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The query [[Category:ENS Notification]] [[Reactor type::GE-2]] [[Scram::+]] was answered by the SMWSQLStore3 in 0.0224 seconds.


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 Entered dateSiteScramRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 529506 September 2017 15:41:00Nine Mile PointAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2On September 6, 2017 at 1157 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram with a Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) and Containment isolation. The scram was due to reactor vessel low water level. The cause of the reactor vessel low water level is under investigation. All control rods fully inserted. Following the scram, pressure was momentarily controlled through the use of the Emergency Condenser (EC) system. At 1205, pressure control was established through the main steam lines to the condenser through the turbine bypass valves. All plant systems responded per design following the scram. The reactor scram is a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The following systems automatically actuated after the scram as expected. These system actuations are an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A): 1. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. HPCI initiated at 1157 and was reset at 1158 when RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. 2. The Core Spray system actuated, but did not discharge to the Reactor Coolant system. The Core Spray system was secured at 1216. 3. Containment and MSIV isolation on reactor vessel low-low water level signal. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor vessel water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. No safety relief valves lifted during the transient. The main steam isolation valves were opened after the isolation signal cleared to facilitate decay heat removal. Offsite power is supplying all plant loads. There was no effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified New York State Department of Environmental Protection and will be issuing a press release.
ENS 528393 July 2017 12:32:00Oyster CreekManual Scram
Automatic Scram
NRC Region 1GE-2At 1015 (EDT) a manual reactor scram was inserted due to degrading main condenser vacuum. All rods inserted into the core as expected and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' At 1033 (EDT) an automatic reactor scram occurred on low reactor water level. Due to the previous manual reactor scram, all rods were (already) inserted. This event is reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation. (1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including : Reactor scram and reactor trip.' Decay heat is being removed using main feedwater and the turbine bypass valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. This event was characterized as a "configuration control event" where a valve misposition allowed the offgas line to flood.
ENS 5262420 March 2017 04:40:00Nine Mile PointManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2On March 20, 2017 at 0227, Nine Mile Point Unit1 was manually scrammed due to pressure oscillations. The Unit was offline and reactor shutdown was in-progress at the time of the scram. The scram was inserted at approximately 4% reactor power when pressure oscillations occurred exceeding the procedurally required limit for pressure oscillations. The cause of the scram was due to Operators manually inserting the scram. The cause of the pressure oscillations is being investigated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Gray).
ENS 5242510 December 2016 12:31:00Nine Mile PointManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2On December 10, 2016 at 0848 EST, (operators at) Nine Mile Point Unit 1 manually scrammed the reactor due to high vibrations on the Main Turbine. Cause of the high vibrations is being investigated. Following the scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI system actuation signal on low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater system and is not an emergency core cooling system. At 0849, RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point and the HPCI system initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the turbine bypass valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic relief valves actuated due to this scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. The licensee has notified the state of New York Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5238120 November 2016 06:01:00Oyster CreekAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2At 0342 EST, an automatic reactor scram was processed during turbine valve testing. All rods inserted into the core as expected and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. The event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The plant response to the reactor scram was uncomplicated. The main feedwater system is maintaining reactor water level and decay heat is being removed by the main turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. The unit is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. No SRVs lifted during the scram. The licensee was testing the main turbine trip function just prior to the scram. The cause is under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5189530 April 2016 19:14:00Oyster CreekManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2Today at 1804 EDT, a manual scram was processed during startup due to rising unidentified leak rate. The rise in unidentified leak rate was identified to be coming from the D Reactor Recirc Pump seal cavity. All rods inserted into the core and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. The event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The reactor is stable in hot shutdown. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 513694 September 2015 12:58:00Nine Mile PointAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2On September 4, 2015, at 0916 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram following Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure and isolation of both main steam lines. The cause of the MSIV closure is not known at this time. All control rods fully inserted. Following the scram, pressure was momentarily controlled through the use of the Emergency Condenser system. At 0950, pressure control was established through the main steam lines to the condenser through Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) 01-02 and 01-04. MSIV 01-03 would not reopen. All other plant systems responded per design following the scram. The reactor scram is a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)." The following systems automatically actuated after the scram as expected. These system actuations are an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). 1. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. HPCI initiated at 0916 and reset at 0917 when RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point. HPCI initiated and was reset a second time at 0922. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. 2. The Core Spray system actuated, but did not discharge to the Reactor Coolant system. The Core Spray system was secured at 1033. 3. The Emergency Condenser (EC) system actuated to control pressure. EC-11 was secured at 0917. EC-12 was secured at 0921 . The maximum shell temperature of EC system was 193 degrees Fahrenheit. 4. Containment Isolation actuation. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Since the scram, there have been no anomalies observed with feedwater system operation. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The Reactor is being supplied by the normal feedwater system and there was indication of a partial lift/reset on one Electrometric Relief Valve (ERV). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York Public Service Commission.
ENS 510557 May 2015 18:55:00Oyster CreekAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2Today at 1727 EDT, an automatic scram from a turbine trip occurred. The cause of the turbine trip is currently under investigation. All rods inserted into the core and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. The event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. Plant response to the scram was uncomplicated and the plant is stable in Mode 3. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5052412 October 2014 05:22:00Oyster CreekManual Scram
Automatic Scram
NRC Region 1GE-2

Today at approximately 0250 (EDT) (on 10/12/14), during a planned reactor power ascension with reactor power at approximately 1% of rated thermal power, reactor water level began lowering. Operators inserted a manual SCRAM at 0251 (EDT) in accordance with station procedures. The cause of the lowering reactor level is currently under investigation. All rods inserted into the core and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. No electromatic (EMRVs) or safety relief valves lifted during the transient. The plant is currently shutdown and plant parameters are stable. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' Decay heat is being released to the main condenser and normal offsite power is being maintained. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JOSH MCGUIRE TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1520 EDT ON 10/17/2014 * * *

An automatic SCRAM occurred at 0251 EDT, moments before operators inserted a manual SCRAM in accordance with station procedures. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cook).

ENS 5027011 July 2014 05:17:00Oyster CreekManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2Today at approximately 0312 (EDT on 7/11/14), during a planned reactor power ascension with reactor power at approximately 55 percent of rated thermal power, main condenser vacuum began to lower. In accordance with the abnormal operating procedure for degrading vacuum, Operators inserted a manual scram of the reactor at 0314 (EDT). The cause of the degraded vacuum is currently under investigation. All rods inserted into the core and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. No electromatic (EMRVs) or safety relief valves lifted during the transient. This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The scram was uncomplicated, normal offsite power is available, and plant is being cooled down to cold shutdown. The cause of the degraded condenser vacuum is suspected condenser boot degradation. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4963314 December 2013 06:57:00Oyster CreekManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2Today at approximately 0337 (EST), during quarterly turbine valve testing with reactor power at 100% of rated thermal power, the plant experienced reactor pressure control abnormalities. Reactor pressure rose to 1042 psig (at which point) the Operators inserted a manual SCRAM. The cause of the rise in reactor pressure is currently under investigation. All control rods inserted into the core. Main steam isolation valves remained open, (however), bypass valves did not open as expected. The plant is in its normal electrical lineup and decay heat is being removed via isolation condensers. No electronic (EMRVs) or safety valves lifted during the transient. The plant is currently shutdown and all parameters are stable. This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the State.
ENS 494146 October 2013 14:26:00Oyster CreekManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2Today at approximately 1040 (EDT), during a planned reactor power ascension with reactor power at approximately 20% of rated thermal power, main condenser vacuum began to lower. In accordance with the abnormal operating procedure for degrading vacuum, Operators inserted a manual scram of the reactor at 1130 (EDT). The cause of the degraded vacuum is currently under investigation. All rods inserted into the core and all systems functioned as expected during the scram. No electromatic (EMRVs) or safety relief valves lifted during the transient. The plant is currently shutdown and parameters are stable. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup and decay heat is being removed via steam bypass valves to the main condenser. This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying state authorities.
ENS 494043 October 2013 09:20:00Oyster CreekAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2At 0643 EDT (on 10/03/13), during reactor startup, with the reactor critical and power in the intermediate range, an automatic reactor scram occurred due to an invalid (noise) intermediate range monitor (IRM) scram signal processed on both RPS trip systems. All control rods fully inserted and plant response was as expected. This notification is in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The reactor is currently subcritical. When the reactor scram occurred, reactor power was below the Point of Adding Heat and had minimal effect on the plant. Normal offsite power is being maintained. Decay heat is being maintained via normal shutdown cooling. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4859013 December 2012 18:36:00Nine Mile PointManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2

An increased usage of Nitrogen to maintain Primary Containment pressure within specification was noticed during steady state operation. Investigation into the extra Nitrogen usage revealed that Primary Containment Leakage was in excess of that allowed per Technical Specification 3.3.3.a. No action statement is provided for leakage in excess of Technical Specification 3.3.3.a; therefore in accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.1, the reactor shall be placed in an operational condition in which the specification is not applicable. This requires the plant to be shutdown and cooled down to less than 216 degrees F. Additionally, this is reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of a system needed to control the release of radioactive material. The primary containment was declared inoperable at 1630 EST and a normal orderly plant shutdown was commenced at 1645 EST and will be less than 215 degrees F within 10 hours. Investigation of containment leakage is in progress. An update will be provided when the plant is in an operational condition in which Technical Specification 3.3.3.a is not applicable. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Licensee has notified the State of New York.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0011 EST ON 12/14/12 FROM CHRISTOPHER GRAPES TO BILL HUFFMAN * * *

As of 2333 EST on 12/13/2012, the reactor is below 215 degrees F, and containment is no longer required to be operable by Technical Specification 3.3.3. As part of the shutdown, a manual reactor scram was initiated as part of the pre-planned shutdown sequence and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 1913 EST, RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point and the HPCI system initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the turbine bypass valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to the scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Cold Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via shutdown cooling (SDC). The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect." The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State authorities. Notified R1DO (Holody) and NRR EO (Lund).

ENS 484773 November 2012 11:50:00Nine Mile PointAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2On November 3, 2012 at 0823 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram on low reactor water level. All control rods fully inserted and all plant systems responded per design following the scram. Prior to the automatic scram, an unexpected high Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level was experienced, followed by a turbine trip and subsequent lowering of RPV water level to the RPV low level scram set point. The cause of the water level transient is unknown. Following the automatic scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 0824 EDT, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation set point and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the Turbine Bypass Valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to this scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Since the scram, there have been no anomalies observed with feedwater system operation. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Unit 2 was not affected during this event.
ENS 4845329 October 2012 21:58:00Nine Mile PointAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2On October 29, 2012 at 2100 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram due to a generator load reject. The cause of the load reject is currently under investigation. All control rods fully inserted and all plant systems responded per design following the scram. Following the automatic scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 2101 EDT, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation set point and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the Turbine Bypass Valves, the preferred system. Three Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to this scram and re-closed automatically. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using bypass valves. Both Reserve Station Transformers are in service and being supplied by their normal power sources. Both Emergency Diesel Generators are operable and in standby. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Caruso).
ENS 4832320 September 2012 11:55:00Nine Mile PointAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2On September 20, 2012 at 0923 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram due to a turbine trip at power. The cause of the turbine trip is currently under investigation. All control rods fully inserted and all plant systems responded per design following the scram. Following the automatic scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 0924 EDT, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation set point and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the Turbine Bypass Valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to this scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. One 115kv off site power source (Line 4) is unavailable for planned maintenance at the James A Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Both Reserve Station Transformers are in service and being supplied by the other 115kv offsite power source (Line 1). Both Emergency Diesel Generators are operable and in standby. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Licensee has notified the state.
ENS 4811017 July 2012 13:23:00Nine Mile PointAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2On July 17 2012, at 1118 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram due to high neutron flux as measured by the Average Power Range Monitoring system. The cause is currently under investigation. All control rods fully inserted and all plant systems responded per design following the scram. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, which is an operating mode of the feedwater system, initiated as expected. There were no planned activities in progress at the time which could have contributed to the event. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. All emergency power sources are available in standby. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. This was an uncomplicated Reactor Scram and the plant is stable with normal levels, temperature, and pressure. Offsite power is in a normal alignment. HPCI has been secured and returned to normal alignment. The cause to the high neutron flux is still under investigation. This event had no impact on Unit 2. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector and State Authorities.
ENS 4650723 December 2010 16:40:00Oyster CreekAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2At 1407 EST, during reactor startup at a RCS (Reactor Coolant System) pressure of 570 psig and with the turbine off-line, a Low Condenser Vacuum trip signal from both RPS (Reactor Protection System) channels resulted in an automatic reactor scram. All control rods fully inserted and plant response was as expected. This notification is in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The reactor is currently subcritical. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4640910 November 2010 13:00:00Nine Mile PointAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2At 10:56 (EST) on Wednesday, November 10, 2010, Nine Mile Point Unit (1) One automatically scrammed from rated power. The cause of the scram was Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure. The MSIV closure occurred during Instrument and Control Lo-Lo Level Surveillance Testing. The Lo-Lo Surveillance Test has been secured and all Reactor Protection System (RPS) Level Signals returned to normal. Two of four MSIVs went closed; troubleshooting to follow to determine the cause of the equipment malfunction (unexpected MSIV closure). Following the automatic scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated. At Nine Mile Point Unit One, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. At 10:58, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation set point and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was initially established on the Emergency Condensers (ECS). The MSIVs have been re-opened and the normal heat removal capability has been re-established (to the Main Condensers). All off-site power sources remain available (with a normal electrical alignment). 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) requires reporting within 4 hours when a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System occurs. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires reporting within 8 hours when a valid actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System occurs. There are no other adverse impacts to the station based on this event. All control rods inserted and the unit is stable in Mode 3 with reactor pressure and temperature approximately 600 psig and 480 degrees. All other safety systems operated as expected. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the New York State Public Service Commission.
ENS 454125 October 2009 14:41:00Nine Mile PointManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2

At 1158 on Monday, October 5, 2009, Nine Mile Point Unit One was manually scrammed from approximately 100% rated power due to failure of the Feedwater Level Control System, in anticipation of a reactor scram. Following the manual scram insertion at 11:58, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated on low Reactor Vessel (RPV) level. At 11:59, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation setpoint, and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. At Nine Mile Point Unit One, a HPCI System actuation signal on low RPV level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. Unit 1 has commenced cooldown, in preparation for the forced outage to commence repairs. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal operating band; reactor temperature is 450?F and reactor pressure is approximately 500 psig.

10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) requires reporting within 4 hours when any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires reporting within 8 hours when a valid actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System occurs. All control rods fully inserted. All systems functioned as required following the reactor scram. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. HPCI has been secured. Makeup water is being provided by the Reactor Feedwater System and decay heat removal is through the bypass valves to the condenser. There was no impact on Unit 2 and the plant is in a normal post-scram electrical lineup. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 4502125 April 2009 20:50:00Oyster CreekManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2Oyster Creek inserted a manual reactor scram due to a loss of cooling to one of its main transformers. All systems responded normally during the reactor scram. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. " The manual scram was described as uncomplicated. All control rods fully inserted. No safeties or PORVs lifted during the transient. There were no electrical power issues besides the problem associated with the main transformer cooling. Normal feedwater cooling was maintained to the reactor and decay heat removal is to the main condenser. There were no ESF actions during the transient. The loss of cooling was to one of Oyster Creeks' two main transformers. Power to the transformer cooling system components (oil cooling pumps and cooling fans) was lost when the control power transformer to the cooling system components failed. The licensee manually scrammed because sustained operation at power would not be possible with loss of cooling to the main transformer and operation with one of the main transformers de-energized is also not possible. The licensee will continue to cold shutdown to perform other maintenance activities while shutdown. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4492321 March 2009 07:54:00Nine Mile PointManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2

At 0121 on Saturday, March 21, 2009, Nine Mile Point Unit One was manually scrammed from approximately 18% rated power in preparation for Refueling Outage 20. The plant scram was a planned evolution. Following the manual scram insertion at 0121, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level. At 0123, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation setpoint, and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. At Nine Mile Point Unit One the HPCI system is a mode of operation of the feedwater and condensate system. It is not an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). A HPCI System actuation signal on low RPV level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires reporting within 8 hours when a valid actuation of the feedwater coolant injection system occurs. The event has been entered into the corrective action program. There are no other adverse impacts to the station based on this event. All control rods fully inserted. Electrical lineup is normal and there are no safety equipment out of service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector

  • * * UPDATE FROM BRIAN FINCH TO JOE O'HARA AT 1611 ON 5/15/09 * * *

Event notification 44923 is being retracted after further evaluation because it has been determined that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system initiation was part of a pre-planned sequence. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) requires that any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in this section, including a feedwater injection system, must be reported within 8 hours. Except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The HPCI actuation that occurred after the manual scram from 18% Rated Thermal Power (RTP) was part of a pre-planned sequence in accordance with an operating procedure on plant shutdown. The HPCI initiation was also discussed during Just-in-Time training for the operating crew prior to performance of the soft shutdown. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, the HPCI system is a mode of operation of the feedwater and condensate systems. The HPCI system is not an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). A HPCI system actuation signal on low reactor water level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to reactor water level shrink. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Holody).

ENS 4468828 November 2008 23:04:00Oyster CreekAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2

At 98% power, a reactor scram occurred due to a Main Transformer fault. The plant is currently stable in the Hot Shutdown Mode. Isolation Condensers initiated as part of this event are currently in Standby Mode. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2) and (b)(3) and the Station Reportability Manual section SAF 1.6 and SAF 1.7. The cause of the transformer fault is unknown and under investigation. There was no fire or explosion associated with the fault. All rods inserted during the scram. As a result of the transient, one electromatic relief valve lifted and subsequently reseated. There were no other isolations or safety equipment actuations during the transient. The station electrical system is in its normal shutdown lineup with offsite power available. Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. Pressure is currently at 700 psi with water level being maintained at 160" via the main feed system. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the State of New Jersey.

  • * * * UPDATE FROM CARL SUCHTING TO JOHN KNOKE AT 0017 EDT ON 11/29/08 * * * *
Notification performed to NJDEP of fish mortality following a reactor scram.  As of this report, one dead bluefish spotted and three distressed bluefish spotted.

Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Doerflein).

ENS 4459824 October 2008 00:48:00Nine Mile PointManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2Control Room Operators observed slight (reactor) pressure rise during panel walk down. Investigation of pressure indication led Control room staff to determine that (the) EPR (Electronic Pressure Regulator) was not functioning properly (noise in the output signal). Control Room Staff entered Special Operating Procedure for failed pressure regulator. EPR could not be moved and this was confirmed by operators in the field. Control Room Staff (then) inserted a manual scram. Immediately after the scram reactor water level reached a low of 36", Emergency Operating Procedures for Level (EOP-2) were entered. HPCI initiated on the turbine trip to control water level. After the turbine tripped, all turbine bypass valves failed open; MSIVs (main steam isolation valve) were manually shut to control pressure. (The) EPR eventually disengaged from control, allowing the operator control of the turbine bypass valves. MSIVs were then reopened. (The) Scram has been reset. (The) turbine driven shaft pump did not initially disengage, pump (was) manually tripped after turbine speed reduced to 1500 rpm. All other systems responded correctly. (The) plant is not currently in any SOPs or EOPs and is proceeding to cold shutdown using normal operating procedures. All control rods fully inserted as expected. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. At the time of the event, containment spray loop 1-12 was out of service for routine surveillance. The plant is currently cooling down and is at 365 psi. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4385419 December 2007 14:57:00Oyster CreekManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2At 1145 hrs. EST, operators inserted a manual reactor scram due to lowering reactor water level after the 'A' main feedwater pump tripped. Prior to the scram, the plant was operating at reduced power due to removing the 'B' main feedwater pump from service for planned maintenance. Reactor water level was at 155" when the scram was initiated and lowered to 100" during the transient. Currently, reactor water level is at the normal operating band and is being maintained by the feedwater system. After the scram, all safety systems functioned as expected. There were no system isolations due to the transient. Electrical power is being provided by normal offsite sources via the startup transformer. Decay heat is being removed via the normal path through bypasses to the main condensers. Additionally, the licensee made an offsite notification to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection due to approximately 300 dead or distressed fish in the discharge canal. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4349517 July 2007 06:30:00Oyster CreekAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2

An automatic reactor scram occurred at 0522 on 07/17/07 due to a low reactor water level, following a trip of the 'C' Reactor Feed Pump. Reactor water level lowered to the low-low level setpoint and a reactor isolation occurred. Reactor level has been returned to the normal band and a reactor cooldown has been initiated using isolation condensers. The cause of the "C" RFP trip is attributed to an electrical fault as sensed on ground sensing and differential sensing instrumentation. No flames or smoke was observed, however, operators reported an acrid smell of insulation. Following the automatic scram on low reactor water level (138" above top of active fuel (TAF)), level continued to decrease to the low-low setpoint of 86" TAF resulting in a reactor isolation signal. The reactor isolation signal initiates closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), trip of the Recirc Pumps and actuation of the Isolation Condensers. Current reactor pressure is 520 psig with a cooldown rate of 82F/hr. The licensee plans to issue a press release and will take the Unit to cold shutdown for repairs. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1000 EDT ON 07/17/07 FROM STEVE FULLER TO S. SANDIN * * *

The following information reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was provided as an update: The following systems actuated upon receipt of a lo-lo reactor water level signal, subsequent to the reactor scram, reported under EN #43495, which occurred at 0522 on 07/17/07: MSIVs - Isolation Isolation Condensers - Initiation Standby Gas Treatment - Initiation Recirc Pumps - Trip Containment Valves - Isolation Core Spray - Start, but no injection Containment Spray - Manual initiation only, following use of EMRVs to control Rx pressure, causing elevated Torus water temperature. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Krafty).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1122 EDT ON 7/17/07 FROM STEVE FULLER TO S. SANDIN * * *

The following information reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) was provided as an update: Notified the New Jersey D.E.P. of an unplanned plant shutdown which occurred at 0522 07/17/07. There was no environmental impact from the plant shutdown. This notification is required to be made within 12 hours of an unplanned plant shutdown. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Krafty).

ENS 425586 May 2006 12:31:00Oyster CreekManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2A manual reactor scram was inserted to expedite a reactor shutdown. The reactor was subcritical at the time of the manual scram. All control rods inserted to less than or equal to position 02 as required. The unit entered a forced outage for necessary repairs including replacement of the "B" recirc pump motor. All systems functioned as required for the manual reactor scram. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4192718 August 2005 11:10:00Nine Mile PointAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2Unit 1 scrammed from 100% power due to a loss of power board 11 coincident with 1/2 scram present already on RPS channel 12 due to (instrumentation and control) (I&C) testing. A loss of power board 11 causes a loss of 11 RPS trip bus which in turn produces a 1/2 scram. Loss of power board 11 is currently under investigation. In addition during the scram, HPCI injected into the reactor vessel on a turbine trip signal to maintain reactor water level. Currently, the reactor is in hot shutdown with reactor water levels being maintained in the normal level band at 74 inches with feedwater in automatic. Reactor pressure is currently 920 psig and being maintained in automatic with turbine bypass valves. Plan is to stay in hot shutdown and complete scram recovery procedures. All control rods fully inserted. No safety relief valves actuated. Electrical busses were being supplied by normal offsite power. Emergency diesel generators are available. The decay heat removal path is currently normal feedwater to the reactor vessel through the turbine bypass valves to the condenser. There was no impact on Unit 2. The licensee is going to suspend any high risk maintenance activities on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4099830 August 2004 11:42:00Nine Mile PointManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2

Nine Mile Point, Unit One is initiating a 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (iv) (B) 4-Hour Non-Emergency notification based upon insertion of a 'MANUAL' scram that occurred at 08:35 on Monday, August 30, 2004. At time of transient, plant was operating in Mode 1, Power Operating Condition, at 99.7% of rated power. At 08:25 on Monday, August 30, 2004, Operators noted oscillations on 13 Feedwater flow control valve (FCV) while in 'AUTOMATIC' mode of operation (normal mode of operation for this equipment). Operators took "MANUAL" control of 13 FCV per Plant Operating Procedures. 13 FCV oscillations continued while in the 'MANUAL' mode, and a decision was made to insert a 'MANUAL' scram at 08:35. All control rods fully inserted and the plant responded as designed to the scram. At 08:44, the scram signal was reset per procedure. Currently, plant is in Mode 2, Hot Shutdown Condition with cooldown in progress. Plant is transitioning to Mode 3, Cold Shutdown Condition, per Plant Operating Procedures. At the time the manual scram was inserted, Reactor Vessel Water Level (RVWL) was 67 inches and decreasing (automatic scram setpoint is 53 inches). The 13 FCV is on the discharge of the turbine-driven feedwater pump. Decay heat is currently being removed by the main condenser via the steam bypass valves. All ECCS and safety-related equipment is available, if needed. At the time of the transient there was no plant maintenance on-going which could have been a contributing factor. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 8/30/04 AT 2358 EDT FROM M. MINNICK TO J. ROTTON * * *

The notification sent to the NRC on 8/30/04 at 11:42 was found to be incomplete. As a normal and expected response to a manual scram at high power, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (feedwater) automatically initiated during the transient following the manual scram. This should have been reported as an 8 hour Non-Emergency 10CFR50. 72 (b) (3) (iv) (A) notification. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Henderson).

ENS 4077827 May 2004 01:21:00Oyster CreekScramNRC Region 1GE-2During a reactor shutdown for scheduled maintenance, a full reactor scram was generated from the Nuclear Instrumentation System. IRMs (Intermediate Range Monitoring detectors) 13, 14 and 18 spiked causing scram signals in both RPS (Reactor Protection Systems). All systems functioned properly post scram, all operator actions were correct. Holding reactor pressure at 900 psig to perform leakage inspection. Following (the leakage) inspection (operations intend) to proceed to cold shutdown. All control rods inserted fully into the core and excess decay heat is currently being diverted to the main condenser, as necessary. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 407192 May 2004 04:09:00Nine Mile PointManual ScramNRC Region 1GE-2Operators inserted a manual scram at 0217 (EDT) in anticipation of torus bulk temperature approaching 110 degrees F following an Electromatic Relief Valve (ERV) failing to close during ERV testing. Technical Specification 3.3.2.e requires the insertion of a manual scram prior to torus bulk temperature reaching 110 degrees F. The maximum average torus temperature was 104 degrees F. Operators opened ERV 123 at 0209 for post maintenance testing from approximately 19% power. The ERV subsequently stuck open. Operators performed the off-normal procedure for a stuck open ERV, but this failed to shut the valve. This ported steam from the reactor vessel to the torus resulting in an uncontrolled torus temperature rise. Operators placed torus cooling in service but this did not stop the rising torus temperature. Following the manual scram, cooldown, and depressurization, shutdown cooling is being placed in service. Immediately following the manual scram, a turbine trip signal actuated the logic for high pressure coolant injection. High pressure coolant injection actuated and operators controlled level above 53 inches. With the ERV stuck open, the cooldown rate could not be controlled. The cooldown rate was approximately 190 degrees F during the first hour following the scram. All control rods fully inserted into the core. Decay heat is being removed by shutdown cooling (in service at the time of the report). The operators intend to cooldown to cold shutdown. The electrical buses are stable. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was not affected. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4009522 August 2003 09:05:00Oyster CreekAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2The licensee reported that an automatic reactor scram occurred at 0259 due to a turbine generator trip from a hi-hi moisture separator water level. One control rod indicated position 02; however, the remainder of the control rods indicated full in. All other systems and components functioned as designed. The licensee is cooling the plant down to cold shutdown. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4007114 August 2003 22:15:00Nine Mile PointAutomatic ScramNRC Region 1GE-2

Automatic reactor scram due to a loss of offsite power. All rods fully inserted into the core. All emergency core cooling systems are operating properly and the emergency diesel generators are operating properly. NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

          • UPDATE 8/15/03 AT 0145 TO LAURA*****

Offsite electrical power was restored. The licensee exited the Unusual Event at 0123. Notified R1IRC and FEMA(Heyman).