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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 539093 March 2019 09:54:00North AnnaNRC Region 2At 0916 EST on March 3, 2019, North Anna Unit 2 declared a Notice of Unusual Event under Emergency Action Level HU 2.1 (fire in/or restricting access to any table H-1 area not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room alarm). At 0906 the control room received a heat sensor alarm for the Unit 2, Reactor Coolant Pump motor cube. The fire brigade was dispatched to the scene where they found no indication of fire, no smoke and no fire damage. There were no actuations associated with the alarm and no redundant indications of fire. There was no effect on plant equipment and no indications of RCS leaks. The site determined that the alarm was invalid and terminated the NOUE. Unit 2 is in a stable condition and in a normal electrical lineup. Offsite support was not requested. The NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local authorities have been notified by the licensee. Notified R2RA (Haney), DNRR (Evans), IRD MOC (Grant), R4RDO (Rose), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
ENS 539083 March 2019 00:13:00North AnnaNRC Region 2On March 2, 2019 at 2237 EST, North Anna Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped, while operating at approximately 12 percent power, due to degrading vacuum in the main condenser. The unit was in the process of a planned shutdown for refueling when condenser vacuum degraded to greater than 3.5 inches of mercury absolute. The operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized the unit in Mode 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. The reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There were no ESF system actuations. Decay heat is being removed by the Steam Generator Pressure Operated Relief valves. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. The Louisa County Administrator will be notified."
ENS 5375225 November 2018 02:47:00MillstoneNRC Region 1

EN Revision Text: LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE DUE TO DOOR FAILURE On 11/24/18 at 2015 EST, a loss of Control Room Envelope (CRE) was declared due to failure of the control room boundary door, 204-36-008. (Abnormal Operating Procedure 8588A Mitigating Actions for Control Boundary Breach was implemented). The door was repaired at 2030 EST, restoring CRE to operable (status). A mechanical failure of the control room door latch prevented the door from closing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 01/18/19 AT 1457 EST FROM GARY CLOSIUS TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

The purpose of this call is to retract a report made on November 25, 2018, NRC Event Number EN53752. NRC Event Report number EN53752 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) in which a control room envelope boundary door was discovered to not be able to fully close due to the latching mechanism being stuck in the extended position. The condition was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) via an 8-hour prompt report as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Upon further review, MPS2 determined that there was no loss of safety function. An engineering evaluation determined that even with the control room boundary door unable to be fully closed due to the latching mechanism being stuck in the extended position, control room air in-leakage would not have been sufficient to prevent the control room emergency ventilation system from performing its safety function. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number EN53752 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion has been provided to the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Carfang).

ENS 5374116 November 2018 05:16:00SurryNRC Region 2

On November 16, 2018 at 0202 EST, a potentially contaminated Dominion worker was transported offsite for medical attention. The individual was initially found unresponsive in a contaminated area. A partial survey was performed prior to the individual being transported offsite, and no contamination was found. The individual passed away in transit to the hospital. Follow-up surveys to verify no contamination are ongoing. A notification to OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) is planned. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to notification of an offsite organization and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) due to a potentially contaminated worker transported offsite. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ALAN BIALOWAS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1640 EST ON 11/16/2018 * * *

Follow-up radiological surveys were performed and determined that there was no contamination on the worker, response personnel, or ambulance. The Occupation Safety and Health Administration was notified on 11/16/18. No media release is planned. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Notified the R2DO (Sandal) and via E-mail the NRR EO (Miller) and IRD MOC (Gott).

ENS 5373612 November 2018 20:52:00SurryNRC Region 2On November 12, 2018, at 1636 EST, with Surry Unit 1 at 100 percent power and Surry Unit 2 defueled, the 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST) pilot wire lockout actuated during restoration of the 'C' RSST following transformer replacement. This resulted in electrical isolation of the 'C' RSST, the 'F' Transfer Bus, the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus, and the Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus. The #1 and #3 Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and loaded onto the 1H and 2J emergency buses, respectively, as designed. Operations entered the appropriate abnormal procedures and stabilized both units. This equipment operated as expected during the event. The Surry electrical distribution system was in an off-normal alignment to support 'C' RSST replacement with the dependable alternate power supply from Unit 2 station service backfeed supplying the 1H and 2J emergency buses. The 'C' RSST pilot wire lockout tripped and locked out the station service supply tie breaker to the 'F' Transfer Bus. The organization is reviewing the 'C' RSST pilot wire lockout and the required actions for recovery. Surry Unit 1 entered a 6-hour action statement to place the unit in Hot Shutdown due to this partial loss of offsite power. This clock was exited upon reset of the pilot wire lockout, restoring backfeed as a dependable offsite power source. Unit 1 remained at 100 percent power throughout the event. No radiological consequences resulted from this event. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to actuation of the #1 and #3 Emergency Diesel Generators. The NRC Resident was notified."
ENS 5369023 October 2018 15:43:00SurryNRC Region 2On October 23, 2018 at 1510 EDT, a notification to OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) was initiated due to a supplemental employee experiencing a non-work related medical event that resulted in the supplemental employee passing. When the issue was identified, the station first aid team responded to administer first aid. The supplemental employee was transported to a local hospital for additional medical support. Subsequent to the employee passing, a report was made to OSHA in accordance with federal requirements. This event is reportable to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) since another governmental agency was notified of this employer medical event. The supplemental employee was in a building within the owner controlled area and was not contaminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
ENS 5368823 October 2018 04:17:00MillstoneNRC Region 1On October 22, 2018 at 2241 hrs. EDT, a loss of Control Room Envelope (CRE) was declared due to failing to meet the requirements of (surveillance requirement) SR 4.7.6.1h during 72-month surveillance testing. Measured in-leakage exceeded the SR acceptance value. Abnormal Operating Procedure 2588A, 'Mitigating Actions for Control Room Envelope Boundary Breach', have been implemented. The licensee has notified Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, Connecticut dispatch, Waterford dispatch, and the NRC Resident Inspector of this event.
ENS 5366212 October 2018 01:14:00SurryNRC Region 2On 10/11/18 at 2304, with both Surry Units at 100% power, the 'A' Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST) tripped on a pilot wire lockout. This resulted in electrical isolation of the 'A' RSST, the 'D' Transfer Bus and the Unit 1 'J' Emergency Bus. The #3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started and loaded on the Emergency Bus, as designed. Operations entered the appropriate Abnormal Procedures and stabilized the unit. All equipment operated as expected during the event. A report of a flash at the 'A' RSST was received (at approximately the time of the initiating event) but there were no reports of visible damage, smoke or fire from the RSST or any associated breakers on subsequent investigation. The #3 EDG is running with normal parameters. There was heavy wind/rain in the area associated with Tropical Storm Michael. All other electrical distribution systems are in a normal alignment. The organization is staffing to evaluate the lockout and required actions for recovery. No radiological consequences resulted from this event. This event is being reported IAW (in accordance with) 10 CFR 50.52(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the actuation of the #3 EDG. The NRC Resident (Inspector) was notified"
ENS 535793 September 2018 15:20:00North AnnaNRC Region 2

At 1045 (EDT) on 9/3/18, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 at 100% power, off-site power feed to the 'A' Reserve Station Transformer was lost which resulted in a loss of power to Unit 1'J' Emergency Bus. As a result of the power loss, the 1'J' Emergency Diesel Generator started as designed and restored power to the Emergency Bus. During this event, the Unit 1 'A' Charging Pump, 1-CH-P-1A automatically started as designed due to the loss of power event.

The valid actuation of these ESF (Engineered Safety Features) components due to the loss of power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A).

The Unit 1 'J' Emergency bus off-site power source was restored via the Unit 2 'B' Station Service bus and the 1 'J' Emergency Diesel was secured and returned to Automatic. The Unit 1 'A' Charging pump has been stopped and returned to Automatic. Both Units are in a stable condition. The apparent cause for the loss of power appears to be a bird strike to the 'A' RSST (Reserve Station Service Transformer) Overhead Cable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 535332 August 2018 13:09:00MillstoneNRC Region 1The following was received via telephone and email notification from Millstone Power Station: Millstone Power Station Unit 3, identified that the underground pipe to the Condensate Surge Tank had leaked greater than 100 gallons of water that included trace amounts of tritium to the ground. The effected piping is inside the protected area and has been isolated and drained. No tritium has been detected in any monitoring wells outside of the Protected Area. There is no threat to employees or the public or impact to drinking water. The Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, and the towns of Waterford and East Lyme were notified at approximately 1300 (EDT) on August 2, 2018. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5342827 May 2018 00:40:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CE
Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop
County and state governments were notified due to the spurious actuation of a single emergency notification siren located in New London County in the Town of Lyme. The siren was silenced. If required, alternate notification of the public in the area will be through local Emergency Operations Center route alerting. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5332812 April 2018 17:36:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1148 EDT on April 12, 2018, a 16.2 ounce bottle of Kombucha tea was found in a small refrigerator in the Administration Building inside the Protected Area. The bottle was found to have a small amount missing from the contents. Kombucha tea is a fermented tea containing trace amounts of alcohol, and is legally sold without restrictions. Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut had previously notified its workforce that Kombucha tea was prohibited from being consumed or carried onsite. The owner has not yet been determined. This is considered an alcoholic beverage and is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 26.719 as a 24 hour report. The NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Connecticut, and local authorities have been notified.
ENS 5326818 March 2018 12:34:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 2007 (EDT) on 3/17/18, a security Officer reported finding a container of herbal tea (Kombucha) on a platform in the Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear Room, which is located inside the Protected Area. Kombucha tea is a fermented tea containing trace amounts of alcohol, and is legally sold without restrictions. Dominion had previously notified its workforce that Kombucha tea was prohibited from being consumed or carried on-site. This is considered an alcoholic beverage and is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 26.719. The individual who brought the beverage on-site was identified and escorted out of the Protected Area. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will also be contacting the County Administrator for Louisa County, Virginia.
ENS 5322925 February 2018 11:24:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed employee was found in violation of the sites Fitness for Duty Policy. The employee's access authorization to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5321014 February 2018 18:04:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5317017 January 2018 15:08:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0952 EST on 01/17/2018 with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100 percent, the normal supply breaker to the Unit 1J Emergency Bus tripped open due to an under-voltage condition when the potential transformer fuses were inadvertently disconnected. This resulted in a loss of power to the Unit 1J Emergency Bus from its normal off-site power supply. Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started on an under-voltage signal and loaded onto the Unit 1J Emergency Bus, as designed. All equipment performed as expected during the event and there were no unexplained occurrences. Maintenance has verified the fuses have been reconnected and at 1221 EST, off-site power was restored to Unit 1J Emergency Bus. At 1254 EST Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator was secured in accordance with Station Operating procedures. All Electrical distribution systems have been restored to a normal alignment. There were no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the auto start of Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 531077 December 2017 15:03:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis non-emergency notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), any event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies has been made. Dominion Energy is in the process of informing the Virginia Department of Health, Department of Environmental Quality, Department of Emergency Management, and the Surry County Administrator of recent groundwater monitoring results at Surry Power Station in accordance with NEI 07-07, Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI). On December 6, 2017 at 1138 EST, Surry Power Station received analysis results of recent samples from the on-site groundwater monitoring program. As part of the program, 10 new groundwater monitoring wells were recently placed in service within the Protected Area to provide early detection, to better define the site's hydrology, and if necessary, to mitigate any potential leaks. The analysis results from one of the new wells indicated tritium activity level above the GPI communication threshold. Samples were re-analyzed, resulting in different values, with the highest result of 59,300 picoCuries per liter. Since each result was above the voluntary reporting threshold, Surry stakeholder communication was implemented in accordance with the NEI GPI Voluntary Communication Protocol, Criterion 2.2. There are no known active leaks at this location; however, Dominion Energy is continuing to investigate the source of the tritium and the reason for the variability in the sample results. Tritium was not detected in the on-site monitoring locations outside of the Protected Area. No tritium has been detected in the on-site and off-site drinking water wells. Since the activity is contained within the site restricted area, the health and safety of on-site personnel and members of the public are not affected. A 30-day report will be submitted to the NRC in accordance with NEI 07-07. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 530059 October 2017 14:23:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

While troubleshooting a hydrogen differential pressure gauge, operators found a hydrogen concentration greater than the lower explosive limit (4% hydrogen concentration). The licensee evacuated the turbine building. The licensee is ventilating the area to allow personnel access to isolate and repair the leak. The plant Fire Brigade is on standby. This event was declared for GU-2: release of toxic or flammable gas. The main generator pressure and hydrogen concentration are stable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1630 EDT ON 10/9/2017 FROM NORMAN KUZEL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The unusual event was terminated at 1617 EDT because the leak was isolated and the hydrogen concentration in the Hydrogen Control Cabinet was zero percent. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Jackson), IRD MOC (Stapleton), NRR (King), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 529486 September 2017 14:11:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopInspection of an underground pipe used to discharge the contents of the Unit 3 Condensate Polishing Facility in accordance with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Discharge Permit identified the potential for small amounts of water containing tritium and Secondary chemicals to be released to the ground within the plant Protected Area. The water met all permit limits for discharge to the normal discharge point. Groundwater tritium levels were well below reportable limits. The line has been removed from service. The Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection was notified at 1115 (EDT) on September 6, 2017. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.
ENS 5290415 August 2017 08:07:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CE

On August 15, 2017 at 0748 EDT, an Unusual Event was declared at Millstone Unit 2 due to a fire alarm indication in containment that was unable to be verified extinguished within 15 minutes. Current containment parameters do not indicate an actual fire. A containment entry is planned to verify that there is no fire. Unit 2 continues at 100% power. Unit 3 was unaffected. The NRC remains in Normal mode. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC. Notified FEMA National Watch and Nuclear SSA via E-mail.

  • * * UPDATE FROM TODD STRINGFELLOW TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0953 EDT ON 8/15/2017 * * *

At 0951 EDT, the Unusual Event was terminated. No signs of an actual fire were present upon containment entry. All alarms are cleared and they are investigating the cause of the alarm. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies. Notified R1DO (Gray), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD (Gott). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC. Notified FEMA National Watch and Nuclear SSA via E-mail.

ENS 528949 August 2017 17:35:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 8/9/17, a Unit 1 containment entry was made in order to investigate increased Reactor Coolant System (RCS) unidentified leakage. The team noted a through-wall leak from the tubing/socket weld area of 'C' Hot Leg Sample Valve. The sample valve and RCS pressure boundary were declared inoperable, and a 6-hour action statement to place Unit 1 in Hot Shutdown was entered at 1338 (EDT) hours as required by Technical Specification 3.1.C.3. At 1606 (EDT) hours on 8/9/17, Unit 1 shutdown was commenced, and at 1637 (EDT), Unit 1 was at Hot Shutdown. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as a result of power reduction required by Technical Specifications. Further, this report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified of this event and is on site. There was no radiation release associated with this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events.
ENS 5263924 March 2017 20:25:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 03/24/2017 at approximately 1500 hours (EDT), a hydraulic line on vendor supplied cleaning equipment failed and leaked approximately 8 gallons of 65% glycol solution into the Surry Power Station Unit 2 D intake bay. Since the intake bay communicates with the James River, the State of Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) was notified of the discharge at 2000 hours. The glycol solution is water soluble and dispersed quickly. All work stopped while the issue is being investigated and corrective actions implemented. No sheen was observed and no impact to state waters is expected to result from this issue. This non-emergency notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), any event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies has been made. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5250120 January 2017 16:02:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0835 (EST) on January 20, 2017, at Millstone Power Station Unit 3, subsequent to personnel passage through a door in the auxiliary building, the door failed rendering it unable to completely close. At this time, in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.6.2 "Secondary Containment," the Shift Manager declared the secondary containment inoperable. The door was repaired and the door completely closed at 1256 (EST) on January 20, 2017, and secondary containment was declared operable. Since Secondary Containment was rendered inoperable, Dominion is reporting that this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5243815 December 2016 13:50:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On 12/14/16 at 1206 (EST), 0-PT-89.9K (underground fuel-oil piping pressure test), was performed UNSAT after a failed attempt to maintain pressure in the supply line to the Unit 2 'H' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Day Tank. The exact source of the leakage is unknown at this time but is reasonable to believe some fuel oil was released underground. The associated Fuel Oil line is currently tagged out and isolated. This condition is reportable to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (VA DEQ) as part of the Underground Storage Tank Program. Pressure tasting of the other EDG fuel oil supply lines has been previously completed satisfactorily. The 2H EDG remains Operable as the redundant fuel oil transfer pump and its fuel oil piping are Operable and capable of maintaining adequate day tank level. The VA DEQ was notified of this condition at 1130 (EST) on 12/15/16. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify Louisa County.

  • * * UPDATE ON 12/28/16 AT 1659 EST FROM JAY LEBERSTIEN TO DONG PARK * * *

This is a follow-up report to Event Number 52438, made on 12/15/2016, regarding offsite notification to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality for potential fuel oil leakage from the supply line to the Unit 2H Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Day Tank. During investigation of the potential fuel oil leak from the 2HB EDG Day Tank supply line (as previously reported in EN 52438), the 2HA fuel oil line, which runs close to the 2HB line, was disturbed and began to leak a mist of fuel oil. The fuel oil was contained in the area and was being cleaned via vacuum truck as it was leaking. Personnel at the scene noted the soil was not contaminated with fuel oil initially and saw the leak start on 2HA line. It has been estimated that less than one gallon of fuel oil was released to the surrounding soil during troubleshooting of the leak. The fuel oil was immediately vacuumed. The 2HA line was isolated and the leakage was stopped. The 2HA line is to be repaired and tested. The 2H EDG remains available, however, it is considered inoperable at this time. Investigation of the 2HB fuel oil line continues. The condition of the 2HA fuel oil line was reported to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (VA DEQ) as part of the Underground Storage Tank Program on 12/28/16. Therefore, this event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify Louisa County. Notified R2DO (Rose).

ENS 522929 October 2016 06:09:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopSurry Unit 2 reactor automatically tripped at 0254 hours on 10/09/2016, due to a Main Generator Differential Lockout Turbine Trip. The cause of the generator differential lockout is under investigation at this time. Reactor Coolant System temperature is currently being maintained at 547 degrees Fahrenheit on the main steam dump valves. All three Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps automatically started as designed on Low-Low Steam Generator Water Level following the trip. Auxiliary feedwater pumps have since been secured and Main Feedwater is in use. All systems operated as required. The source range nuclear instruments had to be manually reinstated following the reactor trip due to indications of undercompensation on Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument channel N-36. Off site power remains available. There is no impact on Surry Unit 1. This notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4-hour notification of Reactor Protection System activation and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for 8-hour notification of automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and is responding to the site. There were no radiation releases, personnel injuries, or contamination events due to this event. All control rods fully inserted. Secondary reliefs lifted and reseated as expected following a reactor trip from 100% power.
ENS 5216911 August 2016 11:09:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CEReactor operators manually tripped the reactor due to the loss of two out of four circulating water pumps which caused a drop in condenser vacuum. The trip was uncomplicated. The reactor is shutdown and stable with decay heat removal via steam dumps to the condenser. The cause of the circulating water pump trips is currently unknown, but initial indications are that the pumps tripped due to a lightning strike that caused an electrical perturbation. The reactor will remain shutdown while the licensee investigates the cause. Unit 3 was not affected. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State and Local governments.
ENS 5213730 July 2016 15:17:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn July 30, 2016 at 1152 hours (EDT) following a containment walkdown to investigate an increase in RCS unidentified leakage to 0.15 gpm, a leak was identified on the seal return line from 2-RC-P-1C, 'C' Reactor Coolant Pump. The source of the leakage cannot be isolated and is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage. (Technical Specification) LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B for the existence of pressure boundary leakage was entered. Technical Requirement TR 3.4.6, ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Components is also applicable. Unit 2 is projected to be taken to Mode 5 for repair. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) for 'the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications' and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for 'any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear plant including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.' The licensee will be notifying the Louisa County Administrator and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5192915 May 2016 07:08:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 0638 EDT on 5/15/2016, an Unusual Event (EAL GU.2) was declared on Millstone Unit 3 due to a Main Generator hydrogen gas leak into the Turbine Building. At 0645 EDT, operators manually tripped the reactor. All rods inserted. All systems functioned as expected following the reactor trip. Operators are currently venting the remaining hydrogen from the generator through the normal vent path. There is no safety related equipment out-of-service. The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up. All Emergency Diesel Generators are available. The licensee notified the State of Connecticut and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, and DHS NICC Watch Officer. Notified via E-mail FEMA National Watch Center and NuclearSSA.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MIKE CICCONE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1044 EDT ON 5/15/16 * * *

At 0949 EDT, the licensee terminated the Unusual Event. At 0645 EDT on 5/15/16, a manual reactor trip was initiated at Millstone Unit 3 due to a hydrogen leak from the main generator. As expected, Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) initiated on the reactor trip. The trip was uncomplicated and the plant is currently in Mode 3 with a normal electric lineup and decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser. The cause of the hydrogen leakage is under investigation. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS actuation while critical, and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) - valid specified system actuation. The licensee has notified Waterford Township, the State of Connecticut and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Burritt), NRR ET (McDermott), NRR EO (Morris), IRD (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and NuclearSSA (email).

ENS 5189230 April 2016 00:48:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 2214 (EDT) on 4/29/16, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100 (percent) power, the North Anna 34.5 kV Bus 5, off site power feed to the 'A' Reserve Station Service Transformer, was lost which resulted in the loss of power to the Unit 1 'J' Emergency Bus. Loss of Bus 5 is still undergoing investigation. As a result of the power loss, the 1J Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started as designed and restored power to the 1J Emergency bus. During the event, the Unit 1 'A' Charging Pump (1-CH-P-1A) automatically started as designed due to the loss of power event. The valid actuation of these ESF components due to the loss of electrical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The Unit 1 'J' Emergency Bus off-site power source was restored to service and the 1J Emergency Diesel Generator was secured and returned to automatic. Restoration of offsite power to Operable is complete. The Unit 1 'A' Charging Pump has been secured and returned to automatic. Both units are currently stable. An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the Bus 5 loss of power. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5188928 April 2016 00:15:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CEOn April 27, 2016 at 20:07 (EDT), a high energy line break (HELB) door between the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump and the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump rooms was discovered open and unattended. In the event of a HELB, this condition could have rendered both trains of auxiliary feedwater inoperable. The boundary was not operable for approximately 1 hour. Upon discovery, the door was closed restoring the boundary. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (B) Remove residual heat; and (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The Licensee notified the Connecticut DEEP and Waterford Dispatch.
ENS 518609 April 2016 23:14:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopDuring pre-planned surveillance testing of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS), an issue was found affecting the Secondary Containment boundary. Millstone Unit 3 is being moved to Mode 5 for a refuel outage where investigation and repairs will be made. This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function for systems or structures to control the release of radioactive material, and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The surveillance testing was being performed while Millstone 3 was being removed from service for an upcoming Refueling Outage. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and Local authorities.
ENS 5168225 January 2016 03:21:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0147 EST on 1/25/16, the 'B' Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) tripped offline. This caused a reactor trip on low coolant flow. As expected, the Aux Feedwater System (AFW) initiated on the reactor trip. The trip was uncomplicated and the plant is currently shutdown in Mode 3 with a normal electrical lineup and decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser. The cause of the 'B' RCP trip is under investigation. A containment entry is planned for dayshift on 1/25/16 to inspect and troubleshoot the 'B' RCP. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5167823 January 2016 19:48:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1703 (EST) on 1/23/16, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% power, the North Anna 34.5 kv Bus 3, off-site power feed to the 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer, was lost which resulted in the loss of power to the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus and the Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus. Loss of 34.5kV Bus 3 resulted from feeder breaker L102 opening. As a result of the power loss, the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator and the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started as designed and restored power to the associated emergency bus. During this event, the Unit 1 'B' Charging Pump, 1-CH-P-18 automatically started as designed due to the loss of power event. The valid actuation of these ESF components due to the loss of electrical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). The Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus off-site power source was restored to service and the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator was secured and returned to Automatic. The Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus power feed continues to be from the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator. Restoration of offsite power to operable status is currently being pursued. The Unit 1 'B' Charging Pump has been secured and returned to automatic. Both units are in a stable condition. An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the L102 feeder breaker opening resulting in the 34.5 kv Bus 3 loss of power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
ENS 516322 January 2016 23:56:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopMillstone Unit 3 reported a non spill related environmental fish kill event with greater than 300 fish found in the trash basket. The cause of the fish kill is unknown at this time. The type of fish reported was Atlantic Menhaden. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5156123 November 2015 17:00:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5155720 November 2015 15:34:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 0823 EST on 11/17/2015, the Unit 1 'A' Vent Stack radiation monitor, 1-VG-RI-179, was declared non-functional due to a faulty heat trace circuit. Compensatory measure to perform grab samples every 6 hours was implemented. At 0823 EST on 11/20/2015, the Unit 1 'A' Vent Stack radiation monitor, 1-VG-RI-179, had been out-of-service for 72 hours. The loss of 1-VG-RI-179 is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. Corrective actions continue to be pursued to restore 1-VG-Ri-179 to functional status. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PATRICK FRENCH TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0931 EST ON 11/22/15 * * *

The Unit 1 'A' Vent Stack radiation monitor, 1-VG-RI-179, was returned to service at 1440 EST on 11/21/15. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ernstes).

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MICHAEL WHALEN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1509 EST ON 1/11/2016 * * *

The purpose of this report is to retract the event notification report made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) on November 20, 2015 at 1534 EST (EN# 51557). After further review it has been determined that the performance of grab samples is an approved back-up method for radiological assessment capabilities as described in the North Anna Emergency Plan implementing procedure EPIP-4.24 Gaseous Effluent Sampling During Emergency. During non-emergencies, VPAP-2103N Offsite Dose Calculation Manual governs grab sampling and is tracked by Operations using 1-LOG-14 Non-Routine Surveillance Log. As such, a loss of radiological assessment capability did not exist and the ability to assess EAL RU1.4 was not affected. This is consistent with NUREG 1022, Rev.3, Supplement 1 and NEI 13-01, Rev. 0. The action was cleared at 1440 hours on 11/21/15 and the Unit 1 'A' Vent Stack radiation monitor, 1-VG-RI-179, was returned to functional status. The NRC Senior Resident lnspector has been informed of this event notification retraction. Notified R2DO (Masters).

ENS 515218 November 2015 02:55:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CEDuring power ascension following refueling outage, a decreasing oil level in the 'C' Reactor Coolant Pump was noted. When the oil level reached 69 percent, with the reactor at approximately 56 percent rated thermal power, per plant procedure, a rapid downpower was initiated which brought the plant to approximately 15 percent power and a manual reactor trip was initiated at that point. The reactor trip was uncomplicated and all plant equipment responded as expected. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 515134 November 2015 11:56:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

At 1133 EST on 11/4/15, an Alert was declared due to a fire in the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) enclosure. Fire caused damage to the safety related EDG and was declared inoperable. The fire is out, and off-site assistance was not necessary. A fire watch has been stationed, and no personnel injuries were reported. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA EOC, FEMA NWC (via email), FDA EOC (via email) and Nuclear SSA (via email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/4/15 AT 1449 EST FROM HERB SEARLE TO DONG PARK * * *

At 1446 EST on 11/4/15, Millstone Unit 3 terminated the Alert declaration following satisfactory atmospheric samples at the site boundary and notifying the State of Connecticut. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Rogge), NRR EO (Morris), and IRD (Grant). Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA EOC, FEMA NWC (via email), FDA EOC (via email) and Nuclear SSA (via email).

ENS 5146713 October 2015 21:20:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopSurry Unit 1 Reactor automatically tripped at 1815 hours (EDT) on 10/13/2015 due to a Generator Differential Lockout Turbine trip. The cause of the Generator Differential Lockout is under investigation at this time. Reactor Coolant System is currently being maintained at 548 degrees F on the Steam Generator PORVs due to closing Main Steam Trip Valves manually. All three Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started automatically as designed on Low-Low Steam Generator Water Level following the trip. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps have since been secured and Main Feedwater is in use. All systems operated as required. Off-site power remains available. There is no impact on Surry Unit 2. This notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4 hour notification of Reactor Protection System activation and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for 8 hour notification of automatic actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and is on site. There were no radiation releases, personnel injuries, or contamination events due to this event. All control rods fully inserted during the reactor trip. The Main Steam Trip Valves were shut due to excessive cooldown. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. There is no steam generator tube leakage.
ENS 514608 October 2015 18:23:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 2147 EDT on October 7, 2015, a high energy line break (HELB) door between the Turbine Building (TB) and the safety related Emergency Switchgear Room (ESGR) was determined to be unlatched. The door was immediately closed (latched). Investigation determined the door was unlatched for approximately 47 minutes. At 1617 EDT on October 8, 2015, it was determined the Unit 2 ESGR was outside of the design analysis for a Unit 1 HELB. A high energy line break in the TB with the door open could result in equipment in the Unit 2 ESGR experiencing high temperature, pressure, or humidity beyond conditions analyzed for equipment qualification which has the potential to render redundant safety-related equipment inoperable. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) & (B) & (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of safety functions to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat, and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 514484 October 2015 10:03:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CE

At 0932 EDT on 10/4/15, the licensee declared an Unusual Event for identified RCS (Reactor Coolant System) leakage exceeding 25 gallons per minute (GPM), per EAL BU2, due to a relief valve leaking on the Shutdown Cooling System common header. The RCS leakage was within the capacity of the Charging System. At 0954 EDT the RCS leakage was terminated by isolating the Shutdown Cooling System. The cause of the relief valve failure is unknown and under investigation. The RCS cooldown was terminated and both RCS loops were restored to service for decay heat removal using both Steam Generators and the Main Condenser. Current RCS temperature is 248 degrees F with RCS pressure at 248 psig. All offsite power and EDGs (Emergency Diesel Generators) are available. The licensee intends to repair the relief valve to resume the RCS cooldown using the shutdown cooling system.. The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, DHS NICC, FEMA, and Nuclear SSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1115 EDT ON 10/04/15 FROM FRED PERKINS TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1100 EDT, based on verification that the RCS leakage was stopped. The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Bower), NRR EO (Morris), and IRD (Gott). Notified DHS SWO, DHS NICC, FEMA, and Nuclear SSA via email.

ENS 5140217 September 2015 00:36:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopWhile performing degraded voltage/under voltage Instrumentation & Control testing with both Units at 100%, the Unit 2 'H' Emergency Bus was lost when an inadvertent under voltage matrix was satisfied. The #2 Emergency Diesel Generator auto-started and assumed the 2H Emergency Bus as designed. The cause of the under voltage matrix coincidence is currently being investigated by station personnel. All testing activities have been terminated and recovery efforts are in progress in accordance with station procedures. Current status is both Units stable at 100% with the #2 Emergency Diesel Generator carrying the 2H Emergency Bus. The loss of the bus places the Unit in a 7-day action statement for the loss of offsite power to the 2H bus and a 14-day action statement for the auxiliary feed cross tie to Unit 1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5135126 August 2015 21:44:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA small brush fire occurred adjacent to an AMTRAK railroad right of way that passes through the Millstone Power Station owner controlled area, due to a downed tree branch that knocked down an AMTRAK electrified power line. The fire is outside the protected area of the site, and poses no public hazard or threat to building or structures. Outside assistance has been requested. Waterford Fire Department and AMTRAK have responded, and have eliminated the source and extinguished the fire. This report is being made pursuant of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). There is no radioactive release associated with this event. Dominion may respond to public inquiry, but no press release is planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Connecticut State Department of Energy and Environmental Protection and Waterford Dispatch were notified.
ENS 5126426 July 2015 22:08:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CEThe Millstone Site Rad Monitor, RM-8169, has failed and was declared NOT FUNCTIONAL at 2025 (EDT) on July 26, 2015. This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off-site response capability, or off-site communication capability. I&C (Instrumentation and Control) is developing a troubleshooting and repair plan. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, and the City of Waterford Dispatch. The loss of this radiation monitor is considered a major loss of assessment capability since it is used in Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification and there is no compensatory measure available.
ENS 5124421 July 2015 07:40:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopUnit 2 Reactor automatically tripped during Unit start up following a maintenance outage. The first indication of the reactor trip was the annunciator Reactor Trip by Turbine Trip. There were no complications following the trip and Unit 2 is stable at Hot Shut Down. Decay Heat Removal is being maintained by dumping steam to the Main Condenser. Steam Generator water level is being maintained by the Main Feedwater system. At the time of the Reactor Trip, Overspeed Protection Circuitry (OPC) Test was being performed on the Unit 2 Main Turbine. The SOV Turbine Trip annunciator was received. The cause of the reactor trip is under investigation. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4-hour notification of Reactor Protection System activation. The Plant responded as expected for the trip. The NRC resident has been notified of the event. There was no radiation release due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5118728 June 2015 11:24:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CE

During Security checks of Control Room doors, a boundary door was found not latched. This door is capable of being manually closed and latched. The door was in this condition for 4 hours and 25 minutes. The door is currently closed and latched. This is being reported as it could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A condition report has been written and the door is posted to require manual checks to ensure it is latched until the door closing mechanism is repaired.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM THOMAS CLEARY TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/8/2015 AT 1314 EDT * * *

Event Report number 51187 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) in which a control room environmental boundary door was found unlatched. This was reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Upon further review, MPS2 has concluded that there was no loss of safety function, because even with the control room boundary door unlatched, the control room emergency ventilation system would have been able to perform its safety function during accident conditions. The MPS2 control room is pressure neutral and the hydraulic door closure mechanism was verified adequate to ensure the door would close and remain closed during accident conditions (even though it was not latching). Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number 51187 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion will be provided to the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Cahill).

ENS 5116117 June 2015 04:15:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

The B train of the service water effluent radiation monitor failed at 2343 EDT and is being repaired. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 07/01/2015 AT 1411 EDT FROM THOMAS CLEARY TO STEVEN VITTO * * *

The purpose of this call is to retract a report made on June 17, 2015, NRC Event Number 51161. Event Report number 51161 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) in which a service water radiation monitor failed, was taken out of service for repair and was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. Upon further review, MPS3 has concluded that the subject radiation monitor is not utilized for emergency assessment capability. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number 51161 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion will be provided to the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO(Dimitriadis) have been notified.

ENS 5114911 June 2015 22:28:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CE

During containment spray pump inservice testing the minimum flow recirculation line recorded negative flow indicating reverse flow in the line. After the troubleshooting, it was determined that a degraded minimum flow check valve was allowing a path to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) for certain post loss of coolant accident (LOCA) conditions. The minimum flow isolation has been closed to eliminate the path. No actuation occurred during this time. The NRC Resident Inspector, Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (DEEP) Hartford, and Watertown Dispatch have been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM TOM CLEARY TO STEVEN VITTO ON 06/16/15 AT 1349 EDT * * *

The purpose of this call is to correct the record for the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) event report provided on June 11, 2015. Event report number 51149 states: 'During containment spray pump inservice testing ...' The condition of the degraded containment spray flow check valve was identified: 'During high pressure safety injection pump inservice testing...'." Notified R1DO (Bickett)

  • * * UPDATE FROM WILLIAM McCOLLUM TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1724 EDT ON 7/10/15 * * *

The purpose of this call is to update the record for the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) event report provided on June 11, 2015. During subsequent investigation, it has been determined that a second release path may have existed through ECCS system relief valves under certain post LOCA conditions as a result of the degraded check valve described in the original report. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cahill).

ENS 510353 May 2015 00:05:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopLoss of assessment capability due to unplanned removal from service of a radiation monitor due to process flow monitor indication failing hi. The normal and hi range ventilation vent process radiation monitors (3HVR*RE10A/B are out of service. This condition was discovered during control room rounds. The condition is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Compensatory measures are in place. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable State and Local authorities.
ENS 509462 April 2015 06:55:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn April 2, 2015 at 0426 EDT, the Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped while operating at 100 percent power due to a failure of the main generator voltage regulator. This also resulted in a turbine trip. The operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized the unit in Mode 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. This reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated as designed and provided makeup flow to the steam generators. The automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were subsequently secured and returned to automatic. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. The Louisa County Administrator will be notified. There was no effect on Unit 2 as a result of this trip.