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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5494311 October 2020 10:25:00CatawbaNRC Region 2At 0315 (EDT) on October 11, 2020, Unit 2 ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) leakage outside containment was determined to exceed the long term habitability dose analysis for the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Support Center (TSC) under bounding conditions. At the current leakage (approximately 3.2 gpm), the dose analysis indicates dose to TSC inhabitants would exceed the 30 days REM TEDE (Total Effective Dose Equivalent) limit should leakage continue for the entire duration. Repairs are currently in-progress to arrest the leakage and restore functionality of the TSC. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility, There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 549346 October 2020 20:16:00HarrisNRC Region 2A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5489812 September 2020 21:12:00CatawbaNRC Region 2

At 1748 EDT on September 12, 2020, Unit 2 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) leakage outside containment was determined to exceed the long-term habitability dose analysis for the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Support Center (TSC) under bounding conditions. Repair options to arrest the leakage and restore functionality of the TSC are currently being evaluated. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.

There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This same condition was reported under EN #54887.

ENS 548888 September 2020 13:13:00CatawbaNRC Region 2

At 0925 EDT, on September 8, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped on Overpower Delta Temperature. Unit 1 Channel 1 Overpower Delta Temperature was tripped as a planned evolution when an inadvertent Unit 1 Channel 2 Overpower Delta Temperature signal was received. This resulted in an automatic reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Because of the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System actuated as expected due to on ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) signal. Unit 2 is not affected.

Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves.

Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a 4-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW system.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 548876 September 2020 11:39:00CatawbaNRC Region 2At 034S (EDT) on September 6, 2020, Unit 2 ECCS leakage outside containment was determined to exceed the long term habitability dose analysis for the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Support Center (TSC) under bounding conditions. Repairs are currently in-progress to arrest the leakage and restore functionality of the TSC. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC: becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5483413 August 2020 13:24:00HarrisNRC Region 2

On August 13, 2020, at 0938 EDT, with Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, a control rod dropped during control rod testing. This is considered to be an unanalyzed condition and requires a manual reactor trip in accordance with plant procedure. All safety systems functioned as expected. Auxiliary Feedwater started as designed and was secured. Steam generator levels are being maintained by Main Feedwater through the feedwater regulator bypass valves. Decay heat is being removed by using the condenser steam dump flow path. Due to the RPS actuation, this event is being reported as a four hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the unanalyzed condition and unplanned Auxiliary Feedwater actuation, this event is also being reported as an eight hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 548123 August 2020 23:31:00BrunswickNRC Region 2

At 2312 EDT, on August 4, 2020, Brunswick Unit 1 declared an Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power. The unit was at approximately 20 percent power and was not synced to the grid when the unit automatically scrammed. All control rods fully inserted. Emergency Diesel Generators started and began powering the safety buses. Safety systems actuated as expected. The Unit also experienced a loss of Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System, but one pump was returned to service. Unit 2 remains at 100 percent power and is unaffected. The licensee notified State and local governments, as well as the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA IOCC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM MARK TURKAL TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0120 EDT ON 8/4/2020 * * *

At approximately 2302 EDT, a loss of offsite power occurred on Unit 1. This resulted in a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation. Per design, emergency diesel generators 1 and 2 properly started and loaded to their respective emergency buses. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was manually started and is being used to control reactor water level. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was manually started and is being used for pressure control. As previously reported, an Unusual Event was declared at 2312 EDT due to the loss of offsite power. At the time of the event, Unit 1 was in the process of shutting down for maintenance associated with a ground on the main generator. Due to the RPS actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). As a result of the reactor trip, reactor water level reached low level 1 (LL1). The LL1 signal causes a Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sample isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The LL1 isolations occurred as designed; the Group 8 valves were closed at the time of the event. Per design, the loss of offsite power also caused a Group 1 (i.e., main steam isolation valve) isolations. Due to the Emergency Diesel Generator and Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuations, this event is also being reported as an eight-hour, nonemergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The safety significance of the event is minimal. All safety related systems operated as designed. Investigation of the cause of the loss of offsite power is in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Inverso).

ENS 5479621 July 2020 12:42:00RobinsonNRC Region 2At 0851 EDT on July 21, 2020, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated at Robinson Unit 2. Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3 was entered due to LCO 3.1.7 not being met as a result of indication loss on Control Rod positions with more than one position indication inoperable for a group. LCO 3.0.3 was entered at 0752 EDT to initiate action within 1 hour to place the unit in MODE 3 within 7 hours. Since a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 1003 EDT on July 21, 2020. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Shutdown was initiated and power was reduced approximately 3 percent. Reactor power was back to 98.5 percent at the time of notification.
ENS 5477310 July 2020 08:30:00HarrisNRC Region 2At 900 EDT on July 10, 2020, Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson Nuclear Sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at Harris Nuclear Plant, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the McGuire Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5477210 July 2020 08:28:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 0900 EDT hours on 7/10/2020 Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson nuclear sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at Brunswick, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5477110 July 2020 08:17:00OconeeNRC Region 2At 0900 EDT hours on 7/10/2020 Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson nuclear sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at Oconee, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5477010 July 2020 08:01:00CatawbaNRC Region 2

At 0900 EDT hours on 7/10/2020 Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson nuclear sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days.

If a declared emergency were to occur at Catawba, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the McGuire Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated.

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 5476910 July 2020 07:45:00McGuireNRC Region 2At 0900 EDT hours on 7/10/2020 Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson nuclear sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at McGuire, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5476810 July 2020 07:10:00RobinsonNRC Region 2

At 0900 EDT hours on 7/10/2020 Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson nuclear sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days.

If a declared emergency were to occur at Robinson, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated.

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 5475222 June 2020 01:00:00CatawbaNRC Region 2At 2100 on June 21, 2020, a condition was discovered which will require corrective maintenance activities to be performed on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work will include repair of the Condensing Unit system. The estimated duration of repair is unknown at this time. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 547353 June 2020 17:10:00McGuireNRC Region 2A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
ENS 547332 June 2020 19:41:00BrunswickNRC Region 2On June 2, 2020, at 1905 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) made a report to the Department of Transportation (DOT) concerning the identification during receipt inspection of removable contamination in excess of 49 CFR 173.443(a) limits on an empty Type 'A' transportation shipping cask received at BSEP. All smears taken on the cask rain cover, trailer bed, and tires were less than minimum detectable activity for removable contamination. This notification is being made as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5471214 May 2020 18:36:00CatawbaNRC Region 2At approximately 1430 (EDT) on May 14, 2020, Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) requested offsite transport for treatment of a contractor to an offsite medical facility. Upon arrival of the coroner, the individual was declared deceased at 1630 (EDT) on May 14, 2020. The fatality was not work-related and the individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area. No news release by CNS is planned. Notifications are planned to the South Carolina Division of Occupational Safety and Health. This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5470713 May 2020 01:14:00CatawbaNRC Region 2

During the performance of reactor vessel closure head (RVCH) inspections, at 2220 EDT on May 12, 2020, it was determined that the Unit 1 RVCH penetration nozzle number 18 did not meet ASME code case N-729-4 requirements. A surface examination (penetrant test) identified a linear indication on nozzle number 18. The indication was not through-wall as determined by ultrasonic testing. The condition of the Unit 1 reactor vessel head penetration nozzle number 18 will be resolved prior to re-installation of the Unit 1 reactor vessel head. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 5467522 April 2020 10:43:00BrunswickNRC Region 2

This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER (licensee event report) submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). At approximately 1025 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on March 5, 2020, with Unit 1 shutdown in Mode 5 for refueling, an invalid actuation of Group 6 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) (i.e., Containment Atmospheric Control/Monitoring and Post Accident Sampling isolation valves) occurred. The invalid actuation occurred when power was lost as a result of the Inboard Isolation Logic Fuse being removed per a planned clearance hang to support maintenance.

The PCIVs functioned successfully and the actuation was complete. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5466111 April 2020 01:03:00OconeeNRC Region 2At 2125 EDT on April 10, 2020, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at approximately 32 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a tube leak in the 3F1 feedwater heater. The trip occurred during a planned shutdown for a refueling outage. The trip was not complicated, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Units 1 and 2 were not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 546518 April 2020 17:23:00HarrisNRC Region 2

On April 8, 2020, at 0945 EDT, a condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered. The issue involved a loss of TSC habitability due to failure of outside air intake fans. These fans were returned to service at 1237 EDT and the TSC is currently functional.

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.

This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified.

ENS 5461426 March 2020 10:45:00McGuireNRC Region 2

EN Revision Text: DEGRADED CONDITION On March 26, 2020, while McGuire Unit 2 was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage, the reactor vessel head penetrations were being examined in accordance with the in-service Inspection Program. Ultrasonic examinations identified a relevant indication in the Control Rod Drive Mechanism nozzle number 35 that did not meet the acceptance criteria under ASME, Section XI IWB-3600, 'Analytic Evaluation of Flaws.' Actions to address the relevant indication will be taken in accordance with the applicable codes, standards, and regulations. This event is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The relevant indication has no impact on the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 3/29/2020 AT 1700 EDT FROM TOM BERNARD TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

McGuire is retracting the eight hour non-emergency notification made on March 26, 2020, at 10:45 ET (EN#54614). A subsequent evaluation determined that the suspect indication identified during ultrasonic examination of Control Rod Drive Mechanism nozzle number 35 is not service induced nor representative of primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). The indication has been classified as "non-relevant" and is not reportable as a degraded condition. The senior NRC Resident Inspection has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 5460324 March 2020 16:02:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 1205 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on March 24, 2020, a Technical Specification-required shutdown was initiated on Unit 1 due to indication of a leak in the drywell. Technical Specification Action 3.4.4.A, Unidentified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage increase not within limit, requires RCS leakage to be reduced to within limits within 8 hours. It was expected that the leakage would not have been reduced to within limits within the required Technical Specification completion time; therefore, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). Reactor water level reached low level 1 (LL1) following the reactor shutdown. The LL1 signal causes Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves), and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The LL1 isolations occurred as designed; the Group 8 valves were closed at the time of the event. Due to the valid Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation, this event is also being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 2 is not affected by this event. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5459923 March 2020 13:36:00HarrisNRC Region 2On March 23, 2020, at 1013 EDT, with Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 in Mode 1, at 100 percent power, an unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system occurred. This resulted in an automatic reactor trip. The trip occurred during the restoration of the auto-stop turbine trip function during a planned maintenance evolution. All safety systems functioned as expected. Auxiliary Feedwater started as designed and was secured. Steam generator levels are being maintained by normal feedwater through the feedwater regulator bypass valves. Decay heat is being removed by using the condenser steam dump flow path. Due to the unplanned Reactor Protection System actuation while critical and the expected Auxiliary Feedwater actuation, this event is being reported as a four hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5452312 February 2020 21:51:00CatawbaNRC Region 2At 1800 EST, on February 12, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post trip. Because of the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System actuated as expected due to on ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) signal. The AFW pumps started as designed when the valid system actuation was received. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as an 4-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The site remains in a normal electrical lineup. The cause of the turbine trip is under investigation.
ENS 545093 February 2020 09:16:00OconeeNRC Region 2

At 0915 EST on February 3, 2020, planned upgrades to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) will begin. The work includes upgrades to furniture, carpet, telecommunications, celling tiles, and HVAC vent covers and the installation of new Audio-Visual equipment to include monitors, speakers, and microphones. The work duration is approximately eight weeks. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC and OSC activation during this period, the TSC and OSC will be staffed and activated at the alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the TSC and OSC planned upgrades and the need to assemble and staff the alternate location during an emergency.

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a planned loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 5447213 January 2020 09:17:00McGuireNRC Region 2This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A planned modification to the Technical Support Center (TSC) power supplies started on January 13, 2020. The work activity includes installation of a permanent back-up diesel generator and rewiring of automatic and manual power transfer switches. The work duration is approximately three weeks. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the Emergency Coordinator and the TSC staff will assemble and staff the alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the TSC modification and the need to assemble and staff the alternate location during an emergency. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 544657 January 2020 19:09:00OconeeNRC Region 2

At 1341(EST), on 01/07/20, it was discovered all trains of the Chilled Water System were simultaneously Inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). During this event, the Bravo train chiller was operating in a maintenance run and the temporary chiller was available and placed in service promptly to restore the safety function. The control room area cooling safety function was restored at time 1435 (EST) when one required train was declared Operable. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 1/23/2020 AT 1718 EST FROM JERRY COLLIER TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on January 7, 2020, at 1909 EST (EN#54465). A subsequent evaluation determined that the Bravo train chiller, which was running at the time of the event, would be able to perform its safety function and was operable at the time of the event. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Coovert).

ENS 543789 November 2019 13:28:00HarrisNRC Region 2

At November 9, 2019, at 0635 EST, it was discovered that both source range instrumentation channels were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The neutron flux monitoring system was OPERABLE during this time period.

NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. It was determined that with one of two source range instruments out of service for planned maintenance, an operator found the other operable source range instrument out-of-calibration. Upon further investigation, the out-of-calibration instrument had a bad potentiometer with its power supply, thus rendering both instruments inoperable.

ENS 5433316 October 2019 14:28:00HarrisNRC Region 2On October 16, 2019, at 0829 (EDT), an individual was transported for treatment to an offsite facility to address a personal medical issue. Due to the nature of the medical condition, only a partial survey could be completed prior to transport. Follow-up surveys performed by radiation protection technicians identified no radiological contamination of the worker or of the ambulance and response personnel. This event is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii), 'Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.' The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified.
ENS 5432210 October 2019 12:14:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 1122 EDT, on October 10, 2019, Duke Energy initiated voluntary notification of North Carolina State and local officials per the guidance in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 07-07, 'Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative - Final Guidance Document,' due to release of tritiated water in excess of 100 gallons. On October 8, 2019, at approximately 1300 EDT, Brunswick plant personnel drilling as part of an ongoing site project, damaged a storm drain discharge line. The resulting leak was isolated and water around the impacted area was sampled for gamma emitters and tritium. No gamma emitters were detected. The tritium concentration was below the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) drinking water limit of 20,000 pCi/L. The leak has been stopped and excavation and repair efforts are in progress. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 543072 October 2019 11:50:00CatawbaNRC Region 2On October 2, 2019, at 0415 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 2 containment spray system occurred during valve strokes of the 2A train containment spray header isolations while the 2B train containment spray pump was in recirculation. The reason for the containment spray actuation was due to a conflicting procedural alignment with the 2B containment spray recirculation procedure. The containment spray system does not have an automatic function, and only receives manual actuation. The Unit 2 containment spray actuation was secured at 0416. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the containment spray system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5428619 September 2019 14:08:00CatawbaNRC Region 210 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A, B, and D) - Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function Unit 2 Component Cooling water system inoperable. On July 6, 2019, from 0156 to 1545 (EDT), it was determined that both trains of the unit 2 component cooling water system were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The affected safety function was restored on July 6, 2019, at 1545 (EDT) when the 2B component cooling train was restored to operable. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. At the time of the event no other safety related systems were inoperable. The event had no impact on Unit 1.
ENS 5426811 September 2019 17:58:00OconeeNRC Region 2A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 542565 September 2019 16:53:00CatawbaNRC Region 2This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system occurred on 4/28/19. Filtration capability was not impacted by this condition. Maintenance subsequently repaired the condition and the TSC ventilation system was returned to service on 5/1/19. This condition did not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affected the functionality of an emergency response facility.
ENS 5423320 August 2019 20:00:00CatawbaNRC Region 2While performing a purification on the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST), it was discovered that the single train system was inoperable due to the level being less than the required volume per SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.5.4.2. The condition was discovered on 8/18/19 at 1700 (EDT). The FWST level was restored to greater than the required volume per SR 3.5.4.2 at 1744 on 8/18/19. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5421211 August 2019 12:14:00RobinsonNRC Region 2At 0840 EDT, on August 11, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post trip. Because of the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System actuated as expected due to low water levels in the steam generators. The AFW pumps started as designed when the valid system actuation was received. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a 4-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an 8-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS and AFW. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The site remains in a normal electrical lineup.
ENS 541443 July 2019 12:42:00BrunswickNRC Region 2This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). At approximately 2000 EDT on May 9, 2019, an invalid actuation of emergency diesel generator (EDG) 1 occurred. At the time, EDG 1 was removed from service for planned maintenance. The invalid actuation occurred when the starting air clearance was being lifted while simultaneously performing a Post Maintenance Test (PMT) where an external DC power source was applied to a relay that provided continuity directly to the starting air solenoids. As a result, the air start solenoids were energized causing EDG 1 to start. EDG 1 started and functioned successfully. The actuation was complete; EDG 1 successfully started and ran unloaded. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5411613 June 2019 03:59:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 2127 EDT on June 12, 2019, during routine testing, the HPCI turbine experienced an overspeed trip and then subsequently restarted and ramped to the required speed. As a result, the response time of the system exceeded the 60-second acceptance criteria, thereby rendering the system inoperable. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System and Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) are operable. The safety significance of this event is minimal. Troubleshooting activities are in progress. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 540526 May 2019 22:49:00BrunswickNRC Region 2

At 2204 EDT on 5/6/19, a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared due to a fire lasting greater than 15 minutes. The fire occurred in the '2B' Heater Drain Pump motor located in the turbine building. The fire was extinguished following initial Emergency Declaration. There were no releases to the environment. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remains in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 5/7/19 AT 0002 EDT FROM MICHAEL BRADEN TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The NOUE was terminated as of 2359 EDT on 5/6/19. No off-site resources were required to extinguish the fire. The turbine building is now free of smoke. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, State of North Carolina, Brunswick County, New Hanover County, and the Coast Guard. Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD (Gott). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 540473 May 2019 19:00:00McGuireNRC Region 2At 1554 EDT on 5/3/19, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped on Over Temperature Delta Temperature following a pressure transient in the Reactor Coolant System. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations manually started the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and has stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser. Unit 2 is not affected. Due to Reactor Protection System actuation while critical and actuation of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 1 is in a normal electrical lineup. Prior to the automatic trip, the backup pressurizer heaters were in service as is normal during power ascension. The pressure transient started when the backup heaters were in the process of being removed from service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5401622 April 2019 01:51:00BrunswickNRC Region 2

At 2307 EDT on April 21, 2019, in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent reactor power, Unit 1 automatically tripped due to a Main Turbine Trip. The Main Turbine Trip was a result of two out of three level instruments sensing a false high reactor water level. All control rods inserted as expected during the scram. Safety Relief Valves G and K lifted per design. The same level instruments that failed also tripped both Reactor Feed Pumps. As a result, reactor water level dropped below the Low Level 1 and 2 actuation setpoints. Per design, the Low Level 1 signal resulted in Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The Low Level 2 signals resulted in Group 3 (i.e. Reactor Water Cleanup) isolation, a secondary containment isolation signal, and an auto start of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. Also, the Low Level 2 resulted in (high pressure coolant injection) HPCI and (reactor core isolation cooling system) RCIC automatically starting and injecting into the vessel. All systems responded as designed. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in valid actuations of the Primary Containment Isolation System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Decay heat is currently being removed via the turbine bypass valves. Condensate and feed water are maintaining water level. The reactor is still at saturation temperature and 475 psi, lowering slowly. The reactor is still in a normal electrical lineup. There was no impact to Unit 2 as a result of this event.

  • * * UPDATE ON 04/22/19 AT 0220 EDT FROM ALAN SCHULTZ TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

The licensee updated the event report to include a 4-Hr Non-Emergency Notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) for Emergency Core Cooling System, HPCI, Discharge to the Reactor Coolant System. Notified R2DO (Dickson), NRR EO (Miller) and IR MOC (Gott).

ENS 5400817 April 2019 15:21:00HarrisNRC Region 2At 0812 EDT on 4/17/2019, it was discovered that both sets of turbine trip solenoids were previously unable to actuate within the allowable time frames; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). At the time of discovery, one set of turbine trip solenoids had been restored. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5396630 March 2019 21:06:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 17:47 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on March 30, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at approximately 23 percent reactor power and main turbine startup in progress coming out of a refuel outage, a high temperature was sensed at main turbine bearing #9. As a result of and to arrest the high temperature condition, the main control room inserted a manual reactor scram. All control rods inserted as expected during the scram. When the scram was inserted, reactor water level dropped below the Low Level 1 actuation setpoint. Per design, the Low Level 1 signal resulted in Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The main control room manually closed all Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), in anticipation of a low vacuum prior to the Group 1 automatic closure signal being received. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) was aligned for pressure control and Reactor Coolant Isolation System (RCIC) was aligned for level control. The Reactor Coolant Sample Line Isolation valves closed as expected on low main condenser vacuum. All systems responded as designed. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in valid actuations of the Primary Containment Isolation System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. At the time of notification, decay heat was being removed by the condenser through one open MSIV and a feedwater pump running.
ENS 5396228 March 2019 20:55:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 1654 EDT on March 28, 2019, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System occurred, closing the outboard Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) due to a low condenser vacuum signal. The MSIVs had been manually closed, per procedure, during the shutdown evolution to address drywell leakage. The inboard MSIVs had not been reopened when the isolation occurred. Subsequently, at 1658 EDT a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation occurred due to reactor water level dropping below the actuation setpoint. All control rods were inserted at the time of the actuation. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in valid actuations of the Primary Containment Isolation System and the Reactor Protection System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The safety function of both the MSIVs and the RPS had already been completed at the time of the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5396128 March 2019 15:07:00BrunswickNRC Region 2

At 1450 EDT on March 28, 2019, the licensee observed that the Unit 1 unidentified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage was greater than 10 gallons per minute (gpm) for greater than or equal to 15 minutes. The licensee declared an Unusual Event in accordance with their EAL SU 5.1. The licensee initiated a unit shutdown in accordance with their procedures and the unit was approximately 58 percent reactor power at 1507 EDT, with unit shutdown in progress. The licensee also received an alarm due to increasing Drywell Pressure at 1.7 pounds drywell pressure. At 1600 EDT the licensee called with an update. Unit 1 was still in an Unusual Event with the unit at 37 percent power with the shutdown continuing. Drywell Pressure had decreased to 0.8 pounds. At 1603 the licensee scrammed Unit 1. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 3/28/2019 AT 1808 EDT FROM MARK TURKAL TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

At 1437 EDT on March 28, 2019, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, a Technical Specification-required shutdown was initiated due to indication of a leak in the drywell. Technical Specification Action 3.4.4.A, Unidentified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage increase not within limit, requires RCS leakage to be reduced to within limits within 8 hours. It is expected that the leakage would not have been reduced to within limits within the required Technical Specification completion time; therefore, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 03/29/19 AT 0302 EDT FROM TOM FIENO TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

At 0259 EDT on March 29, 2019, the Unusual Event was terminated because RCS leakage was reduced to less than 10 gallons per minute. The most recent leakage rate measured at 0225 EDT was 3.9 gpm. The source of the leak will be identified when plant conditions allow containment entry. No elevated radiation levels were observed during this event. Drywell pressure is currently 0.0 psig. Unit 1 is in Mode 4. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser), NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5395525 March 2019 11:14:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 0402 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on March 25, 2019, an actuation of the four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) occurred. At the time of the event, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at approximately 100% power and Unit 2 was in Mode 4 at 0% power. Unit 2 was in the process of aligning the electrical distribution system to power the emergency buses via the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) in accordance with plant procedures. It was determined that a fault occurred on the power path between the 230 KV switchyard and the UAT. This caused a main generator differential lockout relay to actuate; thereby starting the EDGs. All emergency buses remained energized from offsite power via the Startup Auxiliary Transformer and, therefore, the EDGs did not tie to their respective buses. The EDGs responded per design to this event. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in valid actuation of the EDGs. Due to the shared configuration of the Brunswick electrical system, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are affected. The Unit 2 main generator lockout was reset and the EDGs have been restored to standby condition. Troubleshooting activities to determine the cause of the fault are in progress. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 539115 March 2019 12:46:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 05:35 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on March 5, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0% power, an actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System occurred during hydrolazing of the reactor water level variable leg instrumentation line nozzle N011B in the reactor cavity. The hydrolazing activity caused low reactor water level to be sensed on Division II of the shutdown range level instrumentation. Per design, the low level 1 signal resulted in Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The Group 8 was reset and shutdown cooling was restored at approximately 05:45 EST. The safety significance of this event was minimal. Although there was a brief interruption of the shutdown cooling, the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling system operation was restored in approximately 10 minutes without extensive troubleshooting or maintenance, and remained operable. The RHR shutdown cooling system is not credited in any Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Chapter 6 or 15 accidents or transients. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5376230 November 2018 04:22:00CatawbaNRC Region 2

At 2300 EST on November 29, 2018 Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) requested offsite transport for treatment of a contractor to an offsite medical facility. Upon arrival of the offsite medical personnel, the individual was declared deceased at 2354 EST on November 29, 2018.

The fatality was not work-related and the individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area.

No news release by CNS is planned. Notifications are planned to the South Carolina Division of Occupational Safety and Health. This is a four hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.