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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5496321 October 2020 14:10:00VogtleNRC Region 2In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) as described in NEI 08-01, Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52, Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to the NRC for determining that Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.3.05.13a.ii (Index No. 344) for Unit 4 requires additional actions to restore the completed status. The ITAAC Closure Notifications for Unit 4 ITAAC 344 was submitted on July 22, 2020 (ML20204B029). On October 19, 2020, it was determined that maintenance activities for the Unit 4 Polar Crane auxiliary hoist holding brake used a different approach for Post Work Verification (PWV) than the original test described in the ICN (ITAAC Closure Notification) for ITAAC 344. The alternate PWV used a test method that is standard industry practice and in accordance with ASME B30.2 to demonstrate that the Acceptance Criteria was met. An ITAAC Post Closure Notification will be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) and NEI 08-01. The 10 CFR 52.99(c)(4) All lTAAC Complete Notification has not been submitted for VEGP (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant) 4. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5486428 August 2020 16:38:00VogtleNRC Region 2

In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2), as described in NEI 08-01, 'Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52,' Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to the NRC for determining that Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.5.02.07a (Index No. 534) and ITAAC 2.5.02.07e (Index No. 538) for both units require additional actions to restore their completed status. The ITAAC Closure Notifications for ITAAC 534 were submitted on March 31, 2017 (Unit 3 ML17093A286, Unit 4 ML17093A535). The ITAAC Closure Notifications for ITAAC 538 were submitted on November 30, 2016 (Unit 3 ML16351A350, Unit 4 ML16351A334).

On August 26, 2020, it was determined that a design change, issued for several Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) isolation barrier assemblies (ISBs), materially altered the basis for determining that the ITAAC 534 and ITAAC 538 Acceptance Criteria were met. The modified ISBs will require testing per IEEE 384-1981, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits, to demonstrate that the Acceptance Criteria is met. System function is not required while the plant is under construction.

ITAAC Post Closure Notifications in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) will be submitted following completion of corrective actions.

The 10 CFR 52.99(c)(4) All ITAAC Complete Notification has not been submitted for VEGP ((Vogtle Electric Generating Plant)) 3 and 4. The resident inspector has been notified.

ENS 5477613 July 2020 17:10:00VogtleNRC Region 2On July 13, 2020 at 0831 (EDT), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined an SNC supervisory personnel failed their fitness for duty test. The employee has been removed from the site and their access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5467722 April 2020 14:52:00HatchNRC Region 2At 1015 (EDT), on 04/22/2020, while Unit 2 was at approximately 0.4 percent power in MODE 2, reactor pressure was increased to 150 psig while HPCI was INOPERABLE due to not having been placed in standby. HPCI does not have a redundant system; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). ADS (Automatic Depressurization System) and low pressure ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) systems were OPERABLE during this time. HPCI was returned to OPERABLE status at 1109 hrs. on 04/22/2020. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 546508 April 2020 17:03:00VogtleNRC Region 2A licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5459621 March 2020 23:46:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1644 EDT with Unit 1 in Mode 6 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 1 Bravo Train Emergency Diesel Generator system (EDG) occurred during Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) testing. The reason for the EDG auto-start signal was a loss of voltage on the Bravo train safety related electrical bus due to the EDG output breaker opening. The EDG was already running at the time of the loss of voltage on the bus. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the EDG system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There was no impact to Unit 2.
ENS 5449122 January 2020 17:50:00HatchNRC Region 2At 2005 EST on January 21, 2020, Hatch Security was informed that a contract worker covered by 10 CFR 26.719(b) had been involved in a legal action as defined in 10 CFR 26.5. The contract worker's plant access has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 544634 January 2020 15:00:00HatchNRC Region 2At 1109 (EST) on 01/04/2020, it was determined that the primary containment leakage rate did not meet value La, defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, 'Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors'. An additional, tested valve has been closed to maintain leakage below maximum allowable leakage, La. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5435929 October 2019 13:25:00VogtleNRC Region 2A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's badge has been confiscated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5432010 October 2019 02:17:00FarleyNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL TRANSPORTED TO AN OFFSITE MEDICAL FACILITY At 2340 CDT, on October 09, 2019, a site contractor was transported offsite for treatment at an offsite medical facility. Due to the nature of the medical emergency, the individual was not thoroughly surveyed prior to being transported offsite. This is an eight-hour notification, non-emergency for the transportation of a contaminated person offsite. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii). Following the individual being transported offsite, but prior to the individual arriving at the offsite medical facility, the individual was confirmed to not be contaminated. This occurred at approximately 2350 CDT, on October 09, 2019. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 3/18/2020 AT 1350 EST FROM RICHARD LENGFORD TO BRIAN LIN * * *

Farley Nuclear Plant is retracting this notification based on the information available at the time of the notification: Health Physics personnel had completed surveys that determined that the contract worker, ambulance, and responders were free of contamination prior to reaching the hospital. The initial report was made to alert the NRC based on the individual being potentially contaminated due to radioactive surveying being deferred to support prompt medical attention. Based on the subsequent determination that the individual was not contaminated the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) are not met and this event report is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 543189 October 2019 12:48:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1023 EDT, on October 9, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, an actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems occurred. The reason for the Emergency Diesel Generator auto-start was the loss of power to the 4160V 1E electrical bus 2AA02 due to a fault at an offsite electrical switchyard. The Emergency Diesel Generator started and energized the 4160V safety bus, and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems automatically started as designed when the undervoltage condition on the safety bus was detected. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident has been notified.
ENS 5428721 September 2019 10:28:00FarleyNRC Region 2At 0800 (CDT), with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent (power), the reactor was manually tripped due to elevated vibration indication on the 2C reactor coolant pump exceeding annunciator response procedure trip criteria. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post trip. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) auto actuated as expected following the manual reactor trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed via the use of AFW and subsequent steaming of the steam generators to the main condenser. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b(2)(iv)(B). In addition, this event report is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR50.72(B)(3)(iv)(A) for a specified system actuation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. Farley reported that there was no increase in containment unidentified leakage or fluctuations with RCP seal flow during this event.
ENS 5423723 August 2019 00:33:00HatchNRC Region 2At 2234 (EDT), on 08/22/2019, while Unit (2) was at approximately 100 percent power in MODE 1, it was discovered that Unit 2 HPCI was INOPERABLE. HPCI does not have a redundant system; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Initial evaluation is that it is a power supply issue. The system had no indications, followed by smoke from behind the circuitry, and then indications returning. This is associated with a 14-day Limiting Condition for Operation.
ENS 5417519 July 2019 13:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0945 (EDT) on July 19, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to Loop 2 'B' Main Steam Isolation Valve failing shut. The Auxiliary Feedwater system (AFW) started automatically as a result of the automatic reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the valid AFW actuation from the reactor trip, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 1 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods fully inserted.
ENS 540401 May 2019 21:03:00FarleyNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MISALIGNED CONTROL ROD At 1643 (CDT), with Unit 2 in Mode 2 during low power physics testing, the reactor was manually tripped per procedure due to a misaligned control rod. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the atmosphere using the atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 is not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 05/08/2019 AT 1212 EDT FROM MIKE CONNER TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

This Event Notification is being updated to clarify that the reactor was not critical when this event occurred. Therefore, the reporting requirement is changed from 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). The reactor was tripped during low power physics testing. The misaligned rod was encountered during rod group insertion and the affected bank had been inserted to the extent that the reactor was subcritical when the operators tripped the reactor. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Lopez)

ENS 5401722 April 2019 16:16:00VogtleNRC Region 2A contract supervisor tested positive for drugs on a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the facility has been revoked and his badge was confiscated. Additionally, the supervisor failed a random test administered the next day (see EN #54018). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5401822 April 2019 16:16:00VogtleNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: CONTRACT SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE ON A RANDOM FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST A contract supervisor tested positive for drugs on a random fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the facility has been revoked and his badge was confiscated. Additionally, the supervisor failed a follow-up test administered the previous day (see EN #54017).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 4/30/2019 AT 1642 EDT FROM KELLI ROBERTS TO BRIAN LIN * * *

On April 16, 2019, an individual was selected for a follow-up drug test. The same individual was selected again on April 17, 2019 for a random drug test. The results for both tests were ruled by the Medical Review Officer (MRO) on the same day and ruled positive for the same drug on April 22, 2019. These FFD violations were reported to the NRC on April 22, 2019, as EN #54017 and EN #54018, respectively. As allowed by 10 CFR 26.185(o), the MRO further reviewed the quantitation of the drug in both tests and determined that no further drug use had occurred since the first positive test. Therefore, the MRO concluded that this should be considered one FFD violation, and EN #54018 is being retracted. No changes are needed to EN #54017. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Heisserer) and FFD Group (email).

ENS 5400216 April 2019 02:59:00FarleyNRC Region 2At 2355 CDT on 4/15/19, life-saving activities by offsite medical personnel for a Farley employee were terminated. The coroner declared the individual deceased at the plant site at 0130 CDT. The fatality is not believed to be work-related and the individual was inside of the Radiological Controlled Area. This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will be notifying the Occupational Safety and Health Administration due to the on-site fatality. The licensee will perform a radiological survey of the individual prior to transportation offsite.
ENS 5396731 March 2019 00:17:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 2130 (EDT) on March 30, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 30 percent reactor power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a main steam isolation valve failing closed. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. The expected actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 1 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified.
ENS 5395324 March 2019 05:23:00HatchNRC Region 2At 0159 (EDT), with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 25 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. After the turbine was tripped, the station service electrical buses did not transfer to alternate supply resulting in loss of the condensate feedwater system and level being controlled by the RCIC system. Operators responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level is being maintained via the RCIC system. Pressure is being controlled and decay heat is being removed by the HPCI system in pressure control mode. Unit 1 is not affected. Additionally, an actuation of the primary containment isolation system occurred during the reactor scram. The reason for the actuation was a group II isolation signal was received on reactor water level and a group I isolation was received on decreasing vacuum. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non- emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the primary containment isolation system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5394419 March 2019 07:41:00HatchNRC Region 2At 0140 (EDT) on 03/19/2019, while the unit was at approximately 1% power and 154 psig pressure in MODE 2, it was discovered that Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) was INOPERABLE. HPCI does not have a redundant system, therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 entered LCO 3.5.1.c for the HPCI being inoperable. There is no effect on Unit 1.
ENS 5389323 February 2019 09:13:00HatchNRC Region 2At 0212 EST on February 23, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 5, an actuation signal for the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was received during the Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Offsite Power logic system functional test. The 2C EDG was running and tied onto the 2G 4160 emergency bus when the alternate supply breaker was closed as required per the test procedure. Immediately upon closing the alternate supply breaker, both the alternate supply breaker and 2C EDG output breaker tripped open. The 2C EDG output breaker reclosed once the 2G 4160 bus undervoltage relays sensed a deenergized bus. When the 2C EDG tied to the 2G 4160 bus, the bus voltage was noted as being high, and the 2C EDG was secured. Investigation is ongoing to determine the cause of the initial bus undervoltage and the subsequent bus excessive voltage. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the emergency AC power system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event puts Unit 1 in a 72 hour Limiting Condition for Operation for the 1C Startup Transformer being out of service.
ENS 5383217 January 2019 16:00:00VogtleNRC Region 2A non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5382715 January 2019 12:25:00FarleyNRC Region 2At 0800 CST on January 15, 2019, a non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been placed on hold. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 538178 January 2019 08:12:00HatchNRC Region 2On November 12, 2018, at 1331 EST, Unit 1 secondary containment isolated and Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) systems started on Unit 1 and Unit 2 due to a blown fuse. The blown fuse was caused by a degraded refuel floor radiation monitoring relay, causing the radiation monitor to trip and resulted in an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Group 10 and Group 11 primary containment isolation valves, all Unit 1 secondary containment isolation valves, and auto start of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SBGT system. The Unit 1 Fission Product Monitor isolated and tripped and both Unit 1 H202 Analyzers isolated. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since the containment isolation and auto-start of SBGT on both units was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of general containment isolation valves in more than one system. All primary and secondary containment isolation valves, with the exception of the 2T41F003A, Refueling Floor Inboard Vent Supply Isolation valve, functioned successfully. The refuel floor inboard vent supply isolation valve failed to travel fully closed on the secondary containment isolation signal and was therefore declared inoperable. The 2T41F003B refuel floor outboard vent supply isolation valve was verified to go fully closed and therefore isolation of that associated penetration line was successful. After assistance from maintenance, the valve was verified to be fully closed. All SBGT systems functioned successfully. The associated fuse and relay were replaced, and secondary containment was returned to normal service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5378913 December 2018 14:37:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1700 EST on December 12, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting a follow-up Fitness for Duty Test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. No work was performed on safety related equipment. The licensee has made a PADs entry.
ENS 536434 October 2018 07:57:00VogtleNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING LOW POWER PHYSICS TESTING At 0544 EDT on October 4, 2018, with Unit 1 in Mode 2 with reactor power in the intermediate range performing low power physics testing, the reactor was manually tripped due to a rod control urgent failure alarm. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam system. Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods inserted as expected. The cause of the rod control urgent failure is being investigated.

  • * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN LOWE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1408 EDT ON 10/19/2018 * * *

This Event Notification is being updated to clarify that the reactor was not critical when this event occurred. Therefore, the reporting requirement is changed from 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). During Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement testing, Control Bank Charlie was inserted approximately 153 steps when the urgent failure occurred (CBC positioned at 75 steps out). Following the scram, additional analysis concluded that the reactor was subcritical when the Reactor Protection System was actuated." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

ENS 5362827 September 2018 14:42:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1000 EDT on September 27, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5361018 September 2018 08:28:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1610 (EDT) on September 17, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5359912 September 2018 14:14:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1115 EDT on September 12, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5359511 September 2018 17:53:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1430 EDT on September 11, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for drugs during a Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5356324 August 2018 15:14:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1034 (EDT) on August 24, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting a follow-up Fitness for Duty Test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 535387 August 2018 14:45:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0909 (EDT) on August 7, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for alcohol during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5352827 July 2018 13:41:00VogtleNRC Region 2A non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5352626 July 2018 17:51:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1040 (EDT) on July 26, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting the Fitness for Duty program. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5351719 July 2018 12:36:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1300 (EDT) on July 18, 2018, a contractor supervisor violated the licensee's Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program by subverting the Fitness for Duty process. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5351518 July 2018 19:27:00VogtleNRC Region 2A contractor supervisor tested positive for alcohol during an access upgrade fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the facility has been suspended. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5351117 July 2018 17:01:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1338 (EDT) on July 17, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 534999 July 2018 20:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1515 (EDT) on July 9, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a for cause Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 534843 July 2018 12:00:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0954 (EDT) on July 3, 2018, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to high steam generator water level. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed through the main steam lines through the steam dumps and into the condenser. The expected actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. All control rods inserted and Unit 1 is in an electrical shutdown lineup. The cause of the high steam generator water level transient is being investigated.
ENS 5347928 June 2018 13:05:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0902 EDT on June 28, 2018, a non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5346922 June 2018 15:12:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 0900 (EDT) on June 22, 2018, a non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5340316 May 2018 16:51:00VogtleNRC Region 2At 1133 EDT on May 16, 2018, Southern Nuclear Operating Company determined a non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random Fitness-for-Duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 533938 May 2018 10:38:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn May 8, 2018 at 0139 Central Daylight Time, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 declared containment inoperable due to total containment leak rate greater than technical specifications. The 1B containment cooler had seat leakage of approximately 30 gallons per minute from a service water drain valve. Though the containment cooler service water supply is not tested per the Appendix J program, a loss of the containment barrier is possible under accident conditions. The service water flow path to the 1B containment cooler has been isolated to exit the condition. The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.
ENS 533928 May 2018 01:39:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn May 7, 2018 at 1041 CDT, Unit 1 performed an RCS (reactor coolant system) leakrate procedure that calculated an unidentified RCS leakrate of 0.202 gpm. The leak source investigation concluded at 2150 that the packing for the charging flow control valve (FCV) was the source of the RCS leakage when it was bypassed, which isolated the leakage. A second RCS leakrate calculation was performed after the charging flow control valve was isolated which calculated an acceptable leakrate of 0.00 gpm. The packing leakage from the charging flow control valve represented leakage external to containment which would result in a greater that 5 Rem dose projection to control room personnel during accident conditions which does not satisfy the GDC19 criteria described in Technical Specification Bases 3.7.10. Therefore the control room emergency filtration system would not be able to fulfill its design function resulting in an unanalyzed condition. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) for a 'condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'. The packing leak from the charging flow control valve will remain isolated until repaired under work order SNC944374. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 533092 April 2018 18:33:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contractor employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5329026 March 2018 18:19:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On March 25, 2018 at 1833 CDT, while at 100 percent power, Farley Unit 1 (FNP-1) conservatively declared a single Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) inoperable on the 1C Steam Generator line due to indication of Steam Generator pressure rise with a corresponding reduction in flow of that loop. FNP-1 began a reactor shutdown at 0400 CDT on March 26, 2018 to establish plant conditions to support testing the affected main steam line MSIVs while in the required action time of Technical Specification 3.7.2. At 1338 CDT on March 26, 2018, testing confirmed that the single MSIV was inoperable and that valve disassembly will be required. The duration of the valve repair would exceed the required action time of Technical Specification 3.7.2. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), as a plant shutdown required by technical specifications. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DOUGLAS HOBSON TO KEN MOTT AT 0202 EDT ON 5/16/18 * * *

This EN (event notification) is being updated to clarify the reporting criteria as 'Voluntary'. Farley Technical Specification 3.7.2 allows continuous operation in MODE 2 with an INOPERABLE MSIV as long as the other MSIV in the affected Main Steam Line is closed. The initiation of the shutdown was performed as a prudent action to repair and restore OPERABILITY of the affected MSIV and was not a requirement of the Farley Technical Specifications. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R2DO (Masters) was notified.

ENS 5327722 March 2018 09:31:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A non-licensed contract supervisor attempted to subvert a random Fitness For Duty test using a subversion kit on their person. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5322120 February 2018 15:36:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000At 0925 (EST) on February 20, 2018, a non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 531599 January 2018 23:38:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On January 9, 2018, at 1759 CST, during review of NFPA 805 requirements and circuit analysis, it was determined that the NFPA 805 analysis and Fire Safe Shutdown Modeling did not consider all fire-induced failures. As such, a condition could possibly exist during a postulated fire where both safety related electrical trains could be impacted. This notification is to report a condition involving the fire safe shutdown analysis. The condition could result in an adverse impact on the ability of operators to respond to a postulated fire in these areas. Therefore, this notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Compensatory fire watches have been established in the affected areas. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM ANTONIO BENFORD TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1752 EST ON 2/28/18 * * *

Following additional refinements to the NFPA 805 Fire PRA Model, the circuits which initiated the initial report of an unanalyzed condition have now been evaluated and have proven that no significant degradation to plant safety existed. Therefore, EN 53159 is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Michel).