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The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On February 1, 2024, a contract worker was transported offsite for medical treatment due to a work-related injury that required the individual to be admitted to the hospital. The individual was free-released from the site prior to transport. The injury and hospitalization were reported by the contract worker's employer to OSHA per 29 CFR 1904.39(a)(2). Based upon that notification to another government agency, Tennessee Valley Authority is reporting this per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

• * * RETRACTION ON 2/29/24 AT 12:29 EST FROM MATTHEW SLOUKA TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous Event Notification, EN 56941, reported on 02/01/2024. On 02/01/2024, at 15:32 EST, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) made an Event Notification 56941 notifying the NRC of a notification to another government agency. During further review of NRC reporting guidance, BFN has concluded that the contract worker's employer report to OSHA was below the reporting threshold outlined in NUREG 1022, Revision 3. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

At 2150 CST on 11/04/2020, it was discovered that Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was INOPERABLE; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. During performance of 1-SR-3.5.1.7, HPCI Main and Booster Pump Set Developed Head and Flow Rate Test at Rated Reactor Pressure, Unit 1 HPCI was manually tripped by the control room operator due to local report of excessive shaking of the cooling water supply from the booster pump line. There was no impact to the safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. CR 1650042 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program. The Unit is in a 14-day LCO 3.5.1(c). The RCIC System is operable.

• * * RETRACTION FROM MARK ACKER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1607 EST ON 12/29/2020 * * *

ENS Event number 54983, made on 11/05/2020 is being retracted. NRC notification 54983 was made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were met when Unit 1 HPCI was manually tripped by the control room operator due to a local report for excessive shaking of the cooling water supply from the booster pump line. A subsequent engineering evaluation concluded on 11/06/2020 there was reasonable assurance of operability with no additional intrusive maintenance performed and that the condition was bounded by a previous evaluation documented in (Condition Report) CR 1347736. As such, the circumstances discussed in the report did not result in any condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures of the system that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). TVA's evaluation of this event is documented in the corrective action program. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Miller).

EN Revision Text: HPCI UNEXPECTEDLY TRANSFERRED TO ALTERNATE SUCTION SOURCE DURING TESTING At 2125 (CST) on 11/21/2018, it was discovered that U1 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. During performance of a routine surveillance, HPCI automatically transferred from its normal suction source to the alternate suction source. The control room operator then manually tripped the HPCI turbine. HPCI was already inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, Condition C during performance of the surveillance. However, this condition was not expected nor induced by the testing. There was no impact to the safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. CR 1469109 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program.

• * * RETRACTION ON 12/28/18 AT 1300 EST FROM MARK MOEBES TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

ENS Event Number 53750, made on November 22, 2018, is being retracted. NRC notification 53750 was made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) were met when the licensee discovered an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. During performance of a routine surveillance, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically transferred from its normal suction source to the alternate suction source. As a result, Unit 1 HPCI was declared inoperable. On December 20, 2018, a Past Operability Evaluation was completed which determined that the HPCI System remained operable. The evaluation determined that the HPCI System could have performed its specified safety function of vessel injection throughout the time that the suction path was aligned to the torus. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). TVA's evaluation of this event is documented in the Corrective Action Program in Condition Report 1469109. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).

At 1604 (CDT) on March 16, 2018, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Engineering reported an unanalyzed condition affecting the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchangers in a postulated fire event. It was discovered that the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) heat exchanger piping associated (with) the credited heat exchangers in the NFPA 805 Nuclear Safety Capability Analysis (NSCA) could experience water hammer damage. Fire damage to the cables for the RHRSW outlet motor operated valves could cause the valves to spuriously open and drain the RHRSW piping. Subsequent starting of the RHRSW pumps on the affected header could cause water hammer loads and damage the piping. Review of NFPA 805 analyses show the cables associated with this condition are routed in Fire Areas 01-03, 02-03, 02-04, 03-03, 16 and 23. There are 11 cases where the deterministically credited heat exchanger could be affected. Compensatory fire watch measures have been established. This event requires an 8 hour report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in: (B) The nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. CR 1139620 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * RETRACTION AT 2215 EST ON 11/29/2018 FROM NEEL SHUKLA TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

NRC notification 53267 was made to ensure that the eight-hour non-emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were met when the licensee discovered an unanalyzed condition with the potential to significantly degrade plant safety. On August 22, 2018, an independent analysis was completed which determined that the RHRSW system would remain functional during the postulated scenario. Based on this analysis, a revised functional evaluation was performed by BFN which determined that the condition did not constitute an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. For credited RHR heat exchangers for fire events in Fire Areas 01-03, 02-03, 02-04, 03-03, 16, and 23, the RHRSW piping will remain intact and the valves will operate manually after a water hammer event. This condition did not significantly degrade plant safety and is therefore not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(a)(2)(ii)(B). On November 16, 2018, TVA canceled the 60 day report which had been submitted for this condition. TVA's evaluation of this event notification is documented in the corrective action program. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Shaeffer).

At 1648 CDT, while the Control Bay AUO (Auxiliary Unit Operator) was attempting to change a light bulb for 1-IL-99-1AA, 1A (Reactor Protection System) RPS (Motor Generator) MG Set available light, the light socket shorted causing the loss of 1A RPS. The loss of 1A RPS resulted in Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 primary containment isolations and initiated Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. All systems responded as designed. The Control Room operators entered the appropriate abnormal operating instruction, 1-AOI-99-1, to restore the affected systems. Operations entered TS LCO 3.3.1.1 conditions A.1 (place channel in Trip in 12 hours) and C.1 (restore RPS trip capability in 1 hr). At 1734 CDT, Operations exited TS LCO 3.3.1.1 upon restoration of 1A RPS per 1-AOI-99-1. This event is reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) (b. General Containment Isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)), except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' This event also requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * RETRACTION FROM RAY SWAFFORD TO DONG PARK AT 1522 EDT ON 6/29/10 * * *

Retraction of an 8 hour non-emergency notification for invalid Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation from a loss of power to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 1A. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) is retracting the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) eight-hour non-emergency report made on April 30, 2010, at 2131 hours Central Daylight Time. BFN's initial report was categorized as a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B). The loss of power to RPS 1A resulted in PCIS Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 primary containment isolations and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. However, plant conditions which require PCIS actuations and system initiations (e.g., low reactor water level, high drywell pressure, abnormal area radiation level, high area temperature) did not exist, therefore, the actuation was invalid. As a consequence, TVA has concluded that this event does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. The event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). A 60-day phone call will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). (See EN #46054) TVA's evaluation of this event is documented in the Corrective Action Program (PER 227662). TVA has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).

A sample was taken of the lubrication/control oil from the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System for moisture content analysis. The results of this analysis concluded that the moisture content in the oil exceeded acceptable levels. As a result of this condition the Browns Ferry Nuclear Unit 1 HPCI system was declared inoperable at 11:48 on 6/1/08. This event is reportable within 8 hours in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v) as event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. It also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(vii). Unit 1 remains at 100% power. Unit 1 has entered Technical Specification LCO 3.5.1 and is performing the required actions. Troubleshooting of the moisture intrusion condition is in progress, and a corrective action plan is being developed. The NRC Resident inspector has been notified.

• * * RETRACTION AT 1239 EDT ON 7/17/08 FROM BAKER TO HUFFMAN * * *

ENS Event Number 44252, made on June 1, 2008, is being retracted. NRC Notification 44252 was conservatively made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were met when an oil sample indicated the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System turbine oil system contained excessive amounts of water. An evaluation performed in response to this report concluded that the Unit 1 HPCI System was capable of performing its intended safety function with the turbine oil system containing more water than recommended in the TVA Lubrication Oil Analysis and Monitoring Program. TVA found through an engineering evaluation that the amount of water contained in the turbine oil system would not impact the HPCI operation during its mission time for the Design Basis Loss-of-Coolant Accident. As such, the circumstances discussed in the report did not result in any condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat, or mitigate the consequences of an accident. Thus, there was no impact on nuclear safety. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) or 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). TVA's evaluation of this issue is documented in the corrective action program (PER 145517). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Haag) notified.

On 1/28/08 at 1843 CST, Browns Ferry Unit 1 was performing 1-SR-3.3.5.1.3(D) HPCI System Condensate Header Low Level Switch Calibration and Functional Test when 1-LS-73-56A failed to actuate. Per TS 3.3.5.1, 1-LS-73-56A is inoperable. 1-SR-3.3.5.1.3(D) defeats the logic relay normally actuated by 73-56A & B. This causes HPCI to be inoperable per TS 3.3.5.1.D if the relay is defeated for greater than 1 hour. Failure of the 73-56A switch prevented restoration of the relay within the 1 hour time frame. This event is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to: Remove Residual Heat' and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to: mitigate the consequences of an accident.' This event also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). The defeated relay was restored to normal and the HPCI system returned to operable status at 2330 CST on 1/28/08. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION AT 1359 EDT ON 3/17/08 FROM RASMUSSEN TO HUFFMAN * * *

On January 28, 2008, Browns Ferry Unit 1 entered an LCO to perform a planned maintenance activity, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Condensate Header Low Level Switch Calibration and Functional Test, 1-SR-3.5.5.1.3(D). During the calibration of 1-LS-073-0056A and 1-LS-073- 0056B, 1-LS-073-0056A was found inoperable. The removal of both level switches from service (and as a result the HPCI transfer on low condensate header level function) was a planned maintenance activity, performed in accordance with an approved procedure and in accordance with the plants TSs. During this time no condition was discovered that could have prevented HPCI from performing its intended function because 1-LS-073-056B was considered OPERABLE. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) or 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO(Lesser) notified.

On 5/28/07 at 0100 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 1 was performing 1-SR-3.5.1.7 (Comp) HPCI Comprehensive pump test when it was determined that HPCI pump set differential pressure was not within specifications and therefore would not support a declaration of operability for HPCI. The event is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat' and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident'. This event also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). Initial investigation reveals a potential problem with the test equipment. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION FROM M. RASMUSSEN TO W. HUFFMAN AT 1810 EDT ON 6/29/07 * * *

This report is being retracted. Engineering has re-evaluated the test results and determined that HPCI System pump met its design basis requirements during testing activities. As such, the circumstance discussed in this event report did not result in any condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) or 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Ayres) notified.