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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5342827 May 2018 00:40:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CE
Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop
County and state governments were notified due to the spurious actuation of a single emergency notification siren located in New London County in the Town of Lyme. The siren was silenced. If required, alternate notification of the public in the area will be through local Emergency Operations Center route alerting. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5342423 May 2018 17:37:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CE

The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. On May 23, 2018, at approximately 1128 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 control room received reactor protection system alarms for low departure from nucleate boiling ratio and an automatic reactor trip occurred. Prior to the reactor trip, Unit 2 was operating normally at 100 percent power. Plant operators entered the reactor trip procedures and diagnosed an uncomplicated reactor trip. All CEAs (control element assemblies) fully inserted into the core. No emergency classification was required per the PVNGS Emergency Plan. The Unit 2 safety-related electrical buses remained energized from normal offsite power during the event. There was no impact to the required circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System; the offsite power grid is stable. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or complicated operator response. Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3 with the reactor coolant system at normal operating temperature and pressure. The cause of the reactor trip is under investigation. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the Unit 2 reactor trip. Decay is being removed via steam dumps to condenser. Units 1 and 3 at Palo Verde were unaffected by the transient and continue to operate at 100 percent power.

ENS 5340114 May 2018 13:17:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEOn May 14, 2018, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of a tornado generated missile, Calvert Cliffs identified a non-conforming condition in the plant design such that specific TS equipment is considered to not be adequately protected from a tornado generated missile. A tornado could generate a missile that could strike the Unit 1 Saltwater system header and associated piping. This could result in damage to the unit 1 Saltwater system header which could affect the ability of the Unit 1 Saltwater subsystems to perform their design function if such a tornado would occur. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being addressed in accordance with NRC enforcement guidance provided in EGM 15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01. Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with these documents. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
ENS 533897 May 2018 17:40:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive result for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5326014 March 2018 09:34:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEA non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a pre-access drug test. The individual's access has been denied. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5321516 February 2018 02:50:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CE

The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. On February 15, 2018, at approximately 2153 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1 Control Room received Reactor Protection System alarms for Low Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio and an automatic reactor trip occurred. Prior to the reactor trip, Unit 1 was operating normally at 100 percent power. Plant operators entered the emergency operations procedures and diagnosed an uncomplicated reactor trip but noted that Reactor Coolant Pumps 1B and 2B were not running due to a loss of power. All CEAs (Control Element Assemblies) fully inserted into the core. Following the reactor trip, all nuclear instruments responded normally. No emergency classification was required per the PVGS Emergency Plan. The PVGS Unit 1 safety related electrical busses remained energized from normal offsite power during the event. The Unit 1 'B' Diesel Generator is currently removed from service for maintenance. Due to ongoing planned maintenance on NAN-X02, Startup Transformer 2, fast bus transfer for NAN-S02 (from NAN-S04) was blocked. This resulted in a loss of offsite power to NAN-S02 and NBN-S02. The offsite power grid is stable. Unit 1 is currently stable in Mode 3 with the reactor coolant system at normal operating temperature and pressure. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the Unit 1 reactor trip.

  • * * UPDATE ON 2/16/18 AT 1640 EST FROM DAVID HECKMAN TO DONG PARK * * *

Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 following an uncomplicated trip. Offsite power has been restored to non-safety related electrical busses. Troubleshooting continues to determine the cause of the event. During performance of the alarm response procedure, it was identified that the seismic monitoring (SM) system had been in alarm since the reactor trip and was incapable of performing its emergency plan function. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), this condition constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with PVNGS procedures to provide alternative methods for HU2.1 event classification with the SM system out of service. Maintenance is currently in progress to restore SM system functionality. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Werner).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1537 EDT ON 03/30/18 FROM LORRAINE WEAVER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

Station staff completed an evaluation of event EN #53215 reported on February 15, 2018, and determined that the seismic monitoring system remained capable of assessing a seismic event following the reactor trip. Therefore, a major loss of emergency assessment capability pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) did not occur as reported in the update on February 16, 2018. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. Notified the R4DO (Gaddy).

ENS 5311111 December 2017 00:35:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CESt. Lucie Unit 1 declared an Unusual Event due to a smoke detector alarm received in the Unit 1 Containment Building that was unable to be confirmed within 15 minutes. A Containment entry was completed and no evidence of fire was found. The Unusual Event was terminated at 00:26 on 12/11/17. State and local officials have been notified by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this by licensee. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
ENS 5308522 November 2017 10:28:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

St. Lucie Unit 2 declared an Unusual Event due to a smoke detector alarm received in the Unit 2 Containment Building that was unable to be confirmed within 15 minutes. A Containment entry is currently being planned to determine the validity of the alarm. State and local officials have been notified by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/22/17 AT 1143 EST FROM JULIUS FLETCHER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

Personnel entered Containment to determine conditions and found no evidence of smoke, fire or damage to equipment. Event terminated at 1127 EST 11/22/17. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Suggs), R2 DRA (Dudes), NRR (Brock), IRD (Gott), and NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 530577 November 2017 10:49:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn November 7, 2017, at approximately 0337 (CST) hours, Waterford 3 (WF3) Control Room received a phone call from Entergy's Load Dispatcher to inform us that the NRC was unable to call Waterford 3 by ENS (emergency notification system) phone or by PABX (private automatic branch exchange) phone. The NRC was called by the Waterford 3 Control Room using the PABX at 0339 (CST) hours. However, the ENS phone could not call the NRC. Also, outside lines were not able to call in to Waterford 3. Offsite prompt Public Warning Sirens were available at all times. State and Local notification capability was available via PABX. WF3 Emergency Response Organization notification capability was available at all times. WF3 site Emergency Response Facility intercommunications were available at all times. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of offsite communications capability. ENS communication and full PABX functionality was reestablished at 0452 (CST) on November 7, 2017. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5303626 October 2017 05:54:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEOn October 26, 2017 at 0212 EDT St. Lucie Unit 2 experienced a reactor trip due to a loss of load event resulting in an RPS (Reactor Protection System) actuation. The cause of the loss of load is currently under investigation. Following the reactor trip, an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal occurred due to low level in the 2A Steam Generator. One of the two Main Feed Isolation Valves to the 2A Steam Generator did not close on the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal. 2A Steam Generator level was restored by Auxiliary Feedwater. The 2B Steam Generator level is being maintained by Main Feedwater. All CEAs (Control Element Assemblies) fully inserted into the core. Decay heat removal is being accomplished through forced circulation with stable conditions from Auxiliary Feedwater/Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass Control System. Currently maintaining pressurizer pressure at 2250 psia and Reactor Coolant System temperature at 532 degrees F. St. Lucie Unit 1 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Specified System Actuation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5301514 October 2017 16:37:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEAt approximately 19:48 Mountain Standard Time on October 13, 2017, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) staff confirmed a non-licensed supervisor tested positive for drugs during a random 'Fitness for Duty' test. The person's access authorization was terminated in accordance with station procedures. The NRC resident inspector has been notified by the licensee.
ENS 5301012 October 2017 20:26:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEA contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during an initial screening test. The individual's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the Licensee.
ENS 5298922 September 2017 20:08:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). On September 21, 2017 at 0915 MST, the seismic monitoring (SM) computer was declared non-functional for the performance of a planned surveillance test. On September 21, 2017 at 1201 MST, the SM system computer became non-responsive during the performance of the test. Control room staff attempted to reboot the computer and were unsuccessful. Maintenance and troubleshooting efforts began thereafter to initiate repairs. As a compensatory measure, PVNGS procedures for seismic event evaluation provide alternative methods for event classification of a seismic event with the SM system out of service. The SM system functions to provide indication that the Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE) threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event and is used in the PVNGS Emergency Plan to perform classification of Initiating Condition 'Seismic event greater than OBE levels' and Emergency Action Level HU2.1. On September 22, 2017 at 1500 MST, maintenance personnel performing software repair efforts determined hardware replacement is required. The required component will not be available before 72 hours from the start of the event. Because the SM system is not expected to be restored within 72 hours, this condition is being reported as a planned event constituting a major loss of emergency assessment capability with viable compensatory measures in place. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition.
ENS 529568 September 2017 17:51:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

At time 1700 (EDT) today, the National Weather Service issued a Hurricane Warning for the area including the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared at time 1714 (EDT). In anticipation of severe weather, the site has completed proceduralized high wind preparations. Both units are currently stable at 100% power. The licensee notified both State and local agencies and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. No safety-related systems are out of service. The electrical grid is stable. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/9/17 AT 1743 EDT FROM DALE THOMAS TO S. SANDIN * * *

At 1701 (EDT) today (09/09/17), a 24-hour update was made to state and local governments following the National Weather Service issuing yesterday's hurricane warning for the area including St. Lucie Plant. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared yesterday (09/08/17) at 1714 (EDT). There are no changes in plant status for either Unit. In anticipation of severe weather, the site previously completed high wind preparations. Our plants have been specifically built to withstand natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, flooding and tidal surges. This approach will ensure the safety of operations and our employees and the communities surrounding our plants. Both units are currently stable at 100% power level and will remain at that power since hurricane force winds are not currently projected to reach St. Lucie Plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (Michel).

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/10/17 AT 1730 EDT FROM DALE THOMAS TO DONG PARK * * *

At 1648 (EDT) today (09/10/17), a 24-hour update was made to state and local governments following the National Weather Service issuing Friday's hurricane warning for the area including St. Lucie Plant. On that basis, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared yesterday (09/08/17) at 1714 (EDT). There are no changes in plant status for either Unit. In anticipation of severe weather, the site previously completed high wind preparations. Our plants have been specifically built to withstand natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, flooding and tidal surges. This approach will ensure the safety of operations and our employees and the communities surrounding our plants. Both units are currently stable at 100% power level and will remain at that power since hurricane force winds are not currently projected to reach St. Lucie Plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2IRC (Franke).

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/11/17 AT 1405 EDT FROM BRIAN KELLY TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The Hurricane Warning has been terminated by the National Weather Service for St. Lucie County including the Plant Site. At time 1313 (EDT) on 9/11/17, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant has terminated from the Unusual Event Classification. Unit 1 is currently shutdown in Mode 3, Hot Standby. Unit 2 continues to operate in Mode 1, 100 percent power. The licensee notified State and Local Government Agencies, and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2IRC (Munday), R2DO (Michel), NRR EO (King), IRD MOC (Gott), DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DHS NICC, USDA Ops Center, EPA Emergency Ops Center, FDA Emergency Ops Center (email), FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5290415 August 2017 08:07:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CE

On August 15, 2017 at 0748 EDT, an Unusual Event was declared at Millstone Unit 2 due to a fire alarm indication in containment that was unable to be verified extinguished within 15 minutes. Current containment parameters do not indicate an actual fire. A containment entry is planned to verify that there is no fire. Unit 2 continues at 100% power. Unit 3 was unaffected. The NRC remains in Normal mode. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC. Notified FEMA National Watch and Nuclear SSA via E-mail.

  • * * UPDATE FROM TODD STRINGFELLOW TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0953 EDT ON 8/15/2017 * * *

At 0951 EDT, the Unusual Event was terminated. No signs of an actual fire were present upon containment entry. All alarms are cleared and they are investigating the cause of the alarm. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies. Notified R1DO (Gray), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD (Gott). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC. Notified FEMA National Watch and Nuclear SSA via E-mail.

ENS 5287931 July 2017 18:32:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEAt 1400 (EDT), St. Lucie completed a review of Unit 1 Hot Leg Injection scenarios. St. Lucie Unit 1 was licensed with a Hot Leg Injection capability that relies upon manual actions to accomplish the function. This review concluded that some postulated single electrical train failure scenarios were not fully addressed in plant procedures. Because of the potential to extend Hot Leg Injection initiation beyond the analysis start time, St. Lucie is reporting this condition under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The affected off-normal procedures were immediately revised to include necessary instructions to restore power to selected valves during a postulated loss of electrical power to restore the Hot Leg Injection strategy. Unit 1 remained at 100% power. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A review found this condition was not applicable for Unit 2.
ENS 5286317 July 2017 17:37:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

During a rain and lightning storm, plant operators observed arcing from the main transformer bus duct and notified the control room. The decision was made to trip the main generator which resulted in an automatic reactor trip. The plant entered EAL SU.1 as a result of the loss of offsite power for greater than fifteen minutes. Plant safety busses are being supplied by both emergency diesel generators while the licensee inspects the electrical system to determine any damage prior to bringing offsite power back into the facility. Offsite power is available to the facility. No offsite assistance was requested by the licensee. During the trip, all rods inserted into the core. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric dump valves with emergency feedwater supplying the steam generators. The main steam isolation valves were manually closed to protect the main condenser. There were no safeties or relief valves that actuated during the plant transient. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. Reactor cooling is via natural circulation. All safety equipment is available for the safe shutdown of the plant. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and the local Parish emergency management agencies. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 7/17/17 AT 2007 EDT FROM MARIA ZAMBER TO DONG PARK * * *

This notification is also made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On July 17, 2017 at 1606 CDT, the reactor automatically tripped due to a loss of Forced Circulation, which was the result of Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) to the electrical (safety and non-safety) buses. Both 'A' and 'B' trains of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started as designed to reenergize the 'A' and 'B' safety buses. The LOOP caused a loss of feedwater pumps, resulting in an automatic actuation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system. Prior to the reactor trip, at 1600 CDT, personnel noticed the isophase bus duct to main transformer 'B' glowing orange due to an unknown reason. Due to this, the main turbine was manually tripped at 1606 CDT. Following the turbine trip, the electrical (safety and non-safety) buses did not transfer to the startup transformers as expected due to an unknown reason. The plant entered the Emergency Operating Procedure for LOOP/Loss of Forced Circulation Recovery. At 1617 CDT, an Unusual Event was declared due to Initiating Condition (IC) SU1 - Loss of all offsite AC power to safety buses (greater than) 15 minutes. All safety systems responded as expected. The plant is currently in mode 3 and stable with the EDGs supplying both safety buses and with EFW feeding and maintaining both steam generators. Offsite power is in the process of being restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and the local Parish emergency management agencies.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ADAM TAMPLAIN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2203 EDT ON 7/17/17 * * *

The licensee terminated the Notification of Unusual Event at 2056 CDT. The basis for terminating was that offsite power was restored to the safety busses. The licensee has notified Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, St. John and St. Charles Parishes, Louisiana Homeland Security Emergency Preparedness, and will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified IRD (Stapleton), NRR (King), R4DO (Hipschman), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1724 EDT ON 7/19/17 * * *

This update is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). During the event discussed in EN# 52863, at 1642 CDT (on July 17, 2017), Condensate Storage Pool (CSP) level lowered to less than 92% resulting in entry to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.3. Level in the CSP was lowered due to feeding from both Steam Generators with EFW. Normal makeup to the CSP was temporarily unavailable due to the LOOP. Filling the CSP commenced at 1815 CDT (on July 17, 2017), and TS 3.7.1.3 was exited on July 18, 2017 at 0039 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hipschman).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1233 EDT ON 9/14/17 * * *

Waterford 3 is retracting a follow up notification made on July 19, 2017 for EN# 52863, concerning the loss of safety function associated with the Condensate Storage Pool (CSP) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The Condensate Storage Pool was performing its required safety function by providing inventory to the Emergency Feed Water pumps when the required Tech Spec level (T.S. 3.7.1.3) dropped below 92%. The Technical Specification was entered at 1624 (CDT) on July 17, 2017 and exited after filling at 0039 on July 18, 2017. The total allowed outage time allowed by Tech Spec 3.7.1.3 is 10 hours to be in Hot Shutdown if not restored. The Condensate Storage Pool level was restored to greater than 92% prior to exceeding the allowed outage time. Based on level being restored and the Condensate Storage Pool performing its required safety function, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) does not apply. Prior to the automatic reactor trip, Condensate Storage Pool level was greater than 92%. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the retraction. Notified R4DO (Groom).

ENS 5276419 May 2017 08:48:00PalisadesNRC Region 3CEPursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), notifications are being performed for a valid actuation of the reactor protection system resulting in a full scram. The actuation was a result of pre-startup testing. The generator coastdown protective relay was left in service which needed to be bypassed to facilitate the testing. This resulted in a reactor scram occurring. The reactor was subcritical with all rods inserted at the time of the actuation. All systems functioned as designed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5275716 May 2017 00:17:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEOn May 15, 2017 at 1800 hours EDT, the '2A3' 4.16 KV safety related bus unexpectedly de-energized. The '2A' emergency diesel generator (EDG) system received a valid start signal from the undervoltage condition on the '2A3' bus but did not start as the EDG had been removed from service for maintenance. Loss of the '2A3' 4.16 KV bus resulted in a valid actuation of the undervoltage protection relays. The direct cause of the de-energization was determined to be failed secondary side potential transformer fuses. The 'B' train safety related electrical busses were unaffected by the event. The '2A3' 4.16 KV bus was reenergized at 2340. This event was determined to be reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). During the electrical transient, the licensee briefly entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 but plant conditions were restored, all required LCOs were satisfied, and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited before the plant was required to downpower. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5275314 May 2017 21:27:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn May 14, 2017 at time 1823 (CDT), Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station notified St. Charles Parish Emergency Services via 911 of a fire in the Generation Support Building (GSB), the Hahnville, Luling and Killona Fire Departments were dispatched. The GSB is an Administrative and Engineering Building outside the Protected Area and on the Owner Controlled Area. The fire was reported out at 1841. No personnel were injured due to the fire. The fire appeared to be from an external building exhaust fan. There was no internal or structural damage to the building. There was no radiological release. No Safety Related Systems were required to function. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 527222 May 2017 15:26:00PalisadesNRC Region 3CE

On May 2, 2017, during planned inspections, an ultrasonic examination performed on weld PCS-4-PRS-1P1-1, revealed an axial indication in the pressurizer nozzle to safe end area of the weld. This indication does not meet applicable acceptance criteria under ASME, Section XI. The plant was in cold shutdown at 0% power for a planned refueling outage at the time of discovery. The condition will be resolved prior to plant startup. This condition has no impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), since an indication was found that did not meet acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code, Section XI.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 5/9/17 AT 1303 EDT FROM BARBARA DOTSON TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Additional evaluations of the recorded indication concluded that the indication was attributed to an erroneous ultrasonic response. This was the result of a combined effect of compromised surface contact at the area of the recorded indication and associated examination scan speed. The contact issue is attributed to the specific tooling configuration required for this exam. The combination of these factors resulted in the introduction of an erroneous reflector in the area of interest that had characteristics of a relevant indication. The vendor repeated the entire examination for axial flaws and there were no service induced indications recorded. A review of the newly acquired data by site, vendor and EPRI personnel confirmed that no service induced flaws are present. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Hills).

ENS 5271026 April 2017 14:49:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
CE
At 1004 CDT, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) reactor automatically tripped due to the partial loss of offsite power. At the time of the trip, the site was in a Tornado Warning and a Severe Thunderstorm Warning. The Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system auto-actuated due to the loss of main feedwater pumps and the loss of the Reactor Coolant pumps. Both Emergency Diesel Generators started as expected with only one loading as expected. All control rods fully inserted. Currently, ANO-1 has stabilized in Hot Standby via natural circulation. ANO-1 also lost Spent Fuel Pool cooling for approximately 69 minutes. The temperature of the spent fuel pool at the beginning of the event was approximately 102 (degrees) F. The spent fuel pool saw a heatup of 1 (degree) F during the loss of spent fuel pool cooling. The Spent Fuel Pool cooling has been restored. ANO-2 is currently in a refueling outage with all fuel in the spent fuel pool. ANO-2 completed a full core off load to the spent fuel pool and this was completed on April 12, 2017. Spent Fuel Pool cooling was lost for approximately 10 minutes. The Spent Fuel Pool temperature was 91 (degrees) F prior to the event. No heat up of the pool was identified during the event. Cooling has subsequently been restored. The #1 Emergency Diesel Generator auto-started as designed but did not supply the safety bus due to availability of offsite power. No radiological releases have occurred from either unit due to this event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 526707 April 2017 14:49:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEOn April 5, 2017, Arizona Public Service Company (APS) completed an evaluation of a deviation, and concluded the condition represented a defect under 10 CFR 21. APS previously submitted an interim report (ADAMS Accession Number ML 16344A118) for this condition pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2). A GE-Hitachi Type AKR-2BE-50, 2000 Amp circuit breaker (used to connect Class 1E batteries to the related Class 1E 125 VDC busses) exhibited arcing and smoking during current injection testing performed to test the overcurrent trip setpoint prior to installation. Arcing occurred at one of two hex bolts anchoring the protective trip device to the line side bus. The electrical arcing resulted from inadequate tightening of both hex bolts which caused a loose electrical connection on the bus within the breaker. APS concluded this condition could result in the breaker failing to perform its safety function and thus could create a substantial safety hazard. The breaker had been refurbished by GE-Hitachi and was received by APS and tested on October 13, 2016. Following the test failure, the damaged bolt was replaced, both bolts were tightened, and the breaker was retested and installed. Pre-installation inspection and testing that includes current injection testing, recommended in GEH document GEK-64459, should, and did, detect faults such as the condition identified in this notification. GE-Hitachi entered this failure into their corrective action program. Vendor: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY, 3901 CASTLE HAYNE RD., WILMINGTON, NC 28402-2819 Device: Breaker Model AKR-2BE-50, 2000 Amp, Serial No. N8682600001 The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5264729 March 2017 18:10:00PalisadesNRC Region 3CEDuring an evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornados, Palisades Nuclear Plant personnel identified conditions in the plant design such that specific TS equipment is considered not adequately protected from tornado missiles. Specifically, vulnerabilities were identified in the following systems and components: Service Water System - Service water pump discharge header and service water pump cable trays. Fuel Oil Transfer System - Fuel oil transfer piping and transfer pump cable trays. Emergency Diesel Generators - Vent lines on the fuel oil day tanks. Control Room Heating, Ventilation, and Cooling System - Both the normal and emergency intake ducts. Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump - Feedwater pump relief valves. Component Cooling Water System - Component cooling water surge tank. The identified vulnerabilities are being addressed in accordance with Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM), 15-002, and Interim Staff Guidance, DSS-ISG-2016-01. Initial compensatory measures are in place. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5264025 March 2017 09:28:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CE

While performing a purification subsystem alignment on the Unit-2 Refueling Water Tank, an inadvertent transfer of Refueling Water Tank level to the common Spent Fuel Pool occurred. This transfer resulted in lowering Unit-2 Refueling Water Tank level below the Technical Specification (TS) required limit for the current mode of operation at 0142 (EDT) on 3/25/17. Upon recognition of the inadvertent transfer, Operations secured the lineup and restored Unit-2 Refueling Water Tank level to its normal operating band at 0225 on 3/25/17. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) '...any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' With less than the required Technical Specification volume in the Refueling Water Tank, insufficient volume existed in the Refueling Water Tank to maintain 30 minutes of full flow Safety Injection, and subsequent continued pump operation after transition to recirculation mode of operation. This level is required by Technical Specification 3.5.4.B and has a one hour action statement to restore level. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM KENT MILLS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1637 EDT ON 3/30/2017 * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract ENS notification 52640 made on March 25, 2017 for Calvert Cliffs. After further evaluation, it has been determined that the volume of water in the Unit 2 Refueling Water Tank was never below the TS required volume of 400,000 gallons. The evaluation considered the as-found condition of the level transmitter and the existing environmental conditions of the tank in determining the actual RWT water volume on the day of the event. Therefore, this event does not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and the ENS report is being retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cook).

ENS 526008 March 2017 20:13:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On March 8, 2017 at 1627 (CST) Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 action 'c' was entered due to both trains of Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) being inoperable. This TS action requires one train of LPSI be restored within 1 hour or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours. It was identified that LPSI train B was inoperable due to SI-135B, Reactor Coolant Loop 1 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, being found open. At the time of discovery, LPSI train A was inoperable for pre planned maintenance, but available and awaiting operability retest. The station was in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. Maintenance workers were scheduled to work Sl-135A Reactor Coolant Loop 2 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, and inadvertently began work on Sl-135B and manually opened the valve which resulted in the LPSI Train B being inoperable. Once identified by Operations Control Room staff, the valve (SI-135B) was placed in the closed position and stroke tested to ensure operability. TS 3.5.2 action 'c' was exited at time 1705. The station remained in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5252331 January 2017 15:39:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEAt 1200 (EST) on January 31, 2017, during investigation of potential 1B2 Reactor Coolant Pump seal degradation, a through wall defect was identified on Class 1 piping servicing the Lower Seal Heat Exchanger, which is part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB). The reactor is presently in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed by the atmospheric steam dump valves. The plant is being maneuvered to Mode 5 to affect appropriate repairs. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5243515 December 2016 06:55:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CE

The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. During a scheduled surveillance test run of the PVNGS (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station) Unit 3 'B' Train Emergency Diesel Generator, there was a catastrophic failure of a piston to include crankcase damage and diesel trip. The Emergency Plan has been entered and an ALERT was declared at 0410 (MST) on 12/15/16 based on an explosion resulting in visible damage to a safety system required for safe shutdown. The cause of the failure is unknown at this time. PVNGS Fire Department responded and no fire was observed. Unit 3 remains on line at 100% power. No other safety functions are impacted. No personnel injuries occurred. The unit is in a ten day technical specification on an emergency diesel generator being inoperable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS, DOE, EPA, FEMA, NICC, USDA, HHS, FDA, NSSA, Mexico, and OIP (Skeen).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0947 EST ON 12/15/2016 FROM MICHAEL GOODRICH TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

This serves as the notification of the termination of Alert HA2.1 declared at 0410 MST at Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station. The event terminated at 0636 MST. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Keller), NRR EO (Miller), IRD (Stapleton), DHS, DOE, EPA, FEMA, NICC, USDA, HHS, FDA, NSSA, Mexico, and OIP (Skeen).

ENS 524137 December 2016 16:59:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. This telephone notification is being made pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1 train A emergency diesel generator (EDG), train A high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump, and train A essential spray pond (SP) pump. These components are portions of the emergency ac electrical power system, the emergency core cooling system, and the emergency service water system, respectively, as described in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). On October 17, 2016 at approximately 1519, Mountain Standard Time, a portion of the Unit 1 train A engineered safety features equipment was automatically started by the balance-of-plant (BOP) engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) while the plant was at steady state conditions. Initiation of the train A ESFAS actuation signal was momentary, and the ESFAS actuation signal cleared 0.2 seconds after being initiated. The invalid ESFAS signal initiated a test-mode start signal for the train A EDG and started the train A HPSI pump. The train A essential SP pump started in support of the train A EDG. All actuated components started and functioned successfully. No systems started in response to actual plant conditions, and no actuation was required to mitigate the consequences of an event. The invalid HPSI actuation neither resulted in an emergency core cooling system discharge, nor should it have. The invalid actuation was the consequence of a spurious momentary signal into the BOP-ESFAS control panel due to an intermittent high resistance electrical connection. The event was entered into the PVNGS corrective action program. There were no adverse impacts to public health and safety nor to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed.
ENS 524095 December 2016 16:24:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEA non-licensed supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for a prohibited substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's unescorted access to the plant has been denied. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 524064 December 2016 01:48:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEOn 12/3/16 at 2224 EST, Calvert Cliffs Unit-2 experienced an automatic reactor trip from full power due to a leak in the Unit-2 Main Turbine Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system. The EHC leak caused the Unit-2 Main Turbine governor valves to close, resulting in a turbine trip and automatic reactor trip. The site Outage Control Center is manned, and investigation into the cause of the leak is underway. Unit-2 remains stable in Mode 3 with normal heat removal. Unit-1 remains at full power and was not affected by the trip. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. All Control rods fully inserted and no primary or secondary safety relief valves lifted during the trip. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will be notifying Calvert County.
ENS 523371 November 2016 12:00:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

This 24 hour report is being made as per 10CFR72.75. On October 31, 2016, at 1100 (CDT), the Supplemental Cooling System was secured to the Dry Cask Storage Hi-Track Transfer cask, as allowed by Dry Fuel Storage T.S. 3.1.4, in preparation for moving the Hi-Track transfer cask. At approximately 1500, after moving the Hi-Track into position for downloading including securing the cleats to the mating device, the next step in the procedure was to lower the Hi-Track. When lowering the Hi-Track, a crane overload condition occurred. With the crane, attached the Supplemental Cooling System can not be operated and has remained secured. The Supplemental Cooling System is classified as 'Important to Safety Category B' and is required to be utilized, as necessary, to maintain the peak fuel cladding temperature below the allowed limits. T.S. 3.1.4 allows the Supplemental cooling system to be secured for up to 7 hours during the Hi-Track transfer process and then followed by a 7 day allowed outage time. This is being reported based on 10CFR72.75 which states in part that a 24 hour Non-emergency notification is required if; 'An event in which important to safety equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed'. The Hi-Track is presently in a safe condition with supplemental cooling still secured. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO DONG PARK AT 1111 EST ON 11/08/16 * * *

On November 1, 2016 at 1100 CDT Waterford 3 notified the NRC of a 24 hour reportable event per 10CFR72.75. The notification is documented under EN# 52337 based on the information known at that time. Follow up investigation determined that the conditions required per 10CFR72.75 were not met and should not have been reported. 10CFR72.75 states in part that a 24 hour non-emergency notification is required if, 'An event in which important to safety equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed.' It also requires that, 'The equipment is required by regulation, license condition, or certificate of compliance to be available and operable to prevent releases that could exceed regulatory limits, to prevent exposures to radiation or radioactive materials that could exceed regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' Based on a review of the bases for Certificate of Compliance, T.S. 3.1.4 thermal analysis shows that the fuel cladding temperature would not exceed the short term temperature limits applicable to an off normal condition. The bases further states that because the thermal analysis is a steady-state analysis, there is an indefinite period of time available to make repairs to the Supplemental Cooling System. The completion time of 7 days to restore the system per T.S. 3.1.4 is considered an appropriate and reasonable amount of time to plan the work and complete repairs. Based on this information there was no possibility of exceeding regulatory limits or the need to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Waterford 3 is retracting event notification EN 52337. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Campbell).

ENS 5233631 October 2016 18:07:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn October 31, 2016, an informal, voluntary communication was made to the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) and the Saint Charles Parish Emergency Operating Center concerning a spill of greater than 100 gallons (estimated 150 gallons total) of Tritium contaminated water to the storm drains located within the Protected Area. Tritium activity was 8.201E-06 micro Ci/ml and no detectable gamma activity. The spill lasted approximately 5 minutes before the pump moving the tritium contaminated water was secured. The contaminated water came from the Condensate Polisher Backwash Storage Tank and discharged from a (loose) hose connection going to a baker tank located within the protected area. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5232127 October 2016 08:26:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

At 0021 (CDT) on 10/27/16, Waterford 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of the charging and letdown systems from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered due to the loss of all three charging pumps. Charging Pump AB was restored and aligned to replace Charging Pump A and WF3 exited TS 3.0.3 at 0055 on 10/27/16. The cause of the loss of charging pumps was due to Refueling Water Storage Pool to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507, not opening as expected following a loss of Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) 014AB during electrical troubleshooting. The cause of CVC-507 not opening is being investigated. Power was restored to SUPS 014AB at 0022. WF3 is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed by the Steam Bypass Control System. Pressurizer Level was maintained throughout the event. WF3 was previously shut down for reasons unrelated to this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Valve CVC-183 closed when the power supply was lost. CVC-183 is the Volume Control Tank outlet isolation valve. Waterford 3 will remain in mode 3 until the issue has been corrected.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1005 EST ON 11/23/16 FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

This is a retraction of EN 52321 which was reported as an 8 hour Non-Emergency on October 27th at 0826 EST. At 0021 (EST) on 10/27/16, Waterford 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of the charging and letdown systems due to an electrical transient on a Static Uninterruptable Power Supply that was being worked under a maintenance work order. The cause of the loss of charging pumps was due to Refueling Water Storage Pool to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507, not opening as expected following a loss of Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) 014AB. Both operating charging pumps automatically secured due to low suction pressure trips as designed. Post event investigation determined that a relay that had failed affected only the normal suction path isolation valves to the charging pumps and did not impact the safety related flow path that is required during a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). Had an SIAS occurred during the period when no active suction path was aligned, the low pressure trip would have been blocked and the pumps selected to start on an SIAS would have auto started. The SIAS would have aligned the Boric Acid Make-up system for Emergency Boration. This would have resulted in the Charging Pumps being aligned to take suction from the Boric Acid Make-up pumps and/or Boric Acid Gravity Feed valves. A function of the charging systems is to inject concentrated boric acid into RCS upon an SIAS. As discussed in FSAR Section 6.3.3.3.1, the injection flow from the charging pumps is not credited in the small break LOCA analysis. Charging is however credited for natural circulation cooldown without letdown in order to meet the safe shutdown requirements of NRC Branch Technical Position (RSB) 5-4. This analysis assumes that the charging source is initially Boric Acid Makeup Tanks followed by Refueling Water Storage Pool. Both sources were available. The charging system was fully capable of performing its safety function following the relay failure. The charging pumps remained capable of starting on an SIAS and the flow path from the Boric Acid Management system remained operable. In addition the flow path from the RWSP was not affected since the outlet isolation valve could be manually opened. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Taylor).

ENS 5230920 October 2016 00:09:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CE

While performing a scheduled inservice inspection on a section of safety injection system piping, a flaw was identified in a circumferential weld on the 14 inch safety injection line from the 2A safety injection tank to the 2A reactor coolant loop. Examination results indicate that the flaw constitutes a welding defect that cannot be found acceptable under ASME Section XI, IWB-3600, or Table IWB-3410-1. Further analysis is being conducted. The unit had been shutdown for its 19th refueling outage (3R19) on October 8, 2016, at 0000. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed of this condition. This piping is required to be operable in modes one through four.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 11/10/16 AT 1640 EST FROM ROBERT CHU TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Subsequent engineering examination of the weld on the 14" safety injection line from the 2A safety injection tank to the 2A reactor coolant loop using enhanced examination techniques concluded the indication in the circumferential weld does not represent a flaw constituting a weld defect. The indication was the result of a metallurgical weld interface in the area of a previously documented weld repair. Therefore, the indication is acceptable under ASME Section XI with no further analysis required. Based on the above information, PVNGS has determined the indication does not represent a degraded condition of a principal safety barrier as defined by 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) and event notification #52309 is retracted. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. Notified R4DO (Campbell).

ENS 522804 October 2016 23:18:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

A Hurricane Warning is in effect for St. Lucie County including the Plant Site. A Hurricane Warning was issued by the National Weather Service at 2250 (EDT). St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant entered an Unusual Event Classification for the Hurricane Warning. State and local officials have been notified by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this by the licensee. This report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(i) due to the Notice of Unusual Event and 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the Offsite Notification. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ANDY TEREZAKIS TO VINCE KLCO ON 10/7/16 AT 1112 EDT * * *

The Hurricane Warning was downgraded to a Tropical Storm Warning by the National Weather Service for St. Lucie County including the Plant Site. At time 1044 (EDT) on 10/7/16, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant has terminated from the Unusual Event Classification. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local authorities. Notified R2 (Jones) NRR EO (King), IRD (Grant), R2DO (Bonser), DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).

ENS 5226728 September 2016 09:46:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CEOn September 16, 2016, at 0036 (CDT), during a 24-hour Technical Specification (TS) endurance run, the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) red train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) became inoperable when its inboard generator bearing failed. ANO-2 TS 3.8.1.1, 'AC Sources', requires an inoperable EDG to be restored to service within 14 days or actions to place the unit in a shutdown condition initiated. It has been determined that repair options cannot be completed within the Allowed Outage Time (AOT) due to unforeseen circumstances which evolved during recovery efforts. At 0745 (CDT), ANO-2 initiated plant shutdown due to the inability to restore the red train EDG. ANO-2 will be shutdown and cooled down to Mode 5. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspectors.
ENS 5225219 September 2016 18:17:00San OnofreNRC Region 4CEAt 1230 (PDT) on 9/19/16, SONGS (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station) made an offsite notification to the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board in regards to an oily waste water release to the environment in excess of allowable limits. On 9/15/16, the Unit 3 oily waste sump overflowed. An estimated 1500 gallons was released to the intake which is pumped to the outfall. A sample was taken during the end of the overflow; no visual indication of oil and grease was noted. The sample analysis completed on 9/19/16 indicated a result that exceeded SONGS' NPDES (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System) instantaneous maximum limit of 20 ppm; results were 34.4 ppm. The licensee will inform NRC Region IV staff.
ENS 522299 September 2016 03:59:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a loss of emergency assessment capability at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). On September 8, 2016 at 1856 (MST), seismic monitoring (SM) system computer AJSMNXYQI0001**INSTRU was determined to be non-functional due to a power spike which caused a temporary loss of power to the seismic instrumentation and resulted in a locked in the Control Room alarm. At 2305, I&C technicians re-booted the computer and verified the SM system was functioning. On September 8, 2016, at approximately 2353, further review of this equipment failure and the related impact to the capability of the SM system determined that this was a reportable loss of emergency assessment capability during the period between 1856 and 2305. This specific SM functions to provide indication that the Operational Basis Earthquake threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event and is used in the PVNGS Emergency Plan to perform classification for emergency action level HA1.1, Natural or Destructive Phenomena affecting Vital Areas. As a compensatory measure, PVNGS procedures for seismic event evaluation provide alternative methods for HA1.1 event classification with the SM out of service. Maintenance to correct the condition has been completed. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition.
ENS 522288 September 2016 16:12:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. This telephone notification is being made pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of both trains of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 essential spray pond (SP) system. The SP system serves as an emergency service water system that does not normally run and serves as an ultimate heat sink as described in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(9). On July 12, 2016, at approximately 0550, Mountain Standard Time, Unit 2 experienced a manual actuation of both trains of the SP system. Approximately 20 minutes earlier, the failure of a +15VDC power supply on the containment purge isolation actuation signal (CPIAS) module resulted in a trip of the B train CPIAS and a momentary cross trip of the A train CPIAS, and both trains of the control room essential filtration actuation system (CREFAS). These brief actuation signals resulted in starting of some but not all essential equipment because the actuation signals cleared before most of the equipment received a start signal. Both trains of the SP system were started manually in accordance with the alarm response procedure. The A train CPIAS and both trains of CREFAS were reset. The B train CPIAS remained in a partially tripped state because of the failed power supply. The manual actuation of both A and B trains of the SP system was complete. Both trains of the SP system started and functioned successfully. The invalid actuation was the consequence of a failed +15VDC power supply on the B train CPIAS module which resulted in momentary trips of both trains of CPIAS and CREFAS. The containment building radiation monitors that actuate CPIAS exhibited normal radiation levels which would not have required CPIAS actuation. The event was entered into the PVNGS corrective action program. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety nor to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed.
ENS 522268 September 2016 04:27:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEOn September 7th, 2016 at approximately 2131 Mountain Standard Time (MST), Palo Verde Unit 1 was manually tripped due to a stuck open main spray valve. Unit 1 was operating at 100 percent power at normal operating temperature and pressure prior to the event. A 120 VAC non-class instrument distribution panel was being transferred to its alternate power supply to establish maintenance conditions. The distribution panel failed to transfer. The panel remained energized from its normal power supply; however, multiple components powered from the distribution panel began to exhibit uncharacteristic behavior. At this time, it was noted that a reactor coolant system main spray valve was open. The alarm response procedure was followed; however, the actions taken were unsuccessful at closing the main spray valve. The plant was then manually tripped due to pressurizer pressure continuing to lower. The reactor coolant pumps were turned off to terminate main pressurizer spray flow to control pressurizer pressure due to the inability to close the main spray valve. No ESF (Engineered Safety Features) actuations occurred and none were required. No emergency classification was required per the emergency plan. Safety related buses remained energized during and following the reactor trip. The emergency diesel generators did not start and were not required. The offsite power grid is stable. Limiting condition for operation 3.4.1 was entered due to low pressurizer pressure. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event. Unit 1 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3. Reactor coolant pumps are secured and natural circulation has been verified. Primary pressure is being maintained at its normal operating pressure manually with pressurizer heaters and auxiliary spray, from the charging system. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The minimum RCS pressure was approximately 2070 psia (normal 2250). The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public. All rods inserted and the trip was uncomplicated. Units 2 and 3 were not affected and continue to run at full power. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5220930 August 2016 18:07:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended.
ENS 5219121 August 2016 20:14:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

At 35 percent power, a main generator lockout caused the main generator to trip, resulting in a reactor trip of Unit 1. Because of the lockout, power did not transfer to the startup transformers. Both emergency diesel generators started and aligned to the emergency busses. During the trip all control rods fully inserted and no safety or relief valves lifted. The plant is in Mode 3 steaming through the atmospheric relief valves and feeding the steam generators using auxiliary feedwater. There is no reported primary to secondary leakage. Primary coolant is being moved using natural circulation cooling. The trip of Unit 1 had no effect on Unit 2. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).

  • * * UPDATE AT 2140 EDT ON 08/21/2016 FROM GREG KRAUTZ TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The Unusual Event was terminated at 2125 EDT after the plant restored normal offsite power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Sandal), IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).

  • * * UPDATE AT 2315 EDT ON 08/21/2016 FROM ANDREW TEREZAKIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On August 21, 2016 at 1926 EDT, St. Lucie Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip and a loss of offsite power due to a main generator inadvertent Energization Lockout Relay actuation. The cause of the lockout is currently under investigation. Coincident with the loss of offsite power, the four reactor coolant pumps deenergized. Both the 1A and 1B Emergency Diesel Generators started on demand and powered the safety related AC buses. All CEAs (Control Element Assemblies) fully inserted into the core. Offsite power to the switchyard remained available during the event, and at 2036, restoration of offsite power to St. Lucie Unit 1 was completed. Decay heat removal is being accomplished through natural circulation with stable conditions from Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves. Currently maintaining pressurizer pressure at 1850 psia and Reactor Coolant System temperature at 532 degrees F. St. Lucie Unit 2 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100% power. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Specified System Actuation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0048 EDT ON 08/22/2016 FROM ANDREW TEREZAKIS TO DANIEL MILLS * * *

On August 21, 2016 at 2330 EDT, St. Lucie Unit 1 started two Reactor Coolant Pumps to establish Forced Circulation in order to enhance Decay Heat removal. Plant conditions remain stable with Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves in service. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(c)(2)(ii) as a follow up notification of protective measures taken. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

ENS 5217915 August 2016 14:10:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On August 12, 2016, at 1704 CDT, the shift operating crew entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 due to both trains of Essential Services Chilled Water being inoperable. Essential Services Chilled Water Loop A had previously been declared inoperable for maintenance on August 11, 2016. On August 12, 2016, at 1704, the shift operating crew noted that Loop B Essential Services Chilled Water outlet temperature exceeded the allowed TS limit of 42 degrees Fahrenheit. Essential Chiller AB was subsequently aligned to Loop B and TS 3.0.3 was exited on August 12, 2016 at 1802 when outlet temperature was verified less than or equal to 42 degrees Fahrenheit. On August 15, 2016, subsequent review of this event determined that this event was reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident' due to both Essential Services Chilled Water Loops being inoperable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5216911 August 2016 11:09:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CEReactor operators manually tripped the reactor due to the loss of two out of four circulating water pumps which caused a drop in condenser vacuum. The trip was uncomplicated. The reactor is shutdown and stable with decay heat removal via steam dumps to the condenser. The cause of the circulating water pump trips is currently unknown, but initial indications are that the pumps tripped due to a lightning strike that caused an electrical perturbation. The reactor will remain shutdown while the licensee investigates the cause. Unit 3 was not affected. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State and Local governments.
ENS 521381 August 2016 06:33:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

On August 1, 2016 at 0342 EDT St. Lucie Unit 1 commenced a unit shutdown required by Technical Specifications due to Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage in excess of the allowable limit of zero leakage. The leak was initially identified on July 31, 2016 at 2115 EDT as not Pressure Boundary leakage. After further analysis, the leak was determined to be Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary leakage at 0123 on August 1, 2016. The leakage is estimated as less than one tenth of a gallon per minute and is not impacting the ability to shut down the unit. Additional impact of the leak is under evaluation. This report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.' The location of the leak is on the Instrumentation piping welded connection at Flow Element FE-3311 attached to (the) Emergency Core Cooling System Injection header to Reactor Coolant System Loop 1A2. The leak activity is 0.167 microCuries per ml. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1335 EDT ON 09/23/16 FROM RICHARD SCISCENTE TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on EN 52138. NRC notification was initially made as a result of a plant shutdown required by technical specifications (TS) for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leakage. Subsequent to the initial report, St. Lucie has determined that the RCS leakage was from a seal weld on a threaded connection that was not pressure boundary leakage. However, the leak was non-isolable and required RCS depressurization to allow immediate investigation to ensure there were no faults in a RCS component body or pipe wall. The leakage was estimated to be less than one tenth of a gallon per minute and did not impact the ability to shut down the unit. No TS limits were exceeded during this event. Therefore, the plant shutdown to investigate and correct leakage past the seal weld of a threaded connection does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R2DO (Blamey).

ENS 5208312 July 2016 21:53:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CE

The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. During the performance of a fire seal and barrier surveillance test, a degraded fire seal barrier that provides 1 hour separation between two fire zones containing redundant safe shutdown trains was identified in the 100 foot elevation of the PVNGS Unit 1 Auxiliary Building. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Fire protection detection and mitigation systems in both fire zones are operable and compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The degraded fire barrier consists of two holes in the through wall fire barrier surrounding two two-inch conduits. The two holes are approximately one to one and a half inches across.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SEAN DORNSEIF TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1356 EDT ON 8/18/16 * * *

Subsequent Engineering evaluation concluded the degraded fire seal in PVNGS Unit 1 reported on July 12, 2016, did not place PVNGS in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. The degraded fire seal would have continued to provide the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains. The evaluation found a fire initiated in a fire zone on either side of the barrier would not propagate within one hour into the adjacent zone with redundant safe shutdown equipment. These conclusions were based on an existing fire analysis which was used to demonstrate that the required degree of separation between safe shutdown equipment remained intact. Based on the above information, PVNGS is retracting event notification report #52083, as the degraded fire seal did not place PVNGS Unit 1 an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed. Notified R4DO (Proulx).

ENS 5204727 June 2016 22:14:00San OnofreNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop
CE

A non-licensed contract employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol following a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. This information will be sent to the NRC Region 4 Office as San Onofre no longer has a resident.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 4/18/2018 AT 1308 EDT FROM TIM CUSICK TO STEVEN VITTO * * *

In the event report, the individual was described as a contract supervisor, thus meeting the reporting threshold. (the violation of the FFD policy was that he failed a for-cause test for alcohol). Recently, an NRC review of SONGS' 2016 Annual Fitness for Duty report found that SONGS described that test failure as 'not reportable' and that the labor category was 'Maintenance (Craft).' After reviewing the data, Access Authorization confirmed that the individual was a Union Maintenance Foreman (not a supervisor). The event was not reportable." SONGS will be notifying NRC Region 4. Notified R4DO (O'KEEFE) and FFD E-mail Group.

ENS 5196731 May 2016 18:12:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEOn 05/31/2016 at 1626 (EDT), a Reactor Trip occurred on Loss of Load RPS (Reactor Protection System) actuation. The Turbine Trip was apparently caused by a failed ESFAS (Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System) logic module. The failed NSR (Non Safety Related) logic module was associated with 11 Steam Generator High Level Turbine Trip. All systems responded as designed. Normal decay heat removal is to the condenser. All offsite power sources remained in service. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5194923 May 2016 15:36:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LP
CE
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.