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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5546215 September 2021 11:30:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0658 CDT on 09/15/2021 a non work-related death occurred of a site employee. The individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area. This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5545913 September 2021 23:47:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn September 13, 2021, at 1822 EDT, an apparent non-compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2 (separation of redundant fire safe shutdown equipment) was identified. Specifically, it was determined that some Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) cables may be susceptible to a hot short/spurious operation to the close circuit. A spurious closure of the emergency bus normal supply breakers after the EDG is powering the bus could result in non-synchronous paralleling, EDG overloading, or EDG output breaker tripping due to faulted power cable from normal supply breaker. The spurious closure of the normal supply breakers is not currently addressed in the Appendix R Report or previous Multiple Spurious Operations (MSO) analysis. This condition is associated with the Appendix R safe-shutdown function of the Emergency Power System. The Emergency Power System is considered operable but not fully qualified for its safety-related design function. The following fire areas are impacted: 1) Fire Area 13, Unit 1 Normal Switchgear Room 2) Fire Area 46, Unit 1 Cable Tray Room 3) Fire Area 3, Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room 4) Fire Area 2, Unit 2 Cable Vault and Tunnel Until this condition is analyzed, Surry has implemented mitigating actions in the above fire areas. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This is also reportable as a 60-day written report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as CR (condition report) 1180502. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. Mitigating actions include posting fire watches in the affected areas.
ENS 5545712 September 2021 22:41:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn September 12, 2021, at 1728 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) while performing inspections of the North Anna Power Station Unit 1 reactor vessel head flange area, a weld leak was identified on the reactor vessel flange leak-off line that connects to the flange between the inner and outer head o-rings. Entered TRM 3.4.6 Condition B for ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components. With known leakage past the inner head o-ring, this condition is reported since the fault in the tubing is considered pressure boundary (Reactor Coolant System) leakage. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded. The NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 554508 September 2021 17:12:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1337 (EDT) on 9/8/2021, V.C. Summer reported the overflow of the Nuclear Operations Building Lift Station (LS-3) to the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. The lift station overflow was due to a broken discharge pipe from Pump 1 to the common discharge header. The overflow was contained in the valve vault, basin gravel, and the nearby concrete surface. None of the overflow reached any storm drains or waters of the state. This release did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5541318 August 2021 01:07:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 0024 EDT on 8/18/21, an unusual event was declared (EAL HU 4.1) due to receipt of multiple fire alarms and halon discharge in the cable tunnel. At 0036, the fire brigade verified no signs of fire. Unit 1 remained at 100 percent power and stable. The area is currently being ventilated. Unit 2 was not affected by this event. The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. R1 Public Affairs (Screnci) was notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT KLINDWORTH TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0414 EDT ON 8/18/21 * * *

At 0401 EDT, Beaver Valley terminated their notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that there was no indication of fire. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified State and local authorities. Notified R1DO (Jackson), IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Felts), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5537522 July 2021 20:28:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn July 20, 2021, at 1707 EDT, an apparent non-compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2 (separation of redundant fire safe shutdown equipment) was identified. This issue was initially categorized as not affecting train separation or the ability of the equipment to perform their Design Basis functions. The original concern was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as CR1177199. Subsequently, on July 22, 2021, at 1751 EDT, a further review of the affected control circuits for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) output breakers and emergency bus feeder breakers identified a concern that breaker position interlocks routed to or through non-safety related components or spaces may affect the ability to provide emergency power on the affected unit due to impacts on the control power circuits during an Appendix R fire associated with a loss of offsite power. The following are the affected fire areas: - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Buildings - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cable Spreading Rooms - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Normal (307) Switchgear Rooms This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This is also reportable as a 60-day written report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as CR 1177399. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
ENS 5536520 July 2021 13:06:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 552999 June 2021 15:02:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1115 EDT on June 9, 2021, during a siren activation test, a loss of the capability to activate the sirens from both Surry local activation sites was identified. The Virginia EOC was participating in the activation test and is aware of the issue and notified the local government authorities in the Surry EPZ of the situation. The NRC Resident has been notified of this issue. The station telecommunications department has been contacted and is aware of the issue. In the event that a radiological emergency should occur at the Surry Power Station, Primary Route Alerting procedures will be put in use by the local jurisdictions. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to notification of other state and local government agencies of the failure of the Alert & Notification system for Surry.

  • * * PARTIAL RETRACTION ON 6/18/2021 AT 0959 FROM STEPHEN MITCHELL TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

Surry Power Station Event Notification 55299 is being retracted based upon further evaluation. Surry has three localities (State SAU, James City, and Surry County) with access to the redundant activation trains (primary and backup systems). The actuation tests only one primary and one backup activation panel at two localities, only primary at the State SAU (Situational Awareness Unit) and back up at James City County were tested. Follow-up telecom and vendor investigation revealed that the primary server was functional from James City County that would have actuated all 71 sirens; Consequently, it was concluded that all of the sirens were fully functional from the James City primary system and there was no loss of all sirens as originally reported on 6/9/2021 (EN 55299). EN 55299 also contained a 4-hour Offsite Notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) that is unaffected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 552978 June 2021 08:37:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 552396 May 2021 14:00:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn May 6, 2021 at 1223 (EDT), Unit 1 was manually tripped from 60 percent power due to degrading main condenser vacuum. Unit 1 was in the process of decreasing power due to increased secondary sodium levels identified earlier in the day. The Operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized Unit 1 in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. This reactor protection actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Auxiliary Feedwater pumps actuated as designed as a result of the reactor trip and provided makeup flow to the steam generators. The automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps is reportable per 10 CFR 50,72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid actuation of an ESF (Engineered Safeguards Features) system. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system. The electrical system is in normal lineup for shutdown conditions. There was no effect on Unit 2 operation. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5521325 April 2021 11:50:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1200 EDT on April 25, 2021, planned maintenance activities on the Harris Nuclear Plant Seismic Monitoring System will be performed. The work includes performance of preventive maintenance and system upgrades. The work duration is approximately 10 days and compensatory measures will be in place for seismic monitoring. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a planned loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5515324 March 2021 22:06:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAn Unusual Event was declared at Turkey Point Unit 4 Nuclear Generating Station at 2129 EDT on 03/24/2021 due to a Fire Alarm in Containment. The licensee was not able to validate the alarm within 15 minutes. Following containment entry there was not smoke or fire present. At 2214 EDT, Turkey Point Unit 4 Nuclear Generating Station terminated the Unusual Event. The cause of the spurious fire alarm is under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Felts), R2DO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
ENS 551171 March 2021 14:07:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 3/1/21 at 1112 EST, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent Rated Thermal Power (RTP), the reactor automatically tripped. Auxiliary Feedwater initiated as designed to provide Steam Generator (S/G) water level control. Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) have been exited and General Operating Procedures (GOPs) were entered. Unit 3 is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All rods are inserted, decay heat is being removed via S/G through normal secondary systems. The plant is in a normal electrical line-up. The cause of the automatic reactor trip is (unknown at this time and is) being investigated. There was no effect on Unit 4.
ENS 5510920 February 2021 22:00:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1830 (EST) on 02/20/21, Turkey Point Nuclear Station Security identified three distressed individuals, potentially drowning, in the bay just offshore of the Owner Controlled Area. The licensee contacted the U.S. Coast Guard and local sheriffs department for assistance. At 1852 all 3 individuals were reported as safe and onshore. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b )(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 550999 February 2021 11:00:00RobinsonNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 0800 on February 9, 2021, thirty-one (31) H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant Offsite Emergency Notification sirens in Darlington County, SC were inadvertently actuated. The Darlington County Emergency Services and South Carolina Emergency Management Division were promptly notified. The actuation lasted for three (3) minutes at full volume. The cause of the actuation is under investigation at this time. Capability to notify the public was never degraded during the inadvertent actuation. All Emergency Notification sirens remain in service. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Offsite Notification, as a four (4) hour report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A local news agency did report about the alarms sounding and reported that there was no concern at the site.
ENS 5507921 January 2021 17:10:00RobinsonNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). At 0946 hrs on December 1, 2020, with unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0% power, an invalid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 'A' and 'B', 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump, 'A' Service Water Booster Pump (SWBP), and Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) Pumps 'A' and 'B' occurred. The actuation was caused by a Safety Injection (SI) signal while installing simulations to support Reactor Safeguards testing. The SI signal occurred when two out of three logic was met for Low Pressurizer Pressure, which was caused by a high resistance connection to a test point from a loose test lead. All aligned equipment, 'A' and 'B' EDGs, 'A' RHR Pump, 'A' SWBP and 'A' and 'B' AFW Pumps, responded properly to the auto-start signal and the actuation was complete. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5504017 December 2020 22:03:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn December 17, 2020 at 1539 EST, with Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 preparing for entry into Mode 4, the Reactor Coolant System was pressurized greater than 1000 psig for approximately 15 minutes with all three Cold Leg Injection Accumulator Discharge Valves closed. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Both Low Head and High Head Safety Injection Systems were operable at this time. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5503816 December 2020 12:19:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn December 16, 2020 at 0851 EST, with Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 80 percent power, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to lockout of the main generator. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The initial assessment of this event indicates that there was a ground fault on the 'B' train of the non-safety electrical distribution system that caused the main generator lockout. Steam generator levels are being maintained by normal feedwater through the feedwater regulator bypass valves. Decay heat is being removed by using the condenser steam dump flow path. Due to the unplanned Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All rods inserted into the core during the trip. The electrical grid is stable and all safe shutdown equipment is available for service. No reliefs lifted during the transient.
ENS 5503614 December 2020 20:21:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1240 EST on 12/14/20, it was determined that all Unit 4 Charging Pumps and Boration Flowpaths were simultaneously inoperable. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 2/10/2021 AT 1210 EST FROM DAVID STOIA TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

On 1/21/21 a past operability review was completed that assessed the event reported on 12/14/20. The evaluation concluded that the condition did not render any Unit 4 Charging Pump or all boration flowpaths inoperable, and that the 8-hour notification submitted on 12/14/20 was not required. This notification is a retraction of EN #55036. The NRC Site Resident has been notified of the EN #55036 retraction. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 5503514 December 2020 15:00:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 2214 EST on 12/12/20, Surry Power Station personnel identified leakage from the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Cooling System to the ground. Leakage was estimated to be greater than 100 gallons and tritium concentration determined to be 4.5E07 picocuries per liter (pCi/L), requiring report in accordance with the industry voluntary groundwater protection program. As such, at 1450 EST on 12/14/2020, the Surry County Administrator, NRC Resident, Virginia Department of Health, Virginia Department of Emergency Management, and Virginia Department of Environmental Quality were notified of this release to the environment. Due to the offsite agency notifications, this 4-hour, non-emergency report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 550171 December 2020 17:00:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn December 1, 2020 at 1116 EST, a condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered during surveillance testing. The issue resulted in a loss of TSC functionality due to a high flow rate measured on outside air intake fans. The cause of the high flow rate is under investigation. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with site procedures. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 533938 May 2018 10:38:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn May 8, 2018 at 0139 Central Daylight Time, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 declared containment inoperable due to total containment leak rate greater than technical specifications. The 1B containment cooler had seat leakage of approximately 30 gallons per minute from a service water drain valve. Though the containment cooler service water supply is not tested per the Appendix J program, a loss of the containment barrier is possible under accident conditions. The service water flow path to the 1B containment cooler has been isolated to exit the condition. The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.
ENS 533928 May 2018 01:39:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn May 7, 2018 at 1041 CDT, Unit 1 performed an RCS (reactor coolant system) leakrate procedure that calculated an unidentified RCS leakrate of 0.202 gpm. The leak source investigation concluded at 2150 that the packing for the charging flow control valve (FCV) was the source of the RCS leakage when it was bypassed, which isolated the leakage. A second RCS leakrate calculation was performed after the charging flow control valve was isolated which calculated an acceptable leakrate of 0.00 gpm. The packing leakage from the charging flow control valve represented leakage external to containment which would result in a greater that 5 Rem dose projection to control room personnel during accident conditions which does not satisfy the GDC19 criteria described in Technical Specification Bases 3.7.10. Therefore the control room emergency filtration system would not be able to fulfill its design function resulting in an unanalyzed condition. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) for a 'condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'. The packing leak from the charging flow control valve will remain isolated until repaired under work order SNC944374. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5336626 April 2018 20:23:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because planned maintenance activities were performed on April 23rd through April 25th on the seismic monitoring system without viable compensatory measures established. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5332611 April 2018 20:56:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn April 11, 2018, while the Harris Nuclear Plant was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage, the reactor vessel head penetrations were being examined in accordance with the lnservice Inspection Program. Ultrasonic examinations identified a flaw in the head penetration nozzle number 33. The unit is in a safe and stable condition. The flaw will be repaired prior to startup from the refueling outage. The flaw and repair have no impact on the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 533187 April 2018 11:59:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn April 7, 2018 at 0451 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an auto actuation of 'A' and 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps occurred during the shutdown of Unit 1 for Harris Nuclear Plant's refueling outage. Plant Operators successfully took control of the AFW flow and noted the 'B' Main Feed pump was still running with proper suction and discharge pressures of 430 lbs. and 1000 lbs. The 'A' and 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received. The cause of the actuation is still being evaluated. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5329026 March 2018 18:19:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On March 25, 2018 at 1833 CDT, while at 100 percent power, Farley Unit 1 (FNP-1) conservatively declared a single Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) inoperable on the 1C Steam Generator line due to indication of Steam Generator pressure rise with a corresponding reduction in flow of that loop. FNP-1 began a reactor shutdown at 0400 CDT on March 26, 2018 to establish plant conditions to support testing the affected main steam line MSIVs while in the required action time of Technical Specification 3.7.2. At 1338 CDT on March 26, 2018, testing confirmed that the single MSIV was inoperable and that valve disassembly will be required. The duration of the valve repair would exceed the required action time of Technical Specification 3.7.2. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), as a plant shutdown required by technical specifications. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DOUGLAS HOBSON TO KEN MOTT AT 0202 EDT ON 5/16/18 * * *

This EN (event notification) is being updated to clarify the reporting criteria as 'Voluntary'. Farley Technical Specification 3.7.2 allows continuous operation in MODE 2 with an INOPERABLE MSIV as long as the other MSIV in the affected Main Steam Line is closed. The initiation of the shutdown was performed as a prudent action to repair and restore OPERABILITY of the affected MSIV and was not a requirement of the Farley Technical Specifications. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R2DO (Masters) was notified.

ENS 5326818 March 2018 12:34:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 2007 (EDT) on 3/17/18, a security Officer reported finding a container of herbal tea (Kombucha) on a platform in the Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear Room, which is located inside the Protected Area. Kombucha tea is a fermented tea containing trace amounts of alcohol, and is legally sold without restrictions. Dominion had previously notified its workforce that Kombucha tea was prohibited from being consumed or carried on-site. This is considered an alcoholic beverage and is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 26.719. The individual who brought the beverage on-site was identified and escorted out of the Protected Area. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will also be contacting the County Administrator for Louisa County, Virginia.
ENS 5322823 February 2018 20:29:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1750 (EST) on 2/23/2018 credible information was obtained that a non-licensed supervisory person had intentionally misused a controlled substance. Unescorted access has been withdrawn. Per 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(i) this is a 24 hour reportable event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5321014 February 2018 18:04:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5317618 January 2018 17:03:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator.

On January 18, 2018 at 1202 EST, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) lost one of its two redundant offsite power supplies. The loss of the 115kV power supply created an undervoltage condition on the normal incoming Engineered Safety Features power supply to safety related bus 1DA. The 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator started and loads sequenced as designed. The 'A' Residual Heat Removal pump started but did not inject any water into the Reactor Coolant System. The 'A' Emergency Feedwater Pump started and ran for approximately 2 minutes. Other plant equipment and systems also responded as expected.

The loss of the 115kV power supply occurred due to an issue with a component in a switchyard, external to VCSNS. The cause of the event is still under investigation.

All loads have been transferred back to the offsite 115kV power supply at 1318 EST. The diesel generator was secured at 1321 EST, reset and is ready to auto-start.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 5317017 January 2018 15:08:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0952 EST on 01/17/2018 with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100 percent, the normal supply breaker to the Unit 1J Emergency Bus tripped open due to an under-voltage condition when the potential transformer fuses were inadvertently disconnected. This resulted in a loss of power to the Unit 1J Emergency Bus from its normal off-site power supply. Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started on an under-voltage signal and loaded onto the Unit 1J Emergency Bus, as designed. All equipment performed as expected during the event and there were no unexplained occurrences. Maintenance has verified the fuses have been reconnected and at 1221 EST, off-site power was restored to Unit 1J Emergency Bus. At 1254 EST Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator was secured in accordance with Station Operating procedures. All Electrical distribution systems have been restored to a normal alignment. There were no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the auto start of Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 531599 January 2018 23:38:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On January 9, 2018, at 1759 CST, during review of NFPA 805 requirements and circuit analysis, it was determined that the NFPA 805 analysis and Fire Safe Shutdown Modeling did not consider all fire-induced failures. As such, a condition could possibly exist during a postulated fire where both safety related electrical trains could be impacted. This notification is to report a condition involving the fire safe shutdown analysis. The condition could result in an adverse impact on the ability of operators to respond to a postulated fire in these areas. Therefore, this notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Compensatory fire watches have been established in the affected areas. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM ANTONIO BENFORD TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1752 EST ON 2/28/18 * * *

Following additional refinements to the NFPA 805 Fire PRA Model, the circuits which initiated the initial report of an unanalyzed condition have now been evaluated and have proven that no significant degradation to plant safety existed. Therefore, EN 53159 is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Michel).

ENS 531077 December 2017 15:03:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis non-emergency notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), any event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies has been made. Dominion Energy is in the process of informing the Virginia Department of Health, Department of Environmental Quality, Department of Emergency Management, and the Surry County Administrator of recent groundwater monitoring results at Surry Power Station in accordance with NEI 07-07, Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI). On December 6, 2017 at 1138 EST, Surry Power Station received analysis results of recent samples from the on-site groundwater monitoring program. As part of the program, 10 new groundwater monitoring wells were recently placed in service within the Protected Area to provide early detection, to better define the site's hydrology, and if necessary, to mitigate any potential leaks. The analysis results from one of the new wells indicated tritium activity level above the GPI communication threshold. Samples were re-analyzed, resulting in different values, with the highest result of 59,300 picoCuries per liter. Since each result was above the voluntary reporting threshold, Surry stakeholder communication was implemented in accordance with the NEI GPI Voluntary Communication Protocol, Criterion 2.2. There are no known active leaks at this location; however, Dominion Energy is continuing to investigate the source of the tritium and the reason for the variability in the sample results. Tritium was not detected in the on-site monitoring locations outside of the Protected Area. No tritium has been detected in the on-site and off-site drinking water wells. Since the activity is contained within the site restricted area, the health and safety of on-site personnel and members of the public are not affected. A 30-day report will be submitted to the NRC in accordance with NEI 07-07. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5308121 November 2017 11:26:00RobinsonNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-licensed contract employee had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 530607 November 2017 22:32:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On 11/7/2017 at 1957 (EST), VC Summer Nuclear Station automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The cause of the turbine trip is under investigation at this time. All systems responded as expected. All Control Rods fully inserted and all Emergency Feedwater pumps started as required. The plant is stable in Mode 3. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat removal via the Main Steam to the Main Condenser. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the South Carolina State Emergency Management Division, the Fairfield, Richland, Lexington and Newberry Counties.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BETH DALICK TO VINCE KLCO ON 11/8/17 AT 1409 EST * * *

All systems responded as expected, with the exception of 'B' Steam Generator Feedwater Isolation Valve XVG1611 B-FW. This valve did not appear to automatically close and was slow to indicate closed from the Main Control Board. All Control Rods fully inserted and all Emergency Feedwater pumps started as required. The plant is stable in Mode 3. Notified the R2DO (Musser).

ENS 530587 November 2017 14:19:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopIt was determined that a licensed employee was not placed in an additional Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) testing program as directed by the MRO (Medical Review Officer). Upon discovery, the individual was subsequently tested . . . and determined Fit-For-Duty per 10 CFR 26 requirements. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 530567 November 2017 08:29:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn November 7, at 0504 (EST), BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to Main Unit Generator over current. The Auxiliary Feedwater system activated and remains in service. Offsite power supply is available. Normal and Emergency busses are being supplied by Offsite power. One Source Range channel failed to energize due to its corresponding Intermediate Range instrument being under compensated. It was manually energized and is not indicating as expected. The second Source Range instrument energized but is reading erratically. Both Source Range instruments have been declared inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specification has been complied with by making the Control Rods not capable of withdrawal and isolating all dilution flow paths. Plant trip response was as expected without complications, and all control rods fully inserted in the core. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3. This event is being reported as an actuation of the Reactor Protection system 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and a Specified System Actuation (Auxiliary Feedwater System) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). BVPS Unit 2 is unaffected by this event and remains at 100% power in Mode 1. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5302017 October 2017 13:22:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 0319 EDT on 10/14/17, site personnel discovered a sanitary lift station overflowing in the protected area. The overflow entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 12. The estimated release volume was approximately 50 gallons. At 1134 EDT on 10/17/17 an initial notification was made to South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. The cause of the overflow is still under investigation. Functionality of the lift pump has been restored and cleanup is complete. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5296211 September 2017 21:48:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator. On September 11, 2017 at 1648 (EDT) the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started on the low voltage signal from Bus 1DA as a result of a 115KV grid perturbation. All emergency buses remained energized from offsite power. The EDG did not tie to the 1DA bus because the offsite power voltage recovered within the designed recovery time limit. The diesel generator has been secured, reset and is ready to auto start. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5296010 September 2017 22:20:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 09/10/17 at 1855 (EDT), (Turkey Point) Unit 4 reactor was manually tripped from 88% RTP (Rated Thermal Power) due to a failure of 4C Steam Generator main feed regulating valve causing lowering S/G (Steam Generator) level. All other systems operated normally. Auxiliary Feed Water initiated as designed to provide S/G water level control. EOP's (Emergency Operating Procedures) have been exited and General Operating procedures (GOP'S) were entered. Unit 4 is stable in Mode 3 at NOT/NOP (Normal Operating Temperature/Normal Operating Pressure). The licensee is investigating the failure of the feed regulating valve. Offsite power is available. Decay heat is being removed via main feedwater with steam discharged to atmosphere using the ADVs (Atmospheric Dump Valves). There is no known primary-secondary steam generator tube leakage. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 529528 September 2017 00:06:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 2300 today, the National Weather Service issued a hurricane warning for the area including Turkey Point Nuclear Units 3 & 4. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared at 2314 (EDT). In anticipation of severe weather, the site has completed proceduralized high wind preparations. Our plants have been specifically built to withstand natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, flooding and tidal surges. This approach will ensure the safety of operations and our employees and the communities surrounding our plants. Both units are currently stable at 100% power level. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. No safety systems are out of service. The electrical grid is stable but grid risk is high. Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC, and NSSA (e-mail).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0458 EDT ON 09/11/17 FROM TIM JONES TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

At 0400 (EDT) on 09/11/17, conditions at Turkey Point Nuclear have met established exit criteria to downgrade the Notice Of Unusual Event (NOUE). The previously reported EAL (Emergency Action Level) has been exited. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified the R2DO (Michel) and R2OC (Miller), IRDMOC (Gott), NRREO (Miller), DHS, DOE, FEMA, HHS, USDA, EPA, FDA, DHS NICC, and NSSA (e-mail).

ENS 5293228 August 2017 10:55:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 8/28/2017 at 0837 (EDT), VC Summer Nuclear Station automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The turbine trip was caused by the Main Generator Differential Lockout due to a fault on the center phase lightning arrester on the Main Transformer (XTF-001). There were no complications with the trip. All control rods fully inserted. Balance of Plant (BOP) buses automatically transferred to their alternate power source XTF 31/32. All Emergency Feedwater pumps started as required. All systems responded as required. The plant is stable in Mode 3. Station personnel are investigating the cause of the fault on the main transformer lightning arrester. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat removal via the Main Steam to the Main Condenser. The licensee will inform both State and local authorities.
ENS 528949 August 2017 17:35:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 8/9/17, a Unit 1 containment entry was made in order to investigate increased Reactor Coolant System (RCS) unidentified leakage. The team noted a through-wall leak from the tubing/socket weld area of 'C' Hot Leg Sample Valve. The sample valve and RCS pressure boundary were declared inoperable, and a 6-hour action statement to place Unit 1 in Hot Shutdown was entered at 1338 (EDT) hours as required by Technical Specification 3.1.C.3. At 1606 (EDT) hours on 8/9/17, Unit 1 shutdown was commenced, and at 1637 (EDT), Unit 1 was at Hot Shutdown. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as a result of power reduction required by Technical Specifications. Further, this report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified of this event and is on site. There was no radiation release associated with this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events.
ENS 5287728 July 2017 16:40:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn July 20, 2017, a fire protection supply line at BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) Unit 1 experienced a mechanical joint separation. When the mechanical joint separated there was an unplanned flow of water from the fire protection line to the ground, which eventually re-entered the Ohio River via storm drains. The source of the water to the BVPS Unit 1 Fire Protection System is the Ohio River. The fire protection water was not treated with chemical additives. The water flow from this fire protection line was terminated on the same day. Due to the situation described above, FENOC (FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company) provided written documentation describing this occurrence to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, (PADEP) on July 28, 2017. This offsite notification to PADEP requires a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). No press release is planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5283329 June 2017 12:43:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On 6/29/2017 at 0857 (EDT), VC Summer Nuclear Station automatically tripped due to a loss of normal feed water flow to the B Steam Generator.

There were no complications with the trip. All control rods fully inserted. All emergency feedwater pumps automatically started and recovered steam generator levels. The plant is stable in Mode 3. Station personnel are investigating the cause of the loss of normal feedwater to the B Steam Generator. This is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the State of South Carolina as well as Fairfield, Lexington, Richland and Newberry Counties regarding the event.

ENS 527969 June 2017 10:17:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of several safety systems. On April 10, 2017 at 1347 hours (EDT) with Unit 3 in Mode 6 during performance of the Train B Engineered Safeguards Integrated Test, safety system actuations occurred prior to the expected point in the test procedure when a loss of continuity resulted while the seismic clips were being removed from a fuse. The actuations were supposed to occur at a subsequent step when the fuse was to be pulled to actuate the Hi Containment Pressure signal. As a result, the following equipment actuated: 3B, 4A and 4B High Head SI pumps; 3B Containment Spray pump; Containment Isolation and Containment Ventilation Isolations; 3A and 3B Emergency Diesel Generators; Emergency Containment Coolers. Because an actual high containment pressure signal did not exist at the time of the actuation, the actuation is considered invalid. All equipment responded as expected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 527916 June 2017 15:48:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis notification is in accordance with Turkey Point Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.6, Action b.1 to report the inoperability of both Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps (SSGFPs) for greater than 24 hours. On 6/6/17 at 1751 hours (EDT) both SSGFPs will be inoperable for greater than 24 hours in support of planned valve repairs that require isolation of the common suction and discharge piping. TS 3.7.1.6, Action b.1 requires a report within four hours if both SSGFPs have been inoperable for 24 hours providing the cause of the inoperability and restoration plans. The valve repairs are currently planned for completion on or about 2300 hours on 6/9/17 which will restore the 'A' pump to service and allow TS 3.7.1.6, Action b.1 to be exited. The diesel-driven 'B' pump will remain out of service for radiator repair which is currently planned for completion on or about 0800 hours on 6/14/17. The function of the Standby Steam Generator Feedwater System is as a backup to the Auxiliary Feedwater System and is not credited in the safety analysis. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Both pumps were taken out of service at 1751 EDT on 6/5/17.
ENS 527852 June 2017 17:07:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

This notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) due to both trains of Penetration Room Filtration (PRF) being inoperable due to an inoperable PRF Boundary. At 0920 (CDT) on 6/2/2017, a gap was discovered between an electrical penetration room ceiling and the containment wall where seismic gap material was noted to be missing. The gap was subsequently closed and PRF testing completed sat. The condition was exited at 1345 (CDT). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 7/25/17 AT 1725 EDT FROM MATT STANLEY TO DONG PARK * * *

On 6/2/17 at 1707 CDT Farley Nuclear Plant notified the NRC Operations Center of an entry into Technical Specification 3.7.12 Condition B for Unit 1 loss of two trains of Penetration Room Filtration (PRF). At 0920 (CDT) on 6/2/2017, a gap had been discovered between an electrical penetration and containment where seismic gap material was noted to be missing. The report was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) under Event Notification 52785. Upon further engineering review and satisfactory testing to support operability, Farley has determined that the configuration did not meet the criteria for a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, and is retracting the notification. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

ENS 5270525 April 2017 14:53:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn April 25, 2017 at approximately 0900 (EDT), it was identified that power to RM-G8 Area Gamma Radiation Monitor for the Fuel Handling Building Bridge, had not been restored within 72 hours. RM-G8 was de-energized during the B train essential bus outage and was restored on April 25, 2017 at 1148. It was out of service for approximately 92 hours. Compensatory measures were in place per HPP-904 while RM-G8 was out of service. RM-G8 is identified in the emergency plan as an equipment important to emergency response. NUREG-1022, Rev. 3 Supplement 1 Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), allows a 72 hour planned outage time to restore equipment important to emergency response. Since RM-G8 was not restored in 72 hours, it is reportable as an 8 hour ENS. This event should have been reported when it was known that the 72 hour outage time was not going to be met. This issue has been entered in the station's corrective action program. Fuel inspections were occurring during this time with compensatory measures in place. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.