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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5407521 May 2019 17:14:00SummerNRC Region 2

At approximately 1833 EDT on 5/20/2019, VC Summer Nuclear Station identified a potential missed surveillance of the Spent Fuel Storage Canister Heat Removal System Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.2. This is a surveillance requirement in the Holtec CoC No. 1032 Amendment 0, Revision 1 for the HI-STORM FW. It was identified that the station suspended verifying all overpack inlets and outlets were free of blockage from solid debris or floodwater every 24 hours and began utilizing the alternate surveillance method of installed temperature monitoring equipment. However, this monitoring equipment had not been declared operable from the completion of the Dry Cask Storage Campaign on April 11, 2019. This surveillance was last performed satisfactorily on May 15, 2019. The station has documented this missed surveillance in the Corrective Action Program under CR-19-01866. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified. The licensee stated that the temperature monitoring equipment while not operable, was functional. The licensee successfully performed the surveillance requirement on 5/21/2019.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM BETH DALICK TO RODNEY CLAGG AT 0828 EDT ON 6/6/19 * * *

ENS Event Number 54075, made on May 21, 2019, is being retracted. NRC Notification 54075 was made to ensure the 24-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirement of 10 CFR 72.75(d)(1)(i) was met for a potential missed surveillance of the Spent Fuel Storage Canister Heat Removal System Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.2. On June 4, 2019, a Past Operability Evaluation determined the temperature monitoring equipment, utilized to complete the Technical Specification Surveillance 3.1.2, was operable during the time period of 5/16/2019-5/21/2019. The station performed satisfactory calibration checks on the temperature monitoring equipment and had not experienced any significant weather events capable of producing vent blockage (i.e. flood, tornado, snow storm, etc.). Therefore, utilizing the installed temperature monitoring equipment is not considered a missed surveillance of SR 3.1.2 and renders this event not reportable under 10 CFR 72.75(d)(1)(i). VCSNS's evaluation of this event is documented in the Corrective Action Program in Condition Report (CR-19-01866). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Rose) and NMSS Events Notification (email).

ENS 5317618 January 2018 17:03:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator.

On January 18, 2018 at 1202 EST, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) lost one of its two redundant offsite power supplies. The loss of the 115kV power supply created an undervoltage condition on the normal incoming Engineered Safety Features power supply to safety related bus 1DA. The 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator started and loads sequenced as designed. The 'A' Residual Heat Removal pump started but did not inject any water into the Reactor Coolant System. The 'A' Emergency Feedwater Pump started and ran for approximately 2 minutes. Other plant equipment and systems also responded as expected.

The loss of the 115kV power supply occurred due to an issue with a component in a switchyard, external to VCSNS. The cause of the event is still under investigation.

All loads have been transferred back to the offsite 115kV power supply at 1318 EST. The diesel generator was secured at 1321 EST, reset and is ready to auto-start.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 530607 November 2017 22:32:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On 11/7/2017 at 1957 (EST), VC Summer Nuclear Station automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The cause of the turbine trip is under investigation at this time. All systems responded as expected. All Control Rods fully inserted and all Emergency Feedwater pumps started as required. The plant is stable in Mode 3. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat removal via the Main Steam to the Main Condenser. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the South Carolina State Emergency Management Division, the Fairfield, Richland, Lexington and Newberry Counties.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BETH DALICK TO VINCE KLCO ON 11/8/17 AT 1409 EST * * *

All systems responded as expected, with the exception of 'B' Steam Generator Feedwater Isolation Valve XVG1611 B-FW. This valve did not appear to automatically close and was slow to indicate closed from the Main Control Board. All Control Rods fully inserted and all Emergency Feedwater pumps started as required. The plant is stable in Mode 3. Notified the R2DO (Musser).

ENS 5302017 October 2017 13:22:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 0319 EDT on 10/14/17, site personnel discovered a sanitary lift station overflowing in the protected area. The overflow entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 12. The estimated release volume was approximately 50 gallons. At 1134 EDT on 10/17/17 an initial notification was made to South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. The cause of the overflow is still under investigation. Functionality of the lift pump has been restored and cleanup is complete. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5296211 September 2017 21:48:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator. On September 11, 2017 at 1648 (EDT) the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started on the low voltage signal from Bus 1DA as a result of a 115KV grid perturbation. All emergency buses remained energized from offsite power. The EDG did not tie to the 1DA bus because the offsite power voltage recovered within the designed recovery time limit. The diesel generator has been secured, reset and is ready to auto start. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5293228 August 2017 10:55:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 8/28/2017 at 0837 (EDT), VC Summer Nuclear Station automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The turbine trip was caused by the Main Generator Differential Lockout due to a fault on the center phase lightning arrester on the Main Transformer (XTF-001). There were no complications with the trip. All control rods fully inserted. Balance of Plant (BOP) buses automatically transferred to their alternate power source XTF 31/32. All Emergency Feedwater pumps started as required. All systems responded as required. The plant is stable in Mode 3. Station personnel are investigating the cause of the fault on the main transformer lightning arrester. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat removal via the Main Steam to the Main Condenser. The licensee will inform both State and local authorities.
ENS 5283329 June 2017 12:43:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On 6/29/2017 at 0857 (EDT), VC Summer Nuclear Station automatically tripped due to a loss of normal feed water flow to the B Steam Generator.

There were no complications with the trip. All control rods fully inserted. All emergency feedwater pumps automatically started and recovered steam generator levels. The plant is stable in Mode 3. Station personnel are investigating the cause of the loss of normal feedwater to the B Steam Generator. This is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the State of South Carolina as well as Fairfield, Lexington, Richland and Newberry Counties regarding the event.

ENS 5270525 April 2017 14:53:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn April 25, 2017 at approximately 0900 (EDT), it was identified that power to RM-G8 Area Gamma Radiation Monitor for the Fuel Handling Building Bridge, had not been restored within 72 hours. RM-G8 was de-energized during the B train essential bus outage and was restored on April 25, 2017 at 1148. It was out of service for approximately 92 hours. Compensatory measures were in place per HPP-904 while RM-G8 was out of service. RM-G8 is identified in the emergency plan as an equipment important to emergency response. NUREG-1022, Rev. 3 Supplement 1 Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), allows a 72 hour planned outage time to restore equipment important to emergency response. Since RM-G8 was not restored in 72 hours, it is reportable as an 8 hour ENS. This event should have been reported when it was known that the 72 hour outage time was not going to be met. This issue has been entered in the station's corrective action program. Fuel inspections were occurring during this time with compensatory measures in place. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 526686 April 2017 15:58:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contractor manager had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a pre-access test. The employee's access to the construction site has been revoked. The licensee notified the NRC Unit 2 & 3 Resident Inspector.
ENS 523579 November 2016 14:58:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 1008 (EST) on 11/9/16, site personnel discovered a sanitary lift station overflowing in the protected area. The overflow entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 13. The estimated release volume is approximately 10 gallons. The release has been stopped. At 1339 an initial notification was made to SCDHEC (South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control). The cause of the overflow is still under investigation. Functionality of the lift pump has been restored and cleanup is complete. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified.
ENS 523548 November 2016 11:44:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP1000In accordance with 10CFR52.99(c)(2), V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 Construction is making this notification to NRC for determining that Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.6.01.02.ii (Seismic Qualification of Reactor Coolant Pump Switchgear) for both units requires additional actions to restore its completed status. The Closure Notification for this ITAAC (NRC Index No. 580) was originally submitted on February 29, 2016 (reference ML16060A344 and ML16060A345). On November 2, 2016, it was determined that modifications to the RCP switchgear cabinet design were required to ensure compliance with the applicable portions of IEEE 384, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits. The modification involved an engineering change which adds different equipment to the RCP Switchgear cabinet which function to trip the RCP. The new components were not previously seismically qualified for use in the RCP switchgear cabinet assembly. The additional components have now undergone seismic qualification testing for use in the RCP switchgear. The Equipment Qualification Data Package and Equipment Qualification Summary Report for the RCP switchgear will be revised based on the results of the testing to confirm the switchgear withstands seismic design basis loads. The revised testing report has been completed on November 8 2016. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5224014 September 2016 01:02:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopDuring routine operator rounds at 2030 EDT, a steam propagation barrier door (SPBD) was discovered propped open for maintenance activities without appropriate station controls. This condition was in existence from approximately 1720 EDT to 2042 EDT when the SPBD was restored to its normal configuration. Throughout the approximate 3 hours and 22 minutes, when the SPBD was propped open, both trains of chill water were rendered non-functional due to a potential high energy line break. This subsequently rendered both trains of high-head safety injection inoperable, which placed the plant in Technical Specification 3.0.3. This condition was corrected prior to commencing a Technical Specification 3.0.3 plant shutdown. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5208614 July 2016 15:15:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP1000On 7/14/16, at 0741 (EDT), it was determined that (a contract employee supervisor) violated its FFD policy. The individual's construction site access has been revoked. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii). The Units 2 and 3 (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5195424 May 2016 15:28:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 1250 (EDT), a contract employee was found unresponsive in (their) personal vehicle located in the parking lot outside of the owner controlled area. The Fairfield County Coroner arrived on-site and declared the individual deceased at 1345. The fatality was due to an apparent personal medical issue and not work related. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee has notified State of South Carolina Department of Labor - OSHA.
ENS 5194118 May 2016 08:13:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Construction Resident Inspector.
ENS 515854 December 2015 18:06:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

Off-site Notification to South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC).

At approximately 1400 (EST) on 12/4/15, site personnel discovered a sanitary lift station overflowing in the owner controlled area. The overflow entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 13. The estimated release volume is between 10-15 gallons. The release has been stopped. At 1448, an initial notification was made to SCDHEC. The overflow appears to be the result of securing electrical power to the general area, including the lift station, to support construction activities. Power has been restored and clean-up is in progress.

The NRC Senior Resident has been notified.

ENS 5148521 October 2015 10:03:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5115816 June 2015 10:39:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP100010 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a failure to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B associated with AP1000 nuclear power plant construction by Chicago Bridge & Iron Company (CB&I) at the V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3 construction site. This 50.55(e) initial notification addresses a failure to comply by CB&I, an agent of South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) for V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3, to meet the requirements of Appendix B, Criteria V and XV. It is concluded that Quality Assurance programmatic issues, as identified by CB&I Root Cause Analysis 2015-0539, could have produced a defect and this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). Root Cause Analysis 2015-0539 investigated the causes that lead to impingement of safety related reinforcing steel and the steel containment vessel during concrete core drilling operations within the Unit 2 containment structure. No defect has been identified. This condition is associated with NRC special inspection report number 05200027/2015-009. This notification closes the Interim Part 21 report submitted on April 16th, 2015, by CB&I. This 50.55(e) Initial Notification is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 511357 June 2015 05:46:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

An individual approached the protected area and grabbed the fence. Local law enforcement assistance has been requested. The Security Team leader does not consider this to be hostile. An emergency declaration was made based on HU4.1, for a security condition that does not involve a hostile action. The licensee notified state and local agencies and informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, and FEMA NWC and NuclearSSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE STEVE WILSON TO DAN LIVERMORE AT 0649 ON 06/07/2015 * * *

The individual was taken into custody without incident. Notified R2DO (Rose), NRR EO (Morris), and IRD (GOTT). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, and Nuclear SSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1616 EDT ON 6/8/2015 FROM MICHAEL MOORE TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Update to correct description of where the individual was apprehended.

An individual approached the outside of the administrative fence near the circulating water intake structure. Local law enforcement assistance was requested. The Security Team Leader does not consider this to be hostile.

This declaration was made based on HU 4.1, a security condition that does not involve Hostile Action.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R2DO (Rose).

ENS 5101024 April 2015 14:14:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contract employee supervisor tested positive for a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employees access to the site has been denied. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5100523 April 2015 13:18:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contract employee supervisor willfully acted to avoid a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual left the construction site after the notification to report to the fitness-for-duty office. The employees access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5081512 February 2015 17:19:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP1000This is a 10 CFR 50.55 initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I), an agent for the Licensee of the V. C. Summer 2 & 3 Construction Project. In August 2014, deviations were found in sub-modules CA03-06, -08, and -09 for the Vogtle 3 Construction Project, which initiated the discovery and evaluation processes for both Part 21 and 10 CFR 50.55. The conditions were determined to be not reportable by CB&I under 10 CFR 21, but an evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.".
ENS 507968 February 2015 08:12:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At approximately 0848 (EST) on February 7, 2015, a contract employee was found unresponsive at a VC Summer Unit 1 facility outside the Owner Controlled Area. The VC Summer Medical Emergency Response Team responded to the scene and provided assistance until offsite medical personnel arrived. Emergency Medical Services arrived on the scene and transported the individual to a local area hospital. VC Summer has reported this to OSHA and is reporting this to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1300 EST ON 02/16/15 FROM MICHAEL MOORE TO S. SANDIN * * *

At 0935 EST, on February 16, 2015 SCE&G notified OSHA that the contract employee had passed away. This update also corrects the second sentence of the initial notification that station personnel versus the Medical Emergency Response Team responded to the scene. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Nease).

ENS 5044210 September 2014 11:51:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP1000This is a 10CFR50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub modules for the Virgil C. Summer Units 2 and 3 construction project. In March, 2014, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for welding program deviations associated with the fabrication of sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10CFR50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5029322 July 2014 07:53:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0414 (EDT on 7/22/2014), VC Summer Nuclear Station automatically tripped due to decreasing water level in the 'C' Steam Generator. The trip occurred when valve XVB-09210 WI System Condensate Bypass Valve failed to open as required while the station was removing the Condensate Polishing System during startup. The Condensate Polishing System is used to purify and filter the condensate from the non-nuclear, secondary side of the plant. This valve failure caused low level in the Deaerator Storage Tank, which consequently tripped all feedwater pumps. This loss of feedwater led to Lo-Lo Steam Generator level in the 'C' Steam Generator. All Emergency Feedwater pumps automatically started on Lo-Lo Steam Generator level and all control rods inserted fully. The Steam Generator levels recovered quickly. Presently the plant is in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by dumping steam to the condenser. A station response team is actively investigating the cause of the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The licensee will notify the State and local governments.
ENS 5022926 June 2014 15:15:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is a non-emergency notification regarding a very small amount of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) which is unaccounted for. On May 30, 2014, a discrepancy was found in the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station SNM inventory. After extensive review, it was determined on June 19, 2014 that one nuclear instrumentation incore detector could not be located at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. Detectors of this type are used to measure incore neutron flux (intensity of neutron radiation) inside the reactor vessel. This is being reported under 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(1)(ii) Reports of Theft or Loss of Licensed Material. According to V.C. Summer documentation, there should be 42 such detectors in storage. Only 41 detectors could be physically located. There is no evidence of theft or diversion of the detector. Detectors of this type contain very small amounts of Uranium-235 (.0041 grams/detector), which qualifies them as SNM. The detector is believed to be located in a storage location in the Reactor Building (RB). The RB storage location will be inspected during the next refueling outage. This event had no effect on plant operations. No impact on public health and safety has been identified. A written report will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(1)(i-vi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5004418 April 2014 22:55:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On April 18, 2014, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Unit 1 identified 3 reactor vessel head penetrations (9, 43 and 51) that did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1. The station is in a refueling outage (RF21) and the plant is currently shutdown and defueled. The reactor vessel head contains a total of 66 penetrations and the volumetric inspection efforts are complete. The indications are not through wall as indicated by volumetric and bare metal visual inspections. The penetrations will be repaired to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a prior to returning the vessel head to service. The inspection results are reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State of South Carolina and local counties.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BETH DALICK TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1302 EDT ON 4/26/14 * * *

On April 26, 2014, V. C. Summer Station (VCSNS) Unit 1 finalized the inspections of the reactor vessel head penetrations. Confirmatory dye penetrant inspections determined that penetrations 15 and 22 also did not meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1. The station is in a refueling outage (RF21) and the plant is currently shutdown and defueled. The indications are not through wall as indicated by volumetric and bare metal visual inspections. The penetrations will be repaired to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a prior to returning the vessel head to service. The inspection results are reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State of South Carolina and local counties. Notified R2DO (McCoy).

ENS 498827 March 2014 15:26:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP1000A construction supervisor failed a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been revoked. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Rose).
ENS 4983114 February 2014 23:08:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

An earthquake was felt in the control room at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1 (VCSNS) at approximately 2223. The earthquake was confirmed with USGS at 2240. An unusual event in accordance with the emergency plan was declared at 2245 and NRC was notified at (2308 EST) via ENS per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i). The plant is stable and continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee has completed preliminary building walkdown inspections with no damage noted. There were no injuries. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BETH DALICK TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1108 EST ON 2/15/14 * * *

(V.C. Summer Nuclear Station) VCSNS has terminated the (Unusual) Event after walkdowns of the plant were satisfactorily completed and no aftershocks were felt. An update to ENS has also been made. The event was terminated at 1045 (EST) on 2/15/2014. The plant continues to operate at 100% power and the licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2RA (McCree), R2DO (Guthrie), NRR EO (Monninger), NRR (Uhle), IRD (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, DHS NICC, and NuclearSSA via email.

ENS 4972214 January 2014 16:14:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOffsite notification to South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). At approximately 1330 EST on January 14, 2014, site personnel discovered a fork lift leaking hydraulic oil in the protected area. The estimated amount of hydraulic oil spilled is between 10-15 gallons. Approximately 3 gallons of hydraulic oil from the spill entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 13. At 1530 (EST) an initial notification was made to SCDHEC. The spill has been contained and clean up efforts are underway. The NRC Residents have been notified.
ENS 4958226 November 2013 13:44:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP1000This is a 10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub modules for the Virgil C. Summer Units 2 & 3 construction project. In September 2013, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for deviations associated with sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 495157 November 2013 16:05:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP1000On November 7, 2013, at 0826 EST, an investigation determined that a Fitness for Duty (FFD) policy violation as defined in 10 CFR 26.417(b)(1) had occurred in the Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) FFD Program at the South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 construction site. On November 5, 2013, a CB&I contractor vending machine service employee, in the presence of a CB&I contract security officer, used another contractor vending machine service employee's badge to gain access to the construction site after his badge did not allow access due to being inactivated in an effort to facilitate a random FFD test. The contractor vending machine service employee was escorted out of the construction site. Subsequent investigation uncovered that it was a practice within the contractor vending machine service company to maintain an employee's badge in the vehicle and periodically use it to ensure the badge was not deactivated. The contractor vending machine service company employee badges have been deactivated pending further investigation. The individuals involved in this event are under 10 CFR 26, Subpart K, and do not perform safety or security related work. This event has been entered in the CB&I and SCE&G Corrective Action Programs for resolution and development of appropriate corrective actions. SCE&G is providing this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 26.417(b)(1). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4934516 September 2013 11:53:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 0700 (EDT) on 9/16/13, site personnel discovered a sewer lift station, in the owner controlled area, overflowing. The overflow entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 13. The estimated release volume is between 500-1000 gallons. The release has been stopped. At 1045 an initial notification was made to SCDHEC. A pump failure is suspected to be the cause of the back-up and subsequent overflow. Repair and clean-up is in process. The NRC Residents have been notified.
ENS 4933610 September 2013 15:57:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-licensed, contract, supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 492539 August 2013 08:21:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contractor supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a follow-up fitness for duty screening. The individual's construction site access was revoked. The Unit 2/3 Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4921324 July 2013 12:21:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn July 23, 2013 at 1345 (EDT), the Fitness-for-Duty Snapshot Self-Assessment team identified an anomaly with the Employee Plant Access Control Tracking (EMPACT) program used to randomly select V.C. Summer employees for daily fitness for duty (FFD) screenings. More specifically, when an employee terminates employment at the station, Access Control personnel select 'Exclude from Random' feature in the EMPACT program to remove their name from the program code that randomly selects current employees for daily FFD screenings. When a former employee returns to the station for re-employment, Access Control personnel select 'New Request' within the EMPACT program. The 'New Request' feature is supposed to automatically deselect the 'Exclude from Random' feature, which adds the employee back to the randomly selected population. This feature of the EMPACT program was determined not to be functional. In accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4), this program flaw constitutes: 'Any programmatic .... discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit the undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program.' This event has been entered into the station's corrective action program under CR-13-03066. The issue is limited to 53 employees (2.9% of the randomly selected population) that have returned to V.C. Summer for employment in the previous six years. Immediate corrective actions consist of contacting the program vendor, conducting an Access Control Program standdown, and contacting the 53 employees to report for fitness-for-duty screening. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Other utilities known to use the EMPACT software have been contacted. This issue does not affect units 2 or 3 since they use a different system.
ENS 489912 May 2013 11:27:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP1000On May 2, 2013, a non-licensed employee supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a random fitness for duty test. The individuals site access has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspectors.
ENS 4891010 April 2013 16:44:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP100050.55(e) initial notification for failure to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VII for procurement of safety-related components associated with AP1000 Nuclear Power Plant construction by CB&I (formerly Shaw Nuclear). This 50.55(e) initial notification addresses a failure to comply by CB&I, an agent of South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) for Virgil C. Summer 2 & 3, to meet the requirements of Appendix B, Criterion VII. It is concluded that the QA programmatic issues, as identified by the root cause analysis associated with NRC violation 05200025/2012-004-02, could have produced a defect and this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The root cause of the programmatic procurement problems was that the existing Shaw Nuclear procurement and quality oversight and inspection program did not include a sufficiently strategic, integrated, and graded approach to assure the required quality of material, equipment, and services. This notification closes the interim report submitted on February 4, 2013 by SCE&G. This 50.55(e) initial notification is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4884624 March 2013 09:54:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0458 (EDT), a lightning strike caused a voltage disturbance on the 115 KV offsite power source and resulted in the automatic start of the 'A' emergency diesel generator on an undervoltage relay actuation. The 'A' emergency diesel generator came up to rated frequency and voltage. The voltage disturbance (duration) was not long enough to cause the normal incoming breaker to the 'A' train 7.2 KV safety related bus (XSW1DA) to open or the 'A' emergency diesel generator output breaker to close. The voltage disturbance caused the 'A' safety related chiller and some ventilation fans to trip. These loads were subsequently restarted with no issue. The 'A' emergency diesel generator was secured and made ready for autostart at 0520 (EDT). The station is in Mode 5 for a mid cycle outage to repair a reactor coolant pump seal. This notification is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of an emergency diesel generator. The unit is in a normal electrical shutdown plant configuration. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the State and Local authorities.
ENS 485615 December 2012 13:03:00SummerNRC Region 2W-AP1000This is a non-emergency 4-hour informational notification to the NRC in accordance with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). On December 5, 2012 at approximately 0810 hours EST, a contract employee within the construction area suffered a non-work related personal medical event. The individual was transported offsite and was pronounced deceased at a local hospital. OSHA was notified at 1134 EST pursuant to the requirements of 29 CFR 1904.39. There was no radioactive contamination involved in this event. South Carolina Electric and Gas Company has not observed any heightened media interest as a result of this event. No other notifications to government agencies are expected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4851818 November 2012 11:10:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On 11/18/2012 at approximately 1130 EST, the Summer Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) will be taken out of service for approximately 12 hours to support a planned maintenance on an inverter that feeds the station's Integrated Plant Computer System (lPCS). During this time frame. ERDS and SPDS will be unavailable. Should the need arise, plant status information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems. SPDS and ERDS are expected to be restored on 11/18/2012 at 1800 EST. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL MOORE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1003 EST ON 11/19/2012 * * *

On November 18, 2012, at approximately 1730, IPCS was returned to service. Completing this planned maintenance activity restored the VCSNS Safety Parameter Display System and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). ERDS was tested this morning, November 19, 2012, by VCSNS and the NRC ERDS Help Desk to verify system operability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Widmann).

ENS 4843523 October 2012 20:59:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On October 23, 2012, V. C. Summer Station Unit 1 (VCSNS) identified two reactor vessel head penetrations (19 and 52) that did not meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1. The station is in a refueling outage (RF20) and the plant is currently shutdown and in Mode 6. The reactor vessel head (RVH) contains a total of 66 penetrations and inspection efforts are approximately 50% percent complete. There have been no previous repairs to the reactor vessel head penetrations and/or j-groove welds. The indications are not through wall as indicated by volumetric and bare metal visual inspections. The penetrations will be repaired to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a prior to returning the vessel head to service. The inspection results are reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State of South Carolina and local counties.

* * * UPDATE FROM BETH QUATTLEBAUM TO PETE SNYDER AT 1800 ON 10/25/12 * * * 

On October 25, 2012, V. C. Summer Station Unit 1 (VCSNS) finalized our inspections of the reactor vessel head, which has identified a total of four reactor vessel head penetrations (19, 52, 31, and 37) that did not meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1. The station is in a refueling outage (RF20) and the plant is currently shutdown and defueled. The indications are not through wall as indicated from volumetric and bare metal visual inspections. The penetrations will be repaired to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a prior to returning the vessel head to service. The inspection results are reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Musser).

ENS 480778 July 2012 12:30:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

VC Summer operators declared an Unusual Event due to one fire detector being in alarm inside the reactor building 'B' steam generator cubicle. There are no other fire detectors in alarm nor are there any elevated containment temperatures. The licensee is making preparations to enter the reactor building to investigate. The reactor continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee contacted the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1640 ON 7/8/2012 FROM BRUCE THOMPSON TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On 7/8/2012 at 1202 EDT, an Unusual Event was declared. The event was (declared based on) HU 2.1 'Fire within the Protected Area not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection' and was based on a single smoke detector alarm in the Reactor Building. There were no other indications of a fire. The NRC was initially notified at 1230 EDT. At 1542 personnel entered the Reactor Building and verified that no fire had occurred. A faulty smoke detector is suspected. At 1634 the Unusual Event was terminated. The smoke detector was declared inoperable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the IRD (Marshall), R2DO (Bonser), NRR (McGinty), DHS SWO, FEMA, and DHS NICC.

ENS 470398 July 2011 16:00:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis notification is being made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) of a situation related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to a state agency has been made. On July 8, 2011, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) made a voluntary notification to the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Groundwater Protection Initiative for an on-site leak that may exceed 100 gallons. The leak was entirely contained within the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station site boundary. On July 7, 2011 during a routine inspection, a leak was discovered in a liquid radwaste line upstream from its final discharge point and downstream of the release radiation monitors. This line contains processed liquid radwaste that has been sampled and permitted for release. The leak occurred inside a containment enclosure which overflowed. The enclosure was drained and the liquid was returned to the plant for disposal. The leak has been isolated and all radwaste release via this pathway has been suspended. The last inspection of this equipment was conducted on February 14, 2011, and revealed no external leakage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4699729 June 2011 09:49:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

The following Part 21 report was received via fax: 10 CFR 21: Appendix R analyses conducted for Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) failed to identify that a fire-induced hot-short failure in an ammeter circuit would result in a loss of the B-train 7.2KV essential electrical bus (XSW1DB). Appendix R analyses performed by Gilbert/Commonwealth (now Worley Parsons) in the early 1980s failed to recognize the possibility of a fire-induced hot-short condition in a circuit that was identified as being required for safe shutdown. This circuit connects a set of sensing current transformers (CTs) to an ammeter on the Main Control Board, and provides over-current sensing for an over-current relay. Gilbert/Commonwealth recognized that a fire-induced open circuit in this ammeter circuit would result in damage to, or a fire in, the B-train 7.2kV essential switchgear. Thyrite protectors were added to the circuit to protect the CTs from this open circuit condition as part of the Appendix R analysis. However, this analysis and resolution failed to consider the hot-short-to-ground failure mode. Current from a hot-short could flow through the ammeters, or neutral conductor, and then through the bus neutral over-current relay to ground. This could actuate the over-current relay, which in turn would actuate a lock-out relay and trip all incoming breakers to bus XSW1DB. This bus provides credited B-train power to safe-shutdown components credited for this scenario. The Appendix R analyses conducted for VCSNS by Gilbert/Commonwealth did not address the hot-short scenario and is considered to be a defect, or omission. reportable under 10 CFR 21. This condition was identified during the circuit analysis review for transitioning the Appendix R Fire Protection Program to NFPA 805 and was reported to the NRC as an unanalyzed condition on 05/03/2011 (see Event Notification No. 46811). Corrective actions have been taken to address this issue. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOE MARSDEN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ ON 6/30/2011 AT 1643 * * *

Worley Parsons Investigation Results: Although this design was not a generic or standard design, Worley Parsons performed further evaluation, including extent of condition, for other Nuclear Power Plants that Worley Parsons performed the original design and performed Appendix R Compliance Review/Modifications. Five plants were identified as follows: 1) Crystal River 3: Worley Parsons discussed the issue with Progress Energy and jointly concluded that Crystal River 3 is not impacted because their corresponding current transformer circuit design has a different configuration. The circuit design is not generic or programmatic. 2) TMI Unit 1: TMI is not impacted because their corresponding current transformer circuit design has a different configuration. The circuit design is not generic or programmatic. 3) Perry: The Appendix R Compliance Review was accomplished by a team of Worley Parsons and others. Since Worley Parsons was involved with the Appendix R analysis and the affected electrical drawings are not readily available at Worley Parsons, it was concluded that Worley Parsons could not complete the evaluation to determine if the Perry design condition could cause a substantial safety hazard. Worley Parsons issued letter PNPP-O-CO-011-WCLT-0001 to the Perry Design Engineering Manager, recommending Perry to complete the evaluation pursuant to 10CFR21.21(a). 4) V.C. Summer: V.C. Summer is the subject plant and is impacted. VC. Summer is issuing LER #2011-001-00, which constitutes the Part 21 Notification for this design defect, or omission. 5) R.E. Ginna: Worley Parsons did not perform the Appendix R analysis for Ginna. Corrective Action: V.C. Summer has implemented immediate compensatory measures for this condition until a permanent solution is identified. A root cause analysis was jointly performed with V.C. Summer. The root cause analysis and Worley Parsons corrective action program review considered this an isolated incident due to human error. No programmatic/procedure corrective actions were identified due to the historical nature of the issue. Actions to preclude recurrence: Human performance issues from this event will be communicated to the Worley Parsons Nuclear Engineering staff under our corrective action and lessons learned program. Notified R1DO (Welling), R2DO (Franke), and R3DO (Lipa). Notified the Part 21 Group via e-mail.

ENS 4689927 May 2011 14:50:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1200 hours on May 27, 2011, the plant was in Mode 3 during startup from a refueling outage with the main steam isolation valves closed. When the 'C' main steam isolation valve was opened for stroke testing, a safety injection occurred. The safety injection was due to a differential pressure of greater than 97 PSIG between the 'C' main steam line and the other main steam lines. The emergency core cooling system started and injected water into the Reactor Coolant System. All systems responded as expected. Safety injection was secured and the plant was stabilized in Mode 3. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Licensee will be notifying the State and local government.
ENS 468113 May 2011 13:02:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 05/03/2011 at 0514 (EDT) V.C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) determined the following: During circuit analysis review for transitioning the Fire Protection Program to NFPA-0805, VCSNS identified two violations of the Appendix R requirement to maintain one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions in accordance with Appendix R. Both instances apply to postulated fires in the Main Control Room and Cable Spreading Room. In the first instance, circuits were identified in the Main Control Room and Cable Spreading Room that impact a control power circuit that could result in the loss of ability to start the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator using local controls. Because fires in these areas can result in the need to evacuate the Main Control Room, the inability to start the diesel using local controls could have an adverse impact on the ability to safely shut down the plant. In the second instance, VCSNS determined that a fire in either the Main Control Room or Cable Spreading Room could result in a hot short that could actuate a relay and trip all incoming breakers to the B-train essential electrical bus (Bus 1DB). Because fires in these areas can result in a loss of power to the bus, this could have an adverse impact on the ability to safely shut down the plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 4657025 January 2011 15:10:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA licensed employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4634519 October 2010 17:45:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4588229 April 2010 20:30:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopWhile performing a walkdown of the 'B' emergency diesel generator remote shutdown circuitry, a wiring discrepancy was identified that could have disabled the Appendix R function of the circuitry. The wiring discrepancy could have prevented complete isolation of the 'B' emergency diesel generator breaker closure circuitry from a postulated fire in the Control Building. This configuration causes the Appendix R function of the 'B' emergency diesel generator to be inoperable. A roving firewatch has been established and a 7 day action statement has been entered in accordance with the applicable fire protection procedure. Corrective actions are being evaluated to resolve this issue. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.