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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5427813 September 2019 12:23:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY UNAVAILABLE DUE TO ACCESS ISSUES This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. A condition impacting access to the Emergency Operating Facility, Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex occurred on September 13, 2019 at 0427 CDT. Fire suppression capabilities for the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex are currently impacted by a water main failure rendering access to the facility unsafe for personnel. If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, other emergency response centers will be activated and staffed using existing emergency planning procedures and have the capability to perform the functions normally performed by the CECC. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The condition does not affect the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/19/2019 AT 1334 EDT FROM NEEL SHUKLA TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

Water lines impacting the Chattanooga Office Complex were repaired, and as of time 0734 EDT on 9/16/19, the CECC was returned to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

ENS 5426611 September 2019 03:10:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2A lightning strike occurred at approximately 1502 CDT on 09/10/2019, and a resulting power surge damaged some of the security door card reader system equipment. However, this did not affect access to plant areas for personnel who were already within protected area. At 1830 on 09/10/2019, it was discovered that some of the oncoming night shift personnel could not access particular areas that required the use of security card readers. Extent of condition check at 1934 on 09/10/2019 determined that access to 1A and 3A Electric Board Rooms, which contain remote shutdown panels and Fire Safe Shutdown equipment. was prohibited for the night shift personnel. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Access was restored to all plant areas at 2106 on 9/10/2019. No plant events occurred during the time frame that the 1A & 3A Electric Board Rooms inaccessible that would have required access to these areas. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5416212 July 2019 22:50:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2At 1640 CDT on 7/12/19, Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) received an invalid auto isolation signal which closed the HPCI steam supply valves rendering HPCI inoperable. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The isolation occurred while performing a calibration and functional check of a level switch for the Unit 1 Core Spray system. Continuity was checked across the incorrect set of contacts which completed the circuit in logic bus 'A' for the auto isolation signal in the HPCI system. There was no impact to the safety of the public or plant personnel during the time HPCI system was isolated. HPCI was returned to operable at 2110 CDT on 7/12/19. CR 1532094 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector
ENS 5395926 March 2019 16:08:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2On 3/26/2019 at 1030 CDT Engineering evaluation determined that Traversing lncore Probe (TIP) System test results related to Leak Rate Testing of 2-CKV-76-653, TIP Purge Header Check Valve, during the Unit 2 Refueling Outage resulted in a reportable condition. On 3/24/2019 at 1558 CDT, Leak Rate Testing identified a (local leak rate test) LLRT failure of 2-CKV-76-653. The gross leakage Leak Rate value exceeded the Technical Specification allowable value for Type C valves of less than 0.6 (allowable leakage) La. This constitutes an 8-hour NRC notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - Any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The short-term corrective actions include repairing the valve such that it passes the test. The valve needs to be repaired before the unit can change modes.
ENS 5394217 March 2019 14:10:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE At 0735 CDT on March 17, 2019, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was isolated due to a water-side leak from the HPCI Gland Seal Condenser. Unit 3 declared the HPCI system Inoperable and entered Technical Specification LCO 3.5.1 Condition C with required actions to verify the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system is Operable, and to restore the HPCI system to Operable status within 14 days. All other Unit 3 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) remain Operable. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(V)(D), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' This is also reportable as a 60-day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(V)(D). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM WESLEY CONKLE TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 4/23/19 AT 1549 EDT * * *

ENS Event Number 53942, made on March 17, 2019, is being retracted. NRC Notification 53942 was made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) were met when the licensee discovered an event, that at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. At 0735 CDT, on March 17, 2019, during the performance of a routine surveillance, a momentary pressure transient of 844 psig from the Feedwater system was introduced into the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system discharge and suction piping that ruptured the seal on the gland seal condenser and flooded the U3 HPCI Room. Unit 3 HPCI was declared inoperable due to isolation of the waterside of the HPCl system. On April 11, 2019, a Past Operability Evaluation was completed which determined that the HPCI System remained operable. The evaluation of the potential pressure transient and room flooding concluded that the HPCI System could have performed its specified safety function of vessel injection throughout the time that the gland seal was ruptured. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). TVA's evaluation of this event is documented in the Corrective Action Program in Condition Report 149973. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

ENS 5392310 March 2019 04:38:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2At 2259 CST on 3/9/2019, Browns Ferry Unit-3 received an automatic SCRAM on Main Generator Breaker Failure and Turbine Load Reject. Unit-3 declared a Notification of Unusual Event SU1 for loss of offsite AC power to Unit-3 specific 4kV Shutdown Boards for greater than 15 minutes. Primary Containment Isolation Systems (PCIS) Groups 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals were received. Upon receipt of these signals, all required components actuated as required. Main steam relief valves lifted on the initial transient. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) initiated on low reactor water level. HPCI remains in service for reactor level and pressure control. RCIC is not in service at this time, the station is investigating low flow from the pump. All four Unit-3 Diesel Generators started and loaded as expected. Residual Heat Removal System is in service for suppression pool cooling. 4kV Station Unit Boards have been restored from the 161kV system. Actions are in progress to restore 4kV Shutdown Boards to offsite power. This event is reportable within 1 hour in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i) for declaration of the Licensees Emergency Plan. Complete as documented on EN 53922. This event requires a 4 hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' This event also requires an 8 hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), (1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including: reactor scram or reactor trip, (2) General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), (4) ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) for boiling water reactors (BWRs) including: core spray systems; high-pressure coolant injection system; low pressure injection function of the residual heat removal system, (5) BWR reactor core isolation cooling system; isolation condenser system; and feedwater coolant injection system, and (8) Emergency AC electrical power systems, including: Emergency diesel generators (EDGs).' The NRC resident inspector has been notified. As of the event report, the MSIVs were opened and decay heat was being removed via the bypass valves to the condenser.
ENS 5392210 March 2019 00:48:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2

At 0012 EST on 3/10/2019, Browns Ferry Unit-3 declared an Unusual Event due to a spurious trip of the generator breaker, resulting in a loss of AC power to the 4 kV shutdown boards greater than 15 minutes. All diesel generators started and loaded to supply onsite power. The reactor auto-scrammed, with all rods fully inserting. The Main Steam Isolation Valves opened and shutdown cooling was being conducted via the condenser. The licensee will exit the emergency declaration once offsite power is restored. There is no estimated restart date. Browns Ferry Unit 1 remains in Mode-1 (100%), Unit 2 remains in Mode-5 for a refueling outage. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event is related to EN 53923. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 3/10/19 AT 1419 EDT FROM JOHN HOLLIDAY TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

At 1310 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit-3 exited the Unusual Event when 161 kV lines were made available. The licensee is executing procedures for securing the diesel generators while alternate offsite power methods are utilized. Switchyard damage evaluation is in progress. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai), R2RA (Haney), DNRR (Nieh), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD (Grant). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 539188 March 2019 15:51:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) is notifying state and local agencies of the presence of an oil sheen in the cold water channel. Water from the cold water channel was running into a tunnel that connects to the waters of the US. BFN Procedure RWI-007, Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plan requires the National Response Center as well as other state and local agencies be notified of any oil sheen on the water. This oil spill is reportable to the EPA (National Response Center) under 40 CFR 112. The notification was made to the National Response Center at 1113 CST under notification number 1239580. The Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) and Alabama Department of Environmental Management (ADEM) were notified at 1120 CST. This event is reportable as a 4-hour Non-Emergency Notification report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The oil is believed to come from the number one cooling tower basin due to heavy rainfall.
ENS 5375022 November 2018 03:56:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: HPCI UNEXPECTEDLY TRANSFERRED TO ALTERNATE SUCTION SOURCE DURING TESTING At 2125 (CST) on 11/21/2018, it was discovered that U1 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. During performance of a routine surveillance, HPCI automatically transferred from its normal suction source to the alternate suction source. The control room operator then manually tripped the HPCI turbine. HPCI was already inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, Condition C during performance of the surveillance. However, this condition was not expected nor induced by the testing. There was no impact to the safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. CR 1469109 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 12/28/18 AT 1300 EST FROM MARK MOEBES TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

ENS Event Number 53750, made on November 22, 2018, is being retracted. NRC notification 53750 was made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) were met when the licensee discovered an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. During performance of a routine surveillance, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically transferred from its normal suction source to the alternate suction source. As a result, Unit 1 HPCI was declared inoperable. On December 20, 2018, a Past Operability Evaluation was completed which determined that the HPCI System remained operable. The evaluation determined that the HPCI System could have performed its specified safety function of vessel injection throughout the time that the suction path was aligned to the torus. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). TVA's evaluation of this event is documented in the Corrective Action Program in Condition Report 1469109. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).

ENS 5367821 October 2018 06:19:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2

At 0200 Central Daylight Time on 10/21/2018, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 3 commenced a reactor shutdown as required by the Technical Requirements Manual Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.1 Coolant Chemistry Condition D due to conductivity greater than 10 micro mho/cm at 25 degrees Celsius. The required action for this condition is to immediately initiate an orderly shutdown and be in Mode 4 as rapidly as cooldown rate permits. This event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1719 EST ON 12/13/2018 FROM NEEL SHUKLA TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

ENS Event Number 53678, made on 10/21/18, is being retracted. NRC notification 53678 was made to ensure that the four-hour non-emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were met when the licensee discovered a condition requiring shut down of a reactor. 10 CFR 50.72 requires a report in accordance with 50.72(b)(2)(i) for any Technical Specifications (TS) required reactor shutdown. NUREG-1022 only specifies TS applicability and makes no mention of a Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) required shutdown. Because the shutdown comes from the TRM and not the TS as discussed in 10 CFR 50.72 and NUREG-1022, an EN was not required. TVA's evaluation of this event notification is documented in the corrective action program. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Ehrhardt).

ENS 5366111 October 2018 15:37:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. On August 16, 2018, at approximately 1736 CDT, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 2 experienced an unexpected loss of the 2B Reactor Protection System (RPS). This resulted in Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations, and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment Trains A, B, and C and Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Train A. All affected safety systems responded as expected with the exception of the Unit 1 Refuel Zone Supply Fan Outboard Isolation Damper, 1-FCO-64-5, that failed to indicate closed position. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid. The cause of the RPS MG (Motor Generator) Set trip was a failed (shorted) operating coil associated with the 480 VAC motor starter inside the control box. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Reports 1440047 and 1440050. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
ENS 5355822 August 2018 19:35:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2On 08/22/2018 at 1803 hours CDT, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant declared an Unusual Event per EAL HU4, a fire potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. At 1748 CDT Unit 1 received a call reporting smoke coming from the 480V Condensate Demineralizer Panel 3 in the Unit 3 turbine building elevation 557'. At approximately 1803 (CDT), the incident commander on the scene confirmed a fire inside the panel and all three units entered 0-AOI-26-1, Fire Response. The board was subsequently de-energized by operations personnel and the fire was extinguished at 1806 CDT. SM (Shift Manager) exited EAL HU4 and all three units exited 0-AOI-26-1 at 1840 CDT. Fire operations remain on scene to monitor. A team is being assembled for damage assessment and recovery. The fire did not affect any safety systems, no plant transients resulted, and no injuries were reported. This event is reportable within 1 hour IAW 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i). The NRC Resident inspector has been notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email) and NuclearSSA (email).
ENS 534979 July 2018 17:01:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2On 07/09/2018 at 1111 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 1 Operators identified U1 High Pressure Cooling Injection system steam supply valves were isolated. After reviewing ICS (Integrated Computer System), Operations determined isolation occurred at 0958 CDT during performance of surveillance testing. The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable at 0958 CDT due to an inadvertent isolation that occurred during testing. During performance of surveillance procedure 1-SR-3.3.6.1.2(3B) HPCI System Steam Supply Low Pressure Functional test, an erroneous signal was induced causing actuation of primary containment isolation system group IV (i.e., HPCI Isolation). Technical Specification 3.5.1, ECCS-Operating, Condition C was entered as a result of the inoperable HPCI system. This constitutes an unplanned HPCI system inoperability and requires an 8-hour NRC notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The erroneous signal was cleared and the HPCI isolation was reset. Upon reset of the isolation signal, the HPCI system was returned to available status. The HPCI system was unavailable for 2 hours and 55 minutes, however the HPCI system remains inoperable. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel as a result of this condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A condition report has been entered into the Licensee's Corrective Action Program to capture this event."
ENS 5346220 June 2018 11:39:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2On June 20, 2018 at 1003 CDT, the licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event based on Emergency Action Level (EAL) 6.5.U, toxic gas release on site. The Notification of Unusual Event was terminated at 1025 CDT. The toxic gas release occurred when site personnel were filling a fire suppression carbon dioxide (CO2) tank outside the diesel generator building. The relief valve in the common diesel generator room for Unit 1 and 2 diesel generators inadvertently lifted causing a toxic gas environment by releasing CO2 into the room. The licensee terminated the tank fill stopping the release of CO2, and with the door to the room being opened, the gas cleared in about 20 minutes. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email) and NuclearSSA (email).
ENS 5334017 April 2018 12:02:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4At 0416 CDT on April 17, 2018, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was isolated due to a water side leak from the gland seal condenser. Unit 1 HPCI remains inoperable pending repairs to the gland seal condenser. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(V)(D), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' This is also reportable as a 60-day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(V)(D). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
ENS 5330029 March 2018 22:28:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4At 1344 on March 29, 2018, it was determined (engineering evaluation) that an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety previously existed. During a postulated control room abandonment due to a fire, and concurrent with a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP), the required number of Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) pumps would not have been available from 10/28/2015 to 3/10/2018. On March 8, 2018, during relay functional testing it was discovered that the C3 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) pump closing springs did not recharge with the breaker transfer switch in emergency. On August 23, 2012, a wire modification was performed that contained a drawing error resulting in wire placement on the incorrect connection points for the C3 EECW pump. On March 10, 2018, the C3 EECW pump breaker wiring was corrected and subsequent testing was completed satisfactorily. Prior to 10/28/2015, Brown's Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) adhered to Appendix R fire protection requirements which did not credit the C3 EECW pump for fire protection from the backup control location. On 10/28/2015, BFN transitioned to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 fire protection requirements which takes credit for the C3 EECW pump from the backup control location. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'. This is also reportable as a 60-day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
ENS 5326918 March 2018 16:16:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4At 1158 CDT on March 18, 2018, the Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to a Reactor Protection System (RPS) signal generated from High Reactor Steam Dome Pressure in response to Turbine Control Valve Closure. The reactor had been operating at 100 percent power. Investigation is in progress. All control rods fully inserted into the core. Main Steam Isolation Valves remained open with Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) operating on the initial transient as expected. Main Turbine Bypass Valves are currently controlling reactor pressure. Reactor Feedwater pumps remained in service to control reactor water level. Primary Containment Isolation Signals Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 containment isolation and initiation signals were received. Upon receipt of these signals all required components actuated as required. All safety system operated as expected. At no time was public health and safety at risk. This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation' and requires an LER within 60 days per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5326716 March 2018 22:04:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2

At 1604 (CDT) on March 16, 2018, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Engineering reported an unanalyzed condition affecting the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchangers in a postulated fire event. It was discovered that the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) heat exchanger piping associated (with) the credited heat exchangers in the NFPA 805 Nuclear Safety Capability Analysis (NSCA) could experience water hammer damage. Fire damage to the cables for the RHRSW outlet motor operated valves could cause the valves to spuriously open and drain the RHRSW piping. Subsequent starting of the RHRSW pumps on the affected header could cause water hammer loads and damage the piping. Review of NFPA 805 analyses show the cables associated with this condition are routed in Fire Areas 01-03, 02-03, 02-04, 03-03, 16 and 23. There are 11 cases where the deterministically credited heat exchanger could be affected. Compensatory fire watch measures have been established. This event requires an 8 hour report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in: (B) The nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. CR 1139620 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 2215 EST ON 11/29/2018 FROM NEEL SHUKLA TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

NRC notification 53267 was made to ensure that the eight-hour non-emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were met when the licensee discovered an unanalyzed condition with the potential to significantly degrade plant safety. On August 22, 2018, an independent analysis was completed which determined that the RHRSW system would remain functional during the postulated scenario. Based on this analysis, a revised functional evaluation was performed by BFN which determined that the condition did not constitute an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. For credited RHR heat exchangers for fire events in Fire Areas 01-03, 02-03, 02-04, 03-03, 16, and 23, the RHRSW piping will remain intact and the valves will operate manually after a water hammer event. This condition did not significantly degrade plant safety and is therefore not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(a)(2)(ii)(B). On November 16, 2018, TVA canceled the 60 day report which had been submitted for this condition. TVA's evaluation of this event notification is documented in the corrective action program. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Shaeffer).

ENS 532477 March 2018 12:25:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4

The licensee declared an Unusual Event based on Emergency Action Level (EAL) 6.7.U and entry into the site Security Plan. All required actions or compensatory measures have been completed. The Notice of Unusual Event was terminated at 1142 CST. There was no impact to the operation of any of the units at the Browns Ferry site. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. See EN #53248. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email) and NuclearSSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1816 EST ON 03/07/2018 FROM DAVID RENN TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The licensee provided additional information regarding the event. Notified the R2DO (Musser), IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Miller).

ENS 5316210 January 2018 13:53:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4At 0928 CST on January 10, 2018, the Unit 3 reactor automatically scrammed due to a Reactor Protection System (RPS) signal generated from Turbine Control Valve Emergency Trip System pressure low. The reactor had been operating near 73 percent power for an emergent issue for Turbine Control Valve (TCV) No. 3. With TCV No. 3 out of service and closed, the unit was operating with RPS in a half scram condition. A subsequent failure of the TCV No. 2 sensing line resulted in RPS coincidence logic being met for TCV fast closure SCRAM. The investigation of the TCV No. 2 sensing line failure continues. All control rods fully inserted into the core. Main Steam Isolation Valves remained open with Main Turbine Bypass Valves controlling reactor pressure. Reactor Feedwater pumps remained in service to control reactor water level. Primary Containment Isolation Signals Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 containment isolation and initiation signals were received. Upon receipt of these signals all required components actuated as required. Neither High Pressure Coolant Injection nor Reactor Core Isolation Cooling initiation signals were received. This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and requires an LER within 60 days per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5307014 November 2017 15:13:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. On September 15, 2017, during a TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority) review of Operations logs, it was determined that a reportable condition occurred in January 2017 but no NRC report had been made. On January 10, 2017, at 0300 Central Standard Time (CST), Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, received Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals. The Group 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations caused the initiation of all three trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem 'A.' At 0311 CST, Operations personnel discovered that the 3A1 RPS circuit protector had tripped on undervoltage. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywall Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywall Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore the actuation of the PCIS was invalid. All affected equipment responded as designed. This condition was the result of an undervoltage condition on the 3A1 circuit protector. During trouble shooting, the undervoltage setpoints were found to be 116 VAC and 115 VAC, when the normal as left acceptance band is 109.7 VAC to 111.3 VAC. The 3A RPS protective relays had been previously replaced in September 2016. The most likely cause of the undervoltage condition in these relays is infant mortality. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
ENS 530491 November 2017 22:26:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4At 1425 (CDT) on November 1, 2017, Operations was notified of a condition affecting Unit 3 4kV Shutdown Boards 3EA, 3EB, 3EC, and 3ED. It was discovered that multiple potential transformer (PT) primary fuses are GE type EJ1 size 0.5 AMP which does not coordinate with the PT's secondary fuses. A fault on the associated cable could clear the primary PT primary fuses for the 4kV Shutdown Board. This would result in the board tripping 4kV motor loads, disconnecting from Off-site power and connecting to the Emergency Diesel Generator. However, since the PT fuse is cleared, the under-voltage trips on the 4kV motors would remain in if there is no Common Accident Signal (CAS) present. The 4kV motor loads include Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pumps, Core Spray (CS) Pumps, Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Pumps, and Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) pumps. Review of NFPA 805 analyses show the cables for all four U3 4kV Shutdown Boards are routed in Fire Area 03-03 and Fire Area 16. Therefore a fire in either area could result in a loss of all four U3 4kV Shutdown Boards motor loads. Cables for 4kV Shutdown Board 3EA and 3EB are both routed in Fire Area 21 which could result in a loss of both Division I Shutdown Board motor loads. Compensatory fire watch measures have been established. This event requires an 8 hour report in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. CR 1354129 was initiated in the Corrective Action Program.
ENS 5301413 October 2017 22:46:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4On October 13, 2017 at 1700 CDT, Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) was declared Inoperable due to discovery of a leak on a sensing line to 1-PCV-073-0043, Lube Oil Cooler & Gland Seal Condenser Pressure Control Valve. The leak is a steady stream located where the sense line connects to the valve. This constitutes an unplanned HPCI System inoperability and requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), due to the failure of a single train system affecting accident mitigation and a 60 day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the Licensee.
ENS 5295910 September 2017 20:45:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4At 1151 (CDT) on September 10, 2017 Browns Ferry Units 1 and 2 declared 'B' Control Bay chiller inoperable. 'A' Control Bay chiller was previously declared inoperable. This resulted in inoperability of the equipment in the U1 and U2 4kV Shutdown Board Rooms. The declarations of the equipment in the Shutdown Board Rooms is a loss of safely function for electrical components (4kv Shutdown Boards and 480V Shutdown Boards) required for shut down of the U1 and U2 reactors and maintaining them in a safe shutdown condition, as well as RHR capability and Accident Mitigation. lnoperability of these boards also requires declaring two trains of Standby Gas Treatment inoperable resulting in a loss of safety function for Units 1, 2 and 3 for systems needed to control the release of radioactive material. This event requires an 8 hour report IAW 50.72(b)(3)(v), 'Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove residual heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. CR 1336821 was initiated in the Browns Ferry Corrective Action Program.
ENS 5270725 April 2017 17:53:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4Following engineering evaluation of tornado missile protection, the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 7 day tank vent piping is subject to potential damage for EDGs D, 3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D. In the event that a tornado missile impact occurs on the aforementioned ventilation piping, there is a possibility that the vent lines could crimp. This could prevent the tanks from venting and would inhibit the transfer of fuel oil from the 7 day tank to the associated EDG. As a result, EDGs D, 3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D are inoperable for tornado missile protection and the Tech Spec actions cannot be met. These conditions are reportable IAW 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. This issue is being addressed IAW EGM 15-002, Revision 1, Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5264829 March 2017 23:36:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4At 1844 CDT on 3/29/2017, Unit 2 initiated a manual scram due to multiple rods inserting. At 1842 during Unit 2 start-up, Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) 'G' drifted low. The operator adjusted the range down one position with no immediate reaction. At 1844, a spike on IRM 'G' caused a half scram on Reactor Protection System (RPS) 'A' trip system. The half scram was being reset after evaluating no trip condition was present. As the operator reset groups 2 and 3, a trip signal from IRM 'F' was received on the RPS 'B' trip system, resulting in rod insertion for groups 1 and 4. When the operator identified multiple rods inserting, the actions of procedure 2-AOI-100-1 were followed and a manual scram was inserted. Investigation is ongoing. All safety systems remained in standby readiness configuration. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) reactor water level initiation set points were reached. Primary Containment Isolations Systems did not receive an actuation signal and performed as designed. This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the RPS when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'any event or condition that results in valid actuation of systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) Reactor Protection System(RPS) including reactor scram and reactor trip'. This event requires an LER within 60 days per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 525872 March 2017 13:53:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4

At 1230 CST, the licensee declared a notification of unusual event based on Emergency Action Level 6.7-U, a non-hostile security event, due to introduction of contraband into the protected area. All required actions have been completed. There was no impact to the operation of any of the units at the Browns Ferry site. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. See EN #52586. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email) and NuclearSSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM THOMAS BRADFORD TO JEFF HERRERA AT 1611 EST ON 3/2/17 * * *

At 1500 CST, the licensee terminated the notification of unusual event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (McCoy), NRR EO (King), and IRD (Grant). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email) and NuclearSSA (email).

ENS 5255716 February 2017 15:57:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4On February 16, 2017 at 1052 CST, Unit 2 received a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System 120V Power Failure alarm. Troubleshooting identified a cleared fuse for the HPCI System Flow Controller, 2-FIC-73-33, which would have prevented automatic or manual HPCI System initiation and rendered the HPCI System inoperable. At 1145 CST, the cleared fuse was replaced and the HPCI system was declared available. The HPCI System remains inoperable for additional troubleshooting. This constitutes an unplanned HPCI System inoperability and requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), due to the failure of a single train system affecting accident mitigation and a 60 day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5245221 December 2016 16:55:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4On October 8, 2016, it was initially discovered that the voltage tap changer settings for the 480V Shutdown Board Transformers 1-XFA-231-TS1A (TS1A) and 1-XFA-231-TS1B (TS1B) were incorrect (4160/480V instead of 3952/480V). This could potentially result in lower than minimum required voltages at the electrically downstream buses and equipment during a postulated loss of coolant accident coincident with design minimum voltage conditions. An initial Licensee Event Report (LER 50-259/2016-004-00) was submitted on December 7, 2016 following the initial review. This LER identified that a supplement would be required pending additional technical evaluation. While comprehensive analysis is not complete, the initial aggregate dynamic loading evaluation does not provide assurance that sufficient voltage would be available for various loading scenarios during postulated accident conditions. This condition was determined to have existed since a Unit 1 Design Change was implemented in 2004. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), as any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. On October 9, 2016, and October 12, 2016. the transformer taps for TS1B and TS1A, respectively, were set in accordance with the applicable drawing, which specify the correct tap settings. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. In October 2016, the licensee validated that this problem did not exist on units two and three.
ENS 5227330 September 2016 16:19:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol on a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 521503 August 2016 21:38:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4On August 3, 2016 at approximately 1300 CDT during review of NFPA 805 requirements, it was determined that the NFPA 805 analysis and Fire Safe Shutdown (FSS) procedures do not consider the potential for fire-induced failure of the 4kV Shutdown Board under-voltage trip functions for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) power supply alignments. As such, a condition could possibly exist during a postulated fire where a required EDG's 4kV loads would not trip on an undervoltage condition. Current procedures and timeline analysis do not consider operator actions that could be necessary to manually strip the 4kV Safe Shutdown (S/D) board prior to subsequent EDG restart. As such, a subsequent restart, manual or automatic, of the EDG under these conditions, with its associated loads still connected to the 4kV S/D board, could potentially over load the EDG on restart. This notification is to report a condition involving a deficiency in FSS procedures affecting restoration of power to safe shutdown busses under certain postulated fire scenarios. The condition could result in an adverse impact on the ability of operators to implement FSS procedures in response to a postulated fire in 6 fire areas. Therefore, this notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Compensatory fire watches have been established in the affected areas and this deficiency has been added to the current fire protection impairment plan. The (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5211320 July 2016 20:33:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4On 07/20/2016 at 1245 CDT, the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Steam Line Inboard Isolation Valve was declared inoperable. HPCI was declared inoperable at 0300 CDT on 7/18/2016 when it was taken out of service for planned maintenance. A 14 day LCO (Limiting Conditions for Operation) was entered and will expire at 0300 CDT on 8/1/2016. HPCI was being returned to service after the planned maintenance period. The inboard isolation valve and the bypass around the outboard isolation valve were open to warm and pressurize the HPCI steam line. HPCI steam line pressure stabilized at approximately 50 psig. The outboard isolation valve was slowly opened to determine if the inboard isolation valve was actually open. There was no change in steam line pressure or indications of flow at the valves. Based on this information, the HPCI Steam Line Inboard Isolation Valve was declared inoperable for its Primary Containment Isolation function. The appropriate Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were entered and the HPCI steam line was isolated. This constitutes an unplanned HPCI system inoperability and requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), due to the failure of a single train system affecting accident mitigation and a 60 day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5202520 June 2016 15:27:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) because the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is in the process of informing the Alabama Radiological Protection Department, Alabama Department of Environmental Management, Limestone County Emergency Management Department, and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) of recent groundwater monitoring results at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in accordance with NEI 07-07, Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative. There are no indications of any impacts to any off-site drinking water source as indicated by Browns Ferry's off-site groundwater monitoring well samples. TVA has taken immediate action to address the apparent leak following the detection of elevated tritium levels from on-site groundwater monitoring wells and will be monitoring affected wells on an increased frequency. No elevated tritium levels have been detected from off-site monitoring locations, and the public is not at risk. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5201918 June 2016 05:49:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4On 6/17/2016, 2-SR-3.3.6.1.6(3) HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) system time delay relay calibration periodic surveillance was being performed. During a section in the procedure a fuse cleared for the logic bus B power at 2135 (CDT). This rendered the HPCI system unable to be manually or automatically initiated. At 2239 the fuse was replaced and the HPCI system was restored to a standby lineup. HPCl is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5200413 June 2016 22:13:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4

At 1845 CDT on June 13, 2016, TVA Corporate Emergency Preparedness notified the Shift Manager at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant that eight of the BFN (Browns Ferry Nuclear) Alert & Notification Sirens (19, 39, 55, 59, 60, 61, 69, 95) failed to rotate. The sirens were activated at 0915 CDT. Post sounding siren feedback indicated thirteen sirens that failed to rotate. BFN EP (Emergency Preparedness) Senior Instrument Mechanics were dispatched to inspect the thirteen sirens and determined, through field inspections that only eight sirens would not rotate. The field inspection was completed and communicated to Corporate Emergency Preparedness at 1733 CDT. Per NPG-SPP-03.5.1, the affected sirens which were lost affect 25.1 percent of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population and the sirens are not expected to be returned to service within 24 hours. Per NPG-SPP-03.5.1, a Loss of Alert and Notification System Capability exists when there is an unplanned or planned loss of primary Alert and Notification System (ANS) equipment for greater than one hour resulting in a loss of capability to alert 25 percent or more of the total Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population and either the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) approved backup alerting method cannot be implemented for the area affected by the lost primary ANS equipment OR the primary ANS equipment is not expected to be returned to service within 24 hours. TVA Corporate Emergency Preparedness is redirecting a team from Watts Bar Nuclear Plant to commence repairs on Wednesday 6/15/2016. This 8 hour notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)xiii. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event has been entered in the Corrective Action Program.

  • * * EVENT RETRACTION FROM MARK MOEBES TO RICHARD SMITH AT 0538 EDT ON 7/08/2016 * * *

The licensee is retracting this event notification. Upon further evaluation using siren modeling software, back-up route alerting was deemed unnecessary since the overlap from neighboring sirens provided the required minimum siren coverage over all populated areas within the EPZ. The TVA siren system provides significant acoustic overlap that is not completely accounted for in the population factors used to initially determine the impacted population for the purposes of reportability. During the event, BFN remained capable of providing adequate siren coverage, and the loss of ANS equipment impacted less than 25 percent of the population within the EPZ. Therefore, this was not a reportable event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the RII RDO (Seymour).

ENS 519968 June 2016 17:51:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4At 0800 CDT on 6/8/2016, 3-SR-3.5.1.7, 'HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) Main and Booster Pump Set Developed Head and Flow Rate Test at Rated Reactor Pressure' periodic surveillance was being performed. As part of the surveillance procedure, HPCI was declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) - Operating, Condition C at 0925. At 1037, the HPCI turbine was started and a turbine trip alarm was received as well as large swings observed on the suction pressure indicator and slow turbine response. The control room operator then manually tripped the HPCI turbine due to the abnormal indications received. HPCl is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5187822 April 2016 18:22:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4At 1359 CDT on April 22, 2016, Browns Ferry Units 1 & 2 experienced a partial loss of power during the transfer of Shutdown Bus 2 from the alternate power source back to the normal power source. During the transfer, the normal feeder breaker failed to close and provide power to the Shutdown Bus, resulting in an auto actuation of two Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). Power to Shutdown Bus 2 was immediately restored using the alternate feeder breaker. The EDGs did not tie to the boards. All systems responded as expected for the loss of power, and both Units 1 & 2 maintained 100% Rx Power. All systems have been restored to a normal lineup, and both Units 1 & 2 remain at 100% Rx Power. This event requires an 8 hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), (8) Emergency AC electrical power systems, including: Emergency diesel generators (EDGs).' The NRC resident inspector has been notified. The cause of the normal feeder breaker failure is being investigated. There was no impact on Unit 3.
ENS 518506 April 2016 17:07:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4

At 1545 CDT on 04/06/16 Browns Ferry Unit 3 declared and exited the declaration of an unusual event due to a main steam line high high radiation condition. Power to Unit 3 was reduced to 91 percent power. The high radiation condition alarm cleared at 1526 CDT. Browns Ferry Unit 3 reported that the high radiation conditions were due to resin intrusion from the condensate demineralizers into the reactor and hydrogen water chemistry was a potential contributor to the event. The cause is still under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. State and Local notifications were made. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM BILL BALL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0034 EDT ON 04/07/2016 * * *

At 1941 (CDT) BFN (Brown's Ferry) determined this notification to be potentially newsworthy due to receiving notification that counties (surrounding the plant) were alerted of this event. No plant conditions changed. The licensee may issue a press release. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Nease).

ENS 5162830 December 2015 13:16:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of the Emergency AC electrical power systems, due to invalid start of an emergency diesel generator (EDG). On November 6, 2015, at 0815 (CST), EDG A received a fast start signal inadvertently. Maintenance Fix-It-Now (FIN) personnel, working in the vicinity of the relay panel, made incidental contact with one of the relays in the Diesel Generator Logic Relay Panel which initiated the engine start. The engine started and obtained rated speed and voltage in single unit mode. This was not a valid initiation of EDG A. Operations personnel responded to the EDG actuation by ensuring that the engine was shut down and placed in standby condition in accordance to plant operating instructions. The plant conditions at the time of the EDG A initiation would not have actuated the EDG; therefore, the actuation of EDG A was invalid. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Condition Report (CR) 1101730. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event.
ENS 5157129 November 2015 20:40:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4On November 29, 2015 at approximately 1600 Central Standard Time, it was reported that the oil catch device in place around the Temporary Diesel Generators (TDG) had overflowed due to a combination of accumulated rainwater and failure of one wall of the catch device to float. There is a small oil leak from the TDG. Less than one gallon of oil is estimated to have been spilled. The oil spill has reached the BFN (Brown Ferry Nuclear) forebay (waters of the US) via the station's storm drainage as evidenced by an oil sheen on the water of the forebay. The source of leakage has been contained. This oil spill is reportable to the EPA (National Response Center) under 40CFR112. Notification to the National Response Center has been made. Additional notification has been made to Alabama Emergency Management. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5139816 September 2015 10:10:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4At 0200 CDT on 9/16/2015, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was manually isolated to stop a steam leak from the stem packing of the HPCI Steam Supply Valve 2-FCV-073-0016. The leak occurred following performance of 2-SR-3.6.1.3.5 (HPCI) HPCI System Motor Operated Valve Operability, which cycled 2-FCV-073-0016. No Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) or PCIS Area High Temperature alarms were received and no automatic isolation setpoints were reached. HPCI was declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)- Operating, Condition C. This constitutes an unplanned HPCI system inoperability and requires an 8-hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), due to the failure of a single train system affecting accident mitigation, and a 60-day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5133320 August 2015 18:51:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4On August 20, 2015, at approximately 1032 CDT, during the Residual Heat Removal flow rate test, the 3ED 4kV Shutdown Board received a degraded voltage signal, which automatically started the 3D Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The EDG performed its safety function by automatically supplying power to the Shutdown Board. Troubleshooting on the degraded voltage signal is in progress. The remaining 4kV Shutdown Boards and EDGs were unaffected and remain operable. This constitutes an automatic actuation of the EDG and requires an 8-hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), due to the valid actuation of the EDG, and a 60-day report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5125022 July 2015 12:38:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4During the performance of the Unit 1 quarterly surveillance 1-SR-3.6.1.3.5 (HPCI), HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) System Motor Operated Valve Operability, the inboard steam isolation valve failed to close within the required time. The valve was subsequently declared inoperable and Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.3 (Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)) was entered which required the HPCI steam line to be closed and de-activated. To comply with TS LCO 3.6.1.3 Condition A, the outboard steam isolation valve was closed and breaker opened. Due to the steam line being isolated, TS 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, Condition C was entered on July 22, 2015 at 0445 CDT as a result of the inoperable HPCI system. Troubleshooting and repair is in progress and during this inoperability, other systems are available to provide the required safety functions. This constitutes an unplanned HPCI system inoperability and requires an 8-hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), due to the failure of a single train system affecting accident mitigation, and a 60-day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5123114 July 2015 22:59:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4At 1810 (Central Daylight Time) on July 14, 2015, Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 initiated actions to commence a reactor shutdown to comply with TS (Technical Specifications) LCO 3.0.3. TS LCO 3.0.3 was entered at 1715 (Central Daylight Time) due to concurrent losses of the A and B Control Bay Chillers. This resulted in a loss of cooling to the U1 and U2 4kV Shutdown Board Rooms. Required actions for the loss of cooling to the U1 and U2 4kV Shutdown Board Rooms are to declare the electrical equipment in the 4kV Shutdown Board Rooms inoperable. The declaration of inoperability of the equipment supported by the U1 and U2 4kV Shutdown Boards resulted in TS LCO 3.0.3 for Units 1, 2, and 3. TS LCO 3.0.3 requires actions to be initiated within one hour to place the affected units in MODE 2 within 10 hours; MODE 3 within 13 hours; and MODE 4 within 37 hours. This event requires a 4-hour report in accordance with 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Condition Report #1056829 has been initiated in the Corrective Action Program. The 4kV shutdown electrical boards are required in all modes of operation.
ENS 5115312 June 2015 17:18:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4

On June 12, 2015 at 1030 CDT, the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to the time to drain the Turbine Exhaust Drain Pot after running the system for periodic testing. The concern is that the turbine may be partially flooded after shutting down and a subsequent restart could cause a water hammer event, possibly damaging the system. This issue was previously analyzed by Engineering as acceptable, but the time to drain the pot after the latest test indicates more water in the exhaust than the maximum amount used in the analysis. Technical Specification 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, Condition C, was entered as a result of the inoperable HPCI system. This constitutes an unplanned HPCI system inoperability and requires an 8-hour NRC notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to the failure of a single train system affecting accident mitigation, and a 60 day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Technical Specification Action statement allows 14 days to restore the HPCI system to operable status.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MATTHEW SLOUKA TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1623 EDT ON 9/10/15 * * *

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant is retracting the 8-hour NRC notification (EN# 51153) made on June 12, 2015 at 1030 CDT. The notification on June 12, 2015, reported a condition where the HPCI system was declared inoperable due to the time to drain the Turbine Exhaust Drain Pot after running the system for periodic testing. The concern was that the turbine may be partially flooded which could cause water hammer and damage the HPCI system. Subsequent evaluation concluded that the HPCI system under the identified flooded turbine conditions will not produce a transient that exceeds design values, therefore, HPCI system operability was maintained and no reportable condition existed during this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer).

ENS 5108522 May 2015 09:31:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. On April 5, 2015 at 0435 CDT, during replacement of a failed fuse (2-FU1-64-16A-K33A), Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic received the B half of the Unit 2 Group 6 isolation signal. This caused initiation of the B and C Standby Gas Treatment, B Control Room Emergency Ventilation, isolation of the Unit 2 reactor zone and all three refueling zone ventilations. This was not a valid initiation of PCIS. Operations personal responded to the PCIS initiation, ensured that all equipment operated as designed, and returned the affected systems back to service. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 6 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, and Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as PER 1010651. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event.
ENS 5106612 May 2015 09:08:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4On May 12, 2015, at 0104 CDT, during performance of 3-SR-3.3.6.1.2(3B), High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Steam Supply Pressure Low Functional Test, an inadvertent PCIS Group 4 (HPCI) isolation occurred. All automatic actions occurred as designed. HPCI was declared inoperable and Technical Specification LCO 3.5.1.C was entered with required action to verify immediately that RCIC is operable administratively and to restore HPCI to operable within 14 days. HPCI was returned to service at 0125 CDT, declared operable and TS LCO 3.5.1.C was exited. The cause of the isolation is unknown with an investigation in progress. This condition is reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to the failure of a single train system affecting accident mitigation. This condition also requires a 60 day written report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5092525 March 2015 21:37:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4On March 25, 2015, at approximately 1413 CDT, a Browns Ferry Nuclear (BFN) employee fell approximately 6 feet and sustained a laceration to his forehead and potential other injuries. The individual had been working in the Unit 2 drywell, which is a contaminated area. The individual was able to be removed from his anti-contamination clothing prior to leaving the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA). The individual was surveyed by a Radiation Protection (RP) technician and had slight contamination (150 cpm (counts per minute)) on his forehead in the area near the laceration. No survey of his back was performed due to being on a stretcher. At 1457 CDT, the individual was transported to an off-site medical facility. A BFN RP technician accompanied the individual to the hospital. Subsequent survey of the individual at the medical facility determined that no other areas of contamination existed. The individual was successfully decontaminated at the medical facility during initial treatment and all locations have been free released. All contaminated materials have been properly controlled. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment. This event has been entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) in SR# 1004507. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The individual was transported to Decatur Morgan General Hospital in Decatur, Alabama for decontamination and follow-up medical treatment.
ENS 5081211 February 2015 16:16:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4While performing 3-SR-3.5.1.2(HPCI) High Pressure Coolant Injection System Monthly Valve Position Verification, Operators closed the supply breaker for 3-FCV-2-166, CST #3 EMERGENCY HEADER ISOLATION VALVE, in order to verify the valve is in its required OPEN position. When the breaker was closed, the position indication 3-ZI-2-166 indicated OPEN and it was observed that the valve was traveling closed. The operator at the breaker reported that the breaker contactor energized when the breaker was closed. Control Room Operators re-opened 3-FCV-2-166 using the hand switch in the control room and when the valve indicated full open, directed the operator in the field to open the breaker for 3-FCV-2-166. Valve 3-FCV-2-166 isolates both the HPCI and (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) RCIC suction path from the Condensate storage tank, both HPCI and RCIC were declared inoperable. The duration of the loss of suction path the HPCI and RCIC was 4 minutes. Applicable Technical Specification required actions were entered for the concurrent HPCI and RCIC inoperability and exited when the suction path was restored. This incident is reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v) as 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' It also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii) The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified
ENS 5075423 January 2015 11:00:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. On November 26, 2014, at approximately 1427 hours Central Standard Time (CST), the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), 1A Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor-Generator (MG) Set Power Supply unexpectedly de-energized resulting in a BFN Unit 1 half scram and Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals. The PCIS Groups 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations caused the initiation of all three trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem 'A', and isolations of the BFN, Unit 1, Reactor Zone ventilation and BFN, Units 1 and 2, Refuel Zone ventilation (Unit 3 Refuel Zone ventilation was tagged out under 3-TO-2014-0001 at the time of this event). Operations personnel responded to the PCIS initiation, ensured all equipment operated as designed, placed the BFN 1A RPS on alternate power, and reset the RPS logic and PCIS isolations. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 1 actuations are Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Low Low Low Water Level (Level 1), Main Steam Line (MSL) High Flow, MSL Area High Temperature, or MSL Low Pressure. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid. The apparent cause for this condition was an intermittent problem with the BFN 1A RPS MG Set voltage adjust potentiometer. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Problem Evaluation Report 961518. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.