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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5619031 October 2022 00:40:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2057 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System occurred during an attempt to start the 'B' Main Feed Pump. The reason for the AFW system auto-start was due to the 'A' electrical bus being under clearance and the 'B' Main Feed Pump not starting, resulting in a valid actuation signal for loss of both Main Feedwater pumps. The 'A' and 'B' motor-driven AFW (MDAFW) pumps were running prior to the attempted start of the B Main Feedwater pump and continued to run. The MDAFW Flow Control Valves (FCVs) went full open automatically as designed when the MDAFW actuation signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5618930 October 2022 09:43:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0653 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1, at 16 percent power, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to an under-voltage condition on the 'A' reactor coolant pump (RCP) and the 'C' RCP. Power was lost from the 'A' auxiliary bus while performing an operating procedure to transfer power from the 'A' start-up transformer to the 'A' unit auxiliary transformer. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the main steam system to the atmosphere using the steam generator power-operated relief valves. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5618628 October 2022 02:24:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2050 EDT (on October 27, 2022), with Unit 1 in Mode 3, it was discovered that all auxiliary feedwater pumps were simultaneously inoperable and the capability to supply the 'B' steam generator was not maintained; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The function of the auxiliary feedwater pumps to supply the 'A' steam generator and 'C' steam generator was maintained. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5611217 September 2022 13:06:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the Southern Nuclear Company via email: At 2257 EDT on 09/16/2022, it was determined that there was a programmatic vulnerability of the Fleet FFD program. Specifically, it was determined that some individuals were not placed into the follow-up pool for additional screening when required by the program. All identified personnel were in the random FFD pool, and were subject to the behavioral observation program. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(4) for all Units and 10CFR26.417(b)(1) for Vogtle Units 3&4. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. See EN#s 56113, 56114, and 56115.
ENS 560957 September 2022 15:06:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. Unescorted access for the individual has been denied at all Dominion Energy sites.
ENS 560884 September 2022 20:30:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1939 EDT, the North Anna Power Station Units 1/2 declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) under emergency declaration HU1.1 confirmed security event. Both units were unaffected by the event. The licensee exited the NOUE at 2036 EDT.
ENS 5607528 August 2022 07:08:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: (On 8/28/2022) at 0329 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a 'B' train main feedwater pump trip. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip. The auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system started automatically as expected. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Steam generator levels are being maintained by AFW through the AFW flow control valves. Decay heat is being removed by using the steam generator power-operated relief valves. The reason for the 'B' train main feedwater pump trip is under investigation. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The cause of the 'B' train main feedwater pump trip is suspected to be the result of an electrical transient due to the alarms that the operators received. In addition, the 'A' train main feedwater pump also tripped subsequent to the reactor trip and that cause is still under investigation.
ENS 5607327 August 2022 12:13:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0810 EDT on August 27, 2022, with Unit 2 at 27% power, the operating crew received an annunciator for a Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip. At 0812 EDT, a report came in from the field of a fire in the north yard due to an "A" Main Transformer upper bushing failure. The station fire brigade was dispatched and offsite assistance was requested. However, at 0842 EDT the fire was put out, prior to needing the offsite assistance. No Emergency Action Level threshold was exceeded for this event. The switchyard is in a normal alignment for providing offsite power to Unit 2. At 1015 EDT, the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) was notified of the event. Additionally, a notification to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality will be made due to approximately 100 gallons of oil reaching the ground. As such, this issue is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for "'Any event or situation for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 560283 August 2022 16:25:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1258 CDT on August 3, 2022, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to the supply breakers of the 1B startup transformer opening. The fast dead bus transfer for the reactor coolant pumps did not occur during the event. Currently the plant is in Mode 3 on natural circulation. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by steaming with atmospheric relief valves. Unit 2 is not affected. An automatic actuation of the 1B diesel occurred because of the power loss to the 1G 4160V bus. Additionally, the actuation of motor driven and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (AFW) also occurred. AFW auto-start is an expected response from this reactor trip. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the 1B diesel and the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5595321 June 2022 16:52:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 1547 EDT on June 21, 2022, it was determined that Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 experienced a reportable chemical leak. Approximately 261 gallons of a Sodium Hypochlorite/Sodium Bromine mixture reached the ground and approximately 130.5 gallons (of the 261 gallons) progressed to the Ohio River (via storm drain). The source of the leakage has been isolated and absorbent material has been placed to contain the leakage. Following confirmation of this leakage, notifications were made to the following offsite agencies starting at 1615 EDT: National Response Center (Incident Report # 1339391) Pennsylvania Department Of Environmental Protection Beaver County Emergency Management This condition is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5594315 June 2022 09:47:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0724 EDT on 6/15/2022, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to lowering Steam Generator levels due to a secondary plant perturbation in the Heater Drain System. All control rods fully inserted into the core and the Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed in response to the full power reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Unit 2 is not affected and remains at 100 percent power and stable. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 558733 May 2022 14:48:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: A non-licensed Dominion Energy supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5586829 April 2022 07:49:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0405 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The Auxiliary Feedwater System started automatically as expected. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam System to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: No Tech Spec limits were exceeded. Offsite power is available. The suspected cause for the loss of condenser vacuum is when performing the scheduled monthly swap of condenser vacuum pumps, a suction valve failed to shut.
ENS 5584314 April 2022 11:18:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On April 14, 2022, at 0928 (EDT) hours, Unit 1 automatically tripped from 100 percent power during the control rod operability periodic test. The reactor trip occurred during the manipulation of the rod control mode selector switch as part of the rod operability testing. The Operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized Unit 1 in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. The reactor trip was uncomplicated, and all control rods fully inserted into the core. This reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The Auxiliary Feedwater pumps actuated as designed because of the reactor trip and provide makeup flow to the steam generators. The automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater system is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv) (A) for a valid actuation of an ESF (Engineered Safety Features) system. The Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were subsequently secured and returned to automatic. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. An investigation into the cause of the reactor trip is underway. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: There was no affect to Unit 2. Unit 2 is operating at 100 percent power.
ENS 558318 April 2022 01:10:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 1900 EDT on 04/07/22, while Unit 4 was in Mode 4 following a refueling outage, it was discovered that both trains of residual heat removal (RHR) were simultaneously inoperable due to gas voiding. At 2032 EDT corrective actions were completed and both trains of RHR were declared operable. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 04/11/22 AT 1022 EST FROM DAVID STOIA TO BRIAN SMITH * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 4/8/2022 at 0110 EDT Turkey Point Unit 4 notified the (NRC Operations Center (NRCOC)) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) that both trains of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) were simultaneously inoperable due to the presence of gas voids that were identified during scheduled system gas accumulation testing. Subsequent evaluation by (Florida Power & Light (FPL)) Engineering has concluded that both trains of RHR remained operable and capable of performing their specified safety function. This NRCOC notification is a retraction of EN# 55831. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Miller)

ENS 558287 April 2022 16:12:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone call: At 0909 EDT on 4/7/2022, it was determined that a security officer tested positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5578512 March 2022 06:56:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0050 EST on 3/12/22, while shutting down for entry into a scheduled refueling outage, the station discovered that a single Main Steam Isolation Valve (4A MSIV) did not fully close on demand. All other equipment operated as expected. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 04/26/22 AT 1422 EDT FROM DAVID STOIA TO BRIAN PARKS * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 3/12/2022 at 0656 EDT Turkey Point Unit 4 notified the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) that a single Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) did not fully close when manually demanded from the control room during shutdown of Unit 4 for a refueling outage. Following disassembly and inspection of the MSIV, Florida Power & Light Engineering identified the cause of the deficiency and determined that the valve would have fully seated under its design accident conditions. This notification is a retraction of EN# 55785. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 557685 March 2022 15:12:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via telephone and email: A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5575725 February 2022 14:53:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via telephone: A non-licensee contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5567427 December 2021 16:49:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On December 27, 2021, at 1014 EST, a system error in the site's Alert and Notification Siren System was identified, indicating a loss of the siren system affecting a greater than 25% of the emergency planning zone population. Review of the system's data logger indicates the system error has been present within the system since December 22, 2021, at 1245 EST. The fleet's telecommunications department has been contacted and is aware of the issue. In the event that a radiological emergency should occur at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Primary Route Alerting procedures will be put in use by the local jurisdictions. This condition is reportable as a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident, state and local agencies have been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 12/29/21 AT 1630 EST FROM SARAH MCDANIEL TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The following information was provided by the Licensee via email: Further troubleshooting efforts identified that the Chatham County EOC Siren Activation Point remained capable of sending an alert signal to the sirens for the duration of the event described above. This ensures siren activation would be performed in a timely manner in the event of a radiological emergency. This Event Notification is therefore retracted, as no loss of emergency preparedness capabilities has occurred. The NRC Resident and local agencies have been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller)

ENS 5564915 December 2021 16:45:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop
  • The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

At 0927 EST on December 15, 2021, it was determined that a non-licensed employee supervisor failed a test specified by the fitness for duty (FFD) testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 5560223 November 2021 09:10:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid specific system actuation. At 0907 (EDT) on September 30, 2021, with Unit 1 in Mode 1, at 100 percent power, an actuation of the 1-1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) occurred during loss of voltage relay functional testing. The 1-1 EDG auto-start was due to human error during performance of the test procedure when the bus 1AE undervoltage signal was improperly defeated and a simulated undervoltage signal was applied. No actual undervoltage condition was present during this event. The 1-1 EDG automatically started as designed when the bus undervoltage signal was received. This was a complete actuation of an EDG to start and come to rated speed, and all affected systems functioned as expected in response to the actuation. Following the actuation, the relays were restored and the 1-1 EDG was shut down in accordance with plant procedures. This event is considered an invalid system actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters and was not a manual initiation. Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this telephone notification is provided within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5558617 November 2021 16:24:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1313 hours on November 17, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of the 21B Main Feedwater Pump (due to low suction pressure). The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed in response to the full power reactor trip. Additionally, the Main Steam Isolation Valves were manually closed to prevent excessive reactor coolant system cooldown. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the atmosphere using the Atmospheric Dump Valves. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power in Mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency Specific System Actuation per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 5558015 November 2021 21:00:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1728 EST on 11/15/2021, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 47 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a main transformer fault. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the emergency feedwater system through the main condenser. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, due to the valid actuation of the emergency feedwater system, this event is being reported as a non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/16/21 AT 1649 EST FROM BRUCE BENNETT TO KERBY SCALES * * *

At approximately 0900 (EST) on 11/16/2021, it was identified that mineral oil from the faulted main transformer had surpassed the capability of the oil containment system and discharged into Lake Monticello. It is estimated that less than 50 gallons of mineral oil entered the Lake. The oil is contained with booms and cleanup is ongoing. The EPA National Response Center and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control have been notified. This is considered a news release or notification to other government agencies; therefore, this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 5557412 November 2021 20:47:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1605 EST on 11/12/21, it was determined that the RCS Pressure Boundary does not meet ASME Section XI, Table IWB-341 0-1, 'Acceptable Standards' due to a through wall leak of the Core Exit Thermocouple Nozzle Assembly. Measures have been taken to establish Mode 5 for corrective actions. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 3/28/2022 AT 0849 EDT FROM DAVID STOIA TO MIKE STAFFORD * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 11/12/2021 EN 55574 reported possible evidence of pressure boundary through-wall leakage observed on a Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) tube. On 3/10/2022, based on laboratory analysis of the affected CET tube section, FPL Engineering determined that there was no pressure boundary through-wall leakage associated with this event. Analysis identified that the leakage likely originated from an adjacent threaded compression fitting on a tubing joint. This condition complies with ASME Section XI requirements and is therefore not reportable. This follow-up NRCOC notification is a retraction of EN 55574. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 5557212 November 2021 13:52:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1007 EST on November 12, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at approximately 17 percent power following a refueling outage, the reactor was manually tripped due to increasing steam generator water levels due to an oscillating Main Feedwater Pump Recirculation Valve. Additionally, the Main Steam Isolation Valves were manually closed to prevent excessive reactor coolant system cooldown. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the atmosphere using the Atmospheric Dump Valves. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power in Mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification, per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5557010 November 2021 18:38:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1515 EST on 11/10/21, approximately 89 gallons of PCB oil is unaccounted for from the Substation 'N' Transformer, located in the Owner Controlled Area. Transformer nameplate oil capacity is 569 gallons. Prior to removal of the original Substation 'N' Transformer, approximately 475 gallons of 10-CA-OIL (PCB Oil) was evacuated and stored by HEPACO (a licensee vendor). Approximately 5 gallons of oil is inaccessible to evacuate and remains in the original transformer. Below the transformer was evidence of oil leakage to the ground. The leakage appears to have been occurring over time, not as a result of a catastrophic failure. This condition is reportable to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (VA DEQ). The VA DEQ was notified of this condition at 1815 on 11/10/21. Cleanup activities are on-going. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.' The licensee will be notifying the Louisa County administrator and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MARC HOFMANN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1309 EST ON 11/12/2021 * * *

Initial, unofficial, field testing performed by HEPACO indicated the oil released to the ground was PCB-Contaminated Oil. The official test results from the lab indicated that the oil is in fact not classified as PCB-Contaminated Oil. Therefore, this update is being made to EN55570 to clarify that the oil released to the environment was not PCB-Contaminated Oil. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the VA DEQ of this update. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 5554022 October 2021 02:15:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0104 EDT on October 22, 2021, during the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 refueling outage, while performing examinations of the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that two penetrations could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME Code Section XI. Penetrations 28 and 40 will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indications were not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-6 to find potential flaws/indications before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 555139 October 2021 07:27:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0300 EDT, with Unit 3 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System occurred when steam generator water level rose to 80 percent causing a Feedwater Isolation signal, which tripped the last remaining Steam Generator Feed Pump during plant cooldown. The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed when the feedwater isolation signal was received. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the high steam generator level is under investigation.
ENS 555075 October 2021 10:07:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0632 EDT on October 5, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at approximately 90 percent power for an end of cycle coastdown, the reactor automatically tripped due to an unexpected unblocking of the low power trip logic. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed in response to the reactor trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power in Mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is being reported as an eight hour, non-emergency Specific System Actuation per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5546215 September 2021 11:30:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0658 CDT on 09/15/2021 a non work-related death occurred of a site employee. The individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area. This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5545913 September 2021 23:47:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn September 13, 2021, at 1822 EDT, an apparent non-compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2 (separation of redundant fire safe shutdown equipment) was identified. Specifically, it was determined that some Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) cables may be susceptible to a hot short/spurious operation to the close circuit. A spurious closure of the emergency bus normal supply breakers after the EDG is powering the bus could result in non-synchronous paralleling, EDG overloading, or EDG output breaker tripping due to faulted power cable from normal supply breaker. The spurious closure of the normal supply breakers is not currently addressed in the Appendix R Report or previous Multiple Spurious Operations (MSO) analysis. This condition is associated with the Appendix R safe-shutdown function of the Emergency Power System. The Emergency Power System is considered operable but not fully qualified for its safety-related design function. The following fire areas are impacted: 1) Fire Area 13, Unit 1 Normal Switchgear Room 2) Fire Area 46, Unit 1 Cable Tray Room 3) Fire Area 3, Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room 4) Fire Area 2, Unit 2 Cable Vault and Tunnel Until this condition is analyzed, Surry has implemented mitigating actions in the above fire areas. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This is also reportable as a 60-day written report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as CR (condition report) 1180502. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. Mitigating actions include posting fire watches in the affected areas.
ENS 5545712 September 2021 22:41:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On September 12, 2021, at 1728 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) while performing inspections of the North Anna Power Station Unit 1 reactor vessel head flange area, a weld leak was identified on the reactor vessel flange leak-off line that connects to the flange between the inner and outer head o-rings. Entered TRM 3.4.6 Condition B for ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components. With known leakage past the inner head o-ring, this condition is reported since the fault in the tubing is considered pressure boundary (Reactor Coolant System) leakage. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded. The NRC Resident has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 10/21/21 AT 1153 EDT FROM DENNIS BRIED TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

The condition identified in EN 55457, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A) has been evaluated, and has been determined not to be Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leakage. As such, the 8-hour report is being retracted, as it is not an event or condition that results in, 'the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.' The leakage was subsequently determined to be in a tubing connection downstream of the reactor vessel inner O-ring. Leakage past a seal or gasket is not considered to be pressure boundary leakage, as defined by Technical Specifications. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller)

ENS 554508 September 2021 17:12:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1337 (EDT) on 9/8/2021, V.C. Summer reported the overflow of the Nuclear Operations Building Lift Station (LS-3) to the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. The lift station overflow was due to a broken discharge pipe from Pump 1 to the common discharge header. The overflow was contained in the valve vault, basin gravel, and the nearby concrete surface. None of the overflow reached any storm drains or waters of the state. This release did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 09/28/2021 AT 1405 EDT FROM JUSTIN BOUKNIGHT TO KERBY SCALES * * *

At 1712 EDT on 9/8/2021, V.C. Summer made Event Notification 55450 notifying the NRC of an environmental report to another government agency, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). In the course of station response, it was determined that the lift station overflow did not exceed any federal, state or local reporting criteria or violate any permits. Following this investigation, the report to the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control is considered a courtesy notification and the event does not meet reporting criteria under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller)

ENS 5541318 August 2021 01:07:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 0024 EDT on 8/18/21, an unusual event was declared (EAL HU 4.1) due to receipt of multiple fire alarms and halon discharge in the cable tunnel. At 0036, the fire brigade verified no signs of fire. Unit 1 remained at 100 percent power and stable. The area is currently being ventilated. Unit 2 was not affected by this event. The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. R1 Public Affairs (Screnci) was notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT KLINDWORTH TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0414 EDT ON 8/18/21 * * *

At 0401 EDT, Beaver Valley terminated their notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that there was no indication of fire. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified State and local authorities. Notified R1DO (Jackson), IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Felts), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5537522 July 2021 20:28:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn July 20, 2021, at 1707 EDT, an apparent non-compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2 (separation of redundant fire safe shutdown equipment) was identified. This issue was initially categorized as not affecting train separation or the ability of the equipment to perform their Design Basis functions. The original concern was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as CR1177199. Subsequently, on July 22, 2021, at 1751 EDT, a further review of the affected control circuits for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) output breakers and emergency bus feeder breakers identified a concern that breaker position interlocks routed to or through non-safety related components or spaces may affect the ability to provide emergency power on the affected unit due to impacts on the control power circuits during an Appendix R fire associated with a loss of offsite power. The following are the affected fire areas: - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Buildings - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cable Spreading Rooms - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Normal (307) Switchgear Rooms This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This is also reportable as a 60-day written report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as CR 1177399. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
ENS 5536520 July 2021 13:06:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 552999 June 2021 15:02:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1115 EDT on June 9, 2021, during a siren activation test, a loss of the capability to activate the sirens from both Surry local activation sites was identified. The Virginia EOC was participating in the activation test and is aware of the issue and notified the local government authorities in the Surry EPZ of the situation. The NRC Resident has been notified of this issue. The station telecommunications department has been contacted and is aware of the issue. In the event that a radiological emergency should occur at the Surry Power Station, Primary Route Alerting procedures will be put in use by the local jurisdictions. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to notification of other state and local government agencies of the failure of the Alert & Notification system for Surry.

  • * * PARTIAL RETRACTION ON 6/18/2021 AT 0959 FROM STEPHEN MITCHELL TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

Surry Power Station Event Notification 55299 is being retracted based upon further evaluation. Surry has three localities (State SAU, James City, and Surry County) with access to the redundant activation trains (primary and backup systems). The actuation tests only one primary and one backup activation panel at two localities, only primary at the State SAU (Situational Awareness Unit) and back up at James City County were tested. Follow-up telecom and vendor investigation revealed that the primary server was functional from James City County that would have actuated all 71 sirens; Consequently, it was concluded that all of the sirens were fully functional from the James City primary system and there was no loss of all sirens as originally reported on 6/9/2021 (EN 55299). EN 55299 also contained a 4-hour Offsite Notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) that is unaffected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 552978 June 2021 08:37:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 552396 May 2021 14:00:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn May 6, 2021 at 1223 (EDT), Unit 1 was manually tripped from 60 percent power due to degrading main condenser vacuum. Unit 1 was in the process of decreasing power due to increased secondary sodium levels identified earlier in the day. The Operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized Unit 1 in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. This reactor protection actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Auxiliary Feedwater pumps actuated as designed as a result of the reactor trip and provided makeup flow to the steam generators. The automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps is reportable per 10 CFR 50,72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid actuation of an ESF (Engineered Safeguards Features) system. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system. The electrical system is in normal lineup for shutdown conditions. There was no effect on Unit 2 operation. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5521325 April 2021 11:50:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1200 EDT on April 25, 2021, planned maintenance activities on the Harris Nuclear Plant Seismic Monitoring System will be performed. The work includes performance of preventive maintenance and system upgrades. The work duration is approximately 10 days and compensatory measures will be in place for seismic monitoring. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a planned loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5515324 March 2021 22:06:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAn Unusual Event was declared at Turkey Point Unit 4 Nuclear Generating Station at 2129 EDT on 03/24/2021 due to a Fire Alarm in Containment. The licensee was not able to validate the alarm within 15 minutes. Following containment entry there was not smoke or fire present. At 2214 EDT, Turkey Point Unit 4 Nuclear Generating Station terminated the Unusual Event. The cause of the spurious fire alarm is under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Felts), R2DO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
ENS 551171 March 2021 14:07:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 3/1/21 at 1112 EST, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent Rated Thermal Power (RTP), the reactor automatically tripped. Auxiliary Feedwater initiated as designed to provide Steam Generator (S/G) water level control. Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) have been exited and General Operating Procedures (GOPs) were entered. Unit 3 is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All rods are inserted, decay heat is being removed via S/G through normal secondary systems. The plant is in a normal electrical line-up. The cause of the automatic reactor trip is (unknown at this time and is) being investigated. There was no effect on Unit 4.
ENS 5510920 February 2021 22:00:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1830 (EST) on 02/20/21, Turkey Point Nuclear Station Security identified three distressed individuals, potentially drowning, in the bay just offshore of the Owner Controlled Area. The licensee contacted the U.S. Coast Guard and local sheriffs department for assistance. At 1852 all 3 individuals were reported as safe and onshore. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b )(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 550999 February 2021 11:00:00RobinsonNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 0800 on February 9, 2021, thirty-one (31) H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant Offsite Emergency Notification sirens in Darlington County, SC were inadvertently actuated. The Darlington County Emergency Services and South Carolina Emergency Management Division were promptly notified. The actuation lasted for three (3) minutes at full volume. The cause of the actuation is under investigation at this time. Capability to notify the public was never degraded during the inadvertent actuation. All Emergency Notification sirens remain in service. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Offsite Notification, as a four (4) hour report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A local news agency did report about the alarms sounding and reported that there was no concern at the site.
ENS 5507921 January 2021 17:10:00RobinsonNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). At 0946 hrs on December 1, 2020, with unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0% power, an invalid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 'A' and 'B', 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump, 'A' Service Water Booster Pump (SWBP), and Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) Pumps 'A' and 'B' occurred. The actuation was caused by a Safety Injection (SI) signal while installing simulations to support Reactor Safeguards testing. The SI signal occurred when two out of three logic was met for Low Pressurizer Pressure, which was caused by a high resistance connection to a test point from a loose test lead. All aligned equipment, 'A' and 'B' EDGs, 'A' RHR Pump, 'A' SWBP and 'A' and 'B' AFW Pumps, responded properly to the auto-start signal and the actuation was complete. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5504017 December 2020 22:03:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn December 17, 2020 at 1539 EST, with Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 preparing for entry into Mode 4, the Reactor Coolant System was pressurized greater than 1000 psig for approximately 15 minutes with all three Cold Leg Injection Accumulator Discharge Valves closed. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Both Low Head and High Head Safety Injection Systems were operable at this time. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5503816 December 2020 12:19:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn December 16, 2020 at 0851 EST, with Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 80 percent power, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to lockout of the main generator. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The initial assessment of this event indicates that there was a ground fault on the 'B' train of the non-safety electrical distribution system that caused the main generator lockout. Steam generator levels are being maintained by normal feedwater through the feedwater regulator bypass valves. Decay heat is being removed by using the condenser steam dump flow path. Due to the unplanned Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All rods inserted into the core during the trip. The electrical grid is stable and all safe shutdown equipment is available for service. No reliefs lifted during the transient.
ENS 5503614 December 2020 20:21:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1240 EST on 12/14/20, it was determined that all Unit 4 Charging Pumps and Boration Flowpaths were simultaneously inoperable. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 2/10/2021 AT 1210 EST FROM DAVID STOIA TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

On 1/21/21 a past operability review was completed that assessed the event reported on 12/14/20. The evaluation concluded that the condition did not render any Unit 4 Charging Pump or all boration flowpaths inoperable, and that the 8-hour notification submitted on 12/14/20 was not required. This notification is a retraction of EN #55036. The NRC Site Resident has been notified of the EN #55036 retraction. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 5503514 December 2020 15:00:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 2214 EST on 12/12/20, Surry Power Station personnel identified leakage from the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Cooling System to the ground. Leakage was estimated to be greater than 100 gallons and tritium concentration determined to be 4.5E07 picocuries per liter (pCi/L), requiring report in accordance with the industry voluntary groundwater protection program. As such, at 1450 EST on 12/14/2020, the Surry County Administrator, NRC Resident, Virginia Department of Health, Virginia Department of Emergency Management, and Virginia Department of Environmental Quality were notified of this release to the environment. Due to the offsite agency notifications, this 4-hour, non-emergency report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.