Semantic search
| Entered date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 56877 | 2 December 2023 12:47:00 | South Texas | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0610 CST on 12/2/2023, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the South Texas Project switchyard south electrical bus was de-energized. Emergency diesel generator (EDG) '22' automatically started in response to the loss of offsite power on the train 'B' engineered safety feature (ESF) electrical bus. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in the valid actuation of an emergency AC electrical power system (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8)). All required loads were successfully started. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The initial loss of the south electrical bus, partial loss of off-site power, put the plant in a 24 hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) in accordance with (IAW) technical specification (TS) 3.8.1.1.E. Power was restored to the train 'B' ESF bus via an alternate offsite power source and the EDG was returned to its automatic standby condition. Currently, the plant is in a 72 hour LCO IAW TS 3.8.1.1.A. |
| ENS 56875 | 29 November 2023 17:02:00 | Indian Point | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This notification is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), as a result of notifications made to State and local government agencies for the discovery of an oil sheen in the discharge canal outside Unit 3. The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation and Westchester County Department of Health were notified. No sheen was observed in the river or at the southern end of the discharge canal near the outfall gates. Clean up efforts are underway. The licensee will notify the NRC Project Manager. |
| ENS 56861 | 16 November 2023 21:30:00 | South Texas | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: 11/05/23, 2200 CST: Essential Chiller 'B' train and associated cascading equipment were declared INOPERABLE for planned maintenance. Unit 2 entered the Configuration Risk Management Program as required by Technical Specifications on 11/12/23 at 2200. 11/16/23, 1541: Essential Chiller 'C' train and associated cascading equipment were declared INOPERABLE due to an unexpected material condition causing the Essential Chiller to trip. The most limiting (Limiting Condition of Operability) LCO is 3.7.7, Action c. This condition resulted in the INOPERABILITY of two of the three safety trains required for the accident mitigating function including: High Head Safety Injection, Low Head Safety Injection, Containment Spray, Electrical Auxiliary Building HVAC, Control Room Envelope HVAC, Essential Chilled Water. This is an 8 hour reportable condition per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because it could affect the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. A risk analysis was performed for the equipment INOPERABILITY and mitigating actions have been taken per site procedures. All 'A' train equipment remains operable. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The 'B' train Emergency Diesel Generator was also inoperable due to planned maintenance and continues to be inoperable. It was considered in the Configuration Risk Management Program and it was determined this condition could be maintained. LCO 3.7.7, Action c requires reactor shutdown within 72 hours. |
| ENS 56850 | 12 November 2023 22:02:00 | Watts Bar | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On November 12, 2023, at 0300 EST, a Watts Bar contractor was transported offsite for medical treatment due to a work-related injury. Upon arrival at an offsite medical facility, medical personnel determined the injury required the individual to be admitted into the hospital and will be kept overnight. The individual was inside of the Radiological Controlled Area, however was free released with no contamination. The injury and hospitalization were reported to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) under 29 CFR 1904.39(a)(2). The contracting agency informed OSHA at 1319 EST. Watt Bar Operations personnel were officially notified by the contracting agency of the report made to OSHA at 1945 EST. This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56848 | 10 November 2023 22:52:00 | South Texas | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 11/10/23 at 0642 CST, essential chiller 'B' train and cascading equipment was declared inoperable due to chill water temperature exceeding limits. At 1413 CST, essential chiller 'C' train and cascading equipment was declared inoperable due to discharge pressure exceeding limits. This condition resulted in an inoperable condition on two out of the three safety trains for the accident mitigating function including the 'B' and 'C' train high head safety injection, low head safety injection, containment spray, electrical auxiliary building HVAC, control room envelope HVAC, and essential chill water. All 'A' train equipment remained operable. This was determined to be reportable within 8 hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Plant is in a 72 hour limiting condition for operation per technical specification 3.7.7. Restoration of 'B' train anticipated on 11/11/23 mid day. |
| ENS 56845 | 9 November 2023 15:55:00 | Sequoyah | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via email: A controlled substance was found in the protected area. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56838 | 7 November 2023 18:18:00 | Seabrook | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On November 07, 2023 at 1200 EST, it was discovered that all pumps in the Auxiliary Feedwater system were inoperable due to the loss of control power to the 'B' train Emergency Feedwater (EFW) flow control valve which supplies the 'D' steam generator. The redundant 'A' train EFW control valve for the 'D' steam generator remains functional, as well as the capability of the Auxiliary Feedwater system to supply all steam generators. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The 'A' and 'B' EFW Flow Control Valves are arranged in a series configuration for each Steam Generator. Failure of any of the 8 EFW Flow Control Valves to meet its Surveillance Requirements will render all EFW Pumps inoperable per tech specs. |
| ENS 56832 | 4 November 2023 01:11:00 | Comanche Peak | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 11/03/2023 at 2231 CDT, a security officer found 2 bottles of vanilla extract in the protected area. One bottle was a 1.5 ounce size with a trace amount of vanilla in the bottle, the other bottle was a 4.5 ounce size with approximately 1 ounce of vanilla. Alcohol was identified as an ingredient on the label. It was determined the vanilla extract is 35 percent alcohol by volume (ABV), above the 0.5 percent ABV considered low alcohol content. Security personnel took custody of the bottles of vanilla extract. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56809 | 21 October 2023 09:25:00 | Watts Bar | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax and email: Fire potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: At 0907 EST, the licensee declared a notification of unusual event, under emergency action level HU.4, due to multiple fire alarms and CO2 discharge in the emergency diesel building. When the plant fire brigade entered the building, there was no indication of fire or damage to any plant equipment. The cause of the multiple alarms is under investigation. State and local authorities were notified and no offsite assistance was requested. Both units remain at 100 percent power. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
At 1007 EDT, Watts Bar terminated the notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that no fire or damaged plant equipment was found. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller), IR-MOC (Crouch), NRR-EO (Felts), DHS-SWO, FEMA Ops Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) is retracting Event Notice 56809, Notice of Unusual Event, based on the following additional information, not available at the time of the initial notification. Specifically, in accordance with the emergency preparedness implementing procedures, WBN reported a condition that was determined to meet emergency action level (EAL) HU4, Initiating criteria number 1, receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indicators and the fire was within any Table H2 plant area, which includes the diesel generator building. It was further determined that multiple fire detection zones actuated (spurious and invalid) enabling the discharge of installed fire suppression (CO2) into the space. Upon entry by the site fire brigade, it was determined that no smoke or fire existed and reported to the Shift Manager at 0930 EDT. All fire alarms were reset. Troubleshooting activities are in progress to determine the cause. A fire watch has been established and CO2 has been isolated. The required compensatory measures for the affected areas will remain in place until completion of the investigation, and CO2 suppression is restored to functional. Notified R2DO (Miller), IR-MOC (Crouch), NRR-EO (Felts), DHS-SWO (email), FEMA Ops Center (email), CISA Central (email), FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email). |
| ENS 56802 | 18 October 2023 15:18:00 | McGuire | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On October 18, 2023, at 1116 (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 5, an automatic actuation of the 1A auxiliary feedwater motor driven pump occurred when an incorrect action resulted in an automatic start signal. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. Feedwater is not needed for plant conditions, and the 1A auxiliary feedwater pump did not feed the steam generators. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56781 | 6 October 2023 18:12:00 | Diablo Canyon | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On August 8, 2023, at 1107 hours pacific daylight time (PDT) with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an invalid actuation occurred when Unit 1 4-kV vital bus 'G' was automatically transferred from auxiliary power to startup power due to an invalid bus under voltage signal, which occurred during planned maintenance activities. As a result of the actuation signal, auxiliary salt water and containment fan cooling units transferred automatically and started as designed. Plant systems responded as expected. This event was entered into the Diablo Canyon Power Plant corrective action program for resolution. There was no plant or public safety impact. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56769 | 1 October 2023 03:02:00 | Diablo Canyon | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2014 (PDT) on 09/30/2023, with (Diablo Canyon) Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 11 percent reactor power in preparation for a pre-planned manual reactor trip into a scheduled refueling outage, the reactor was manually tripped due to a failed secondary system dump valve. Auxiliary feedwater was manually started in accordance with plant procedures. This event is being reported in accordance with the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no plant or public safety impact. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Diablo Canyon Unit 2 was unaffected. |
| ENS 56723 | 6 September 2023 19:24:00 | Callaway | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 09/06/2023, at approximately 0830 (CDT), a bottle of vanilla extract, intended for use in cooking, with an alcohol content of greater than 0.5 percent by volume was found in the protected area. An immediate extent-of-condition search of other kitchen areas within the protected area identified four additional bottles of vanilla extract or imitation vanilla extract, for a total of five bottles identified. The alcohol content by volume (ABV) of these extracts ranged from an unlisted percentage (with ethyl alcohol as a listed ingredient) up to 41 percent ABV. The volume capacities of the bottles ranged from 2 to 8 fluid ounces, with varying volumes of remaining contents. |
| ENS 56715 | 5 September 2023 17:22:00 | Comanche Peak | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: A supplemental contract manager had a confirmed positive for an illegal substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. |
| ENS 56714 | 5 September 2023 17:05:00 | McGuire | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The contract supervisor's access to the plant has been terminated. |
| ENS 56702 | 30 August 2023 14:57:00 | Comanche Peak | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 07/05/2023, at 0130 hours, a security officer found a 1 ounce bottle of vanilla extract in the protected area. Alcohol was identified as an ingredient on the ingredients label. It was determined the alcohol by volume (ABV) for vanilla extract is 35 percent ABV, above the 0.5 percent ABV considered low alcohol content. Vanilla extract is not listed as a prohibited item within Comanche Peak procedures. The initial reporting assessment of not reportable has been questioned during an in-process security access inspection and reassessed as a reportable condition. Emergency Notification System notification should have been made by 0130 CDT on 07/06/2023. This report restores compliance. The NRC Resident will be notified. |
| ENS 56698 | 25 August 2023 23:39:00 | Byron | NRC Region 3 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At approximately 1600 CDT on 8/25/2023, a partial loss of the commercial phone communications system occurred that affects the emergency notification system (ENS) and the functionality of an emergency response facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification of a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Communications via alternate methods were subsequently established. The telecommunications provider has not provided an estimated repair time. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56694 | 24 August 2023 08:24:00 | Vogtle 1/2 | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: A non-licensed contract supervisor failed a test specified by the FFD testing program. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified |
| ENS 56692 | 22 August 2023 21:05:00 | Vogtle 1/2 | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1724 EDT, on August 22, 2023, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a failure of the non-safety heater drain pump 'B' and the failure of the non-safety condensate pump 'A' to automatically or manually start. At 1735 EDT, a fire was identified on heater drain pump 'B' and was extinguished by the onsite fire brigade at 1807 EDT. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. The trip was not complex, with all safety systems responding normally post-trip. Decay heat is being removed by the main steam system to the main condenser using the steam dumps. There was no impact to Units 2, 3, or 4. An automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) also occurred, as expected, due to lo-lo steam generator levels resulting from the reactor trip. AFW is currently controlling all steam generator levels at their normal levels. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the notification of another government agency, the Burke County Fire Department, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The Burke County Fire Department was not needed to extinguish the fire. This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56660 | 4 August 2023 20:51:00 | Watts Bar | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1746 EDT on 08/04/2023, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to number 2 steam generator low low level. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by using the auxiliary feedwater and steam dump systems. Unit 1 is not affected. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The expected actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight-hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All control rods are fully inserted. The cause of the number 2 steam generator low low level is being investigated. |
| ENS 56645 | 30 July 2023 18:20:00 | Seabrook | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On July 30, 2023 at 1526 EDT, with unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to low main turbine electro-hydraulic control oil level. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat removal is being accomplished using the steam dumps in steam pressure mode to the main condenser. Emergency Feedwater actuated due to low-low steam generator level as expected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56620 | 12 July 2023 12:49:00 | Millstone | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0449 (EDT) on 7/12/2023, Millstone Unit 3 declared the 'B' train of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) inoperable due to a degraded damper associated with the ventilation support system for the 'B' charging pump. At the time of this event, the 'A' train of service water was already inoperable due to planned maintenance on a breaker that would have prevented an 'A' service water valve powered from this breaker from closing on a safety signal. This configuration resulted in the possibility that the 'A' train of ECCS would not have been available to fulfill its design function under all postulated accident conditions. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), '(any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (B) remove residual heat).' Subsequently, the 'A' train of service water was restored to operable at 0548 on 7/12/2023. Repairs and investigation continue on the 'B' train ECCS damper. The NRC resident has been notified. This event did not impact Millstone Unit 2. There was no impact to the public.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email: The condition was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), via an 8-hour report as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat. A subsequent engineering review of the conditions that existed at the time determined that, based on area temperature response, any impact on ventilation flows into and out of the `B' charging pump cubicle did not generate an observable change in the temperature trend. Based on this, it is concluded with reasonable assurance that the functional requirement of the support system was maintained and the `B' charging pump would have continued to perform its safety function until the `A' train of service water was restored to operable and as a result safety function was not lost. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number 56620 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion has been provided to the NRC Resident Inspector." Notified R1DO (Bicket). |
| ENS 56593 | 27 June 2023 19:04:00 | Watts Bar | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1626 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a main turbine trip. The (reactor) trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed using the auxiliary feedwater and steam dump systems. Unit 1 is not affected. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The expected actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All control rods are fully inserted. The cause of the turbine trip is being investigated. |
| ENS 56592 | 27 June 2023 11:52:00 | Sequoyah | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0831 (EDT) on June 27, 2023, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant reported an oil discharge into the plant intake located on the Tennessee River to the (Department of Transportation) National Response Center (report number 1371356). The source of oil was from a broken hydraulic hose from equipment in use on the intake. This oil spill is minor and did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56580 | 16 June 2023 22:16:00 | Comanche Peak | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: (On June 16, 2023,) at 1832 CDT, Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped on lo-lo level in the '1-04' steam generator (SG). Prior to the trip, the 1B (main feedwater pump) (MFP) tripped due to speed oscillations and a runback to 700MW was in progress. Both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps started due to the lo-lo level in SG '1-04'. Unit 1 is being maintained in hot standby (Mode 3) in accordance with Integrated Plant Operating Procedure IPO-007A. The Emergency Response Guideline network has been exited. Decay heat is being rejected to the main condenser via the steam dump valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Unit 1 is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up. There was no effect on Unit 2 due to the Unit 1 trip. |
| ENS 56576 | 15 June 2023 09:35:00 | Byron | NRC Region 3 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via email: A non-licensed, non-supervisory employee was identified bringing a prohibited item into the protected area. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56564 | 8 June 2023 09:37:00 | Seabrook | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On April 12, 2023, with Seabrook Station Unit 1 in Mode 6 at zero percent power, a valid actuation of the 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) emergency power sequencer occurred due to a loss of power to the 'B' train emergency bus. The 'B' EDG was removed from service for scheduled maintenance during this time. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid actuation of the 'B' EDG emergency power sequencer. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56565 | 8 June 2023 09:37:00 | Seabrook | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 05/06/2023, at 1552 (EDT) with Seabrook Unit 1 in Mode 3 at zero percent power, while performing digital rod position indication system surveillance testing, shutdown bank 'E' stopped withdrawing. In response, the reactor trip breakers were manually opened, initiating a valid actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS). Subsequently, at 2253 while continuing to perform digital rod position indication system surveillance testing, shutdown bank 'C 'stopped inserting. Reactor trip breakers were manually opened, initiating a valid actuation of the RPS. The RPS responded as designed during both events, and both actuations are being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56561 | 7 June 2023 11:00:00 | Callaway | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information is summary provided by the licensee via email: A non-licensed supervisor was found to have falsified fitness for duty reports for a period of two months. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56556 | 5 June 2023 17:26:00 | Seabrook | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On June 2, 2023, a blind specimen provided to a laboratory did not analyze as expected. The specimen reported a false negative for amphetamines and a false positive for opiates. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(c)(2) and 10 CFR 26.719(c)(3). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Follow-up investigation by an independent Health and Human Services laboratory confirmed that the blind specimen in question was analyzed correctly. The error is thought to have occurred during the preparation of the blind specimen, prior to delivery to the site. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." Notified R1DO (Eve) and FFD Group (email) |
| ENS 56544 | 30 May 2023 08:34:00 | Millstone | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0446 EDT on 5/30/2023, with Millstone Power Station Unit 3 operating at approximately 100 percent reactor power, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip caused by electrical protection. The reactor trip was uncomplicated and decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser. All systems responded as expected to the trip. Auxiliary feedwater actuated automatically as expected following the trip due to low-low levels in the steam generators. There was no risk to the public. There was no impact to Millstone Unit 2. This event is being reported as a four hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as a condition that resulted in actuation of the reactor protection system while the reactor was critical, and as an eight hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) for actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56541 | 25 May 2023 17:02:00 | Watts Bar | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1345 EDT on May 25, 2023, it was determined that a fire barrier for area 737-A1B was not installed, and would render the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) not operable in the event of a fire on the Unit 2 side of elevation 737 in the Auxiliary Building. The 2A EDG is the credited power source for fire safe shutdown for a fire located in this area. Without the credited source of power, this places WBN U2 (Watts Bar Nuclear Unit 2) in an unanalyzed condition. A fire watch has been established in the area until the issue is resolved. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56522 | 17 May 2023 18:21:00 | Diablo Canyon | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On May 17, 2023, at 0649 PDT, it was determined that a prohibited item had been found inside the protected area. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56521 | 17 May 2023 03:25:00 | South Texas | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On May 16, 2023, it was determined that a licensed operator violated the station's FFD policy. The employee's unescorted access at South Texas has been terminated. This event was determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii). The NRC resident inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56520 | 16 May 2023 17:20:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1127 CDT on 5/16/2023, during the reperformance of test procedure 'STS PE-006, Charcoal Adsorber In-Place Leak Test' due to a failure from the previous day, both trains of emergency exhaust were rendered inoperable due to incorrect performance of the procedure. Performers incorrectly de-energized the humidity control heating coil for the unit not under test, rendering it inoperable. This issue was identified and rectified at 1138 CDT on 5/16/2023, exiting the LCO (limiting condition of operation) for both trains inoperable at that time. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public.
The initial failure of the STS PE-006 test was caused by a malfunction of the test equipment which initially injected excessive amounts of tracer gas and caused saturation of the charcoal. Using test equipment sourced from Callaway, and following guidance from the vendor, STS PE-006 test was successfully passed on 5/17/2023. No maintenance or intrusive testing was performed on the unit between initial test failure and satisfactory completion of the test. Because this train of emergency exhaust was not actually inoperable at the time the second train was rendered inoperable due to incorrect procedure performance, there was no loss of safety function. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gepford). |
| ENS 56503 | 4 May 2023 12:25:00 | Indian Point | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following summary was provided by the licensee via phone: On May 4, 2023 at 1145 EDT, the licensee found contact dose rates of 215 and 555 millirem-per-hour at 2 separate spots on the top of an exclusive use package during receipt survey. These dose rates are above the 200 millirem-per-hour allowable. No loose surface contamination was identified. The package contains tools from Holtec and was intact on delivery. The package has subsequently been secured in a locked radiation storage building. No overexposure or unauthorized exposure resulted to plant personnel. The licensee suspects shielding, internal to the package, may have shifted and the licensee will investigate further. Dose rates at one foot from the package were recorded at 65 millirem per hour. |
| ENS 56480 | 20 April 2023 13:29:00 | Comanche Peak | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: Notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A) and (v)(D) At time 1630 CDT on 4/18/23, Comanche Peak Unit 1 entered TS (Technical Specification) 3.0.3 for 11 minutes due to declaring Train A component cooling water (CCW) inoperable in conjunction with a Train B centrifugal charging pump (CCP) inoperable for scheduled maintenance. This resulted in an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, high head injection of the emergency core cooling system. CCP 1-02 and fan cooler were tagged out of service at 0400 CDT on 4/18/23 due to scheduled maintenance activities. Containment spray (CT) pump 1-03 seal oil cooler CCW leak was found by a watchstander at 0930 CDT on 4/18/23. Engineering determined that leakage was CCW from a pipe flange weld after insulation removal and could not (determine) operability and notified control room at 1630 CDT on 4/18/23. This placed unit 1 in a TS 3.0.3 condition from 1630 to 1641 CDT for approximately 11 minutes until CCP 1-02 was restored back to operable status. CCW was declared operable at 1912 after CT pump 1-03 seal oil cooler was isolated. CT pump 1-03 remained inoperable until weld repair completed. Train A CT pump 1-03 declared operable at 1211 CDT 4/19/23. ENS notification should have been made by 0030 CDT on 4/19/23. This report restores compliance. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: Although Comanche Peak Unit 1 conservatively entered a limiting condition for operation action statement and performed repairs immediately, further engineering inspection and evaluation concluded that the CCW system was fully able to provide the needed flow to the 1-03 CT pump seal coolers from the time of discovery (0930 CDT) until which time the piping was isolated for repairs. During this period, structural integrity of the joint was maintained, CCW inventory loss remained within acceptable limits, and CCW could perform its intended design and safety functions. Based on this revised operability determination, train A CCW was always operable, and TS 3.0.3 did not apply. Therefore, reportability requirements per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A) and (v)(D) did not apply, and a 60 day LER will not be submitted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Young) |
| ENS 56451 | 2 April 2023 11:29:00 | McGuire | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On April 2, 2023, at 0341 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 and the 2B main feedwater pump feeding the steam generators, the 2A main feedwater pump recirculation valve, 2CF-76, failed. Further, observation of the operating 2B main feedwater pump recirculation valve, 2CF-81, called into question its functionality. At 0352 EDT, operations manually started the auxiliary feedwater motor driven pumps to feed the stream generators to allow maintenance on the main feedwater system. The auxiliary feedwater motor driven pumps started as designed. Flow to the steam generator was not adversely impacted during this sequence. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56439 | 30 March 2023 04:26:00 | South Texas | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At approximately 0037 CDT on March 30, 2023, a non-responsive individual at South Texas Project (STP) Electric Generating Station was transported offsite for treatment at an offsite medical facility. The offsite medical facility notified STP Nuclear Operating Company that the individual had been declared deceased as of 0103 CDT. The fatality was not work-related, and the individual was outside of the radiologically controlled area. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for an on-site fatality and notification of another government agency. OSHA will be notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56401 | 9 March 2023 17:51:00 | Callaway | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At approximately 1153 CST on March 9, 2023, a contract worker was injured requiring an ambulance transport to a local hospital. Union Electric (Ameren Missouri) subsequently learned that the individual requires an overnight hospital stay. This event is reportable to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration per 29 CFR 1904.39(a)(2) by the contract worker's employer and is reportable to the Missouri Public Service Commission in accordance with Missouri regulation 20 CSR 4240-3.190(3)(A). This notification is being made to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to other government notification. The individual was not working in a radiologically controlled area. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. |
| ENS 56352 | 16 February 2023 13:26:00 | Braidwood | NRC Region 3 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. |
| ENS 56366 | 16 February 2023 11:33:00 | McGuire | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On February 16, 2023 at 0859 EST, a contract worker at McGuire was transported off-site for treatment at an off-site medical facility. Upon arrival at the off-site medical facility, medical personnel declared the individual deceased at 0915 EST. The fatality was not work-related and the individual was inside the Radiologically Controlled Area. An on-site survey confirmed that neither the individual nor the individual's clothing were contaminated. A notification will be made to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for an on-site fatality and notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56345 | 9 February 2023 14:53:00 | McGuire | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of a Licensee Event Report as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid system actuation. On January 1, 2023, at approximately 0604 EST, static inverter KXA failed causing a loss of power to shared 120-VAC auxiliary control panel board KXA. Operations entered the appropriate procedures to assist in diagnosing and responding to the event. As expected, the solenoid valves in the instrument lines to steam supply valves 1SA-48ABC and 1SA-49AB deenergized, causing 1SA-48ABC and 1SA-49AB to open and admit steam to the unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP). Operations reduced turbine load to maintain reactor power less than 100 percent. At approximately 0641 EST, power was restored to the KXA panelboard and the TDAFWP was secured. All systems functioned as required. Actuation of the TDAFWP was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system nor was the actuation due to an intentional manual initiation. Therefore, this actuation is considered an invalid actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56354 | 6 February 2023 13:26:00 | Byron | NRC Region 3 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. |
| ENS 56322 | 25 January 2023 13:22:00 | Sequoyah | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information is a synopsis of information provided by the licensee via fax and phone: On May 23, 2022, Framatome informed Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) of a deviation of breakers purchased under contract. On January 23, 2023, TVA determined that a defect of the basic component could create a substantial safety hazard. Framatome Inc. identified a deviation in the Siemens medium voltage vacuum circuit breaker where a failure to electrically charge or electrically close could occur. Framatome Inc. identified this as a departure from the technical requirements included in the procurement document. It is noted that the ability to electrically trip the circuit breaker would not be affected by the condition. TVA was notified by Framatome under 10 CFR 21.21(b) to evaluate the application of the breaker for a substantial safety hazard. The TVA evaluation identified these breakers as intended for use in safety related Class 1E applications where a loss of the closure function would impact mitigation of design basis accidents and transients. During the Framatome dedication testing/inspection of Siemens medium voltage vacuum breakers, a hi-pot test failure on one circuit breaker was encountered. Troubleshooting and inspection found damage to charging motor wiring. It was determined that the cause of the damage was due to the manner in which control wiring was routed and connected to the internal bracket in close proximity to a bracket edge. This edge caused damage to wiring after significant number of cycles were applied to the breaker prior to dedication testing. TVA received nine medium voltage vacuum circuit breakers at an offsite warehouse facility. While located at that facility, TVA, with assistance from Framatome, examined the affected breakers for the wire routing condition. The wiring harnesses of certain breakers were corrected. Framatome is to examine medium voltage vacuum circuit breakers that may be purchased under this contract for the wiring condition and correct as necessary before delivery. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i).
The following information is a synopsis of information provided by the licensee via phone: The Sequoyah site licensing manager requested via phone call to the HOO that the model number for the basic component with the defect be listed in the Part 21 event narrative in addition to the official Part 21 report. The component discussed is a Siemens 6.9kV, 1200A, 125VDC Vacuum Circuit Breaker, Model No.: 7-HKR-50-1200-130. Notified R2DO (Miller) and the Part 21 Reactors Group (Email). |
| ENS 56316 | 19 January 2023 13:20:00 | McGuire | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 01/19/23 at approximately 1000 EST, the emergency sirens in Catawba County, Gaston County, Iredell County, Lincoln County, and Mecklenburg County were inadvertently activated by an offsite agency during a planned silent test. The sirens are in the McGuire Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). Duke Energy notified the state and all counties within the EPZ. Mecklenburg County has issued a press release. This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56294 | 4 January 2023 06:08:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2259 EST on 1/3/2023, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 1 B and Unit 2 A emergency diesel generator (EDG) systems, as well as an actuation of the associated auxiliary feedwater (AFW) systems on each unit occurred. The reason for the EDG auto-starts was due to a loss of an offsite power source (loss of one of the two reserve auxiliary transformers (RAT) on each unit) to the Unit 1 B and Unit 2 A safety related buses. The EDG and AFW systems automatically started as designed when the valid undervoltage signal on the affected safety related bus was received. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and the Auxiliary Feedwater Systems for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56286 | 24 December 2022 05:08:00 | Salem | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0222 (EST) on 12/24/22, with Unit 2 at 100 percent power during steady state operation, the reactor automatically tripped and a safety injection actuated due to steam generator differential pressure. The trip and safety injection were not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. An actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system occurred following the reactor trip as expected due to low level in the steam generators. The unit is stable in Mode 3. The turbine bypass steam dumps and auxiliary feedwater system are removing decay heat. Salem Unit 1 was not affected. Due to the actuation of the reactor protection system while critical, this event is being reported as a four hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56274 | 15 December 2022 12:52:00 | Watts Bar | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with paragraphs 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) actuation at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1. On November 24, 2022, at 1621 Eastern Standard Time (EST), the Train B CVI actuated due to an invalid high radiation signal from 1-RM-90-131, Containment Purge Air Exhaust Monitor. Upon investigation, the high radiation signal was caused by a failed power supply. Corrective action included replacing the power supply, 1-RM-90-131 ratemeter, and restoring the system to service. Prior to and following the invalid high radiation alarm, all radiation monitors except 1-RM-90-131 were stable at their normal values; therefore, the CVI was invalid. Control room operators performed appropriate checks and confirmed that all required automatic actuations occurred as designed. This event has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 1819098. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 56269 | 12 December 2022 11:05:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On October 13, 2022, during Refueling Outage 25, 2 bolts and 2 washers were discovered in the strainer basket upstream of the main steam stop valve in the steam line from the 'A' steam generator. It was determined that these bolts and washers were from the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) upstream of the stop valve. One bolt and one washer were also determined to be missing from the MSIV on the line from the 'B' steam generator. The MSIVs are a similar design as the Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs). It appears that the torque values for these backseat bolts provided by the vendor weren't sufficient to prevent the bolts from coming loose. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation personnel evaluated the condition and determined that the inadequate torque values provided by the vendor could have constituted a substantial safety hazard if left uncorrected. In particular, if bolts had come loose from the MFIVs, they could have traveled downstream to the steam generators and then challenged the integrity of steam generator tubes. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification will be provided within 30 days. |