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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeSystemScramEvent description
ENS 5624328 November 2022 15:34:00GinnaNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopA non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5624128 November 2022 08:38:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4Service water
High Pressure Coolant Injection
Residual Heat Removal
Emergency Equipment Cooling Water
The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0400 EST on November 28, 2022, during the performance of Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) cooling tower fan operability and RHR Service Water valve lineup verification, it was reported that the Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) Fan 'B' was making a loud metallic noise. The cause of the metallic noise is unknown at this time. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on inoperable cooling water to the HPCI room cooler, per LCO 3.0.6. Investigation into the Division 2 MDCT Fan 'B' abnormal noise is in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5623622 November 2022 17:35:00MonticelloNRC Region 3GE-3The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 11/22/2022, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant initiated a voluntary communication to the State of Minnesota after receiving analysis results for an on-site monitoring well that indicated tritium activity above the (Offsite Dose Calculation Manual) ODCM and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI) reporting levels. The source of the tritium is under investigation and the station will continue to monitor and sample accordingly. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency report for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5623117 November 2022 20:23:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000A contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5622114 November 2022 13:05:00OconeeNRC Region 2B&W-L-LPReactor Coolant SystemThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: During a scheduled refueling outage, a walkdown inside containment discovered a small amount of boron on the 1B2 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) lower bearing temperature instrument. At 0730 EST on November 14, 2022, with Unit 1 in Mode 6, disassembly of the instrument indicated the source of the boron was from a leak in the thermowell. The thermowell is considered part of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary and as such the condition is reportable. Repairs for the condition are in progress. This event is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5622013 November 2022 04:01:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4High Pressure Coolant Injection
Reactor Protection System
Primary Containment Isolation System
Control Rod
The following information was provided by the licensee email: On November 12, 2022, at 2319 CST, an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) initiated a full scram. The plant was in Mode 2, reactor pressure was 149 pounds. The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) injection valve, HPCI-MOV-MO19, opened and injected cold water into the reactor vessel while HPCI system testing was in progress. The cause is still under investigation. All control rods inserted. Plant is currently in Mode 3 and stable. All systems operated as designed with no Primary Containment Isolation System group isolations. This event is being reported under two event classifications: 50. 72(b)(2)(iv)(B) -- "Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. 50. 72(b)(3)(iv)(A) -- "Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The NRC Resident has been informed.
ENS 5621610 November 2022 10:12:00CookNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSteam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
Automatic ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0744 EST on November 10, 2022, DC Cook Unit 2 tripped automatically on high-high level of number 23 steam generator (SG). The reason for the high-high level in SG 23 is under investigation. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. The DC Cook NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. All Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started properly. Decay heat is being removed via the Steam Dump System. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the reactor trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the post trip review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event.
ENS 562149 November 2022 15:37:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 562104 November 2022 17:10:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Main Condenser
Manual ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On November 4, 2022, at 1400 hours, with Unit 2 (U2) in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, a manual scram was inserted on U2 due to rising reactor water level, which occurred following an unexpected opening of the 2B Feedwater Regulating Valve. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately 0 inches, which resulted in an automatic Group II and Group III isolation (expected response). Reactor Water Level control has been established in a normal band. The cause and details of the event are under investigation. The Unit 2 scram was not complicated. Operations responded using the Emergency Operating Procedures and stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100 percent power. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 562034 November 2022 08:04:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0006 CDT on 11/04/2022, it was discovered that both trains of control room area ventilation air conditioning systems were simultaneously inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: With both trains of control room area ventilation air conditioning systems inoperable, the plant entered a 72 hour limiting condition for operation (LCO). One train had been restored at the time of report which extends the LCO to 30 days.
ENS 562023 November 2022 14:05:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: This 60-day telephonic notification is being made in lieu of a licensee event report submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid engineered safety feature actuation signal. On September 6, 2022, at Waterford 3, while performing a plant protection system (PPS) power supply check, technicians observed an abnormally high voltage output. When the technicians opened the PPS bay cabinet door to adjust the voltage, they then observed low voltage indications. The direct cause of this issue is believed to be vibration induced relay chattering or an intermittent connection issue when opening the rear doors of PPS cabinets. This resulted in half the logic being met for the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signal (ESFAS) signals to fully actuate. The ESFAS signal opened the following valves: EFW-228A (EFW to SG 1 Primary Isolation), EFW-229A (EFW to SG 1 Backup Isolation), EFW-228B (EFW to SG 2 Primary Isolation) and EFW-229B (EFW to SG 2 Backup Isolation). This was a partial actuation of ESFAS. Affected plant systems functioned successfully. The inadvertent actuation was caused by a spurious signal and was not a valid signal resulting from actual parameter inputs. The 1992 Statements of Consideration define an invalid signal to include spurious signals including jarring of a cabinet door. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written licensee event report. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. These events did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.
ENS 561971 November 2022 16:56:00OconeeNRC Region 2B&W-L-LPReactor Coolant SystemThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1433 EDT on November 1, 2022, it was determined that a single relevant indication in the RCS pressure boundary did not meet the acceptance criteria under ASME, Section XI IWB-3514-2. 'Allowable Planar Flaws.' The condition will be resolved prior to plant startup. This event is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5619031 October 2022 00:40:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopFeedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2057 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System occurred during an attempt to start the 'B' Main Feed Pump. The reason for the AFW system auto-start was due to the 'A' electrical bus being under clearance and the 'B' Main Feed Pump not starting, resulting in a valid actuation signal for loss of both Main Feedwater pumps. The 'A' and 'B' motor-driven AFW (MDAFW) pumps were running prior to the attempted start of the B Main Feedwater pump and continued to run. The MDAFW Flow Control Valves (FCVs) went full open automatically as designed when the MDAFW actuation signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5618930 October 2022 09:43:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopSteam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Steam
Automatic ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0653 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1, at 16 percent power, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to an under-voltage condition on the 'A' reactor coolant pump (RCP) and the 'C' RCP. Power was lost from the 'A' auxiliary bus while performing an operating procedure to transfer power from the 'A' start-up transformer to the 'A' unit auxiliary transformer. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the main steam system to the atmosphere using the steam generator power-operated relief valves. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5618628 October 2022 02:24:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopSteam Generator
Auxiliary Feedwater
The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2050 EDT (on October 27, 2022), with Unit 1 in Mode 3, it was discovered that all auxiliary feedwater pumps were simultaneously inoperable and the capability to supply the 'B' steam generator was not maintained; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The function of the auxiliary feedwater pumps to supply the 'A' steam generator and 'C' steam generator was maintained. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5618527 October 2022 19:49:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6Secondary containmentThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1228 CDT on October 27, 2022, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was in Mode 1 at 88 percent power when a failure of a draw down surveillance resulted in the loss of secondary containment. During the performance of the surveillance GGNS was unable to maintain secondary containment pressure, as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.4, greater than or equal to 0.266 inches of water vacuum for 1 hour at a flow rate of less than or equal to 4000 cfm. The test was secured. Secondary containment was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 A.1 was entered at 1228 CDT. Secondary containment was restored to operable status at 1240 CDT by restoring the configuration to a previously known operable condition. This event is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5617724 October 2022 11:40:00CatawbaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSteam Generator
Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Manual ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 10/24/2022 at 0857 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 7 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a 2B train main feedwater pump trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system started automatically as expected. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the steam generators and discharging to the condenser. Unit 1 is not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The automatic start of the auxiliary feedwater system is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5617623 October 2022 19:05:00Diablo CanyonNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopReactor Coolant SystemThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0830 PDT on 10/23/2022, during routine outage inspections on Unit 2, it was determined that the RCS Pressure Boundary did not meet ASME Section XI acceptance criteria on a 2-inch vacuum refill connection line. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5617523 October 2022 11:14:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000Automatic Depressurization SystemThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0405 EDT on 10/23/2022, with (Vogtle) Unit 3 in Mode 6 and the reactor subcritical for greater than 28 hours, it was discovered that all three required flow paths for the stage four ADS were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The diverse actuation system was operable for manual stage four ADS during this time period. At 0432 EDT on 10/23/2022, two of the three required flow paths were restored to operable status, which exited the reportable condition. All required flow paths were operable at 0447 EDT. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5617422 October 2022 17:36:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4Core Spray
Decay Heat Removal
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: During Mode 5 Refueling operations, while attempting to establish flow through the Fuel Pool Cooling system filter demineralizers, an air operated valve to a radioactive waste tank failed to close automatically. This caused the Fuel Pool Cooling system to pump water from the Skimmer Surge Tanks (SST) to the radioactive liquid waste system. In response to the loss of inventory from the SSTs, the Control Room operating crew started Core Spray Pump A to restore normal operating level In the SST. This prevented the loss of the Fuel Pool Cooling/Alternate Decay Heat Removal system which was the only in service system meeting the safety function of decay heat removal. Core Spray Pump A was used for Injection for less than 3 minutes. This is reportable as a discharge of ECCS into the RCS in response to an event, but not part of a pre-planned sequence under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) and actuation of a specified system under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(Iv)(A). The resident inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Licensee reported approximately 6000-7000 gallons of water was injected into the RCS. The stuck open air operated valve was closed. Proceeding with refueling outage operations.
ENS 5617220 October 2022 20:24:00CatawbaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1446 EDT on October 20, 2022, an individual was transported offsite for treatment at an offsite medical facility. Due to the nature of the medical condition, the individual was not thoroughly surveyed prior to being transported offsite. Follow-up surveys performed by radiation protection technicians identified no contamination of the worker or of the ambulance and response personnel. This is an eight-hour notification, non-emergency for the transportation of a contaminated person offsite. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5617120 October 2022 11:31:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6Secondary containmentThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0427 CDT on October 20, 2022, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power when a failure of a draw down surveillance resulted in the loss of secondary containment. During the performance of the surveillance GGNS was unable to maintain secondary containment pressure, as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.4, greater than or equal to 0.266 inches of water vacuum for 1 hour at a flow rate of less than or equal to 4000cfm. The test was secured. Secondary containment was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 A.1 was entered at 0427 CDT. Secondary containment was restored to operable status at 0520 CDT by restoring the configuration to a previously known operable condition. This event is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5616818 October 2022 22:08:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4Standby Liquid ControlThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 10/18/2022 at 1440 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 3 declared both trains of standby liquid control (SLC) inoperable due to acceptance criteria failure of 3-SI-3.1.7.6, 'Standby Liquid Control System ATWS Equivalency Calculation for Newly Established Pump Flow Rate.' The purpose of this surveillance is to ensure the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) calculation criteria is met after each pump flow test. Chemistry performed the surveillance following pump flow testing and the requirement for equivalency calculation failed low with a result of less than 1.0. CR 1810303 documents this condition in the corrective action program. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This condition is also reportable as a 60-day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A),10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officer's report guidance: The plant entered an 8 hour limiting condition for operation based on the above. The condition was resolved at 2053 CDT when the system was restored to normal operation.
ENS 5616515 October 2022 15:46:00CatawbaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 10/15/2022 at 1159 (EDT), during the Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 refueling outage, it was determined that the results of a planned surface examination Liquid Penetrant test (PT) performed on a previous overlay repair on nozzle number 74 of the reactor vessel closure head (RVCH) did not meet applicable acceptance standards. The examination was being performed to meet the requirements of Relief Request RA-21-0144, 'Proposed Alternative to Use Reactor Vessel Head Penetration Embedded Flaw Repair for Life of Plant'. The penetration required repairs for the discovered indications. The repairs have been completed in accordance with the ASME Code of Record prior to returning the vessel head to service. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The original indication that led to the overlay repair was discovered in April 2021, during ultrasonic testing and reported to the NRC and assigned EN55201.
ENS 5616314 October 2022 18:03:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4High Pressure Coolant InjectionThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to an inadvertent division 2 isolation signal and subsequent valve closure. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident will be notified.
ENS 5615812 October 2022 09:21:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: On 10/08/22, a non-supervisory employee violated the station's FFD policy. The individual's site access has been terminated.
ENS 561537 October 2022 08:35:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopControl RodThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax: Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) penetration 69 degraded. At 0119 (CDT) on October 7, 2022, it was determined that the CRDM penetration 69 was degraded because examination identified unacceptable indications in accordance with ASME Code Case N-729-6. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 561527 October 2022 05:41:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: On 10/7/2022 at 0050 CDT, a potentially contaminated individual was transported off-site via ambulance to a local hospital. Due to the nature of the medical condition, an initial on-site survey for radioactive contamination was not performed prior to transport. Prior to arrival at the hospital, it was confirmed the individual and (the individual's) clothing were not radiologically contaminated. Follow-up surveys performed by radiation technicians identified no radiological contamination of the ambulance and response personnel. This event is being reported per 50.72(b)(3)(xii) - 'Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 561476 October 2022 10:06:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000Reactor Protection System
Residual Heat Removal
The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0244 EDT on 10/06/2022, with Unit 3 Defueled at 0 percent power, an actuation of the RPS occurred during restoration of Division B Class 1E DC and uninterruptible power supply system. The reason for the RPS actuation was due to the opening of the Division B passive residual heat removal (PRHR) heat exchanger outlet flow control valve. The reactor trip breakers were in an open state at the time of the event when the RPS signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 561404 October 2022 15:54:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CE
B&W-L-LP
A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 561384 October 2022 10:27:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4Primary containment
Reactor Building Ventilation
The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for invalid actuations of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). At approximately 0628 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on August 6, 2022, an invalid actuation of group 6 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) (i.e., containment atmospheric control/monitoring and post accident sampling isolation valves) occurred. The group 6 isolation signal resulted from the reactor building ventilation radiation monitor `A' channel exceeding the setpoint value. This condition recurred at approximately 1305 EDT on August 12, 2022. In both instances, the `B' channel, located in the same plenum, remained steady and below the setpoint value through the entire event. This, along with readings made by radiation protection technicians, confirmed that there were no actual high radiation conditions in the reactor building exhaust in either instance. Following each invalid actuation, upon returning unit 2 reactor building ventilation to service, the `A' channel readings returned to be consistent with the `B' channel. It was determined that these invalid actuations likely resulted from degradation of circuit components associated with the radiation monitor. The `A' channel radiation monitor was replaced on September 22, 2022. During these two events, the PCIVs functioned successfully and the actuations were complete. The actuations were not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, they were not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, these events have been determined to be invalid actuations. These events did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.
ENS 561361 October 2022 00:08:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CE
B&W-L-LP
A supplemental supervisor violated the station's FFD policy. The individuals access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
ENS 5613530 September 2022 17:13:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1608 (EDT) on September 30, 2022, it was discovered that both trains of the chemical volume and control system were simultaneously inoperable due to an unisolable piping flaw inside containment detected during plant pressurization in preparation for startup following a refueling outage. St. Lucie Unit 2 was not affected and remains at 100 percent power. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM RICHARD ROGERS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1155 EDT ON 11/11/2022 * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 09/30/2022 at 1713 EDT (EN 56135). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring both trains of U1 Chemical and Volume Control System inoperable due to a piping flaw detected during plant pressurization in preparation for startup following a refueling outage. Subsequent to the initial report, FPL (Florida Power and Light) has concluded that the flaw identified in line 2"-CH-109 did not exceed (with sufficient margin) the allowable axial flaw size utilizing the ASME Code Case N-869 methodology, and the Chemical and Volume Control System was operable but degraded for the period of concern. Therefore, this event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER) per 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 5612826 September 2022 22:39:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1741 EDT on September 26, 2022, it was discovered that both trains of the chemical volume and control system were simultaneously inoperable due to an unisolable piping flaw detected during plant pressurization in preparation for startup following refueling outage. St. Lucie Unit 2 was not affected and remains at 100 percent power. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM RICHARD ROGERS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1155 EST ON 11/11/2022 * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 09/26/2022 at 2239 EDT (EN 56128). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring both trains of U1 Chemical and Volume Control System inoperable due to a piping flaw detected during plant pressurization in preparation for startup following a refueling outage. Subsequent to the initial report, FPL (Florida Power and Light) has concluded that the flaw identified in line 2"-CH(1)104 did not exceed (with sufficient margin) the allowable axial flaw size utilizing the ASME Code Case N-869 methodology, and the Chemical and Volume Control System was Operable but degraded for the period of concern. Therefore, this event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER) per 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 5612726 September 2022 21:16:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On September 26, 2022, at approximately 1100 Mountain Standard Time, a Reactor Operator's test results were confirmed positive for use of a controlled substance following a random Fitness For Duty (FFD) screening test and it was determined that the individual violated the station's FFD Policy. The individual's unescorted access has been terminated in accordance with station procedures. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The licensee will conduct an investigation of the individual's work history.
ENS 5612026 September 2022 06:39:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5Reactor Protection System
Main Condenser
Manual ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax email: At 0238 CDT on 9/26/2022 with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor manually tripped due to a reported fire on the isophase bus duct. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip with the exception of the 2A reactor protection system power supply, which tripped and power was transferred to the alternate source. The fire was reported extinguished at 0240 CDT on 9/26/2022. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Operations responded using the emergency operating procedure LGA-001 and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 is not affected. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5611926 September 2022 05:41:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1GE-4Reactor Protection System
Main Steam Isolation Valve
Control Rod

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0001 EDT on September 26, 2022, James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) removed the generator from service as part of a planned shutdown for refueling. At 0306 EDT, with the mode switch in Startup/Hot Standby and inserting rods, JAF experienced a spurious Scram and closure of seven out of eight main steam isolation valves (MSIV's). The reactor protection system (RPS) actuated during the event, resulting in all control rods being fully inserted. The cause of the closure of MSIV's and the Scram is being investigated. This condition is being reported as a four-hour NRC report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation, and as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the safety system actuation based on the multiple main steam isolation valves closing on an isolation signal. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/4/22 AT 2047 EDT FROM ANDREW WEAVER TO KERBY SCALES * * *

The following update was provided by the licensee via email: This Event Notification is being updated to clarify that the reactor was not critical when this event occurred. Therefore, the reporting requirement is changed from 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) for Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation along with Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) system actuation. An analysis of reactor criticality was performed for the period of time prior to the RPS actuation event. Operators were inserting control rods per the shutdown Reactivity Management Plan. The Intermediate Radiation Monitoring (IRM) readings preceding the scram signal demonstrate a negative reactivity direction without control rod movement. The analysis concluded that the reactor was subcritical when RPS was actuated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Young).

ENS 5611819 September 2022 19:29:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At approximately 1520 CDT on September 19, 2022, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) requested transport for treatment of a non-responsive individual, a contract employee, to an offsite medical facility. The offsite medical facility notified GGNS at approximately 1630 CDT that the individual had been declared deceased. The fatality was not work-related, and the individual was outside of the Radiological Control Area. This is a four-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) related to the notification of a government agency. The contractor's employee will be notifying the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5611719 September 2022 12:49:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On September 19, 2022, a non-licensed supervisor violated the station's FFD policy. The employee's unescorted access at South Texas has been terminated. This event was determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii). The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5611619 September 2022 08:37:00River BendNRC Region 4GE-6Service water
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
High Pressure Core Spray
The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0132 CDT on September 19, 2022, River Bend Station (RBS) was operating at 100% power when the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system was declared inoperable in accordance with technical specification 3.8.9, condition E (declare HPCS and standby service water system pump 2C inoperable immediately) due to a E22-S003, HPCS transformer feeder malfunction. The HPCS is a single train system at RBS, therefore this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfilment of a safety function. The reactor core isolation cooling system has been verified to be operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: RBS has entered a 14-day limiting condition for operation due to the loss of HPCS and they have upgraded their on-line plant risk model to "yellow".
ENS 5611217 September 2022 13:06:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the Southern Nuclear Company via email: At 2257 EDT on 09/16/2022, it was determined that there was a programmatic vulnerability of the Fleet FFD program. Specifically, it was determined that some individuals were not placed into the follow-up pool for additional screening when required by the program. All identified personnel were in the random FFD pool, and were subject to the behavioral observation program. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(4) for all Units and 10CFR26.417(b)(1) for Vogtle Units 3&4. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. See EN#s 56113, 56114, and 56115.
ENS 5611417 September 2022 13:06:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by Southern Nuclear Company via email: At 2257 EDT on 09/16/2022, it was determined that there was a programmatic vulnerability of the Fleet FFD program. Specifically, it was determined that some individuals were not placed into the follow-up pool for additional screening when required by the program. All identified personnel were in the random FFD pool, and were subject to the behavioral observation program. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(4) for all Units and 10CFR26.417(b)(1) for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. See EN#s 56112, 56113, and 56115.
ENS 5611317 September 2022 13:06:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4The following information was provided by the Southern Nuclear Company via email: At 2257 EDT on 09/16/2022, it was determined that there was a programmatic vulnerability of the Fleet FFD program. Specifically, it was determined that some individuals were not placed into the follow-up pool for additional screening when required by the program. All identified personnel were in the random FFD pool, and were subject to the behavioral observation program. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(4) for all Units and 10CFR26.417(b)(1) for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. See EN#s 56112, 56114, and 56115.
ENS 5611517 September 2022 13:06:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following information was provided by the Southern Nuclear Company via email: At 2257 EDT on 09/16/2022, it was determined that there was a programmatic vulnerability of the Fleet FFD program. Specifically, it was determined that some individuals were not placed into the follow-up pool for additional screening when required by the program. All identified personnel were in the random FFD pool, and were subject to the behavioral observation program. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(4) for all Units and 10CFR26.417(b)(1) for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. See EN#s 56112, 56113, and 56114.
ENS 5610814 September 2022 21:43:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: With Unit 2 in Mode 5 and cooling down for a scheduled maintenance outage, Operations was bypassing safety injection and safety injection bypass sensor modules per procedure. Due to a human performance issue, a safety injection actuation signal was generated. All equipment operated as expected. Operations has reset the safety injection actuation signal and restored the equipment to its required condition. Unit 1 was at 100 percent power and unaffected by this issue. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
ENS 560957 September 2022 15:06:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. Unescorted access for the individual has been denied at all Dominion Energy sites.
ENS 560947 September 2022 15:06:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSteam Generator
Auxiliary Feedwater
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #12 actuation and isolation of the Steam Generator Blowdown for 'A', 'B' and 'C' Steam Generators. Per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), the telephone notification is made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation. On 7/28/2022 at 1705 CDT, the Unit 1 Control Room received alarm SPQD0183 'SG LO-LO LVL TRN B ACT' and actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #12 and isolation of the Steam Generator Blowdown for 'A', 'B' and 'D' Steam Generators. This event was classified as an unplanned entry into Technical Specification Shutdown LCO equal to or less than 24 hours 'Simple Restoration', due to the availability of CRMP. This alarm occurred several times and with each occurrence the alarm was short lived (1 second or less). Operations placed Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #12 in the Pull-To-Lock position to prevent starting of the pump with each alarm occurrence. During troubleshooting it was determined that SSPS Logic 'R' train was generating the intermittent alarm condition. A Logic board and a Safeguard Driver board were replaced which was identified as the possible cause. Operations performed applicable sections of the Logic test to ensure SSPS 'R' train operable. The event had no effects/consequences on the unit. The Logic board and Safeguard Driver board in SSPS 'R' train were both replaced as the possible causes, and therefore both boards were sent to Westinghouse to determine which board was at fault. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 560916 September 2022 03:00:00Comanche PeakNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSteam Generator
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Condenser
Automatic ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2345 CDT, Unit 1 Reactor tripped due to a turbine trip. All auxiliary feedwater pumps started due to steam generator Lo Lo levels. Unit 1 is being maintained in Hot Standby (Mode 3) in accordance with Integrated Plant Operating Procedure IPO-007A. The Emergency Response Guideline procedure has been exited. Decay heat is being rejected to the main condenser via steam dump valves. The cause of the Turbine Trip is currently under investigation. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 is unaffected by this event.
ENS 560894 September 2022 21:31:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5Feedwater
Shutdown Cooling
Control Rod
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: On September 4, 2022 with Unit 2 in Mode 3, an (Reactor Protection System) RPS actuation and Containment Isolation occurred on (Reactor Pressure Vessel) RPV Low Level (Level 3) of 159.3 inches due to issues with the normal feedwater level control system during plant cooldown. The RPS actuation occurred with control rods already inserted and a containment isolation on Level 3. The containment isolation signal impacted (Residual Heat Removal) RHR Shutdown Cooling, RHR letdown to radwaste, and RHR sampling. All impacted valves were closed at the time the isolation occurred. Operators took manual control of RPV level and restored level to the normal operating band shortly after the low level was received. This is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 560884 September 2022 20:30:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1939 EDT, the North Anna Power Station Units 1/2 declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) under emergency declaration HU1.1 confirmed security event. Both units were unaffected by the event. The licensee exited the NOUE at 2036 EDT.