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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5436230 October 2019 01:20:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2

On 10/30/19 at 0026 EDT, an Unusual Event (HU3) was declared due to a release of flammable gas to the Unit 1 Pipe Penetration area (Reactor Auxiliary Building). The hydrogen supply valve to the area has been isolated. The area is being ventilated and follow-up air sampling will be performed. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM FRED POLLAK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0521 EDT ON 10/30/2019 * * *

The Notice of Unusual Event was terminated at 0454 EDT on 10/30/19. The area has been purged and normal access restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (McCoy), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD (Grant). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 542627 September 2019 12:01:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2On September 09, 2019 at 0824 EDT, with St. Lucie Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped on Low Reactor Coolant System Flow due to a trip of the 1A1 reactor coolant pump. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operators responded and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. The cause of the loss of the 1A1 reactor coolant pump is currently under investigation. St. Lucie Unit 2 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip. Decay heat removal is being accomplished by main feed water and the main condenser using the turbine steam bypass valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 542531 September 2019 17:44:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2A hurricane warning is in effect for St. Lucie County including the plant site. A hurricane warning was confirmed with the State Watch Office at 1717 EDT. As a matter of procedure, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant entered an Unusual Event classification for the hurricane warning. State and local officials have been notified by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this by the licensee. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(a)(2)(i) due to the Notice of Unusual Event and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the offsite notification."
ENS 5407218 May 2019 14:00:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2This is a non-emergency notification to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) (four hour notification) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid Engineered Safeguards (ESF) actuation (eight hour notification) due to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) initiation. Unit 3 manual reactor trip following grid disturbance. Following the grid disturbance, a manual reactor trip was initiated due to lowering steam generator water levels. All control rods fully inserted. AFW started as expected. All other systems responded as expected. Current reactor temperature is 547 degrees F. Current reactor pressure is 2235 psig. Decay heat is being removed through the Atmospheric Steam Dumps (no known primary to secondary Reactor Coolant System leakage exists). The unit is in a normal post-trip electrical lineup. There was no affect on Unit 4. The cause of the grid disturbance is under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 540463 May 2019 16:43:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 5402725 April 2019 12:04:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2At 0918 (EDT) on 4/25/19, with (Saint Lucie) Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a Turbine Trip. The reactor trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally. Operations is maintaining the plant stable in Mode 3. Decay heat removal is being accomplished by main feed water and the main condenser using the turbine steam bypass valves. Unit 2 is not affected and remains at 100% power. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5401220 April 2019 09:54:00Duane ArnoldNRC Region 3At 0507 (CDT on April 20, 2019), the DAEC (Duane Arnold Energy Center) experienced a trip of both reactor feed pumps. Operators inserted a manual scram. All control rods inserted, as required. As a result of the feed pump trips and scram, HPCI and RCIC automatically injected. Also, containment isolations occurred, as expected for this event. All systems responded as designed. Operators are currently taking the unit to cold shutdown conditions. Vessel level is being controlled by RCIC with Condensate System available. Pressure is being controlled using Main Steam Line drains and the Main Condenser is available. Normal electrical lineup remains. The cause of the reactor feed pumps tripping is believed to be an instrument air leak to flow control valves, causing loss of suction to both feed pumps. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5385431 January 2019 17:06:00SeabrookNRC Region 1On 1/31/2019, the Medical Review Officer for Seabrook was notified of an error made by the HHS (Health and Human Services) certified lab resulting in a false negative Fitness for Duty quality assurance test result. The test lab, Quest Diagnostics-Norristown, was provided an adulterated sample specimen that was part of a blind performance test, which tested negative. This false negative test result will be investigated and the results reported as required. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(c)(3). NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 537795 December 2018 20:07:00Point BeachNRC Region 3At 1539 (CST) December 5, 2018, with Unit 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally, post-trip. An actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system occurred during the manual trip. The auxiliary feedwater system automatically started as designed when the valid actuation signal was received. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3 (hot standby). Decay heat is being removed by atmospheric dump valves. Unit 2 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The loss of condenser vacuum resulted because one of two circulating water pumps was running and its discharge valve shut. The cause for the valve shutting is under investigation. There is no primary to secondary leakage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
ENS 5376029 November 2018 12:56:00SeabrookNRC Region 1This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). At 0147 (EST) on October 1, 2018, Seabrook Unit 1 was in Mode 3 shutdown, when an invalid Reactor Protection System actuation occurred due to a high Source Range detector. All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. Specifically, all actuations were complete and successful. There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into Seabrook's corrective action program for resolution. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Source Range detector which gave the invalid input has been replaced.
ENS 5370329 October 2018 16:47:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2On October 29, 2018 at 1317 EDT, with St. Lucie Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor was manually tripped due to inadequate feedwater flow to both 1A and 1B Steam Generators (S/Gs). The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. (All control rods fully inserted and there were no specified system actuations.) Operators responded and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. The cause of the inadequate feed flow to the 1A and 1B Steam Generators is currently under investigation. Decay Heat removal is being accomplished through forced circulation with stable conditions from Main Feedwater and the Steam Bypass Control System to the Main Condenser. Currently maintaining Pressurizer pressure at 2250 psia and Reactor Coolant System temperature at 532 degrees F. St. Lucie Unit 2 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100% power. This report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5367619 October 2018 21:44:00Duane ArnoldNRC Region 3At 1725 CDT, a Feedwater Regulating valve failed closed, resulting in a reactor level transient, which initiated a reactor trip, Primary Containment Isolation System signals to valves in Groups 2, 3, and 4 and initiation of High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling. All control rods inserted and level has been restored to normal. The cause of the feedwater valve failure is under investigation. All other systems responded as expected. This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B), (b)(3)(iv)(A) and (b)(2)(iv)(A). The Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser and reactor vessel water level is being maintained by the condensate and feedwater systems.
ENS 5366512 October 2018 16:54:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2On October 12, 2018 at 1353 EDT, St. Lucie Unit 2 experienced an automatic RPS actuation and Reactor Trip due to a fault on the 2A1 6.9kv bus during a transfer of the bus power supply from the 2A Auxiliary Transformer to the 2A Startup Transformer. The bus fault caused a fire in the 2A1 6.9kv switchgear that has been extinguished. Offsite support was not required to extinguish the fire. The specific cause of the fault is currently under investigation. Following the reactor trip, both Steam Generators are being supplied by main feedwater. All (Control Element Assemblies) (CEAs) fully inserted into the core. Decay Heat removal is being accomplished through forced circulation. Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass Control Systems are maintaining stable conditions in Mode 3. St. Lucie Unit 1 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the Reactor Trip. The fire was extinguished within 28 minutes. Plant loads are being supplied by the 2B Auxiliary Transformer. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5361924 September 2018 14:06:00Duane ArnoldNRC Region 3On September 22, 2018, at approximately 0050 (CDT), Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Security was contacted by a site assigned contractor that they had located what appeared to be drug paraphernalia inside the Protected Area. Local Law Enforcement was contacted and responded to DAEC. The Linn County Sheriff's office took the items into evidence for testing to determine if there was any presence of a controlled substance. On September 24, 2018, at 1013, the Linn County Sheriff's office notified DAEC that the items tested positive for the presence of a controlled substance. Therefore, this is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719. DAEC Site security is working with NextEra Corporate security regarding the investigation into this incident. The Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5359811 September 2018 23:23:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2At 2200 EDT on September 11, 2018, during inspections as part of the pressurizer bare metal inspection program, an apparent weld defect was identified on Class 1 pressurizer level piping at the piping to pressurizer interface. The reactor is currently defueled in a refueling outage. Appropriate repairs will be made during the refueling outage. NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5350011 July 2018 03:58:00Duane ArnoldNRC Region 3On July 11, 2018, as part of pre-planned maintenance, the site meteorological tower will be removed from service. The tower will be out of service for approximately 11 days. As a result, this is reportable under 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii). During the time the data is not available from the meteorological tower; compensatory measures will be in place to obtain the data from the National Weather Service if necessary. The (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 534969 July 2018 16:25:00Duane ArnoldNRC Region 3At approximately 1334 CDT on 7/9/18, both doors of a Secondary Containment Airlock were reported to be open simultaneously for a period of less than 3 seconds. The brief time that the doors were simultaneously open constituted an inoperable condition of Secondary Containment. Secondary Containment was immediately restored to operable by closing the airlock doors. Subsequently, the airlock interlock was verified to operate correctly. This event is being reported pursuant of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5326014 March 2018 09:34:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEA non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a pre-access drug test. The individual's access has been denied. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 532391 March 2018 20:05:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopDuring review of protection of equipment from damaging effects of tornados, Point Beach Nuclear Plant identified a potential vulnerability for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps due to steam supply piping that is not routed through a Class 1 structure. Immediate compensatory measures were taken to mitigate the potential consequences of a tornado generated missile impact. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and (D). The identified vulnerability is being addressed in accordance with EGM 15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01, enforcement discretion memorandum and interim guidance document for resolution of noncompliance with tornado-generated missile protection. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5316716 January 2018 10:06:00Duane ArnoldNRC Region 3GE-4This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. At 2230 CST on November 30, 2017, with the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) operating at 100 percent power, an invalid Group 3 isolation on the 'B' side of the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) occurred. Group 3 isolation signals were generated for Primary Containment Isolation Valves for Drywell and Torus Ventilation and Purge, Containment Nitrogen Compressor Suction and Discharge, Recirculation Pump Seals, and Post Accident Sample System. This event was caused by a fault on the 1D25 Instrument AC Inverter. The fault was caused by an insufficient design clearance to ground and was corrected by increasing the clearance. All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. Specifically, all actuations were complete and successful. There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into DAEC's corrective action program for resolution. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5311111 December 2017 00:35:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CESt. Lucie Unit 1 declared an Unusual Event due to a smoke detector alarm received in the Unit 1 Containment Building that was unable to be confirmed within 15 minutes. A Containment entry was completed and no evidence of fire was found. The Unusual Event was terminated at 00:26 on 12/11/17. State and local officials have been notified by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this by licensee. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
ENS 5308522 November 2017 10:28:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

St. Lucie Unit 2 declared an Unusual Event due to a smoke detector alarm received in the Unit 2 Containment Building that was unable to be confirmed within 15 minutes. A Containment entry is currently being planned to determine the validity of the alarm. State and local officials have been notified by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/22/17 AT 1143 EST FROM JULIUS FLETCHER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

Personnel entered Containment to determine conditions and found no evidence of smoke, fire or damage to equipment. Event terminated at 1127 EST 11/22/17. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Suggs), R2 DRA (Dudes), NRR (Brock), IRD (Gott), and NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5304230 October 2017 12:48:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopDuring a scheduled refueling outage, an inspection of components inside containment revealed a suspected weld defect on 1CV-309B, 1P-1B RCP Labyrinth Seal 1PT-124 Upper Root. 10 CFR 50.2 (2)(i) defines the reactor coolant pressure boundary as being connected to the reactor coolant system, up to and including the outermost containment isolation valve in system piping which penetrates primary reactor containment. The weld defect is located on the transmitter side of 1CV-309B. This can be isolated from the RCS by shutting 1CV-309B and 1CV-308B, 1P-1B RCP Labyrinth Seal 1PT-124 Lower Root. Based on the definition provided in 10 CFR 50.2, the condition is considered reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii). Unit 1 is currently in mode 3. Repairs for the condition are being determined. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5303626 October 2017 05:54:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEOn October 26, 2017 at 0212 EDT St. Lucie Unit 2 experienced a reactor trip due to a loss of load event resulting in an RPS (Reactor Protection System) actuation. The cause of the loss of load is currently under investigation. Following the reactor trip, an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal occurred due to low level in the 2A Steam Generator. One of the two Main Feed Isolation Valves to the 2A Steam Generator did not close on the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal. 2A Steam Generator level was restored by Auxiliary Feedwater. The 2B Steam Generator level is being maintained by Main Feedwater. All CEAs (Control Element Assemblies) fully inserted into the core. Decay heat removal is being accomplished through forced circulation with stable conditions from Auxiliary Feedwater/Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass Control System. Currently maintaining pressurizer pressure at 2250 psia and Reactor Coolant System temperature at 532 degrees F. St. Lucie Unit 1 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Specified System Actuation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 530049 October 2017 09:15:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

At 0737 CDT on 10/9/17, Point Beach declared an Unusual Event with Emergency Action Level HU 3.1 due to report of toxic gas from a spill in a service building within the protected area. The spill is contained and cleanup operations are in progress. The spill was not in a contaminated area or vital area. The janitorial worker injured while mixing cleaning chemicals in a closet was taken to the hospital. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/9/17 AT 1111 EDT FROM DENNY SMITH TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Point Beach has terminated the Unusual Event at 0944 (CDT) on 10/9/2017. The Unusual Event condition is no longer warranted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Hills), NRR EO (King), IRD (Stapleton), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5297619 September 2017 00:01:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopAt 1724 (CDT) on 9/18/17 during Control Room Ventilation testing Door-61, South Control Room Door, became wedged against its door stop and stuck open. Door-61 is a credited High Energy Line Break (HELB) / Fire / Flood Barrier in addition to its function to maintain the Control Room envelope. The door stop was subsequently unbolted from the floor and the door was free to close. Door-61, South Control Room Door, has since been inspected, and at 1750 (CDT), was declared functional as a HELB / Fire / Flood Barrier and Operational for purposes of maintaining the Control Room Envelope. During the 26 minutes the door was stuck open, the Control Room was in an unanalyzed condition with regards to protection from a High Energy Line Break. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5296010 September 2017 22:20:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 09/10/17 at 1855 (EDT), (Turkey Point) Unit 4 reactor was manually tripped from 88% RTP (Rated Thermal Power) due to a failure of 4C Steam Generator main feed regulating valve causing lowering S/G (Steam Generator) level. All other systems operated normally. Auxiliary Feed Water initiated as designed to provide S/G water level control. EOP's (Emergency Operating Procedures) have been exited and General Operating procedures (GOP'S) were entered. Unit 4 is stable in Mode 3 at NOT/NOP (Normal Operating Temperature/Normal Operating Pressure). The licensee is investigating the failure of the feed regulating valve. Offsite power is available. Decay heat is being removed via main feedwater with steam discharged to atmosphere using the ADVs (Atmospheric Dump Valves). There is no known primary-secondary steam generator tube leakage. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 529568 September 2017 17:51:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

At time 1700 (EDT) today, the National Weather Service issued a Hurricane Warning for the area including the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared at time 1714 (EDT). In anticipation of severe weather, the site has completed proceduralized high wind preparations. Both units are currently stable at 100% power. The licensee notified both State and local agencies and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. No safety-related systems are out of service. The electrical grid is stable. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/9/17 AT 1743 EDT FROM DALE THOMAS TO S. SANDIN * * *

At 1701 (EDT) today (09/09/17), a 24-hour update was made to state and local governments following the National Weather Service issuing yesterday's hurricane warning for the area including St. Lucie Plant. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared yesterday (09/08/17) at 1714 (EDT). There are no changes in plant status for either Unit. In anticipation of severe weather, the site previously completed high wind preparations. Our plants have been specifically built to withstand natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, flooding and tidal surges. This approach will ensure the safety of operations and our employees and the communities surrounding our plants. Both units are currently stable at 100% power level and will remain at that power since hurricane force winds are not currently projected to reach St. Lucie Plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (Michel).

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/10/17 AT 1730 EDT FROM DALE THOMAS TO DONG PARK * * *

At 1648 (EDT) today (09/10/17), a 24-hour update was made to state and local governments following the National Weather Service issuing Friday's hurricane warning for the area including St. Lucie Plant. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared yesterday (09/08/17) at 1714 (EDT). There are no changes in plant status for either Unit. In anticipation of severe weather, the site previously completed high wind preparations. Our plants have been specifically built to withstand natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, flooding and tidal surges. This approach will ensure the safety of operations and our employees and the communities surrounding our plants. Both units are currently stable at 100% power level and will remain at that power since hurricane force winds are not currently projected to reach St. Lucie Plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2IRC (Franke).

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/11/17 AT 1405 EDT FROM BRIAN KELLY TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The Hurricane Warning has been terminated by the National Weather Service for St. Lucie County including the Plant Site. At time 1313 (EDT) on 9/11/17, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant has terminated from the Unusual Event Classification. Unit 1 is currently shutdown in Mode 3, Hot Standby. Unit 2 continues to operate in Mode 1, 100 percent power. The licensee notified State and Local Government Agencies, and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2IRC (Munday), R2DO (Michel), NRR EO (King), IRD MOC (Gott), DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DHS NICC, USDA Ops Center, EPA Emergency Ops Center, FDA Emergency Ops Center (email), FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 529528 September 2017 00:06:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 2300 today, the National Weather Service issued a hurricane warning for the area including Turkey Point Nuclear Units 3 & 4. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared at 2314 (EDT). In anticipation of severe weather, the site has completed proceduralized high wind preparations. Our plants have been specifically built to withstand natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, flooding and tidal surges. This approach will ensure the safety of operations and our employees and the communities surrounding our plants. Both units are currently stable at 100% power level. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. No safety systems are out of service. The electrical grid is stable but grid risk is high. Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC, and NSSA (e-mail).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0458 EDT ON 09/11/17 FROM TIM JONES TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

At 0400 (EDT) on 09/11/17, conditions at Turkey Point Nuclear have met established exit criteria to downgrade the Notice Of Unusual Event (NOUE). The previously reported EAL (Emergency Action Level) has been exited. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified the R2DO (Michel) and R2OC (Miller), IRDMOC (Gott), NRREO (Miller), DHS, DOE, FEMA, HHS, USDA, EPA, FDA, DHS NICC, and NSSA (e-mail).

ENS 528811 August 2017 17:00:00Duane ArnoldNRC Region 3GE-4

At 0934 CDT, while appropriately removed from service for pre-planned testing, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) inboard steam isolation valve, MO-2238, valve position indication was found to be inadequate. As a result, MO-2238 was declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3. This resulted in a condition that caused the HPCI system to be inoperable. The cause of the inadequate valve position indication is currently being investigated. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 09/11/17 AT 1144 EDT FROM BOB MURRELL TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 8/1/17 at 1700 (EDT) (EN 52881). NRC notification was initially made as a result of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) inboard steam isolation valve, MO-2238, valve position found to be inadequate. Subsequent to the initial report, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold (NextEra) has determined that the condition observed on 8/1/17 for MO-2238 did not exist prior to removing the system from service for pre-planned testing, but was observed during post maintenance testing. Consequently, the failure does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Riemer).

ENS 5287931 July 2017 18:32:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEAt 1400 (EDT), St. Lucie completed a review of Unit 1 Hot Leg Injection scenarios. St. Lucie Unit 1 was licensed with a Hot Leg Injection capability that relies upon manual actions to accomplish the function. This review concluded that some postulated single electrical train failure scenarios were not fully addressed in plant procedures. Because of the potential to extend Hot Leg Injection initiation beyond the analysis start time, St. Lucie is reporting this condition under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The affected off-normal procedures were immediately revised to include necessary instructions to restore power to selected valves during a postulated loss of electrical power to restore the Hot Leg Injection strategy. Unit 1 remained at 100% power. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A review found this condition was not applicable for Unit 2.
ENS 527969 June 2017 10:17:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of several safety systems. On April 10, 2017 at 1347 hours (EDT) with Unit 3 in Mode 6 during performance of the Train B Engineered Safeguards Integrated Test, safety system actuations occurred prior to the expected point in the test procedure when a loss of continuity resulted while the seismic clips were being removed from a fuse. The actuations were supposed to occur at a subsequent step when the fuse was to be pulled to actuate the Hi Containment Pressure signal. As a result, the following equipment actuated: 3B, 4A and 4B High Head SI pumps; 3B Containment Spray pump; Containment Isolation and Containment Ventilation Isolations; 3A and 3B Emergency Diesel Generators; Emergency Containment Coolers. Because an actual high containment pressure signal did not exist at the time of the actuation, the actuation is considered invalid. All equipment responded as expected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 527916 June 2017 15:48:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis notification is in accordance with Turkey Point Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.6, Action b.1 to report the inoperability of both Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps (SSGFPs) for greater than 24 hours. On 6/6/17 at 1751 hours (EDT) both SSGFPs will be inoperable for greater than 24 hours in support of planned valve repairs that require isolation of the common suction and discharge piping. TS 3.7.1.6, Action b.1 requires a report within four hours if both SSGFPs have been inoperable for 24 hours providing the cause of the inoperability and restoration plans. The valve repairs are currently planned for completion on or about 2300 hours on 6/9/17 which will restore the 'A' pump to service and allow TS 3.7.1.6, Action b.1 to be exited. The diesel-driven 'B' pump will remain out of service for radiator repair which is currently planned for completion on or about 0800 hours on 6/14/17. The function of the Standby Steam Generator Feedwater System is as a backup to the Auxiliary Feedwater System and is not credited in the safety analysis. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Both pumps were taken out of service at 1751 EDT on 6/5/17.
ENS 5275716 May 2017 00:17:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEOn May 15, 2017 at 1800 hours EDT, the '2A3' 4.16 KV safety related bus unexpectedly de-energized. The '2A' emergency diesel generator (EDG) system received a valid start signal from the undervoltage condition on the '2A3' bus but did not start as the EDG had been removed from service for maintenance. Loss of the '2A3' 4.16 KV bus resulted in a valid actuation of the undervoltage protection relays. The direct cause of the de-energization was determined to be failed secondary side potential transformer fuses. The 'B' train safety related electrical busses were unaffected by the event. The '2A3' 4.16 KV bus was reenergized at 2340. This event was determined to be reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). During the electrical transient, the licensee briefly entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 but plant conditions were restored, all required LCOs were satisfied, and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited before the plant was required to downpower. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5271829 April 2017 21:19:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1844 (EDT) on 04/29/2017, while the unit was in a low power condition exiting from a refueling outage, the reactor was manually tripped following a P-14 signal (Steam Generator Hi-Hi Level) and a resulting feedwater isolation signal. All control rods were verified to be fully inserted. The cause of the ('B') steam generator high level is currently being investigated. Emergency feedwater actuated at 1845 due to a low-low water level in steam generator 'D'. Plant equipment response is being evaluated and the plant is stabilized in Mode 3 with decay heat removal through the steam dump system to the condensers. There was no release and the emergency feedwater system has been restored to standby. The event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5263623 March 2017 21:06:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopOn 3/23/17, at 0325 hours CDT, it was discovered that a prohibited item was present in the protected area from 0508-1718 hours on 3/22/17, which resulted in a reportable condition pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5262720 March 2017 17:53:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

At 1620 (CDT), an unusual event was declared due to a smoke detector alarm in Unit 1 containment. (There were) no indications of any other detector alarms, no abnormal equipment indications, and containment parameters are normal (temperature, humidity). At 1631 (CDT), visual inspection (of the) 66 ft. hatch indicated no smoke or abnormal smell. At 1640 (CDT), local inspection of Unit 1 containment verified no fire or hot spots. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC. Notified FEMA National Watch and Nuclear SSA via E-mail.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RYAN RODE TO DONG PARK AT 2208 EDT ON 3/20/2017 * * *

Event transmitted under ENS # 52627 is terminated at 2022 (CDT on) 3/20/17." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD (Stapleton). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC. Notified FEMA National Watch and Nuclear SSA via E-mail.

ENS 5262318 March 2017 15:07:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On 3/18/17 at 1107 (EDT), the Unit 3 reactor tripped as a result of the loss of the 3A 4kV bus. All three reactor coolant pumps (RCP) tripped and the 3B RCP was restarted for forced recirculation. The reactor is stable in Mode 3. The 3A 4kV bus remains deenergized until troubleshooting and repairs are complete. In addition, Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, Action C requires a four hour report for the concurrent inoperability of the Unit 4 startup transformer to Unit 3 via the 3A 4kV bus and the Unit 3 3A diesel generator. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector will be notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 3/18/2017 AT 1854 EDT FROM JAMES SPICHER TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Update to previous report (EN 52623) to include additional reporting criteria. On 3/18/17 at 1107 (EDT) the Unit 3 reactor tripped as a result of the loss of the 3A 4kV bus. The 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started on the loss of power signal but did not load, as designed, due to the bus fault. The 3A EDG was manually stopped at 1332. The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System also initiated as expected. AFW was stopped at 1135. The actuations of the 3A EDG and AFW are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). A loss of safety function affecting Units 3 and 4 occurred due to the loss of the 3A high head safety injection (HHSI) pump because it could not be powered from the faulted 3A 4kV bus with both Unit 4 HHSI pumps earlier (0624) removed from service due to planned maintenance. This caused three of the four HHSI pumps to be inoperable. The four HHSI pumps are shared by both Units 3 and 4. The safety function is achieved by two of the four HHSI pumps. Both Unit 4 HHSI pumps were restored to operable status at 1336. The loss of safety function is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Unit 3 reactor is stable in Mode 3. The 3A 4kV bus remains deenergized until troubleshooting and repairs are complete. Unit 4 remains operating at 100% power. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt) and NRR EO (Miller).

ENS 5262118 March 2017 12:09:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

Alert declared at 1119 EDT 3/18/17 based on EAL H.A.2 - Fire or Explosion affecting plant safety systems. Fire alarms in the Unit 3 4kV switchgear rooms resulting in a loss of the 3A 4kV bus and trip of all three Reactor Coolant Pumps. The reactor tripped and was stabilized in Mode 3. No actual fire was observed. The 3A 4kV is deenergized. The 3B Reactor Coolant Pump was restarted for forced circulation. All other safety systems functioned as required. A refueling outage was scheduled to begin on 3/20/17. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. Decay heat is being removed using feedwater and steam generator atmospheric steam dumps. One person was injured with a minor burn and possible sprained ankle and was taken to a local hospital. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA (e-mail), NWC (e-mail), NNSA (e-mail), and NRCC SASC (e-mail).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1426 EDT ON 3/18/2017 FROM DAN HAGARDY TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Unit 3 was determined by the Emergency Coordinator to be in a safe and stable condition, the Emergency Plan personnel at the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility were no longer required for support, the Operations Support Center was staffed for recovery efforts, and plant personnel were sufficient and capable for continuing mitigation efforts. Investigation of the fault on the 3A 4kV bus is ongoing. Based on the above conditions, the Alert was exited at 1420 hours (on 3/18/2017). The injured electrician was taken to an offsite hospital to treat minor burns and possible sprained ankle. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Ehrhardt), NRR EO (Miller and King), IRD MOC (Stapleton), DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA (e-mail), NWC (e-mail), NNSA (e-mail), and NRCC SASC (e-mail).

ENS 5252331 January 2017 15:39:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEAt 1200 (EST) on January 31, 2017, during investigation of potential 1B2 Reactor Coolant Pump seal degradation, a through wall defect was identified on Class 1 piping servicing the Lower Seal Heat Exchanger, which is part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB). The reactor is presently in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed by the atmospheric steam dump valves. The plant is being maneuvered to Mode 5 to affect appropriate repairs. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5251126 January 2017 11:26:00Duane ArnoldNRC Region 3GE-4On January 25, 2017, at 1800 CST, during planned surveillance testing, the Drywell Vent Line Inboard Isolation valve, CV-4302, was found to exceed its valve leakage limits and was declared inoperable. After completion of repairs to CV-4302, post maintenance testing showed that the Drywell Vent Line Outboard Isolation valve, CV-4303, was exceeding its valve leakage limits, and therefore, was declared inoperable at 0300 CST on January 26, 2017. This resulted in a containment penetration flow path not within purge valve leakage limits and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). Repairs were completed on CV-4303 and both containment valves were declared operable at 1007 CST on January 26, 2017. Secondary Containment was operable at all times. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 522887 October 2016 18:28:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b). At 1620 EDT today, a prohibited substance (marijuana) was identified inside the protected area. The substance was obviously very old, so is surmised to be from a preoperational period. The item (a small remainder, or butt, of a marijuana joint) is currently under the control of the site security department and will be turned over to local law enforcement for disposal. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 522804 October 2016 23:18:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

A Hurricane Warning is in effect for St. Lucie County including the Plant Site. A Hurricane Warning was issued by the National Weather Service at 2250 (EDT). St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant entered an Unusual Event Classification for the Hurricane Warning. State and local officials have been notified by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this by the licensee. This report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(i) due to the Notice of Unusual Event and 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the Offsite Notification. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ANDY TEREZAKIS TO VINCE KLCO ON 10/7/16 AT 1112 EDT * * *

The Hurricane Warning was downgraded to a Tropical Storm Warning by the National Weather Service for St. Lucie County including the Plant Site. At time 1044 (EDT) on 10/7/16, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant has terminated from the Unusual Event Classification. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local authorities. Notified R2 (Jones) NRR EO (King), IRD (Grant), R2DO (Bonser), DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).

ENS 5219121 August 2016 20:14:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

At 35 percent power, a main generator lockout caused the main generator to trip, resulting in a reactor trip of Unit 1. Because of the lockout, power did not transfer to the startup transformers. Both emergency diesel generators started and aligned to the emergency busses. During the trip all control rods fully inserted and no safety or relief valves lifted. The plant is in Mode 3 steaming through the atmospheric relief valves and feeding the steam generators using auxiliary feedwater. There is no reported primary to secondary leakage. Primary coolant is being moved using natural circulation cooling. The trip of Unit 1 had no effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).

  • * * UPDATE AT 2140 EDT ON 08/21/2016 FROM GREG KRAUTZ TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The Unusual Event was terminated at 2125 EDT after the plant restored normal offsite power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Sandal), IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).

  • * * UPDATE AT 2315 EDT ON 08/21/2016 FROM ANDREW TEREZAKIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On August 21, 2016 at 1926 EDT, St. Lucie Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip and a loss of offsite power due to a main generator inadvertent Energization Lockout Relay actuation. The cause of the lockout is currently under investigation. Coincident with the loss of offsite power, the four reactor coolant pumps deenergized. Both the 1A and 1B Emergency Diesel Generators started on demand and powered the safety related AC buses. All CEAs (Control Element Assemblies) fully inserted into the core. Offsite power to the switchyard remained available during the event, and at 2036, restoration of offsite power to St. Lucie Unit 1 was completed. Decay heat removal is being accomplished through natural circulation with stable conditions from Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves. Currently maintaining pressurizer pressure at 1850 psia and Reactor Coolant System temperature at 532 degrees F. St. Lucie Unit 2 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100% power. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Specified System Actuation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0048 EDT ON 08/22/2016 FROM ANDREW TEREZAKIS TO DANIEL MILLS * * *

On August 21, 2016 at 2330 EDT, St. Lucie Unit 1 started two Reactor Coolant Pumps to establish Forced Circulation in order to enhance Decay Heat removal. Plant conditions remain stable with Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves in service. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(c)(2)(ii) as a follow up notification of protective measures taken. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

ENS 521628 August 2016 20:31:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1045 EDT, on August 8, 2016, it was determined that a non-licensee contract supervisor had failed to provide a urinalysis specimen for a random test and the medical explanation was not sufficient. It was ruled a refusal by the Medical Review Officer. The individual's access has been permanently denied. This is reportable under 10 CFR26.719(b)(2)(ii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 521381 August 2016 06:33:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

On August 1, 2016 at 0342 EDT St. Lucie Unit 1 commenced a unit shutdown required by Technical Specifications due to Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage in excess of the allowable limit of zero leakage. The leak was initially identified on July 31, 2016 at 2115 EDT as not Pressure Boundary leakage. After further analysis, the leak was determined to be Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary leakage at 0123 on August 1, 2016. The leakage is estimated as less than one tenth of a gallon per minute and is not impacting the ability to shut down the unit. Additional impact of the leak is under evaluation. This report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.' The location of the leak is on the Instrumentation piping welded connection at Flow Element FE-3311 attached to (the) Emergency Core Cooling System Injection header to Reactor Coolant System Loop 1A2. The leak activity is 0.167 microCuries per ml. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1335 EDT ON 09/23/16 FROM RICHARD SCISCENTE TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on EN 52138. NRC notification was initially made as a result of a plant shutdown required by technical specifications (TS) for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leakage. Subsequent to the initial report, St. Lucie has determined that the RCS leakage was from a seal weld on a threaded connection that was not pressure boundary leakage. However, the leak was non-isolable and required RCS depressurization to allow immediate investigation to ensure there were no faults in a RCS component body or pipe wall. The leakage was estimated to be less than one tenth of a gallon per minute and did not impact the ability to shut down the unit. No TS limits were exceeded during this event. Therefore, the plant shutdown to investigate and correct leakage past the seal weld of a threaded connection does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R2DO (Blamey).

ENS 5213630 July 2016 03:52:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

Power had been reduced for planned maintenance on the 3B feedwater heater. During isolation of the feedwater heaters, a repeated water hammer was experienced. A normal shutdown of Unit 3 was performed. Unit 4 was not affected by the water hammer. The decay heat is being removed via the condenser and all offsite and onsite electrical power is available. The investigation of the cause is underway. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 2141 EDT ON 07/30/16 FROM ERIC JUERGENS TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: At 0352 EDT on July 30, 2016, EN #52136 provided notification of a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation during a normal shutdown of Unit 3 in response to a secondary system equipment issue. Upon further investigation, the unit shutdown and manual RPS actuation were in accordance with general plant operating procedures. The manual RPS actuation was in accordance with the general operating procedure and not required to mitigate the consequences of the secondary system equipment issue. As such, the notification made by EN #52136 for a valid actuation of a specified system is hereby retracted. The NRC Resident lnspector will be notified. Notified R2DO (Rose).

ENS 5205329 June 2016 17:21:00Duane ArnoldNRC Region 3GE-4At 0940 CDT on 6/29/2016, both doors of a Secondary Containment Airlock were reported to be open simultaneously for a period of less than 5 seconds. The brief time that the doors were simultaneously open constituted an inoperable condition of Secondary Containment. Secondary Containment was immediately restored to operable by closing the airlock doors. The airlock interlock was repaired and verified to operate correctly. This event is being reported pursuant of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5202219 June 2016 21:38:00Duane ArnoldNRC Region 3GE-4At 1533 CDT on 06/19/2016, while performing Tech Spec Secondary Containment Airlock verification testing, both doors of a Secondary Containment Airlock were reported to be open simultaneously. The identified condition caused Secondary Containment to be considered inoperable. Upon discovery, immediate action was taken to close the doors restoring Secondary Containment. Airlock doors were under control of plant personnel throughout the event. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5193216 May 2016 02:02:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 0300 EDT on May 16, 2016, Seabrook Station's seismic monitoring instrumentation will be removed from service for a planned upgrade to the Seismic Monitoring Control Panel and its accelerometers. Modifications are expected to be complete on May 27, 2016. Proceduralized compensatory measures are in place and have been communicated to applicable emergency response decision makers. This preplanned action is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 5/26/16 AT 2049 EDT FROM MIKE TAYLOR TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

At 2045 EDT on 5/26/16, the seismic monitoring system was returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl).