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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5471414 May 2020 19:28:00South TexasNRC Region 4At 1535 CDT, on 5/14/2020, it was determined that approximately 10 gallons of hydraulic oil was spilled during dredging activities into the STP Intake Basin (adjacent to the Colorado River). Cleanup using oil booms is underway and there is no longer a visible sheen. The cause of the hydraulic oil spill is under investigation. The Texas General Land Office was notified at 1610 CDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5460524 March 2020 17:15:00South TexasNRC Region 4At 1046 CDT on 3/24/2020, with Unit 1 defueled and Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the South Texas Project (STP) South switchyard electrical bus was deenergized. This resulted in a loss of power to Standby Transformer 2 which was supplying power to the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) 4160v busses for Unit 1 A- and C-Trains, and Unit 2 B-Train. Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) 11, 13, and 22 automatically started in response to the undervoltage condition. The cause for the loss of the South switchyard electrical bus was an error in relay testing in the switchyard. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in the valid actuation of emergency AC electrical power systems (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8)) as well as the Unit 1 A- and C-Train and Unit 2 B-Train Reactor Containment Fan Coolers (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(7)) and Unit 2 B-Train Auxiliary Feedwater pump (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6)). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5458717 March 2020 19:38:00South TexasNRC Region 4

At 1532 CDT, on 3/17/2020, it was reported to the Unit 1 Control Room that less than one gallon of hydraulic oil was spilled into the Colorado River during dredging activities. Cleanup using oil booms was completed at 1747 CDT. The cause of the hydraulic oil spill is under investigation.

The Texas General Land Office was notified at 1558 CDT.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 545614 March 2020 12:24:00South TexasNRC Region 4

EN Revision Text: NOTIFICATION TO OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY On March 4, 2020, an actual Unusual Event code was inadvertently sent to an offsite agency, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and to a former NRC Resident Inspector during a planned emergency response drill. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 3/5/2020 AT 1554 EST FROM RONALD ROHAN TO DONALD NORWOOD * * *

Based on further review of the NRC reporting guidance relative to these criteria, STP has concluded that this condition is below the reporting threshold outlined in NUREG-1022 Revision 3. NUREG-1022 states the following (page 54): 'Licensees generally do not have to report media and government interactions unless they are related to the radiological health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment. The condition originally reported in EN 54561 is not a news release or government notification and has no impact on the radiological health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment. Therefore, STP is retracting EN 54561. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified on 3/5/2020 at 1310 CST. Notified R4DO Rick Deese.

ENS 545562 March 2020 20:45:00South TexasNRC Region 4A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5453018 February 2020 20:20:00South TexasNRC Region 4

On February 18, 2020 a non-licensed contractor supervisor violated the station's FFD policy. The employee's unescorted access to South Texas has been terminated.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 5452917 February 2020 19:23:00South TexasNRC Region 4

At 1647 CST on 2/17/2020, it was determined that approximately two quarts of hydraulic oil were spilled into the Colorado River during preparation for dredging activities. Cleanup using an oil dispersant and oil booms is underway. The cause of the hydraulic oil spill is under investigation.

The Texas General Land Office was notified at 1717 CST. Additional reports were made to the Texas Commission of Environmental Quality, the Environmental Protection Agency National Response Center, and the Matagorda County Local Emergency Planning Committee.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 5451711 February 2020 14:45:00South TexasNRC Region 4

On February 11, 2020, a licensed Senior Reactor Operator violated the station's fitness-for-duty policy. The employee's access to South Texas has been terminated.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The employee tested positive on a follow-up test for alcohol.

ENS 5450230 January 2020 17:15:00South TexasNRC Region 4

On January 30, 2020, a non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 2/3/2020 AT 1223 EST FROM WILLIAM HERZOG TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The initial NRC report wording was incorrect. Specifically, the non-licensed supervisory personnel violated the fitness for duty policy, they did not have a confirmed positive for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The title of this event is corrected. Notified R4DO (Taylor) and FFD Group.

ENS 5435125 October 2019 03:24:00South TexasNRC Region 4On October 24, 2019, at 2051 Central Time, while performing Train C Sequencer maintenance, a valid undervoltage actuation signal was sent to Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 23. The ESF Train C bus loads were shed but EDG 23 did not automatically start because it had been placed in Pull-To-Stop to support the sequencer maintenance activities. EDG 23 was taken out of Pull-To-Stop by Control Room staff to allow it to auto start and load the bus. As a result of the bus strip signal, the in service Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump secured. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling was restored with no measurable increase in pool temperature. The reactor was not critical and reactor decay heat removal was not challenged throughout the event. This actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the automatic actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5428418 September 2019 13:42:00South TexasNRC Region 4At 0750 CDT, on September 18, 2019, South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) experienced an unplanned loss of the Integrated Computer System (ICS) to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The loss of ICS resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability to the STPEGS EOF for greater than 90 minutes. Assessment capability has been verified to be available in the Unit 2 Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Rooms. ICS was restored to the EOF at 0932 CDT on September 18, 2019. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as any event that resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 542576 September 2019 02:47:00South TexasNRC Region 4

EN Revision Text: CONTAINMENT PENETRATION DISCOVERED NOT ISOLATED At 2115 CDT on 9/5/2019, an inside containment test connection and inoperable outside containment isolation valve were discovered to be open for a containment air sample penetration. This resulted in the containment penetration not being isolated. The inside containment test connection was closed at 2322 CDT on 9/5/2019.

This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL BURTON TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1342 EST ON 11/7/19 * * *

This event was originally reported on September 6, 2019 under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Upon completion of the investigation of the event, it was determined that the event had insignificant safety consequences because the containment breach was disconnected from the Reactor Coolant System by a series of closed valves for the duration of the event. Additionally, the lines to the inside containment connection and the outside inoperable containment isolation valve that was found to be open as well as the main line connecting and passing through the penetration were one-inch diameter lines. Analysis determined that containment breaches that are less than a three-inch diameter do not lead to a large radiation release. The event did not place the plant in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Therefore, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) did not apply to this event and this notification is to retract reporting under that criterion. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Drake).

ENS 5419031 July 2019 15:55:00South TexasNRC Region 4

EN Revision Text: DISCOVERY OF CONDITION THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED FULFILLMENT OF A SAFETY FUNCTION South Texas Project (STP) Unit 1 reactor head vent valve B1RCHCV0601 was declared inoperable on December 29, 2018, STP Unit 1 reactor head vent valve B1RCHCV0602 was declared inoperable on July 30, 2019. Technical Specification 3.3.3.5 requires one of two reactor head vent valves to be operable. This issue placed the plant in a 30-day Technical Specification Action. At 0741 CDT on July 31, 2019, South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) made a determination based on firm evidence that reactor head vent valve B1RCHCV0602 had been inoperable since June 24, 2019. This results in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The inoperable equipment is required for accident conditions and presents no danger to the health and safety of the public or the safe operation of the units. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL BURTON TO KERBY SCALES AT 1108 EDT ON 8/21/19 * * *

The Event Date and Time provided in EN# 54190 should have been reported as 7/30/2019 at 1521 CDT, since this was the time of discovery of a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Young).

ENS 541453 July 2019 15:24:00South TexasNRC Region 4

At 1026 CDT on July 3, 2019, the National Weather Service notified the South Texas Project (STP) that the Bay City NOAA radio transmitter was out of service. This affects the tone alert radios used to notify the public in the event of an emergency condition. This condition impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population for the STP Electric Generating Station. The loss of the alert radio system meets the reporting criterion for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The Matagorda County alert sirens, which are also part of the Public Prompt Notification System, remain operable. Compensatory measures have been verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. These measures consist of a reverse 911 system available from Matagorda County as well as local law enforcement personnel who would perform route alerting for the affected areas of the EPZ. The event has been entered into the Corrective Action Program and the NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A return to service time for the radio transmitter is not currently available. Matagorda County was also notified by the National Weather Service and STP. This meets the reporting requirement for notification of an offsite agency, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT TATRO TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1615 EDT ON 7/3/19 * * *

At 1321 CDT, the National Weather Service communication tower was returned to service. South Texas Project verified that the automatic notification radios have been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Haire).

ENS 540971 June 2019 17:58:00South TexasNRC Region 4On June 1,2019, at 1618 (CDT), a notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) is being made due to notification to offsite agencies as a result of gasoline leakage to the site drainage system in the owner controlled area at South Texas Project. During a routine tour, the facilities department notified the site environmental group about a gasoline leak on fuel tank sight glass at the fuel island on site. The site environmental (group) has determined the leak amount requires notification to the Texas Commission of Environmental Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency National Response Center. The Texas Commission of Environmental Quality was notified at 1618 on June 1, 2019, and the Environmental Protection Agency National Response Center at 1626 on June 1, 2019. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee stated that approximately 1,384 gallons of gasoline leaked over a period of time. The spill is located at an equipment warehouse area at a distance from the plant. The leak has been isolated and the cleanup is expected to be completed by tomorrow.
ENS 5402424 April 2019 10:40:00South TexasNRC Region 4On April 23, 2019, at 12:56 Central Time, South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) identified a programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the fitness for duty (FFD) program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5365610 October 2018 01:29:00South TexasNRC Region 4

At 2115 CST on October 9, 2018, South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) experienced an unplanned loss of the Integrated Computer System (ICS) to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The loss of ICS resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability to the STPEGS Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for greater than 75 minutes. Assessment capability has been verified to be available in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Support Centers (TSC) and the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Rooms. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or off site communications ability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The cause of the unplanned loss is currently being investigated and compensatory measures are in place.

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/10/18 AT 0951 EDT FROM RICK NANCE TO PHIL NATIVIDAD * * *

Integrated Computer System was returned to service as of 0810 CDT on October 10, 2018. Notified R4DO (Gepford) and CAT via email.

ENS 5340516 May 2018 23:29:00South TexasNRC Region 4

On May 16, 2018 at approximately 1425 CDT, two grass fires started in the Owner Controlled Area surrounding South Texas Project (STP) Nuclear Generating Station. The Bay City Volunteer Fire Department was called to the site to fight the fire. Reinforcements from Tres Palacios Oaks, Midfield and Markham Fire Departments were called in to assist with firefighting efforts. The grass fires were extinguished on May 16, 2018 at 2046 CDT. The fires occurred outside the protected area of the plant and presented no danger to the public or the safe operation of the units. On May 16, 2018 at 2202 CDT, STP Nuclear Generating Station issued a press release to inform area residents. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON MAY 17, 2018 AT 13:33 EDT FROM BILLY HERZOG TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

On May 17, 2018, at 11:10 CDT STP Nuclear Generating Station notified the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) of the grass fires, resulting in visible emissions, that occurred in the Owner Controlled Area of the STP Nuclear Generating Station on May 16, 2018, between the times of 14:25 and 20:46 CDT. No further press releases are planned. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gepford).

ENS 531411 January 2018 12:45:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA South Texas Project Offsite Emergency Notification siren (#7) was inadvertently going off. The Matagorda County Sheriff's office notified the Emergency Response Organization at the station of the siren actuation. Station personnel are addressing the issue with the siren. The Matagorda County Sheriff's office was the only offsite agency that was contacted during this event. This notification is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event where other government agencies were notified. The licensee has personnel at the siren which is no longer alarming (1.5 hours after alarm notification). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
ENS 5311812 December 2017 23:04:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1757 CST on December 12, 2017, South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) Unit 1 and Unit 2 experienced an unplanned partial loss of the Integrated Computer System (ICS). The partial loss of Unit 1 and Unit 2 ICS resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability to STPEGS Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Support Center (TSC) for greater than 75 minutes. Assessment capability has been verified to be available in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or off site communications ability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5311612 December 2017 17:52:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA South Texas Project (STP) Offsite Emergency Notification Siren (#7) was inadvertently going off. A resident who lived near the siren notified the Matagorda County Sheriff's Office at 0905 CST of the event and subsequently left a message with the STP Emergency Response staff. The Emergency Response staff dispatched maintenance to repair the siren and then later notified the Control Room at 1519 CST that the Sheriff's department was notified. The siren was inspected and reset. No issues were found with the siren. The Matagorda County Sheriff's Office was the only offsite agency that has been notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5291117 August 2017 16:48:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1315 Central Daylight Time (CDT) on 8/17/2017, the South Texas Project Unit 1 Control Room was notified that a contract employee had experienced a non-work-related medical emergency within the Protected Area. The individual was transported to Matagorda Regional Medical Center in Bay City, TX. At 1442 CDT, the Unit 1 Control Room was notified that the patient was declared deceased. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) will be notified. This notification is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event for which another government agency is being notified. The deceased individual was not radioactively contaminated. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5277530 May 2017 14:10:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn May 30, 2017 at 0929 (CDT), South Texas Project (STP) removed from service Integrated Computer System (ICS) connections to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for planned maintenance. The ICS computers are used in the EOF to directly monitor selected plant parameters and to provide Emergency Response assessment capabilities. This planned maintenance implements a software modification and is expected to last for four days. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the EOF assessment capabilities would not be able to be restored within the facility activation time and assessment capabilities cannot be performed at a backup facility (i.e., there is no backup EOF). While ICS connections in the EOF are out of service, if the Emergency Plan is entered and the Technical Support Center (TSC) and EOF are staffed, the EOF will not activate and Emergency Director authority will remain in the TSC. The Emergency Response Organization team members that report to the EOF and TSC have been notified regarding the status of the ICS computers in the EOF. The planned modification that impacts the ICS computers in the EOF does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the Matagorda County Sheriff, and the State of Texas Department of Public Safety and the Department of State Health Services.
ENS 527335 May 2017 00:45:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn 5/4/17 at 2103 CDT, the South Texas Project (STP) Security Department was conducting on-the-job training for Bomb Threat response. While simulating the Bomb Threat Checklist via phone call, the trainer mistakenly contacted the Brazoria County, TX Child Protective Services (CPS) and reported a bomb threat. In response, the Child Protective Services notified the City of Brazoria, TX Police Department of the threat. The Brazoria Police Dept. then contacted both the Bay City, TX Police Department and the STP Security Department. By approximately 2130 CDT, all agencies had been notified by the STP Security Department of the mistaken phone call and that no actual bomb threat existed. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified of the issue.
ENS 5271629 April 2017 17:59:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA grass fire was reported to the Unit 1 control room at 1102 CDT. The grass fire was reported to be in the owner controlled area 1/2 mile west of the protected area and switchyard. The local fire department was dispatched to fight the grass fire. The fire was reported to be out at 1155 CDT. No plant equipment was damaged and the operation of the plant was not affected. Region 12 (Houston) of the Texas Commission of Environmental Quality (TCEQ) was notified of the event at 1623 CDT for visible emissions resulting from the grass fire. No further actions are required by the TCEQ at this time and no press release is planned. An insulator on a 345 kV line failed and the attached line separated and hit the ground. A spark was created when the 345 kV line hit the ground and started a fire that eventually grew to a 20 feet x 20 feet area. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5258328 February 2017 21:48:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopEvent Report per 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1). On February 28, 2017, a violation of the site Fitness For Duty policy was committed. A prohibited item was found inside the Protected Area. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5230318 October 2016 22:18:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test.. Unescorted access to the plant has been denied. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 521421 August 2016 17:53:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1118 (CDT) during planned maintenance activities there was an unintentional release of approximately 146.5 pounds of Halon gas into an enclosed room in the Unit-2 Electrical Auxiliary Building. There was no impact to plant operations or plant personnel. The room was verified by station Safety Personnel to be safe for normal access. At 1518, Region 12 (Houston) of the Texas Commission of Environmental Quality (TCEQ) was notified of an event which met the requirements of 'Emission Event' for the TCEQ of a HALON release that exceeded the reportable quantity threshold of 100 pounds in a 24 hour period. No further actions are required by the TCEQ at this time and no press release is planned. The halon discharge was contained within the site protected area. Therefore, this event is not significant with respect to the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5210619 July 2016 17:58:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopDuring the planned NRC/FEMA evaluated drill exercise on 7/13/16, two press releases written in the Joint Information Center (JIC) were published in the Public Information and Emergency Response (PIER) system without 'THIS IS A DRILL' denoted at the top of the page. The original press release was stamped with 'THIS IS A DRILL' at the top of page 1 and at the bottom of page 2. When it was added into the PIER system for publication/faxing, it was not noticed the top of the document denoting 'THIS IS A DRILL' was cut off. The local radio station affiliate was not aware of STP's (South Texas Project's) exercise on 7/13/16. As a result, the affiliate station thought it was a real event and read the press releases over the airwaves at 1014 (CDT) and again at 1046 (CDT). At approximately 1400 (CDT) on the same day, the radio station told their listening audience of the mistake and stated STP was having a training exercise not a real event. The correction was broadcast over the airwaves three times every hour until midnight. This unplanned media event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). This event is not significant with respect to the health and safety of the public. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5196427 May 2016 23:17:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA South Texas Project offsite emergency notification siren was inadvertently going off. The Matagorda County Sheriff's Office notified Site Security that a siren had actuated. At the time of the inadvertent siren actuation the area was experiencing lightning and rain. Suspect lightning caused the inadvertent siren actuation. Station Personnel are addressing the issue with the siren. The Matagorda County Sheriff's Office was the only offsite agency that was contacted during the event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 518971 May 2016 22:14:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 2021 (CDT) on 05/01/2016 Unit 1 automatically tripped due to a generator lockout. Relay 86/G1 actuated. The generator lockout resulted in a Unit 1 turbine trip and a reactor trip. Auxiliary Feedwater and Feedwater Isolation actuated as designed. All Control Rods fully inserted. No primary or secondary relief valves opened. There were no electrical problems. Normal operating temperature and pressure is (being maintained). There were no significant TS LCO's entered. This event was not significant to the health and safety of the public based on all safety systems performed as designed. Unit 2 was not affected. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3, with decay heat being removed via dump valves to the condenser. The cause of the generator lockout is under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5178714 March 2016 04:52:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA South Texas Project, Offsite Emergency Notification Siren, was inadvertently going off. The Matagorda County Sheriff's Office notified Site Security that a siren had actuated for no apparent reason. Station personnel are addressing the issue with the siren. The Matagorda County Sheriff's Office was the only offsite agency that was contacted during the event. The siren was tested and is considered functional at this time. Additional testing will be completed during daylight hours. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5168727 January 2016 01:44:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 2325 (CST) on 01/26/2016, Unit 1 was manually tripped due to loss of Feedwater on 'C' S/G (Steam Generator). The loss of Feedwater was a result of a failure on 'C' S/G Main Feedwater Regulating Valve that caused the valve to travel closed with no Operator action. Auxiliary Feedwater and Feedwater Isolation actuated as designed. All Control and Shutdown Rods fully inserted. Intermediate Range Nl 36 (Nuclear Instrument) failed above P10 and, as a result, Source Range Nuclear Instruments were manually energized. No primary or secondary relief valves opened. There were no electrical problems. Normal operating temperature and pressure (NOT/NOP) is 567 degrees F and 2235 psig. There were no significant TS LCOs entered.

This event was not significant to the health and safety of the public based on all safety systems performed as designed. Unit 2 was not affected. Decay heat removal is being controlled via Steam Dumps. Offsite power is in the normal electrical lineup. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 5161521 December 2015 18:06:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1519 (CST), the Main Turbine was tripped due to an Oscillating Governor Valve 2 (cause not known). At 1533, Unit 1 was manually tripped due to a feedwater isolation P-14 (caused by steam generator swell induced high steam generator level, resulting in) steam generator low level (after the isolation). Aux feedwater actuated as designed. All Control and Shutdown Rods fully inserted. Intermediate Range NI 36 failed above P-10 so SR-Nis (source range nuclear instruments) were manually energized. No primary relief valves lifted. All Steam Generator PORVs (power operated relief valves) opened. There were no electrical bus problems. Normal operating temperature and pressure (NOT/NOP) is 567F and 2235 psig. There were no significant TS LCOs (Technical Specification limiting conditions for operations) entered. This event was not significant to the health and safety of the public based on all safety systems performed as designed. Unit 2 was not affected and continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5153613 November 2015 08:21:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

While in Mode 3, South Texas Project Unit 1 declared an Unusual Event at 0639 CST on 11/13/15, due to SU7 of EAL1- Unidentified RCS or Pressure Boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm. The excessive leakage to the WHT (waste holding tank) occurred when a letdown system demineralizer was placed in service. Operators bypassed the demineralizer and the RCS leakage was stopped. The excess leakage lasted for approximately 8 minutes and the maximum leakage was estimated to be 12-15 gpm. There was no impact on South Texas Unit 2 which continues to operate at 100% power. South Texas Project Unit 1 exited the Unusual Event at 0802 CST on 11/13/15, after verifying Unidentified RCS leakage less than 1 gpm. The demineralizer drain valve was partially open and was the cause of the excess leakage. The drain valve has been closed. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspectors. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, FEMA NWC, NICC Watch Officer, and NuclearSSA via email

  • * * UPDATE AT 1414 EST ON 11/13/2015 FROM JASON BERRIO TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Due to entering the STP (South Texas Project) Emergency Plan (Unusual Event), STP has officially determined to make a planned press release. Per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), STP is making a notification to the NRC via the emergency notification system (ENS). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the press release. The planned press release shares the following information: On November 13, 2015, STP Nuclear Operating Station, Unit 1, declared an Unusual Event at 0639 CST. Plant operators identified increasing reactor coolant system leakage in Unit 1. Plant Operators took immediate actions to verify the source and safely isolate and stop the leakage. Upon identifying the source of the leakage, the Unusual Event was exited at 0802 CST on November 13, 2015. The leakage was captured and maintained within an on-site storage tank and there was no radioactive release to the environment. STP Unit 1 is preparing for restart following a scheduled refueling and maintenance outage. Notified the R4DO (Gaddy).

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1221 EST ON 12/08/15 FROM MARC HILL TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The purpose of this report is to retract the ENS report made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (a)(1)(i) on November 13, 2015, at 08:21 EST (ENS # 51536). STP Nuclear Operating Company declared an Unusual Event at 0639 CDT on November 13, 2015, based on Initiating Condition for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage Emergency Action Level (EAL) SU7. The event was reported to the NRC under EN # 51536 and the event was subsequently terminated on November 13, 2015 at 0802 CST. After further review, the emergency declaration is being retracted because the source of the leakage was from the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) and not from the RCS. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified the R4DO (Hagar).

ENS 5133923 August 2015 17:37:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA fire was reported to the unit 2 control room at 1300 central time (CDT). The fire was reported to be in the owner controlled area 3/4 of a mile west of the protected area and switchyard. The local fire department was dispatched to fight the fire. The fire burned approximately 1.5 acres. The fire was reported to be out at 1417 central time. No plant equipment was damaged and the operation of the plant was not affected. Region 12 (Houston) of the Texas Commission of Environmental Quality (TCEQ) was notified of the event at 1509 for visible emissions resulting from the grass fire. No further actions are required by the TCEQ at this time and no press release is planned. The fire was caused by a downed 12.5 kV power line which powers outlying plant areas. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 511153 June 2015 16:02:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn June 2, 2015 at 2027 CDT, it was discovered that the unit vent radiation monitor was inoperable beginning on June 1, 2015 at 1026 CDT. Compensatory measures were not taken in accordance with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) during this time period and the radiation monitor was unable to be used to assess Emergency Action Levels in accordance with the Emergency Plan. On June 3, 2015 it was recognized that because no compensatory measures were implemented during the period of inoperability that the condition resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability which is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures were implemented per the ODCM upon discovery on June 2 at 2027, thus there is currently no major loss of emergency assessment capability. This event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barriers and it did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
ENS 5107315 May 2015 21:03:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA South Texas Project Offsite Emergency Notification siren was (inadvertently) going off. The Matagorda County Sheriff's office notified the Emergency Response organization at the station that a siren had actuated during a severe thunderstorm moving through the area. Station personnel are addressing the issue with the siren. The Matagorda County Sheriffs office was the only offsite agency that was contacted during this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 507165 January 2015 20:49:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt approximately 1545 CST on 1/5/15, an employee was found unconscious by fellow teammates. His teammates, who are certified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), commenced resuscitation until Matagorda County EMS arrived on the scene and transported the individual to Matagorda County Regional Hospital for medical treatment. The individual was evaluated by the Emergency Room Physician and was later pronounced deceased due to Cardiopulmonary Arrest. STP is investigating the incident. STP has reported this to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and as such is reporting this in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). A press release is not planned at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 4974018 January 2014 05:56:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 0346 CST (the Unit 1 control room) received a fire alarm in the plant computer room. Upon investigation (the licensee) discovered (the plant computer) room with heavy smoke present and the halon system actuated. (Plant operators) entered '0P0P04-ZO-0008, Fire and Explosion'. Entered Unusual Event at 0401 CST. Fire brigade present at Unit 1 electrical auxiliary building. At 0412 CST the fire was declared to be under control with no visible signs of flame noticed by the fire brigade. Unusual Event based on HU2 (fire or explosion) in the (Protected Area or Switchyard) which affects normal plant operations." At 0446 CST the fire was declared to be extinguished. No plant equipment or indications were affected. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Texas, and other local authorities. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, NICC Watch Officer, and NuclearSSA via e-mail.

  • * * UPDATE FROM TRIPP FRAHM TO DANIEL MILLS AT 0957 EST ON 1/18/14 * * *

At 0957 EST, (on 1/18/14, the) Unusual Event (was) terminated. Fire damage assessment not complete. Working with site engineering, fire protection, and maintenance personnel to restore all fire detection and protection systems. Continuous fire watch being maintained. Priority is to restore fire detection and protection systems to affected area, followed by repairs to damaged equipment. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Texas, and other local authorities. Notified R4DO (Keller), NRR (Uhle), R4RA (Dapas), NRR EO (Lee), and IRD MOC (Grant). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, NICC Watch Officer, and NuclearSSA via e-mail.

ENS 4966620 December 2013 11:23:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopWhile in Mode 3 in preparing the Unit 2 secondary plant for startup, conditions occurred where it became necessary to break vacuum on the main condenser. Procedures directed closing of the main steam isolation valves. Instead of shutting each main steam isolation valve individually, a manual main steam isolation actuation was initiated through the solid state protection system (SSPS) to close the valves. This actuation of SSPS was a valid signal. The actuation was not part of a preplanned sequence. This notification is supported by the guidance of NUREG-1022, Revision 3, 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73.' In part, the guidance states: 'The Commission is interested in both events in which a system was needed to mitigate the consequences of an event (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events in which a system actuated unnecessarily.' The manual actuation was not initiated to mitigate the consequences of an actual event. However, the method of closing the main steam valves for this condition did not specifically require that the valves should be closed by initiating a main steam isolation signal and therefore, the safety system was unnecessarily actuated. Therefore, this notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) that was not part of preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The system listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) is (2) main steam isolation valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4949031 October 2013 19:35:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopWhile performing a review of industry OE (operating experience) concerning unfused ammeter circuits on station batteries, it was discovered that the ammeter circuits for all of the non-1E batteries are of a similar design to that described in the OE. Also, while reviewing additional DC circuits, it was discovered that the control circuit for the Turbine Generator Emergency Lube Oil pump is unfused, protected only by the motor circuit breaker with a trip setting of 350 amps. The concern is that under the fire safe shutdown rules it is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage these circuits and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cables and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10CFR50 Appendix R. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 486598 January 2013 18:15:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

Fire in Unit 2 main transformer 2A. Reactor trip. Two train of offsite power lost to Unit 2. An Unusual Event was declared based on EAL HU-2 - Fire or explosion in protected area or switchyard which affects normal plant operations. At 1655 CST, South Texas Unit 2 declared an Unusual Event due to a main transformer fire. Unit 2 tripped from 100% power and is currently at 0% power in Mode 3. The transformer fire is out. In addition to the loss of the main transformer, several safety related electrical busses and non-safety electrical busses lost offsite power. The appropriate emergency diesel generators started and powered the safety related busses. Unit 2 is currently stable and on natural circulation due to the loss of power to the reactor coolant pumps. Auxiliary feedwater is functioning as required and decay heat is being removed through the steam generator atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RICK NANCE TO BILL HUFFMAN AT 2055 EST ON 1/8/2013 * * *

On January 8, 2013, at 1640 CST, a failure of the Unit 2 Main Transformer occurred which resulted in a Unit 2 automatic trip. The failure of the main transformer resulted in a fire and damage to the transformer. The onsite fire brigade responded to the fire. The fire was declared under control at 1649 CST and declared out at 1656 CST. No offsite assistance was required. An Unusual Event was declared at 1655 CST for initiating condition HU-2 (Fire or explosion in protected area or switchyard which affects normal plant operations) due to the main transformer fire. Due to the site electrical lineup at the time, the loss of the main transformer resulted in a loss of power to 4160 ESF buses 2A and 2C, and associated Standby Diesel Generators 21 and 23 started as required and loaded on to their respective buses. 4160 ESF bus 2B remained energized from offsite power during this event and Standby Diesel Generator 22 did not start since an undervoltage condition did not exist on its ESF bus. All three (3) motor-driven and the steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started as required. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed in accordance with procedure to limit plant cooldown. Decay heat is being removed via Auxiliary Feedwater with Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves. Following the reactor trip, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve 656A momentarily lifted and re-closed. There were no personnel injuries and no radiological release as a result of this event. A press release has been issued. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 and the cause of the event is under investigation. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1947 CST on 1/8/2013. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gaddy), NRR (Leeds), R4 (Reynolds), IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Hiland). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA, and NuclearSSA via email.

ENS 486514 January 2013 14:19:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn January 4, 2013, at 0941 hours (CST), Unit 2 was manually tripped after 2 shutdown rods unexpectedly dropped during monthly control rod surveillance testing. Shutdown Bank C rods were being inserted in accordance with the surveillance procedure, when 2 rods in Shutdown Bank E (D-8 and M-8) unexpectedly dropped. This met the criteria for a manual reactor trip, which was immediately performed. The appropriate procedures were entered to mitigate the transient and all systems responded as designed. Unit 2 is currently in Mode 3 and the cause of the 2 dropped rods is under investigation. All three (3) motor-driven and the steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started as required and have since been secured. Decay heat is being removed using normal startup feedwater with steam discharge to the main condenser via the bypass valves. Unit 2 is in a normal post trip electrical lineup. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4844827 October 2012 17:43:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

On 10/27/2012 at 1415 CDT, the control room was notified of a loss of telephone communications. Reason is unknown at this time. Offsite communications lost includes the state and county ring down lines, the NRC ring down line. The ability to transfer information from the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) to offsite agencies is believed not to be available. Satellite phones remain available. At approximately 1500 CDT, the NRC Operations Center was notified via satellite communications of alternate phone numbers to contact the Unit 1 Control Room and that Unit 2 Control Room satellite phone is not available to receive calls. This is a follow up to make the notification of this event to the NRC pursuant 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified of the issue." State and local agencies were notified via alternate means.

  • * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS VANFLEET TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0003 EDT ON 10/28/12 * * *

Emergency Notification System has been returned to service. The cause of the loss of communications was a cut fiber optic line. Notified R4DO (Hagar).

ENS 482775 September 2012 16:35:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

During flooding walkdowns being performed on August 22, 2012, with the unit at 100 percent power, South Texas Project Unit 2 discovered the potential for water intrusion into the 10' Elevation Electrical Auxiliary Building (EAB) via a 2-inch underground conduit that was found to be missing its flood seal. It has been determined that the missing flood seal compromised the external flood design controls for the EAB. If flooding of the 10 (foot) EAB were to occur as a result of the missing flood seal, the operability of the Train A Engineered Safety Features (ESF) switchgear and the ESF Sequencers for all three Standby Diesel Generators could have been affected. Additionally, the Qualified Display Parameter System process cabinets (which control Auxiliary Feedwater flow and Steam Generator PORVs) and the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel are also located on the 10' Elevation. Repairs have been made and the 2-inch conduit is sealed. The event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for Unit 2 being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM JAMES MORRIS TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1658 EDT ON 09/20/12 * * *

The purpose of this call is to retract the notification made on 09/05/2012, Event Number 48277. Further analysis indicates that water intrusion resulting from the missing 2-inch conduit seal would not have been sufficient to affect the operability of the equipment located on the 10-foot elevation of the Unit 2 Electrical Auxiliary Building. It has been determined that the maximum water depth would not have exceeded 2 inches in depth and all safety related equipment on the 10-foot elevation is greater than 2 inches above the floor, therefore there would be no impact to any safety-related equipment. Accordingly, this event notification is being retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Geoffrey Miller).

ENS 4749130 November 2011 16:13:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn November 20, 2011 at 0546 hours (CST), STP Unit 2 transitioned modes from Mode 4 to Mode 3. Prior to the mode change, all Solid State Protection System (SSPS) generated turbine trip signals were defeated by a maintenance work activity that installed a jumper in both channels (Train R and S) of non-class relays to the turbine trip circuit. The SSPS signals to the non-class relays that were defeated by the jumpers included the turbine trip from reactor trip breakers open (P4), turbine trip from a reactor trip signal (P-16), and the turbine trip from Steam Generator HI- HI (P-14). T.S. 3.3.2 Items 5a (P4) and 5b (P-14) are required in Modes 1, 2, and 3. The jumpers were removed around 0930 on November 20, 2011 with U2 still in Mode 3. Both the UFSAR and TS bases identify that the turbine trip mitigates the consequences of an accident. The TS bases states that an ESFAS initiated turbine trip mitigates the consequences of a steam line break or loss of coolant accident. The accident analysis for SGTR also assumes a turbine trip on a reactor trip to isolate the steam path. Although Unit 2 was in Mode 3, with the reactor trip breakers open, and turbine throttle valves closed while the jumpers were installed, this condition is conservatively considered to be a safety system functional failure. If not corrected, this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the accident mitigating and control of the release of radiation safety functions. A review of the performance of this activity in previous outages was conducted. It was identified that during 2RE14 in April of 2010, a work package for this activity was not closed until after Mode 3. The 60 day LER will address if the jumpers were installed in Mode 3 in April, 2010. This was determined to be reportable within 8 hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) parts (C) and (D). The licensee did not determine the reportability of this event until 1415 CST on 11/30/11. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4748529 November 2011 06:55:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 0329 CST on 11/29/2011, Unit 2 experienced an automatic Reactor Trip while the plant was stable at 100% power in Mode 1. All systems actuated as designed. The reactor trip was caused by Generator Lockout. All ESF systems actuated as designed. The following systems actuated: Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) and Feedwater Isolation. All control rods fully inserted. Steam Dump system valve FV 7485 failed open and was manually isolated. This caused a letdown isolation that was restored. No primary/secondary relief valves lifted. There were no electrical bus transfer problems. Normal operating temperature and pressure (of) 567 degrees F and 2235 psig (is being maintained). There were no significant TS LCOs entered. The electrical grid is stable and is supplying power to the plant via a normal shutdown electrical line-up. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser with AFW supplying the steam generators. There was no effect on Unit 1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/29/11 AT 1312 EST FROM BRINKLY TO HUFFMAN * * *

The licensee has issued a press release concerning this event. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. R4DO (Farnholtz) informed.

ENS 4736220 October 2011 20:38:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn October 20, 2011 at approximately 1335 hours, a South Texas Project employee suffered an apparent heart attack offsite while attending a fire brigade training exercise. The person was transported to Matagorda County Regional hospital. The individual was evaluated by emergency room personnel and later pronounced deceased. OSHA is being notified pursuant to the requirements of 29CFR1904.39. This ENS report is being made in accordance with 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no radioactive contamination involved in this event. The licensee does not plan any media or press release. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4721028 August 2011 03:38:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 2130 (EDT) on August 27, 2011, an automatic actuation of the Unit 1 Train A emergency diesel generator occurred due to an actuation signal from the load sequencer. The Train A 4160 kV emergency bus transferred to the emergency diesel generator and all Train A emergency loads required for Mode 2 started and sequenced onto the Train A 4160 KV emergency bus except the 480 volt center breaker to the bus E1A2 that did not close. The load sequencer is designed upon the receipt of a safety injection actuation and/or loss of offsite power to provide a signal to strip loads from the 4160 kV emergency bus and then, in sequence, to re-energize the associated 480 volt buses and to load engineering safety feature components onto the 4160 kV and associated 480 volt emergency buses in a predetermined sequence. Per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B), additional emergency safety features loads that actuated were the Train A reactor containment fan coolers and auxiliary feedwater system. Unit 1 remains critical at 100 percent power. No emergency core cooling system injection occurred into the reactor coolant system. The event occurred during surveillance testing when the Train A sequencer was taken from the AUTO Test position to the local position. It is not understood why the actuation occurred. In addition, it is not understood why the 480 volt load center breaker to the bus E1A2 did not close. The 480 volt bus E1A2 was re-energized at 2308 (EDT) on August 27, 2011. The Train A 4160 kV bus was restored to the offsite power source at 0150 (EDT) on August 28, 2011 and the Train A emergency diesel generator and engineering safety features loads were restored to their normal condition at 0201 (EDT) on August 28, 2011. With the Train A sequencer non-functional, the following Train A components are inoperable: 1) High Head Safety Injection Pump 1A; 2) Low Head Safety Injection Pump 1A; 3) Containment Spray Pump 1A; 4) RCFC (Reactor Containment Fan Cooler) Fan 11A; 5) RCFC Fan 12A; 6) Component Cooling Water Pump 1A; 7) Essential Cooling Water Pump 1A; 8) Aux Feedwater Pump 11; 9) Control Room/Elect. Aux Bldg HVAC; 10) Ess (Essential) Chiller 12A; and 11) ESF Diesel Generator 11. Although these components will not automatically start on a safety injection signal or loss of offsite power, these loads can be manually actuated. Engineered Safety Features Trains B and C remain operable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/13/11 AT 1221 EDT FROM MORRIS TO HUFFMAN * * *

The licensee is updating this event report to retract the originally reported valid specified system actuation and report it instead as a 60-day invalid specified system actuation report made by telephone: This update is a 60-day telephone notification in lieu of a written licensee event report being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1). This event was originally reported per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of the Unit 1 Train A emergency diesel generator and sequencing of Mode II (Loss of Offsite Power) emergency loads. The actuation occurred during surveillance testing when the Train A load sequencer was taken from the AUTO test position to the local position. Subsequent investigation has determined that the actuation occurred due to a faulty integrated chip within the sequencer's load sequence auto test module, and was not due to sensed or simulated plant conditions that would require a Mode II actuation. Unit 1 was at 100% power and no loss of offsite power occurred. The Train A equipment response to this invalid actuation is described in the original notification information provided on 08/28/2011. Additionally, the 10CFR50.72 Notification originally reported under Event Number 47210 is being retracted, since the actuation has been determined to be not valid. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Whitten) notified.