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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5548423 September 2021 18:46:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4During planned testing of the Unit 1 HPCI (high pressure coolant injection) system, flow controller oscillations occurred which prevented successful completion of the surveillance test. Operators secured Unit 1 HPCI and declared the system inoperable. HPCI inoperable placed the licensee in a 14-day limiting condition for operation that was extended to 30 days after their risk-informed completion time evaluation was done. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5545510 September 2021 14:45:00Three Mile IslandNRC Region 1B&W-L-LPThis is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of another government agency. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and 10 CFR 72.75(b)(2). At 1055 EDT on 9/10/21, an employee of a site contractor that was performing work under a contract and in possession of the immediate area where the work was being performed, was involved in a material handling accident in the owner controlled area at Three Mile Island. Londonderry Township EMS and Fire responded to render assistance to the individual. Upon arrival to the site, medical personnel declared the individual deceased. The fatality was work related and the individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area.
ENS 5542724 August 2021 16:51:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1GE-4During an extent of condition review of DC control circuits, it was identified there are additional unprotected DC control circuits which are routed between separate Appendix R fire areas. A postulated fire in one area can cause a short circuit and potentially result in secondary fires or cable fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures degrade the degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains and are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory actions for affected fire areas have been implemented. Design modifications in the affected control circuits are being developed and will be scheduled to correct this condition.
ENS 553963 August 2021 19:48:00DresdenNRC Region 3GE-3At approximately 1539 CDT on 8/3/2021, the Dresden Station Main Control was notified of the inadvertent actuation of 17 full sounding emergency response sirens affected Dresden Station in Will County Illinois, while testing other sirens. Will County EMA inadvertently actuated the sirens on 8/3/2021 at 1440 CDT. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b )(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agencies. This is a 4-Hour Reporting requirement. The Dresden NRC Resident has been notified. See related Event Notification #55395.
ENS 553953 August 2021 19:35:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt approximately 1539 CDT on 8/3/2021, the Braidwood Station Main Control Room was notified of the inadvertent actuation of 17 Full Sounding sirens affecting Braidwood Station in Will County Illinois while testing other sirens. Will County EMA inadvertently actuated the sirens on 08/03/2021 at 1440 CDT. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), News release or Notification of Other Government Agencies. This is a 4 Hour Reporting requirement. The Braidwood NRC Resident has been notified. See related Event Notification #55396.
ENS 5536319 July 2021 18:27:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5On July 19, 2021 at 1316 EDT, an individual experienced a non-work related medical emergency. The onsite fire brigade and emergency medical technicians administered first aid, but the individual was unresponsive. The individual was transported to the local hospital. At 1458 EDT, the local hospital notified the station that the individual was deceased. The individual was outside of the radiological controlled area and was not contaminated.
ENS 553458 July 2021 20:07:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4This 60-Day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. On May 13, 2021, during the restoration of the Unit 2 Refuel Floor High Radiation Isolation Logic an invalid isolation signal was received. The condition requiring an isolation signal was verified not to be present prior to restoring the logic; however, it was not recognized that a previous isolation signal was latched in and had not been reset. When the isolation logic was restored, the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolated on the invalid signal. The systems successfully completed the isolation per the plant design and plant configuration. The following systems actuated due to the Unit 2 PCIS Group 6C Isolation: - Isolation of Containment Hydrogen and Oxygen Sampling Valves, - Start of the 2A Reactor Enclosure Recirculation System, - Trip of the Units 1 and 2 Refuel Floor HVAC, - Start of the A and B Trains of Standby Gas Treatment Systems. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5532524 June 2021 14:56:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the Technical Support Center (TSC) supply fan belt had failed, which affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Corrective maintenance activities will be performed to restore functionality. The work includes replacing the failed belt and restarting the TSC supply fan. The work duration is approximately 8 hours. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. (The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency.) There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector and Illinois Emergency Management Agency have been notified.
ENS 5532021 June 2021 03:06:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0051 CDT Braidwood Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to a generator lockout relay trip and subsequent turbine trip and reactor trip. The cause of the generator lockout relay trip is unknown at this time and is under investigation. Numerous lightning strikes were present in the area during the time of the generator lockout relay trip. Both trains of auxiliary feedwater started automatically following the reactor trip to maintain steam generator water levels. All systems responded as expected with the exception of failure of source range nuclear instruments to automatically re-energize following the reactor trip. Both source range nuclear instruments were manually energized in accordance with station procedures. The main steam dump valves are in service to the main condenser to provide heat sink cooling. The plant is being maintained at normal operating pressure and temperature. AC power is being provided by Offsite Power with the 1B Diesel Generator in standby. 1A Diesel Generator is out of service for planned maintenance. All other safety systems are available. There is no impact to Unit 2. This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a RPS actuation, 4 hr. notification, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system, 8 hr. notification. The NRC Resident Inspector and Illinois Emergency Management Agency have been informed.
ENS 5526117 May 2021 13:12:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4

(Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station declared an unusual event due to a) "receipt of a single fire alarm in the Unit 2 drywell and the existence of the fire not verified in less than 30 minutes of alarm receipt." The NRC Resident Inspector and State and Local Authorities were notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 5/17/21 AT 1423 EDT FROM BRETT HENRY TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

At 1355 EDT, the licensee terminated the notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that the smoke has dissipated and there were no signs of fire. The licensee notified State and Local Authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Grieves), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD MOC (Grant). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), FEMA NRCC THD (email) and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 6/8/2021 AT 1249 EDT FROM JAMES BROWN TO DONALD NORWOOD * * *

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station is retracting notification EN 55261, 'Peach Bottom - Unusual Event,' based on the following additional information not available at the time of the notification: Following a Unit 2 drywell inspection, analysis of temperature data, and evaluation of equipment in operation; it was concluded that a fire did not exist. The smoke's most likely apparent cause was the result of heating residual oil/grease in the drywell. Peach Bottom reported the condition and entry into the UE initially based on the available information at the time and to ensure timeliness with emergency declaration and reporting notification requirements. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Ferdas).

ENS 552406 May 2021 17:05:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On March 10, 2021, at 0815 (CST), during the Unit 2 Refueling Outage (L2R18), while performing a test to verify functionality of an isolation relay following replacement of the relay, a Group 4 isolation signal was actuated. The Group 4 isolation logic affects both the Reactor Building Ventilation (VR) and Containment Vent and Purge (VQ) system (for both units). All equipment responded as designed to the Group 4 isolation, including startup of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) to maintain secondary containment pressure (for both units). Investigation determined that the cause of the isolation was an inadvertent contact of the self-retracting grip jumper between two adjacent terminals that caused a short to ground and a blown fuse during the test performance. The fuse was replaced and systems restored as needed for the plant condition. The containment isolation was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for containment isolation. Therefore, this is considered an invalid actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
ENS 5522430 April 2021 07:38:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4On 4/29/21 at 2354 (EDT), an alarm was received for U2 HPCI Inverter Power Failure. (It was) identified that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) flow controller had lost power due to a failure of an inverter. Without the flow controller, HPCI would not auto start to mitigate the consequences of an accident; thus, HPCI was declared inoperable. All other emergency core cooling systems and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. HPCI is a single train system with no redundant equipment in the same system; therefore, this failure is reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(d). The NRC Resident has been informed of this notification.
ENS 5514721 March 2021 23:57:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEAt 2216 EDT on 3/21/2021, Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 was manually tripped from 37 percent power due to lowering level in the 21 Steam Generator. All systems responded per design. Main Feedwater was secured and Auxiliary Feedwater was manually initiated. The Site Senior Resident has been notified. The cause of the lowering level in the 21 Steam Generator is under investigation.
ENS 5514620 March 2021 04:55:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3At 20:30 CDT on March 19, 2021, with the Unit 1 in Mode 5 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) occurred during outage activities on Transformer 12 (T-12) resulting in a trip. The cause of the Unit 1 EDG auto-start was bus undervoltage as a result of the T-12 trip. The Unit 1 EDG automatically started as designed when the Bus 14-1 undervoltage signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Unit 1 EDG. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5513713 March 2021 01:11:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2On March 12, 2021, at 2102 (EST), Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP) 13 tripped. The cause for the trip is under investigation. Following the RRP trip, the Average Power Ranger Monitors (APRMs) flow bias trips are inoperable due to reverse flow through RRP 13. The APRMs were restored to operable on March 12, 2021, at 2110 (EST) when the RRP 13 Discharge Blocking Valve was closed. This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) which states: 'Licensee shall notify the NRC of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5513412 March 2021 12:12:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEA licensed operator had a confirmed positive alcohol test during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified.
ENS 5513210 March 2021 18:26:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3On March 10, 2021, Exelon reported an unpermitted release of a radionuclide (i.e., tritium) into the groundwater within the site boundary at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) in accordance with Illinois state regulations. There has been no detection of the release beyond the site boundary. The suspected source for the increased groundwater tritium levels is an onsite water storage tank or pipe; however, an investigation is in progress and the exact cause and source is not yet known. The increase in groundwater tritium concentration does not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 551224 March 2021 04:00:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEAt time 0323 (EST) on March 04, 2021, it was determined that the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary did not meet the acceptance criteria under ASME, Section XI IWB-3600, "Analytical Evaluation of Flaws." This condition will be resolved prior to plant start up. This event is being reported as an eight hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 5510617 February 2021 11:30:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5
GE-2
A new, not qualified security officer self reported illegal drug use and resigned following a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC resident inspectors and R1 security inspector were notified.
ENS 5508629 January 2021 02:43:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the Technical Support Center (TSC) Supply Fan belt had failed which affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Corrective maintenance activities are being performed on January 29, 2021 to the TSC HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system). The work includes replacing the failed belt and restarting the TSC Supply Fan. The work duration is approximately 12 hours. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will be notifying the Illinois Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 5506612 January 2021 20:26:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA corporate supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plants has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspectors will be notified.
ENS 5504623 December 2020 12:28:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5At 0653 CST on 12/23/20, it was discovered the single train of high pressure core spray was inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). All other emergency core cooling systems were operable during this time. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The high pressure core spray is inoperable because the water lake pump tripped. This inoperability puts the licensee in a 14-day limiting condition for operability.
ENS 550203 December 2020 17:10:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEAt 0923 EST on December 3, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the Emergency AC Electrical Power System (Emergency Diesel Generator 1A) occurred during normal plant operations. The reason for Emergency Diesel Generator 1A auto start was due to Class 1E 4KV Bus 11 feeder breaker opening. The Emergency Diesel Generator 1A automatically started as designed when the loss of voltage signal on 4KV Bus 11 was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency AC Electrical Power System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the 4KV Bus 11 Feeder Breaker opening is unknown at the present time and is under investigation.
ENS 5500217 November 2020 03:40:00ClintonNRC Region 3GE-6At 1918 CST on 11/16/2020, it was discovered both required trains of the Main Control Room Ventilation and Air Conditioning systems were simultaneously inoperable. Due to these inoperabilities, the systems were in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Subsequent post-maintenance testing demonstrated that the Division 1 Main Control Room Ventilation system was available at the time of the event and was restored to operable status at 2036 CST on 11/16/2020. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5500016 November 2020 12:13:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4During normal plant start up on Limerick Unit 1, reactor pressure was raised above 200 psig prior to unisolating the Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection system (HPCI) which remained inoperable. Per TS 3.5.1, HPCI is required to be operable in Mode 2 above 200 psig. HPCI has since been restored to operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5499613 November 2020 05:32:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4At 0245 EST on November 13, 2020, the Limerick Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed on a valid Reactor High Pressure signal (1096psig). The Reactor High Pressure signal was caused by the closure of the 1B Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), causing reactor pressure to rise, exceeding the Reactor Protection System (RPS) setpoint of 1096psig. The shutdown was normal and the plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with normal pressure control via the Main Steam Bypass Valves to the Main Condenser and normal level control using the Feedwater System. The closure of the 1B Inboard MSIV appears to have been caused by a loss of Primary Containment Instrument Gas (PCIG) pneumatic supply to the valve. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be notifying Berks, Chester, and Montgomery Counties, as well as the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 549793 November 2020 08:00:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CE

At 0011 EST on 11/03/20, it was discovered that BOTH trains of salt water were simultaneously INOPERABLE. While in a planned (limiting condition for operation) LCO window with the 21 salt water train INOPERABLE for post-maintenance testing, debris intrusion in the 22 salt water header rendered the redundant salt water train INOPERABLE. Due to this INOPERABILITY, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). One train of salt water was restored to operable at time 0026 EST. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event did not affect Unit 1.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 11/20/2020 AT 1218 EST FROM BRIAN FOVEAUX TO OSSY FONT * * *

Following the eight hour 10 CFR 50.72 notification made on 11/03/2020 (EN 54979), further engineering analysis determined that 22 Saltwater subsystem flow remained at levels sufficient to fulfill its safety function based on the conditions existing at the time of the event. Despite flow in 22 Saltwater subsystem falling below the short term (four hour) minimum value for approximately 15 minutes, engineering analysis was able to determine the increased heat removal capacity associated with the lower bay temperatures was sufficient to offset the reduced heat removal capacity associated with the lower 22 Saltwater subsystem flow. This demonstrated that actual heat transfer to the saltwater subsystem was sufficient to ensure all safety functions were fulfilled during the event. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), (B) and (D). The NRC Resident has been informed. Notified R1DO (Greives)

ENS 5497129 October 2020 15:12:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4At 1030 EDT on Thursday, October 29, 2020, during the performance of Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station leakage testing of the reactor pressure vessel and associated piping, a through-wall leak (non-isolable) was identified on an instrument line connected to the N16A nozzle. The reactor will be maintained shutdown until pipe repairs and testing are complete. The NRC resident inspector has been informed.
ENS 5492329 September 2020 21:19:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3On July 22, 2020, at 1030 CDT, it was discovered that the as-found Unit 2 Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Maximum Confirmation Count Setpoint did not match the values in the Quad Cities Unit 2 (Core Operating Limits Report) (COLR) per TS SR 3.3.1.3.3. All Unit 2 OPRMs were declared inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the OPRM system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). There were no other Technical Specification or safety systems inoperable at the time of this event. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Quad Cities Unit 2 returned their OPRMs to operable on July 23, 2020, at 1210 CDT, following a setpoint adjustment. In addition, during a more recent meeting between station personnel and the NRC resident inspectors, feedback was provided that brought to the station management's attention that they needed to make the required 50.72 notification as a result to this past inoperability.
ENS 5491728 September 2020 05:02:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1

EN Revision Imported Date : 10/12/2020 LOSS OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE: This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the planned maintenance affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Planned maintenance activities are being performed on 09/28/20 to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work includes replacement of supply fan and roof-top unit. Work is scheduled to complete on 10/11/20. If an emergency is declared requiring PBAPS TSC activation during this period, the PBAPS TSC will be staffed and activated using existing Emergency Preparedness (EP) procedures. If the PBAPS TS becomes uninhabitable due to radiological, or other conditions, the TSC Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with EP procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee.

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/9/20 AT 1234 EDT FROM BRIAN BAILEY TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

An eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability was made on 9/28/20 under Event Notification 54917 for planned maintenance activities to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. This event was reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the planned maintenance affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. This update to EN 54917 is to notify applicable stakeholders that, following satisfactory completion of the planned supply fan and roof-top unit replacement work, the PBAPS TSC ventilation system has been returned to service with no remaining work or outstanding deficiencies related to this work. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Lally).

ENS 5491325 September 2020 15:28:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 548741 September 2020 14:48:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1The following is a synopsis of information received from the licensee: On March 6, 2020, while at zero percent power and in Cold Shutdown - Mode 4, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) determined through surveillance testing that three Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) did not meet their Technical Specification closure time. The cause of the MSIV failures has been determined to be delayed Air Pack response. The delay was caused by a buildup of corrosion product and waxy foreign material believed to be dried pipe thread sealant or O-ring assembly lube that accumulated on the internal surfaces of the Air Pack during refurbishment by the vendor Trillium (previously Hiller). The following is action taken or planned to be taken to prevent recurrence: A note will be added to the procurement requirement evaluation form and purchase order for MSIV Air Pack refurbishments to minimize use of O-ring lubricant and thread sealant to limit likelihood of capturing foreign material on Air Pack valve internals. The Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) component function identifier and system name of each component or system referred to above is: Component - Main Steam Isolation Valves, Air Pack. IEEE 803 Function Identifier - VOP. IEEE805 System Identification - SB. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. For further information contact: Todd Tierney Plant Manager Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Exelon Generation Company, LLC Brandon Shultz Site Regulatory Assurance Manager Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (315) 349-7012 .
ENS 5486328 August 2020 10:22:00DresdenNRC Region 3At 1645 CDT on 8/27/2020, it was determined that a licensed operator tested positive in accordance with the FFD testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5482911 August 2020 20:22:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1At 1334 EDT on Tuesday August 11th, the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System lost power due to a trip of the Station Blackout (SBO) electric power supply breaker. The trip was due to a fault at the Conowingo Dam and Conowingo was not able to realign electric power to the SBO within an hour. Power restoration is complete and TSC Ventilation was restored at 1725 EDT. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities due to a reduction in the effectiveness of the Onsite Technical Support Center (TSC). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 548206 August 2020 13:10:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1This report is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an automatic actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. Because the actuation was invalid, this 60-day telephone notification is being made instead of a written LER (licensee event report), in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). On 06/08/2020, at approximately 0424 EDT, a trip of the Unit 3 'A' reactor protection system (RPS) MG-Set resulted in a partial activation of the primary containment isolation system and inboard containment isolation valves closed in multiple systems. All affected Group III containment isolation valves were verified to be closed. It was determined that the normal power supply for the Unit 3 'A' RPS had failed. Power was transferred from the normal to the alternate source and the RPS 'A' channel was reset. Investigation determined that the 3A RPS MG Set motor contactor coil winding had failed due to an internal short circuit. The motor contactor has been replaced. The containment isolation was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for containment isolation. Therefore, this is considered to be an invalid actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
ENS 5471013 May 2020 18:01:00ByronNRC Region 3At 1000 CDT on May 13, 2020, the Byron Station Technical Support Center (TSC) emergency ventilation system inlet isolation damper would not open as required to support system operation. This failure affected the ability of the TSC ventilation system to maintain adequate radiological habitability in the event of an emergency with an airborne radiological release. All other capabilities of the TSC were unaffected by this condition. If an emergency was declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If the TSC became uninhabitable, the Station Emergency Director would relocate the TSC staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable procedures. The TSC emergency ventilation system inlet isolation damper has been repaired and is now functional. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 546934 May 2020 23:40:00LaSalleNRC Region 3

This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. A through wall leak was found on piping connected to the Division 3 Diesel Generator (DG) Cooling Water Strainer. This condition has been evaluated and the Division 3 DG Cooling Water System has been declared inoperable. The Division 3 DG Cooling Water System is a support system for the Division 3 Emergency DG and the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON MAY 8, 2020 AT 1709 EDT FROM JOE MESSINA TO BRIAN LIN * * *

This update retracts Event Notification #54693, which reported a condition that could have potentially prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An evaluation of the flaw on the piping connected to the Unit 2 Division 3 Diesel Generator (DG) Cooling Water strainer concluded that the system would have remained operable. The High Pressure Core Spray system, supported by the operable DG Cooling Water system, remained operable and capable of performing its safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Stone).

ENS 546923 May 2020 22:28:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1On 5/3/2020 at 1100 EDT, Operations identified a step change in the Main Control Room ambient noise. The cause of the noise was a rise in vibrations on the Number 11 fan motor of the Main Control Room Ventilation Circulating Fan. Another step change in noise occurred and Operations swapped from the Number 11 fan motor to its redundant Number 12 fan motor, but the noise and vibrations did not improve. The two independent motors are connected to the blower shaft with belts on either end of the shaft. This entire fan and motor assembly is contained within the Main Control Room ventilation ducting and is not visible. At 1118 EDT, Operations shut off the Main Control Room Ventilation Circulating Fan due to Number 11 fan motor vibrations, declared the Main Control Room Air Treatment System inoperable, and entered the Technical Specification 3.4.5.e, 7-day action statement. At 1750 EDT, Maintenance entered the ductwork and informed Operations that the Number 11 fan bearing had catastrophically failed and because of the extent of damage and close physical proximity to the Number 12 fan motor, jeopardized its continued operation. As a result, Operations also declared the Number 12 fan motor inoperable and determined the event was reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5466614 April 2020 23:36:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3On April 14, 2020 at 1645 CDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (CREV AC) system was declared inoperable when the electrical feed breaker to the Refrigeration Compressor Unit (RCU) was found in a tripped condition. As a result, both units entered Technical Specification 3.7.5 Condition A. Investigation is in progress to determine the cause and corrective actions of the RCU feed breaker trip. The CREV AC system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV AC could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
ENS 5465710 April 2020 10:58:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1On April 10, 2020, at 0300 (EDT), an oil leak from 23PCV-12, HPCI (High Pressure Core Injection) Trip System Pressure Control Valve (PCV), resulted in the system being declared inoperable. This condition is being reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5459420 March 2020 17:47:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3On March 20, 2020, at 1025 hours (CDT), Unit 2 MCC (motor control center) 28/29-5 failed to transfer to its alternate feed during surveillance testing. This would result in MCC 28/29-5 being de-energized in the event of a DBA LOCA (design basis accident loss of coolant accident) in which the Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator fails to energize Bus 29. Consequently, the LPCI (low pressure coolant injection) Injection Valve (MO 2-1001-29A/B) would not have power to open on the loop selected by LPCI Loop Select. This renders both divisions of the LPCI mode of Residual Heat Removal system inoperable. Technical Specification 3.5.1, Condition E had previously been entered during testing, requiring restoration of LPCI in 72 hours. No other ECCS (emergency core cooling) systems were inoperable at the time of the event. Troubleshooting and repairs are in progress. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The plant is still in its 72-hr. LCO action statement. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state of Illinois Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 545624 March 2020 15:35:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1At 1205 EST, on March 4, 2020, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 initiated a manual reactor scram due to lowering Electrohydraulic Control System (EHC) level in the turbine control system. The cause of the lowering level was a leak in the EHC system piping. All control rods inserted. There were no safety system actuations. The cause of the EHC leak is being investigated. The NRC Resident has been notified. Additionally, the licensee notified the New York State Public Service Commission.
ENS 5453320 February 2020 15:04:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1(On February 20, 2020, at 1240 EST, the Licensee determined the following information:) This notification is in reference to reports EN 54130 and LER 2019-002, which were retracted. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant received additional information on the technical basis for the retraction. Further review, including testing of the terminal blocks, demonstrated that the short circuit current would result in heat levels in excess of cable insulation ratings. Unprotected DC control circuits for non-safety related DC motors are routed between separate fire areas. A postulated fire in one area can cause a short circuit and potentially result in secondary fires or cable fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures degrade the degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains and are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory actions per the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) for affected fire areas have been implemented. A modification to install fuses in the control circuits for 94P-2(M), 31P-7A(M), 31P-7B(M), and 94P-13(M) has been scheduled and shall correct this condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5450331 January 2020 09:46:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1At 0555 (EST), on January 31, 2020, James A. FitzPatrick was at 38 percent power when an automatic scram occurred as a result of a main turbine trip on high Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level. The plant was at reduced power in preparation for maintenance activities. The 'A' Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) was being removed from service when a perturbation in reactor water level reached the high RPV water level setpoint. This resulted in a main turbine trip and 'B' RFP trip. The automatic scram inserted all control rods. A subsequent low water level resulted in a successful Group 2 isolation. The plant is stable in Mode 3 with the 'B' RFP maintaining RPV water level. The initiation of the reactor protection systems (RPS) due to the automatic scram signal at critical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The general containment Group 2 isolations are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and the State and Local government for the scram. Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser.
ENS 5440321 November 2019 21:11:00ClintonNRC Region 3

EN Revision Imported Date : 1/13/2020 UNIT 1 HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY INOPERABLE On 11/21/2019, at 1225 CST, as a result of Division 4 DC bus voltage oscillations, bus voltage lowered to less than the required improved technical specification (ITS) voltage of 127.6 VDC. This resulted in declaring High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system inoperable per technical specification LCO 3.8.4 and 3.8.9 actions. Division 4 DC bus voltage was restored to greater than 127.6 VDC at 1227 CST. The HPCS system remains inoperable due to Division 4 DC battery charger inoperability. Since HPCS is an emergency core cooling system and is a single train safety system, this condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Clinton Power Station has implemented required compensatory actions due to the Division 4 DC battery charger and HPCS remaining inoperable.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 1/10/20 AT 1145 EST FROM JACOB HENRY TO KARL DIEDERICH * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 11/21/2019 (EN 54403) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Subsequent to the initial notification, the event and the NRC guidance in NUREG-1022 pertaining to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) were reviewed further. The evaluation determined that the Division 4 DC bus voltage oscillations were caused by a degraded but operable charger. The Division 4 battery remained fully charged during the event and its operability was not impacted. Therefore, the HPCS system remained Operable. Under these circumstances, this event does not represent an inoperability of an accident mitigation system under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Therefore, EN 54403 is retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Hanna).

ENS 5438412 November 2019 18:23:00LaSalleNRC Region 3This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), "News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency". The Main Control Room received a report from on-site Maintenance personnel performing diving activities at the lake screen house that communications with a diver had been lost. Onsite and offsite emergency responders were dispatched. The diver was removed from the water but was unresponsive. At 1601 (CST), the LaSalle County Station Operating Department was notified by emergency responders on-site that the individual was deceased. The Grundy County Sheriff, LaSalle County Sheriff, Seneca Emergency Services, and NRC Senior Resident Inspector have been notified. A press release is planned
ENS 543641 November 2019 10:03:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1On November 1, 2019 at 0316 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) received Control Room annunciation for HPCS SYSTEM INOPERABLE and inoperable status light indication for TRIP UNITS OUT OF FILE/POWER FAIL. Initial investigation has identified a potential failed 24 vdc power supply which supplies power to the HPCS trip units for system initiation and control. The HPCS system has been declared inoperable per TS 3.5.1 resulting in an unplanned 14 day LCO. All other plant systems functioned as required. NMP2 is currently at 100 percent power in Mode 1. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as, 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.' The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5436029 October 2019 13:58:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3At approximately 0945 CDT, on 10/29/2019, the Braidwood Station main control room was notified of the inadvertent actuation of 17 full sounding sirens affecting Braidwood Station in Will County, Illinois. Will County notified Exelon of the inadvertent actuation that occurred on 10/29/2019, at 0919 CDT, during the performance of regular maintenance on the siren equipment at the Laraway Communication Center at the Will County Sheriff Dispatch Center. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agencies. The Braidwood NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The siren equipment has been repaired and restored to service.
ENS 5435829 October 2019 13:12:00DresdenNRC Region 3At approximately 0945 CDT, on 10/29/2019, the Dresden Station main control room was notified of the inadvertent actuation of nine full sounding sirens affecting Dresden Station in Will County Illinois. Will County notified Exelon of the inadvertent actuation that occurred on 10/29/2019, at 0919 CDT, during the performance of regular maintenance on the siren equipment at the Laraway Communication Center, the Will County Sheriff Dispatch Center. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agencies. The Dresden NRC Resident has been notified. The siren equipment has been repaired and sirens have been returned to service.
ENS 5435527 October 2019 22:36:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3On October 27, 2019, at 1605 CDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) was declared inoperable due to finding water in the system's Air Filtration Unit (AFU) filter enclosure. Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven days. No other systems were out of service at the time this was declared inoperable. The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), "Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function," because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.