Semantic search
| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 56569 | 11 June 2023 05:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Unanalyzed Condition | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0130 EDT on June 11, 2023, it was discovered that the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 auxiliary building door A-35-5A, credited for tornado missile protection of the primary component cooling water system, was open and unlatched. Upon discovery, the door was shut and latched. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 56527 | 19 May 2023 12:52:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0852 (EDT) on May 19, 2023, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 at zero percent power, an actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) occurred. The reason for the AFW auto-start was a failed start attempt of the 'B' main feedwater pump. The 'A' and 'B' motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater | |
| ENS 56519 | 15 May 2023 16:08:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty Report | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone: A licensed operator failed a test specified by the FFD testing program. The individual's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 56485 | 22 April 2023 23:42:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Degraded | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1942 EDT on April 22, 2023, during the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 refueling outage, while performing examinations of the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that one penetration could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME Code Section XI. The reactor vessel vent line penetration will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indication was not through-wall as there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified | Reactor Coolant System | |
| ENS 56435 | 28 March 2023 13:13:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty Report | A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 56350 | 12 February 2023 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Inoperable | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone call and email: At 0800 on February 12, 2023, it was discovered that both trains of control room emergency ventilation system were simultaneously inoperable due to a safety injection relief valve discharging to a Unit 1 sump. This leakage in conjunction with design basis loss of coolant accident may result in radiological dose exceeding limits to the exclusion area boundary and to the control room, which is common to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an 'Unanalyzed Condition and a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.' There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Retraction of EN56350, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Inoperable: Based on subsequent evaluation, it was determined that the control room emergency ventilation system remained operable due to the maximum measured leak rate being within the bounds of the analysis. The maximum measured leak rate of 32,594 cc/hr from the safety injection system did not challenge the calculated maximum engineered safety features leak rate of 45,600 cc/hr and remained within the current dose analysis limits. As such, this was not an unanalyzed condition and did not prevent the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Bickett). | Control Room Emergency Ventilation | |
| ENS 55953 | 21 June 2022 19:47:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Agency Notification Due to Chemical Leak | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 1547 EDT on June 21, 2022, it was determined that Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 experienced a reportable chemical leak. Approximately 261 gallons of a Sodium Hypochlorite/Sodium Bromine mixture reached the ground and approximately 130.5 gallons (of the 261 gallons) progressed to the Ohio River (via storm drain). The source of the leakage has been isolated and absorbent material has been placed to contain the leakage. Following confirmation of this leakage, notifications were made to the following offsite agencies starting at 1615 EDT: National Response Center (Incident Report # 1339391) Pennsylvania Department Of Environmental Protection Beaver County Emergency Management This condition is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 55943 | 15 June 2022 11:24:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Manual Reactor Trip and Automatic Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0724 EDT on 6/15/2022, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to lowering Steam Generator levels due to a secondary plant perturbation in the Heater Drain System. All control rods fully inserted into the core and the Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed in response to the full power reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Unit 2 is not affected and remains at 100 percent power and stable. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Steam Generator Reactor Protection System Auxiliary Feedwater Main Condenser Control Rod | |
| ENS 55586 | 17 November 2021 18:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Manual Reactor Trip and Automatic Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation | At 1313 hours on November 17, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of the 21B Main Feedwater Pump (due to low suction pressure). The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed in response to the full power reactor trip. Additionally, the Main Steam Isolation Valves were manually closed to prevent excessive reactor coolant system cooldown. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the atmosphere using the Atmospheric Dump Valves. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power in Mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency Specific System Actuation per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident has been notified. | Reactor Coolant System Feedwater Reactor Protection System Main Steam Isolation Valve Auxiliary Feedwater | |
| ENS 55572 | 12 November 2021 15:07:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Increasing Steam Generator Water Levels | At 1007 EST on November 12, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at approximately 17 percent power following a refueling outage, the reactor was manually tripped due to increasing steam generator water levels due to an oscillating Main Feedwater Pump Recirculation Valve. Additionally, the Main Steam Isolation Valves were manually closed to prevent excessive reactor coolant system cooldown. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the atmosphere using the Atmospheric Dump Valves. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power in Mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification, per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Steam Generator Reactor Coolant System Feedwater Reactor Protection System Main Steam Isolation Valve | |
| ENS 55540 | 22 October 2021 05:04:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Degraded | At 0104 EDT on October 22, 2021, during the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 refueling outage, while performing examinations of the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that two penetrations could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME Code Section XI. Penetrations 28 and 40 will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indications were not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-6 to find potential flaws/indications before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Reactor Coolant System | |
| ENS 55507 | 5 October 2021 10:32:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Trip and Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation | At 0632 EDT on October 5, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at approximately 90 percent power for an end of cycle coastdown, the reactor automatically tripped due to an unexpected unblocking of the low power trip logic. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed in response to the reactor trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power in Mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is being reported as an eight hour, non-emergency Specific System Actuation per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Reactor Protection System Auxiliary Feedwater Main Condenser | |
| ENS 55602 | 30 September 2021 14:07:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | 60-DAY Optional Telephonic Notification for an Invalid Emergency Diesel Generator Actuation | This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid specific system actuation. At 0907 (EDT) on September 30, 2021, with Unit 1 in Mode 1, at 100 percent power, an actuation of the 1-1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) occurred during loss of voltage relay functional testing. The 1-1 EDG auto-start was due to human error during performance of the test procedure when the bus 1AE undervoltage signal was improperly defeated and a simulated undervoltage signal was applied. No actual undervoltage condition was present during this event. The 1-1 EDG automatically started as designed when the bus undervoltage signal was received. This was a complete actuation of an EDG to start and come to rated speed, and all affected systems functioned as expected in response to the actuation. Following the actuation, the relays were restored and the 1-1 EDG was shut down in accordance with plant procedures. This event is considered an invalid system actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters and was not a manual initiation. Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this telephone notification is provided within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 55413 | 18 August 2021 04:24:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Notification of Unusual Event Declared Due to Fire Alarms in Cable Tunnel | At 0024 EDT on 8/18/21, an unusual event was declared (EAL HU 4.1) due to receipt of multiple fire alarms and halon discharge in the cable tunnel. At 0036, the fire brigade verified no signs of fire. Unit 1 remained at 100 percent power and stable. The area is currently being ventilated. Unit 2 was not affected by this event. The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. R1 Public Affairs (Screnci) was notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
At 0401 EDT, Beaver Valley terminated their notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that there was no indication of fire. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified State and local authorities. Notified R1DO (Jackson), IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Felts), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email). | ||
| ENS 54749 | 18 June 2020 21:25:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Notification of Environmental Report to Another Government Agency | On June 18, 2020, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 determined that leakage from an outside out-of-service liquid waste pipe that is within a radiologically controlled area contains several isotopes. Analysis indicates greater than 2,000 picoCuries per liter of tritium, and isotopes of Mn-54, Co-58, Co-60, and Cs-137 are above the lower limit of detection. At 1725 EDT, in accordance with site procedures and NEI 07-07, 'Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative,' notification to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was planned. At 1930 EDT notification to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was completed. The leak is currently contained. The leakage did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a planned notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54680 | 24 April 2020 05:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Reactor Coolant System (Rcs) Pressure Boundary Degraded | At 0130 (EDT) on April 24, 2020, during the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 refueling outage, while performing examinations of the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that one penetration could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME Code Section XI. Penetration 37 will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indication was not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-4 to find potential flaws/indications before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Reactor Coolant System | |
| ENS 54369 | 4 November 2019 10:35:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Steam Dump Transient | At 0535 (EST) on November 4, 2019, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 15 (percent) power, the reactor was manually tripped due to the lifting of an 'A' Main Steamline Safety Valve following a Condenser Steam Dump transient. The trip response was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip, and all control rods fully inserted into the core. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the Main Condenser by using the Condenser Steam Dump Valves. Offsite power is available and is currently supplying Normal and Emergency busses. The plant is currently stable in mode 3. Unit 2 is unaffected by this event and remains at 100 (percent) power in mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Reactor Protection System Main Condenser Control Rod | |
| ENS 54366 | 2 November 2019 19:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Refueling Water Storage Tank Declared Inoperable Due to Low Level | At 1515 on November 2, 2019, the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) was declared inoperable due to a Low Head Safety Injection relief valve discharging to the Safeguards Sump during routine surveillance testing. The leakage from the Low Head Safety Injection system in conjunction with a postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) with transfer to Safety Injection Recirculation may result in dose exceeding the Dose Analysis of the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) and the Control Room, which is common to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. This condition may not be bounded by existing design and licensing documents; however, it poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The Low Head Safety Injection relief valve has been isolated to prevent further leakage, and makeup to the RWST completed. At 1602 on November 2, 2019 the RWST was declared Operable. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), (C), (D) as an Unanalyzed Condition and a condition that could have prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function." The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | ||
| ENS 54337 | 17 October 2019 23:51:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Degraded | At 1951 (EDT) on October 17, 2019, fretting indications on the reactor coolant system pressure boundary piping (pressurizer spray line) were identified. This condition does not appear to meet original construction code, ANSI B31.1, 1967 Edition thru summer 1971 Addenda. The condition will be resolved prior to plant startup. This event is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This condition will be corrected prior to the plant entering Mode 4.
An engineering evaluation has determined that the subject fretting is not considered a flaw, but instead is considered wear. Appendix F of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code was applied and it was determined that the pressurizer spray line piping maintained its required design safety functions in the as-found condition. The wear has been repaired during the current refueling outage in accordance with the original construction code (ANSI B3l.l, 1967 Edition through summer 1971 Addenda) as well as Owner's Requirements. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Young). | Reactor Coolant System | |
| ENS 54183 | 26 July 2019 14:48:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty Report - Confirmed Positive Test for Alcohol | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 53924 | 11 March 2019 12:51:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Communication System Maintenance | On 03/11/2019 planned maintenance activities will be performed on the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 Digital Radiation Monitoring System's (DRMS) Communications System. The work includes upgrades to the DRMS hardware, software and computer peripherals. Components to be upgraded under this planned maintenance include: Redundant Servers, Operator Console, Health Physics Office Console/Workstation, Printers and Portable Mass Storage/Backup and Computer peripherals necessary to interface with the computer system. This planned upgrade on the Unit 2 DRMS Communications System will result in the loss of Unit 2 radiological monitoring capability in the Control Room and on the Plant Computer System (PCS). Neither the Emergency Response Facilities nor the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) will receive radiological data. No actual radiation monitors are affected. The scheduled work duration is approximately three weeks. When the DRMS is out of service for the upgrade, compensatory actions will be in place. Radiation monitors will be continuously monitored for any increases in radiation levels. The Unit 2 Shift Manager will be notified of any increase in radiation monitor readings, including exceeding Emergency Action Levels (EAL). This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the upgrade to the DRMS Communications System will result in the loss of the Unit 2 radiological monitoring capability in the Control Room and to the Unit 2 Plant Computer System that affects the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee is currently in a Technical Specification Action Statement, Limiting Condition for Operation for spent fuel pool radiation monitor and leakage rate monitor. | Emergency Response Data System | |
| ENS 53711 | 1 November 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Discovery of Indications That Did Not Meet Acceptance Criteria on One Reactor Vessel Head Penetration | On 11/01/2018, during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) refueling outage, while performing examinations of the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that one penetration could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME Code Section XI. Penetration 27 will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indication was not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-4 to find potential flaws/indications before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. The other 65 penetrations will be examined during the 2R20 (current) refueling outage. The plant is currently shutdown and in Undefined Mode. The reactor vessel head is not currently installed. Repairs are currently being planned and will be completed prior to startup. This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as-found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-4 to remain in-service without repair. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 53548 | 12 August 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown | En Revision Imported Date 8/17/2018 | EN Revision Text: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN - LOSS OF 480 VOLTAGE EMERGENCY BUS On 8-12-18 at 0158 EDT, Beaver Valley Unit 2 experienced a loss of 480 Volt 2P Emergency Bus. This resulted in a Loss of Safety Function due to the 2-2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) being Inoperable coincident with the Residual Heat Release Valve (2SVS-HCV104). A Technical Specification shutdown is required per LCO 3.0.3. The Licensee also stated they were in an unanalyzed condition due to the EDG and Residual Heat Release Valve being inoperable at the same time. The Licensee is shutting down to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown). The Licensee is notifying the Resident Inspector. The Licensee will be making a Press Release about the unplanned shutdown.
On 8-12-18 at 0158 (EDT) Beaver Valley Unit 2 experienced a loss of 480 Volt 2P Emergency Bus. Per operational guidance, this was determined to be a Loss of Safety Function due to the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) being INOPERABLE coincident with the Residual Heat Release Valve (2SVS-HCV104) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and (D). This was also reported as an Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(b). No Press Release was performed for this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. At 0410 (EDT) a Technical Specification Shutdown was commenced 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). At 2011 (EDT) the 480 Volt 2P Emergency Bus was restored and energized. Further evaluation of the event has determined that this event was not an Unanalyzed Condition and did not result in a Loss of Safety Function. The classifications of Unanalyzed Condition and Loss of Safety Function are being retracted. The accuracy of the existing guidance relative to Safety Function has been entered in the Corrective Action Program and interim actions have been taken to provide accurate guidance. Notified R1DO (Young) via email. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 53419 | 22 May 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown | En Revision Imported Date 6/22/2018 | EN Revision Text: GAS VOIDS DISCOVERED IN BOTH TRAINS OF LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION On 5/22/2018, while operating at approximately 100 percent power, Ultrasonic Testing of the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pump suction piping identified gas voids in excess of the acceptable limit for void volume. Both trains of LHSI were declared inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 for both trains of the LHSI system was entered along with TS 3.0.3 which requires the initiation of a plant shutdown. Time of TS entry was 12:56 (EDT). Plant shutdown was commenced at 15:56 (EDT) in accordance with plant procedures. At 15:59 (EDT) Train 'A' LHSI was restored to operable status, TS 3.0.3 Action was exited and the power reduction was stopped at approximately 99 percent. At 17:43 (EDT) Train 'B' LHSI was restored to operable status, TS 3.5.2 Actions were exited. This is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) Unanalyzed Condition, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function and 10 CFR 50. 72(b )(2)(i) TS Required Shutdown. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Further engineering evaluation has determined that the gas voids that existed at the time of discovery would not have rendered the LHSI (Low Head Safety Injection) system inoperable if it were required to actuate. The engineering evaluation concluded that filling of the containment sump during a Design Basis Accident would result in a void volume reduction such that the void in the LHSI suction piping would not be large enough to significantly impact the operability of the system. Therefore, the system remained operable but degraded. No TSs (Technical Specifications) were required to be entered and no shutdown was required. As such, all three reporting criteria do not apply and are being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Burritt). | ||
| ENS 53228 | 23 February 2018 22:50:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty - Misuse of a Controlled Substance by Supervisory Personnel | At 1750 (EST) on 2/23/2018 credible information was obtained that a non-licensed supervisory person had intentionally misused a controlled substance. Unescorted access has been withdrawn. Per 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(i) this is a 24 hour reportable event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 53056 | 7 November 2017 10:04:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Unit 1 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Unit Generator Over Current | On November 7, at 0504 (EST), BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to Main Unit Generator over current. The Auxiliary Feedwater system activated and remains in service. Offsite power supply is available. Normal and Emergency busses are being supplied by Offsite power. One Source Range channel failed to energize due to its corresponding Intermediate Range instrument being under compensated. It was manually energized and is not indicating as expected. The second Source Range instrument energized but is reading erratically. Both Source Range instruments have been declared inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specification has been complied with by making the Control Rods not capable of withdrawal and isolating all dilution flow paths. Plant trip response was as expected without complications, and all control rods fully inserted in the core. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3. This event is being reported as an actuation of the Reactor Protection system 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and a Specified System Actuation (Auxiliary Feedwater System) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). BVPS Unit 2 is unaffected by this event and remains at 100% power in Mode 1. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Reactor Protection System Auxiliary Feedwater Control Rod | 05000334/LER-2017-003 |
| ENS 53058 | 6 November 2017 19:45:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty Program Vulnerability | It was determined that a licensed employee was not placed in an additional Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) testing program as directed by the MRO (Medical Review Officer). Upon discovery, the individual was subsequently tested . . . and determined Fit-For-Duty per 10 CFR 26 requirements. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 52877 | 28 July 2017 19:43:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Notification to Offsite Agency of Non-Routine Flow of Fire Protection Water to the Ohio River | On July 20, 2017, a fire protection supply line at BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) Unit 1 experienced a mechanical joint separation. When the mechanical joint separated there was an unplanned flow of water from the fire protection line to the ground, which eventually re-entered the Ohio River via storm drains. The source of the water to the BVPS Unit 1 Fire Protection System is the Ohio River. The fire protection water was not treated with chemical additives. The water flow from this fire protection line was terminated on the same day. Due to the situation described above, FENOC (FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company) provided written documentation describing this occurrence to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, (PADEP) on July 28, 2017. This offsite notification to PADEP requires a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). No press release is planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 52571 | 23 February 2017 15:40:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Potential Tornado Missile Vulnerabilities | In order to address the concerns outlined in RIS (Regulatory Information Summary) 2015-06 'TORNADO MISSILE PROTECTION', an evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and their potential impact on Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment was conducted. This evaluation concluded that the following Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) are potentially vulnerable to tornado generated missiles: The BVPS Unit 1 (BV-1) and BVPS Unit 2 (BV-2) Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSVs) discharge flow paths to atmosphere (reference TS 3.7.1) are potentially vulnerable to tornado generated missiles. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the exhaust piping of the MSSVs potentially crimping the piping and resulting in reduced flow capacity. In the worst case, all MSSV's could be rendered inoperable. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The BV-1 and BV-2 Atmospheric Steam Dumps (ADVs) discharge flow paths to atmosphere (reference TS 3.7.4) are potentially vulnerable to tornado generated missiles. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the exhaust piping of the ADVs potentially crimping the piping and resulting in reduced flow capacity. In the worst case, all ADVs could be rendered inoperable. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The BV-2 Auxiliary Building tornado missile shield door (A-35-5A), credited for tornado missile protection of the Primary Component Cooling Water (PCCW) system, was found to not be fully closed and latched. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the PCCW system with the missile door open rendering both trains of the PCCW system inoperable. This door is now maintained closed and latched except when opened under administrative controls. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The BV-2 Spent Fuel Building tornado missile shield door (F-66-3), credited for tornado missile protection of the irradiated fuel assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool including the Cask Pit, was found to not be fully closed and latched. This door is now maintained closed and latched except when opened under administrative controls. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The potential tornado missile vulnerabilities for the MSSVs and ADVs (discussed above) are being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002 Rev 1 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 (NRC enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). Immediate compensatory measures were taken to reduce the likelihood and mitigate the potential consequences of an onsite tornado generated missiles. The NRC Resident inspector has been notified. | Main Steam Safety Valve | 05000334/LER-2017-002 05000334/LER-2017-001 |
| ENS 52513 | 27 January 2017 11:41:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Unusual Event Declared Due to Unverified Fire Alarm in Containment | An Unusual Event (HU.4) was declared at BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) Unit 1 at 0641 EST due to a fire alarm in Containment which was unable to be verified extinguished within 15 minutes. Current Containment parameters do not indicate an actual fire. The Fire Alarm has subsequently been reset (at 0648 EST). The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." The Licensee has notified State and local government agencies. A containment entry is planned for 1000 EST to verify that there is no fire. Unit 1 continues at 100 percent power. Unit 2 was unaffected. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, and NICC Watch Officer. E-mailed FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA.
The time of the fire alarm reset was at 0648 EST on 1/27/2017. The Unusual Event has been terminated at 0934 EST on 1/27/2017 after a containment entry and visual inspection determined no fire or indications of a fire exist. The following notifications were made: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, Beaver County in Pennsylvania, The State of Ohio Emergency Management Agency, Columbia County in Ohio, The State of West Virginia Emergency Management Agency and Hancock County in West Virginia. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Welling), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD MOC (Gott). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, and NICC Watch Officer. E-mailed FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA. | ||
| ENS 52390 | 22 November 2016 20:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification of a Minor Release of Non-Radiological Diluted Cleaning Solution to the Ohio River | During routine floor cleaning activities inside of the BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) Main River Water Intake Structure, approximately one and one half cups (approximately 12 oz.) of Simple Green cleaning solution diluted in three gallons of mop cleaning water was inadvertently released into the Ohio River. Subsequent to confirmation of the inadvertent release to the Ohio river, a notification was made to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, (PADEP). This offsite notification to PADEP requires a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). Actions were taken to preclude any further liquid cleaning solution to be released, and no detectable impact to the Ohio River was observed. The amount of cleaning solution does not exceed any Reportable Quantity limit that would be hazardous to the environment or personal health. No press release is planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 52132 | 29 July 2016 01:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Postulated Fire Event That Could Adversely Impact Safe Shutdown Equipment | A review of the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report (FPSSR) found that a postulated fire had the potential to spuriously open all three individual steam generator atmospheric dump valves in addition to a common residual heat release valve. Previous analysis did not consider all of the valves spuriously opening from a fire. The potential impact of these valves spuriously opening is a cooldown that could adversely affect shutdown margin. Hourly fire tours have been put in place for those fire areas that have the potential to initiate this condition. This condition is reportable as an 8 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. This condition is not applicable to Unit 1.
Retraction of EN 52132 'Postulated Fire Event That Could Adversely Impact Safe Shutdown Equipment'. On 07/29/2016, an 8-hour notification (EN 52132) was made describing the discovery of a postulated fire event that could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment, specifically the spurious opening of the three Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ASDVs) and the Residual Heat Release (RHR) Valve, simultaneously. This notification was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition because of the potential effect on shutdown margin. Further engineering evaluation has determined that the required shutdown margin is not challenged by the event, as bounded by previous analysis of a similar scenario as well as validated operator actions. Therefore, this does not result in a reportable condition. The Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. Notified the R1DO (Cook). | Steam Generator | |
| ENS 51948 | 20 May 2016 19:31:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Inadvertent Sounding of the Emergency Notification Sirens | At approximately 1531 (EDT) hours, a tornado signal was inadvertently activated from Hancock County, West Virginia which sounded 118 out of 120 Emergency sirens. The remaining 2 sirens do not receive a tornado signal. The sirens alarmed for approximately 3 minutes. A silent test was subsequently performed for all 120 sirens and validated the emergency siren system remains functional. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency, a 4 hour notification is required. The (NRC) Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. No press releases are planned. The licensee notified state and local agencies. | ||
| ENS 51712 | 5 February 2016 06:09:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Excessive Control Room In-Leakage Identified | On February 5, 2015 at 0109 EST, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) was declared inoperable due to a higher than allowed identified in-leakage rate for the Control Room Envelope (CRE) when in the Normal Operating Mode. Unit 1 remains at 100 percent power and Unit 2 remains in Mode 3 for an unrelated planned maintenance outage. Unit 1 and Unit 2 share a common CRE. This in-leakage was detected during additional testing following the event documented in EN #51584. At the time of discovery, there is a reasonable expectation this condition could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is required to mitigate the consequences of an accident, thus satisfying the reporting criteria for 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Actions to implement mitigating actions were immediately initiated in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10. CREVS has been placed in Recirculation Ventilation Mode, isolating the control room from outside air. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the condition.
Following the 8-hour 10 CFR 50.72 notification made on 02/05/2016 (EN 51712) regarding the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) inoperability, further engineering evaluation has determined the identified in-leakage does not result in exceeding the design criteria for dose to the control room personnel. Therefore the degraded Control Room Emergency Ventilation System remained operable with the identified air in-leakage as determined by the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program. As such, the safety function was never lost and the event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident has been notified. Notified the R1DO (Jackson). | Control Room Emergency Ventilation | |
| ENS 51631 | 1 January 2016 21:34:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Unusual Event Declared Due to Unverified Fire Alarm in Containment | Unusual Event declared at BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) Unit 1 at 1634 EST due to a fire alarm in Containment (which was) unable to be verified extinguished within 15 minutes. Current Containment parameters do not indicate an actual fire. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, and NICC Watch Officer. E-mailed FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA.
At 1655 the fire alarm was reset. The Unusual Event has been terminated at 2035 EST after a containment entry and visual inspection determined no fire or indications of fire exist. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies. Notified R1DO (McKinley), NRR EO (Morris), and IRD MOC (Gott). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, and NICC Watch Officer. E-mailed FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA. | ||
| ENS 51584 | 4 December 2015 02:07:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Excessive Control Room In-Leakage Identified | On December 3, 2015 at 2107 (EST), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) was declared inoperable due to a higher than allowed identified in-leakage rate for the Control Room Envelope (CRE) when in the Normal Operating Mode. Both Unit 1 & Unit 2 remain at 100 percent power and they share a common CRE. At the time of discovery, there is a reasonable expectation this condition could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is required to mitigate the consequences of an accident, thus satisfying the reporting criteria for 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Actions to implement mitigating actions were immediately initiated in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10. CREVS has been placed in Recirculation Ventilation Mode, isolating the control room from outside air. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the condition.
Following the 8-hour 10CFR50.72 notification made on 12/4/2015 (EN 51584) regarding the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) inoperability, an engineering evaluation determined inleakage did not exceed limits described in the Beaver Valley licensing basis. Therefore, the degraded Control Room Emergency Ventilation System remained Operable with the identified air inleakage as determined by the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program. As such, the safety function was never lost and the event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). FENOC is planning to repair the degraded components of the system. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified." Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis). | Control Room Emergency Ventilation | |
| ENS 51479 | 17 October 2015 20:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notifications Made for Hazardous Chemical Leak | At 1230 EDT, it was discovered that sodium hypochlorite had leaked into the ground soil at the bottom of a leak sensing pit, which is located near the BVPS-1 Cooling Tower Pump House, at the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit Number 1 (BVPS-1). The source of the sodium hypochlorite, is suspected to be from a piping leak, and has been terminated. The cause of the leak has not yet been conclusively determined, and there is no evidence that the sodium hypochlorite reached the surface water of the Ohio River. At 1613 EDT on October 17, 2015, it was determined that there was CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation & Liability Act) reportable leak of a minimum 294 gallons of sodium hypochlorite to ground soil, and the following offsite notifications were made starting at 1625 EDT: National Response Center (Incident Report #1131084); Pennsylvania (PA) Department of Environmental Protection; Beaver County Emergency Management; PA Emergency Management Agency. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 51478 | 16 October 2015 16:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Made for Hazardous Chemical Spill | At 1115 EDT there was a non-oil chemical spill at the main intake structure during delivery of corrosion inhibitor. The spill occurred due to a failed tank-fill connection. Approximately 10 gallons of the inhibitor reached the Ohio River. The spill has been stopped and contained, and recovery is in progress. This is not a CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act), Reportable Quantity for the Environmental Protection Agency. However, at 1245 EDT, it was determined to be reportable to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP), in accordance with the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law and NPDS (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination), permit; thus, a notification was made, to the PADEP, at 1250 hours EDT . This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 51453 | 5 October 2015 12:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Two Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations Could Not Be Dispositioned as Acceptable | On 10/5/2015, during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) refueling outage, while performing planned ultrasonic examinations (UT) on the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined, that two penetrations could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) Code Section XI in a Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary. The indications of a degraded condition, on these two penetrations, are not through wall, as no leak path was identified. The examinations are being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D), and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to find potential flaws/indications well before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. All 66 reactor vessel head penetrations are scheduled to be examined during the current refueling outage. The plant is currently shutdown and in Mode 6. The reactor vessel head is not currently installed. Repairs are currently being planned and will be completed prior to startup. This is reportable, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on 10/05/2015 (EN 51453). This retraction is based on additional examinations and subsequent engineering assessments completed that concluded the penetrations meet the requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1 as amended by 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and no repairs are required. The two reactor head penetration indications, are therefore not reportable, pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. R1DO(Gray) has been notified. | Reactor Coolant System | |
| ENS 51345 | 26 August 2015 09:48:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Spurious Intermittent Actuation of an Emergency Notification System Siren | At 05:48 (EDT) BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) received notification that siren #6, Potter Township Municipal Building, was sounding intermittently. The fire department activation cable to the siren was severed by a motor vehicle. The ENS activation function remains functional. This event is reportable as a 4-hour Non-Emergency Notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'a News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency.' The Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 51323 | 17 August 2015 14:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Oil Spill | At 0837 EDT on August 17, 2015, it was determined that Beaver Valley Unit 2 had experienced a small oil leak of approximately 1 liter from equipment located inside the Alternate Intake structure, some of which progressed to the Ohio River. Subsequent to confirmation of this discovery, notification was made to the following offsite agencies starting at 1030 EDT: National Response Center (Incident Report# 1125865), Pennsylvania (PA) Department of Environmental Protection, Beaver County Emergency Management, PA Emergency Management Agency, and downstream water authorities (Midland Water Authority, Allegheny Ludlum, East Liverpool Water Co.) This notification is a required 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). The source of the oil leak has been stopped. Absorbent material has been placed to contain the oil that had leaked. No press release is planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 51064 | 11 May 2015 20:29:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Power to Digital Radiation Monitoring System | At 1629 EDT on May 11, 2015, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 (Mode 6 Refueling) opened circuit breaker PCB-92 to de-energize system service transformer 1A due to an emergent issue with a transformer bushing. This resulted in a loss of power to the ERF (Emergency Response Facility) substation which powers various plant support equipment at both units. The BVPS Unit 2 Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) was non-functional for approximately 21 minutes. This was a loss of radiation monitor capability to alarm and indicate in the control room. Following power restoration to the ERF substation, the radiation monitor system was restored at 1650 EDT. Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 remain stable. Since the BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was non-functional, this event resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 50895 | 14 March 2015 21:08:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Digital Radiation Monitoring System Failed | At 1708 EDT on March 14, 2015, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 determined that the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) was not operating. This resulted in a loss of radiation monitor capability to alarm and indicate in the control room. BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was declared non-functional. Repair efforts were initiated and compensatory measures were initiated. The radiation monitoring computer system is a stand-alone system. No cyber interference is suspected. At 2056 EDT on March 14, 2015, following initial investigation and repairs, BVPS Unit 2 emergency assessment capability was restored in conjunction with DRMS restoration. Since the BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was non-functional, this event resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 50627 | 19 November 2014 14:43:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Eal Required Gaseous Waste Effluent Radiation Monitors Removed from Service for Planned Maintenance | The Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 Special Particulate, Iodine and Noble Gas (SPING 4) monitors were removed from service for a planned equipment upgrade/replacement. During the replacement process certain Emergency Action Level (EAL) required monitors will not be functional, therefore, alternate methods of monitoring have been placed in effect. The replacement activities are expected to take approximately 60 days. A follow-up notification will be made after the required monitors are returned to service and declared functional. This is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No BVPS Unit 2 systems will be adversely affected by the Unit 1 replacement activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The planned equipment upgrade was completed and the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 Particulate, Iodine and Noble Gas (PING) monitors were returned to service and declared functional at 1714 EST on 2/27/2015. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Gray). | ||
| ENS 50430 | 6 September 2014 13:51:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Onsite Oil Spill | At 0951 EDT on September 6, 2014, it was determined that Beaver Valley Unit 2 had experienced an oil spill to the catch basin system that progressed to the Ohio River, requiring notification of: National Response Center (incident report #1094523), Pennsylvania (PA) Department of Environmental Protection, Beaver County Emergency Management Agency, PA Emergency Management Agency and, Downstream water authorities (Midland Water Authority, Allegheny Ludlum, East Liverpool Water Co.) This notification is a required 4-hour report per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). Oil was inadvertently pumped from a transformer spill catch area during routine seasonal water removal efforts. Oil was not expected in the catch area and the spill catch area had tested negative for oil during pre-removal testing. An oil sheen has been detected on the Ohio River immediately surrounding the outfall. The source of the spill has been terminated, however some residual oil is washing out of the catch basin system into the river. It is estimated that less than 5 gallons entered the river. Clean up efforts for the catch basins are currently underway and containment efforts for the oil in the river are being evaluated. A press release is currently being planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The licensee has decided not to issue a press release concerning this event. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Ferdas). | ||
| ENS 50417 | 29 August 2014 13:32:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Digital Radiation Monitoring System Operating Intermittently | At 0932 EDT on August 29, 2014, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 determined that the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) was operating intermittently. This resulted in an intermittent loss of radiation monitor capability to alarm and indicate in the control room. BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was declared non-functional. Repair efforts were initiated and compensatory measures were established. At 1556 EDT on August 29, 2014, following initial investigation and repairs, BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was declared functional. Since the BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was non-functional, this event resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause was attributed to an automatic reboot of the computer based on lack of disk space. | ||
| ENS 50275 | 11 July 2014 19:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Made for Hazardous Chemical Spill | At 1415 (EDT) the Control Room received a report that a refrigeration unit had failed and was spilling coolant (Ethylene Glycol) on the floor of an office building inside the protected area. At 1440 (EDT) the leak was isolated. It is estimated that approximately 10 gallons of Ethylene Glycol was introduced to the floor drains which ultimately lead to the environment. This is not a Reportable Quantity for the Environmental Protection Agency but the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection was notified in accordance with the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law at 1500 hours. The spill was contained and cleanup is complete. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 50234 | 27 June 2014 15:31:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Individual Violated Fitness for Duty Policy | On June 27, 2014, at approximately 1131 hours EDT, it was determined that an individual who is licensed under Part 10 CFR Part 55 to operate a power reactor was in violation of the FENOC (FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company) Fitness for Duty policy. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii) . The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 50124 | 20 May 2014 12:35:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Manual Reactor Trip During Reactor Startup | On May 20, 2014, at 0835 hours during plant startup, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 Operations personnel manually tripped the reactor due to meeting the pre-briefed trip criteria of 85% narrow range level on the 'A' Steam Generator. This manual trip criterion was reached after the steam generator water level began to oscillate following the start of the 'A' Condensate pump. A manual main steam line isolation was performed in order to limit reactor coolant system cool down. Plant trip response was as expected without complications, and all control rods fully inserted in the core. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 was not affected by this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. No relief or safety valves lifted during this event. The unit is maintaining primary temperature using the atmospheric steam dumps and main feedwater pumps. There is no primary to secondary leakage. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. | Steam Generator Reactor Coolant System Feedwater Main Steam Line Control Rod | 05000412/LER-2014-002 |
| ENS 50079 | 1 May 2014 20:10:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Degraded Condition Discovered on Reactor Vessel Head Control Rod Drive Penetration | On 5/01/2014 during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) refueling outage, it was determined that the results of planned ultrasonic (UT) examinations performed on one of the 66 penetrations of the reactor vessel head would not meet the applicable acceptance criteria. This penetration will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indication was not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to find potential flaws/indications well before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. Currently 52 of 66 penetrations have been examined, with 51 satisfactory. All of the penetrations will be examined during the current refueling outage. The plant is currently shutdown and in a mode undefined (Defueled) and the reactor vessel head is not currently installed. Repairs are currently being planned and will be completed prior to startup. This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Control Rod | 05000412/LER-2014-001 |