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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5091725 February 2020 09:04:00OconeeNRC Region 2B&W-L-LPAt approximately 0605 EDT on March 23, 2015, the Oconee Nuclear Station main control room and Security received an emergency call for an employee experiencing a non-work related medical issue. Site first responders were dispatched in conjunction with a request for off-site medical assistance. The individual was transported by ambulance to the Oconee Medical Center and was pronounced dead at 0717 EDT. The individual was outside of the protected area (within the owner controlled area) and no radioactive material or contamination was involved. The cause of death has not been determined. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b )(2)(xi) for situations related to the health of on-site personnel for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. The South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration (SCOSHA) was notified at 0920 EDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified Pickens County, South Carolina and Oconee County Emergency Managements.
ENS 5075325 February 2020 08:52:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4At approximately 0531 EST on January 23, 2015, the Brunswick Nuclear Plant main control room received an emergency call for a contract employee experiencing a non-work related medical issue. Site first responders were dispatched in conjunction with a request for off-site medical assistance. At approximately 0613 EST, the responding off-site paramedics determined that the efforts to revive the patient were unsuccessful. The individual was outside of the protected area (within the owner controlled area), and no radioactive material or contamination was involved. The cause of death has not been determined. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for situation related to the health of on-site personnel for which a notification to other government agencies is planned. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) will be notified. A press release is not planned at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4812625 February 2020 07:44:00CatawbaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn July 23, 2012, at 0508 EDT, the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation was tagged out for routine maintenance. It was believed that only the cooling function was affected and that the TSC ventilation system was still capable of performing its intended function of pressurization and filtration. A review by operations today determined that the TSC filtration and pressurization portion was also affected. Under certain accident conditions, the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exists to relocate the TSC to an alternate location. Currently it is expected that the TSC ventilation system maintenance will be completed by the end of the day shift today and turned over to operations. Operations should start up the system early during night shift (7/24). This is reportable to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as an eight hour non-emergency notification. The event had no effect on plant operations and no impact on public health and safety has been identified. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, States and Counties.
ENS 4803225 February 2020 07:44:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4

On June 17, 2012, at approximately 1400 hours EDT, the Brunswick Nuclear Plant will be restoring the normal power supply configuration to the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) uninterruptable power supply electrical bus 'A.' This will result in a temporary loss of the site ERFIS, Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and Plant Process Computer (PPC) functions for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Brunswick Units 1 and 2 had established an alternate power supply to the ERFIS UPS electrical bus 'A' on June 13, 2012 (i.e., EN 48019). During the loss of these functions, manual data transfer will be available to the NRC. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), for a loss of emergency preparedness capability. A follow-up notification will be made when the ERFIS, SPDS, ERDS, and PPC functions are restored. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of these actions.

* * * UPDATE FROM STUART BYRD TO PETE SNYDER AT 1757 EDT ON 6/17/12 * * *

Units 1 and 2 ERFIS, SPDS and ERDS have been returned to service. The PPC is expected to be returned to service at approximately 1900 EDT. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ayers).

ENS 4818525 February 2020 07:44:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopDuke Energy notified the NC Wildlife Resource Commission of dead catfish in the vicinity of the McGuire low level intake. Notification was made on 8/13/12 at 1630 EDT. In addition, the NC Dept. of Environment and Natural Resources will be notified. The dead fish are suspected to have been caused by increasing lake temperature and decreased oxygen levels, which is common during the late summer. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
ENS 5452312 February 2020 21:51:00CatawbaNRC Region 2At 1800 EST, on February 12, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post trip. Because of the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System actuated as expected due to on ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) signal. The AFW pumps started as designed when the valid system actuation was received. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as an 4-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The site remains in a normal electrical lineup. The cause of the turbine trip is under investigation.
ENS 545093 February 2020 09:16:00OconeeNRC Region 2

At 0915 EST on February 3, 2020, planned upgrades to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) will begin. The work includes upgrades to furniture, carpet, telecommunications, celling tiles, and HVAC vent covers and the installation of new Audio-Visual equipment to include monitors, speakers, and microphones. The work duration is approximately eight weeks. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC and OSC activation during this period, the TSC and OSC will be staffed and activated at the alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the TSC and OSC planned upgrades and the need to assemble and staff the alternate location during an emergency.

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a planned loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 5447213 January 2020 09:17:00McGuireNRC Region 2This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A planned modification to the Technical Support Center (TSC) power supplies started on January 13, 2020. The work activity includes installation of a permanent back-up diesel generator and rewiring of automatic and manual power transfer switches. The work duration is approximately three weeks. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the Emergency Coordinator and the TSC staff will assemble and staff the alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the TSC modification and the need to assemble and staff the alternate location during an emergency. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 544657 January 2020 19:09:00OconeeNRC Region 2

At 1341(EST), on 01/07/20, it was discovered all trains of the Chilled Water System were simultaneously Inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). During this event, the Bravo train chiller was operating in a maintenance run and the temporary chiller was available and placed in service promptly to restore the safety function. The control room area cooling safety function was restored at time 1435 (EST) when one required train was declared Operable. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 1/23/2020 AT 1718 EST FROM JERRY COLLIER TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on January 7, 2020, at 1909 EST (EN#54465). A subsequent evaluation determined that the Bravo train chiller, which was running at the time of the event, would be able to perform its safety function and was operable at the time of the event. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Coovert).

ENS 543789 November 2019 13:28:00HarrisNRC Region 2

At November 9, 2019, at 0635 EST, it was discovered that both source range instrumentation channels were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The neutron flux monitoring system was OPERABLE during this time period.

NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. It was determined that with one of two source range instruments out of service for planned maintenance, an operator found the other operable source range instrument out-of-calibration. Upon further investigation, the out-of-calibration instrument had a bad potentiometer with its power supply, thus rendering both instruments inoperable.

ENS 5433316 October 2019 14:28:00HarrisNRC Region 2On October 16, 2019, at 0829 (EDT), an individual was transported for treatment to an offsite facility to address a personal medical issue. Due to the nature of the medical condition, only a partial survey could be completed prior to transport. Follow-up surveys performed by radiation protection technicians identified no radiological contamination of the worker or of the ambulance and response personnel. This event is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii), 'Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.' The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified.
ENS 543072 October 2019 11:50:00CatawbaNRC Region 2On October 2, 2019, at 0415 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 2 containment spray system occurred during valve strokes of the 2A train containment spray header isolations while the 2B train containment spray pump was in recirculation. The reason for the containment spray actuation was due to a conflicting procedural alignment with the 2B containment spray recirculation procedure. The containment spray system does not have an automatic function, and only receives manual actuation. The Unit 2 containment spray actuation was secured at 0416. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the containment spray system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5428619 September 2019 14:08:00CatawbaNRC Region 210 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A, B, and D) - Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function Unit 2 Component Cooling water system inoperable. On July 6, 2019, from 0156 to 1545 (EDT), it was determined that both trains of the unit 2 component cooling water system were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The affected safety function was restored on July 6, 2019, at 1545 (EDT) when the 2B component cooling train was restored to operable. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. At the time of the event no other safety related systems were inoperable. The event had no impact on Unit 1.
ENS 5426811 September 2019 17:58:00OconeeNRC Region 2A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5423320 August 2019 20:00:00CatawbaNRC Region 2While performing a purification on the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST), it was discovered that the single train system was inoperable due to the level being less than the required volume per SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.5.4.2. The condition was discovered on 8/18/19 at 1700 (EDT). The FWST level was restored to greater than the required volume per SR 3.5.4.2 at 1744 on 8/18/19. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5421211 August 2019 12:14:00RobinsonNRC Region 2At 0840 EDT, on August 11, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post trip. Because of the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System actuated as expected due to low water levels in the steam generators. The AFW pumps started as designed when the valid system actuation was received. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a 4-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an 8-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS and AFW. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The site remains in a normal electrical lineup.
ENS 541443 July 2019 12:42:00BrunswickNRC Region 2This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). At approximately 2000 EDT on May 9, 2019, an invalid actuation of emergency diesel generator (EDG) 1 occurred. At the time, EDG 1 was removed from service for planned maintenance. The invalid actuation occurred when the starting air clearance was being lifted while simultaneously performing a Post Maintenance Test (PMT) where an external DC power source was applied to a relay that provided continuity directly to the starting air solenoids. As a result, the air start solenoids were energized causing EDG 1 to start. EDG 1 started and functioned successfully. The actuation was complete; EDG 1 successfully started and ran unloaded. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5411613 June 2019 03:59:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 2127 EDT on June 12, 2019, during routine testing, the HPCI turbine experienced an overspeed trip and then subsequently restarted and ramped to the required speed. As a result, the response time of the system exceeded the 60-second acceptance criteria, thereby rendering the system inoperable. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System and Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) are operable. The safety significance of this event is minimal. Troubleshooting activities are in progress. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 540526 May 2019 22:49:00BrunswickNRC Region 2

At 2204 EDT on 5/6/19, a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared due to a fire lasting greater than 15 minutes. The fire occurred in the '2B' Heater Drain Pump motor located in the turbine building. The fire was extinguished following initial Emergency Declaration. There were no releases to the environment. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remains in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 5/7/19 AT 0002 EDT FROM MICHAEL BRADEN TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The NOUE was terminated as of 2359 EDT on 5/6/19. No off-site resources were required to extinguish the fire. The turbine building is now free of smoke. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, State of North Carolina, Brunswick County, New Hanover County, and the Coast Guard. Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD (Gott). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5401622 April 2019 01:51:00BrunswickNRC Region 2

At 2307 EDT on April 21, 2019, in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent reactor power, Unit 1 automatically tripped due to a Main Turbine Trip. The Main Turbine Trip was a result of two out of three level instruments sensing a false high reactor water level. All control rods inserted as expected during the scram. Safety Relief Valves G and K lifted per design. The same level instruments that failed also tripped both Reactor Feed Pumps. As a result, reactor water level dropped below the Low Level 1 and 2 actuation setpoints. Per design, the Low Level 1 signal resulted in Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The Low Level 2 signals resulted in Group 3 (i.e. Reactor Water Cleanup) isolation, a secondary containment isolation signal, and an auto start of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. Also, the Low Level 2 resulted in (high pressure coolant injection) HPCI and (reactor core isolation cooling system) RCIC automatically starting and injecting into the vessel. All systems responded as designed. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in valid actuations of the Primary Containment Isolation System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Decay heat is currently being removed via the turbine bypass valves. Condensate and feed water are maintaining water level. The reactor is still at saturation temperature and 475 psi, lowering slowly. The reactor is still in a normal electrical lineup. There was no impact to Unit 2 as a result of this event.

  • * * UPDATE ON 04/22/19 AT 0220 EDT FROM ALAN SCHULTZ TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

The licensee updated the event report to include a 4-Hr Non-Emergency Notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) for Emergency Core Cooling System, HPCI, Discharge to the Reactor Coolant System. Notified R2DO (Dickson), NRR EO (Miller) and IR MOC (Gott).

ENS 5400817 April 2019 15:21:00HarrisNRC Region 2At 0812 EDT on 4/17/2019, it was discovered that both sets of turbine trip solenoids were previously unable to actuate within the allowable time frames; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). At the time of discovery, one set of turbine trip solenoids had been restored. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5396228 March 2019 20:55:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 1654 EDT on March 28, 2019, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System occurred, closing the outboard Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) due to a low condenser vacuum signal. The MSIVs had been manually closed, per procedure, during the shutdown evolution to address drywell leakage. The inboard MSIVs had not been reopened when the isolation occurred. Subsequently, at 1658 EDT a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation occurred due to reactor water level dropping below the actuation setpoint. All control rods were inserted at the time of the actuation. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in valid actuations of the Primary Containment Isolation System and the Reactor Protection System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The safety function of both the MSIVs and the RPS had already been completed at the time of the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5396128 March 2019 15:07:00BrunswickNRC Region 2

At 1450 EDT on March 28, 2019, the licensee observed that the Unit 1 unidentified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage was greater than 10 gallons per minute (gpm) for greater than or equal to 15 minutes. The licensee declared an Unusual Event in accordance with their EAL SU 5.1. The licensee initiated a unit shutdown in accordance with their procedures and the unit was approximately 58 percent reactor power at 1507 EDT, with unit shutdown in progress. The licensee also received an alarm due to increasing Drywell Pressure at 1.7 pounds drywell pressure. At 1600 EDT the licensee called with an update. Unit 1 was still in an Unusual Event with the unit at 37 percent power with the shutdown continuing. Drywell Pressure had decreased to 0.8 pounds. At 1603 the licensee scrammed Unit 1. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 3/28/2019 AT 1808 EDT FROM MARK TURKAL TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

At 1437 EDT on March 28, 2019, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, a Technical Specification-required shutdown was initiated due to indication of a leak in the drywell. Technical Specification Action 3.4.4.A, Unidentified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage increase not within limit, requires RCS leakage to be reduced to within limits within 8 hours. It is expected that the leakage would not have been reduced to within limits within the required Technical Specification completion time; therefore, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 03/29/19 AT 0302 EDT FROM TOM FIENO TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

At 0259 EDT on March 29, 2019, the Unusual Event was terminated because RCS leakage was reduced to less than 10 gallons per minute. The most recent leakage rate measured at 0225 EDT was 3.9 gpm. The source of the leak will be identified when plant conditions allow containment entry. No elevated radiation levels were observed during this event. Drywell pressure is currently 0.0 psig. Unit 1 is in Mode 4. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser), NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5395525 March 2019 11:14:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 0402 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on March 25, 2019, an actuation of the four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) occurred. At the time of the event, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at approximately 100% power and Unit 2 was in Mode 4 at 0% power. Unit 2 was in the process of aligning the electrical distribution system to power the emergency buses via the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) in accordance with plant procedures. It was determined that a fault occurred on the power path between the 230 KV switchyard and the UAT. This caused a main generator differential lockout relay to actuate; thereby starting the EDGs. All emergency buses remained energized from offsite power via the Startup Auxiliary Transformer and, therefore, the EDGs did not tie to their respective buses. The EDGs responded per design to this event. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in valid actuation of the EDGs. Due to the shared configuration of the Brunswick electrical system, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are affected. The Unit 2 main generator lockout was reset and the EDGs have been restored to standby condition. Troubleshooting activities to determine the cause of the fault are in progress. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 539115 March 2019 12:46:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 05:35 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on March 5, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0% power, an actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System occurred during hydrolazing of the reactor water level variable leg instrumentation line nozzle N011B in the reactor cavity. The hydrolazing activity caused low reactor water level to be sensed on Division II of the shutdown range level instrumentation. Per design, the low level 1 signal resulted in Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The Group 8 was reset and shutdown cooling was restored at approximately 05:45 EST. The safety significance of this event was minimal. Although there was a brief interruption of the shutdown cooling, the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling system operation was restored in approximately 10 minutes without extensive troubleshooting or maintenance, and remained operable. The RHR shutdown cooling system is not credited in any Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Chapter 6 or 15 accidents or transients. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5360915 September 2018 15:45:00BrunswickNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO SITE CONDITIONS PREVENTING PLANT ACCESS A hazardous event has resulted in on site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles due to flooding of local roads by Tropical Storm Florence. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS, and DHS NICC. Notified FEMA NWC, NuclearSSA, and FEMA NRCC via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BRUCE HARTSCOK TO VINCE KLCO ON 9/28/2018 AT 1414 EDT * * *

On 9/18/2018 at 1400 EDT, the Unusual Event at Brunswick was terminated due to the ability to transport personnel to the site. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspectors. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie), NRR EO (Miller) and the IRD MOC (Grant). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS, and DHS NICC. Notified FEMA NWC, NuclearSSA, and FEMA NRCC via email.

ENS 535908 September 2018 01:38:00HarrisNRC Region 2At 2210 EDT on September 7, 2018, Duke Energy personnel determined that the following event required notification of a federal agency, North Carolina State agency and a local agency for a chemical spill exceedance. At 2140 EDT on September 7, 2018, plant personnel identified a sodium hypochlorite spill of more than the reportable quantity of 75.9 gallons. This notification is being made as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agencies. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 534989 July 2018 18:23:00McGuireNRC Region 2On July 9, 2018, at 1155 hours (EDT), while testing the TSC Ventilation System, an equipment malfunction occurred that resulted in an unplanned loss of TSC ventilation functionality/habitability for greater than seventy-five minutes. If an emergency had been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The TSC ventilation system has been placed in an interim configuration that restored functionality and habitability. Additional maintenance is planned to promptly resolve the malfunctioning equipment. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the equipment malfunction affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The equipment malfunction (a failed solenoid valve) resulted in the loss of the ability to pressurize and filter the air in the TSC.
ENS 5341321 May 2018 10:41:00BrunswickNRC Region 2On May 21, 2018, at approximately 0840 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Duke Energy confirmed that one emergency notification siren (i.e., B13) located in Brunswick County was malfunctioning. The siren was making an abnormal sound, alternating between low and high pitch. The siren was deactivated upon confirmation of the siren malfunction. There are a total of 38 sirens located in Brunswick and New Hanover Counties. No other sirens were affected. Duke Energy notified the State of North Carolina, Brunswick County, New Hanover County and Coast Guard of the issue. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5340617 May 2018 14:26:00BrunswickNRC Region 2On May 17, 2018, at approximately 1045 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Duke Energy confirmed that one emergency notification siren (i.e., B03) located in Brunswick County was malfunctioning. The siren was making an abnormal sound, alternating between low and high pitch. At approximately 1103 EDT, the siren was deactivated. There are a total of 38 sirens located in Brunswick and New Hanover Counties. No other siren was affected. Duke Energy notified the State of North Carolina, Brunswick County, and New Hanover County of the issue. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5336626 April 2018 20:23:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because planned maintenance activities were performed on April 23rd through April 25th on the seismic monitoring system without viable compensatory measures established. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5332913 April 2018 06:07:00OconeeNRC Region 2B&W-L-LPOn 4/13/2018 at 0227 (EDT), the Oconee Unit 1 Reactor was manually tripped from 24 percent power due to the inability to control main feedwater flow through the Main Feedwater Control Valves using the Integrated Control System. Due to the RPS actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a 4-hour Non-Emergency per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Following the reactor trip, multiple Main Steam Relief Valves failed to reseat at the expected pressure. Using procedure guidance, Main Steam Pressure was lowered by 115 psig, resulting in the closing of all Main Steam Relief Valves. All other post-trip conditions are normal and all other systems performed as expected. Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3 and stable. Decay heat is being removed by the steam generators discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Units 2 and 3 are not affected by the Unit 1 reactor trip. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5332611 April 2018 20:56:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn April 11, 2018, while the Harris Nuclear Plant was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage, the reactor vessel head penetrations were being examined in accordance with the lnservice Inspection Program. Ultrasonic examinations identified a flaw in the head penetration nozzle number 33. The unit is in a safe and stable condition. The flaw will be repaired prior to startup from the refueling outage. The flaw and repair have no impact on the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 533197 April 2018 12:10:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4

On April 7, 2018, at 0836 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped during testing of the stator cooling system. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally. No safety-related equipment was inoperable at the time of the event. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

Operations responded using Emergency Operating Procedures and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Reactor water level being maintained via normal feedwater system. Decay heat is being removed through the bypass valves.

Reactor water level reached low level 1 (LL1) as a result of the reactor trip. The LL1 signal causes a Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The LL1 isolations occurred as designed; the Group 8 valves were closed at the time of the event. Due to the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation, this event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the PCIS. Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The safety significance of this event is minimal. The automatic reactor trip was not complicated and all safety-related systems operated as designed. Investigation of the cause of the Reactor Protection System actuation is in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 533187 April 2018 11:59:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn April 7, 2018 at 0451 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an auto actuation of 'A' and 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps occurred during the shutdown of Unit 1 for Harris Nuclear Plant's refueling outage. Plant Operators successfully took control of the AFW flow and noted the 'B' Main Feed pump was still running with proper suction and discharge pressures of 430 lbs. and 1000 lbs. The 'A' and 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received. The cause of the actuation is still being evaluated. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 533072 April 2018 11:20:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A planned modification to the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system started on April 2, 2018. The work activity includes replacement of the air conditioning system. The work duration is approximately three weeks. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the TSC modifications and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5327119 March 2018 10:49:00CatawbaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAutomatic actuation of the 2B CA (Auxiliary Feedwater) System. At 0329 (EDT on) 03-19-18, with Unit 2 in Mode 5, an actuation of the 2B CA (Auxiliary Feedwater) system occurred during maintenance associated with the 2B Main Feedwater Pump. The cause of the CA (Auxiliary Feedwater) system automatic start was an unanticipated reset and subsequent trip signal of the 2B Main Feedwater pump during maintenance activities. The 2B CA Pump/Train automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received. The system operated as required. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the CA System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 5321716 February 2018 13:58:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1014 (EST) hours on 2/16/18, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped when the Reactor Trip Breakers opened during Train B Solid State Protection System (SSPS) testing. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations manually started the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDCAP) auto-started on low steam generator level. A Feedwater Isolation occurred as designed due to the Reactor Trip and Lo Tave condition. Operations stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser. Unit 2 is not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, actuation of the TDCAP and motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps along with the Feedwater Isolation, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8 hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5316010 January 2018 02:13:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

During normal power operations at 100 percent power on Unit 2, both trains of Containment Air Return Fans (CARF) were declared inoperable at 19:28 (EST) on January 9, 2018 due to a common issue with control power fuses. The fuses potentially could not handle the in-rush current upon re-energizing the circuits. This condition resulted in a loss of a reasonable expectation that the Unit 2 Containment Air Return Fans would meet their design safety function and mitigate an accident. This loss of safety function is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 8 hour report. The site entered T.S. 3.0.3 at 19:28 and exited at 20:54 when repairs to 2B CARF were completed. 2A CARF repairs are complete. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee verified this problem does not affect unit-1.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 0939 EST ON 03/08/2018 FROM JUSTIN BLACK TO TOM KENDZIA * * *

A subsequent evaluation determined that the fuses for the Containment Air Return Fans (CARFs) would be able to perform their safety function and were operable at the time of discovery. The limiting safety condition for the fuses is the return to power following a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). The evaluation determined that the fuses would satisfy their safety function upon re-energizing the circuits if a LOOP occurred and would not impact the ability of the CARFs to perform their safety function. The subject fuses were replaced on January 9, 2018." The Licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Musser).

ENS 5308121 November 2017 11:26:00RobinsonNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-licensed contract employee had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 530618 November 2017 11:52:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0824 EST on 11/8/17, a Switchyard Autotransformer began to burn due to an equipment failure. The autotransformer supports interconnectivity between each side of the switchyard and is not required for switchyard operation. There was no work in progress on the associated autotransformer at the time of the event. The autotransformer and the switchyard are outside the protected area approximately one mile away. The fire was contained to the autotransformer only. The fault has been electrically isolated and there was no effect on either MNS (McGuire Nuclear Site) Unit 1 or Unit 2 operations. No personnel were injured as a result of the fire. Local Fire Department responded and has contained the fire. MNS fire brigade leader along with switchyard maintenance have confirmed no effects to the MNS bus lines, power availability, or the ability for the site to generate power. Environmental personnel have made a notification to the National Response Center due to the oil and foam mixture occurring as a result of the fire response. McGuire hazmat personnel are currently working to contain this oil and foam mixture. Environmental personnel are also submitting a report to the NC (North Carolina) Department of Environmental Water Quality within 24 hours. There is no impact to the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5297417 September 2017 16:49:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4On September 17, 2017, during planned surveillance activities involving Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 4, unexpected voltage and frequency indications were noted when EDG 4 was synchronized to Emergency Bus E4. With EDG 4 in manual mode, the Operator responded by lowering load to reopen the EDG 4 output breaker. Opening of the EDG 4 output breaker with the breakers from Balance of Plant (BOP) Bus 2C, which normally feeds the Emergency Bus E4, opened; resulted in de-energizing Emergency Bus E4. The EDG 4 voltage regulator and governor automatically reverted to auto control, and EDG 4 reconnected to Emergency Bus E4. Normal frequency and voltage were restored with EDG 4 in auto control. The momentary power interruption to Emergency Bus E4 resulted in Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems), and Group 10 (i.e., air isolation to the drywell) isolations. The actuations of Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVS) were completed and the affected equipment responded as designed. Per design, no Unit 1 safety system group isolations or actuations occurred. These actuations are being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Additional Unit 2 actuations included PCIS Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation), and the automatic start of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System subsystems A and B. These systems functioned as designed. This event did not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The safety significance of this event is minimal. Safety systems functioned as designed following the power perturbation on E4. Plant systems responded as designed. The cause of the event is under investigation.
ENS 528884 August 2017 17:25:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4

On August 4, 2017, at 1511 EDT, Unit 1 Secondary Containment was declared inoperable due to a small (i.e., approximately 0.75 inch diameter) hole in Service Water system piping which was found during ultrasonic testing activities. The affected portion of piping penetrates Secondary Containment and flow in the piping creates a vacuum condition; thus bypassing Secondary Containment. The identified hole is being evaluated with respect to its impact on operability of the Service Water system. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. Initial Safety Significance Evaluation: The initial safety significance of this event is minimal. At the time of discovery, Unit 1 was at 100% steady state conditions. Reactor Building Ventilation was in service in a normal alignment. No abnormal radioactivity conditions existed within Secondary Containment. Corrective Actions: Temporary repair of the affected Unit 1 Service Water piping has been completed. This repair was evaluated by Engineering and it has been determined that the repair meets the requirements to maintain Secondary Containment operable. Unit 1 Secondary Containment operability was restored at 1704 EDT on August 4, 2017. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MIKE BRADEN TO RICHARD SMITH AT 1447 EDT ON 9/27/17 * * *

Based upon further evaluation, Duke Energy is retracting Event Notification 52888. The safety objective of Secondary Containment is to limit the release of radioactivity to the environment after an accident so that the resulting exposures are kept to a practical minimum and are within regulatory limits. A bounding engineering evaluation was performed which demonstrates that potential releases from Secondary Containment could not have resulted in offsite or control room doses exceeding regulatory limits. Furthermore, the condition did not impact Technical Specification operability of Secondary Containment in that the ability of Secondary Containment to maintain the required vacuum was not impacted. Therefore, this condition does not represent an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), and the event notification is being retracted. The NRC Senior Resident was notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (A. Masters).

ENS 5284510 July 2017 19:26:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4At approximately 14:10 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), the Control Room was notified of a contract employee experiencing a non-work related medical emergency within the protected area in the service building. First responders were immediately dispatched. Off-site assistance was requested. The individual was transported to the New Hanover Regional Medical Center. No radioactive material or contamination was involved. At 16:02 EDT, hospital officials notified plant personnel that the patient was declared deceased. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for a situation related to the health of on-site personnel for which a notification to other government agencies is planned. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) will be notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 527885 June 2017 19:40:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4At 1352 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on June 5, 2017, during control building damper inspection activities, a control building instrument air line was disconnected. This resulted in the inoperability of the three Control Room Air Conditioning subsystems required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, 'Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System', and the two Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystems required by TS 3.7.3, 'Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System. As a result, this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function for these systems. Control Room AC and CREV system operability was restored at 1407 hours with restoration of control building instrument air. Because Brunswick has a shared control room, this report applies to both Units 1 and 2 and is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This event did not impact public health and safety. INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The condition existed for approximately 15 minutes. Plant staff took immediate actions to return the equipment to service. For the brief time the Control Room AC and CREV systems were inoperable, performance of plant personnel and equipment in the Control Room was not adversely affected. The maximum Control Room back panel temperature during this event was approximately 70 degrees F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Control Room AC and CREV system operability was restored at 1407 hours with restoration of control building instrument air. During subsequent investigation of the event, it was determined that at approximately 0930 hours on June 5, 2017, both subsystems of CREV were similarity rendered inoperable due to isolation of control building instrument air. Control Room AC was not affected. Operability of CREV was restored at approximately 1009 hours. This loss of the CREV system was not apparent to Operations personnel at the time of the event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5277831 May 2017 07:50:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). On April 6, 2017, at 1212 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), an invalid actuation of emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 1, 2. 3. and 4 occurred. In support of maintenance associated with the onsite electrical distribution system, activities were in progress to power the 2C balance-of-plant (BOP) bus from the startup auxiliary transformer (SAT) followed by de-energization of the 2D BOP bus. However, flexible links between the SAT and the 2D BOP bus had not been installed. As a result, under voltage sensing relay (27SX) was not energized and an invalid SAT secondary side under voltage EDG auto start signal was generated. There was no actual under voltage on the SAT, no loss of power, and all emergency buses continued to be powered by the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT). The EDGs responded properly to the auto-start signal. The actuation was complete, in that the EDGs successfully started and ran unloaded. The EDGs were returned to standby status by 1415 EDT. Since no actual under voltage condition existed which required the EDGs to start, and the start was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for initiation, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5268317 April 2017 07:40:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4On April 17, 2017, at 0004 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), an automatic actuation of the four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) was received. At the time of the event, Unit 2 was in the process of starting the main turbine following a refueling outage. Operations personnel tripped the main turbine due to elevated bearing vibrations. When the main turbine was tripped, Power Circuit Breakers (PCBs) 29A and 29B failed to open. This caused a main generator primary lockout due to generator reverse power and the subsequent automatic actuation of all four EDGs. All emergency buses remained energized from offsite power and therefore, the EDGs did not tie to their respective buses. The protective relaying and EDGs responded per design to this event. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the EDGs. Due to the shared configuration of the Brunswick electrical system, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are affected. This event did not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified.
ENS 526624 April 2017 02:33:00RobinsonNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 2155 hours EDT on 04/03/2017, with the unit in Mode 3 at 0 (percent) power, an automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System occurred during surveillance testing. The cause of the AFW system auto-start was an improperly performed procedure step to bypass the auto-start logic of the AFW pumps during performance of the surveillance test. The 'A' and 'B' AFW pumps automatically started as designed when the feedwater isolation signal was received. Due to the valid actuation of the AFW system, this event requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)(B)(6). At no time did this occurrence pose undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5257323 February 2017 22:01:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn February 23, 2017, a containment visual inspection was performed to identify the source of elevated RCS (Reactor Coolant System) leakage. A leak was identified at the nozzle connection of the boron injection line to 2D RCS cold leg at 1922 (EST). It was determined that the leak cannot be isolated and is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage. Unit 2 entered TS LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B, for the existence of pressure boundary leakage. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) (4 hours) for 'initiation of plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications' and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) (8 hours) for 'any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.' The unit will shutdown and repairs will be performed in Mode 5. This condition has no impact on public health and safety. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. At the time of the event notification, Unit 2 was at 33 percent power. Unidentified RCS leakage is estimated at 0.28 gpm. Unit 2 is expected to be in Mode 3 by 0122 EST on 02/24/2017. Unit 1 is not affected by this event.
ENS 5248612 January 2017 18:25:00OconeeNRC Region 2B&W-L-LPA non-licensed supervisor has been found in violation of the Duke Energy Fitness for Duty Policy during a random fitness for duty test. The individual's access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.