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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5252325 February 2020 09:51:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEAt 1200 (EST) on January 31, 2017, during investigation of potential 1B2 Reactor Coolant Pump seal degradation, a through wall defect was identified on Class 1 piping servicing the Lower Seal Heat Exchanger, which is part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB). The reactor is presently in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed by the atmospheric steam dump valves. The plant is being maneuvered to Mode 5 to affect appropriate repairs. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5186125 February 2020 09:31:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. At approximately 2335 (MST) on April 10, 2016, while performing planned routine visual examinations of Unit 1 components in the Containment Building, engineering personnel identified white residue on the piping instrument nozzle for the reactor coolant system (RCS) 2B cold leg resistance temperature detector, 1JRCET121Y. The white residue was dry and no active leakage was noted on the instrument nozzle. Preliminary chemical analysis for radionuclide and boron content of the white residue determined the existence of boron and the isotopic content was consistent with RCS fluid. At 0535 (MST) on April 11, 2016, it was determined the residue resulted from RCS pressure boundary leakage, based on results of the chemical analysis and additional examination of the piping and instrument nozzle by qualified engineering personnel. Technical Specifications Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.4.14 permits no RCS pressure boundary leakage and therefore, the discovery of leakage from the instrument nozzle represents a degradation of a principal safety barrier. This notification is being made for a degraded condition pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The unit has been shut down for its 19th refueling outage since 4/9/16 at 0000. The NRC resident inspectors have been informed of this condition.
ENS 5020925 February 2020 09:04:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CEAt 0832 EDT on 6/18/2014, Millstone Station Unit 2 removed the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors RM-4299B and RM-4299C from service for pre-planned maintenance. Portable handheld radiation detectors will be used to assess radiation releases. Both radiation monitors will be restored no later than 2200 EDT on 6/19/14. The licensee informed both State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5134025 February 2020 08:52:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CE
B&W-L-LP
This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50 72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that will result in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g. a significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System or offsite notification system.) The emergency preparedness plan requires seismic monitoring instruments to diagnose an earthquake for emergency actions levels (EAL) HU6 (Natural or destructive phenomena affecting protected area) and HA6 (Natural or destructive phenomena affecting vital areas). At 1020 CDT on August 24, 2015 the Semi-Annual Seismic System Functional Test commenced. While this test is in progress, seismic alarm capability is not available for EAL declaration purposes. ANO procedures provide compensatory measures of using offsite sources to obtain seismic data. It should be noted that seismic data will still remain capable of being recorded, only alarm capability is lost. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5004525 February 2020 08:52:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CEMain steam line radiation monitors RM-4299A, RM4299B, RM4299C will be removed from service for a period of approximately 4 days during planned maintenance on the power supplies. This constitutes a loss of assessment capability. The radiation monitors will be returned to service following maintenance. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Connecticut, and the local government.
ENS 5103325 February 2020 08:52:00PalisadesNRC Region 3CE

At 1241 EDT, Operations staff at Palisades declared an Unusual Event under EAL HU1.1 due to seismic activity felt on site. No seismic alarms were initiated. No plant equipment was affected. The epicenter of the 4.2 magnitude earthquake was located south of Galesburg, MI. Palisades continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JC RANEY TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1601 EDT ON 5/2/15 * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1541 EDT on 5/2/15. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state and local government. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski), IRD MOC (Stapleton), NRR EO (Morris), NRR ET (Dean), and R3RA (Pederson). Notified other Federal Agencies (DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, FEMA NWC, NICC Watch Officer and NuclearSSA).

ENS 5016525 February 2020 08:46:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CEAt 0933 EDT, Millstone Station Unit 2 removed the Stack High Range Radiation Monitor RM-8168 from service for planned maintenance. Maintenance and testing were completed and the Stack Radiation Monitor returned to service at 1252 EDT. The licensee informed both State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4917825 February 2020 08:26:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEOn July 8, 2013, at 0830 EDT, the National Response Center and the State Watch office were notified of a leak greater than the limit of 109 gal of 11% Sodium Hypochlorite onto the ground. Total amount spilled is approximately 200 gallons. While the leak is currently active, the leak has being routed to an approved injection point. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi) due to notification of off-site agencies. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4950925 February 2020 08:25:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CEThe Millstone Station stack radiation monitor, RM-8169, was removed from service for preplanned maintenance at 1028 (EST) and returned to service at 1513 (EST). The Unit 2 high range stack radiation monitor, RM-8168, was removed from service for preplanned maintenance at 1543 (EST) and will be removed from service for approximately 3 days. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable state and local authorities.
ENS 4779325 February 2020 07:36:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEAt 0022 (EDT) on 03/31/12 while maintaining power stable at 10% for Steam Bypass Control System testing, Unit 1 was manually tripped due to an uncontrolled cooldown caused by PCV-8802 (Steam Bypass Control Valve) unexpectedly opening. Following the trip, PCV-8802 closed and the secondary was isolated by closing the Main Steam Isolation Valves per Standard Post Trip Actions. Following isolation of the steam demand, the trip was uncomplicated with all CEAs fully inserted. No automatic safety system actuations were required and none occurred. The cause of the unexpected opening of the Steam Bypass Control System valve is under investigation. The plant is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. RCS Heat Removal is being maintained with Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves. The Offsite power grid is available and stable. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to manual RPS actuation with the reactor at power. The RCS cooled down from 532 degree to 515 degrees over a period of approximately 2 minutes and 40 seconds. The reactor was manually tripped when RCS temperature reached 515 degrees and the lowest RCS temperature observed after the trip was 505 degrees. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4477525 February 2020 04:51:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CEUnit 2 performed a controlled shutdown from 60% power to make repairs to a low pressure feedwater heater. The unit was taken off line at 1148 today. The unit is stable in Mode 3, Hot Standby. A press release was made at 1430 today. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4465525 February 2020 04:51:00Fort CalhounNRC Region 4CEOn November 13, 2008, at 0020 CST, the State of Nebraska, Department of Environmental Quality and National Response Center were notified by Omaha Public Power District's Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station of an oil spill due to a crack in upper pump bearing sight glass line for 'C' Circulating Water Pump, CW-1C. The spill involved a small quantity of oil estimated to be less than one gallon to the intake Structure sump with trace amounts discharged to the Missouri River. Per Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations' National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, the notifications were made and samples were taken for offsite analysis to determine if the quantity discharged involved an actual violation of the discharge permit. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 72.75 (b) (2) (xi), 4 hour non-emergency notification due to a notification being made to a Government Agency (State of Nebraska, Department of Environmental Quality and National Response Center). The licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also notified the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality and the National Response Center.
ENS 4376325 February 2020 04:04:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEA non-licensed employee supervisor, not involved in plant operations, had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been denied. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
ENS 4380425 February 2020 04:03:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. On Friday, November 23, 2007, at 22:26 Mountain Standard Time (MST) Palo Verde Nuclear Station Unit 1 initiated a normal reactor shutdown to comply with Condition H of Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1. TS LCO 3.8.1 requires that automatic load sequencers for train A and B be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. The shutdown is necessary due to an inoperable automatic load sequencer for train A in Unit 1. The train A automatic load sequencer was declared inoperable on November 22, 2007, at 19:30 MST and was not restored to operable status within the TS required 24 hour completion time of Condition F of TS 3.8.1. TS 3.8.1 Condition H requires the plant to be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours if the required actions and associated completion time of TS Condition F are not met. Efforts are in progress to correct the condition. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public. The licensee is taking measures to evaluating the extent of this condition from the remaining automatic load sequencers for Units 1, 2 and 3. The inoperability was discovered due to an invalid actuation of the A train load sequencer that resulted in a pond spray pump initiation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5342827 May 2018 00:40:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CE
Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop
County and state governments were notified due to the spurious actuation of a single emergency notification siren located in New London County in the Town of Lyme. The siren was silenced. If required, alternate notification of the public in the area will be through local Emergency Operations Center route alerting. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5342423 May 2018 17:37:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CE

The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. On May 23, 2018, at approximately 1128 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 control room received reactor protection system alarms for low departure from nucleate boiling ratio and an automatic reactor trip occurred. Prior to the reactor trip, Unit 2 was operating normally at 100 percent power. Plant operators entered the reactor trip procedures and diagnosed an uncomplicated reactor trip. All CEAs (control element assemblies) fully inserted into the core. No emergency classification was required per the PVNGS Emergency Plan. The Unit 2 safety-related electrical buses remained energized from normal offsite power during the event. There was no impact to the required circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System; the offsite power grid is stable. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or complicated operator response. Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3 with the reactor coolant system at normal operating temperature and pressure. The cause of the reactor trip is under investigation. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the Unit 2 reactor trip. Decay is being removed via steam dumps to condenser. Units 1 and 3 at Palo Verde were unaffected by the transient and continue to operate at 100 percent power.

ENS 5340114 May 2018 13:17:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEOn May 14, 2018, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of a tornado generated missile, Calvert Cliffs identified a non-conforming condition in the plant design such that specific TS equipment is considered to not be adequately protected from a tornado generated missile. A tornado could generate a missile that could strike the Unit 1 Saltwater system header and associated piping. This could result in damage to the unit 1 Saltwater system header which could affect the ability of the Unit 1 Saltwater subsystems to perform their design function if such a tornado would occur. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being addressed in accordance with NRC enforcement guidance provided in EGM 15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01. Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with these documents. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
ENS 5326014 March 2018 09:34:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEA non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a pre-access drug test. The individual's access has been denied. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5308522 November 2017 10:28:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

St. Lucie Unit 2 declared an Unusual Event due to a smoke detector alarm received in the Unit 2 Containment Building that was unable to be confirmed within 15 minutes. A Containment entry is currently being planned to determine the validity of the alarm. State and local officials have been notified by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/22/17 AT 1143 EST FROM JULIUS FLETCHER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

Personnel entered Containment to determine conditions and found no evidence of smoke, fire or damage to equipment. Event terminated at 1127 EST 11/22/17. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Suggs), R2 DRA (Dudes), NRR (Brock), IRD (Gott), and NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 530577 November 2017 10:49:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn November 7, 2017, at approximately 0337 (CST) hours, Waterford 3 (WF3) Control Room received a phone call from Entergy's Load Dispatcher to inform us that the NRC was unable to call Waterford 3 by ENS (emergency notification system) phone or by PABX (private automatic branch exchange) phone. The NRC was called by the Waterford 3 Control Room using the PABX at 0339 (CST) hours. However, the ENS phone could not call the NRC. Also, outside lines were not able to call in to Waterford 3. Offsite prompt Public Warning Sirens were available at all times. State and Local notification capability was available via PABX. WF3 Emergency Response Organization notification capability was available at all times. WF3 site Emergency Response Facility intercommunications were available at all times. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of offsite communications capability. ENS communication and full PABX functionality was reestablished at 0452 (CST) on November 7, 2017. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5303626 October 2017 05:54:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEOn October 26, 2017 at 0212 EDT St. Lucie Unit 2 experienced a reactor trip due to a loss of load event resulting in an RPS (Reactor Protection System) actuation. The cause of the loss of load is currently under investigation. Following the reactor trip, an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal occurred due to low level in the 2A Steam Generator. One of the two Main Feed Isolation Valves to the 2A Steam Generator did not close on the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal. 2A Steam Generator level was restored by Auxiliary Feedwater. The 2B Steam Generator level is being maintained by Main Feedwater. All CEAs (Control Element Assemblies) fully inserted into the core. Decay heat removal is being accomplished through forced circulation with stable conditions from Auxiliary Feedwater/Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass Control System. Currently maintaining pressurizer pressure at 2250 psia and Reactor Coolant System temperature at 532 degrees F. St. Lucie Unit 1 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Specified System Actuation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5301514 October 2017 16:37:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEAt approximately 19:48 Mountain Standard Time on October 13, 2017, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) staff confirmed a non-licensed supervisor tested positive for drugs during a random 'Fitness for Duty' test. The person's access authorization was terminated in accordance with station procedures. The NRC resident inspector has been notified by the licensee.
ENS 5298922 September 2017 20:08:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). On September 21, 2017 at 0915 MST, the seismic monitoring (SM) computer was declared non-functional for the performance of a planned surveillance test. On September 21, 2017 at 1201 MST, the SM system computer became non-responsive during the performance of the test. Control room staff attempted to reboot the computer and were unsuccessful. Maintenance and troubleshooting efforts began thereafter to initiate repairs. As a compensatory measure, PVNGS procedures for seismic event evaluation provide alternative methods for event classification of a seismic event with the SM system out of service. The SM system functions to provide indication that the Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE) threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event and is used in the PVNGS Emergency Plan to perform classification of Initiating Condition 'Seismic event greater than OBE levels' and Emergency Action Level HU2.1. On September 22, 2017 at 1500 MST, maintenance personnel performing software repair efforts determined hardware replacement is required. The required component will not be available before 72 hours from the start of the event. Because the SM system is not expected to be restored within 72 hours, this condition is being reported as a planned event constituting a major loss of emergency assessment capability with viable compensatory measures in place. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition.
ENS 529568 September 2017 17:51:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

At time 1700 (EDT) today, the National Weather Service issued a Hurricane Warning for the area including the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared at time 1714 (EDT). In anticipation of severe weather, the site has completed proceduralized high wind preparations. Both units are currently stable at 100% power. The licensee notified both State and local agencies and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. No safety-related systems are out of service. The electrical grid is stable. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/9/17 AT 1743 EDT FROM DALE THOMAS TO S. SANDIN * * *

At 1701 (EDT) today (09/09/17), a 24-hour update was made to state and local governments following the National Weather Service issuing yesterday's hurricane warning for the area including St. Lucie Plant. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared yesterday (09/08/17) at 1714 (EDT). There are no changes in plant status for either Unit. In anticipation of severe weather, the site previously completed high wind preparations. Our plants have been specifically built to withstand natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, flooding and tidal surges. This approach will ensure the safety of operations and our employees and the communities surrounding our plants. Both units are currently stable at 100% power level and will remain at that power since hurricane force winds are not currently projected to reach St. Lucie Plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (Michel).

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/10/17 AT 1730 EDT FROM DALE THOMAS TO DONG PARK * * *

At 1648 (EDT) today (09/10/17), a 24-hour update was made to state and local governments following the National Weather Service issuing Friday's hurricane warning for the area including St. Lucie Plant. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared yesterday (09/08/17) at 1714 (EDT). There are no changes in plant status for either Unit. In anticipation of severe weather, the site previously completed high wind preparations. Our plants have been specifically built to withstand natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, flooding and tidal surges. This approach will ensure the safety of operations and our employees and the communities surrounding our plants. Both units are currently stable at 100% power level and will remain at that power since hurricane force winds are not currently projected to reach St. Lucie Plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2IRC (Franke).

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/11/17 AT 1405 EDT FROM BRIAN KELLY TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The Hurricane Warning has been terminated by the National Weather Service for St. Lucie County including the Plant Site. At time 1313 (EDT) on 9/11/17, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant has terminated from the Unusual Event Classification. Unit 1 is currently shutdown in Mode 3, Hot Standby. Unit 2 continues to operate in Mode 1, 100 percent power. The licensee notified State and Local Government Agencies, and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2IRC (Munday), R2DO (Michel), NRR EO (King), IRD MOC (Gott), DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DHS NICC, USDA Ops Center, EPA Emergency Ops Center, FDA Emergency Ops Center (email), FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5290415 August 2017 08:07:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CE

On August 15, 2017 at 0748 EDT, an Unusual Event was declared at Millstone Unit 2 due to a fire alarm indication in containment that was unable to be verified extinguished within 15 minutes. Current containment parameters do not indicate an actual fire. A containment entry is planned to verify that there is no fire. Unit 2 continues at 100% power. Unit 3 was unaffected. The NRC remains in Normal mode. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC. Notified FEMA National Watch and Nuclear SSA via E-mail.

  • * * UPDATE FROM TODD STRINGFELLOW TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0953 EDT ON 8/15/2017 * * *

At 0951 EDT, the Unusual Event was terminated. No signs of an actual fire were present upon containment entry. All alarms are cleared and they are investigating the cause of the alarm. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies. Notified R1DO (Gray), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD (Gott). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC. Notified FEMA National Watch and Nuclear SSA via E-mail.

ENS 5287931 July 2017 18:32:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEAt 1400 (EDT), St. Lucie completed a review of Unit 1 Hot Leg Injection scenarios. St. Lucie Unit 1 was licensed with a Hot Leg Injection capability that relies upon manual actions to accomplish the function. This review concluded that some postulated single electrical train failure scenarios were not fully addressed in plant procedures. Because of the potential to extend Hot Leg Injection initiation beyond the analysis start time, St. Lucie is reporting this condition under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The affected off-normal procedures were immediately revised to include necessary instructions to restore power to selected valves during a postulated loss of electrical power to restore the Hot Leg Injection strategy. Unit 1 remained at 100% power. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A review found this condition was not applicable for Unit 2.
ENS 5275716 May 2017 00:17:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEOn May 15, 2017 at 1800 hours EDT, the '2A3' 4.16 KV safety related bus unexpectedly de-energized. The '2A' emergency diesel generator (EDG) system received a valid start signal from the undervoltage condition on the '2A3' bus but did not start as the EDG had been removed from service for maintenance. Loss of the '2A3' 4.16 KV bus resulted in a valid actuation of the undervoltage protection relays. The direct cause of the de-energization was determined to be failed secondary side potential transformer fuses. The 'B' train safety related electrical busses were unaffected by the event. The '2A3' 4.16 KV bus was reenergized at 2340. This event was determined to be reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). During the electrical transient, the licensee briefly entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 but plant conditions were restored, all required LCOs were satisfied, and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited before the plant was required to downpower. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 527222 May 2017 15:26:00PalisadesNRC Region 3CE

On May 2, 2017, during planned inspections, an ultrasonic examination performed on weld PCS-4-PRS-1P1-1, revealed an axial indication in the pressurizer nozzle to safe end area of the weld. This indication does not meet applicable acceptance criteria under ASME, Section XI. The plant was in cold shutdown at 0% power for a planned refueling outage at the time of discovery. The condition will be resolved prior to plant startup. This condition has no impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), since an indication was found that did not meet acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code, Section XI.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 5/9/17 AT 1303 EDT FROM BARBARA DOTSON TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Additional evaluations of the recorded indication concluded that the indication was attributed to an erroneous ultrasonic response. This was the result of a combined effect of compromised surface contact at the area of the recorded indication and associated examination scan speed. The contact issue is attributed to the specific tooling configuration required for this exam. The combination of these factors resulted in the introduction of an erroneous reflector in the area of interest that had characteristics of a relevant indication. The vendor repeated the entire examination for axial flaws and there were no service induced indications recorded. A review of the newly acquired data by site, vendor and EPRI personnel confirmed that no service induced flaws are present. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Hills).

ENS 526707 April 2017 14:49:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEOn April 5, 2017, Arizona Public Service Company (APS) completed an evaluation of a deviation, and concluded the condition represented a defect under 10 CFR 21. APS previously submitted an interim report (ADAMS Accession Number ML 16344A118) for this condition pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2). A GE-Hitachi Type AKR-2BE-50, 2000 Amp circuit breaker (used to connect Class 1E batteries to the related Class 1E 125 VDC busses) exhibited arcing and smoking during current injection testing performed to test the overcurrent trip setpoint prior to installation. Arcing occurred at one of two hex bolts anchoring the protective trip device to the line side bus. The electrical arcing resulted from inadequate tightening of both hex bolts which caused a loose electrical connection on the bus within the breaker. APS concluded this condition could result in the breaker failing to perform its safety function and thus could create a substantial safety hazard. The breaker had been refurbished by GE-Hitachi and was received by APS and tested on October 13, 2016. Following the test failure, the damaged bolt was replaced, both bolts were tightened, and the breaker was retested and installed. Pre-installation inspection and testing that includes current injection testing, recommended in GEH document GEK-64459, should, and did, detect faults such as the condition identified in this notification. GE-Hitachi entered this failure into their corrective action program. Vendor: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY, 3901 CASTLE HAYNE RD., WILMINGTON, NC 28402-2819 Device: Breaker Model AKR-2BE-50, 2000 Amp, Serial No. N8682600001 The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5264729 March 2017 18:10:00PalisadesNRC Region 3CEDuring an evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornados, Palisades Nuclear Plant personnel identified conditions in the plant design such that specific TS equipment is considered not adequately protected from tornado missiles. Specifically, vulnerabilities were identified in the following systems and components: Service Water System - Service water pump discharge header and service water pump cable trays. Fuel Oil Transfer System - Fuel oil transfer piping and transfer pump cable trays. Emergency Diesel Generators - Vent lines on the fuel oil day tanks. Control Room Heating, Ventilation, and Cooling System - Both the normal and emergency intake ducts. Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump - Feedwater pump relief valves. Component Cooling Water System - Component cooling water surge tank. The identified vulnerabilities are being addressed in accordance with Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM), 15-002, and Interim Staff Guidance, DSS-ISG-2016-01. Initial compensatory measures are in place. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 526008 March 2017 20:13:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On March 8, 2017 at 1627 (CST) Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 action 'c' was entered due to both trains of Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) being inoperable. This TS action requires one train of LPSI be restored within 1 hour or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours. It was identified that LPSI train B was inoperable due to SI-135B, Reactor Coolant Loop 1 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, being found open. At the time of discovery, LPSI train A was inoperable for pre planned maintenance, but available and awaiting operability retest. The station was in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. Maintenance workers were scheduled to work Sl-135A Reactor Coolant Loop 2 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, and inadvertently began work on Sl-135B and manually opened the valve which resulted in the LPSI Train B being inoperable. Once identified by Operations Control Room staff, the valve (SI-135B) was placed in the closed position and stroke tested to ensure operability. TS 3.5.2 action 'c' was exited at time 1705. The station remained in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5243515 December 2016 06:55:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CE

The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. During a scheduled surveillance test run of the PVNGS (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station) Unit 3 'B' Train Emergency Diesel Generator, there was a catastrophic failure of a piston to include crankcase damage and diesel trip. The Emergency Plan has been entered and an ALERT was declared at 0410 (MST) on 12/15/16 based on an explosion resulting in visible damage to a safety system required for safe shutdown. The cause of the failure is unknown at this time. PVNGS Fire Department responded and no fire was observed. Unit 3 remains on line at 100% power. No other safety functions are impacted. No personnel injuries occurred. The unit is in a ten day technical specification on an emergency diesel generator being inoperable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS, DOE, EPA, FEMA, NICC, USDA, HHS, FDA, NSSA, Mexico, and OIP (Skeen).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0947 EST ON 12/15/2016 FROM MICHAEL GOODRICH TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

This serves as the notification of the termination of Alert HA2.1 declared at 0410 MST at Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station. The event terminated at 0636 MST. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Keller), NRR EO (Miller), IRD (Stapleton), DHS, DOE, EPA, FEMA, NICC, USDA, HHS, FDA, NSSA, Mexico, and OIP (Skeen).

ENS 524137 December 2016 16:59:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. This telephone notification is being made pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1 train A emergency diesel generator (EDG), train A high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump, and train A essential spray pond (SP) pump. These components are portions of the emergency ac electrical power system, the emergency core cooling system, and the emergency service water system, respectively, as described in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). On October 17, 2016 at approximately 1519, Mountain Standard Time, a portion of the Unit 1 train A engineered safety features equipment was automatically started by the balance-of-plant (BOP) engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) while the plant was at steady state conditions. Initiation of the train A ESFAS actuation signal was momentary, and the ESFAS actuation signal cleared 0.2 seconds after being initiated. The invalid ESFAS signal initiated a test-mode start signal for the train A EDG and started the train A HPSI pump. The train A essential SP pump started in support of the train A EDG. All actuated components started and functioned successfully. No systems started in response to actual plant conditions, and no actuation was required to mitigate the consequences of an event. The invalid HPSI actuation neither resulted in an emergency core cooling system discharge, nor should it have. The invalid actuation was the consequence of a spurious momentary signal into the BOP-ESFAS control panel due to an intermittent high resistance electrical connection. The event was entered into the PVNGS corrective action program. There were no adverse impacts to public health and safety nor to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed.
ENS 524095 December 2016 16:24:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEA non-licensed supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for a prohibited substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's unescorted access to the plant has been denied. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 523371 November 2016 12:00:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

This 24 hour report is being made as per 10CFR72.75. On October 31, 2016, at 1100 (CDT), the Supplemental Cooling System was secured to the Dry Cask Storage Hi-Track Transfer cask, as allowed by Dry Fuel Storage T.S. 3.1.4, in preparation for moving the Hi-Track transfer cask. At approximately 1500, after moving the Hi-Track into position for downloading including securing the cleats to the mating device, the next step in the procedure was to lower the Hi-Track. When lowering the Hi-Track, a crane overload condition occurred. With the crane, attached the Supplemental Cooling System can not be operated and has remained secured. The Supplemental Cooling System is classified as 'Important to Safety Category B' and is required to be utilized, as necessary, to maintain the peak fuel cladding temperature below the allowed limits. T.S. 3.1.4 allows the Supplemental cooling system to be secured for up to 7 hours during the Hi-Track transfer process and then followed by a 7 day allowed outage time. This is being reported based on 10CFR72.75 which states in part that a 24 hour Non-emergency notification is required if; 'An event in which important to safety equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed'. The Hi-Track is presently in a safe condition with supplemental cooling still secured. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO DONG PARK AT 1111 EST ON 11/08/16 * * *

On November 1, 2016 at 1100 CDT Waterford 3 notified the NRC of a 24 hour reportable event per 10CFR72.75. The notification is documented under EN# 52337 based on the information known at that time. Follow up investigation determined that the conditions required per 10CFR72.75 were not met and should not have been reported. 10CFR72.75 states in part that a 24 hour non-emergency notification is required if, 'An event in which important to safety equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed.' It also requires that, 'The equipment is required by regulation, license condition, or certificate of compliance to be available and operable to prevent releases that could exceed regulatory limits, to prevent exposures to radiation or radioactive materials that could exceed regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' Based on a review of the bases for Certificate of Compliance, T.S. 3.1.4 thermal analysis shows that the fuel cladding temperature would not exceed the short term temperature limits applicable to an off normal condition. The bases further states that because the thermal analysis is a steady-state analysis, there is an indefinite period of time available to make repairs to the Supplemental Cooling System. The completion time of 7 days to restore the system per T.S. 3.1.4 is considered an appropriate and reasonable amount of time to plan the work and complete repairs. Based on this information there was no possibility of exceeding regulatory limits or the need to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Waterford 3 is retracting event notification EN 52337. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Campbell).

ENS 5230920 October 2016 00:09:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CE

While performing a scheduled inservice inspection on a section of safety injection system piping, a flaw was identified in a circumferential weld on the 14 inch safety injection line from the 2A safety injection tank to the 2A reactor coolant loop. Examination results indicate that the flaw constitutes a welding defect that cannot be found acceptable under ASME Section XI, IWB-3600, or Table IWB-3410-1. Further analysis is being conducted. The unit had been shutdown for its 19th refueling outage (3R19) on October 8, 2016, at 0000. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed of this condition. This piping is required to be operable in modes one through four.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 11/10/16 AT 1640 EST FROM ROBERT CHU TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Subsequent engineering examination of the weld on the 14" safety injection line from the 2A safety injection tank to the 2A reactor coolant loop using enhanced examination techniques concluded the indication in the circumferential weld does not represent a flaw constituting a weld defect. The indication was the result of a metallurgical weld interface in the area of a previously documented weld repair. Therefore, the indication is acceptable under ASME Section XI with no further analysis required. Based on the above information, PVNGS has determined the indication does not represent a degraded condition of a principal safety barrier as defined by 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) and event notification #52309 is retracted. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. Notified R4DO (Campbell).

ENS 522299 September 2016 03:59:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a loss of emergency assessment capability at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). On September 8, 2016 at 1856 (MST), seismic monitoring (SM) system computer AJSMNXYQI0001**INSTRU was determined to be non-functional due to a power spike which caused a temporary loss of power to the seismic instrumentation and resulted in a locked in the Control Room alarm. At 2305, I&C technicians re-booted the computer and verified the SM system was functioning. On September 8, 2016, at approximately 2353, further review of this equipment failure and the related impact to the capability of the SM system determined that this was a reportable loss of emergency assessment capability during the period between 1856 and 2305. This specific SM functions to provide indication that the Operational Basis Earthquake threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event and is used in the PVNGS Emergency Plan to perform classification for emergency action level HA1.1, Natural or Destructive Phenomena affecting Vital Areas. As a compensatory measure, PVNGS procedures for seismic event evaluation provide alternative methods for HA1.1 event classification with the SM out of service. Maintenance to correct the condition has been completed. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition.
ENS 522288 September 2016 16:12:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. This telephone notification is being made pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of both trains of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 essential spray pond (SP) system. The SP system serves as an emergency service water system that does not normally run and serves as an ultimate heat sink as described in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(9). On July 12, 2016, at approximately 0550, Mountain Standard Time, Unit 2 experienced a manual actuation of both trains of the SP system. Approximately 20 minutes earlier, the failure of a +15VDC power supply on the containment purge isolation actuation signal (CPIAS) module resulted in a trip of the B train CPIAS and a momentary cross trip of the A train CPIAS, and both trains of the control room essential filtration actuation system (CREFAS). These brief actuation signals resulted in starting of some but not all essential equipment because the actuation signals cleared before most of the equipment received a start signal. Both trains of the SP system were started manually in accordance with the alarm response procedure. The A train CPIAS and both trains of CREFAS were reset. The B train CPIAS remained in a partially tripped state because of the failed power supply. The manual actuation of both A and B trains of the SP system was complete. Both trains of the SP system started and functioned successfully. The invalid actuation was the consequence of a failed +15VDC power supply on the B train CPIAS module which resulted in momentary trips of both trains of CPIAS and CREFAS. The containment building radiation monitors that actuate CPIAS exhibited normal radiation levels which would not have required CPIAS actuation. The event was entered into the PVNGS corrective action program. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety nor to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed.
ENS 5220930 August 2016 18:07:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended.
ENS 5219121 August 2016 20:14:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

At 35 percent power, a main generator lockout caused the main generator to trip, resulting in a reactor trip of Unit 1. Because of the lockout, power did not transfer to the startup transformers. Both emergency diesel generators started and aligned to the emergency busses. During the trip all control rods fully inserted and no safety or relief valves lifted. The plant is in Mode 3 steaming through the atmospheric relief valves and feeding the steam generators using auxiliary feedwater. There is no reported primary to secondary leakage. Primary coolant is being moved using natural circulation cooling. The trip of Unit 1 had no effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).

  • * * UPDATE AT 2140 EDT ON 08/21/2016 FROM GREG KRAUTZ TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The Unusual Event was terminated at 2125 EDT after the plant restored normal offsite power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Sandal), IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).

  • * * UPDATE AT 2315 EDT ON 08/21/2016 FROM ANDREW TEREZAKIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On August 21, 2016 at 1926 EDT, St. Lucie Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip and a loss of offsite power due to a main generator inadvertent Energization Lockout Relay actuation. The cause of the lockout is currently under investigation. Coincident with the loss of offsite power, the four reactor coolant pumps deenergized. Both the 1A and 1B Emergency Diesel Generators started on demand and powered the safety related AC buses. All CEAs (Control Element Assemblies) fully inserted into the core. Offsite power to the switchyard remained available during the event, and at 2036, restoration of offsite power to St. Lucie Unit 1 was completed. Decay heat removal is being accomplished through natural circulation with stable conditions from Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves. Currently maintaining pressurizer pressure at 1850 psia and Reactor Coolant System temperature at 532 degrees F. St. Lucie Unit 2 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100% power. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Specified System Actuation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0048 EDT ON 08/22/2016 FROM ANDREW TEREZAKIS TO DANIEL MILLS * * *

On August 21, 2016 at 2330 EDT, St. Lucie Unit 1 started two Reactor Coolant Pumps to establish Forced Circulation in order to enhance Decay Heat removal. Plant conditions remain stable with Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves in service. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(c)(2)(ii) as a follow up notification of protective measures taken. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

ENS 5216911 August 2016 11:09:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CEReactor operators manually tripped the reactor due to the loss of two out of four circulating water pumps which caused a drop in condenser vacuum. The trip was uncomplicated. The reactor is shutdown and stable with decay heat removal via steam dumps to the condenser. The cause of the circulating water pump trips is currently unknown, but initial indications are that the pumps tripped due to a lightning strike that caused an electrical perturbation. The reactor will remain shutdown while the licensee investigates the cause. Unit 3 was not affected. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State and Local governments.
ENS 521381 August 2016 06:33:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

On August 1, 2016 at 0342 EDT St. Lucie Unit 1 commenced a unit shutdown required by Technical Specifications due to Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage in excess of the allowable limit of zero leakage. The leak was initially identified on July 31, 2016 at 2115 EDT as not Pressure Boundary leakage. After further analysis, the leak was determined to be Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary leakage at 0123 on August 1, 2016. The leakage is estimated as less than one tenth of a gallon per minute and is not impacting the ability to shut down the unit. Additional impact of the leak is under evaluation. This report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.' The location of the leak is on the Instrumentation piping welded connection at Flow Element FE-3311 attached to (the) Emergency Core Cooling System Injection header to Reactor Coolant System Loop 1A2. The leak activity is 0.167 microCuries per ml. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1335 EDT ON 09/23/16 FROM RICHARD SCISCENTE TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on EN 52138. NRC notification was initially made as a result of a plant shutdown required by technical specifications (TS) for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leakage. Subsequent to the initial report, St. Lucie has determined that the RCS leakage was from a seal weld on a threaded connection that was not pressure boundary leakage. However, the leak was non-isolable and required RCS depressurization to allow immediate investigation to ensure there were no faults in a RCS component body or pipe wall. The leakage was estimated to be less than one tenth of a gallon per minute and did not impact the ability to shut down the unit. No TS limits were exceeded during this event. Therefore, the plant shutdown to investigate and correct leakage past the seal weld of a threaded connection does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R2DO (Blamey).

ENS 5208312 July 2016 21:53:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CE

The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. During the performance of a fire seal and barrier surveillance test, a degraded fire seal barrier that provides 1 hour separation between two fire zones containing redundant safe shutdown trains was identified in the 100 foot elevation of the PVNGS Unit 1 Auxiliary Building. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Fire protection detection and mitigation systems in both fire zones are operable and compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The degraded fire barrier consists of two holes in the through wall fire barrier surrounding two two-inch conduits. The two holes are approximately one to one and a half inches across.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SEAN DORNSEIF TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1356 EDT ON 8/18/16 * * *

Subsequent Engineering evaluation concluded the degraded fire seal in PVNGS Unit 1 reported on July 12, 2016, did not place PVNGS in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. The degraded fire seal would have continued to provide the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains. The evaluation found a fire initiated in a fire zone on either side of the barrier would not propagate within one hour into the adjacent zone with redundant safe shutdown equipment. These conclusions were based on an existing fire analysis which was used to demonstrate that the required degree of separation between safe shutdown equipment remained intact. Based on the above information, PVNGS is retracting event notification report #52083, as the degraded fire seal did not place PVNGS Unit 1 an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed. Notified R4DO (Proulx).

ENS 5204727 June 2016 22:14:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CE
Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

A non-licensed contract employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol following a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. This information will be sent to the NRC Region 4 Office as San Onofre no longer has a resident.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 4/18/2018 AT 1308 EDT FROM TIM CUSICK TO STEVEN VITTO * * *

In the event report, the individual was described as a contract supervisor, thus meeting the reporting threshold. (the violation of the FFD policy was that he failed a for-cause test for alcohol). Recently, an NRC review of SONGS' 2016 Annual Fitness for Duty report found that SONGS described that test failure as 'not reportable' and that the labor category was 'Maintenance (Craft).' After reviewing the data, Access Authorization confirmed that the individual was a Union Maintenance Foreman (not a supervisor). The event was not reportable." SONGS will be notifying NRC Region 4. Notified R4DO (O'KEEFE) and FFD E-mail Group.

ENS 5194923 May 2016 15:36:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CE
B&W-L-LP
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5192212 May 2016 13:35:00PalisadesNRC Region 3CEA non-licensed contractor supervisor violated the fitness-for-duty policy (for alcohol) during a random fitness-for-duty test. The contractor's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5189129 April 2016 10:48:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CE
B&W-L-LP
The licensee notified the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management, National Response Center, and Local Emergency Planning Committee regarding an onsite spill of 12 (percent) Sodium Hypochlorite (bleach solution). Approximately 2000 gallons of Sodium Hypochlorite solution leaked from a bulk tank within the protected area, outside the tank containment berm. Approximately 100 gallons were estimated to have entered the nearby storm drain. The estimate was based on preliminary chemistry samples. The quantity released exceeded the Reportable Quantity (RQ) for Sodium Hypochlorite (RQ of 100 pounds) and was therefore reported. There is no impact to the operation of the ANO units or personnel onsite or offsite. No harm to the environment is expected. No offsite emergency response is required. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies have been made. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 518442 April 2016 03:50:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. At approximately 2229 (MST) on April 1, 2016, Arizona Public Service Company completed an offsite notification to the Environmental Protection Agency's National Response Center to report a spill of approximately 8000 gallons of sodium hypochlorite (8% solution) in the vicinity of the Unit 3 cooling towers at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). Additional notifications were made to Arizona State and Maricopa County environmental authorities. The Unit 3 cooling towers are located in the Security Owner Controlled Area at PVNGS and are outside of the protected area. The leak, which resulted from a failed hose on the main hypochlorite distribution header, was stopped by closing a valve to isolate the header. The immediate area has been barricaded. The quantity released exceeded the Reportable Quantity for sodium hypochlorite (RQ of 100 pounds) and was therefore reported. There was no impact to the operation of the PVNGS units or personnel onsite or offsite. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified.
ENS 5182024 March 2016 08:58:00PalisadesNRC Region 3CEAt approximately 0211 (EDT), on March 24, 2016, both control room ventilation filtration trains were declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10, Condition B, due to a control room boundary door not being fully closed. Following routine security rounds, the door was unable to be fully closed due to the door's locking bolts not retracting back into the door body, causing interference between the door and door frame. Mitigating actions have been implemented that ensure control room envelope (CRE) occupant radiological exposures will not exceed limits, and CRE occupants are protected from chemical and smoke hazards. Repairs to the door are currently in progress. Technical Specification 3.7.10 allows control room boundary doors to be opened intermittently, under administrative control for preplanned activities, provided the doors can be rapidly restored to the design condition. Previous evaluations of the door not being fully closed for a limited time concluded no loss of safety function had existed. This condition had no impact on the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5178510 March 2016 09:44:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CE
B&W-L-LP
This notification is being made due to planned maintenance during the Semi-Annual Seismic System Functional Test. This test will result in a major loss of emergency assessment capability for emergency action levels (EAL) HA6 (Natural or destructive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAS), while the control room 0.1g acceleration alarm is non-functional. The emergency preparedness plan requires the 0.1g acceleration alarm indication to declare EAL HA6 during a seismic event > Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE). This condition requires an 8 hour nonemergency immediate reportability to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Major Loss of Assessment, Response, or Communication Capability. At approximately 0840 CST on March 10, 2016 the Semi-Annual Seismic System Functional Test commenced. While this test is in progress, seismic alarm capability is not available for EAL declaration purposes. ANO procedures provide compensatory measures of using offsite sources to obtain seismic data. It should be noted that seismic data will still remain capable of being recorded and only alarm capability is lost. The Semi-Annual Seismic System Functional Test is scheduled to be completed in less than 24 hours. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.