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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5545510 September 2021 14:45:00Three Mile IslandNRC Region 1B&W-L-LPThis is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of another government agency. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and 10 CFR 72.75(b)(2). At 1055 EDT on 9/10/21, an employee of a site contractor that was performing work under a contract and in possession of the immediate area where the work was being performed, was involved in a material handling accident in the owner controlled area at Three Mile Island. Londonderry Township EMS and Fire responded to render assistance to the individual. Upon arrival to the site, medical personnel declared the individual deceased. The fatality was work related and the individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area.
ENS 5542724 August 2021 16:51:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1GE-4During an extent of condition review of DC control circuits, it was identified there are additional unprotected DC control circuits which are routed between separate Appendix R fire areas. A postulated fire in one area can cause a short circuit and potentially result in secondary fires or cable fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures degrade the degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains and are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory actions for affected fire areas have been implemented. Design modifications in the affected control circuits are being developed and will be scheduled to correct this condition.
ENS 5541318 August 2021 01:07:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 0024 EDT on 8/18/21, an unusual event was declared (EAL HU 4.1) due to receipt of multiple fire alarms and halon discharge in the cable tunnel. At 0036, the fire brigade verified no signs of fire. Unit 1 remained at 100 percent power and stable. The area is currently being ventilated. Unit 2 was not affected by this event. The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. R1 Public Affairs (Screnci) was notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT KLINDWORTH TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0414 EDT ON 8/18/21 * * *

At 0401 EDT, Beaver Valley terminated their notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that there was no indication of fire. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified State and local authorities. Notified R1DO (Jackson), IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Felts), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5538428 July 2021 16:30:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5537021 July 2021 20:50:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1826 EDT on July 21, 2021, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to a trip of the Main Turbine. Unit 1 reactor was operating at 100 percent reactor power with no evolutions in progress. The Control Room received indication of a Main Turbine trip with both divisions of RPS (Reactor Protection System) actuated and all control rods inserted. The Reactor Recirculation Pumps tripped on EOC-RPT (end of cycle recirculation pump trip). Reactor water level lowered to +8 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. No ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) or RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system) actuations occurred. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using Reactor Feed Water. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3 with main condenser available. Investigation into the trip of the Main Turbine is in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA will be made. This event requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).
ENS 5536319 July 2021 18:27:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5On July 19, 2021 at 1316 EDT, an individual experienced a non-work related medical emergency. The onsite fire brigade and emergency medical technicians administered first aid, but the individual was unresponsive. The individual was transported to the local hospital. At 1458 EDT, the local hospital notified the station that the individual was deceased. The individual was outside of the radiological controlled area and was not contaminated.
ENS 553458 July 2021 20:07:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4This 60-Day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. On May 13, 2021, during the restoration of the Unit 2 Refuel Floor High Radiation Isolation Logic an invalid isolation signal was received. The condition requiring an isolation signal was verified not to be present prior to restoring the logic; however, it was not recognized that a previous isolation signal was latched in and had not been reset. When the isolation logic was restored, the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolated on the invalid signal. The systems successfully completed the isolation per the plant design and plant configuration. The following systems actuated due to the Unit 2 PCIS Group 6C Isolation: - Isolation of Containment Hydrogen and Oxygen Sampling Valves, - Start of the 2A Reactor Enclosure Recirculation System, - Trip of the Units 1 and 2 Refuel Floor HVAC, - Start of the A and B Trains of Standby Gas Treatment Systems. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5526117 May 2021 13:12:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4

(Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station declared an unusual event due to a) "receipt of a single fire alarm in the Unit 2 drywell and the existence of the fire not verified in less than 30 minutes of alarm receipt." The NRC Resident Inspector and State and Local Authorities were notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 5/17/21 AT 1423 EDT FROM BRETT HENRY TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

At 1355 EDT, the licensee terminated the notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that the smoke has dissipated and there were no signs of fire. The licensee notified State and Local Authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Grieves), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD MOC (Grant). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), FEMA NRCC THD (email) and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 6/8/2021 AT 1249 EDT FROM JAMES BROWN TO DONALD NORWOOD * * *

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station is retracting notification EN 55261, 'Peach Bottom - Unusual Event,' based on the following additional information not available at the time of the notification: Following a Unit 2 drywell inspection, analysis of temperature data, and evaluation of equipment in operation; it was concluded that a fire did not exist. The smoke's most likely apparent cause was the result of heating residual oil/grease in the drywell. Peach Bottom reported the condition and entry into the UE initially based on the available information at the time and to ensure timeliness with emergency declaration and reporting notification requirements. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Ferdas).

ENS 5522430 April 2021 07:38:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4On 4/29/21 at 2354 (EDT), an alarm was received for U2 HPCI Inverter Power Failure. (It was) identified that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) flow controller had lost power due to a failure of an inverter. Without the flow controller, HPCI would not auto start to mitigate the consequences of an accident; thus, HPCI was declared inoperable. All other emergency core cooling systems and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. HPCI is a single train system with no redundant equipment in the same system; therefore, this failure is reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(d). The NRC Resident has been informed of this notification.
ENS 5520221 April 2021 09:45:00PilgrimNRC Region 1GE-3On April 21, 2021, at 0752 hours (EDT), an offsite notification was made to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MADEP) in accordance with Regulation 310 CMR 40.0000: Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP). The notification documents non-radiological contaminants found above reportable concentrations in select samples collected during site characterization efforts. The reported reportable concentrations were slightly above reporting limits in a soil sample for Per and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS), two groundwater sampling locations for PFAS, and isolated instances of metals in groundwater including Arsenic, Vanadium, Lead, Antimony, Beryllium, Cadmium, Chromium, Nickel, and Thallium. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) based on notification being made to another government agency. Concentrations above reporting limits have been entered into the site's corrective action program. As per MCP, the site will proceed with requirements to implement the phased MCP process. This condition does not represent a threat to station personnel or to members of the general public.
ENS 5514822 March 2021 13:16:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1005 EDT on 3/22/2021, the control room was notified of a personal medical event in the Radiologically Controlled Area. An ambulance entered Susquehanna plant property at 1019 and exited at 1028 to transport the individual to a local hospital. Ambulance did not enter the Protected Area. The individual was considered potentially contaminated since a complete frisk could not be performed prior to transport. Following transportation to a local hospital, Radiation Protection (RP) technicians confirmed the individual and ambulance were not contaminated. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii). An Event of Potential Public Interest (EPPI) was made to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) due to an emergency vehicle accessing plant property. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5514721 March 2021 23:57:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEAt 2216 EDT on 3/21/2021, Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 was manually tripped from 37 percent power due to lowering level in the 21 Steam Generator. All systems responded per design. Main Feedwater was secured and Auxiliary Feedwater was manually initiated. The Site Senior Resident has been notified. The cause of the lowering level in the 21 Steam Generator is under investigation.
ENS 5513713 March 2021 01:11:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2On March 12, 2021, at 2102 (EST), Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP) 13 tripped. The cause for the trip is under investigation. Following the RRP trip, the Average Power Ranger Monitors (APRMs) flow bias trips are inoperable due to reverse flow through RRP 13. The APRMs were restored to operable on March 12, 2021, at 2110 (EST) when the RRP 13 Discharge Blocking Valve was closed. This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) which states: 'Licensee shall notify the NRC of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5513412 March 2021 12:12:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEA licensed operator had a confirmed positive alcohol test during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified.
ENS 551289 March 2021 08:08:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 0313 EST on March 9th, 2021, during performance of Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) valve exercising, the inboard vacuum breaker isolation valve did not stroke closed as expected, but remained mid-position. The affected penetration of primary containment was isolated by closing the outboard HPCI vacuum breaker isolation valve. This results in an unplanned inoperability of the Unit 1 HPCI system. This is being reported as a loss of an entire safety function condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Unit 1 is in a 14-day LCO for Tech Spec 3.5.1(d), HPCI inoperability. Tech Spec 3.6.1.3(a), Containment Penetration Valve, was completed with closing the outboard HPCI vacuum breaker isolation valve. The Units are in a normal offsite power line-up.
ENS 551224 March 2021 04:00:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEAt time 0323 (EST) on March 04, 2021, it was determined that the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary did not meet the acceptance criteria under ASME, Section XI IWB-3600, "Analytical Evaluation of Flaws." This condition will be resolved prior to plant start up. This event is being reported as an eight hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 5510617 February 2021 11:30:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5
GE-2
A new, not qualified security officer self reported illegal drug use and resigned following a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC resident inspectors and R1 security inspector were notified.
ENS 5507118 January 2021 17:31:00PilgrimNRC Region 1GE-3On January 18, 2021 at 1600 hours (EDT), Holtec Decommissioning International (HDI) made an off-site notification to the Environmental Protection Agency's Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Division in accordance with Section B of the station's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit No. 0003557. The event was associated with an underground sewage water system holding tank. The specific details of the occurrence are as follows: On January 13, 2021 at 1000 hours (EDT) site personnel identified what appeared to be water bubbling up from an unidentified cover within the security protected area of the site. The water emanating from the cap had no visible color or solid material and no odor. The water estimated at 25 gallons per hour or less was flowing to a site storm drain connected to permitted outfall number 007. Initial indication was that the water was potable water as part of the station's fire protection system. Further investigation determined that a back-up in an underground sewage holding tank inlet was the source of the leakage. By 1400 hours (EDT) when bathrooms including toilets on site were shutdown and removed from service, efforts were underway to pump the tank and remove the blockage, and the bubbling from the cover had stopped. The licensee has notified the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Agency, the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5502610 December 2020 10:58:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with paragraphs 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid actuation of the 'B' train High Head Safety Injection Pump (3SIH*P1B), the 'B' train Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump (3RHS*P1B) and four Steam Generator Blowdown Containment isolation valves at Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3. At 1908 EST on November 6, 2020, with Unit 3 in Mode 3, a partial invalid actuation of 'B' train Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) components occurred. The 'B' train SIH pump and the 'B' train RHS pump had started, and ran successfully on recirculation. Four Steam Generator Blowdown Containment isolation valves also closed. Due to this condition the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator and the 'B' Emergency Generator Load Sequencer (EGLS) were declared inoperable and the required Technical Specification action statements were entered. Troubleshooting determined that this actuation was caused by a failure of one of the circuit boards in the 'B' train EGLS that caused a partial 'B' train 'SIS only' signal. Other 'B' Train components received the 'SIS only' signal but did not start because they were already running or were a backup to an already running component. Troubleshooting discovered a failed NAND gate on the 'B' Train EGLS XA93 circuit card. The card was replaced, retested, and the Technical Specification action statements were exited. The pumps and valves responded in accordance with plant design. No other equipment was affected during this event. There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into the station's corrective action program. The actuation was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for an ECCS actuation. Therefore, this is considered an invalid actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 550203 December 2020 17:10:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEAt 0923 EST on December 3, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the Emergency AC Electrical Power System (Emergency Diesel Generator 1A) occurred during normal plant operations. The reason for Emergency Diesel Generator 1A auto start was due to Class 1E 4KV Bus 11 feeder breaker opening. The Emergency Diesel Generator 1A automatically started as designed when the loss of voltage signal on 4KV Bus 11 was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency AC Electrical Power System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the 4KV Bus 11 Feeder Breaker opening is unknown at the present time and is under investigation.
ENS 5500016 November 2020 12:13:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4During normal plant start up on Limerick Unit 1, reactor pressure was raised above 200 psig prior to unisolating the Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection system (HPCI) which remained inoperable. Per TS 3.5.1, HPCI is required to be operable in Mode 2 above 200 psig. HPCI has since been restored to operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5499613 November 2020 05:32:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4At 0245 EST on November 13, 2020, the Limerick Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed on a valid Reactor High Pressure signal (1096psig). The Reactor High Pressure signal was caused by the closure of the 1B Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), causing reactor pressure to rise, exceeding the Reactor Protection System (RPS) setpoint of 1096psig. The shutdown was normal and the plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with normal pressure control via the Main Steam Bypass Valves to the Main Condenser and normal level control using the Feedwater System. The closure of the 1B Inboard MSIV appears to have been caused by a loss of Primary Containment Instrument Gas (PCIG) pneumatic supply to the valve. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be notifying Berks, Chester, and Montgomery Counties, as well as the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 549888 November 2020 10:10:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CE
Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

Millstone Units 2 & 3 declared an Unusual Event at 0921 EST after an earthquake was felt onsite. The earthquake monitoring instrumentation did not actuate, and there were no station system actuations. No damage has been detected at this time. Millstone has initiated their Abnormal Operating Procedure for an earthquake and performing station walkdowns. The State of Massachusetts has been notified. The Waterford Police and U.S. Coast Guard have contacted the station. The NRC resident has been notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/09/2020 AT 0715 EST FROM JASON HARRIS TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

At 1510 EST on November 8, 2020, Millstone Units 2 & 3 exited the Unusual Event due to the earthquake following plant walkdowns that revealed no damage to plant structures, systems, or components. Station and System walkdowns identified no issues due to the earthquake. Millstone notified the State and local authorities, and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (DeFrancisco), IRD (Grant), NRR (Nieh), R1RA (Lew), NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 549793 November 2020 08:00:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CE

At 0011 EST on 11/03/20, it was discovered that BOTH trains of salt water were simultaneously INOPERABLE. While in a planned (limiting condition for operation) LCO window with the 21 salt water train INOPERABLE for post-maintenance testing, debris intrusion in the 22 salt water header rendered the redundant salt water train INOPERABLE. Due to this INOPERABILITY, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). One train of salt water was restored to operable at time 0026 EST. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event did not affect Unit 1.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 11/20/2020 AT 1218 EST FROM BRIAN FOVEAUX TO OSSY FONT * * *

Following the eight hour 10 CFR 50.72 notification made on 11/03/2020 (EN 54979), further engineering analysis determined that 22 Saltwater subsystem flow remained at levels sufficient to fulfill its safety function based on the conditions existing at the time of the event. Despite flow in 22 Saltwater subsystem falling below the short term (four hour) minimum value for approximately 15 minutes, engineering analysis was able to determine the increased heat removal capacity associated with the lower bay temperatures was sufficient to offset the reduced heat removal capacity associated with the lower 22 Saltwater subsystem flow. This demonstrated that actual heat transfer to the saltwater subsystem was sufficient to ensure all safety functions were fulfilled during the event. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), (B) and (D). The NRC Resident has been informed. Notified R1DO (Greives)

ENS 5497129 October 2020 15:12:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4At 1030 EDT on Thursday, October 29, 2020, during the performance of Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station leakage testing of the reactor pressure vessel and associated piping, a through-wall leak (non-isolable) was identified on an instrument line connected to the N16A nozzle. The reactor will be maintained shutdown until pipe repairs and testing are complete. The NRC resident inspector has been informed.
ENS 549272 October 2020 12:35:00MillstoneNRC Region 1At 0945 hours (EDT) on 10/02/2020, with Millstone Unit 3 in Mode 4, Operations discovered a door in the Secondary Containment boundary blocked open. Investigation determined the door was blocked open at 1842 (EDT) on 10/01/2020, rendering Secondary Containment inoperable. The door was closed at 1002 ((EDT) on 10/02/2020), restoring Secondary Containment to operable status. Since Secondary Containment was rendered inoperable, Dominion Energy is reporting this as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being reported as an eight hour report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) and (D). There was no release of radioactivity to the public. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. With the door blocked open, the plant was in a 24-hour shutdown action statement. The state of Connecticut and local towns were notified.
ENS 5491728 September 2020 05:02:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1

EN Revision Imported Date : 10/12/2020 LOSS OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE: This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the planned maintenance affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Planned maintenance activities are being performed on 09/28/20 to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work includes replacement of supply fan and roof-top unit. Work is scheduled to complete on 10/11/20. If an emergency is declared requiring PBAPS TSC activation during this period, the PBAPS TSC will be staffed and activated using existing Emergency Preparedness (EP) procedures. If the PBAPS TS becomes uninhabitable due to radiological, or other conditions, the TSC Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with EP procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee.

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/9/20 AT 1234 EDT FROM BRIAN BAILEY TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

An eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability was made on 9/28/20 under Event Notification 54917 for planned maintenance activities to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. This event was reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the planned maintenance affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. This update to EN 54917 is to notify applicable stakeholders that, following satisfactory completion of the planned supply fan and roof-top unit replacement work, the PBAPS TSC ventilation system has been returned to service with no remaining work or outstanding deficiencies related to this work. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Lally).

ENS 5491325 September 2020 15:28:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5489510 September 2020 16:09:00PilgrimNRC Region 1A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's rights to access the plant have been suspended. The licensee notified the NRC Region I Decommissioning Lead Inspector.
ENS 548741 September 2020 14:48:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1The following is a synopsis of information received from the licensee: On March 6, 2020, while at zero percent power and in Cold Shutdown - Mode 4, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) determined through surveillance testing that three Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) did not meet their Technical Specification closure time. The cause of the MSIV failures has been determined to be delayed Air Pack response. The delay was caused by a buildup of corrosion product and waxy foreign material believed to be dried pipe thread sealant or O-ring assembly lube that accumulated on the internal surfaces of the Air Pack during refurbishment by the vendor Trillium (previously Hiller). The following is action taken or planned to be taken to prevent recurrence: A note will be added to the procurement requirement evaluation form and purchase order for MSIV Air Pack refurbishments to minimize use of O-ring lubricant and thread sealant to limit likelihood of capturing foreign material on Air Pack valve internals. The Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) component function identifier and system name of each component or system referred to above is: Component - Main Steam Isolation Valves, Air Pack. IEEE 803 Function Identifier - VOP. IEEE805 System Identification - SB. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. For further information contact: Todd Tierney Plant Manager Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Exelon Generation Company, LLC Brandon Shultz Site Regulatory Assurance Manager Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (315) 349-7012 .
ENS 5482911 August 2020 20:22:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1At 1334 EDT on Tuesday August 11th, the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System lost power due to a trip of the Station Blackout (SBO) electric power supply breaker. The trip was due to a fault at the Conowingo Dam and Conowingo was not able to realign electric power to the SBO within an hour. Power restoration is complete and TSC Ventilation was restored at 1725 EDT. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities due to a reduction in the effectiveness of the Onsite Technical Support Center (TSC). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 548206 August 2020 13:10:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1This report is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an automatic actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. Because the actuation was invalid, this 60-day telephone notification is being made instead of a written LER (licensee event report), in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). On 06/08/2020, at approximately 0424 EDT, a trip of the Unit 3 'A' reactor protection system (RPS) MG-Set resulted in a partial activation of the primary containment isolation system and inboard containment isolation valves closed in multiple systems. All affected Group III containment isolation valves were verified to be closed. It was determined that the normal power supply for the Unit 3 'A' RPS had failed. Power was transferred from the normal to the alternate source and the RPS 'A' channel was reset. Investigation determined that the 3A RPS MG Set motor contactor coil winding had failed due to an internal short circuit. The motor contactor has been replaced. The containment isolation was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for containment isolation. Therefore, this is considered to be an invalid actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
ENS 548164 August 2020 22:43:00MillstoneNRC Region 1

EN Revision Imported Date : 8/20/2020 BOTH SERVICE WATER HEADERS DECLARED INOPERABLE On 8/4/20, at 1745 EDT, Millstone Unit 2 entered technical specification (TS) 3.0.3 due to both service water headers being declared inoperable because strainer differential pressures (D/Ps) were greater than 9 psid. The high service water strainer D/P was the result of heavy debris impingement caused by tropical storm Isaias. To reduce heat loads and service water flow, Unit 2 reduced power to 75 percent. One service water header was restored to operable at 1816 EDT, at which time TS 3.0.3 was exited. At 1843 EDT both service water headers were declared operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 8/19/2020 AT 1141 EDT FROM ERIC DONCH TO KIRBY SCALES * * *

The purpose of this call is to retract a report made on August 4, 2020, NRC Event Number EN 54816 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) in which both trains of service headers were declared inoperable due to service water strainer differential pressures greater than 9 psid. The condition was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), (B) and (D) via an 8 hour prompt report as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Upon further review, MPS2 determined that there was no loss of safety function. An engineering evaluation supports the conclusion that a strainer differential pressure of 16 psid would not challenge the system flow distribution during worst case conditions. The evaluation also demonstrates that flowrates on both headers were observed to be unaffected during the timeframe of the high strainer differential pressure conditions. Therefore, both service water headers would have provided the required flows to perform their safety function. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number EN 54816 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion has been provided to the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Greives).

ENS 5474918 June 2020 20:37:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1On June 18, 2020, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 determined that leakage from an outside out-of-service liquid waste pipe that is within a radiologically controlled area contains several isotopes. Analysis indicates greater than 2,000 picoCuries per liter of tritium, and isotopes of Mn-54, Co-58, Co-60, and Cs-137 are above the lower limit of detection. At 1725 EDT, in accordance with site procedures and NEI 07-07, 'Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative,' notification to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was planned. At 1930 EDT notification to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was completed. The leak is currently contained. The leakage did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a planned notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 547406 June 2020 12:25:00SeabrookNRC Region 1At 0920 (EDT), with the unit in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to group 1 of control rod bank 'B' fully inserting into the core. All systems responded normally post trip. Operations has stabilized the plant in mode 3 at NOP/NOT (normal operating pressure and temperature). Decay heat removal is being accomplished via the steam dumps in the steam pressure mode to the main condenser. Emergency feedwater actuated due to low low steam generator level as expected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) The senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The plant response to the trip was uncomplicated. All safe shutdown equipment is available. There were no reliefs or safeties actuated during the transient. The licensee manually tripped eight days ago for the same condition. See EN #54731.
ENS 547385 June 2020 10:39:00MillstoneNRC Region 1

EN Revision Imported Date : 10/6/2020 CONTROL ROOM BOUNDARY DOOR FAILURE On June 5, 2020, at 0320 (EDT) a loss of control room envelope (CRE) was declared inoperable due to failure of door 204-36-007. The door was repaired at 0322 (EDT), restoring the CRE to operable. The NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local authorities were notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 07/09/2020 AT 1443 EDT FROM GERALD A. BAKER TO OSSY FONT * * *

The purpose of this call is to retract a report made on June 5, 2020, NRC Event Number EN54738. NRC Event Report number EN54738 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) in which a control room envelope boundary door was discovered to not be able to fully close due to the latching mechanism being stuck in the extended position. The condition was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) via an 8 hour prompt report as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Upon further review, MPS2 determined that there was no loss of safety function. An engineering evaluation determined that even with the control room boundary door unable to be fully closed due to the latching mechanism being stuck in, the extended position, control room air in-leakage would not have been sufficient to prevent the control room emergency ventilation system from performing its safety function. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number EN54738 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion has been provided to the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis).

  • * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL GAGNON TO BRIAN P. SMITH AT 1444 EDT ON 10/01/2020 * * *

The purpose of this call is to provide an update to the retraction for a report made on June 5, 2020, NRC Event Number EN54738. The retraction being updated was made on 7/9/2020 at 1443 hours. NRC Event Report number EN54738 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) in which a control room envelope boundary door was discovered to not be able to fully close due to the latching mechanism being stuck in the extended position. The condition was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) via an 8 hour prompt report as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (the Control Room Envelope). A subsequent engineering evaluation of the conditions that existed at the time, determined that the inability of the control room boundary door to fully close due to the latching mechanism being stuck in the extended position did not have an adverse impact upon the ability of the CRE to perform its safety function. The CRE remained operable throughout this event, and the ventilation system would have performed its safety function. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number EN54738 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion has been provided to the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Lally).

ENS 5473129 May 2020 16:41:00SeabrookNRC Region 1At 1403 EDT, with the unit in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to Group 1 of Control Rod Bank 'B' unexpectedly inserting. All systems responded normally post-trip. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3 at 557 degrees Fahrenheit. Decay heat removal is being accomplished via the steam dumps in the steam pressure mode to the main condenser. Emergency feedwater actuated due to low low steam generator level as expected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR (b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5471615 May 2020 13:25:00SalemNRC Region 1At 0947 (EDT) on 5/15/20, Salem reported to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection a sheen on the Delaware River. This discovery did not violate any NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will be notifying the National Response Center and Lower Alloways Creek Township. The substance spilled was less than one pint of hydraulic oil.
ENS 546923 May 2020 22:28:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1On 5/3/2020 at 1100 EDT, Operations identified a step change in the Main Control Room ambient noise. The cause of the noise was a rise in vibrations on the Number 11 fan motor of the Main Control Room Ventilation Circulating Fan. Another step change in noise occurred and Operations swapped from the Number 11 fan motor to its redundant Number 12 fan motor, but the noise and vibrations did not improve. The two independent motors are connected to the blower shaft with belts on either end of the shaft. This entire fan and motor assembly is contained within the Main Control Room ventilation ducting and is not visible. At 1118 EDT, Operations shut off the Main Control Room Ventilation Circulating Fan due to Number 11 fan motor vibrations, declared the Main Control Room Air Treatment System inoperable, and entered the Technical Specification 3.4.5.e, 7-day action statement. At 1750 EDT, Maintenance entered the ductwork and informed Operations that the Number 11 fan bearing had catastrophically failed and because of the extent of damage and close physical proximity to the Number 12 fan motor, jeopardized its continued operation. As a result, Operations also declared the Number 12 fan motor inoperable and determined the event was reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 546913 May 2020 11:43:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1At 0821 EDT on May 3, 2020, the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to a trip of the Main Turbine. The Unit 1 reactor was operating at 76 percent reactor power following a ramp schedule to full power subsequent to a maintenance outage. The Control Room received indication of a Main Turbine trip with both divisions of the Reactor Protection System actuated and all control rods inserted. The Reactor Recirculation Pumps tripped on End of Cycle - Recirculation Pump Trip. Reactor water level lowered to -1 inch causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. No Emergency Core Cooling System or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling actuations occurred. The operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using Reactor Feed Water. No Steam Relief Valves opened. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Investigation into the trip of the Main Turbine is in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and press release will occur. This event requires a 4-hour Emergency Notification System (ENS) notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8-hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).
ENS 5468024 April 2020 07:00:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1At 0130 (EDT) on April 24, 2020, during the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 refueling outage, while performing examinations of the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that one penetration could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME Code Section XI. Penetration 37 will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indication was not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-4 to find potential flaws/indications before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5466313 April 2020 19:33:00MillstoneNRC Region 1At 1550 EDT on 4/13/2020, with Millstone Power Station Unit 3 operating at approximately 82 percent reactor power, an automatic reactor trip occurred following a turbine trip due to low condenser vacuum caused by the trip of multiple circulating water pumps. Due to the loss of the circulating water pumps, decay heat removal was established by the steam generator atmospheric dump valves. All other systems responded as expected to the trip. Auxiliary feedwater actuated automatically as expected following the trip due to low-low levels in the steam generators. There was no risk to the public. There was no impact to Millstone Unit 2. The Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. This event is being reported as a four hour report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as a condition that resulted in actuation of the reactor protection system while the reactor was critical, and as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) for actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. The licensee also notified the state of Connecticut, the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, and the city of Waterford.
ENS 5465710 April 2020 10:58:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1On April 10, 2020, at 0300 (EDT), an oil leak from 23PCV-12, HPCI (High Pressure Core Injection) Trip System Pressure Control Valve (PCV), resulted in the system being declared inoperable. This condition is being reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 546311 April 2020 19:11:00MillstoneNRC Region 1On April 1, 2020, at 1625 EDT, Milllstone Unit 3 was in Mode 1, at 100 percent power, when an automatic reactor trip occurred following a main generator trip. The cause was due to a circuit fault between the main generator breaker and the offsite switchyard. The reactor trip was not complicated and the reactor remains stable in Mode 3. One of the two offsite electrical sources remain inoperable with an investigation of the circuit fault underway. Decay heat removal is maintained by the main condenser. There was no effect on Unit 2. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The licensee notified State and local government agencies.
ENS 5460725 March 2020 03:30:00SalemNRC Region 1At 0056 EDTon March 25, 2020, with Unit 1 at 17 percent power during a unit power ascension, the reactor was manually tripped due to the failure of the 11 Rod Control Motor Generator caused by a malfunction of its associated Voltage Regulator. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. An actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system occurred following the manual reactor trip as expected due to low level in the steam generators. The unit is stable in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by the Atmospheric Steam Dumps and Auxiliary Feedwater System. Salem Unit 2 was not affected. Due to the actuation of the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), This event is also being reported as an eight hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified.
ENS 545695 March 2020 21:14:00SeabrookNRC Region 1On March 05, 2020, at 2100 EST, the site commenced a planned upgrade of the main plant computer system (MPCS). During this upgrade, the normal computer data will not be available to the emergency response facilities, but compensatory capabilities will be in place. The scheduled duration for the MPCS upgrade is 96 hours. Since the compensatory measures will be in place in excess of 72 hours, this condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 545624 March 2020 15:35:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1At 1205 EST, on March 4, 2020, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 initiated a manual reactor scram due to lowering Electrohydraulic Control System (EHC) level in the turbine control system. The cause of the lowering level was a leak in the EHC system piping. All control rods inserted. There were no safety system actuations. The cause of the EHC leak is being investigated. The NRC Resident has been notified. Additionally, the licensee notified the New York State Public Service Commission.
ENS 5453320 February 2020 15:04:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1(On February 20, 2020, at 1240 EST, the Licensee determined the following information:) This notification is in reference to reports EN 54130 and LER 2019-002, which were retracted. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant received additional information on the technical basis for the retraction. Further review, including testing of the terminal blocks, demonstrated that the short circuit current would result in heat levels in excess of cable insulation ratings. Unprotected DC control circuits for non-safety related DC motors are routed between separate fire areas. A postulated fire in one area can cause a short circuit and potentially result in secondary fires or cable fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures degrade the degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains and are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory actions per the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) for affected fire areas have been implemented. A modification to install fuses in the control circuits for 94P-2(M), 31P-7A(M), 31P-7B(M), and 94P-13(M) has been scheduled and shall correct this condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5452514 February 2020 03:36:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1At 0025 EST on February 14, 2020, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 reactor was manually scrammed due to rising Main Condenser backpressure caused by a loss of the Unit 2 Offgas Recombiner. Unit 2 reactor was being operated at maximum facility output, approximately 98% RTP, when at 0012 EST, Unit 2 Recombiner 0C145 Panel Trouble and 2C198 HWC Panel Trouble alarms were received along with rising Main Condenser backpressure. Initial Main Condenser backpressure was 2.6 in HgA and was rising at approximately 0.3 HgA/min. A Recirc Lim 2 was inserted to lower reactor power and condenser backpressure continued to rise following the reduction in reactor power. A manual scram was inserted at 0025 EST by placing the Mode Switch to Shutdown when condenser backpressure rose to 6 in HgA. All control rods inserted. Reactor water level lowered to -30 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolation and partial (Division 2) Level 2 (-38 inches) isolation. No ECCS actuations occurred and RCIC initiated. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using Reactor Feed Water. No steam relief valves opened. The Reactor Recirculation Pumps remained in service. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Investigation into the cause of the loss of Unit 2 recombiner is underway. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA and press release will occur.
ENS 5450331 January 2020 09:46:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1At 0555 (EST), on January 31, 2020, James A. FitzPatrick was at 38 percent power when an automatic scram occurred as a result of a main turbine trip on high Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level. The plant was at reduced power in preparation for maintenance activities. The 'A' Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) was being removed from service when a perturbation in reactor water level reached the high RPV water level setpoint. This resulted in a main turbine trip and 'B' RFP trip. The automatic scram inserted all control rods. A subsequent low water level resulted in a successful Group 2 isolation. The plant is stable in Mode 3 with the 'B' RFP maintaining RPV water level. The initiation of the reactor protection systems (RPS) due to the automatic scram signal at critical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The general containment Group 2 isolations are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and the State and Local government for the scram. Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser.