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The query [[Category:ENS Notification]] [[Reactor type::GE-3]] [[Scram::+]] was answered by the SMWSQLStore3 in 0.0680 seconds.


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 Entered dateSiteScramRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 531474 January 2018 17:57:00PilgrimManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-3On January 4, 2018, at 1410 hours EST, with the reactor at approximately 100 percent power and steady state conditions, the winter storm across the Northeast caused the loss of offsite 345 kV Line 342. Reactor power was reduced to approximately 81 percent and a procedurally required manual reactor scram was initiated. All control rods fully inserted. As a result of the reactor scram, indicated reactor water level decreased, as expected, to less than +12 inches resulting in automatic actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation Systems for Group II - Primary Containment Isolation and Reactor Building Isolation System, and Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System. Reactor Water Level was restored to the normal operating band. The Primary Containment Isolation Systems have been reset. The Reactor Protection System signal has been reset. Following the reactor scram, the non-safety related Control Rod Drive Pump "B" tripped on low suction pressure. Control Rod Drive Pump "A" was placed in service. All other systems operated as expected, in accordance with design. This event is reportable per the requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) - "RPS Actuation" and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) - "Specified System Actuation. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The main steam isolation valves are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser. Offsite power is still available from 345kV line 355. As a contingency, emergency diesel generators are running and powering safety busses per licensee procedure. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The licensee will be notifying the town of Plymouth as part of their local notifications. The licensee will be issuing a press release.
ENS 522236 September 2016 11:24:00PilgrimManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-3On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 0827 (EDT), with the reactor at 91% core thermal power (CTP), Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) operators initiated a manual reactor scram due to high reactor water level resulting from feedwater level control oscillation. Other than the feedwater level control oscillations, all other plant systems responded as designed. Plant cooldown is in progress using the High Pressure Coolant Injection System in the pressure control mode. The plant is in hot shutdown. The cause of the feed water level control oscillations is under investigation. This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public. Subsequent to the manual reactor scram the plant experienced the following isolation signals: Group 1 Isolation: Main Steam Isolation Valves Group 2 Isolation: Miscellaneous containment isolation valves Group 6 Isolation: Reactor Water Clean-up Reactor Building (Ventilation) Isolation Actuation The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical...'. This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section...' (B)(2) 'General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).' All rods were inserted. The plant is stable with normal off-site power line-up. The licensee will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
ENS 5133822 August 2015 20:14:00PilgrimAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-3

On Saturday, August 22, 2015, at 1628 (EDT), with the reactor at 100% core thermal power (CTP) the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) experienced an automatic reactor scram signal due to the rapid closure of one main steam isolation valve (MSIV). Other than the MSIV all other plant systems responded as designed. Plant cooldown is in progress using steam bypass to the main condenser. The plant is in hot shutdown. The cause of the MSIV closure is still under investigation. This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'Any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical'. Subsequent to the reactor scram the plant experienced the following isolation signals:

    -  Group 2 Isolation: Miscellaneous containment isolation valves
    -  Group 6 Isolation: Reactor Water Clean-up
    -  Reactor Building Isolation Actuation

This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section' (B)(2) 'General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).' Plant response was considered normal and the plant is in a stable shutdown / cooldown condition. The license will be notifying the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

ENS 5108722 May 2015 13:36:00PilgrimManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-3

On Friday, May 22, 2015 at 1002 EDT, with the Reactor Mode Select Switch in the Start-Up position and the reactor at approximately 3 percent core thermal power, while returning to power from Refueling Outage Number 20, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to degrading main condenser vacuum. The cause of the degraded vacuum is currently under investigation. Following the reactor scram, all rods were verified to be fully inserted and no Emergency Operating Procedure entry conditions existed. All plant systems responded as designed. Currently reactor pressure is being maintained at 400 psig with the Mechanical Hydraulic Control System (turbine by-pass valves). Reactor water level is being maintained in normal bands with the Condensate and Feedwater System. Off-site power is being supplied to the station by the Startup Transformer (normal power supply for shutdown operations). This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector is on-site and has been notified. The licensee has notified the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. The licensee will be issuing a press release.

  • * * UPDATE FROM EVERETT PERKINS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1110 EDT ON 5/24/2015 * * *

The following was provided by the licensee as clarifying information to the first paragraph of the original event notification: As a conservative measure, the operating crew had previously started reducing power from 20 percent core thermal power when it was first noticed that main condenser vacuum was degrading. This was well before any low condenser vacuum alarms were received. During the shutdown, after already securing the main turbine, the operating crew established benchmark values for degrading condenser vacuum for a normal plant shutdown and for a manual reactor scram should vacuum continue to decline to preclude an automatic scram. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Dwyer).

ENS 509493 April 2015 01:32:00Quad CitiesManual ScramNRC Region 3GE-3On April 2, 2015 at 2133 CDT, a manual scram was inserted on Unit 1 following discovery of a steam leak in the Turbine Building at the D-ring, near the Turbine Bypass valves. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately -2 inches, which resulted in an automatic Group II and Group III isolation (expected response). The steam leak was isolated by manual closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 remains in Mode 3, with cooldown in progress. Reactor water level is in the normal level band. The cause and details of the event are under investigation. Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100 percent power. Operators reduced reactor power to 20 percent before initiating a SCRAM. All rods fully inserted and the reactor is shutdown and stable. The electrical supply is in a normal shutdown lineup. The reactor is being supplied by normal feedwater, and decay heat is being controlled by use of the ADS valves. The licensee is currently cooling down and depressurizing the reactor in preparation for repair of the steam leak. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois Resident Inspector.
ENS 507926 February 2015 16:53:00DresdenAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3At 1227 CST on 06 Feb 2015, Dresden Unit 2 automatically scrammed due to a Reactor Water Level transient. Set up activities for weekend maintenance were being performed on the feedwater system at the time of the event. All rods inserted to their full-in positions. Systems operated as expected. Reactor vessel inventory and pressure are being maintained in normal control bands. The ultimate heat sink was maintained. The source of the transient was a loss of Feedwater Level Control and the reactor automatically scrammed on low reactor water level. Cause of the failure is under investigation. All three feed pumps tripped as a result of the transient. The 2B reactor feed pump was restored following the transient in accordance with station operating procedures. Level is being maintained with normal feedwater. High Pressure Coolant Injection initiated on a valid low-low reactor water level. Manual operator action was taken to prevent unneeded injection into the reactor coolant system. Group 2 Primary Containment and Group 3 Shutdown Cooling and Reactor Water Clean-up system isolations occurred as expected. Unit 2 and 2/3 (swing diesel) EDGs started as expected, but did not load onto their associated busses as offsite power was maintained. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5077127 January 2015 16:56:00PilgrimAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-3On Tuesday, January 27, 2015, at 0948 EST, with the Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in the Shutdown position and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) at 0% core thermal power, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was isolated by the main control room operating crew and declared INOPERABLE. HPCI had been in service for reactor pressure control following the automatic reactor scram experienced during winter storm 'Juno' reported in EN# 50769. It appears there was a malfunction of the HPCI turbine gland seal condenser blower or associated condensate pump. Reactor pressure control was transitioned to the safety relief valves and the reactor cooldown was continued. The plant is stable. The Emergency Diesel Generators are powering the safety related 4KV buses and reactor water level is being maintained by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system. HPCI is required to be OPERABLE in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.C.1. Since HPCI is a single train system, the INOPERABILITY is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The cause of the HPCI malfunction is not known at this time and troubleshooting continues. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Shutdown cooling is in service.
ENS 5076927 January 2015 06:41:00PilgrimAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-3On Tuesday January 27, 2015 at 0402 hours, with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in Run and reactor power approximately 52% an automatic reactor scram signal was received due to the automatic trip of the main turbine that was initiated by the opening of the main generator breaker, ACB-104. The event occurred during winter storm 'Juno.' Prior to the event off-site transmission Line 355 was de-energized due (to) weather conditions and its associated PNPS switchyard breakers (ACB-105, a main generator breaker and ACB-102), were open. Per station procedures, reactor power was being lowered, a reactor protection system bus had been placed onto a back-up power supply, the Emergency Diesel Generators had been started and were powering the associated safety related 4 KV buses. The second off-site transmission Line 342 de-energized and the associated PNPS switchyard breakers (ACB-104 main generator breaker and ACB-103) opened. The Shutdown Transformer off-site power supply has remained available throughout this event. All control rods were verified to be fully inserted. Per plant design, Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group lI sampling systems, Group VI Reactor Water Clean-up (RWCU) system and Reactor Building Isolation System (RBIS) isolations occurred. Currently, the EDG's are powering the safety related 4KV buses, reactor water level is being maintained by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system and reactor pressure is being maintained by High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. The station is conducting a plant cool down at this time. All systems responded as designed with the exception of a non-safety-related diesel air compressor, K-117 that failed to start. The licensee will notify the State and local governments and plans on issuing a press release. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5073313 January 2015 22:10:00DresdenManual ScramNRC Region 3GE-3At 1904 Central Time 13 Jan 2015, Dresden Unit 2 was manually scrammed by Operators due to a Reactor Water Level transient. All rods inserted to their full-in positions. All systems operated as expected. Reactor vessel inventory and pressure are being maintained in normal control bands. The source of the transient was a failure of both controllers in the Feedwater Level Control system. Cause of the failure is under investigation. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (R) when the reactor is critical. There was no on-going work or testing during this time which could be attributed to the failure of the level controllers. Unit 2 is in a normal post scram electrical line-up and maintaining pressure and temperature. RHR cooling is available if required. Unit 3 was unaffected by this transient. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 500853 May 2014 15:15:00DresdenAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3At 1209 CDT on 3 May 2014, Dresden Unit 2 automatically scrammed on a Generator-Turbine Load Mismatch signal following a main generator trip. All rods inserted to their full in positions. All systems operated as expected. Reactor vessel inventory and pressure are being maintained in automatic. The cause of the scram was due to a main generator trip that occurred during a voltage regulator channel transfer. Troubleshooting is in progress to determine the exact cause of the generator trip. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Main feedwater is being used to maintain reactor vessel level and decay heat is being removed by the main condenser via the turbine bypass valves. There was no impact on Unit 3 which remains stable at 100 percent power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5003012 April 2014 13:24:00DresdenAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3At 1012 CDT on April 12, 2014, Dresden Unit 2 automatically scrammed on TR-2 sudden pressure relay actuation. All rods inserted to their full-in positions. Following the reactor scram, the 'A' reactor recirculation pump did not run back to minimum speed automatically. Operators took action to run the recirculation pump to minimum speed manually. All other systems operated as expected. Reactor vessel inventory and pressure are being maintained in automatic. The cause of the scram was due to a trip of the sudden pressure relay for Main Power Transformer 2. Troubleshooting is in progress to determine the cause (of the trip of the sudden pressure relay). This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. Normal offsite power remains available. There was no impact on Unit 3. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 499882 April 2014 15:32:00Quad CitiesManual ScramNRC Region 3GE-3

Quad Cities Unit 2 Alert Classification (HA3) Due to Fire. On April 2, 2014, at 1340 CDT, an ALERT was declared due to a fire in the Unit 2 turbine building. Prior to declaring the ALERT, Unit 2 was manually scrammed at 1302 CDT. All control rods inserted and all automatic isolations actuated as designed. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were manually closed. The fire has been extinguished. Unit 2 is currently in Hot Shutdown. The cause of the event is under investigation. Unit 1 remains at 100% power. The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the event. Unit 2 is still being supplied from off-site power and is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup with the exception of Bus 29-1 (480 VAC safety bus) that was deenergized. One Unit 2 emergency diesel generator is inoperable due to the loss of power to its cooling water pump. The licensee has notified the State and local agencies. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA OPS Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and Nuclear SSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MIKE HAYES TO DONG PARK AT 2252 EDT ON 04/02/2014 * * *

At 2132 CDT on April 2, 2014, the licensee terminated the Unit 2 Alert declaration. Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown). Unit 2 is proceeding to Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) on shutdown cooling. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State emergency agencies. Notified the IRD (Gott), R3DO (Passehl), and NRR EO (McGinty). Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA OPS Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and Nuclear SSA via email.

ENS 4929622 August 2013 11:39:00PilgrimManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-3On Thursday, August 22, 2013 at 0755 hours (EDT), with the reactor critical at approximately 98% core thermal power, and the mode switch in RUN, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to lowering reactor water level. The cause of the lowering reactor water level was due to the trip of all three Feedwater Pumps. The cause of the Feedwater Pump trip event is currently under investigation. Following the reactor scram, all control rods were verified to be fully inserted. All 4kV busses transferred to the Startup Transformer as designed. Following the scram the reactor water level lowered to +12 inches initiating the Primary Containment Isolation System (Group II, Reactor Building Isolation System (RBIS); and Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System) automatically as per design. Reactor water level lowered to -46 inches initiating Primary Containment Isolation System Group I - Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs); Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) actuated which included automatic start and injection of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System and an automatic start of the Emergency Diesel Generators as designed. Reactor water level was promptly restored to normal level. Currently a cooldown is in progress with reactor pressure is being maintained by the HPCI System operating in the pressure control mode and reactor water level is being maintained by the RCIC System. Reactor Water Clean-up System and normal reactor building ventilation have been restored. Off-site power is being supplied to the station by the Start-up Transformer (normal power supply for shutdown operations). This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. This 4-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(A) and (B). The plant is transferring from decay heat removal to the torus to decay heat removal to the main condenser. Reactor pressure is 371 psig. Initial indications are that a main feedwater power supply breaker tripped.
ENS 4892315 April 2013 02:01:00PilgrimManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-3On Sunday, April 14, 2013 at 2217 hours, with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in Start-up, the turbine generator previously removed from service, and the reactor sub-critical on Intermediate Range Monitors Range 2 and lowering, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to reactor pressure lowering beyond established control bands. At the time of the manual reactor scram PNPS was conducting a planned reactor shutdown to commence refueling outage (RFO) -19. All control rods fully inserted and Primary Containment Isolation System Group II (Reactor Building) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup System) actuations occurred as designed due to the expected reactor water level shrink associated with the scram signal. All plant systems responded as designed. Off-site power was unaffected and was supplied by the start-up transformer (normal power supply for refuel and reactor shutdown operations). The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) were manually closed to terminate the reactor pressure reduction and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was manually started in the reactor pressure control mode. The Reactor Protection System (RPS) was reset as were the reactor building and reactor water clean-up system isolation signals. Currently, the plant cooldown is continuing with the HPCI system in pressure control and reactor water level being maintained within normal bands with the condensate and feedwater system. The cause of the lowering reactor pressure has not been determined and remains under review. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. This 8-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will also be notifying state authorities.
ENS 487368 February 2013 22:50:00PilgrimAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-3

Pilgrim Station scrammed on a loss of offsite power. All systems performed as designed. Groups I, II, VI went to completion. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) is injecting to the vessel controlling level. High Pressure Coolant Injection is in pressure control and slowly cooling down. Offsite power was lost multiple times. The Startup Transformer has been declared inoperable. The Unusual Event was declared under EAL SU 1.1 based on loss of offsite power greater than 15 minutes (at 2200 EST). The licensee originally experienced an automatic reactor scram at 2117 EST due to a load reject with a turbine trip/reactor scram due to loss of power. Offsite power availability has been fluctuating in and out to the site. The licensee states that all systems are functioning as required. All rods fully inserted and the reactor is stable in Mode 3. Both Emergency Diesel Generators are providing power to the safety related buses. The loss of offsite power is believed to be weather related. The licensee has notified the State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA, and NuclearSSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL GALLANT TO VINCE KLCO AT 2/10/13 AT 1108 EST* * *

Pilgrim terminated the Unusual Event and has transitioned to recovery effective at 10:55 AM on 02/10/2013. Offsite power has been restored to safety-related and non-safety-related electrical buses through the station Startup Transformer via a single 345 KV line. The other two offsite power sources remain out of service. The emergency diesel generators have been secured and are in standby. Residual heat removal is in shutdown cooling mode maintaining the reactor in cold shutdown. Fuel Pool Cooling is in service with fuel pool coolant temperatures trending down. The licensee notified State, local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1 RA (Dean), R1DO (Powell), NRR DIR(Leeds) NRR EO (Evans) and NSIR IRD (Marshall). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA, and NuclearSSA via email.

ENS 4866410 January 2013 19:05:00PilgrimManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-3On Thursday, January 10, 2013 at 1534 hour (EST), with the reactor at 100% core thermal power, both recirculation pumps spuriously tripped and a manual reactor scram was inserted as required by station procedures. The cause of the recirculation pump trip is under investigation. Following the reactor scram, all rods were verified to be fully inserted and the Primary Containment Isolation System Group II (Reactor Building) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup System) actuations occurred as designed due to the expected reactor water level shrink associated with the scram signal. All other plant systems responded as designed. Currently reactor pressure is being maintained between 900 and 1050 psig with the Mechanical Hydraulic Control System (turbine by-pass valves). The Reactor Protection System has been reset; Reactor Water Cleanup System and normal reactor building ventilation have been restored. Reactor water level is being maintained in normal bands with the Condensate and Feedwater System. Off-site power is being supplied to the station by the Start-up Transformer (normal power supply for shutdown operations) and the switchyard ring bus has been restored. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector is on-site and has been notified. This 4-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B). The scram was uncomplicated and decay heat is being released to the main condenser via the turbine by-pass valves.
ENS 4834125 September 2012 15:11:00MonticelloAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3During maintenance on 4160V Bus 12 ammeter, a Bus 12 lockout occurred. The station power was from 1R Reserve transformer for work on the 2R Auxiliary transformer. Net effect was Bus 12 locked out, removing power from 12 Reactor Feed Pump and 12 Reactor Recirculation pump. Reactor level lowered to +23 inches then began to rise. With both Main Feed Reg Valves in AUTO, the level transient reached +48 inches, the Reactor Water Level Hi Hi setpoint. The Main Turbine and 11 Reactor Feed Pump tripped as designed, and a Reactor SCRAM occurred. Reactor water level began to drop, and C.4.A Abnormal Procedure for SCRAM was used to restart 11 Reactor Feed Pump and recover water level. Minimum water level reached was -26 inches. Reactor Low Level SCRAM signal and Group 2 Primary Containment isolation occurred at +9 inches as designed, No Safety Relief valves lifted during this transient. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) did not receive an initiation signal due to not reaching their setpoints. There were no Emergency Core Cooling Systems initiation setpoints reached. Prior to the event, both divisions of Standby Liquid Control were inoperable as part of planned maintenance. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed through the turbine bypass to the main condenser. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup and stable in Mode 3. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the State and local governments.
ENS 4794522 May 2012 16:33:00PilgrimManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-3On Tuesday, May 22, 2012 at 1311 hours (EDT), with the reactor at approximately 35% core thermal power, during a planned power reduction to support thermal backwash of the main condenser, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to degrading main condenser vacuum. The cause of the degraded vacuum is currently under investigation. Following the reactor scram, all rods were verified to be fully inserted and the Primary Containment Isolation System Group II (Reactor Building) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup System) actuations occurred as designed due to the expected reactor water level shrink associated with the scram signal. Standby Gas Treatment System Train 'B,' which is designed to shutdown 65 seconds after the Group II signal is received if the Standby Gas Treatment Train 'A' is in service, continued to operate until manually secured. With this exception, all other plant systems responded as designed. Currently reactor pressure is being maintained at 920 psig with the Mechanical Hydraulic Control System (turbine by-pass valves). Reactor water level is being maintained in normal bands with the Condensate and Feedwater System. Off-Site power is being supplied to the station by the Start-up Transformer (normal power supply for shutdown operations). This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." The licensee has notified the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 4784718 April 2012 18:07:00Quad CitiesAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3On April 18, 2012, at 1511 hours (CDT), an automatic scram occurred on high reactor pressure. The pressure increase occurred during post-modification testing on the main generator automatic voltage regulator, which had been upgraded during the recent refueling outage. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately zero inches, which resulted in automatic Group II and III isolations (Reactor Water Clean Up and Secondary Containment Isolation) as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. The cause of the event is still under investigation. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). All Control Rods fully inserted, decay heat is being removed through the bypass steam valves to the main condenser, and the plant remains in a normal shutdown electrical alignment. The high reactor pressure appears to have been caused by a load rejection associated with the main generator voltage regulator testing. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4746020 November 2011 02:10:00MonticelloAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3While performing a regularly scheduled Turbine Bypass Valve surveillance, prior to Turbine Bypass Valve movement, a 'B' half scram (signal) was received. Operators immediately suspended testing. Approximately 10 seconds later, a full Reactor Protection System actuation occurred. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level lowered below the Group II isolation initiation setpoint of +9 inches, (resulting in containment valve isolations). There were no radioactive releases associated with this event. No other alarms were received prior to the RPS actuation. The cause of the reactor scram is under investigation at this time. Also, due to the reactor scram, discharge canal temperature rate of change exceeded plant requirements. As a result, the State of Minnesota, and appropriate local agencies will be notified. All control rods inserted and the scram is considered uncomplicated. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical configuration. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4736421 October 2011 16:42:00MonticelloAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3

The station experienced a lockout of the 2R Auxiliary Power Transformer. The resulting transient caused an automatic actuation of the RPS system. All control rods fully inserted. A Group 2 Primary Containment isolation occurred. Both 11 and 12 Emergency Diesel Generators started on a loss of voltage signal. Equipment response was that the 11 ESW (Emergency Service Water) pump (cooling for the #11 Emergency Diesel) failed to develop required pressure. The #13-4160V non-safety related bus failed to restore after the transient (and feed the Division 1 Essential Bus). Additionally, the #15 bus transferred to the 1AR transformer (and is feeding the Essential Bus). The #11 Emergency Diesel Generator is currently tagged out of service. Electrical supply is being provided by offsite power. Reactor heat is being removed through the main steam line to the main condenser and reactor water inventory is being provided by the feedwater system. The SRVs lifted and reseated. The HPCI system was manually place into a pressure control mode. The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency is being notified due to the licensee violating the site discharge canal temperature rate of change limit. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RYAN RICHARDS TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1730 EDT ON 11/01/2011 * * *

Prior to this event the 'B' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) and 'B' Control Room Ventilation (CRV) Systems were inoperable for planned maintenance. On 10-21-11 at 1325 CDT, the #11 EDG ESW Pump was declared inoperable due to low cooling water pump flow, resulting in the #11 EDG being inoperable, which in turn resulted in the 'A' CREF and 'A' CRV being inoperable. Contrary to reporting requirements this condition was not identified and reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as required within 8-hours in the previous event notification. This condition resulted in a loss of safety function for both divisions of CREF and CRV. This update amends the 10-21-11 event notification to include this as an 8-hour non-emergency event pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Nick Valos)

ENS 4695113 June 2011 10:17:00Quad CitiesManual ScramNRC Region 3GE-3On June 13, 2011 at 0510 CDT, a manual scram was inserted on Unit 1 following discovery of a steam leak in the turbine building downstream of the Main Turbine Stop Valves. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately -19 inches, which resulted in automatic Group II and Group III isolations (expected response). The steam leak was isolated by closure of the Main Turbine Stop Valves. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 remains in Mode 3 (hot shutdown), maintaining reactor pressure with the Main Turbine Bypass Valves; reactor water level is in the normal level band. The cause of the event is still under investigation. Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4632511 October 2010 13:38:00DresdenAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3

On October 11, 2010 in preparation for maintenance, the 'A' Reactor Protection System Bus was being transferred from the normal to the reserve power supply. As a part of the transfer, a half scram is expected. During the transfer a (full) reactor scram occurred. All rods inserted to their full-in positions. Following the reactor scram, all systems operated as expected. Reactor vessel inventory is being maintained by the Condensate / Feedwater system. Following the scram, the Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator auto started due to the transfer of the Auxiliary Power system. Currently the cause of the full Reactor Protection System (scram) is unknown. Troubleshooting is in progress to determine the malfunction. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. The auto-start of the EDG was expected as a result of the 'A' RPS bus transfer and has been secured and placed back in standby. Decay heat is being discharged to the condenser. The Unit is in a normal shutdown electrical line-up. The scram had no impact on Unit 2. The licensee characterized the scram as uncomplicated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RILEY RUFFIN TO ERIC SIMPSON 1415 EDT ON 10/20/10 * * *

The second to last paragraph of the original report has been updated to read as follows: The auto-start of the EDG was anticipated as a result of the Auxiliary Power System transfer and has been secured and placed back in standby. The R3DO (Orth) has been notified.

ENS 4618417 August 2010 16:54:00Quad CitiesManual ScramNRC Region 3GE-3On August 17, 2010, at 1414 hours, a manual scram was inserted on Unit 2 due to rising reactor water level. The water level increase was caused by a trip of the 2B Recirculation Pump. Restoration of the 2B Recirculation Pump Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) on the 2B Adjustable Speed Drive (ASD) was in progress at the time of the event. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately minus 15 inches, which resulted in automatic Group II and III isolations as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. The cause of the event is still under investigation. Unit I was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). All control rods inserted on the scram. No ECCS initiations occurred. No safety or relief valves lifted. The unit is stable in Mode 3 at 926 psig and 530 degrees Fahrenheit. Pressure is being controlled on the turbine bypass system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety.
ENS 4616912 August 2010 08:04:00Quad CitiesAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3While performing a main condenser flow reversal at 0358 (CDT) on August 12, 2010 the Unit 1 reactor received an automatic scram on turbine stop valve closure. Turbine stop valve closure was initiated from a turbine trip on low vacuum. Reactor water level decreased to approximately -3 (inches), which resulted in automatic Group II and III isolations as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit One remains in Mode 3, maintaining reactor pressure with reactor water level in the normal level band. The cause of the event is still under investigation. Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). All rods fully inserted. Normal feedwater is supplying the reactor with decay heat removal via the turbine bypass valves. No safety relief valves lifted during the transient. The transient was initiated during the condenser flow reversal when one of the flow reversal valves failed to fully reverse the flow. This resulted in inadequate heat transfer to circ water at full power operation causing the condenser vacuum to increase. In addition, the condenser vacuum trip of the turbine appears to have initiated before it was actually required. Overall, the scram was characterized as uncomplicated and all systems functioned as required.
ENS 454093 October 2009 20:26:00DresdenScramNRC Region 3GE-3On 10/03/09 at 1734 CDT, Unit 3 scrammed due to a Group 1 MSIV closure. The cause of the event is being investigated. The 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator also auto-started during the event. The cause of the auto start is also being investigated. All rods fully inserted. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3 with makeup water coming from the control rod drive system and decay heat removal from the isolation condenser. All systems functioned as required with the exception of the unexplained MSIV closure and the auto start of the 2/3 EDG. There was no impact on Unit 2 and the plant is in a normal post-scram electrical lineup. There was no need for the 2/3 EDG to auto-start and it did not load. Group 2 and 3 isolations were also received during the transient which is expected and normal. Reactor water level is being maintained between 8 and 48 inches and pressure between 800 and 1060 psi. Investigation of the cause of the MSIV closure is in progress The licensee stated that there were no activities or surveillances in progress at the time that could have caused the MSIV closure. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4473519 December 2008 21:52:00PilgrimAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-3On December 19, 2008, at 1831 hours with the reactor at 100% core thermal power (CTP) an automatic reactor scram occurred. It appears the scram occurred as a result of a load reject experienced during a severe winter storm. Three of the four safety relief valves opened in response to the event. Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (sample valves) and Group 6 (reactor water cleanup system) and the reactor building isolation system (RBIS-secondary containment) isolated as designed (all have since been restored) on the reactor water level +12 inches setpoint due to normal vessel shrink. Initial review indicates all safety-related systems responded as designed. Off-site power has been maintained; however the two 4kv safety related buses (A5&A6) were conservatively placed on the station emergency diesel generators due to potential grid stability concern. Currently, the reactor mode select switch (RMSS) is in the Shutdown position; the reactor scram has been reset; the reactor is being maintained at approximately 940 psig, with pressure being maintained by the main turbine by-pass valves; and reactor water level is being maintained at normal levels of 29 inches with the main condensate and feedwater system. Station maintenance personnel are assessing the status of the station switchyard. Once this activity is complete the duration of the forced outage and recovery plans will be determined. All control rods fully inserted on the scram. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4347910 July 2007 22:55:00PilgrimAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-3During a planned power reduction to support thermal backwash of the main condenser, an automatic reactor scram resulted from a main turbine trip. The cause for the turbine trip is currently under investigation. Following the reactor scram, the expected reactor level shrink resulted in valid group 2, Reactor Building Ventilation, and group 6, Reactor Water Cleanup System isolations. All safety systems and equipment functioned as designed. A schedule for plant restart has not yet been determined. All control rods fully inserted and no safety relief valves lifted from the scram. Minimum level after the scram was -10 inches. Decay heat is being removed using the main turbine bypass valves to the main condenser and maintaining level using normal reactor feed water. The plant is using the normal shut down electrical lineup and slowly cooling down (currently at 820 psi). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 433465 May 2007 02:13:00DresdenManual ScramNRC Region 3GE-3The condensate prefilters isolated earlier in the day and the bypass valve automatically opened. The computer controlling these valves was in the process of being replaced when the bypass valve shut. Unit experienced a loss of feedwater due to condensate pre-filter valves going closed. The reactor was manually scrammed and HPCI was used to restore reactor water level. MSIVs closed and the U2 and U2/3 EDGs auto started on low level. All rods fully inserted on the manual scram. Minimum level was approximately -54 inches. Decay heat is being removed using the isolation condenser and level is being maintained with Control Rod Drive leak by. No safety or relief valves lifted during this event. The plant is in the normal shutdown electrical lineup. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4324517 March 2007 21:11:00PilgrimManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-3On March 17 2007, at approximately 1658 EDT, Group 2 (Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation) and Group 6 (RWCU Isolation) automatic containment isolation signals were received due to low reactor water level following the insertion of a manual scram signal. The manual scram signal was inserted following the reaching of internal administrative limits on changes in unidentified drywell leakage. The receipt of these isolation signals is not unusual following the insertion of a scram signal. The reactor was manually shutdown due to reaching internal administrative limits on changes in unidentified drywell leakage. Prior to the manual shutdown, the leakage had not reached the applicable Technical Specification limits. Drywell leakage as of 1800 EDT was 1.3 GPM identified and 2.59 GPM unidentified with the unit in Hot Shutdown Mode. All safety systems responded as expected. The plant is in a stable condition. Investigation is continuing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4319828 February 2007 05:53:00Quad CitiesManual ScramNRC Region 3GE-3At 0120 hours on February 28, 2007 the Unit 2 Reactor was manually scrammed due to decreasing condenser vacuum. All control rods fully inserted during the scram. Reactor water level decreased to approximately -10", which resulted in automatic Group II and III isolations as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 2 remains in Mode 3, maintaining reactor pressure, with reactor water level in the normal level band. The cause of this event is still under investigation. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remains at 97% power. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). The Main Condenser remains in service removing decay heat via the bypass valves. All ECCS equipment is available, if needed. The licensee will inform the State and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4311423 January 2007 14:27:00MonticelloAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3The purpose of this notification is to inform the NRC that Nuclear Management Company (NMC) will be issuing a press release approximately two hours (CST) after this notification to the NRC on January 23, 2007, concerning an event previously reported to the NRC on January 10, 2007, via EN# 43088. The event in question involved an automatic reactor scram at 3:26 PM on January 10, 2007. As reported in that notification, all safety systems operated correctly. The scram occurred following the unexpected opening of the main turbine control valves. There was no release of radioactivity during the event. The purpose of the press release is to provide information to the media and the public regarding the results of NMC's investigation as to the cause of the January 10 event and the status of remedial actions. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify State and Local authorities.
ENS 4241413 March 2006 21:21:00PilgrimManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-3During a power ascension, the non-safety Augmented Offgas System experienced a failure which caused a Recombiner high temperature condition. To protect components of the non-safety Augmented Offgas System, station procedures require a manual scram of the reactor when this condition occurs. Station procedures were followed and the reactor was manually scrammed at 18:08. All rods fully inserted and all safety systems performed per design. Primary containment isolation systems responded properly resulting in an automatic isolation of Primary Containment Isolation System Groups 2 and 6 valves and a Reactor Building Isolation due to the transient low reactor water level condition caused by the scram. The plant is in a stable condition. Investigation is continuing. No safety valves lifted on the scram, decay heat is being removed with the bypass valve, normal feed and condensate are maintaining reactor water level, and the electrical grid is stable on the startup transformer. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4235622 February 2006 04:51:00Quad CitiesAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3At 0122 hours (CST) on February 22, 2006, the Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed from 85% power due to a valid turbine-generator load reject signal. The maximum reactor pressure was approximately 1050 PSIG during the event. All control rods inserted to their full-in position. Reactor water level decreased to approximately -10 inches, which resulted in automatic Group 2 and 3 isolations as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 is in Mode 3, maintaining reactor pressure, and reactor water level in the normal level band. An investigation into the Unit 1 scram and load reject is in progress. Unit 2 remains at 85% power. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). No SRVs opened during the transient. Post shutdown electrical lineup is normal with the exception of the loss of one offsite power supply. Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser and feedwater being provided via main feedwater. Unit 2 is in a Tech Spec LCO for Loss of One Offsite power source. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 423012 February 2006 04:51:00MonticelloScramNRC Region 3GE-3Train "A" of the Emergency Filtration Train (EFT) Unit, which services the control room ventilation system, tripped off line due to a low flow condition. The cause was determined to be a rip in the rubber boot at the suction of the fan, thus causing an automatic trip of the EFT system from a low flow condition through the filter where flow is sensed. Both the "A" and "B" trains were declared inoperable due to the amount of leakage the "B" EFT was having through the ripped boot in the "A" EFT, and the condition found on "B" EFT rubber boot. Upon further evaluation of the "B" EFT boot condition, the "B" train was declared operable at 03:02 CST on 02/02/06. The "A" EFT will remain in a 7 day LCO until the rubber boot is replaced. The 8 hour notification was issued due to both EFT Units being declared inoperable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4178217 June 2005 15:02:00Quad CitiesAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3At 1120 hours (CDT) on June 17, 2005, the Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed from 85% power due to a valid high reactor pressure signal. The maximum reactor pressure was approximately 1044 psig during the event. All control rods inserted to their full-in position. Initial indications are that the reactor pressure increase was caused by a malfunction in the Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system, which resulted in closure of the main turbine control valves. The main turbine bypass valves (nine) opened as expected in response to the pressure increase. No reactor pressure vessel safety or relief valves were required to actuate during the event. Reactor water level decreased to approximately -20 inches, which resulted in automatic Group 2 and 3 isolations as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 is in Mode 3 with a cooldown in progress and reactor water level in the normal level band. An investigation into the Unit 1 scram is in progress. Unit 2 remains at 94% power. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4151724 March 2005 07:59:00DresdenAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3The licensee provided the following information via email (licensee text in quotes): On 3/24/05 at approximately 0529 Unit 2 received a Group 1 isolation on main steam line high flow. All Group 1 valves closed as required and the reactor scrammed. The Isolation Condenser was manually initiated to control reactor pressure. Group 2 and 3 Containment Isolations occurred as expected. Investigation as to the cause of the Group 1 isolation is in progress. All systems responded as required with no abnormalities noted. The licensee also indicated that a Main Turbine Generator EHC transient occurred at the time of the isolation. All control rods fully inserted, the electrical grid is stable, and decay heat is being removed via the Isolation Condenser System. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4071328 April 2004 18:50:00DresdenManual ScramNRC Region 3GE-3On 4/28/04 at 1536 (CDT), Dresden Unit 2 experienced a trip of the 2A Recirc MG set and associated recirc pump. This placed the unit in the immediate scram region of the power to flow map. The Unit NSO manually scrammed the reactor in accordance with the immediate operator actions of DOA 202.01. Troubleshooting is in progress to determine the cause of the 2A Recirc MG set trip. There were no Electromatic Relief or Safety Relief Valve actuations. There were no ECCS initiations. PCIS Group 2 and Group 3 Isolations occurred as expected due to normal reactor water level decrease following the scram. All systems responded as expected following the reactor scram. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) for an actuation of the RPS and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for Group 2 and 3 actuations. All control rods fully inserted, the electrical grid is stable, ECCS and the EDGs remain operable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4070224 April 2004 09:00:00DresdenAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) . On 04/24/2004 at 06:03 (CDT), Dresden Unit 2 experienced an automatic Scram from 20% Reactor power due to Main Steam Isolation Valve closure, cause is under investigation. There were no Electromatic Relief or Safety Relief Valve actuations and the Isolation Condenser was initiated manually for pressure control. There were no ECCS initiations. PCIS Group 2 and Group 3 Isolations occurred as expected due to normal reactor water level decrease following the scram. All other systems responded as expected. All control rods fully inserted on the automatic scram. The electric plant is in a normal lineup and being supplied from offsite power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4062530 March 2004 10:40:00Quad CitiesAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3At 0740 hours (CST) during testing of the turbine thrust bearing wear detector, a main turbine trip occurred. This resulted in an automatic reactor scram due to turbine stop valve closure. Following the scram all Group II (Primary Containment) and Group III (Reactor Water Cleanup) isolations occurred as expected. All essential equipment functioned as required. Unit 2 remains in Mode 3 with reactor water level in the normal level band. An investigation into the Unit 2 turbine trip is in progress. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remains at 85% power. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident inspector.
ENS 4049130 January 2004 14:35:00DresdenAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3Unit 3 experienced an automatic reactor scram due to a main turbine trip. The main turbine tripped due to low oil pressure, the cause of which is under investigation. Primary Containment Isolation System Group 2 and 3 isolations occurred as expected due to the reactor water level decrease following the scram. After reactor water level was restored to normal (+30 inches), level continued to increase to the reactor feed pump high level trip setpoint. Reactor level was subsequently restored to normal and the reactor feed pumps were restarted and are currently supplying the reactor. Decay heat is being removed by the main steam system via auxiliary loads. All other systems responded as expected. Current reactor pressure is 850 psi, and level is stable at 30 inches. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector is in the control room.
ENS 4038812 December 2003 01:25:00DresdenManual ScramNRC Region 3GE-3Manual scram was inserted during a Stator Cooling Runback that was not expected. Cause of the Stator Cooling Runback is under investigation. Group 2 & 3 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolations occurred as expected due to reactor level drop during the scram. All other systems operated as expected. All controls rods were fully inserted during the manual scram. The MSIVs are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The condensate and feedwater system is in operation maintaining reactor vessel water level. Current Reactor Pressure is 880 psig and Reactor Level +30 inches. The electrical plant lineup is stable and in a normal lineup for this condition. The manual scram of this unit had no affect on the other unit onsite which is in a refueling outage. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4020930 September 2003 23:11:00DresdenAutomatic ScramNRC Region 3GE-3Dresden Unit 2 automatically scrammed on low reactor vessel water level after "2C" reactor feed pump tripped (1 of 2 running). All systems responded as required (all rods fully inserted). Investigation into reactor feed pump trip cause has begun. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.