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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5108025 February 2020 09:04:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At approximately 1130 EDT on May 19, 2015, Fermi-2 determined that a sanitary sewer system leak had occurred from underground lines beneath the parking lot near Warehouse E. Some of the sewage entered the storm sewer. The leak has been secured. A local sanitary contractor is currently responding to the site to clean the affected areas. The duration and quantity of the spill is unknown, however, current estimates of the sewage entering the storm sewer are less than 200 gallons. Reports to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), the local health department and the local news media are required in accordance with Michigan Act 451, Public Acts of 1994, as amended, Part 31, Section 342.3112a. Since reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency, and therefore is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b )(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The release was onsite only and did not reach navigable waters.
ENS 5447413 January 2020 15:08:00FermiNRC Region 3A non-licensed contract employee supervisor tested positive for alcohol at another facility. The employee's access to Fermi 2 has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5445218 December 2019 15:27:00FermiNRC Region 3On December 18, 2019, at 0908 EST, with the East and Center Reactor Building HVAC (RBHVAC) trains in service, secondary containment pressure degraded to the point where the Technical Specification (TS) requirement for secondary containment pressure was not met and secondary containment was declared inoperable. Secondary containment pressure did not meet the TS required limit for approximately four minutes. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.064 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) by starting Division 1 of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS). Secondary containment was declared Operable at 0912 EST. A modulating damper associated with the Center train of RBHVAC was identified as not properly controlling; an investigation is in progress. RBHVAC was manually secured to support problem identification and resolution. Secondary containment pressure is currently stable with Division 1 SGTS in service. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5429325 September 2019 15:30:00FermiNRC Region 3

At 1203 EDT, on September 25, 2019, during a Division 2 Emergency Equipment Service Water (EESW) pump and valve surveillance test, the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) Temperature Control Valve was found to be approximately 80 percent open rather than in its required full open position during fail safe testing. The Division 2 EESW system is required to support operability of the Division 2 EECW system. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. An investigation is underway into the cause of the failure. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee is in 72-hour shutdown action statement.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 11/21/19 AT 1547 EST FROM PAUL ANGOVE TO BRIAN LIN * * *

Subsequent engineering evaluation has determined that the EECW TCV was capable of passing sufficient flow to perform its design basis functions, including supporting the HPCI room cooler, while approximately 80% open. Therefore, HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The event did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). EN 54293 is retracted and no Licensee Event Report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Cameron).

ENS 5416816 July 2019 17:34:00FermiNRC Region 3At 1445 EDT, on 7/16/2019, during routine maintenance activities on the sanitary sewage system, a leak from an overflow line to a parking lot was discovered. The total amount leaked is estimated to be 20 gallons. Approximately 2 gallons reached gravel in an excavated section of the parking lot. A local sanitary contractor is currently responding to the site to clean the affected areas. The cause of the leak is under investigation. As a result of some of the sewage reaching gravel, environmental reports are being made to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), the Monroe County Health Department, and the local news media. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5409227 May 2019 11:53:00FermiNRC Region 3On May 27, 2019 at 0940 EDT, a portable chemical toilet was found tipped over. Approximately one gallon of contents spilled to the gravel only and did not reach any waterways or storm drains. Cleanup efforts are in progress. A notification to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality and local health department is required, as well as a press release. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5388319 February 2019 15:19:00FermiNRC Region 3On February 19, 2019, at 1307 EST, with the reactor at 100 percent Core Thermal Power and steady state conditions, plant personnel notified the Main Control Room that both doors in the Secondary Containment Airlock on the Reactor Building Fifth Floor were opened simultaneously for a period of approximately five minutes (i.e., from 1253 to 1258 EST). The failure of this interlock, which is intended to prevent both doors from being opened simultaneously, resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 not being met. The maximum Secondary Containment pressure observed during that time remained within TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring Secondary Containment inoperable as a result of not meeting TS SR 3.6.4.1.3 is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The repair to the failed interlock is in progress. As a compensatory measure signs are posted on the doors to notify personnel to not access the Reactor Building via those doors.
ENS 5383016 January 2019 18:38:00FermiNRC Region 3At 0900 EST on 01/16/2019, it was discovered that a licensee manager intentionally failed to re-approve the list of individuals granted unescorted access to verify each individual was subject to a behavioral observation program. Compensatory actions have been taken in response to this event. Personnel affected have had their access authorization suspended. This is reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(3) as an intentional act that casts doubt on the integrity of the Fitness-For-Duty program. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5382211 January 2019 10:07:00FermiNRC Region 3

EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY A non-licensed employee disclosed that he had previously used illegal drugs. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM ETHAN HAUSER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1456 EDT ON 5/21/2019 * * *

The following event notifications are retracted: EN 53822 reported on 1/11/2019 and EN 53982 reported on 4/5/2019. Subsequent to the initial notification, further investigation revealed that no new information was discovered that would meet the criteria for reporting under RG 5.62 or NUREG-1304. Further the events were also determined to be limited to an act of personal deception by those applying for unescorted access, without intent to commit or cause events identified in paragraphs I (a) and (d) of Appendix G to Part 73, and is not a programmatic breakdown. Based on this information, and consistent with the NRC memorandum dated May 19, 1995, 'Access Authorization Reportability and Enforcement Issues,' this event does not meet the threshold for reporting. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Cameron) and via E-mail the FFD E-mail group.

ENS 538111 January 2019 11:02:00FermiNRC Region 3On January 1, 2019 at approximately 0454 EST, while performing planned maintenance activities on the Feedwater Distributed Control System (FW DCS), it was discovered that the automatic trip instrumentation of the Gland Seal Exhauster (GSE) was inoperable. The automatic GSE trip is assumed in the safety analysis for the Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA) and is required when Thermal Power is less than or equal to 10%. The automatic trip function of the GSE was inoperable for 1 minute, 19 seconds. No Control Rod movement occurred while the automatic trip of the GSE was inoperable. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees and there was no radiological release. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 537724 December 2018 13:35:00FermiNRC Region 3

EN Revision Text: HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO MECHANICAL DRAFT COOLING TOWER FAN BRAKE INVERTER FAILURE At 0935 EST on December 4, 2018, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation into why the Division 2 MDCT fan over speed brake inverter failed is in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Fermi 2 is in a 14-day LCO for inoperability of HPCI and a 72-hour LCO for UHS inoperability.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 1/30/19 AT 1605 EST FROM CHRIS ROBINSON TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract EN 53772 made on December 4, 2018. Subsequent to the initial notification, the event and site Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed further. An evaluation determined that TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.9 for barriers could be applied to the MDCT fan brakes. As a result of applying TS LCO 3.0.9 to the MDCT fan brakes, it was not necessary to declare the UHS inoperable. With the Division 2 UHS operable on December 4, 2018, the HPCI system was also operable. With HPCI operable, there was no event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Therefore, EN 53772 is retracted and no Licensee Event Report (LER) under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Cameron).

ENS 5356224 August 2018 15:01:00FermiNRC Region 3

At 0745 EDT on August 24, 2018, the Active Seismic Monitoring System failed a planned surveillance test and was declared inoperable. Compensatory measures to provide alternative methods for event classification of a seismic event have been implemented in accordance with the Fermi 2 Emergency Plan procedures. The compensatory measures include the use of information provided by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to confirm if an earthquake has occurred within a 100 mile radius. The loss of the Active Seismic Monitoring System is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No seismic activity has been felt onsite and the USGS recorded no seismic activity in the area. The NRC Resident Inspector bas been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM JEFF GROFF TO VINCE KLCO ON SEPTEMBER 13, 2018 AT 1524 EDT * * *

After further review the Active Seismic Monitoring system was removed from service for planned maintenance for a duration less than 72 hours with appropriate compensatory measures established. Therefore, no major loss of emergency assessment capability occurred. In addition, the surveillance tests were re-performed and the Active Seismic Monitoring System was declared Operable. Therefore, no reportable condition existed and EN 53562 reported on August 24, 20I8 is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Hanna).

ENS 5355421 August 2018 12:25:00FermiNRC Region 3At 08/20/2018 at 1856 (EDT), it was determined that a contract supervisor failed a test specified by the FFD (fitness for duty) testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 535373 August 2018 14:10:00FermiNRC Region 3At 0940 EDT on August 3, 2018, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation into why the Division 2 MDCT fan over speed brake inverter failed is in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5343531 May 2018 16:20:00FermiNRC Region 3On May 31, 2018 at 1420 EDT, the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation Differential Flow - High function was declared inoperable as a result of indicating downscale. This condition would have prevented the primary containment isolation valves for the RWCU system from automatically isolating on a high differential flow condition. At 1519 EDT, RWCU was shutdown and the affected penetration flow paths were isolated in accordance with station procedures per Fermi Technical Specifications. The cause of the event is under investigation. There was no radiological release associated with this event. All other RWCU primary containment isolation instrumentation functions remained operable and the associated RWCU system primary containment isolation valves were capable of being remotely closed by the control room operators throughout the event. However, the condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5333614 April 2018 14:34:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1040 EDT, Fermi 2 automatically scrammed on RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) Level 3 following a loss of the Division 1 Station System Transformer (SST) #64. All control rods fully inserted. HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) and RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) automatically started as designed on Reactor Water Level (RWL) 2 and restored RWL. The lowest RWL reached was 101.8 inches (above Top of Active Fuel). HPCI injected for approximately 35 seconds. RWL is currently being maintained in the normal level band with RCIC. No Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) actuated. All isolations and actuations for RWL 3 and 2 occurred as expected. Investigation into loss of SST #64 continues. At the time of the scram, all Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were operable, and no safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), any event that results in ECCS discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal and 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event that results in the actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical. Following the loss of power and reactor scram, the Division 2 EECW (Emergency Equipment Cooling Water) Temperature Control Valve (TCV) controller was in Emergency Manual and maintaining max cooling. Operators placed the controller in Auto and the TCV is controlling normally. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified. Decay heat is being removed via Division 2 steam dumps to the condenser. The plant is in a modified shutdown electric lineup with offsite power available and stable. Emergency diesel generators did automatically start and load.

  • * * UPDATE ON 4/14/2018 AT 1838 EDT FROM JEFF MYERS TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

This update provides additional clarification of the applicable reporting criteria for this event associated with Primary Containment Isolation Actuations. All isolations and actuations for RWL (Groups 4, 13, and 15) and RWL 2 (Groups 2, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 18) occurred as expected. This report is also being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B): RPS, HPCI, and RCIC. RPV pressure is being maintained by the bypass valves to the main condenser. All actuations that occurred were fully completed and restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stone).

  • * * UPDATE ON 4/15/2018 AT 1950 EDT FROM KELLEY BELENKY TO DAVID AIRD * * *

This update provides additional information regarding the specified system actuations and an additional applicable reporting criteria. The loss of Division 1 Station System Transformer (SST) #64 at 1040 EDT on 4/14/2018 resulted in the automatic initiation of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 11 and 12. The EDGs started as expected and continue to supply their associated busses. This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), as an event or condition that resulted in a valid actuation of any system listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), including EDGs. In addition, the loss of the Division 1 SST #64 resulted in the expected transfer from the normal to alternate power source for the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) swing bus, rendering LPCI loop select inoperable. The alternate power source continued to energize the LPCI swing bus throughout the event until the system was realigned to the normal power source at 1239 EDT on 4/14/2018. This condition is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stone).

ENS 532361 March 2018 13:53:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4A non-licensed, supervisory employee was determined to be under the influence of alcohol during a random test. The employee's unescorted access was terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5317822 January 2018 15:09:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1115 EST, on 1/22/18, Fermi 2 determined that the site was in violation of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit due to an oil sheen being observed in a overflow canal that had breached the installed oil booms and entered navigable waterways. Approximately 5-10 gallons of oil has reached navigable water, which resulted in exceeding State limits. The oil is currently contained with no additional leakage to navigable waters and cleanup is in progress. The cause of the oil entering the overflow canal is under investigation. Reports will be made to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) and other local agencies. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Licensee has notified the National Response Center.
ENS 5316511 January 2018 16:06:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On January 11, 2018, at 1041 EST, a planned train swap of the Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (RBHVAC) system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for less than one minute. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.117 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge per TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.1 by starting Division 1 of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) in addition to the RBHVAC system already in operation. Secondary containment pressure is currently stable. Secondary containment was declared Operable at 1045 EST. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable as a result of not meeting TS SR 3.6.4.1.1 is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 529589 September 2017 15:04:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1000 EDT on September 9, 2017, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation into why the Division 2 MDCT fan over speed brake inverter failed is in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident based on a loss of a single train safety system. The licensee entered two (2) LCO Action Statements (AS); 14-day LCO AS 3.5.1 for ECCS (HPCI Inoperable) and 72-hour AS 3.7.2 for UHS. The licensee has two spare inverters on-site. After replacement and successful post-maintenance testing the licensee expects to exit both AS before 72-hours. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 528371 July 2017 17:35:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1420 EDT on 7/1/17, Fermi 2 determined that the site was in violation of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit due to chemical addition pumps (for the cooling tower reservoir) being out of service for approximately seventeen hours. This resulted in sodium hypochlorite concentrations exceeding state limits. As of 0855 EDT (on) 7/1/17, the levels of sodium hypochlorite were restored to less than measureable values. Reports will be made to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) and other local agencies. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a news release or notification to other government agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee also notified Monroe County.
ENS 527242 May 2017 18:34:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On May 2, 2017, while performing a past operability review associated with Combustion Turbine Generator (CTG) 11-1, it was determined that a past configuration of CTG 11-1 could not have assured all of the applicable Appendix R success criteria under all of the postulated scenarios described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). From November 21, 2016 until March 18, 2017 when Mode 4 was entered, CTG 11-1 was in a configuration where it could not be started from the dedicated shutdown panel, although it could be started locally. One of the specific scenarios for Appendix R in the UFSAR credits CTG 11-1 to support a safe shutdown based on an assumed time required to start CTG 11-1 and then provide flow to the reactor pressure vessel using the Standby Feedwater System. During the time period where CTG 11-1 could only be started locally, this assumed time would have been exceeded. Therefore, this event is being reported as an 'unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety' under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At the time of discovery, CTG 11-1 was fully operable and the described condition had already been corrected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY GREG MILLER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1532 EDT ON 05/19/2017 * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on May 2, 2017 (EN 52724) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The notification to the NRC involved an event where Combustion Turbine Generator (CTG) 11-1 could only be started locally such that required operator actions during an Appendix R safe shutdown scenario could be delayed. Subsequent to the initial notification, the event, additional site documentation, and the NRC guidance in NUREG-1022 pertaining to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) were reviewed further. lt was verified that Fermi 2 procedures contained actions to ensure Appendix R safe shutdown capability under the plant conditions during the relevant time period. A time validation study was performed (May 9, 2017) which verified that the operator actions could have been completed within the time described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for initiating Standby Feedwater flow to the reactor pressure vessel. In addition, a review of the supporting design calculation identified margin in the required time described in the UFSAR. Based on this information, the condition of CTG 11-1 during the time period from November 21, 2016 until March 18, 2017 would not have prevented compliance with the Appendix R safe shutdown requirements. Under these circumstances, the event does not represent an 'unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety' under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) per the guidance in NUREG-1022. Therefore, EN 52724 can be retracted and no Licensee Event Report (LER) under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) is required to be submitted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Cameron).

ENS 5243415 December 2016 03:40:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On December 14, 2016, starting at 2345 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately one second for each instance. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 0300 EST on December 15, 2016, high wind conditions had subsided and secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter)

ENS 5243214 December 2016 15:10:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On December 14, 2016, at 1314 EST, the startup of the Reactor Building HVAC (Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning) system resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met for approximately 1 second. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.07 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) by Reactor Building HVAC and Standby Gas Treatment System already in operation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter)

ENS 5243014 December 2016 11:20:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 0945 EST on 12/14/16, Fermi 2 discovered a sanitary sewer system leaking through a covered manhole in the Owner Controlled Area. Approximately 100 gallons of the sewage has entered the storm drain system. The sewage leak was stopped at 1030. A local sanitary contractor is currently responding to the site to clean the affected areas. The cause and extent of the sewage teak is under investigation. Reports to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), the local health department (Monroe County), and the local news media are in progress. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5239829 November 2016 01:41:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On November 28, 2016, starting at 2105 hrs. EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 0055 EST on November 29, 2016, high wind conditions had subsided and secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS MCALLISTER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1027 EST ON 11/29/16 * * *

On November 29, 2016, at 0242 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times following the initial event notification. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure to within TS limits. High wind conditions are expected to decrease throughout the day. If additional instances are identified that require entry into the Technical Specifications (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met, another follow up notification will be performed. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

ENS 5238020 November 2016 04:56:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On November 19, 2016, starting at 2150 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 0430 EST, high wind conditions have subsided and secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/20/16 AT 1416 EST FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

On November 20, 2016, starting at 0654 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met on multiple different occasions as of event notification update time. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each instance. Fermi 2 continues to remain in a gale force wind advisory for the local area of Lake Erie. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Jeffers) has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/20/16 AT 2104 FROM GREG MILLER TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

On November 20, 2016, at 1426 EST, high wind conditions encountered on site resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary not being met. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second. The Fermi 2 local area of Lake Erie is no longer in a gale force wind advisory and the high wind conditions have subsided. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Jeffers) has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter)

ENS 5236414 November 2016 14:01:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1106 EST on 11/14/16, Fermi 2 discovered a sewage leak from a temporary restroom trailer that had reached a permeable gravel surface. The majority of the spill was confined to the impermeable surface below the restroom trailer. lt was estimated that the quantity of the spill which reached the permeable gravel surface was less than approximately 5 gallons. None of the sewage entered the storm drain system. The source of the sewage leak was eliminated by 1126 EST. A local sanitary contractor will be contacted to respond to the site to clean the affected areas. Reports to the Michigan Department of Environment.al Quality, the local health department (Monroe County), and the local news media are in progress. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 523422 November 2016 15:05:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On November 2, 2016, while performing a re-evaluation of the radiological consequences of the Fermi 2 control rod drop accident (CRDA), DTE Electric Company (DTE) identified a non-conservatism in the current Fermi 2 design and licensing basis of the CRDA. As described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 15.4.9, the current design and licensing basis assumes that the post-CRDA release pathway consists of carryover with steam to the turbine condenser. The re-evaluation has identified that a forced release from the gland seal exhausters (GSEs) could also occur which could result in post-CRDA radiological consequences that exceed the current 10 CFR 100.11 offsite dose limits and Standard Review Plan 6.4 (General Design Criterion 19) main control room dose limits when operating at low power conditions. The unanalyzed condition described above only applies to low power operating conditions (i.e. less than 10% power) since the fuel damage postulated as a result of a CRDA is only credible under low power operating conditions when an individual control rod worth is high. Fermi 2 is currently at 97% power and, therefore, the plant condition is currently bounded by the design and licensing basis such that the condition currently does not exist and no immediate actions are required. However, Fermi 2 has operated at low power levels several times in the past three years. Those periods of operation at low power represent unanalyzed conditions that significantly degraded plant safety since the occurrence of a CRDA during those periods could have resulted in offsite and main control room doses exceeding regulatory limits. Therefore, this 8-hour notification is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5233128 October 2016 21:58:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On October 28, 2016, at 1500 EDT, the Standby Liquid Control system was declared inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.7 Condition B was entered due to sodium pentaborate concentration not within limits. Standby Liquid Control sodium pentaborate concentration was found to be low outside of the acceptable region following a Standby Liquid Control system tank high level alarm in the Main Control Room. Sodium pentaborate was added to the Standby Liquid Control tank by chemistry personnel and the concentration was then verified to be acceptable. Standby Liquid Control was declared Operable on 10/28/16 at 1935 EDT. The cause of the out-of-acceptable concentration was due to make-up water leaking by a closed valve. (The licensee cycled this valve and closed an upstream valve.) Declaring the Standby Liquid Control system inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), (C), and (D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, control the release of radioactive material, and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5221431 August 2016 23:32:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

In Event Notification (EN) 52202 on August 25, 2016, Fermi 2 identified an unanalyzed condition related to the inoperability of Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans due to nonfunctionality of the associated brakes that occurred on April 6, 2016. The MDCT fan brake is required to prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support the operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) reservoir and associated Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). The EN noted that a past operability review was in progress to determine if declaring a MDCT fan inoperable due to a fan brake being nonfunctional resulted in additional instances of unanalyzed conditions within the: three years prior to August 25, 2016. On August 31, 2016 at 1950 EDT, the past operability review identified five additional instances of unanalyzed conditions within the past three years. These five instances are being reported in one EN since they are related and were all discovered and reported within 8 hours. Although these instances are related to the one previously reported in EN 52202, they are being reported in a new EN due to the time elapsed since EN 52202. The MDCT fans and fan brakes are currently operable. 1) February 2016 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 0936 EST to 1344 EST on February 25, 2016. This nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system outage in Division 2. 2) March 2015 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 1000 EDT on March 23, 2015, until 1447 EDT on April 9, 2015. There is reasonable expectation that the nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with various Division 2 systems, structures, or components (SSCs) out of service during a forced outage. 3) February 2014 - The Division 2 MDCT fan 'B' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 1118 EST to 1529 EST on February 20, 2014. There is reasonable expectation that the nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'B' brake coincided with various Division 1 SSCs out of service during a refueling outage. 4) February 2014 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 1747 EST on February 14, 2014, until 1514 EST on February 24, 2014. There is reasonable expectation that the nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with various Division 2 SSCs out of service during a refueling outage. 5) January 2014 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 0915 EST on January 24, 2014, until 1537 EST on January 31, 2014. This nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with approximately 30 hours where various Division 2 safety-related SSCs were inoperable. The occurrences discussed above resulted in unanalyzed conditions because the plant configuration when equipment in one division was inoperable while a MCDT fan brake was nonfunctional in the opposite division would not support safe shutdown capability in the event of a tornado. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), as an event or condition that results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JEFF YEAGER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1508 EDT ON 10/20/2106 * * *

The licensee is RETRACTING item 1 only of the 5 events listed above: 1) February 2016 - The Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake nitrogen bottle pressure was below the required limit from 0936 EST to 1344 EST on February 25, 2016. This nonfunctionality of the MDCT fan 'A' brake coincided with a High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system outage in Division 2. Fermi 2 is retracting item 1 of the 8-hour event notification made on August 31, 2016, at 2332 EDT, (EN #52214). EN #52214 originally reported a non-functionality of the Division 1 MDCT fan 'A' brake on February 25, 2016, as an unanalyzed condition due to it coinciding with a Division 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system outage. Subsequent engineering evaluation has determined that although the intermediate nitrogen bottle pressure was below its required limit, the pressure in the main nitrogen bottle was sufficient to ensure that the MDCT fan 'A' brake could have performed its intended function in the event of a tornado. Since the MDCT fan 'A' brake was determined to be functional, the MDCT fan 'A', the associated Division 1 UHS reservoir, and the Division 1 EDGs were all operable at that time. Therefore, no unanalyzed condition existed on February 25, 2016. The other four items (2-5) included in EN #52214 are not being retracted and are still considered unanalyzed conditions. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Orth).

ENS 5220527 August 2016 17:48:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On August 27, 2016, at 1500 EDT a severe thunderstorm occurred in Monroe County, including the Fermi 2 site. Due to high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary was not met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each event. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 1540 EDT, secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter).

ENS 5220225 August 2016 21:39:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1629 EDT on August 25, 2016, it was determined that a Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fan should be declared inoperable if its associated fan brake is nonfunctional. The MDCT fan brake is required to prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support the operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). Currently, the MDCT fans and fan brakes are operable. A past operability evaluation is being performed and has initially identified that from 0855 EDT to 1738 EDT on April 6, 2016, the Division 1 'A' fan brake was nonfunctional due to a nitrogen bottle being below the required pressure. Additionally, from 0856 EDT on April 6, 2016, to 1641 EDT on April 7, 2016, the Division 1 'C' fan brake was also nonfunctional due to a nitrogen bottle being below the required pressure. Therefore, the Division 1 UHS and associated Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) would have been inoperable. During this time, at 1347 EDT on April 6, 2016, the Division 2 EDG 14 was inoperable for 22 seconds for a planned testing. This resulted in an unanalyzed condition because the plant configuration during the 22 seconds when EDG 14 was inoperable would not support safe shutdown capability in the event of a tornado. A past operability review is in progress to determine if declaring a MDCT fan inoperable due to a fan brake being nonfunctional results in any additional instances of unanalyzed condition within the past three years. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), as an event or condition that results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety or to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 521492 August 2016 20:33:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 1612 EDT on 08/02/16, Fermi 2 discovered a sanitary sewer system leak from underground lines beneath the parking lot near Warehouse B. Some of the sewage has entered the storm drain system. The sewage leak was stopped at approximately 1730 EDT. The duration and quantity of the spill is unknown. A local sanitary contractor is currently responding to the site to clean the affected areas. Reports to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), the local health department (Monroe County), and the local news media are in progress. Since these reports are in the process of being made, this is considered a News Release or Notification to Other Government Agencies, therefore this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5208413 July 2016 22:43:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On July 13, 2016, at 19:50 EDT a severe thunderstorm warning was issued for Monroe County. This severe thunderstorm warning included the Fermi 2 site. Due to high winds encountered during the thunderstorm, the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure boundary was not met numerous times. The duration of time that the secondary containment Technical Specification was not met was approximately 1 second for each event. All plant equipment responded as required to the changing environmental conditions and Reactor Building HVAC returned secondary containment pressure within TS limits. At 20:40 EDT secondary containment vacuum was greater than the TS operability limit of 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) and steady, and the LCO was exited. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1922 EDT ON 3/17/2017 FROM DEREK ETUE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

In this event notification, DTE Electric Company (DTE) reported conditions whereby the Fermi 2 secondary containment was believed to have exceeded Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements due to high winds. DTE hereby retracts this event notification as the Fermi 2 secondary containment has been determined to have been operable during this event as described below. The Fermi 2 secondary containment pressure is maintained at a pressure less than the external pressure to contain, dilute, hold up, and reduce the activity level of fission products prior to release to the environment, and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during a Design Basis Accident or certain operations. Secondary containment pressure is monitored by a number of differential pressure (dP) sensors. High wind gusts have resulted in momentary negative pressure on the leeward side of the building, causing a more positive pressure indication from one or more dP sensors. The secondary containment building pressure remains relatively constant during these 'wind events.' In December 2016, DTE implemented a software design change to display a 120-second rolling average for secondary containment dP indication. A 120-second rolling average recorded every second provides the operator a more accurate report of actual secondary containment conditions, while mitigating the signal noise and wind gust effects. The conditions associated with the subject event notification were re-reviewed in light of the improved secondary containment dP indication and it was determined that the Fermi 2 secondary containment was operable during this event. Specifically, the secondary containment pressure did not exceed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements during this event. In summary, the above event notification is retracted because the Fermi 2 secondary containment was determined to have been fully operable during the conditions identified in the subject report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter)

ENS 5175525 February 2016 16:35:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On January 6, 2016, at approximately 1514 EST, with Fermi 2 in Mode 1 operating at 100 percent reactor thermal power, the East and West Turbine Bypass Valves (TBVs) automatically opened for 3 minutes and 32 seconds in response to the number one High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) drifting from full open to 25 percent open. Reactor power was subsequently lowered to 91.0 percent reactor thermal power and the bypass valves closed. Per Technical Specification Bases 3.3.1.1, TBVs must remain shut while reactor thermal power is at or above 29.5 percent to consider the TSV closure and Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure Reactor Protection System (RPS) functions operable. The condition was recognized at the time of the event and the RPS functions were not declared inoperable since the functions were verified to remain enabled. Since the RPS functions were not declared inoperable, Fermi 2 did not report this event within 8 hours of occurrence. However, after further evaluation, it was determined that this event met the reporting criterion. Accordingly, this event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. The cause of the High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve drifting was due to an actuator malfunction that has since been corrected. This event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16. See EN #51756 for a similar event that occurred on 02/21/16.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JEFF GROFF TO STEVEN VITTO ON 03/02/2016 AT 1530 EST * * *

Upon further review, it was determined that this event also meets the reporting criterion of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Although this event was determined to be reportable at 1200 EST on 02/24/16, it met the reporting requirement on the date of the event (01/06/2016). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Valos).

ENS 5153512 November 2015 18:59:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On 11/12/2015 at approximately 1500 EST, a spill to the environment was determined to be reportable to the state environmental and local health agencies. A press release is planned. The spill occurred when a portable chemical toilet tipped over and was identified at approximately 1440 EST. The contents and exact quantity of the spill are unknown but the toilet has a capacity of 60 gallons. The spill contacted the ground but did not reach any waterways. Cleanup efforts are in progress. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality.
ENS 515165 November 2015 10:32:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On November 5, 2015 at approximately 1000 EST, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) was removed from service for planned maintenance on the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) vital bus power supply. The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) resides on the IPCS platform and will be out of service and unavailable to Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) during the time that IPCS is removed from service. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 48 hours. During this time dose assessment (Raddose) capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. The majority of the Control Room indications remain available to the plant staff and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS is completely restored, including SPDS to the Operational Support Center, the Technical Support Center, and alternate facilities. The plant is currently in Mode 5, and will remain in Mode 5, for the duration of the IPCS and SPDS unavailability. This 8-hour non-emergency notification is being made per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, as described in NEI 13-01. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5131312 August 2015 13:31:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1007 (EDT) on August 12, 2015, while restoring Reactor Building (RB) HVAC (RBHVAC) after surveillance testing, an equipment malfunction resulted in improper damper alignment resulting in Secondary Containment Technical Specifications (TS) to not be met. The plant TS require Secondary Containment pressure be maintained greater than or equal to -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). This specification was not maintained for five seconds and the highest pressure observed was -0.095 inches of vacuum water gauge. This value was observed on only one of two installed recorders, of the Secondary Containment pressure recorders. The highest observed pressure on the other recorder was -0.14 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary Containment was restored by the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) already in operation and shutting down the affected train of RBHVAC. The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment at -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1159 EDT ON 08/13/15 FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is updating this report to delete the minus sign for all references to inches of vacuum water gauge. FOLLOW UP - CORRECTED INFORMATION: At 1007 (EDT) on August 12, 2015, while restoring Reactor Building (RB) HVAC (RBHVAC) after surveillance testing, an equipment malfunction resulted in improper damper alignment resulting in Secondary Containment Technical Specifications (TS) to not be met. The plant TS require Secondary Containment pressure be maintained greater than or equal to .125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). This specification was not maintained for five seconds and the highest pressure observed was .095 inches of vacuum water gauge. This value was observed on only one, of two installed recorders, of the Secondary Containment pressure recorders. The highest observed pressure on the other recorder was .14 inches of vacuum water gauge. Secondary Containment was restored by the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) already in operation and shutting down the affected train of RBHV AC. The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment greater than or equal to .125 inches of vacuum water gauge for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)c as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. the licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Powell).

ENS 512027 July 2015 16:07:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

On 7/7/2015 at approximately 1435 EDT, the Technical Specification for Secondary Containment Pressure Boundary was not met when vacuum could not be maintained greater than or equal to -0.125 inches of water gauge for approximately 41 seconds. As part of post-maintenance testing for the non-safety related Reactor Building HVAC Center Exhaust Fan, the fan was started while the safety-related Standby Gas Treatment system was also in operation. Shortly after the fan was started, operators observed degrading vacuum in secondary containment and subsequently secured the center exhaust and supply fans. Vacuum continued to degrade momentarily after the fans were secured, and then returned to a Technical Specification allowable value. Subsequent inspections discovered that the affected fan was operating in the reverse direction. This is believed to have caused Secondary Containment pressure to increase. Since vacuum could not be maintained with the safety-related Standby Gas Treatment system operating, the plant operated in an unanalyzed condition. The cause of the reverse rotation is under investigation. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS ROBINSON TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/7/2015 AT 2153 EDT* * *

Based on plant configuration at the time of the event and further review of the Fermi 2 UFSAR, the plant did not operate in an unanalyzed condition. The Reactor Building HVAC fans would have tripped, as designed, upon receipt of a safety-related Standby Gas Treatment actuation signal during the time of the event. Therefore, the fans' pressurizing effect on secondary containment would have ceased within the time limits assumed in the existing accident analysis. The reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) remains valid. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Stone).

ENS 511285 June 2015 14:19:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4The following was received via phone call and email: This 60-day report, as allowed by 10CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made pursuant to 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of containment isolation valves. At 1930 EDT on May 24, 2015, a loss of power to Reactor Protection System (RPS) Train B occurred. Initial investigation found the RPS Motor Generator (MG) Set B not running, with its Motor Off light illuminated caused by both Normal EPA breakers and MG Set B output breaker being tripped. Visual inspection at the distribution cabinet was inconclusive at the time and revealed no abnormalities and no abnormal odors in the area. Further investigation of the RPS MG Set B verified normal voltages on all fuse clips, and all power and control power fuses were operational. As a result of the loss of RPS B, the following containment isolation valves closures occurred: Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Outboard Isolation valves, Torus Water Management System (TWMS) Outboard Isolation valves, Division 2 Drywell Pneumatics Inboard and Outboard Isolation valves, Primary Containment Radiation Monitoring System Inboard and Outboard Isolation valves, Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Purge Flow Outboard Isolation valves, and Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain Sump Inboard Isolation Valves. The Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5090319 March 2015 10:51:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 0702 EDT on March 19, 2015, Fermi 2 received an automatic scram due to actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) function of Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Upscale. The plant had recently transitioned to Single Loop Operation after securing the 'A' Reactor Recirculation Pump due to loss of normal and emergency cooling water supply. The lowest reactor water level was 134 inches above top of active fuel. Reactor water level is being maintained in the normal band by the Feedwater and Control Rod Drive Systems. No Safety Relief Valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor pressure is being maintained via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves and Main Condenser. Reactor Pressure Vessel Level 3 isolation occurred. No additional safety system actuations occurred. All off-site power sources were available throughout the event. The plant is currently in Mode 3 and in a stable condition. Investigation into the cause of the event is ongoing. This event is being reported under the four hour Non-Emergency reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5083119 February 2015 09:55:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 0304 EST on February 19, 2015, Fermi 2 experienced a trip of the Reactor Building Ventilation (RB) (HVAC) during plant operations associated with very cold temperatures outside. At the time of the trip, outside air temperature was -1 degrees Fahrenheit and RB HVAC tripped due to a Freeze-Stat actuation (a freeze protection feature). The plant Technical Specifications require that Secondary Containment pressure be maintained greater than or equal to -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1). This specification was not maintained and the highest pressure observed was -0.11 inches of vacuum water gauge. Subsequently, at 0450, during restoration activities, RB pressure degraded again to higher than -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for 38 seconds. The lowest observed pressure was -0.11 inches of vacuum water gauge. RB HVAC has been restored by resetting the Freeze-Stat and the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) has been placed back in a standby condition. The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment at -0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge for secondary containment operability. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM WARREN PAUL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1035 ON 4/8/2015 * * *

After reviewing the events that occurred on February 19, 2015 against the accident analyses in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR and design functions of the Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary Containment structure, it is concluded that a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material did not occur as a result of momentarily exceeding the Technical Specification for Secondary Containment vacuum after a loss of the normal Reactor Building Ventilation System. The Fermi 2 accident analysis for a LOCA does not assume that secondary containment is under vacuum throughout the duration of an accident and contains conservative leakage assumptions to bound the effects of a postulated ground level release. The accident analysis credits the operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS); both divisions of SGTS were operable at the time of the event. Although secondary containment was declared inoperable due to exceeding the Technical Specification value for secondary containment vacuum, the structural integrity of the secondary containment was not degraded at the time. Upon receipt of an accident signal, SGTS would have automatically started and restored secondary containment vacuum to within the bounding analyses of Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. Secondary containment was capable of performing its design function of minimizing any ground level release of radioactive material by maintaining boundary integrity so that the SGTS may draw a vacuum in the Reactor Building and filter radioactive material at all times. The event reported in EN # 50831 did not result in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material. This event report is being retracted. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Skokowski).

  • * * UPDATE FROM WARREN PAUL TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/15/15 AT 1348 EDT * * *

Upon further review of NUREG-1022 section 3.2.7, the original Non-Emergency Event Notification, 50831, remains valid. The NRC Resident Inspect has been informed. Notified R3DO (McCraw).

ENS 5011213 May 2014 14:40:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4This 60-day report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of containment isolation valves which occurred during the most recent refueling outage at Fermi 2. On 3/18/2014, at approximately 1930 EST, shortly after transferring Division 2 Reactor Protection System (RPS B) from the alternate to the normal power supply, Operations personnel noted that an unexpected half-scram occurred. Initial investigation found a fuse in an RPS Power Distribution Panel had blown. Further investigation found that a power contactor had failed causing the fuse to blow. The contactor failure resulted in an invalid half scram and actuations (closure) of Torus Water Management System (TWMS) Outboard containment isolation valves, Division 2 Drywell Pneumatics Inboard and Outboard containment isolation valves and the Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain Sumps Inboard containment isolation valves. All valves operated as expected. Since containment isolation valves in more than one system were actuated by this failure, this event constitutes an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of the system listed in paragraph 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
ENS 4993720 March 2014 14:15:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1405 EDT on 3/20/14, Fermi Nuclear Station declared an Alert due to a fire in the lagging of an Emergency Diesel Generator Turbo Charger. The Alert notification was based on EAL HA02, fire or explosion affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. The fire in the EDG-11 turbocharger lagging occurred during testing. The fire was extinguished using handheld CO2 fire extinguishers and a reflash watch was set. EDG-11 has been removed from service and damage is minimal. The plant is shutdown in Mode 4 for Refueling Outage 16. All parameters associated with the reactor are stable. RHR Pump D remains in service in Shutdown Cooling and is unaffected by the EDG-11 fire. There has been no other impact on the plant electrical systems or shutdown cooling and Fermi Nuclear Station remains in an Alert pending further evaluation. The NRC remained in Normal Mode. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, and FDA. Notified NuclearSSA via email only.

  • * * UPDATE FROM SAM HASSOUN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1535 EDT ON 3/20/13 * * *

At 1359 (EDT on 3/20/14), with the plant in Mode 4, a fire was confirmed on Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)-11 turbocharger. At 1402, the fire was extinguished with a CO2 extinguisher. An ALERT was declared at 1405 and Assembly and Accountability was ordered by the Emergency Director. The Assembly and Accountability was completed satisfactorily by 1441. The fire was from oil soaked lagging on the engine turbocharger. The insulation was removed and the engine exhaust header was inspected. The damage was limited to only the lagging. The room has been ventilated using the Engine room fans and has been cleared of all of the smoke. The Emergency Director terminated the event at 1532 (EDT on 3/20/14). The Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3RA (Pederson), NRR (Dorman), R3DO (Lara), IRD (Grant), IRD (Morris), DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA, and Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (Tennant). Notified NuclearSSA via email only.

ENS 4985123 February 2014 12:23:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

(On) February 23, 2014, at approximately 1200 (EST), the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) was removed from service outside of the Control Room to support planned system maintenance. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform and (was rendered) out of service when the IPCS (was) removed from Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). These systems will be unavailable to all Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for approximately 50 hours. During this time, dose assessment (Raddose) capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. The SPDS indications and Raddose remain available to the plant staff in the Control Room, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS is completely restored, including SPDS and ERDS, to the Operational Support Center, the Technical Support Center, and alternate facilities. This 8-hour non-emergency notification is being made per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0905 EDT ON 03/15/14 FROM PAUL GRESH TO S. SANDIN * * *

The following update was received from the licensee: On February 23, 2014, at approximately 1200 (EST), the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) was removed from service to support planned system maintenance. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform and were out of service when IPCS was removed from service. On March 15, 2014 at approximately 0800 (EDT), planned maintenance on ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS is complete, restoring full Emergency assessment capabilities to the control room and all onsite emergency response facilities. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Passehl).

ENS 498016 February 2014 19:17:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1254 (EST) on February 6, 2014, while shutting down Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW), a human performance error occurred resulting in the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch being placed in manual override. Division 2 EECW remained running and continued to operate normally. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. With the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch in manual override, Division 2 EECW may have been prevented from performing its safety function during a loss of power event. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred due to the Division 2 EECW inoperability which may have prevented HPCI from performing its safety function. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI via T.S. LCO 3.5.1 and subsequently exited 36 seconds later upon returning the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch to normal. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on a loss of a single train safety system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee reported that the individuals involved have been removed from licensee duties pending further investigation.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM PAUL GRESH TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0931 EDT ON 4/4/14 * * *

The Fermi 2 Engineering staff has completed a comprehensive evaluation of the momentary mispositioning of the Division 2 EECW system overide switch initially reported on February 6, 2014. The evaluation determined that HPCI room temperature would remain below the HPCI room steam leak detection isolation logic setpoint in the unlikely event that the momentary mispositioning resulted in the temporary interruption of the cooling water flow to the HPCI system room cooler. Over the brief period of time for which EECW would have been unavailable to support the effective operation of the room cooler, its function was not necessary for HPCI to perform its required safety functions. Therefore, event notification 49801 is retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Passehl).

ENS 4957524 November 2013 02:54:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4On 11/24/2013 at 00:00:54 seconds (EST), Reactor Building ventilation tripped due to low outside air temperature. At 00:01:42 seconds, Secondary Containment Differential pressure went positive, with a maximum of +0.08 inches WC (water column). This is a loss of Secondary Containment function. At 00:02:30 seconds, Standby Gas Treatment System was started and Secondary Containment pressure then decreased to <0 inches WC at 00:03:18 seconds. All the above data parameters were taken from the Division 2 Reactor Building Differential pressure recorder. Secondary Containment pressure is stable with differential pressure negative <-0.30 inches WC. The loss of Secondary Containment function is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. Technical Specification requirement are to maintain secondary containment pressure <-0.125 WC. No actual radiation release occurred during the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4945118 October 2013 15:52:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 1505 EDT on October 18, 2013, Fermi 2 experienced an oil spill to navigable waters, requiring notification of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Pollution Emergency Alert System, Detroit Edison Corporate Environmental Management and Resources, and the Primary Public Safety Answering Point. The spill has not left site. Oil leaked from a fitting on a pump during the performance of fire truck testing. It is estimated that the volume of the overflow was less than four gallons. The overflow entered the on-site quarry. The source of the spill has been terminated. Media interest is anticipated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE FROM DEREK ETUE TO PETE SNYDER ON 10/21/13 AT 1445 EDT * * * 

In the first sentence of the second paragraph in the original report above the words 'fire truck' were replaced with 'FLEX pump.' Additionally, "as of 10/18/2013 at 1820 EDT the oil cleanup was completed with no waste generated due to oil dissipation." The licensee also notified the Michigan State Police, Monroe County Sheriff, and the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski).

ENS 488874 April 2013 08:35:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4

At 0406 (EDT) on April 4, 2013, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) failed. This resulted in a loss of approximately 60 percent of data on the Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS). While IPCS and SPDS are not fully functional, the Emergency Plan can still be implemented if a plant emergency does occur, as assessment capabilities are available under alternate means. Investigation is in progress. A follow up message will be made when IPCS and SPDS are restored to fully functional status. This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM GREG MILLER TO VINCE KLCO AT 1636 EDT ON 4/5/2013 * * *

At 1627 (EDT) on April 4, 2013, plant personnel were able to restore full functionality of IPCS and SPDS. This restored full assessment capabilities to all onsite emergency response faculties. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Daley).