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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5686620 November 2023 17:53:00DresdenNRC Region 3GE-3The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0956 (CST) on November 20, 2023, accumulated gas was identified in the Dresden Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system discharge header. As a result, the HPCI system was declared inoperable. Since HPCI is a single-train system, this is a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCI system was subsequently vented, and the accumulated gas has been removed, restoring the Dresden Unit 2 HPCI system to an operable status. All other emergency core cooling systems remained operable during this time period. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The licensee administratively verified the isolation condenser was operable after declaring HPCI inoperable as required by technical specifications. The licensee stated there was no increase in plant risk. The cause of gas accumulating in the Dresden Unit 2 HPCI discharge header is under investigation, and this issue has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
ENS 5686519 November 2023 14:44:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and fax: On November 18, 2023, the presence of alcohol was discovered inside the protected area. In accordance with the Constellation Fitness For Duty (FFD) Program, the individual has been escorted offsite and access to the plant denied pending the results of an investigation. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1) as it represents a significant FFD violation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5685616 November 2023 05:15:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0227 EST on 11/16/23, Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 experienced an automatic trip from the reactor protection system (RPS) based on reactor trip bus undervoltage (UV). At that time, a loss of U-4000-22 (13 kV to 4 kV transformer) caused a loss of 22, 23, and 24 4 kV busses. This resulted in a loss of both motor generator (MG) sets causing the reactor trip bus UV. The loss of 22 and 23 4 kV non-safety related busses resulted in a loss of main feedwater. Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) was manually initiated and is feeding both steam generators. The 2B diesel generator (DG) started and restored the 24 4 kV safety related bus. Heat removal is via the normal turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. RPS actuation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - 4 hour report ESFAS (engineering safety features actuation system) actuation (2B DG start on UV) is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - 8 hour report AFW operation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) - 60 day report The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: All rods fully inserted. There was no impact on Unit 1 operations. Unit 2 is stable in mode 3.

  • * * UPDATE ON AT 0940 EST FROM KERRY HUMMER TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

ESFAS actuation (AFW manual initiation) is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - 8 hour report Notified R1DO (Defrancisco).

ENS 568418 November 2023 13:27:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0645 EST, on November 8, 2023, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 at zero percent power, a manual actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) occurred during a planned plant cooldown. The reason for the AFW manual-start was a trip of the 22 steam generator feed pump due to a high casing level. The 23 AFW motor driven pump was manually started in accordance with implementation of AOP-3G, Malfunction of Main Feedwater System to restore steam generator levels. There was no impact to Unit 1. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: No other systems were affected. No other compensatory or mitigation strategies implemented. Plant cooldown was the only significant evolution in progress. No impact to other technical specifications or limiting conditions for operation. All systems functioned as required. The electric plant is being supplied by offsite power with all diesel generators available. No significant increase in plant risk. There was nothing unusual or not understood.
ENS 568397 November 2023 18:42:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1617 on 11/7/2023, Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 experienced an automatic trip from a Reactor Protection System (RPS) based on reactor trip bus under voltage (UV). At that time a loss of U-4000-22 caused a loss of 22, 23, and 24 4kV busses. This resulted in a loss of both motor generator (MG) sets causing the reactor trip bus UV condition. The loss of 22 and 23 4kV non-safety related busses resulted in a loss of main feedwater. Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) was manually initiated and is feeding both steam generators. The 2B diesel generator (DG) started and restored the 24 4kV safety related bus. Heat removal is via the normal turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. RPS actuation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - 4-hour report. ESFAS actuation (2B DG start on UV) is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - 8-hour report. ESFAS actuation (AFW manual initiation) is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - 8-hour report. Site Senior NRC resident inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Unit 1 was unaffected. Estimation of duration of shutdown is 24 hours.
ENS 5682230 October 2023 17:06:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via phone call and email: A non-licensed supervisory employee had a confirmed positive test during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5681022 October 2023 01:43:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On October 21, 2023, at 2048 EDT, reactor recirculation pump (RRP) 12 tripped. The cause for the trip is under investigation. Following the RRP trip, the average power range monitors (APRMs) flow bias trips were inoperable due to reverse flow through RRP 12. The APRMs were restored to operable on October 21, 2023, at 2058 EDT, when the RRP 12 discharge blocking valve was closed. This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) which states: "Licensee shall notify the NRC of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5679012 October 2023 23:31:00GinnaNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 10/12/23 at 2127 EDT, with the Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100% Power, operators identified degrading condenser vacuum and manually tripped the reactor. All control rods inserted as expected. The trip was not complex, and all systems responded normally post-trip. The cause of the degraded condenser vacuum was an unexpected closure of the condenser air ejector regulator. The cause of the air ejector regulator going closed is not fully understood and is being investigated. Following the SCRAM, Operators responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam System through the Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs) and Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) systems. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid specified system actuation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5675321 September 2023 10:31:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: A licensed operator had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during another entity's pre-access fitness-for-duty screening for unescorted access authorization. The individual's unescorted access at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station has been denied. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5674518 September 2023 23:26:00ClintonNRC Region 3GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 9/18/2023 at 2007 CDT, Clinton reported to the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, National Response Center and DeWitt County a hazardous substance release of 1300 gallons of Sodium Bisulphite. The release was at the site's flume discharge building due to a crack on a fitting inside the building. This release did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 567319 September 2023 15:35:00GinnaNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 9/9/23 at 1143 EDT, with the Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, all 4 turbine control valves closed resulting in a reactor protection system (RPS) automatic reactor trip on over temperature differential temperature. All control rods inserted as expected. The trip was not complex and all systems responded normally post-trip. The cause of the control valve closure has not been determined. Following the SCRAM, operators responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the main steam system through the atmospheric relief valves and auxiliary feed water systems. Due to the RPS actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid specified system actuation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 567102 September 2023 09:46:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 9/2/2023 at 0632 EDT, a feedwater transient occurred resulting in an reactor protection system (RPS) automatic reactor scram on low level (Level 3, 159.3 inches). Following the scram, reactor water level dropped below Level 2 (108.8 inches) resulting in a Group 2 recirculation sample system isolation, Group 3 traveling in-core probe (TIP) isolation valve isolation, Group 6 and 7 reactor water cleanup isolation, and Group 9 containment purge isolations. All control rods inserted as expected. High pressure core spray and reactor core isolation cooling initiated and injected as expected. ECCS systems have been secured and normal reactor pressure and level control has been established for hot shutdown. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 is stable and in Mode 3. These 4 hour and 8 hour non-emergency reports are being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) (iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident was informed. There was no impact on Unit 1.
ENS 5669825 August 2023 23:39:00ByronNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At approximately 1600 CDT on 8/25/2023, a partial loss of the commercial phone communications system occurred that affects the emergency notification system (ENS) and the functionality of an emergency response facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification of a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Communications via alternate methods were subsequently established. The telecommunications provider has not provided an estimated repair time. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5667611 August 2023 08:03:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0329 (CDT) on August 11, 2023, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 90 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. The cause and details of the event are under investigation. Containment isolation valves actuated closed in multiple systems on a valid Group II signal. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Group II isolation. Operations responded using the emergency operating procedure and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 is not affected. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 566678 August 2023 17:03:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: A licensed (non-active) individual failed to comply with fitness for duty testing policies. The individual's unescorted access was terminated.
ENS 566523 August 2023 16:58:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2The following information was provided by the licensee via email: A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 566063 July 2023 17:03:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1530 (EDT) on July 3, 2023, Constellation Generation Company, LLC reported to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency and Office of Homeland Security (IEMA-OHS) that tritium concentrations in existing monitoring wells in a known (10 CFR) 50.75(g) recovery area were found higher than normal (at Quad Cities Nuclear Generating Station). This higher than normal tritium concentration did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria and there is no indication of a liquid release beyond the site boundary. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a notification of other government agency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5657615 June 2023 09:35:00ByronNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via email: A non-licensed, non-supervisory employee was identified bringing a prohibited item into the protected area. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 565606 June 2023 13:19:00Three Mile IslandNRC Region 1B&W-L-LPThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0937 EDT on June 6, 2023, it was discovered that a site employee suffered a non-work-related fatality. The individual was found non-responsive outside the Radiological Controlled Area. This is a four-hour, non-emergency notification for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Region I inspector has been notified.
ENS 565595 June 2023 21:58:00GinnaNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1823 EDT, the shift manager was notified that one siren, part of the public notification system (siren number 10), spuriously activated for approximately one minute. Monroe County agencies were notified regarding the actuation. The cause of the actuation is being investigated and the ability for the siren to actuate has been removed until the cause is determined. There is no impact to the emergency planning zone. This event is a four-hour, non-emergency report for notification to other government agencies in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).
ENS 565139 May 2023 17:41:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1455 (EST) on Tuesday May 9, 2023, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) technical support center (TSC) ventilation system lost power. Power loss was caused by a tree down on the 361 transmission line. Power was not able to be restored within an hour. At 1639 (EST), power was restored to TSC ventilation, and capability was restored. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a major loss of emergency preparedness capabilities due to a reduction in the effectiveness of the onsite TSC. NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 565024 May 2023 10:27:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: A non-licensed, non-supervisor contractor was found to be in possession of alcohol in the protected area. The individual's site access has been terminated. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5647117 April 2023 09:37:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0246 CDT on April 17, 2023, it was discovered that the single train low pressure core spray system was inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). All other emergency core cooling systems remained operable during this time period. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: LaSalle Unit 1 is in a 7 day limiting condition for operation.
ENS 5646411 April 2023 11:05:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid specific system actuation of the Emergency Service Water (ESW) System. On 2/16/2023, while performing a calibration planned maintenance (PM) for a jacket water pressure indicator during a D13 diesel generator system outage window, the 'C' ESW pump unexpectedly auto-started. Subsequent investigation identified that the affected jacket water pressure indicator shares a common sensing line with a jacket water pressure switch that provides a back-up to the engine speed switch for the engine running signal. At the time the jacket water pressure indicator calibration PM was being performed, the power circuits for D13 diesel generator instrumentation were energized. Pressurization of the energized jacket water pressure switch during the pressure indicator calibration activity resulted in initiation of a false engine running signal to the `C' ESW pump start logic. This event is considered an invalid system actuation because the 'C' ESW pump started in response to a false signal that the D13 EDG was running when the D13 EDG did not start. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters and was not a manual initiation. The ESW system functioned as expected in response to the actuation. The affected ESW pump was shut down in accordance with plant procedures. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5642118 March 2023 19:07:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 3/18/2023 at 1410 EDT, with Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 in a planned refueling outage, the main control room was notified of the results of an automated examination of a dissimilar metal weld on reactor penetration N2E. The results indicate a defect present which cannot be found acceptable under ASME Section XI, IWB-3600. This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) which states, `The licensee shall notify the NRC ... of the occurrence of ... any event or condition that results in: (A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.' The NRC Senior Resident was informed. A repair plan is being developed.
ENS 563894 March 2023 16:42:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0910 (CST), with Unit 2 in Mode 4 at 0 percent power, an actuation of a reactor scram on low charging water header pressure occurred during restoration from hydrostatic test conditions. All control rods were already fully inserted prior to the receipt of the scram signal. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Unit 2 RPS system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 563863 March 2023 09:48:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: A non-licensed supervisor tested positive in accordance with the FFD (fitness-for-duty) testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5637319 February 2023 08:56:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 0105 EST on February 19, 2023, with the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) at 100 percent power, a valid high main steam line radiation signal was received. An actuation of a fire protection foam system caused migration of high conductivity water into a low conductivity sump. Organic compounds were introduced into the primary coolant and resulted in a temporary increase in nitrogen-16 which was detected by main steam line radiation monitors and actuated primary containment isolation signals in more than one system. The reactor water recirculation sample system isolated. The signal also went to the normally isolated main steam line drain system and condenser air removal system. The event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The elevated radiation condition no longer exists. Health and safety of the public was not impacted by this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5635216 February 2023 13:26:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified.
ENS 563479 February 2023 15:40:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER (Licensee Event Report) submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). At approximately 0637 EST on December 25, 2022, the 2B EDG inadvertently started and ran unloaded without a valid undervoltage or safety injection actuation signal. It was determined that this condition was caused by the failure of the emergency start button due to age-related degradation. The button is normally held depressed (closed) by the glass enclosure in standby. To start the EDG using the Emergency Start Button, the button is released (open) when the glass enclosure is broken, which sends a start signal to the EDG. During troubleshooting, the resistance across the button contacts was measured at zero volts DC, indicating the button had failed to an open state causing the EDG to start. The button fell apart when the glass enclosure was removed. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the emergency diesel generator. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 563576 February 2023 13:26:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified.
ENS 563646 February 2023 13:26:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified.
ENS 563626 February 2023 13:26:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified.
ENS 563606 February 2023 13:26:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified.
ENS 563636 February 2023 13:26:00GinnaNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopThe following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified.
ENS 563616 February 2023 13:26:00DresdenNRC Region 3GE-3The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified.
ENS 563586 February 2023 13:26:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified.
ENS 563556 February 2023 13:26:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEThe following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified.
ENS 563546 February 2023 13:26:00ByronNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified.
ENS 563596 February 2023 13:26:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5
GE-2
The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified.
ENS 563566 February 2023 13:26:00ClintonNRC Region 3GE-6The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified.
ENS 563281 February 2023 01:40:00ClintonNRC Region 3GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via fax and telephone: Generator trip due to power load unbalance which caused a turbine trip and subsequent reactor scram. Experienced a trip on circulating water pump A. NRC Resident Inspector notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Off-site power available and unaffected. Decay heat removal via main steam line and drains to condenser. Plant is stable in mode 3.
ENS 5628321 December 2022 13:32:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid specific system actuation of the Emergency Service Water System (ESW). On 11/2/2022, during normal reactor operations, multiple main control room alarms were received for D12 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) running and Unit 1 Division 2 Safeguard Battery Ground. The D12 EDG did not start; however, the 'B' ESW Pump auto started. Subsequent troubleshooting determined that the cause of the D12 EDG running alarms and the inadvertent auto start of the 'B' ESW Pump was a malfunction on the D12 EDG speed switch. This event is considered an invalid system actuation because the 'B' ESW Pump started in response to a false signal that the D12 EDG was running when D12 EDG did not start. This was a complete actuation of the ESW System and the system functioned as expected in response to the actuation. The affected ESW Pump was shut down in accordance with plant procedures and the degraded D12 EDG speed switch was replaced. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5628019 December 2022 12:50:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of a primary containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. On November 11, 2022, at 2333 hours EST, Peach Bottom experienced an unplanned loss of the #343 Off-Site Startup Source. Due to the temporary loss of power during automatic bus transfers, several systems experienced Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group II and Group III (GP II/III) isolation signals. Plant Systems impacted by isolation valve closure included: Reactor Water Clean Up (RWCU), Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC), Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) Purge, Primary Containment Floor and Equipment Drains, and the Instrument Nitrogen system. All equipment responded as designed. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS GP II isolation signals are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level, High Drywell Pressure, RWCU system High Flow or RWCU Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger High Outlet Temperature. The PCIS GP III actuations are initiated by the Reactor Vessel Low Water Level, Primary Containment High Pressure, Reactor Building Ventilation High Radiation or Refuel Floor Ventilation High Radiation. At the time of the event, none of these actual plant conditions existed; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid. The loss of the #343 Off-Site Startup Source was caused by a failed printed circuit card in the programable logic controller (PLC) for the 3435 breaker. There is no time-based maintenance strategy for PLC replacement. The PLC circuit card was replaced, and the breaker restored to full qualification and service. Preventive maintenance strategy will be enhanced to address the identified vulnerability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5624328 November 2022 15:34:00GinnaNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopA non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 562104 November 2022 17:10:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On November 4, 2022, at 1400 hours, with Unit 2 (U2) in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, a manual scram was inserted on U2 due to rising reactor water level, which occurred following an unexpected opening of the 2B Feedwater Regulating Valve. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately 0 inches, which resulted in an automatic Group II and Group III isolation (expected response). Reactor Water Level control has been established in a normal band. The cause and details of the event are under investigation. The Unit 2 scram was not complicated. Operations responded using the Emergency Operating Procedures and stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100 percent power. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 562034 November 2022 08:04:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0006 CDT on 11/04/2022, it was discovered that both trains of control room area ventilation air conditioning systems were simultaneously inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: With both trains of control room area ventilation air conditioning systems inoperable, the plant entered a 72 hour limiting condition for operation (LCO). One train had been restored at the time of report which extends the LCO to 30 days.
ENS 5616314 October 2022 18:03:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to an inadvertent division 2 isolation signal and subsequent valve closure. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident will be notified.
ENS 5615812 October 2022 09:21:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: On 10/08/22, a non-supervisory employee violated the station's FFD policy. The individual's site access has been terminated.
ENS 561537 October 2022 08:35:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) penetration 69 degraded. At 0119 (CDT) on October 7, 2022, it was determined that the CRDM penetration 69 was degraded because examination identified unacceptable indications in accordance with ASME Code Case N-729-6. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 12/13/22 AT 1825 EST FROM KRYSTIAN JARONCZYK TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

The notification is being corrected to state: At 0119 (CDT) on October 7, 2022, it was determined that the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) penetration 69 was degraded because liquid penetrant testing, performed on the seal weld, identified unacceptable indications in accordance with ASME Section III and NRC approved licensee relief request for a previously performed embedded flaw repair. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Notified R3DO (Ruiz).