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The query [[Category:ENS Notification]] [[Category:Power Reactor]] [[Region::NRC Region 1]] was answered by the SMWSQLStore3 in 0.7229 seconds.


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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 541036 June 2019 12:02:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting multiple Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). On April 18, 2019 at approximately 0110 EDT, during performance of an ASME reactor vessel leak check, all four inboard MSIVs closed as a result of actuation of the Main Steam Line (MSL) high flow instrumentation. The high flow signal was spurious on the 'D' channel with no flow in the MSLs. Since an actual high flow condition did not exist at the time of the actuation, the actuation was considered invalid. The MSIVs functioned as designed on actuation of the MSL high flow instrumentation. All outboard MSIVs were closed at the time of the actuation in accordance with the vessel leak check procedure. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 540984 June 2019 04:10:00LimerickNRC Region 1At 0145 EDT, on 6/4/19, Unit 2 was manually scrammed during a Rapid Plant Shutdown. At 64 percent reactor power, a Rapid Plant Shutdown was initiated due to lowering Main Condenser vacuum as a result of the loss of a plant electrical panel that powers Offgas System controls. The shutdown was normal and the plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with normal pressure control via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves to the Main Condenser and normal level control using Feedwater and Condensate. Main Condenser Vacuum has been restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Additionally, State and local government agencies were notified. Prior to restarting Unit 2, an evaluation needs to be done due to the Unit 1 Diesel currently out of service for maintenance. The Unit 1 Diesel is a power supply for some of the common systems under the Unit 2 Technical Specifications and therefore required.
ENS 5408925 May 2019 00:30:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1A licensed employee was determined to be under the influence of alcohol during a random (fitness-for-duty) test. The employee's access to the plant has been canceled. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5408324 May 2019 09:51:00LimerickNRC Region 1This 60-Day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of Limerick Generating Station Unit 2 containment isolation logic. On April 18, 2019, while performing a relay replacement on the Division 2/4 Main Steam Line logic, a partial containment isolation occurred due to a blown fuse. The following systems had components that actuated due to the partial isolation: Reactor Water Clean-Up System Primary Containment Instrument Gas System Drywell Chilled Water System Reactor Enclosure Cooling Water System Core Spray System The Residual Heat Removal System received an isolation signal; however, the system remained in service because the isolation was defeated in accordance with plant procedures. This event resulted in partial Group 2A, 3, 7A, 8A, and 8B isolations. The systems successfully functioned per the plant design and plant configuration. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5407822 May 2019 06:01:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1

On 5/22/2019, the 'A' Control Structure Chiller (Div I) tripped due to a loss of (motor control center) MCC 0B136. The 'B' Control Structure Chiller was already inoperable due to Div II (Emergency Service Water) ESW being out of service for planned maintenance. With the loss of Control Structure HVAC System the ability to maintain temperatures in various spaces including relay rooms, Control Room Floor Cooling and Emergency Switchgear rooms was lost. The 'B' Control Structure Chiller was restarted at 0251 EDT and cooling was reestablished to the required areas, however the 'B' chiller is not considered operable at this time. Units 1 and 2 entered (Technical Specification) TS 3.0.3 at 0256 EDT and a controlled shutdown of both units commenced, Unit 2 at 0340 EDT and Unit 1 0350 EDT. This constitutes a TS required shutdown and requires a 4 hour (Emergency Notification System) ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). The failure also requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) due to the loss of a safety function. The licensee needs to restore the 'B' loop of ESW to exit the Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO). The licensee is currently performing a flow surveillance, once complete and assuming the data is acceptable, the licensee will be able to exit the LCO. The units are in a normal electrical lineup. The licensee will be notifying the state of Pennsylvania FEMA Operations Center. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 05/22/2019 AT 1302 FROM SCOTT MYRTHEL TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

On 5/22/2019 at 0601 EDT Susquehanna Steam Electric Station reported a shutdown had been commenced at 0340 EDT for Unit 2 and 0350 EDT for Unit 1 due to inoperability of both control structure chillers. Power has been restored to MCC 0B136, and at 0901 EDT the 'A' control structure chiller was declared operable and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. Power reduction for both units was halted at 0901 EDT and preparations for power restoration initiated. As of 1255 EDT on 5/22/2019, Unit 1 power is 94% and Unit 2 power is 92%. Notified the R1DO (Arner).

ENS 5407118 May 2019 02:09:00PilgrimNRC Region 1

On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 2303 (EDT), with the reactor at 70 (percent) core thermal power, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station initiated a manual reactor scram due to degrading condenser vacuum as a result of the trip of Seawater Pump B. All control rods inserted as designed. The plant is in hot shutdown. Plant safety systems responded as designed. Pressure is being controlled using the Mechanical Hydraulic Control System and Main Condenser. Reactor water level is being maintained with the feedwater and condensate system. During the manual reactor scram, the plant experienced the following isolation signals as designed:

"Group 2 Isolation: Miscellaneous containment isolation valves
Group 6 Isolation: Reactor Water Clean-up
Reactor Building Isolation Actuation

Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical...' This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section...' (B)(2) 'General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).' This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency."

ENS 540559 May 2019 13:51:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5403730 April 2019 07:37:00Indian PointNRC Region 1A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive test for a prohibited substance during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The individual's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee."
ENS 5401521 April 2019 12:43:00LimerickNRC Region 1Event of Public Interest performed to notify State and Local agencies for emergency vehicle response required due to an on-site non-work related illness. The individual was unresponsive and was unable to be resuscitated due to the medical issue. The individual was outside the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA) and no radioactive material or contamination was involved. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5401421 April 2019 08:46:00LimerickNRC Region 1This 60-Day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of Limerick Generating Station Unit 1 containment isolation logic. On February 22, 2019, while performing work on the 1C Main Seam Line Rad Monitor a partial containment isolation occurred due to a blown fuse. The blown fuse caused a single channel 'C' isolation signal for the Refueling Area Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation and the Reactor Enclosure Ventilation Exhaust-High Radiation logic. The following systems had components that actuated due to the partial isolation: - Plant Process Radiation Monitoring System - Nuclear Boiler System - Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System - Containment Atmospheric Control System - Primary Containment Instrument Gas System This event resulted in partial Group VIC and partial Group VIIIB isolations. All the components that would actuate on a single 'C' isolation signal responded as designed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5399814 April 2019 03:21:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1On April 14, 2019 at 0003 (EDT), Nine Mile Point Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram during reactor startup. The cause of the automatic scram was due to high (Reactor Pressure Vessel) pressure following closure of the turbine stop valves. All control rods fully inserted and all plant systems responded per design following the scram. Following the automatic scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems, and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 0004, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation set point and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the Turbine Bypass Valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to this scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Hot Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect. The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Licensee will notify the State of New York.
ENS 539774 April 2019 15:16:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1Oyster Creek NGS (Nuclear Generating Station) Tech Support Center (TSC) ventilation is not functional due to a broken belt on exhaust fan FN-843-14. The TSC ventilation system will remain non-functional until fan belt replacement can be completed. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to partial loss of the TSC. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5395424 March 2019 17:40:00Indian PointNRC Region 1On March 24, 2019, at 1445 EDT, Indian Point Unit 2 automatically tripped on a turbine trip due to a loss of excitation. All control rods fully inserted and plant equipment responded normally to the unit trip. This RPS (reactor protection system) actuation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The auxiliary feedwater system actuated following the automatic trip as expected. This specified system actuation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). During the event offsite power remained available and stable. No primary or secondary reliefs lifted. Unit 2 is in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. Decay heat removal is via the steam generators to the atmospheric steam dumps. No radiation was released. Indian Point Unit 3 was unaffected by this event and remains defueled in a scheduled refueling outage. A post trip investigation is in progress. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector The New York State Public Service Commission, Consolidated Edison System Operator, and New York State Independent System Operator were also notified.
ENS 5393715 March 2019 13:39:00Indian PointNRC Region 1On March 15, 2019 at 1300 EDT, Indian Point Unit 2 automatically tripped offline from mode 1 - 100% power operations. Reactor Operators verified the reactor trip and the plant is currently stable in mode 3. All automatic systems functioned as required. The auxiliary feedwater system actuated following the trip, as expected. All control rods fully inserted upon the trip, as expected. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The unit remains on offsite power in hot standby at normal operating temperature and pressure. Decay heat is being removed from the steam generators via the auxiliary feedwater system and the condensate steam dump valves. Unit 3 remains in mode 6 for a scheduled refueling outage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the local transmission company, and New York State Independent System Operator. The Indian Point Unit 2 automatic trip was caused by the trip of the main generator. The cause of the generator trip is unknown at this time.
ENS 5393314 March 2019 17:08:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1A licensed employee was determined to be under the influence of alcohol during a random test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended pending an investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5392912 March 2019 11:21:00Indian PointNRC Region 1A contract employee failed to report for a random fitness for duty test. The contractor's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the NY Public Service Commission.
ENS 5392411 March 2019 10:00:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1On 03/11/2019 planned maintenance activities will be performed on the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 Digital Radiation Monitoring System's (DRMS) Communications System. The work includes upgrades to the DRMS hardware, software and computer peripherals. Components to be upgraded under this planned maintenance include: Redundant Servers, Operator Console, Health Physics Office Console/Workstation, Printers and Portable Mass Storage/Backup and Computer peripherals necessary to interface with the computer system. This planned upgrade on the Unit 2 DRMS Communications System will result in the loss of Unit 2 radiological monitoring capability in the Control Room and on the Plant Computer System (PCS). Neither the Emergency Response Facilities nor the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) will receive radiological data. No actual radiation monitors are affected. The scheduled work duration is approximately three weeks. When the DRMS is out of service for the upgrade, compensatory actions will be in place. Radiation monitors will be continuously monitored for any increases in radiation levels. The Unit 2 Shift Manager will be notified of any increase in radiation monitor readings, including exceeding Emergency Action Levels (EAL). This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the upgrade to the DRMS Communications System will result in the loss of the Unit 2 radiological monitoring capability in the Control Room and to the Unit 2 Plant Computer System that affects the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee is currently in a Technical Specification Action Statement, Limiting Condition for Operation for spent fuel pool radiation monitor and leakage rate monitor.
ENS 539219 March 2019 13:59:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1A sewage line on the south end of the plant backed up causing sanitary wastewater to flow into storm drains and out to the Chesapeake Bay. This is a required notification of the Maryland Department of the Environment under COMAR (Code of Maryland Regulations) 26.08 for discharge of a pollutant into navigable waters or the adjoining shoreline. The amount has been estimated at less than 1000 gallons and the source has been isolated and storm drains have been covered to stop any flow into them and subsequently to the Chesapeake Bay. This notification is made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to notification of a state agency. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 538636 February 2019 12:46:00Indian PointNRC Region 1On February 05, 2019 at approximately 1800 EST, candy that contained alcohol was discovered in the plant protected area. The candy was removed from the protected area by station security management. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York Public Service Commission.
ENS 5385431 January 2019 17:06:00SeabrookNRC Region 1On 1/31/2019, the Medical Review Officer for Seabrook was notified of an error made by the HHS (Health and Human Services) certified lab resulting in a false negative Fitness for Duty quality assurance test result. The test lab, Quest Diagnostics-Norristown, was provided an adulterated sample specimen that was part of a blind performance test, which tested negative. This false negative test result will be investigated and the results reported as required. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(c)(3). NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5385231 January 2019 04:23:00SalemNRC Region 1At 0301 (EST) on 1/31/19, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor was manually tripped due to icing conditions requiring the removal of 4 Circulating Water Pumps from service. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. 21 CFCU (Containment Fan Cooler Unit) was inoperable prior to the event for a planned maintenance window and did not contribute to the cause of the event and did not adversely impact the plant response to the trip. An actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System occurred following the manual reactor trip. The reason for the Auxiliary Feed Water System auto-start was due to low level in a steam generator. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam Dumps and Auxiliary Feedwater System. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feed Water System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The icing condition was described as frazil ice. Unit-1 reduced power to 88% because one circulating water pump was shutdown.
ENS 5382816 January 2019 08:12:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1On January 16, 2019, with James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100 percent power, the Emergency and Plant Information Computer (EPIC) indicated that Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge while isolating Reactor Building Ventilation. The Secondary Containment differential pressure was less than 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge for approximately ten (10) seconds, and then immediately returned to greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. This condition did not impact the leak tightness of Secondary Containment or the ability of the Standby Gas Treatment system to establish and maintain the required differential pressure. When Secondary Containment did not meet the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1 for differential pressure, the Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) was not met. Therefore, Secondary Containment was inoperable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
ENS 538188 January 2019 15:45:00PilgrimNRC Region 1On January 8, 2019, at 0945 EST Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station discovered that the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system failed to meet its surveillance test requirements and was declared inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), 'event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function: (D), mitigate the consequences of an accident.' There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 538155 January 2019 17:30:00PilgrimNRC Region 1

EN Revision Text: POTENTIAL LOSS OF MSIV SCRAM FUNCTION DURING MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE TESTING At approximately 1040 EST on January 5, 2019, during evaluation of test results for the 'C' Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), it was determined that closure of three of four Main Steam Lines would not necessarily have resulted in a full scram during testing due to failure of a limit switch (LS-6) associated with MSIV-1C while in the test configuration. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), 'Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.' The system was restored from the testing configuration at 1057 EST and the failed trip channel was placed in the tripped condition at 1326 EST thus restoring the design function. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1529 EST ON 02/11/19 FROM JOSEPH FRATTASIO TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The purpose of the notification is to retract ENS Notification 53815 made on 01/05/19 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The previous notification reported that there was a potential loss of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) scram function during main steam line isolation valve testing, at the time of discovery, due to failure of a limit switch (LS-6) associated with MSIV-1C while in the test configuration. Subsequent evaluation has demonstrated that the scram function credited in the design basis was not lost. Specifically, after an Engineering Evaluation, it has been determined that the MSIV position RPS logic was not lost for those functions within the design basis and, as such, was capable of performing its intended safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R1DO (Cahill).

ENS 5378611 December 2018 15:09:00SalemNRC Region 1This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The successful, complete train actuation of the 22 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was initiated by an invalid signal during testing. The Auxiliary Feedwater System was not impacted in its ability to perform its function. There were no safety consequences or impacts to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 537785 December 2018 17:06:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1At 1010 (EST) on December 5, 2018, Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. This condition existed for approximately 3 minutes before the differential pressure was restored to normal when the Standby Gas Treatment system was manually initiated. This event was caused by a trip of the service air compressor 39AC-2A. The loss of instrument air pressure caused Reactor Building ventilation to isolate and raise Secondary Containment differential pressure. The instrument air pressure was restored when 39AC-2A was isolated and the two backup air compressors started. This condition did not impact the leak tightness of Secondary Containment or the ability of the Standby Gas Treatment system to establish and maintain the required differential pressure. When Secondary Containment did not meet the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1 for differential pressure, the Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) was not met. Therefore, Secondary Containment was inoperable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 537652 December 2018 06:17:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1

During the post-maintenance testing run of the Division III Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), (a field operator) reported smoke coming from the diesel and an emergency shutdown was required. After the EDG was shutdown, significant damage (thrown rod) to the EDG was observed. Emergency Action Level HA 2.1 (an Alert) was declared at 0530 (EST). Currently, the plant is stable and operating at 100 percent power. All safety systems are available. The damage occurred approximately 20 minutes into the required 1 hour run. The licensee's emergency response organization has been activated. No offsite assistance was required or requested. There is a 14-day shutdown limiting condition for operation (LCO) in effect under technical specification 3.5.1 for the high pressure core spray system. Notified DHS Senior Watch Officer, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, HHS Operations Center, DOE Operations Center, EPA Emergency Operations Center, FDA EOC (email), FEMA NWC (email) and DHS Nuclear SSA (email). The licensee has notified state and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 12/2/18 AT 0737 EST FROM TODD DAVIS TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

The licensee terminated the Alert at 0731 EST on 12/2/18. The basis for termination was that the licensee has met all procedural requirements to terminate the emergency and on-shift personnel can operate the unit without further assistance. Notified R1DO (Burritt), NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Gott), HQPAO (Couret), ERDS Activation Group, DHS Senior Watch Officer, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, HHS Operations Center, DOE Operations Center, EPA Emergency Operations Center, FDA EOC (email), FEMA NWC (email) and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

ENS 5376029 November 2018 12:56:00SeabrookNRC Region 1This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). At 0147 (EST) on October 1, 2018, Seabrook Unit 1 was in Mode 3 shutdown, when an invalid Reactor Protection System actuation occurred due to a high Source Range detector. All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. Specifically, all actuations were complete and successful. There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into Seabrook's corrective action program for resolution. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Source Range detector which gave the invalid input has been replaced.
ENS 5375225 November 2018 02:47:00MillstoneNRC Region 1

EN Revision Text: LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE DUE TO DOOR FAILURE On 11/24/18 at 2015 EST, a loss of Control Room Envelope (CRE) was declared due to failure of the control room boundary door, 204-36-008. (Abnormal Operating Procedure 8588A Mitigating Actions for Control Boundary Breach was implemented). The door was repaired at 2030 EST, restoring CRE to operable (status). A mechanical failure of the control room door latch prevented the door from closing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 01/18/19 AT 1457 EST FROM GARY CLOSIUS TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

The purpose of this call is to retract a report made on November 25, 2018, NRC Event Number EN53752. NRC Event Report number EN53752 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) in which a control room envelope boundary door was discovered to not be able to fully close due to the latching mechanism being stuck in the extended position. The condition was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) via an 8-hour prompt report as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Upon further review, MPS2 determined that there was no loss of safety function. An engineering evaluation determined that even with the control room boundary door unable to be fully closed due to the latching mechanism being stuck in the extended position, control room air in-leakage would not have been sufficient to prevent the control room emergency ventilation system from performing its safety function. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number EN53752 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion has been provided to the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Carfang).

ENS 537111 November 2018 15:38:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1On 11/01/2018, during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) refueling outage, while performing examinations of the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that one penetration could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME Code Section XI. Penetration 27 will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indication was not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-4 to find potential flaws/indications before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. The other 65 penetrations will be examined during the 2R20 (current) refueling outage. The plant is currently shutdown and in Undefined Mode. The reactor vessel head is not currently installed. Repairs are currently being planned and will be completed prior to startup. This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as-found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-4 to remain in-service without repair. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5369928 October 2018 15:10:00Indian PointNRC Region 1During the performance of Service Water Essential header swap, SWN-6 (Supply to Turbine Building Oil Coolers) valve stem became disconnected from its gear box at 85% open and could not be operated. Therefore, the non-essential service water system was inoperable. LCO 3.0.3 was entered at 0930 (EDT) with required actions to be in Mode 3 in 7 hours, Mode 4 in 13 hours and Mode 5 in 37 hours. Repair efforts were successful at shutting SWN-6, and LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 1305 (EDT) before adding any negative reactivity in support of shutdown. ('TS Required S/D' box not checked.) This condition constituted a loss of safety function which requires an 8 hour report (in accordance with) IAW 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B): Without the ability to close SWN-6, the non-seismic portion of the conventional Service Water System could not be isolated as required in the event of either a seismic event or as required in the EOPs. The nonessential service water system is required to support the recirculation phase post (Design Basis Accident) DBA for accident mitigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.
ENS 5369627 October 2018 01:50:00GinnaNRC Region 1RCS (Reactor Coolant System) Pressure: vented to containment, refueling cavity greater than 23ft. (above reactor vessel). RCS temperature: 96 degrees Fahrenheit. The 12A bus de-energized, 'A' EDG (Emergency Diesel Generator) automatically started and loaded on (emergency) buses 14 and 18. The RCS configuration is refueling cavity level greater than 23ft. above the reactor flange with no impact to shutdown cooling. Radiation monitor R-1, Control Room radiation monitor, lost power for 2 hrs 10 min. This placed Ginna in a major loss of emergency preparedness capabilities. A temporary radiation monitor has been installed in the Control Room. Prior to the notification, the licensee had restored the 12A bus from offsite power and the R-1 monitor was re-energized. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5369123 October 2018 19:24:00SalemNRC Region 1At 1616 EDT on 10/23/18, Salem reported to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection a sheen on ground water discovered during excavation in the Salem Switchyard. This discovery did not violate any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify Lower Alloway Creek Township.
ENS 5368823 October 2018 04:17:00MillstoneNRC Region 1On October 22, 2018 at 2241 hrs. EDT, a loss of Control Room Envelope (CRE) was declared due to failing to meet the requirements of (surveillance requirement) SR 4.7.6.1h during 72-month surveillance testing. Measured in-leakage exceeded the SR acceptance value. Abnormal Operating Procedure 2588A, 'Mitigating Actions for Control Room Envelope Boundary Breach', have been implemented. The licensee has notified Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, Connecticut dispatch, Waterford dispatch, and the NRC Resident Inspector of this event.
ENS 5366614 October 2018 07:35:00GinnaNRC Region 1Notified New York State Department of Environmental Conservation for draining of sodium hypochlorite (12-15% by weight) from the storage tank into it's engineered secondary containment of approximately 1300 gallons. Reportable per regulation 6 NYCRR Part 597. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee. Licensee investigation into the cause of the leak is ongoing.
ENS 5366312 October 2018 03:58:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1During a post maintenance start of the 1B diesel generator, the air start solenoid valves did not close as expected. This resulted in lowering air pressure in the common air start headers causing inoperability of the 2A and 2B diesel generators at time 23:03. The 1B diesel generator was isolated from the common air start header, which restored the air start header pressure to the 2A and 2B diesel generators. The 2A and 2B diesel generators were declared operable at 23:34. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 536485 October 2018 15:39:00PilgrimNRC Region 1On Friday, October 5, 2018 at 1209 hours, with the reactor at 100 percent core thermal power, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) automatically tripped due to reactor water level perturbation and receipt of a low reactor water level Reactor Protection System (RPS) signal. The cause of the low reactor water level is under investigation. The plant is in hot shutdown. All other plant systems responded as designed. Pressure is being controlled using the Mechanical Hydraulic Control System and Main Condenser. Reactor water level is being maintained with the feedwater and condensate system. During the automatic reactor scram the plant experienced the following isolation signals as designed: Group 2 Isolation: Miscellaneous containment isolation valves Group 6 Isolation: Reactor Water Clean-up Reactor Building Isolation System Actuation Due to the RPS actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.' This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section ... ' (B)(2) 'General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.' This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 5363030 September 2018 15:29:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1On Sunday, September 30, 2018, at 1130 EDT, an automatic scram was received on U3 following a loss of two condensate pumps. Following the reactor scram, water level lowered from normal level of 23" to below 1" which resulted in automatic Group II and Group III isolations. Reactor water level lowered to -48" which resulted in initiation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling systems. Reactor water level and reactor pressure have been restored to their normal bands. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 3 remains in Mode 3 with reactor pressure being controlled on the turbine bypass valves. The cause and details of the event are under investigation. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). All control rods inserted. Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A notification to the media and a press release were made. Unit 2 was unaffected and continues coastdown to refueling.
ENS 5362526 September 2018 21:43:00Hope CreekNRC Region 1

On 9/26/2018 at 1530 EDT, it was discovered that the HPCI system was inoperable due to a blown fuse in the 10C617 Panel, E21-F15A. Therefore, this condition Is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The blown fuse also impacts 'A' channel Residual Heat Removal (RHR) subsystem and 'A' Core Spray (CS) subsystem. These Emergency Core Cooling subsystems have been declared inoperable. Remaining Emergency Core Cooling subsystems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain OPERABLE.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the local authorities.

ENS 5361118 September 2018 09:06:00Indian PointNRC Region 1Due to a steam leak on the reheater line to 36C Feedwater Heater, operators initiated a manual trip of the reactor, verified the reactor trip, and closed all Main Steam Isolation Valves. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 with the steam leak isolated. The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated following the trip as expected. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The unit remains on offsite power in Hot Standby at normal operating temperature and pressure. Decay heat is being removed from the steam generators via the Auxiliary Feedwater System and atmospheric steam dumps. Unit 2 was unaffected and remains at 100 percent power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of New York, and the local transmission company.
ENS 5360614 September 2018 16:28:00SalemNRC Region 1At 1323 (EDT) on 9/14/18, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 90% power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a failure of 23BF19, 23 Steam Generator (SG) Feed Regulating Valve. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. No equipment was inoperable prior to the event. An actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system occurred following the automatic reactor trip. The reason for the auxiliary feed water system auto-start was due to low level in the steam generator. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the main steam dumps and auxiliary feedwater system. Unit 1 is not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non- emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feed water system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified."
ENS 5360113 September 2018 08:24:00Indian PointNRC Region 1A hurricane is within 500 nautical miles from Indian Point Energy Center with wind speed in excess of 87 knots. The National Weather Service has issued a hurricane warning for a hurricane with wind in excess of 87 knots (approximately 100 mph) within 500 nautical miles of the facility. Per the Technical Requirement Manual a prompt report shall be made to the NRC Incident Response Center within 1 hour of receipt of that hurricane warning. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
ENS 5359411 September 2018 17:14:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1On September 11, 2018 the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation was discovered to be non-functional during system testing. At 1310 EDT, an air leak was identified that prevented the modulating dampers to operate as designed to maintain required pressure. The air leak was not able to be repaired within a 60 minute period. This failure affected the ability of the TSC ventilation system to maintain adequate radiological habitability in the event of an emergency with an airborne radiological release. All other capabilities of the TSC are unaffected by this emergent condition. The air leak has been repaired and post maintenance testing was completed satisfactory at 1654 (EDT), restoring the TSC ventilation to a functional condition. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility because of the unavailability of the ventilation system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 535846 September 2018 17:18:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1Pursuant to 50.73(a)(1) the following information is provided as a sixty (60) day telephone notification to the NRC. This notification, reported under 50.73(a)(2)(iv), is being provided in lieu of the submittal of a written LER (Licensee Event Report) to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI). At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater system and is not an emergency core cooling system. On March 19, 2018 Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) was at 0 percent power and in cold shutdown in support of a planned maintenance outage. At approximately 0118 (EDT), a reactor water level transient initiated by the fill and vent of 12 Reactor Recirculation Pump (12 RRP) occurred. During the fill and vent, Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level lowered quickly from the initial level of 68 inches and a low level alarm was received. Control Room Operators reduced Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) reject flow to turn the level trend and clear the low level alarm generated off of the compensated, GEMAC, level instrumentation. RWCU reject flow was reduced by 50 percent which caused RPV level to start to rise. RPV level was raised to approximately 72 inches at which time the Reactor Operator began to raise reject flow to reestablish the normal level band. During the RPV level transient, with actual water level at 74 inches on the GEMAC, the Yarway level instrumentation, which is not density compensated and therefore invalid, reached 92 inches causing an invalid high RPV water level turbine trip signal and associated invalid HPCI initiation signal. At no point in time did actual RPV water level reach the high RPV water level turbine trip set point of 92 inches. The potential for a turbine trip signal to occur due to shutdown activities was understood and tags were hung to lockout the Feedwater Pumps to prevent the HPCI start signal. Therefore, no HPCI injection occurred. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
ENS 535781 September 2018 13:52:00Indian PointNRC Region 1Twelve (12) cans of an alcoholic beverage were discovered inside the protected area. The 12 cans were removed from the protected area and taken to and secured by site station security. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5356527 August 2018 03:12:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1

EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC SCRAM DUE TO A GENERATOR TRIP At 0033 EDT Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an automatic scram on high reactor pressure due to a turbine trip. The cause of the turbine trip was due to a generator trip. All control rods inserted. There were no safety system actuations. The cause of the generator trip is being investigated. This is a 4-Hour report for 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser. Reactor vessel water level is being maintained by the condensate and feedwater systems. The licensee will be notifying the state of New York.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DANIEL CIFONELLI TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1653 EDT ON 8/28/18 * * *

After further review, the licensee has determined that the cause of automatic scram was due to turbine control valve fast closure as a result of the turbine trip, not high reactor pressure, as originally reported. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl).

ENS 5355622 August 2018 02:00:00LimerickNRC Region 1At 2322 EDT, Limerick Generating Station notified the Pennsylvania DEP (Department of Environmental Protection) that our plant waste water pond (holding pond) overflowed due to heavy rainfall in the area. Plant alignment changes were made and the holding pond stopped overflowing at 0017 EDT. Limerick Generating Station has not determined this release to contain oil, grease, or pollutants hazardous to the public. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5355217 August 2018 08:17:00Three Mile IslandNRC Region 1

EN Revision Text: FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST POSITIVE FOR NON-LICENSED EMPLOYEE At 1519 EDT on August 16, 2018, Exelon determined a non-licensed employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random Fitness-for-Duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL FITZWATER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1310 EST ON 1/8/2019 * * *

The following is a correction to the reason for the Fitness-for-Duty test: At 1519 EDT on August 16, 2018, Exelon determined a non-licensed employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a follow-up Fitness-for-Duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this correction. Notified R1DO (Bower) and FFD E-mail group.

ENS 5354812 August 2018 02:58:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1

EN Revision Text: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN - LOSS OF 480 VOLTAGE EMERGENCY BUS On 8-12-18 at 0158 EDT, Beaver Valley Unit 2 experienced a loss of 480 Volt 2P Emergency Bus. This resulted in a Loss of Safety Function due to the 2-2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) being Inoperable coincident with the Residual Heat Release Valve (2SVS-HCV104). A Technical Specification shutdown is required per LCO 3.0.3. The Licensee also stated they were in an unanalyzed condition due to the EDG and Residual Heat Release Valve being inoperable at the same time. The Licensee is shutting down to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown). The Licensee is notifying the Resident Inspector. The Licensee will be making a Press Release about the unplanned shutdown.

  • * * UPDATE ON 08/16/2018 AT 1424 EDT FROM BLASE BARTKO TO KEN MOTT * * *

On 8-12-18 at 0158 (EDT) Beaver Valley Unit 2 experienced a loss of 480 Volt 2P Emergency Bus. Per operational guidance, this was determined to be a Loss of Safety Function due to the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) being INOPERABLE coincident with the Residual Heat Release Valve (2SVS-HCV104) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and (D). This was also reported as an Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(b). No Press Release was performed for this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. At 0410 (EDT) a Technical Specification Shutdown was commenced 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). At 2011 (EDT) the 480 Volt 2P Emergency Bus was restored and energized. Further evaluation of the event has determined that this event was not an Unanalyzed Condition and did not result in a Loss of Safety Function. The classifications of Unanalyzed Condition and Loss of Safety Function are being retracted. The accuracy of the existing guidance relative to Safety Function has been entered in the Corrective Action Program and interim actions have been taken to provide accurate guidance. Notified R1DO (Young) via email.

ENS 535332 August 2018 13:09:00MillstoneNRC Region 1The following was received via telephone and email notification from Millstone Power Station: Millstone Power Station Unit 3, identified that the underground pipe to the Condensate Surge Tank had leaked greater than 100 gallons of water that included trace amounts of tritium to the ground. The effected piping is inside the protected area and has been isolated and drained. No tritium has been detected in any monitoring wells outside of the Protected Area. There is no threat to employees or the public or impact to drinking water. The Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, and the towns of Waterford and East Lyme were notified at approximately 1300 (EDT) on August 2, 2018. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.