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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 4954525 February 2020 08:25:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability. At 0955 (PST) on 11/17/2013,

it was discovered that the CMS-SR-13 sample valves would not align to allow monitoring the drywell. The redundant sample rack, CMS-SR-14, is already out of service due to an issue with the sample pump, which is currently awaiting replacement parts. The capability to monitor the drywell for H2 and O2 remotely is non-existent if an emergency situation were to arise because of these two issues. The only method currently available to sample the drywall for H2 and O2 is manually via chemistry procedures. This method would be unavailable in accident conditions because the sample point isolation valves isolate on an accident signal (F or A). Even if the sample points were not isolated, the Chemist would be unable to draw a sample safely during an accident due to radiation levels in the Reactor Building and/or H2 and O2 levels in containment. PPM 13.1.1 Table 6 specifies DW/WW (Drywell/Wetwell) hydrogen and oxygen measurements as a method for determining potential loss of Primary Containment. PPM 13.14.11 does not specify an alternative method for the loss of CMS-SR-13 & 14. Based on this information and discussions with Licensing and Emergency Preparedness, the station has determined this issue is a loss of emergency assessment capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DAVID HOLICK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0159 EST ON 11/19/13 * * *

At 1351 PST on 11/18/13, repairs on CMS-SR-13 were completed, returning the monitor to operable status of being able to sample both the drywell and wetwell for hydrogen and oxygen as required for emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (PROULX).

ENS 544668 January 2020 02:49:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4On January 7, 2020, Columbia Generating Station (CGS) experienced an equipment failure that resulted in a loss of the seismic assessment instrumentation. This is being reported as a major loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No other plant systems were affected. Compensatory measures have been implemented and will remain in place until the seismic system has been restored. The NRC resident has been notified. Licensee received a design basis earthquake alarm, but no other local indication of seismic activity, nor on the U.S. Geological Survey website. Licensee compensatory measures include local readings on seismic instrumentation.
ENS 5440925 November 2019 18:20:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4

EN Revision Text: TEMPORARY PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SAMPLE CART NON FUNCTIONAL At 1245 PST, on November 23, 2019, the Turbine Building Process Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack (TEA-SR-26) was declared non-functional and taken out of service to perform planned preventive maintenance per procedure. The temporary sample cart was placed in service as an alternate method per plant procedures. At 0854 PST, on November 25, 2019, it was discovered that the temporary sample cart had a broken belt. At that time neither the Turbine Building Process Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack nor the temporary sample cart could be returned to service. At 1300 PST, on November 25, 2019, the temporary sample cart was returned to service following repairs. This restored the required compensatory measures for TEA-SR-26. This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/27/2019 AT 0655 EST FROM SEAN KEEHN TO BRIAN LIN * * *

At 2057 PST, on November 26, 2019, it was discovered that the temporary sample cart had lost power and was not in service. At this time, neither TEA-SR-26 nor the temporary sample cart were in service, this was a subsequent failure of the temporary sample cart, and at the time the station had been unsuccessful at restoring a reliable alternate sampling method following the failure that occurred at 0854 PST, on November 25, 2019. At 2350 PST, on November 26, 2019, the temporary sample cart was returned to service following repairs. This restored the required compensatory measures for TEA-SR-26. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified the R4DO (Pick) via email.

ENS 5411312 June 2019 12:17:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant had been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 538604 February 2019 18:40:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4A licensed reactor operator had a confirmed positive random fitness-for-duty drug test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 537754 December 2018 17:12:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4On 12/4/2018 at 1340 (PST), Columbia entered a planned evolution to replace the seismic monitoring system. Use of the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale has been implemented as a compensatory measure per station procedures. The expected duration of the replacement activity will exceed 72 hours, therefore, this is being reported as a major loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures will remain in place until the seismic system replacement has been completed. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5341018 May 2018 13:27:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 0651 (PDT) on May 18th, 2018, Columbia Generating station experienced a Main Transformer trip, that caused a Reactor Scram. Reactor Power, Pressure and Level were maintained as expected for this condition. MS-RV-1A (Safety Relief Valve) and MS-RV-1B (Safety Relief Valve) opened on reactor high pressure during the initial transient. MS-RV-1B appeared to remain open after pressure lowered below the reset point. The operating crew removed power supply fuses for MS-RV-1B and it currently indicates intermediate position. SRV (Safety Relief Valve) tail pipe temperatures indicate all valves are closed. Suppression pool level and temperature have remained steady within normal operating levels. All control rods inserted and reactor power is being maintained subcritical. RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) water level is being maintained with condensate and feed system with startup flow control valves in automatic. Reactor Pressure is being maintained with the Turbine Bypass valves controlling in automatic. The main condenser is the heat sink. No ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) systems actuated or injected; the EOC-RPT (End of Cycle-Recirculation Pump Trip) and RPS (Reactor Protection System) systems actuated causing a trip of the RRC pumps and a reactor scram. Core recirculation is being maintained with RRC-P-1A (Reactor Recirculation Pump) running. No release has occurred. At this time there will be no notifications to state, local or other public agencies. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified. The cause of the event is currently under investigation. Plant conditions are stable. The plant is in its normal electrical alignment and offsite power is available to the site.
ENS 529993 October 2017 16:58:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On October 3, 2017, at 0800 PDT, Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure momentarily rose above the Technical Specification (TS) limit. Secondary Containment was declared inoperable and TS Action Statement 3.6.4.1.A was entered. The pressure rise was due to unexpected isolation of an exhaust valve in the Reactor Building ventilation system during electrical switchgear inspections. The cause of the closure is still under investigation. The Control Room operators reopened the Reactor Building exhaust valve and pressure returned to within limits automatically. Secondary Containment was declared operable at 0802 PDT and TS Action Statement 3.6.4.1.A was exited. This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and accident mitigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5296612 September 2017 19:11:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On September 12, 2017, at 1228 PDT, Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure momentarily rose above the Technical Specification (TS) limit. Secondary Containment was declared inoperable and TS Action Statement 3.6.4.1.A was entered. The pressure rise was due to unexpected isolation of the supply and exhaust valves in the Reactor Building ventilation system due to an electrical transient on the power panel feeding the valve operators' solenoid pilot valves during maintenance. The cause of the electrical transient is under investigation. The Reactor Building differential pressure controller restored the building pressure to within limits. The Control Room operators reopened the Reactor Building ventilation supply and exhaust valves. Secondary Containment was declared operable at 1228 PDT and TS Action Statement 3.6.4.1.A was exited. This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and accident mitigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5291820 August 2017 22:46:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

On August 20, 2017 at 1605 PDT, Columbia Generating Station was manually scrammed from 100 percent power due to a rise of Main Condenser back pressure. Manual scram of the unit is procedurally required upon a loss of Main Condenser back pressure. Preliminary investigations indicate that the Main Condenser air removal suction valve (AR-V-1) closed, resulting in the Condenser back pressure rising to within 1.0 inch Hg of the setpoint with reactor power greater than 25 percent. Further investigations continue. All control rods fully inserted. In addition to the closure of the air removal suction valve, one of two Reactor Feedwater startup flow control valves did not adequately operate to control Reactor vessel level and resulted in a high-level (Level-8) actuation tripping the Reactor Feedwater System. All other systems operated as expected. Reactor water level is currently being controlled manually with the start-up level control isolation valve. AR-V-1 has been manually opened with a jumper and temporary air supply. Reactor decay heat is being removed via bypass valves to the Main Condenser. This event is being reported under the following: 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), which requires a four-hour notification for any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System when the reactor is critical. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee plans to issue a press release.

  • * * UPDATE ON 8/24/17 AT 1937 EDT FROM MATT HUMMER TO DONG PARK * * *

The licensee is updating the notification to include an 8 hour notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a specified system actuation due to a Level 3 isolation signal which occurred approximately 20 minutes after the scram. The licensee is currently in cold shutdown to repair the Reactor Feedwater startup flow control valve. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).

ENS 5291317 August 2017 17:55:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5Pursuant to 10 CFR 21, this is a non-emergency notification by Energy Northwest concerning a defect in General Electric (GE) Nuclear HMA124A2 relays received at Columbia Generation Station. On August 12, 2017, Energy Northwest completed a 10 CFR 21 evaluation of a condition associated with GE Nuclear HMA124A2 relays supplied by GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC, and intended for use at Columbia Generating Station. The evaluation was performed to determine the applications where the relays were approved for installation, and where they were installed in the plant, and to determine if the failure of the relays could result in a Substantial Safety Hazard as defined In 10 CFR 21.3. Two of the HMA124A2 relays received had back plates that were mounted upside down, causing the terminals to not match the standard configuration. Although the internal wiring to the physical stud locations was correct, the numbering scheme embossed on the back plate did not match the correct configuration. With the incorrectly mounted back plate, the internal coil of the energizing circuit could be wired to the incorrect portion of the control circuitry, which would not energize when required and could result in the failure of a safety function. This deviation presents a Substantial Safety Hazard as defined In 10 CFR 21.3, as these relays were approved for use in safety related applications; however, there was no actual risk to plant safety since this deviation was recognized and resolved by station craft prior to installation of the relays. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(1) as a defect as defined in 10 CFR 21.3. The defective HMA124A2 relays were installed in the plant in the correct configuration with post-maintenance testing performed to ensure operability of the relays. The remaining HMA124A2 relays were examined and no additional defects were identified. GE Hitachi has been notified of the condition. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5286924 July 2017 13:36:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 1647 (PDT) on May 25, 2017, during the performance of a post-maintenance test for replacement of a Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) low water level 3 indicator switch (MS-LIS-24A), a pressure perturbation in the common pressure reference line resulted in tripping of the RPV Level 2 instruments and an unplanned start of High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) pump (HPCS-P-1) and its supporting emergency diesel (DG3). The Reactor Pressure Vessel was flooded up during the refueling outage, thus, the actuations of the HPCS pump and its supporting emergency diesel (DG3) were unplanned and invalid. The HPCS pump did not inject into the RPV due to the RPV level being above Level 8 which is an interlock to close the HPCS RPV injection valve (HPCS-V-4). During the event, the single train HPCS system initiated normally but did not inject into the reactor pressure vessel as expected due to flooded-up conditions of the reactor pressure vessel for refueling outage activities. The emergency diesel generator started normally in response to the initiation signal of HPCS. Both HPCS and the emergency diesel generator functioned successfully. All systems responded in conformance with their design and there was no safety significance associated with this event. At the time of the event, the licensee notified the NRC Resident (Inspector).
ENS 5284811 July 2017 17:45:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. On July 11th, 2017, it was discovered that the flow indicating switch for the high pressure core spray (HPCS) minimum flow valve was providing unreliable indication. There was no flow through the line at the time the condition was discovered. This switch provides the flow signal to the HPCS minimum flow valve logic. The switch was declared inoperable and the required actions of Technical Specification 3.3.5.1 were entered. This condition could have prevented the HPCS system, a single train safety system, from performing its specified safety function. Troubleshooting is underway to determine the cause of and correct the condition. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM DAN SHARPE TO KARL DIEDERICH AT 1710 EDT ON 9/20/17 * * *

The condition reported in Event notification #52848 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) has been evaluated, and determined not to have met the threshold for classification as an Event or Condition the Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. Engineering analysis has concluded that the affected switch was capable of performing its required support function to provide the flow signal to the HPCS minimum flow valve logic. Thus, the HPCS system remained capable of performing its specific function for the identified condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (G. Miller).

ENS 5261516 March 2017 15:07:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, this is a non-emergency notification by Energy Northwest concerning a defect in Size 1 Freedom Series Starters with nominal 120 VAC coils manufactured by AZZ/NLI (Nuclear Logistics Inc.) used at Columbia Generating Station. On February 8, 2017 Energy Northwest was notified by NLI of a deviation associated with starter contactors used at Columbia that failed to close due to overheating of the starter coil. The coils that were provided were determined to not meet specified voltage ratings. The evaluation completed by Energy Northwest on March 14, 2017 concluded that the deviation did create a Substantial Safety Hazard, and is reportable under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(1) as a defect. A 30 day report will be issued by April 13, 2017 per 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4). The licensee performed a prompt operability assessment for the two starters currently installed. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5251026 January 2017 03:11:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On January 25, 2017, at 1836 PST, smoke was detected in the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) diesel room with no indication of a fire. Investigation found the motor starter coil for DMA-FN-32 (Diesel Mixed Air Fan 32), HPCS diesel generator room normal cooling fan, failed. This fan is required for operability of the switchgear that powers the HPCS pump. The HPCS pump is currently inoperable due to maintenance being performed on other support systems. This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5238220 November 2016 18:53:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On November 20, 2016 at 1402 PST, Reactor Building Exhaust Air Fan 1B, REA-FN-1B, failed to start in manual which caused the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary to not be met. The duration of the time that the secondary containment TS was not met was approximately less than one minute. REA-FN-1B was being started in manual during a shift of Reactor Building Ventilation to support a post-maintenance support task on REA-FN-1B. Secondary containment differential pressure was restored within the TS requirement of greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge by restarting Reactor Building HVAC Train A. The cause of REA-FN-1B failing to start is currently under investigation. This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and accident mitigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 522763 October 2016 16:49:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On October 3, 2016, at 1008 PDT a Reactor Building Exhaust Valve (REA-V-1) unexpectedly closed, which caused the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary to not be met. The duration of time that the secondary containment TS was not met was approximately 4 minutes. Secondary containment differential pressure was restored within TS requirement of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge at approximately 1012 PDT by manually starting Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) system (SYS) A. The cause of the REA-V-1 closure is currently under investigation. This condition is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) for an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5156223 November 2015 17:50:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At approximately 1100 PST, Columbia Generating Station (CGS) planned to make a non-required notification to Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council (EFSEC) regarding indications of two fuel defects. This condition has not affected full power operation at CGS, and there is no impact to the health and safety of the public or to the environment. CGS plans on making this notification to EFSEC on November 24, 2015 at 1330 PST. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5152610 November 2015 04:15:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 2040 PST on 11/9/2015, Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure increased to above the Technical Specification Surveillance requirement of 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge for approximately seven minutes. Operators took action to manually start Standby Gas Treatment System to restore Reactor Building pressure. This event is reportable as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radiation and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The cause of the event is under investigation. There were no radiological releases associated with the event. No safety system actuations or isolations occurred. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 512016 July 2015 20:41:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5A recent review of Fire Protection and Post Fire Safe Shutdown (PFSS) Programs at Columbia Generating Station (CGS) identified a potential unanalyzed condition with Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Scenario 2x. Review of the circuit design for High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) HPCS-V-10, HPCS-V-11 and HPCS-V-15 identified that fire-induced circuit failure (hot shorts) on the OPEN function control circuits for each valve would create the flow path to potentially drain inventory from the suppression pool (SP). The normal operation of HPCS-P-3 (keep-fill pump) would allow additional inventory from the SP to be transferred to the CSTs (Condensate Storage Tank). If a fourth hot short is postulated, HPCS-P-1 would transfer inventory from the SP to the CST at a much faster rate. HPCS-V-11 was deactivated on 6/12/2015 due to a maintenance repair issue and will be left in the fully closed position. This plant alignment resolves current concern for MSO scenario 2x as fire-induced circuit damage cannot cause spurious opening of HPCS-V-11. However, with an incomplete analysis for MSO scenario 2x, compliance with PFSS MSO requirements would have been challenged from the completion of the MSO project (October 2012) up to June 2015. CGS is reporting this event as an unanalyzed condition in conformance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Further analyses are being implemented to confirm the condition and to develop appropriate remedial actions. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5118226 June 2015 04:38:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 2200 PDT during startup from refueling outage 22, it was discovered that both level instruments used in reactor protection system (RPS) trip system 'A' for initiation of a reactor scram on low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level were observed to have failed high. This resulted in the inability to generate a full reactor scram on low level (+13 inches). All remaining RPV level indications demonstrated that level was being maintained within normal operating bands. This constitutes a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to shut down the reactor. The RPS trip logic at Columbia consists of two trip systems, RPS trip system 'A' and RPS trip system 'B'. There are two level instrument channels in each trip system. Columbia utilizes a 'one-out-of-two taken-twice' trip logic to generate a full scram signal. At least one channel in both trip systems must actuate to generate a full scram signal. With both level instruments in RPS system 'A' failed high, the RPS trip logic was unable to generate a full scram. At 2246 (PDT) and in accordance with TS LCO 3.3.1.1 Condition C, a half scram was generated on RPS trip system 'A' to restore full scram capability. The cause of the failure of the two level instruments associated with RPS Trip system 'A' is under investigation. The level channels are being calibrated prior to changing to mode 1 (power operations). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5109428 May 2015 03:35:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5A planned outage of the Division 2 medium voltage switchgear (SM-8) was initiated at 22:17 PDT on 5/27/15. The bus outage results in all area radiation monitors required for emergency classification being non-functional. Compensatory measure monitoring equipment has been established prior to the loss to provide alternate means of monitoring area radiation levels. The SM-8 outage window is scheduled to last 124 hours. Although the monitoring function is maintained by the compensatory monitoring equipment, the planned loss of area radiation monitors for greater than 72 hours is being reported as a major loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 72(b )(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5108622 May 2015 10:43:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 0014 PDT on 05/22/2015, Columbia experienced an unexpected momentary loss of SM-7, a Division 1 4.16 kV vital bus, resulting in a start of Emergency Diesel DG-1 . Additionally, under voltage circuitry prevented Standby Service Water pump 1A from starting to support DG-1 in response to the valid under voltage condition, and operators tripped the diesel at 0016 PDT. The SM-7 bus was reenergized by a 115 kV offsite source through backup transformer TR-B. The cause of this event was an inadvertent trip of under voltage circuitry while connecting test equipment in preparation for Diesel and Loss of Power logic testing. Division 1 was inoperable due to ongoing maintenance during the current refueling outage and was not being relied upon for decay heat removal or core circulation. Columbia is in Mode 5 with a coolant temperature of 96 degrees F, water level is at the normal refueling flooded level with fuel pool cooling gates removed. Division 2 is providing required electrical power and supporting components required for decay heat removal and inventory control. There was no impact to Shutdown Safety Assessment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5106812 May 2015 22:13:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5On 4/21/2015, during performance of source check surveillance on the liquid effluent radiation monitor for the Plant Service Water (TSW), a non-radioactive system, it was discovered that the instrument was determined to be nonfunctional. It was determined on 4/25/15 that the failure was due to an incorrect 'as left' setting from testing conducted on 4/3/2015. The instrument was determined to be non-functional from the period 4/03/15 to 4/25/15 when the setting was corrected. On 5/12/15 it was recognized that because no compensatory measures were implemented during the time the instrument was non-functional that this condition constituted a major loss of radiation assessment capability which is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
ENS 5102730 April 2015 21:24:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 1811 PDT on 04/29/2015, the station declared the RPIS system inoperable when a Control Room panel alarmed the loss of indication. The cause of the equipment loss is under investigation. This unplanned equipment outage is being conservatively reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No other safety equipment has been impacted by this event and the plant continues normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5038019 August 2014 14:14:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0733 (PDT), on 08/19/2014, PRM-RE-18, Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Intermediate Range Detector, failed downscale. PRM-RE-1A and PRM-RE-1C, the Reactor Building Stack Monitor - low and high range detectors, both remain operable and fully functional. Compensatory measures are being implemented per plant procedures at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5029422 July 2014 16:57:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

At 0635 hours PDT on July 22, 2014, Turbine Building Exhaust Air Radiation Indicating Switch (TEA-RIS-13) and the Turbine Building Process Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack (TEA-SR-26) were declared non-functional. The cause of the malfunction is under investigation. Compensatory measures have been implemented to obtain radiation readings from the associated effluent release pathway. Field team assessment function was unaffected and remains available. This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DUANE SALSBURY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2018 EDT ON 7/28/2014 * * *

At 1351 PDT on 7/28/2014, Turbine Building Exhaust Air Radiation Indicating Switch (TES-RIS-13) and Turbine Building Process Radiation Monitoring Sample Rack (TES-SR-26) were declared functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (O'Keefe).

ENS 501829 June 2014 18:11:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

At 0715 hours PDT on June 9, 2014, the Rad Waste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack was declared non-functional. The cause of the equipment malfunction is under investigation. Compensatory measures were implemented to obtain radiation readings from the associated effluent release pathway. Field team assessment function was unaffected and remains available. This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY QUOC VO TO JEFF ROTTON AT 2019 EDT ON 06/14/2014 * * *

At 1255 PDT on 06/13/2014, the Rad Waste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack was declared functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Werner).

ENS 500843 May 2014 03:42:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 1920 (PDT), on 05/02/2014, PRM-RE-18, Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Intermediate Range Detector, failed downscale. PRM-RE-1A and PRM-RE-1C, the Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Low and High Range Detectors, both remain operable and fully functional. Compensatory measures are being implemented per plant procedures at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1754 EDT ON 05/08/14 FROM JASON LOVEGREN TO DONG PARK * * *

Following completion of maintenance activities PRM-RE-1B, Reactor Building Stack Monitor - Intermediate Range Detector was returned to operable status at 0810 PDT on 05/08/2014, restoring its required emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Whitten).

ENS 4989811 March 2014 18:27:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5An extent of condition review of all unfused ammeters circuits in Direct Current (DC) distribution systems at Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) identified areas in the plant which may be susceptible to secondary fires due to hot shorts from these unfused ammeters. It is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage these circuits and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cables and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. This condition is reportable as an 8-hour ENS report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4984119 February 2014 14:29:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0829 (PST), on 2/19/2014 the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was removed from service for planned maintenance activities. The Division 1 sample rack is expected to be out of service for 14 hours. The redundant Division 2 sample rack was previously removed from service for maintenance and remains out of service for repairs. Compensatory measures to monitor primary containment for hydrogen and oxygen are available via grab samples using chemistry procedures. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM NICHOLAS RULLMAN TO VINCE KLCO AT 1400 EST ON 2/20/2014 * * *

Following completion of surveillance activities, the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was returned to operable status at 1037 PST on 2/20/2014, restoring its required emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Allen).

ENS 4983417 February 2014 10:42:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure rose above the Technical Specification Surveillance requirement of 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge multiple times from 0044 (PST) to 0305 (PST) on 2/17/14. The alarm was received in the control room at 0305 (PST). This is reportable as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radiation and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Reactor Building pressure has been restored to normal (greater than 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge), returning Secondary Containment to operable status. Highest actual value indicated was +0.21 inches pressure water gauge. The cause of the event is under investigation. There were no radiological releases associated with the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4976527 January 2014 05:05:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

At 0045 PST on 1/27/14, the Turbine Building Exhaust Low and Intermediate radiation monitors and the Rad Waste Building Exhaust Low and Intermediate radiation monitors were declared inoperable because of planned maintenance for replacement of the monitors. Compensatory measures have been implemented per station procedures; however, the time required for installation, testing, and acceptance of the new equipment is expected to last several weeks. Therefore, this radiological monitoring equipment outage is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability under regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures will be in place throughout the duration of the planned equipment outage. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 6/6/2014 AT 2008 EDT FROM JOHN KAINEG TO DONG PARK * * *

At 1416 PDT on 5/31/14, the Turbine Building Exhaust Low and Intermediate radiation monitors were declared operable, and at 1312 PDT on 6/06/14 the Rad Waste Building Exhaust Low and Intermediate radiation monitors were declared operable after outages due to equipment replacements. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Taylor).

ENS 4970910 January 2014 02:14:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure increased to above the Technical Specification Surveillance requirement of 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge briefly (two minutes or less) on two occasions. This is reportable as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radiation and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Reactor Building pressure has been restored to normal (greater than 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge) returning Secondary Containment to operable status. The cause of the event is under investigation. There were no radiological releases associated with the event. No safety system actuations or isolations occurred. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 497028 January 2014 19:49:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

At (1010 PST) on 1/08/14, during performance of a surveillance the power supply for ten area radiation monitors in the Reactor Building was found with voltage out of specification. As a result, the affected area radiation monitors were declared non-functional. This condition represents a major loss of assessment capability and is being reported as such under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii). As directed by station procedures, compensatory measures have been enacted until the power supply is restored. The Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JASON LOVEGREN TO JIM DRAKE ON 01/10/2014 AT 0214 EST* * *

The power supply voltage has been restored to specification per applicable station procedures. All affected area radiation monitors have been declared functional. Compensatory measures have been suspended. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 3/13/14 AT 1853 EDT FROM JOHN KAINEG TO DONG PARK * * *

Licensee is retracting this event notification based on the following: Energy Northwest performed an evaluation for the reported out-of-specification voltage condition for the power supply to several radiation monitors in the Reactor Building. The evaluation concluded that the voltage deviation from the -24 VDC set point was small and within the calculated uncertainty for the instrument, and did not result in equipment failure. Therefore, it was concluded that the radiation monitors were functional and that the reported major loss of assessment capability did not occur. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).

ENS 497007 January 2014 16:07:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

At 1210 PST on January 7, 2014 the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor- Intermediate Range detector was declared non-functional due to scheduled maintenance on supporting equipment. The monitor is expected to be out of service for approximately 1 hour. Preplanned compensatory actions have been implemented. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 1238 PST on January 7, 2014 the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor -Intermediate Range detector was declared functional following scheduled maintenance on supporting equipment. Emergency Assessment Capability has been restored. Preplanned compensatory actions have been secured. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MATT REID TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1636 EST ON 02/09/2015 * * *

Licensee is retracting this event notification based on the following: Regulatory guidance in NUREG-1022 Revision 3 allows for not reporting EP equipment outages that are planned (i.e., maintenance) when outage time is not expected to exceed or does not exceed 72 hours, and when there are viable compensatory measures in place. Verification of the Control Room Logs indicates Columbia had viable compensatory measures in place during the maintenance outage and the outage duration was less than 72 hours. Columbia met the conditions in NUREG-1022; therefore, this event did not represent a loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Allen).

ENS 4966119 December 2013 12:58:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0838 PST on 12/19/2013, the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was removed from service for planned maintenance activities. The Division 1 sample rack is expected to be out of service for 14 hours. The redundant Division 2 sample rack was previously removed from service for maintenance and remains out of service for repairs. Compensatory measures to monitor primary containment for hydrogen and oxygen are available via grab samples using chemistry procedures. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM QUOC VO TO VINCE KLCO AT 0130 EST ON 12/20/13 * * *

Following completion of surveillance activities, the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was returned to operable status at 2114 PST on 12/19/2013, restoring its required emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Lantz).

ENS 4964517 December 2013 15:25:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

At 1133 PST on December 17, 2013, the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector was declared non-functional due to scheduled maintenance on supporting equipment. Preplanned compensatory actions have been initiated. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A follow up notification will be made when the equipment has been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RUSSELL LONG TO DONG PARK AT 1912 EST ON 12/21/13 * * *

At 1457 (PST) on December 21, 2013, the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector was declared functional following scheduled maintenance on supporting equipment. Emergency assessment capability has been restored. Preplanned compensatory actions have been secured. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Werner).

ENS 4963113 December 2013 19:44:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

On December 13, 2013 it was determined that a reportable condition has existed at Columbia Generating Station since 1500 hours (PST) on November 25, 2013. At 1500 hours on November 25, 2013, the Control Room Envelope (CRE) was declared inoperable based on the inability to ensure that the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System would be able to maintain a positive differential pressure with all areas surrounding the CRE boundary. Columbia does not have the installed instrumentation to directly monitor the differential pressure between the Main Control Room (MCR) and certain areas adjacent to the MCR. The pressure in the adjacent areas is controlled by placing conservative limits on allowed breach size for these adjacent areas. On November 25, 2013, it was identified that the combined breach size associated with several doors in these adjacent spaces resulted in exceeding the allowed limit. Based on exceeding the allowed breach size limit to the adjacent areas, the Control Room Envelope was declared inoperable, and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.3.B.1 was entered. An additional breach was discovered on 12/05/13 from a hole in ductwork passing through the cable spreading room, which is one of the adjacent areas to the CRE boundary, and that condition was added to the existing action statement 3.7.3.B.1. These are conditions that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and are reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BRIAN HEAVILIN TO VINCE KLCO ON 1/21/2014 AT 1720 EST* * *

In the case of this event, the Control Room Envelope (CRE) was declared inoperable and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.3.B.1 was entered conservatively based upon limited knowledge at the time of discovery. There is no installed differential pressure indication between the CRE and this area adjacent to the Main Control Room (MCR), therefore conservatively this adjacent area is included in the CRE, and leakage is administratively controlled. The leakage between the MCR and the adjacent area included in the CRE exceeded this administrative limit. Testing performed on November 20, 2013, prior to the December 13, 2013 reported events, as well as testing after the event, January 10, 2014, has demonstrated that the leakage identified does not prevent the Control Room Envelope (CRE) from establishing and maintaining the required differential pressure to ensure fulfillment of its required safety function for Control Room Habitability. The ability of the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system to perform its function of pressurizing and maintaining the Main Control Room positively pressurized with respect to its surroundings was not lost due to the leaking doors and duct specified in the event. Performance of the surveillance without these breaches sealed validated this conclusion. The event described above should not have been reported, as the Control Room Envelope was always operable and capable of fulfilling its safety function with the existing breaches and did not constitute a reportable event as conditions that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Spitzberg).

ENS 4962612 December 2013 12:44:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0436 (PST), on 12/12/2013 the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was removed from service for planned maintenance activities. The Division 1 sample rack is expected to be out of service for 14 hours. The redundant Division 2 sample rack was previously removed from service for maintenance and remains out of service for repairs. Compensatory measures to monitor primary containment for hydrogen and oxygen are available via grab samples using chemistry procedures. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM QUOC VO TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1705 EST ON 12/13/13 * * *

Following completion of maintenance activities, the Division 1 sample rack for monitoring primary containment oxygen and hydrogen atmospheric concentrations was returned to operable status at 1150 PST on 12/13/2013, restoring its required emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Walker).

ENS 496033 December 2013 12:30:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

During scheduled maintenance, at approximately 0822 PDT on December 3, 2013 the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector was declared non-functional due to scheduled maintenance on supporting equipment. To compensate for the loss of assessment capability due to the non-functioning radiation monitoring equipment, an additional Health Physics (HP) Technician trained to acquire offsite dose assessment information on offsite releases is available. The additional personnel are pre-staged in support of the radiation monitoring system outage and will be mobilized in accordance with guidance in the compensatory measure instructions. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A follow up notification will be made when the equipment has been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The planned outage is scheduled for approximately 90 hours.

  • * *UPDATE PROVIDED BY DAVID HOLICK TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0652 EST ON 12/07/2013 * * *

At 2104 PST on 12/6/13, planned maintenance on the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector was complete, the instrument was retested satisfactorily, and the instrument was declared functional. This restored the emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO(Vasquez) and R1DO(Cook).

ENS 4946022 October 2013 12:43:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

At 0754 on 8/23/13, a loss of power to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 'B' occurred due to the unexpected opening of the circuit breaker (RPS-CB-MG2) for the RPS 'B' motor generator due to a failure of the voltage regulator circuit card. The loss of RPS 'B' resulted in a half scram signal, closure of Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) from multiple systems and loss of power to main steam line radiation monitors (MS-RIS-610B & MS-RIS-610D). No plant parameters or maintenance activities existed which would cause the opening of RPS-CB-MG2 or actuation of the primary containment isolation; therefore, this is considered to be an invalid actuation of a system listed in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv). The half scram signal, closure of Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) from multiple systems, and loss of power to main steam line radiation monitors were an expected response to the loss of RPS 'B'. RPS 'B' was repowered from an alternate power supply. The half scram signal was reset, the containment isolation valves were opened and the affected systems were returned to normal operation. The voltage regulator circuit card was replaced and RPS 'B' was returned to its normal power supply. As indicated in 10CFR50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephonic notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days of discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. This 60-day telephone notification is being made to meet the reporting requirements instead of submitting an LER since the actuation was invalid. The following additional information is provided as specified in NUREG-1022: The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: PCIVs in multiple systems

    EDR-V-19 Drywell Equipment Drain Inboard Isolation Valve
    EDR-V-20 Drywell Equipment Drain Outboard Isolation Valve
    FDR-V-3 Drywell Floor Drain Inboard Isolation Valve
    FDR-V-4 Drywell Floor Drain Outboard Isolation Valve
    RWCU-V-1 Reactor Water Cleanup Suction Inboard Isolation Valve
    RWCU-V-4 Reactor Water Cleanup Suction Outboard Isolation Valve
    RRC-V-19 Reactor Water Sample Inboard Isolation Valve
    RRC-V-20 Reactor Water Sample Outboard Isolation Valve
    TIP-V-15 Traversing In-Core Probe Purge Isolation Valve
    CRD-V-11 Control Rod Drive Scram Discharge Volume Drain Valve

Whether each train actuation was complete or partial:

    All PCIVs actuations for a loss of RPS 'B' were complete.
    The reactor half scram for a loss of RPS 'B' was a partial activation.

Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully:

    All PCIVs functioned successfully.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 4942510 October 2013 14:08:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

At 0809 PDT on 10/10/2013, after starting Standby Service Water (SW) pumps, Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) received a flow low alarm for the Low Pressure Containment Spray (LPCS) pump motor cooling water. The flow indicator SW-FIS-19 was reported too low to support pump function. The LPCS system was declared inoperable, and the appropriate Technical Specification action statement was entered. The cause of the low flow alarm has not been determined. This event is reportable under criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) 'Any Event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.' Columbia is continuing to troubleshoot and repair as appropriate to restore the SW flow to the LPCS pump. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/11/13 AT 1653 EDT FROM MATT HUMMER TO DONG PARK * * *

Subsequent to receipt of the low flow alarm, flushing of the flow indicating switch sensing lines was conducted. It has been determined that the instrument sensing lines are partially blocked providing a flow indication that is slow to respond to actual flow conditions. The flow is currently reading normally. The LPCS pump was declared operable on 10/10/13 at 1447 PDT. The initial notification incorrectly stated 'Low Pressure Containment Spray (LPCS)', the correct description is 'Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)'. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hay).

  • * * RETRACTION FROM DAVID HOLICK TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2030 EDT ON 10/18/13 * * *

Subsequent evaluation of this event found there was no actual low flow condition to the LPCS bearing cooler. A flow scan on the SW outlet line from the LPCS pump bearing cooler was conducted on 10/12/13 which confirmed the actual flow conditions were reading normally. The problem resides in the installed flow indication switch. Since there was no actual low flow condition to the LPCS bearing cooler, the LPCS pump could perform its safety function to mitigate an accident. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted. Notified R4DO (Azua). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 493329 September 2013 07:11:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

Scheduled maintenance of the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) HVAC system for maintenance on the Air Handler (AMA-AH-S1) recirculation fan, outside air duct heater, and thermostat will start at approximately 0400 hours PDT on 09/09/13 and will last approximately 40 hours (estimated time from equipment tag out back to OPERABLE). During this time the TSC and OSC will not be available for use to support emergency response activities. Established compensatory measures direct Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members normally responding to either of these facilities to respond to alternate locations. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by the scheduled TSC / OSC Facilities HVAC maintenance work. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The resident inspector has been notified. A follow up notification will be made when HVAC maintenance to the TSC / OSC Facilities has been completed and operability of these EP Facilities has been restored.

* * * UPDATE FROM VERLE KESZLER TO PETE SNYDER AT 0823 EDT ON 9/15/13 * * * 

Scheduled maintenance of the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) HVAC system is completed. The HVAC system has been returned to service and declared functional at 05:05 PDT on 9/15/13. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." Notified R4DO (Hay).

ENS 493286 September 2013 14:47:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

At 0607 hours PDT on September 6, 2013, the Radwaste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack was declared non-functional due to a loss of power to the sample rack. The cause of the loss of power is under investigation. At 0945 hours PDT, auxiliary sampling equipment was installed to collect samples from the associated effluent release pathway. To compensate for the loss of assessment capability while the Radwaste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack is non-functional, field team survey results will be used if required. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM QUOC VO TO VINCE KLCO ON 9/6/13 AT 2251 EDT * * *

Repairs have been completed and the Radwaste Building process radiation monitoring sample rack has been returned to service and declared functional at 1631 hours PDT. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Gaddy).

ENS 493276 September 2013 05:10:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5At 2244 PDT on September 5, 2013, the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Low Range detector, and the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector were declared non-functional due to a failure of the sample rack supply fan. At 0156 hours PDT on September 6, 2013, a temporary sample cart was installed to return the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Low Range detector, and the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector to service. To compensate for the loss of assessment capability while the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitoring equipment was nonfunctional, a field team survey would have been used if required. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4930726 August 2013 01:05:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure increased to above the Technical Specification Surveillance requirement of 0,25 inches vacuum water gauge. This event is reportable as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radiation and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The Reactor Building differential pressure controller was placed in manual operation and Secondary Containment pressure was restored to normal (greater than 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge) returning Secondary Containment to operable status. Secondary Containment pressure was outside the allowable Technical Specification requirement for 4 minutes. There were no radiological releases associated with the event. No safety system actuations or isolations occurred. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4930625 August 2013 00:46:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

At 1614 hours PDT on August, 24, 2013 the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor - High Range and Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detectors were declared non-functional due to a loss of supporting equipment. Corrective actions are being pursued to restore the affected monitors to functional status. To compensate for the loss of assessment capability due to the non-functioning Radiation Monitoring Equipment, an additional Health Physics (HP) Technician trained to acquire offsite dose assessment information on offsite releases is available. The additional personnel are pre-staged in support of the Radiation Monitoring System outage and will be mobilized in accordance with guidance in the compensatory measure instructions. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A follow up notification will be made when the Equipment has been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MATT HUMMER TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/29/13 AT 1739 EDT * * *

Repairs have been completed and both the Intermediate and High Range Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitors have been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Hagar).

ENS 4929019 August 2013 17:23:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

At 1013 hours PDT on August 19, 2013 the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor High Range Detector was declared nonfunctional due to increasing background noise. The Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor Intermediate Range Detector remains functional and shows no increase in effluent radioactivity. To compensate for the loss of assessment capability due to the nonfunctioning radiation monitoring equipment, an additional Health Physics (HP) Technician trained to acquire offsite dose assessment information on offsite releases will be available. The additional personnel will be pre-staged in support of the Radiation Monitoring System outage and will be mobilized in accordance with guidance in the compensatory measure instructions. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A follow-up notification will be made when the equipment has been returned to service. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL STODICK TO PETE SNYDER AT 2028 EDT ON 8/19/13 * * * 

Initial investigation into the cause of the malfunction of the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor High Range Detector revealed that the condition also affected the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor Intermediate Range Detector. Therefore, this monitor has also been declared non-functional as of 1633 hours PDT on August 19, 2013. Compensatory measures remain in effect to provide emergency response capability for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological release through this pathway. Corrective actions are being pursued to restore the affected monitors to functional status. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Werner).

  • * * UPDATE FROM MOT HEDGES TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1236 EDT ON 8/21/13 * * *

The cause of the increased background noise for the Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor-High Range was due to failing cooling components for the instrumentation, resulting in increased electronic background noise in the instrumentation. There has been no change in the radiation levels at the plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Werner).

  • * * UPDATE FROM MOT HEDGES TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ ON 8/22/2013 AT 1630 EDT * * *

Repairs have been completed and both the Intermediate and High Range Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitors have been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Werner).

ENS 4919316 July 2013 07:48:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5

Scheduled maintenance of the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) HVAC system for replacement of charcoal filters started at 0430 hours (PDT) on 7/16/13 and will last approximately 37 hours (estimated time from equipment tag out back to OPERABLE). During this time the TSC and OSC will not be available for use to support emergency response activities. Established compensatory measures direct Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members normally responding to either of these facilities to respond to alternate locations. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by the scheduled TSC / OSC Facilities HVAC maintenance work. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A follow up notification will be made when HVAC maintenance to the TSC / OSC Facilities has been completed and operability of these EP Facilities has been restored.

  • * * UPDATE RECEIVED FROM RYAN OAKES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2359 EDT, ON 7/19/13 * * *

This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 49193. Scheduled maintenance of the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) HVAC system for replacement of charcoal filters started at 0430 (PDT) on 7/16/13. Difficulty was experienced in system testing that resulted in exceeding the original estimate of 37 hours. Maintenance to the TSC / OSC Facilities has been completed as of 2001 July 19, 2013 and operability of these EP Facilities has been restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Miller).