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| Entered date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 56779 | 5 October 2023 12:29:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1439 EDT on August 7, 2023, a spurious level spike on the unit 4 reactor coolant system (RCS) level instrument (4-RCS-LT160A, 'Hot Leg 1 Level') caused actuation of containment isolation, reactor trip, automatic depressurization system (ADS) stage 4, and in containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) isolation signals. The spurious level changes caused an invalid signal based on the incidental response of the 4-RCS-LT160A instrumentation due to water spray that was being used for reactor vessel cleaning (being performed prior to initial fuel loading). The level fluctuations resulted in engineered safety features actuation signals (containment isolation, ADS stage 4, and IRWST isolation signals) and a reactor trip signal, with the reactor trip signal already present. Three containment isolation valves closed due to the containment isolation signal that was generated. These valves were: 4-CAS-V014, 'instrument air supply containment isolation, air-operated valve,' 4-SFS-V034, 'spent fuel pool cooling system suction header containment isolation, motor-operated valve,' and 4-SFS-V035, 'spent fuel pool cooling system suction header containment isolation, motor-operated valve.' The other automatic containment isolation valves were either already closed at the time of the event or properly removed from service. All affected equipment functioned properly. The other actuation signals that were observed during this event (ADS stage 4, IRWST isolation, and reactor trip) did not result in any equipment changing position or automatically operating (i.e., the actuation signals occurred while the systems were properly removed from service). Units 1, 2, and 3 were not affected. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 56648 | 1 August 2023 11:48:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1506 EDT on July 31, 2023, it was determined that a contractor supervisor failed a test specified by the fitness for duty testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56632 | 21 July 2023 15:06:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1148 EDT on 07/21/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 32 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped on low reactor coolant pump (RCP) speed due to decaying RCP motor voltage during power ascension testing. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam via steam generator power operated relief valves to the atmosphere, and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56614 | 9 July 2023 16:57:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1328 EDT on 07/09/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 45 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped during power ascension testing due to low reactor coolant flow from decaying voltage to the reactor coolant pumps. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam via steam generator power operated relief valves to the atmosphere, and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56497 | 2 May 2023 07:57:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0423 EDT on 05/02/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 14 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to securing all main feed pumps, due to sudden high differential pressure on their suction strainers. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip. No equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or adversely impacted plant response to the reactor trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the steam dumps, and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Units 1, 2, and 4 were not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56460 | 10 April 2023 04:34:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0048 EDT on 4/10/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 18 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to low reactor coolant flow due to voltage decaying to the reactor coolant pumps during main generator testing activities. The trip was not complex, with all safety-related systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam via steam generator power operated relief valves to atmosphere. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56415 | 16 March 2023 13:23:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0845 EDT on March 16, 2023, it was determined that a contract employee supervisor failed a for-cause FFD test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56414 | 16 March 2023 01:26:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2157 EDT on 03/15/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 18 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to the loss of two reactor coolant pumps when their electrical buses failed to transfer after a main generator excitation protective relay tripped. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by steam generator power operated relief valves. Units 1, 2, and 4 are not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56367 | 16 February 2023 15:52:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0743 EST on February 16, 2023, it was determined that a contract supervisor failed a random fitness-for-duty (FFD) test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56311 | 14 January 2023 14:05:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0721 EST on 01/14/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power and reactor trip breakers open, a manual actuation of the RPS occurred while conducting pre-criticality testing. The RPS manual actuation was procedurally driven in response to low gland steam pressure, resulting in the necessity to break condenser vacuum following a trip of the auxiliary boiler. The reactor trip breakers were in an open state at the time of the event. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56231 | 17 November 2022 20:23:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56175 | 23 October 2022 11:14:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0405 EDT on 10/23/2022, with (Vogtle) Unit 3 in Mode 6 and the reactor subcritical for greater than 28 hours, it was discovered that all three required flow paths for the stage four ADS were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The diverse actuation system was operable for manual stage four ADS during this time period. At 0432 EDT on 10/23/2022, two of the three required flow paths were restored to operable status, which exited the reportable condition. All required flow paths were operable at 0447 EDT. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56147 | 6 October 2022 10:06:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0244 EDT on 10/06/2022, with Unit 3 Defueled at 0 percent power, an actuation of the RPS occurred during restoration of Division B Class 1E DC and uninterruptible power supply system. The reason for the RPS actuation was due to the opening of the Division B passive residual heat removal (PRHR) heat exchanger outlet flow control valve. The reactor trip breakers were in an open state at the time of the event when the RPS signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56115 | 17 September 2022 13:06:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the Southern Nuclear Company via email: At 2257 EDT on 09/16/2022, it was determined that there was a programmatic vulnerability of the Fleet FFD program. Specifically, it was determined that some individuals were not placed into the follow-up pool for additional screening when required by the program. All identified personnel were in the random FFD pool, and were subject to the behavioral observation program. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(4) for all Units and 10CFR26.417(b)(1) for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. See EN#s 56112, 56113, and 56114. |
| ENS 55735 | 7 February 2022 15:49:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following information was provided by the licensee via telefone: A non-licensed contractor superintendent had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55552 | 29 October 2021 14:25:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | At 1010 EDT on October 29, 2021, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a contractor supervisor attempted to subvert a random Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) test. The employee's badge has been confiscated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55328 | 25 June 2021 15:27:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail: The individual informing the Commission is Michael J. Yox, 7825 River Road, Waynesboro, GA 30830. The activities which fail to comply include construction processes including, installation of some electrical and mechanical commodities, and control of measuring and test equipment at the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project. The primary construction firm for the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project is Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel). This report is being provided based on construction nonconformances including, installation of some electrical and mechanical commodities, and control of measuring and test equipment for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The nonconformances affect cable separation and other raceway structural elements. The extent of condition for the measuring and test equipment issue is under evaluation and may impact additional safety-related work. The identified construction nonconformances are a small fraction of the overall structures and components. There is no specifically identified substantial safety hazard (SSH) for these nonconformances. The nonconformances identified affect some safety-related components and based on this it was conservatively judged that the issues could be related to an SSH. These issues were discovered while the facility is under construction. The identified conditions will be corrected prior to completion of the facility. The evaluation for this report was completed on June 24, 2021. As stated above, there are no specifically identified basic components that have been identified to contain a defect for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The nonconformances identified affect some safety-related components and based on this it was conservatively judged that these conditions involve a failure to comply that could be related to an SSH. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken include: Comprehensive extent-of-condition reviews and correction of identified conditions are being conducted. The actions to identify and resolve the nonconforming conditions are in process and will be completed in accordance with the site corrective action program. Bechtel, and other subcontractors as needed, will implement actions to correct the identified conditions and ensure that processes are in place to avoid future occurrences. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is the organization responsible for ensuring Bechtel and the other subcontractors complete the required actions to correct the nonconforming conditions and ensuring that processes are in place to avoid future occurrences. |
| ENS 55185 | 9 April 2021 16:08:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant had been terminated. |
| ENS 54963 | 21 October 2020 14:10:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) as described in NEI 08-01, Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52, Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to the NRC for determining that Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.3.05.13a.ii (Index No. 344) for Unit 4 requires additional actions to restore the completed status. The ITAAC Closure Notifications for Unit 4 ITAAC 344 was submitted on July 22, 2020 (ML20204B029). On October 19, 2020, it was determined that maintenance activities for the Unit 4 Polar Crane auxiliary hoist holding brake used a different approach for Post Work Verification (PWV) than the original test described in the ICN (ITAAC Closure Notification) for ITAAC 344. The alternate PWV used a test method that is standard industry practice and in accordance with ASME B30.2 to demonstrate that the Acceptance Criteria was met. An ITAAC Post Closure Notification will be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) and NEI 08-01. The 10 CFR 52.99(c)(4) All lTAAC Complete Notification has not been submitted for VEGP (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant) 4. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 54864 | 28 August 2020 00:00:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2), as described in NEI 08-01, 'Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52,' Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to the NRC for determining that Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.5.02.07a (Index No. 534) and ITAAC 2.5.02.07e (Index No. 538) for both units require additional actions to restore their completed status. The ITAAC Closure Notifications for ITAAC 534 were submitted on March 31, 2017 (Unit 3 ML17093A286, Unit 4 ML17093A535). The ITAAC Closure Notifications for ITAAC 538 were submitted on November 30, 2016 (Unit 3 ML16351A350, Unit 4 ML16351A334). On August 26, 2020, it was determined that a design change, issued for several Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) isolation barrier assemblies (ISBs), materially altered the basis for determining that the ITAAC 534 and ITAAC 538 Acceptance Criteria were met. The modified ISBs will require testing per IEEE 384-1981, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits, to demonstrate that the Acceptance Criteria is met. System function is not required while the plant is under construction. ITAAC Post Closure Notifications in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) will be submitted following completion of corrective actions. The 10 CFR 52.99(c)(4) All ITAAC Complete Notification has not been submitted for VEGP ((Vogtle Electric Generating Plant)) 3 and 4. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Upon successful completion of the work to correct the identified impact to ITAAC 534, it has been determined there was no material impact to ITAAC 538. Confirmation was made that the credible fault only affected PMS to PLS analog ISBs and not PMS to PLS relay isolation ISBs. It was also confirmed that the relay isolation ISB testing and qualification summary information was unaffected by the modifications made to the analog ISBs to correct the credible fault scenario condition. Resolution of the credible fault scenario did not result in modifications to the relay isolation ISBs which are the subject of ITAAC 538. Therefore, the ITAAC Closure Notifications submitted for ITAAC 538 on November 30, 2016 (Unit 3 ML16351A350, Unit 4 ML16351A334) continue to be valid and ITAAC Post Closure Notifications are not required. The licensee has notified NRC Region 2. Notified R2DO (Miller) and NRR Vogtle Project Office (via email). |
| ENS 53309 | 2 April 2018 18:33:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contractor employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 53277 | 22 March 2018 09:31:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contract supervisor attempted to subvert a random Fitness For Duty test using a subversion kit on their person. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 53221 | 20 February 2018 15:36:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | At 0925 (EST) on February 20, 2018, a non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 53018 | 16 October 2017 17:59:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed supervisory contractor subverted a random Fitness for Duty (FFD) test. At 0851 (EDT) on October 16, 2017, a contractor supervisor was notified to report for a random FFD test and (the individual) did not report to the testing facility and left the premises. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 52968 | 14 September 2017 09:10:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | On September 13, 2017, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) determined a Contractor Manager confirmed positive for alcohol during a for cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 52763 | 18 May 2017 15:14:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | On May 17, 2017, at 1852 (EDT), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) contractor informed SNC that a contractor Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) collector failed to follow the process defined in both NRC Regulation 10 CFR 26.105(b) and contractor FFD procedures. The collector was fully trained, qualified, and knowledgeable of the process requirements. This determination was made based on initial department investigations and corroborated via independent investigations performed by the contractor. SNC has determined that this is reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(3). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and NRC Region II. |
| ENS 52668 | 6 April 2017 15:58:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contractor manager had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a pre-access test. The employee's access to the construction site has been revoked. The licensee notified the NRC Unit 2 & 3 Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 52641 | 27 March 2017 16:02:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contractor employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 52482 | 11 January 2017 13:52:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed supervisor tested positive for alcohol during a for-cause test. The individual's access to the site has been terminated pending the results of an investigation. The licensee notified RII (Patterson) and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 52412 | 7 December 2016 13:12:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2), Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to NRC for determining that Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.6.01.02.ii (ECS System Seismic Category I Equipment Design Basis Loads) for both units requires additional actions to restore its completed status. The Closure Notification for this ITAAC (NRC Index No. 580) was originally submitted on May 17, 2016 (reference ML 16138A080 and ML 16166A030). On November 1, 2016, it was determined by the Vogtle 3&4 Contractor that modifications to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) breaker (i.e., switchgear) cabinet design were required to ensure compliance with the applicable portions of IEEE 384, 'Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits.' The modification involves an engineering change which adds different equipment to the RCP Breaker cabinet that function to trip the RCP. The new components were not previously qualified for use in the RCP breaker cabinet assembly. Additional seismic qualification type testing and analysis of components are being performed for the added components in the RCP breaker. Update of the Equipment Qualification Data Package and Equipment Qualification Summary Report for the RCP breaker to confirm the breaker withstands seismic design basis loads and Licensee's acceptance is in progress. The revised ITAAC Completion Notice will be submitted to the NRC once all related ITAAC activities have been completed. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 52354 | 8 November 2016 11:44:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | In accordance with 10CFR52.99(c)(2), V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 Construction is making this notification to NRC for determining that Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.6.01.02.ii (Seismic Qualification of Reactor Coolant Pump Switchgear) for both units requires additional actions to restore its completed status. The Closure Notification for this ITAAC (NRC Index No. 580) was originally submitted on February 29, 2016 (reference ML16060A344 and ML16060A345). On November 2, 2016, it was determined that modifications to the RCP switchgear cabinet design were required to ensure compliance with the applicable portions of IEEE 384, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits. The modification involved an engineering change which adds different equipment to the RCP Switchgear cabinet which function to trip the RCP. The new components were not previously seismically qualified for use in the RCP switchgear cabinet assembly. The additional components have now undergone seismic qualification testing for use in the RCP switchgear. The Equipment Qualification Data Package and Equipment Qualification Summary Report for the RCP switchgear will be revised based on the results of the testing to confirm the switchgear withstands seismic design basis loads. The revised testing report has been completed on November 8 2016. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 52208 | 30 August 2016 16:05:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. |
| ENS 52147 | 2 August 2016 16:22:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A member of the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) staff violated the FFD policy in December, 2014 by responding to a call-in for unscheduled work after having consumed alcohol within the prohibited 5 hour period. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 52086 | 14 July 2016 15:15:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | On 7/14/16, at 0741 (EDT), it was determined that (a contract employee supervisor) violated its FFD policy. The individual's construction site access has been revoked. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii). The Units 2 and 3 (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 51986 | 7 June 2016 14:10:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 51941 | 18 May 2016 08:13:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Construction Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 51875 | 21 April 2016 18:18:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed supervisory contractor admitted to attempting to subvert a Fitness for Duty test. The contractor's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 51158 | 16 June 2015 10:39:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | 10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a failure to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B associated with AP1000 nuclear power plant construction by Chicago Bridge & Iron Company (CB&I) at the V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3 construction site. This 50.55(e) initial notification addresses a failure to comply by CB&I, an agent of South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) for V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3, to meet the requirements of Appendix B, Criteria V and XV. It is concluded that Quality Assurance programmatic issues, as identified by CB&I Root Cause Analysis 2015-0539, could have produced a defect and this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). Root Cause Analysis 2015-0539 investigated the causes that lead to impingement of safety related reinforcing steel and the steel containment vessel during concrete core drilling operations within the Unit 2 containment structure. No defect has been identified. This condition is associated with NRC special inspection report number 05200027/2015-009. This notification closes the Interim Part 21 report submitted on April 16th, 2015, by CB&I. This 50.55(e) Initial Notification is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 51010 | 24 April 2015 14:14:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contract employee supervisor tested positive for a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employees access to the site has been denied. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 51005 | 23 April 2015 13:18:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contract employee supervisor willfully acted to avoid a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual left the construction site after the notification to report to the fitness-for-duty office. The employees access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 50857 | 2 March 2015 18:31:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | On March 2, 2015, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) had a non-licensed supervisory contractor employee confirmed positive result for alcohol during a fitness-for-duty test. The contractor employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. |
| ENS 50815 | 12 February 2015 17:19:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | This is a 10 CFR 50.55 initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I), an agent for the Licensee of the V. C. Summer 2 & 3 Construction Project. In August 2014, deviations were found in sub-modules CA03-06, -08, and -09 for the Vogtle 3 Construction Project, which initiated the discovery and evaluation processes for both Part 21 and 10 CFR 50.55. The conditions were determined to be not reportable by CB&I under 10 CFR 21, but an evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.". |
| ENS 50798 | 9 February 2015 11:36:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | This is a 10 CFR 50.55 initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I), an agent for the Licensee of the Vogtle 3&4 Construction Project. In August 2014, deviations were found in sub-modules CA03-06, -08, and -09, which initiated the discovery and evaluation processes for both Part 21 and 10 CFR 50.55 . The conditions were determined to be not reportable by CB&I under 10 CFR 21, but an evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55 (4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55 (5)(i). The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. |
| ENS 50574 | 29 October 2014 14:08:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contractor employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The contractor employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 50442 | 10 September 2014 11:51:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | This is a 10CFR50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub modules for the Virgil C. Summer Units 2 and 3 construction project. In March, 2014, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for welding program deviations associated with the fabrication of sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10CFR50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 50441 | 10 September 2014 11:24:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | This is a 10CFR50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub-modules for the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project. In March, 2014, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for welding program deviations associated with the fabrication of sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10CFR50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 50226 | 25 June 2014 11:48:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contract employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's plant access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 50163 | 2 June 2014 16:47:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive result for a controlled substance. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 49882 | 7 March 2014 15:26:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A construction supervisor failed a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been revoked. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Rose). |
| ENS 49595 | 2 December 2013 13:52:00 | Vogtle | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | This is a 10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub-modules for the Vogtle 3 & 4 construction project. In September 2013, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for deviations associated with sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Reference similar Summer Event (EN#49582). |