 minutes. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a major loss of communications capability. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The Brunswick Nuclear Plant and State of North Carolina Emergency Response Plans include back-up processes to provide warning to affected areas, if required, in the event of the loss of sirens. The cause of the loose modem cable will be investigated. The NRC Senior Resident (Inspector) has been notified.
ENS 5035512 August 2014 05:04:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4

The licensee declared an Unusual Event because of a halon discharge in the simulator. This potentially affects access and habitability of the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The Unusual Event was declared under HU3.1 "toxic, corrosive, asphyxiate, or flammable gases in amounts that have or could have adversely affected normal plant operations." The fire brigade has been dispatched to determine whether a fire actually exists. The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified other FEDS (FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, DHS SWO) and (Nuclear SSA, FEMA NWC) via email.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0707 EDT ON 8/12/2014 FROM DAVID FASCHER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The Unusual Event was terminated at 0700 EDT. Halon discharged into the plant simulator. There was no actual fire. Offsite assistance was requested. Local fire department and ambulance are on site. The TSC and EOF have been activated. The halon discharge into the simulator building is not impacting normal plant operations where the ERO (Emergency Response Organization) capabilities and staffing are still required. Therefore, activation for UE (Unusual Event) is being terminated. The Incident Commander released the building for normal access at 0717 EDT. The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Nease), IRD (Gott), and NRR (Thomas). Notified other FEDS (FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, DHS SWO) and (Nuclear SSA, FEMA NWC) via email.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1218 EDT ON 8/12/14 FROM CRAIG OLIVER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER * * *

EVENT DESCRIPTION: This is an update of a previous notification which was made by telephone to the (NRC) Operations Center at approximately 0504 EDT per Event Number 50355. At approximately 0421 EDT on 08/12/2014, the Halon fire suppression system in the Plant Simulator actuated by releasing the Halon. A Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared at 0432 EDT on the basis that a release of toxic or asphyxiating gas had occurred on site (Emergency Action Level HU3.1). Emergency response personnel reported to the site and prepared to perform emergency response activities. The site fire brigade was dispatched. The local fire department was called and emergency personnel were dispatched to the site. The reason for the Halon discharge is not known at this time and is under investigation. No actual fire was observed. The Plant Simulator is located in the same building with the primary Technical Support Center (TSC) and primary Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Since the Halon discharge occurred in this building, the site incident commander restricted access to these two primary Emergency Response Facilities, rendering them unavailable for use. The NOUE was terminated at 0700 EDT. Normal access to the TSC and EOF was restored at 0717 EDT. INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: This event had no effect on the operating units, and there was no adverse impact on nuclear safety or on the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Offsite fire department personnel assisted by on site fire brigade have validated that no fire condition existed. The building has been ventilated and normal access restored. The failure of the Halon System is being tracked for restoration in accordance with station fire protection documents. Notified R2DO (Hopper) and NRR Daytime EO (Thomas).

ENS 5004620 April 2014 08:08:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4Due to openings found in degraded roof drain piping, Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 secondary containment was declared inoperable at 0215 (EDT) on 04/20/2014. During operator rounds the Reactor Building Aux Operator noted rainwater coming out of a roof drain line into the Reactor building. Upon further investigation a rusted area 2 foot by 2 inches was found on the pipe. Several through wall holes were found in this rusted area and the remainder of the rusted area was allowing water to weep through. The openings resulting from the through wall holes and rusted area exceeded the allowable openings in secondary containment, and this would have challenged secondary containment from performing its safety function. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. This is a non-emergency notification. INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: At the time that is was discovered that Unit 2 Secondary Containment was inoperable. Unit 2 was at 100% steady state conditions. Reactor building ventilation was in service in a normal alignment. The Unit 2 reactor building differential pressure was normal during the entire time secondary containment was inoperable. At no time was there a release of radioactive material from Unit 2 secondary containment. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The Unit 2 reactor building roof drain line has had a temporary repair applied. This repair has been evaluated by the Engineering department with site procedures and meets the requirements to maintain Secondary Containment operable. Unit 2 Secondary Containment operability was restored at 04/20/2014 0600 (EDT). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 499933 April 2014 11:43:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4At 0730 EDT on April 3, 2014, it was determined that approximately 40 gallons of turbine lube oil (MOBIL DTE 732) had been released to the ground from the Unit 1 Turbine Building . The release occurred during the process of depressurizing the Unit 1 main generator. The source of the leak was identified and secured. The area of the oil spill has been contained, (and) no oil reached storm sewers or surrounding waters. Notification of the lube oil spill was made to the Underground Storage Tank Section of the North Carolina Division of Waste Management at 1006 hours EDT on April 3, 2014. This report is made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event related to protection of the environment for which notification to another government agency has been made. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The safety significance of this event is minimal. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety. The area of the oil spill has been contained, no oil reached storm sewers or surrounding waters. Efforts are in progress to excavate the soil containing the lube oil. The source of the lube oil leak was identified and secured. Efforts are in progress to excavate the soil containing the lube oil. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4993520 March 2014 11:34:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4This is a non-emergency notification. In preparation for converting from 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, to NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) Standard 805, an update to the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed which identified circuit configurations where fire damage, under certain postulated fire scenarios, could impact the ability to safely shut down following a fire, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. Affected fire areas are CB-23E, RB1-N, RB1-S, RB2-N, RB2-S, TB1, DG-07, and DG-16E. A fire in one of these areas could potentially affect the post fire capability of the following safe shutdown systems: 1) Containment Overpressure Protection, 2) Emergency Bus Load Shed, 3) Control Room HVAC, or 4) Emergency Diesel Generator Building HVAC. This is reportable as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Fire protection compensatory measures (i.e. roving fire watches) currently exist in the affected fire areas. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The safety significance is minimal. Fire watches were already ongoing in these areas prior to the time of discovery. The conditions identified here are based on hypothetical fire scenarios that have not actually occurred. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program (i.e. CR 676576). Previous similar events were reported in NRC Event Reports 47341 and 49222, and in Brunswick LERs 1-2011-002 and 1-2013-002. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4992117 March 2014 11:26:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4At 0750 EDT on March 17, 2014, Operations determined that both the inner and outer secondary containment airlock doors, on the 20 foot elevation of the Unit 1 reactor building, had been simultaneously opened for approximately 10 seconds. This event occurred while an employee was exiting secondary containment immediately after another employee had previously entered. Upon recognition of the condition, the employees took action to secure both doors. The cause of this event was malfunction of the secondary containment airlock door interlock. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. With both doors open, Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.3 of Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Secondary Containment, was not met, rendering secondary containment inoperable. At the time at the time of the condition, Unit 1 was engaged in Operations with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) and was crediting Secondary Containment as Operable. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The safety significance of this is minimal. Secondary containment was only inoperable for approximately 10 seconds. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The door interlock investigation (is) in progress. Doorwatches with communications have been stationed on either side of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 20 foot reactor building air lock doors. All other secondary containment access doors on both Reactor Building have been controlled as emergency exit only. Installation of temporary video surveillance system (is) being pursued until long term corrective action can be established per the corrective action program. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified.
ENS 4991013 March 2014 14:12:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4At 0937 EDT on March 13, 2014, Operations determined that both the inner and outer secondary containment airlock doors, on the 50 foot elevation of the reactor building, had been simultaneously opened for approximately one minute. This event occurred while an employee was exiting secondary containment at the same time when an employee was attempting to enter secondary containment. Upon recognition of the condition, the employees took action to secure both doors. The apparent cause of this event was malfunction of the secondary containment airlock door interlock. However, upon investigation no failures of the interlock could be identified. The interlock was satisfactorily tested multiple times following the event. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. With both doors open, Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.3 of Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Secondary Containment, was not met, rendering secondary containment inoperable. At the time at the time of the condition, Unit 1 was engaged in Operations with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) and was crediting Secondary Containment as Operable. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The safety significance of this is minimal. Secondary containment was only inoperable for approximately one minute. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The door interlock was investigated and tested multiple times with no abnormalities noted. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified. The licensee is establishing a door watch as a compensatory measure.
ENS 498806 March 2014 20:41:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4At 1605 EST on March 6, 2014, Operations determined that both the inner and outer secondary containment airlock doors, on the 50 foot elevation of the reactor building, had been simultaneously opened for approximately one minute on March 5, 2013. This event occurred while an employee was exiting secondary containment. The inner door failed to latch and opened as the employee was opening the outer door. Upon recognition of the condition the employee took action to secure both doors. The cause of this event was malfunction of the secondary containment airlock door interlock. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. With both doors open, Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.3 of Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Secondary Containment, was not met, rendering secondary containment inoperable. Repairs to the secondary containment airlock door interlock have been completed. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 498006 February 2014 11:00:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4This 60-day report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1 ), is being made per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid closure of Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) valves. On December 11, 2013, at 0818 EST, an instrument technician was adjusting the output voltage of the 'A' 120-volt Reactor Protection System (RPS) motor-generator (MG) set, which is the normal power supply for the 'A' RPS bus. As the adjustment potentiometer was being moved, output voltage momentarily dropped below the setpoint of an Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) on the 'A' RPS bus. The EPA tripped and removed power from the 'A' RPS bus. Removing power from the RPS bus resulted in PCIS valves receiving a close signal. Affected valves or systems were a Reactor Water Sample valve, Main Steam Line Drain valves, Containment Atmospheric Control System valves, Drywell Equipment Drain and Floor Drain valves, and a Reactor Water Cleanup System valve. Other systems affected were Standby Gas Treatment, Control Room Emergency Ventilation, and Radiation Monitoring on Main Steam Lines, Main Stack, Reactor Building Vent, and Main Condenser. All actuations that resulted from the loss of power to RPS Bus 'A' were completed as expected. This event resulted from the attempt to adjust the voltage control potentiometer on the RPS MG set. When a technician attempted to adjust the potentiometer, the movement caused the RPS MG set to momentarily and unexpectedly experience a low voltage on the output, tripping the output breakers. Power was restored to the affected RPS bus by 0858 EST on December 11, 2013, and all affected systems were subsequently returned to service. Since no actual plant or process conditions existed which would have caused the various actuations described above, this event is being reported per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) as an invalid actuation. This issue has been entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CR 651284) for evaluation and implementation of further corrective actions. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
ENS 497883 February 2014 10:26:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4

At 1003 EST, Unit 1 declared an Unusual Event - EAL HU 3.1 (Toxic/corrosive/asphyxiate/flammable gas release that could affect normal operations) due to smoke in the Unit 1 "B" Battery room. The Unit 1 standby UPS inverter cabinet was smoking and leaking fluid. The fire brigade responded and declared the room uninhabitable due to smoke. The standby inverter was de-eneergized and the smoke subsided. The standby inverter was not in service and no plant equipment was lost. Unit 2 was not affected. Request for offsite assistance was sent to the local fire department but was not needed.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of North Carolina, and local emergency response organizations. Notified Federal Agencies (DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, NICC Watch Officer, and NuclearSSA) via email.

  • * *UPDATE PROVIDED TO JEFF ROTTON FROM MARTIN HAMM AT 1045 EST ON 02/03/2014* * *

Licensee terminated from the Unusual Event at 10:25 EST. Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of North Carolina and local emergency response organizations. Notified Federal Agencies (DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, NICC Watch Officer and Nuclear SSA) via email.

ENS 4971310 January 2014 20:11:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4

The licensee declared a Notice of an Unusual Event per EAL HU2.2 "Explosion with Protected Area Boundary" following an apparent fault and explosion on the M29 transformer (a non-safety related transformer). This resulted in a loss of one electrical bus at the ocean discharge station; however, no safety-related electrical loads were effected and both units remained at 100 percent electrical power. Station personnel reported that there was no smoke in the area of the M29 transformer and the event may have been a flashover explosion in the area of the transformer. All safety systems remain available. Licensee is investigating the cause of the explosion, and no offsite assistance was required. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of North Carolina, and other local authorities. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, NICC Watch Officer, and NuclearSSA via e-mail.

  • * * UPDATE ON 01/10/14 AT 2343 EST FROM MIKE MORRIS TO RYAN ALEXANDER * * *

Notification of an Unusual Event is being terminated (at 2320 EST) because the condition no longer exists. The source of the apparent explosion was a failed insulator on a breaker and is known to present no danger to public health and safety. Both Units are stable and a recovery organization is in place. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector regarding the termination of the event. Notified R2DO (Hopper), NRR EO (Lubinski), IRD Manager (Gott), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, NICC Watch Officer, and Nuclear SSA via e-mail.

ENS 4922229 July 2013 17:19:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4This is a non-emergency notification. In preparation for converting from 10 CFR 50. Appendix R, to NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 805, a review of the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) Safe Shutdown Analysis identified conditions that may not ensure required equipment remains available under certain postulated fire scenarios. The analysis determined that the effects of a postulated fire in specific fire areas could prevent critical systems or components from performing their intended functions, potentially resulting in the inability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. Alternate safe shutdown procedures currently credited with bringing about operator actions to mitigate a postulated fire have been found not to contain needed actions. Affected fire areas are RB1-N, RB1-S, RB2-N, RB2-S, DG-07, and DG-08E. A fire in one of these areas could potentially adversely affect Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) 2, 3, and 4 along with EDG Building ventilation system components that could fail vital auxiliaries (HVAC) to the affected switchgear rooms. This is reportable as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Most required fire watches were already in place as a result of a previous similar event reported in Brunswick ENS Report 47341 and Brunswick LER 1-2011-002. Two additional actions have been taken to establish fire watches in areas containing electrical busses E6 and E7. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action Program (i.e., CR 619341). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 491682 July 2013 10:10:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4This 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). Due to the shared configuration of the onsite AC Electrical Distribution System, this event is applicable to both Units 1 and 2. On May 7, 2013, at approximately 2114 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), while Operations personnel were making preparations for Unit 2 main turbine generator synchronization to the grid, a Main Generator Reverse Power Trip occurred. Main Generator Reverse Power Trip was actuated after adjusting the Manual Voltage Regulator on the Main Generator. The reverse power relay operates the Generator Primary Lockout which initiates a turbine trip and start of all four EDGs. These features functioned as designed. The main generator breaker was open at the time of the event; as such, electrical power was not lost to the emergency busses. All four EDGs started and operated as expected. Because electrical power was never lost to the emergency busses and none of the EDGs loaded to their respective emergency busses, the actuations were considered to be partial. The EDGs were returned to their standby line-up by 2229 hours on May 7, 2013. Since no actual bus under voltage condition existed which required the EDGs to start and the start was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for initiation, this event has been classified as an invalid actuation. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4897226 April 2013 12:21:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4This 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). Due to the shared configuration of the onsite AC Electrical Distribution System, this event is applicable to both Units 1 and 2. On March 4, 2013, at approximately 0804 EST, while performing a planned maintenance activity associated with the Unit 2 Start-Up Auxiliary Transformer (SAT), the SAT lock-out relay was inadvertently energized. This occurred when a Transmission Maintenance electrician closed the fault pressure device oil isolation valve without having previously opened the fault pressure cutoff switch. This action resulted in energizing the SAT lock-out relay and, per design, started all four EDGs. All four EDGs started and operated as expected. Because electrical power was never lost to the emergency busses and none of the EDGs loaded to their respective emergency busses, the actuations were considered to be partial. The EDGs were returned to their standby line-up by 1023 (EST) hours on March 4, 2013. Since no actual bus under voltage condition existed which required the EDGs to start and the start was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for initiation, this event has been classified as an invalid actuation. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 488905 April 2013 07:02:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4

At 0624 (EDT), the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) declared an Unusual Event due to a fire alarm in the Stack Filter House. The classification of the Unusual Event is based on Emergency Action Level (EAL) HU2.1, 'Fire not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room fire alarm.' Verification of fire could not be made within 15 minutes of fire alarm due to confined space conditions. Actual fire conditions did not exist; alarm was caused by environmental conditions. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public. The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0650 EDT. Personnel injuries and equipment damage did not occur. Offsite assistance was not required. The licensee has notified the state and local authorities. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM WILLIAM MURRAY TO VINCE KLCO AT 1644 EDT ON 4/5/2013 * * *

This event is being retracted based upon the following: As stated in the original event notification, an actual fire condition did not exist and the control room fire alarm was caused by environmental conditions. Because an actual fire did not exist and the fire detection system alarm was not valid, the condition described in the Emergency Action Level (EAL) HU2.1, 'Fire not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room fire alarm,' also did not exist. The Unusual Event was terminated at 0650 (EDT). The Unusual Event classification was appropriately made, in accordance with the EAL basis which requires the control room alarm be validated by other indications or alarms or by an actual field report, or the classification must be made. Based on the preceding information, Event Notification 48890 is retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Rich) and the NRR EO (Lee).