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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5595321 June 2022 16:52:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 1547 EDT on June 21, 2022, it was determined that Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 experienced a reportable chemical leak. Approximately 261 gallons of a Sodium Hypochlorite/Sodium Bromine mixture reached the ground and approximately 130.5 gallons (of the 261 gallons) progressed to the Ohio River (via storm drain). The source of the leakage has been isolated and absorbent material has been placed to contain the leakage. Following confirmation of this leakage, notifications were made to the following offsite agencies starting at 1615 EDT: National Response Center (Incident Report # 1339391) Pennsylvania Department Of Environmental Protection Beaver County Emergency Management This condition is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5594315 June 2022 09:47:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0724 EDT on 6/15/2022, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to lowering Steam Generator levels due to a secondary plant perturbation in the Heater Drain System. All control rods fully inserted into the core and the Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed in response to the full power reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Unit 2 is not affected and remains at 100 percent power and stable. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5590923 May 2022 21:01:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1716 hours EDT on May 23, 2022, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed. Unit 1 reactor was being operated at approximately 100 percent (Rated Thermal Power) RTP. The Control Room received indication that both divisions of (Reactor Protection System) RPS actuated from (Reactor Pressure Vessel) RPV high pressure signals and all control rods fully inserted. The Main Turbine bypass valves opened automatically to control reactor pressure. Reactor water level lowered to -42 inches causing Level 3 and Level 2 isolations. (High Pressure Coolant Injection) HPCI (Emergency Core Cooling System) ECCS actuation occurred as designed at -38 inches and injected to the Reactor Vessel. No other ECCS system actuations occurred. (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) RCIC automatically initiated as designed at -30 inches. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using Feedwater pumps. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation is in progress into the cause of the Automatic SCRAM. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to (Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency) PEMA will be made. This event requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) & 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
ENS 5589916 May 2022 19:51:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: Unit 2 experienced multiple electrical transients resulting in a Group I Primary Containment Isolation Signal (PCIS) isolation and subsequent unit reactor scram. Low reactor water level during the automatic scram caused PCIS Group II and III isolation signals. Following the PCIS Group I isolation, all main steam lines isolated. All control rods inserted and all systems operated as designed. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee via phone in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Peach Bottom Unit 2 automatically scrammed from 100 percent power due to an electrical transient and subsequent PCIS Group I isolation (Main Steam Isolation Valve closure). Unit 2 lost main feedwater due to the PCIS Group I isolation, however, all other systems responded as expected following the scram. High Pressure Coolant Injection is maintaining pressure control while Condensate Pumps are maintaining inventory. The unit is currently stable and in Mode 3. Peach Bottom Unit 3's Adjustable Speed Drives were impacted by the electrical transients and the unit reduced power to 98 percent power. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5589311 May 2022 18:12:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant is on hold in accordance with the licensee's fitness-for-duty policy. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5587129 April 2022 20:44:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1251 EDT on April 29, 2022, while troubleshooting the failure of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Exhaust Drain Pot High Level Alarm to clear, it was discovered that the High Pressure Coolant Injection exhaust line condensate drain system was not functioning as designed to support removal of condensate from the turbine exhaust. This resulted in some water accumulation in the turbine casing. Subsequently, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System was declared inoperable. As a result, this condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function at the time of discovery.
ENS 5584415 April 2022 11:31:00PilgrimNRC Region 1GE-3The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On April 15, 2022 at 1000 hours (EDT), four off-site notifications were made to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Environmental ÿProtection (MADEP) in accordance with the Massachusetts Contingency Plan (310 CMR 40.0000). ÿThe notifications document non-radiological contaminants found slightly above reportable concentrations in select soil and groundwater samples collected during site characterization efforts, as part of the decommissioning process, from four parcels of land at the property.ÿ ÿReportable concentrations in soil were identified in a composite sample for Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs). ÿReportable concentrations in groundwater were identified in samples for per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) and Semi Volatile Organic Compound (SVOC). Additionally, the reports include sample results where laboratory reporting limits equaled or exceeded reporting thresholds. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).ÿ There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Lead Decommissioning Inspector and NMSS Project Manager assigned to Pilgrim have been notified.
ENS 558215 April 2022 06:08:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone and email: On 4/5/2022, at time 0223, during maintenance on Feedwater Level Control Valve 2FWS-LV10B, a Feedwater transient occurred resulting in an RPS Automatic Reactor Scram on Low Level (Level 3, 159.3 inches). Following the scram, reactor water level dropped below Level 2 (108.8 inches) resulting in a Group 2 Recirculation Sample System Isolation, Group 3 TIP ((Traversing Incore Probe)) Isolation Valve Isolation, Group 6 and 7 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation and Group 9 Containment Purge Isolations. All control rods inserted as expected. High Pressure Core Spray and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling initiated and injected as expected. ECCS Systems have been secured and normal reactor pressure and level control has been established for hot shutdown. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3. These 4 hour and 8-hour non-emergency ENS ((Emergency Notification System)) reports are being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident was informed. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: There was no impact on Unit 1.
ENS 5580428 March 2022 14:55:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed employee possessed a prohibited substance (alcohol) within the Protected Area. The employee's access to the plant has been placed on hold pending results of an investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 556853 January 2022 17:01:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On January 3, 2022, a Licensed Reactor Operator violated the station's Fitness for Duty policy. The employee's unescorted access to Limerick Generating Station has been terminated in accordance with station procedures. The event was determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 556843 January 2022 15:58:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1223 (EST) on 01/03/2022, Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 automatically tripped from 100 percent power due to loss of electrical load. The cause is under investigation. The site Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: All rods inserted and decay heat is being removed via the condenser. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. There was no impact on Unit 1.
ENS 5561630 November 2021 16:22:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1254 EST on November 30, 2021, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed during Turbine Valve Cycling surveillance activities. Unit 1 reactor was being operated at approximately 80 percent rated thermal power with turbine valve cycling surveillance activities in progress. The Control Room received indication that both divisions of RPS (reactor protection system) actuated from turbine valve closure signals and all control rods fully inserted. The Main Turbine was manually tripped, and turbine bypass valves opened automatically to control reactor pressure. Reactor water level lowered to -35 inches causing Level 3 and Level 2 isolations. No ECCS (emergency core cooling systems) actuations occurred. RCIC (reactor core isolation cooling) automatically initiated as designed at -30 inches. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using Feedwater pumps and RCIC was placed in a standby lineup. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation is in progress into the cause of the turbine valve closure signals. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA (Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency) will be made. This event requires a 4-hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8-hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Unit 2 was not affected and remains at 100 percent power, Mode 1.
ENS 5560924 November 2021 20:24:00GinnaNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopThis 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report one invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Containment Isolation System Train "A" in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On October 17, 2021 at approximately 1358 (EDT), a DC breaker was opened to perform an inspection of a Containment Isolation (CI) rack. A CI signal was produced and resulted in a loss of Letdown during filling and venting the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) with the RCS at 344 psig. RCS pressure began to rise, and prompt actions were taken by the Control Room to secure a Charging Pump within 20 seconds. The RCS pressure rise continued and both Pressure Operated Relief Valves cycled at 409.9 psig as designed, lowering RCS pressure. The CI Train "A" was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of Train "A" Containment Isolation valves in more than one system. All valves functioned successfully. The DC breaker was closed, CI signal reset, and associated CI valves re-opened. All systems functioned as required and returned to normal service. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5560223 November 2021 09:10:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThis 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid specific system actuation. At 0907 (EDT) on September 30, 2021, with Unit 1 in Mode 1, at 100 percent power, an actuation of the 1-1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) occurred during loss of voltage relay functional testing. The 1-1 EDG auto-start was due to human error during performance of the test procedure when the bus 1AE undervoltage signal was improperly defeated and a simulated undervoltage signal was applied. No actual undervoltage condition was present during this event. The 1-1 EDG automatically started as designed when the bus undervoltage signal was received. This was a complete actuation of an EDG to start and come to rated speed, and all affected systems functioned as expected in response to the actuation. Following the actuation, the relays were restored and the 1-1 EDG was shut down in accordance with plant procedures. This event is considered an invalid system actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters and was not a manual initiation. Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this telephone notification is provided within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5559721 November 2021 14:28:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEAt 1046 EST on November 21, 2021, with Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to lowering levels in both steam generators following a loss of the 21 and 22 steam generator feed pumps. An Auxiliary Feedwater System actuation occurred to restore steam generator water levels. The trip was not complicated, with all systems responding normally. Decay heat is being removed by the Auxiliary Feedwater System. Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 is unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification. RPS actuation, per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification, Specific System Actuation, per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5559319 November 2021 00:50:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1GE-4On November 18, 2021, during the performance of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) surveillance testing, 23MOV-19 (HPCI PUMP DISCH TO REACTOR INBD ISOL VALVE) did not go open as expected while performing the sensed low water level portion of the test. The ability to manually open 23MOV-19 from the control room was unaffected as such, the HPCI system remained available for use. Failure of 23MOV-19 to open automatically prevents the HPCI system from performing its safety function as such this condition renders HPCI inoperable but available and is being reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). HPCI inoperable placed the licensee in a 14-day limiting condition for operation for Tech Spec 3.5.1.c. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5558617 November 2021 16:24:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1313 hours on November 17, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of the 21B Main Feedwater Pump (due to low suction pressure). The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed in response to the full power reactor trip. Additionally, the Main Steam Isolation Valves were manually closed to prevent excessive reactor coolant system cooldown. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the atmosphere using the Atmospheric Dump Valves. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power in Mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency Specific System Actuation per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 5557614 November 2021 17:06:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CEOn November 14, 2021, at 1150 EST, while operating in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the supply check valve from the Number 2 steam generator to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was determined during troubleshooting that it is not able to perform its isolation function. This failure would have resulted in the blowdown of both steam generators during a main steam line break in the Number 2 steam generator main steam line upstream of the main steam isolation valves until the operators could isolate the faulted steam generator. Previous evaluation has determined that this condition constituted an unanalyzed condition that could impact containment pressure. There has been no radioactive release to the environment. The steam lines from the steam generators to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump have been isolated by use of a motor operated valve in the discharge line of the Number 2 steam generator. There has been no impact to Unit 3 which remains at 100 percent power. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
ENS 5557514 November 2021 08:50:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4At 0525 EST, November 14, 2021, "Unit 2 was manually scammed by operations due to lowering main condenser vacuum. This resulted in PCIS (process control and instrumentation system) Group II/III isolation signals. All control rods inserted, and all systems operated as designed. Unit 3 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power in Mode 1. The Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5557212 November 2021 13:52:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1007 EST on November 12, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at approximately 17 percent power following a refueling outage, the reactor was manually tripped due to increasing steam generator water levels due to an oscillating Main Feedwater Pump Recirculation Valve. Additionally, the Main Steam Isolation Valves were manually closed to prevent excessive reactor coolant system cooldown. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the atmosphere using the Atmospheric Dump Valves. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power in Mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification, per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 555679 November 2021 13:33:00PilgrimNRC Region 1GE-3At 1040 hours EST, November 9, 2021, the site reported a violation of the station National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit. The 24-hour environmental report addressed an unauthorized discharge of 7,245 gallons of non-radiological water that was pumped into a storm drain to de-water an on-site electrical vault located outside of the protected area. This discharge occurred from 0800 to 1230 hours on November 8, 2021. Sampling and analysis of the vault water is in progress to assess for the presence of pollutants. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection.
ENS 555656 November 2021 13:03:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CEDuring a Unit 2 refueling outage valve overhaul activity on the steam supply check valve from the number 2 steam generator to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, 2-MS-4B, the check valve was found with its disc separated from the disc arm. This failure would have resulted in the blowdown of both steam generators during a main steam line break in the steam generator number 2 main steam line upstream of the main steam isolation valves until the operators could isolate the faulted steam generator. On November 6, at approximately 1100 EDT evaluation determined that this condition constituted an unanalyzed condition that could impact containment pressure. There has been no radioactive release to the environment. The valve has been repaired. The check valve in the steam supply from the number 1 steam generator to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was inspected and found to be satisfactory. There has been no impact to Unit 3 which remains at 100% power. The Senior Resident has been notified. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
ENS 5554022 October 2021 02:15:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0104 EDT on October 22, 2021, during the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 refueling outage, while performing examinations of the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that two penetrations could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME Code Section XI. Penetrations 28 and 40 will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indications were not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-6 to find potential flaws/indications before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5551411 October 2021 17:05:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1321 EDT on October 11, 2021, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 reactor automatically scrammed due to a trip of the Main Turbine. Unit 2 reactor was being operated at approximately 95 percent RTP (rated thermal power) with no evolutions in progress. The Control Room received indication of a Main Turbine trip with both divisions of RPS (Reactor Protection System) actuated and all control rods inserted. Turbine bypass valves opened automatically to control reactor pressure and subsequently failed open causing the reactor to depressurize. When reactor pressure reached approximately 560 psig, the operations crew manually closed the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MISVs) to stop the depressurization. Reactor water level lowered to -31 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. No (automatic) ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) actuations occurred. HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) and RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) were manually initiated to control reactor water level. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using RCIC and reactor pressure was controlled with HPCI in pressure control mode and main steam line drains. The Reactor Recirculation Pumps tripped as designed on EOC-RPT (end of cycle recirculation pump trip). The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation into the cause of the turbine trip is underway. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA will be made. This event requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
ENS 555075 October 2021 10:07:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0632 EDT on October 5, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at approximately 90 percent power for an end of cycle coastdown, the reactor automatically tripped due to an unexpected unblocking of the low power trip logic. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed in response to the reactor trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power in Mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is being reported as an eight hour, non-emergency Specific System Actuation per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 555044 October 2021 08:05:00GinnaNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopThe 'A' Steam Generator Narrow Range Water Level went less than 17 percent causing an Auxiliary Feed Water System valid actuation signal. The Auxiliary Feed Water System was in service at the time of the event providing decay heat removal. There was no adverse effect on plant systems. The Steam Generator Narrow Range Water Level was restored to normal operating band. This is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), which states, 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' (Reactor Coolant System) RCS Pressure 340 pounds and RCS Temperature 340 Degrees F. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5549225 September 2021 09:16:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2On 9/25/2021 at 0342 EDT, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 experienced a loss of the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS), UPS 162A, which resulted in a loss of Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus 11. This resulted in an isolation of both No. 11 and No. 12 Emergency Condensers. Emergency Condenser No. 11 was returned to standby on 9/25/2021 at 0420 EDT and Emergency Condenser No. 12 was returned to standby on 9/25/2021 at 0429 EDT. This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) which states: 'Licensee shall notify the NRC of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (B) remove residual heat.' The NRC Senior Resident was informed.
ENS 5548423 September 2021 18:46:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4During planned testing of the Unit 1 HPCI (high pressure coolant injection) system, flow controller oscillations occurred which prevented successful completion of the surveillance test. Operators secured Unit 1 HPCI and declared the system inoperable. HPCI inoperable placed the licensee in a 14-day limiting condition for operation that was extended to 30 days after their risk-informed completion time evaluation was done. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5545510 September 2021 14:45:00Three Mile IslandNRC Region 1B&W-L-LPThis is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of another government agency. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and 10 CFR 72.75(b)(2). At 1055 EDT on 9/10/21, an employee of a site contractor that was performing work under a contract and in possession of the immediate area where the work was being performed, was involved in a material handling accident in the owner controlled area at Three Mile Island. Londonderry Township EMS and Fire responded to render assistance to the individual. Upon arrival to the site, medical personnel declared the individual deceased. The fatality was work related and the individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area.
ENS 5542724 August 2021 16:51:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1GE-4During an extent of condition review of DC control circuits, it was identified there are additional unprotected DC control circuits which are routed between separate Appendix R fire areas. A postulated fire in one area can cause a short circuit and potentially result in secondary fires or cable fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures degrade the degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains and are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory actions for affected fire areas have been implemented. Design modifications in the affected control circuits are being developed and will be scheduled to correct this condition.
ENS 5541318 August 2021 01:07:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 0024 EDT on 8/18/21, an unusual event was declared (EAL HU 4.1) due to receipt of multiple fire alarms and halon discharge in the cable tunnel. At 0036, the fire brigade verified no signs of fire. Unit 1 remained at 100 percent power and stable. The area is currently being ventilated. Unit 2 was not affected by this event. The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. R1 Public Affairs (Screnci) was notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT KLINDWORTH TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0414 EDT ON 8/18/21 * * *

At 0401 EDT, Beaver Valley terminated their notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that there was no indication of fire. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified State and local authorities. Notified R1DO (Jackson), IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Felts), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 5538428 July 2021 16:30:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5537021 July 2021 20:50:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1826 EDT on July 21, 2021, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to a trip of the Main Turbine. Unit 1 reactor was operating at 100 percent reactor power with no evolutions in progress. The Control Room received indication of a Main Turbine trip with both divisions of RPS (Reactor Protection System) actuated and all control rods inserted. The Reactor Recirculation Pumps tripped on EOC-RPT (end of cycle recirculation pump trip). Reactor water level lowered to +8 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. No ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) or RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system) actuations occurred. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using Reactor Feed Water. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3 with main condenser available. Investigation into the trip of the Main Turbine is in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA will be made. This event requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).
ENS 5536319 July 2021 18:27:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5On July 19, 2021 at 1316 EDT, an individual experienced a non-work related medical emergency. The onsite fire brigade and emergency medical technicians administered first aid, but the individual was unresponsive. The individual was transported to the local hospital. At 1458 EDT, the local hospital notified the station that the individual was deceased. The individual was outside of the radiological controlled area and was not contaminated.
ENS 553458 July 2021 20:07:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4This 60-Day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. On May 13, 2021, during the restoration of the Unit 2 Refuel Floor High Radiation Isolation Logic an invalid isolation signal was received. The condition requiring an isolation signal was verified not to be present prior to restoring the logic; however, it was not recognized that a previous isolation signal was latched in and had not been reset. When the isolation logic was restored, the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolated on the invalid signal. The systems successfully completed the isolation per the plant design and plant configuration. The following systems actuated due to the Unit 2 PCIS Group 6C Isolation: - Isolation of Containment Hydrogen and Oxygen Sampling Valves, - Start of the 2A Reactor Enclosure Recirculation System, - Trip of the Units 1 and 2 Refuel Floor HVAC, - Start of the A and B Trains of Standby Gas Treatment Systems. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5526117 May 2021 13:12:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4

(Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station declared an unusual event due to a) "receipt of a single fire alarm in the Unit 2 drywell and the existence of the fire not verified in less than 30 minutes of alarm receipt." The NRC Resident Inspector and State and Local Authorities were notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 5/17/21 AT 1423 EDT FROM BRETT HENRY TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

At 1355 EDT, the licensee terminated the notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that the smoke has dissipated and there were no signs of fire. The licensee notified State and Local Authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Grieves), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD MOC (Grant). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), FEMA NRCC THD (email) and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 6/8/2021 AT 1249 EDT FROM JAMES BROWN TO DONALD NORWOOD * * *

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station is retracting notification EN 55261, 'Peach Bottom - Unusual Event,' based on the following additional information not available at the time of the notification: Following a Unit 2 drywell inspection, analysis of temperature data, and evaluation of equipment in operation; it was concluded that a fire did not exist. The smoke's most likely apparent cause was the result of heating residual oil/grease in the drywell. Peach Bottom reported the condition and entry into the UE initially based on the available information at the time and to ensure timeliness with emergency declaration and reporting notification requirements. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Ferdas).

ENS 5522430 April 2021 07:38:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4On 4/29/21 at 2354 (EDT), an alarm was received for U2 HPCI Inverter Power Failure. (It was) identified that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) flow controller had lost power due to a failure of an inverter. Without the flow controller, HPCI would not auto start to mitigate the consequences of an accident; thus, HPCI was declared inoperable. All other emergency core cooling systems and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. HPCI is a single train system with no redundant equipment in the same system; therefore, this failure is reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(d). The NRC Resident has been informed of this notification.
ENS 5520221 April 2021 09:45:00PilgrimNRC Region 1GE-3On April 21, 2021, at 0752 hours (EDT), an offsite notification was made to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MADEP) in accordance with Regulation 310 CMR 40.0000: Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP). The notification documents non-radiological contaminants found above reportable concentrations in select samples collected during site characterization efforts. The reported reportable concentrations were slightly above reporting limits in a soil sample for Per and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS), two groundwater sampling locations for PFAS, and isolated instances of metals in groundwater including Arsenic, Vanadium, Lead, Antimony, Beryllium, Cadmium, Chromium, Nickel, and Thallium. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) based on notification being made to another government agency. Concentrations above reporting limits have been entered into the site's corrective action program. As per MCP, the site will proceed with requirements to implement the phased MCP process. This condition does not represent a threat to station personnel or to members of the general public.
ENS 5514822 March 2021 13:16:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 1005 EDT on 3/22/2021, the control room was notified of a personal medical event in the Radiologically Controlled Area. An ambulance entered Susquehanna plant property at 1019 and exited at 1028 to transport the individual to a local hospital. Ambulance did not enter the Protected Area. The individual was considered potentially contaminated since a complete frisk could not be performed prior to transport. Following transportation to a local hospital, Radiation Protection (RP) technicians confirmed the individual and ambulance were not contaminated. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii). An Event of Potential Public Interest (EPPI) was made to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) due to an emergency vehicle accessing plant property. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5514721 March 2021 23:57:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEAt 2216 EDT on 3/21/2021, Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 was manually tripped from 37 percent power due to lowering level in the 21 Steam Generator. All systems responded per design. Main Feedwater was secured and Auxiliary Feedwater was manually initiated. The Site Senior Resident has been notified. The cause of the lowering level in the 21 Steam Generator is under investigation.
ENS 5513713 March 2021 01:11:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-2On March 12, 2021, at 2102 (EST), Reactor Recirculation Pump (RRP) 13 tripped. The cause for the trip is under investigation. Following the RRP trip, the Average Power Ranger Monitors (APRMs) flow bias trips are inoperable due to reverse flow through RRP 13. The APRMs were restored to operable on March 12, 2021, at 2110 (EST) when the RRP 13 Discharge Blocking Valve was closed. This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) which states: 'Licensee shall notify the NRC of any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5513412 March 2021 12:12:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEA licensed operator had a confirmed positive alcohol test during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified.
ENS 551289 March 2021 08:08:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4At 0313 EST on March 9th, 2021, during performance of Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) valve exercising, the inboard vacuum breaker isolation valve did not stroke closed as expected, but remained mid-position. The affected penetration of primary containment was isolated by closing the outboard HPCI vacuum breaker isolation valve. This results in an unplanned inoperability of the Unit 1 HPCI system. This is being reported as a loss of an entire safety function condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Unit 1 is in a 14-day LCO for Tech Spec 3.5.1(d), HPCI inoperability. Tech Spec 3.6.1.3(a), Containment Penetration Valve, was completed with closing the outboard HPCI vacuum breaker isolation valve. The Units are in a normal offsite power line-up.
ENS 551224 March 2021 04:00:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEAt time 0323 (EST) on March 04, 2021, it was determined that the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary did not meet the acceptance criteria under ASME, Section XI IWB-3600, "Analytical Evaluation of Flaws." This condition will be resolved prior to plant start up. This event is being reported as an eight hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 5510617 February 2021 11:30:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5
GE-2
A new, not qualified security officer self reported illegal drug use and resigned following a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC resident inspectors and R1 security inspector were notified.
ENS 5507118 January 2021 17:31:00PilgrimNRC Region 1GE-3On January 18, 2021 at 1600 hours (EDT), Holtec Decommissioning International (HDI) made an off-site notification to the Environmental Protection Agency's Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Division in accordance with Section B of the station's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit No. 0003557. The event was associated with an underground sewage water system holding tank. The specific details of the occurrence are as follows: On January 13, 2021 at 1000 hours (EDT) site personnel identified what appeared to be water bubbling up from an unidentified cover within the security protected area of the site. The water emanating from the cap had no visible color or solid material and no odor. The water estimated at 25 gallons per hour or less was flowing to a site storm drain connected to permitted outfall number 007. Initial indication was that the water was potable water as part of the station's fire protection system. Further investigation determined that a back-up in an underground sewage holding tank inlet was the source of the leakage. By 1400 hours (EDT) when bathrooms including toilets on site were shutdown and removed from service, efforts were underway to pump the tank and remove the blockage, and the bubbling from the cover had stopped. The licensee has notified the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Agency, the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5502610 December 2020 10:58:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with paragraphs 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid actuation of the 'B' train High Head Safety Injection Pump (3SIH*P1B), the 'B' train Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump (3RHS*P1B) and four Steam Generator Blowdown Containment isolation valves at Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3. At 1908 EST on November 6, 2020, with Unit 3 in Mode 3, a partial invalid actuation of 'B' train Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) components occurred. The 'B' train SIH pump and the 'B' train RHS pump had started, and ran successfully on recirculation. Four Steam Generator Blowdown Containment isolation valves also closed. Due to this condition the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator and the 'B' Emergency Generator Load Sequencer (EGLS) were declared inoperable and the required Technical Specification action statements were entered. Troubleshooting determined that this actuation was caused by a failure of one of the circuit boards in the 'B' train EGLS that caused a partial 'B' train 'SIS only' signal. Other 'B' Train components received the 'SIS only' signal but did not start because they were already running or were a backup to an already running component. Troubleshooting discovered a failed NAND gate on the 'B' Train EGLS XA93 circuit card. The card was replaced, retested, and the Technical Specification action statements were exited. The pumps and valves responded in accordance with plant design. No other equipment was affected during this event. There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into the station's corrective action program. The actuation was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for an ECCS actuation. Therefore, this is considered an invalid actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 550203 December 2020 17:10:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEAt 0923 EST on December 3, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the Emergency AC Electrical Power System (Emergency Diesel Generator 1A) occurred during normal plant operations. The reason for Emergency Diesel Generator 1A auto start was due to Class 1E 4KV Bus 11 feeder breaker opening. The Emergency Diesel Generator 1A automatically started as designed when the loss of voltage signal on 4KV Bus 11 was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency AC Electrical Power System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the 4KV Bus 11 Feeder Breaker opening is unknown at the present time and is under investigation.
ENS 5500016 November 2020 12:13:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4During normal plant start up on Limerick Unit 1, reactor pressure was raised above 200 psig prior to unisolating the Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection system (HPCI) which remained inoperable. Per TS 3.5.1, HPCI is required to be operable in Mode 2 above 200 psig. HPCI has since been restored to operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5499613 November 2020 05:32:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4At 0245 EST on November 13, 2020, the Limerick Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed on a valid Reactor High Pressure signal (1096psig). The Reactor High Pressure signal was caused by the closure of the 1B Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), causing reactor pressure to rise, exceeding the Reactor Protection System (RPS) setpoint of 1096psig. The shutdown was normal and the plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with normal pressure control via the Main Steam Bypass Valves to the Main Condenser and normal level control using the Feedwater System. The closure of the 1B Inboard MSIV appears to have been caused by a loss of Primary Containment Instrument Gas (PCIG) pneumatic supply to the valve. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be notifying Berks, Chester, and Montgomery Counties, as well as the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.