RS-16-176, County, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ic

County, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ich

ML16336A810
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	12/01/2016
From:	Kaegi G Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RS-16-176
Download: ML16336A810 (95)

Text

^!ExeLon Generation.

RS-16-176 10 CFR 50.54(f)

December 1, 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

Subject:

High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ML12053A340)

2. NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," As An Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013 (ML13106A331)

3. NEI Letter, Final Draft of Industry Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic (EPRI 1025287), dated November 27, 2012 (ML12333A168 and ML12333A170)

4. NRC Letter, Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 1025287, Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, dated February 15, 2013 (ML12319A074)

5. Exelon Generation Company, LLC letter to NRC, LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 -

Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 31, 2014 (RS-14-068) (ML14091A013)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Hazard 2.1 High Frequency Supplement December 1, 2016 Page 2

6. NRC Letter, Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated May 9, 2014 (ML14111A147)

7. NRC Memorandum, Support Document for Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluation for Operating Reactors in the Central and Eastern United States, dated May 21, 2014 (ML14136A126)

8. NEI Letter, Request for NRC Endorsement of High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation (EPRI 3002004396),

dated July 30, 2015 (M L 1 5223A 100 / M L 1 5223A 102)

9. NRC Letter to NEI: Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396: "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility' dated September 17, 2015 (ML15218A569) 10.NRC Letter, Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, dated October 27, 2015 (ML15194A015)

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Request for Information per 10 CFR 50.54(f) (Reference 1) to all power reactor licensees. The required response section of Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 indicated that licensees should provide a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of the letter for Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) nuclear power plants. By NRC letter dated May 7, 2013 (Reference 2), the date to submit the report was extended to March 31, 2014.

By letter dated May 9, 2014 (Reference 6), the NRC transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation report for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 submitted on March 31, 2014 (Reference 5). In accordance with the screening, prioritization, and implementation details report (SPID) (References 3 and 4), and Augmented Approach guidance (Reference 2), the reevaluated seismic hazard is used to determine if additional seismic risk evaluations are warranted for a plant. Specifically, the reevaluated horizontal ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) at the control point elevation is compared to the existing safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) or Individual Plant Examination for External Events (I PEEE) High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Spectrum (I HS) to determine if a plant is required to perform a high frequency confirmation evaluation. As noted in the May 9, 2014 letter from the NRC (Reference 6) on page 2 of Enclosure 2, LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 is to conduct a limited scope High Frequency Evaluation (Confirmation).

Within the May 9, 2014 letter (Reference 6), the NRC acknowledged that these limited scope evaluations will require additional development of the assessment process. By Reference 8, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted an Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) report entitled, High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation (EPRI 3002004396) for NRC review and endorsement. NRC endorsement was provided by Reference 9. Reference 10 provided the NRC final seismic hazard evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Hazard 2.1 High Frequency Supplement December 1, 2016 Page 3 screening determination results and the associated schedules for submittal of the remaining seismic hazard evaluation activities.

The High Frequency Evaluation Confirmation Report for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, provided in the enclosure to this letter, shows that all high frequency susceptible equipment evaluated within the scoping requirements and using evaluation criteria of Reference 8 for seismic demands and capacities, are acceptable.

Therefore, no additional modifications or evaluations are necessary.

This transmittal completes the scope of work described in Section 4.2 of Reference 5, for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2.

This letter closes the associated regulatory Commitment No. 1 contained in Enclosure 2 of Reference 5 for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Ronald Gaston at 630-657-3359.

1 declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 1't day of December 2016.

Respectfully submitted, Glen T. Kaegi U Director - Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Enclosure:

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 - Seismic High Frequency Evaluation Confirmation Report cc: NRC Regional Administrator - Region III NRC Project Manager, NRR LaSalle Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector LaSalle Station Mr. Brett A. Titus, NRR/JLD/JCBB, NRC Mr. Stephen M. Wyman, NRR/JLD/JHMB, NRC Mr. Frankie G. Vega, NRR/JLD/JHMB, NRC Illinois Emergency Management Agency Division of Nuclear Safety

Enclosure LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Seismic High Frequency Evaluation Confirmation Report (91 pages)

HIGH FREQUENCY CONFIRMATION REPORT IN RESPONSE TO NEAR TERM TASK FORCE (NTTF) 2.1 RECOMMENDATION for the LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT 1 AND 2 2601 N 21st Rd, Marseilles, IL 61341 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 NRC Docket Nos.60-373 and 50-374 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176

-~ Exeton..

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon)

PO Box 805398 Chicago, IL 60680-5398 Prepared by:

Stevenson & Associates 1661 Feehanville Drive, Suite 150 Mount Prospect, IL 60056 Report Number..15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Printed Name Sinnature Date Preparer. F. Ganatra 0 G-4c- 10/21/2016 Reviewer: M. Delaney 't`' '- ( 10/21/2016 t . its Approver: M. Delaney 10/21/2016 Lead Responsible Engineer.

Branch Manager:

~~rdc~~. %hike:

Senior Manager _

Design Engineering: M 'W Ito6 Corporate Acceptance:

e~~c~y S. C1A,r-k It 11 1

Document ID: 15CO348-RPT-002

Title:

High Frequency Confirmation Report for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 in Response to Near Term Task Force NTTF 2.1 Recommendation Document Type:

Criteria Interface Report Specification Other Drawing Project Name:

LaSalle, Unit 1 and 2 High Frequency Confirmation Job No.: 15C0348 Client: ExeLon.

This document has been prepared under the guidance of the S&A Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 18 and project requirements:

Initial Issue (Rev. 0)

Originated by: F. Ganatra W4'" Date: 10/21/2016 Checked by: M. Delaney ,, Date: 10/21/2016 Approved by: M. Delaney- Date: 10/21/2016

/L(A-4-a Revision Record:

Revision Originated by/ Checked by/ Approved by/ Description of Revision No. Date Date Date DOCUMENT PROJECT NO.

APPROVAL SHEET 15CO348 Figure 2.8 Stevenson & Associates

l5[O34M-RPT-OO2, Rev. O Correspondence No.: RS-16-176

.xecutive Summary The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1]. In particular, this report provides information requested to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, of the March I2,2OI2 letter [l].

Folloxvlngtheaccidenta1theFukushlmaDailchlnudeorpovverplantresultlngfrorntheK4arohI1, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations [15] intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees' perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety."

EPRl 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation 0atolls (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic" [6]

provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details tothe U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and was subsequently endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Eva/uation,"[8] and was endorsed by the NRClna letter dated September 17,2O15[3].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided byNRCina letter dated October 27,2O15[2].

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for LaSalle County Station, Unit 1and 2 (LA5). The objective ofthis report lsto provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made asa result of the evaluations.

EPRI 3002004396 [8] is used for the LAS engineering evaluations described in this report. In accordance with Reference [8], the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this w Process of selecting components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation 0 Estimation of a vertical ground motion response spectrum (GMRS)

Page oofV1

l5CO34O-RPT-OO2, Rev. O Correspondence N R316-176 Estimation of in-cabinet seismic demand for subject components Estimation of in-cabinet seismic capacity for subject components 0 Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations Page 4ofe1

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the NRC in its March 12, 2012 50.54(f) letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1]. In particular, this report provides requested information to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [1].

1.2 BACKGROUND

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees' perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety."

EPRI 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic" [6] provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and is endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 30020043961 "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [8] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [2].

On March 31, 2014, LAS submitted a reevaluated seismic hazard to the NRC as a part of the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. By letter dated October 27, 2015 [2], the NRC transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation.

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for LAS using the methodologies in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Page 5 of 91

Correspondence N RS-I6-176 Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," as endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17,2Ol5[3].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the conclusions made as a result nf the evaluations.

1~3 APPROACH EPRl3UO2OO439G[8]ls used for the LAS engineering evaluations described ln this report. Section 4.1 of Reference [8] provided general steps to follow for the high frequency confirmation component evaluation. Accordingly, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

• LAS SSE and GIVIRSInformation

• Selection of components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation

• Estimation of seismic demand for subject components

• Estimation of seismic capacity for subject components

• Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations

~ Summary ofResults 1.4 PLANT SCREENING LAS submitted reevaluated seismic hazard information including GIVIRS and seismic hazard information to the NRCon March 31,2Ol4[4].lna letter dated April 2l,2O1S, the NRCstaff concluded that the submitted GIVIRS adequately characterizes the reevaluated seismic hazard for the LAS site for 11Seismic [14].

The NRC final screening determination letter concluded [2] that the LAS GIVIRS to SSE comparison resulted in a need to perform a High Frequency Confirmation in accordance with the screening criteria ln the SPlO[5].

1.5 REPORT Docuy0ENlATDON Section 2 describes the selection of devices. The identified devices are evaluated in Reference

[17] for the seismic demand specified in Section 3 using the evaluation criteria discussed in Section 4. The overall conclusion is discussed ln Section 5.

Table B-1 lists the devices identified in Section 2 and provides the results of the evaluations performed in accordance with Section 3 and Section 4.

Page morm1

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Selection of Components for High-Frequency Screening The fundamental objective of the high frequency confirmation review is to determine whether the occurrence of a seismic event could cause credited FLEX/mitigating strategies equipment to fail to perform as necessary. An optimized evaluation process is applied that focuses on achieving a safe and stable plant state following a seismic event. As described in Reference [8], this state is achieved by confirming that key plant safety functions critical to immediate plant safety are preserved (reactor trip, reactor vessel inventory and pressure control, and core cooling) and that the plant operators have the necessary power available to achieve and maintain this state immediately following the seismic event (AC/DC power support systems).

Within the applicable functions, the components that would need a high frequency confirmation are contact control devices subject to intermittent states in seal-in or lockout (SILO) circuits. Accordingly, the objective of the review as stated in Section 4.2.1 of Reference [8] is to determine if seismic induced high frequency relay chatter would prevent the completion of the following key functions.

2.1 REACTOR TRIP/SCRAM The reactor trip/SCRAM function is identified as a key function in Reference [8] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that "the design requirements preclude the application of SILO circuits that prevent reactor trip/SCRAM functions" and that "No high-frequency review of the reactor trip/SCRAM systems is necessary."

2.2 REACTOR VESSEL INVENTORY CONTROL The reactor coolant system/reactor vessel inventory control systems were reviewed for contact control devices in SILO circuits that would create a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The focus of the review was contact control devices that could lead to a significant leak path. Check valves in series with active valves would prevent significant leaks due to misoperation of the active valve; therefore, SILO circuit reviews were not required for those active valves.

The process/criteria for assessing potential reactor coolant leak path valves is to review all P&ID's attached to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and include all active isolation valves and any active second valve upstream or downstream that is assumed to be required to be closed during normal operation or close upon an initiating event (LOCA or Seismic). A table with the valves and associated P&ID is included in Table B-2 of this report.

Manual valves that are normally closed are assumed to remain closed and a second simple check valve is assumed to function and not be a Multiple Spurious Failure.

Page 7 of 91

I5CO348-RPT'OO2, Rev. O Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 On BVVR'sthe instrument lines that are 1" or less, in general, are assumed to have restricting orifices that are designed to mitigate any leakage due to make up.

Table 8-2 only lists the Unit 2valves. Unit 1 has equivalent valves. For example, Unit 2 valve 282l-FOI3Cls equivalent to Unit 1 valve 1B2I-FO13C.

Active Function: Afunctlon that requires mechanical motion or change of state (e.g, the closing ofe valve or relay or the change }n state ofotranslstor).

Simple Check Valve: Axalve which doses upon reverse fluid flow only.

Table B-2 contains a list of valves analyzed and the resultant devices selected which are also identified below. Devices controlling the valves listed in Table B-1 were selected based on the analysis detailed below.

Main Steam System Valves Automatic Depressurization Valves IB21-FOl3C/D/E/R/5/U/\,ZB2I-FOI8C/D/E/R/S/U/V; Safety Relief Valves 1B2l- FOl3F/H/K/L/M/P,Z821'FO13F/H/K/L/W1/P.

Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via relays controlled by the Auto Depressurization Logic /A/B Solenoids ofl/2821-FO13C/D/E/R/3/U/V>, the Low-Low Setpolnt Relief Logic (8/C Solenoids of1/2B22'FOI3C/D/E/K/P/S/U),or reactor pressure (C Solenoids uf l/2B21-FO13F/H/L/M/R/V)[32, pp. 7.3'7].

The Auto Depressurization Logic can seal in via contacts onI/2B2lC-K4A/B,I/2B21[-KOA/8[93, 34,35,36]. The input logic to 1/ 2 821C-K4A/B and l/2B22C-KOA/8ls via several diverse contacts. It is unlikely that coincident chatter would occur simultaneously in each of these input contacts in a way that would cause 1/2B21C-K4A/B and 1/2B21C-K8A/B to both seal in, and for this reason these input devices are not included in the analysis. Relays 1/2B2IC-K7A/Band l/2B2IC-K6A/B are slaves toI/2B21C'K4A/8 and 1/2B2IC'K0A/8 and do not seal-in ontheir own, thus do not meet selection criteria.

Any chatter which could energize the coil of the Low-Low 3etpolnt Relief auxiliary relay associated with the B/C Solenoid-operated pilot valve, and also seal ln the Low-Low Setpo}nt Relief Logic, could cause the valve to open and remain open [37,38,39,4D]. This could happen if a combination of two of the following relays chatter simultaneously: 1/2B21C'K54A/8, 1/ 2 B21C-K55A/B,I/2B31C-K56A/B,1/2B2IC'K57A/8,1/2B21C-K66A/B,1/2B21C-K68A/B, 1/2B21C-K69A/B, 1/ 2 B21C-K70A/8,1/2B21C-K71A/B,1/2821C'K72A/B,1/2B21C'K75A/B, l/282lC-K7GA/8;or the pressure switches PS-l/2BN2l-NO39C/CC,PS-1/2BN21-NO39O/DD,PS' 1/2BN22-NO39E/EE,PS-1/2BN21-NO39K/KK,PS-1/2131\12I'1\103913/1313,PS-1/2BN21-NO395/BS,PS' 1/28N2I'NO39U/UU,orPS-1/2BN21-NO60U/UU[41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48](U2),[49,50,51, 52,53,54,55,56](U2).

Chatter in the pressure switch of the pressure-controlled C Solenoids may cause the valve to momentarily open, however there is no seal-in of this pressure signal and the valves would redoae after the period of strong shaking [42,43,44`45,5O,5I,52,53]. Thus none ofthese pressure switches meet the selection criteria.

Main Steam Isolation Valves l821'F02%A/8/C/D,1821'FD28A/8/[/D,2821-FO22A/B/C/D, 2B21-FO28A/8/C/D.

The solenoid-operated pilot valves of these normally-open valves are energized to keep the valves open. Chatter in the auxiliary relays controlling these valves [57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, Page oo,m1

Rev O Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 64](Ul),[65,66 67 88,69,70 7l,72](U2),orln the Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Logic [73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, BO] could cause the valves to dose, vvhloh is e beneficial effect. If an isolation signal is generated, no relay chatter would cause these valves to remain open after the period of strong shaking. For this reason, no devices controlling these valves meet the selection criteria.

Main Steam Drain Valves I132I-FOI6,I8J1-FO19,IQ2l-FOG7A/B/C/C\2B22-FOl6,2B21-FOI9,2B21-FOG7A/8/C/O.

These motor-operated valves are normally open and chatter in the opening control circuit is blocked by open rugged limit and torque switches [8l,82,83,84]. Chatter ln the closing contactor auxiliary contacts or the isolate signal relay contacts could cause valve closure, however this effect ls beneficial as far as leak-path lsconcerned. All other contact devices lnthe closing circuit are rugged.

Feedumatermnd Zinc System Valves Valves ]821-FOl1A/B,2821-FO1IA/8.

Based on the P&lD [05, 86], these are normally open manual valves without electrical controls. This removes these valves from consideration as a potential RCS leak path resulting from high-frequency seismic effects.

Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirculation Valves Reactor Recirculation Pump Discharge Valves lB33-FO67A/B,2833-FOB7A/B.

These valves are normally open and chatter in the opening control circuit is blocked by open rugged limit and torque switches [O7,88]. Chatter ln the closing contactor auxiliary contacts could cause valve closure, however this effect is beneficial as far as leak-path is concerned.

Chatter of other devices in the close circuit would only have a temporary effect on valve closure and thus does not meet the selection criteria [89,9O,9l,92].

Reactor Recirculation Flow Control Valves IB33-F080//B,2B33-FD60A/B.

These valves are controlled by hand switches via a solid-state positioning system [93, 94, 95, 96].

There are no vulnerable SILO contact devices which may hold these valves in the open position.

Reactor Recirculation Pump Suction Valves lB39-FO23A/B,2B33-FUZ3A/B.

These motor-operated valves are normally open and chatter in the opening control circuit is blocked by open rugged limit and torque switches [97,98,99,I00]. Chatter ln the closing contactor auxiliary contacts could cause valve closure, however this effect is beneficial as far as leak-path lsconcerned. All other contact devices ln the closing circuit are rugged.

Residual Heat Removal System Valves Containment Spray Valves 1EI2'FO16A/B,lE12-FOl7A/B,2El2'FO16A/8,3E12-FOl7A/B.

These motor-operated valves are normally closed and controlled by hand switches with permissive contacts ln the opening circuit [lO1,1O2,lO3,1O4,IO5,1O6]. Chatter /n the auxiliary contact of the 42-0 opening contactor could bypass the permissive and control switch and seal-in the contactor, which would open the valve. Chatter in the opening permissive contacts are blocked bya rugged control switch. Chatter ln the closing circuit is blocked by open and rugged limit and torque switches.

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15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Residual Heat Removal Suction Cooling Isolation Valves 1E12-F008, 1E12-F009, 2E12-F008, 2E12-F009.

These motor-operated valves are normally closed and controlled by hand switches with an isolate signal permissive contact in the opening circuit [107, 108, 109, 110]. In the absence of an isolation signal, chatter in the auxiliary contact of the 42-0 opening contactor could bypass the control switch and seal-in the contactor, which would open the valve. The inboard isolation valve, 1/2E12-F009, also has an interposing auxiliary relay CR1. Chatter in the contact of this relay could also lead to seal-in of the opening contactor. Chatter in the closing circuit is blocked by open and rugged limit and torque switches.

Reactor Water Clean-Up System Valves Reactor Water Clean-Up System Isolation Valves 1G33-F001, 2G33-F001; Reactor Water Clean-Up Vessel Drain Line Recirculation Valves 1034101, 2G33-F101.

Per the MID these motor-operated valves are normally open [111, 112]. Chatter in the opening control circuit is blocked by open rugged limit and torque switches [113, 114, 115, 116]. Chatter in the closing contactor auxiliary contacts could cause valve closure, however this effect is beneficial as far as leak-path is concerned. All other contact devices in the closing circuit are rugged.

Reactor Water Clean-Up Line Suction Inside Containment Valves 1G33-F102, 2G33-F102.

These are normally-open motor operated valves controlled by rugged hand switches [113, 115]. There is no seal-in associated with the control of these valves.

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Valves Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Isolation Valves 1E51-F063, 1E51-F008, 2E51-F063, 2E51-F008.

These normally-open motor-operated valves are required to remain open to supply steam to the RCIC Turbine, which powers the AC-Independent Core Cooling System credited in Section 2.4 below, and for the Phase 1 FLEX Response. There is no seal-in in the opening circuit, and closure, if needed, is not blocked by SILO [117, 118, 119, 120]. Inadvertent closure of these valves is covered in the RCIC chatter analysis in Section 5.3.7 of Ref. [18].

Page 10 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002 Rev.O Correspondence N 115-16-176 2.3 REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE CONTROL The reactor vessel pressure control function b identified asa key function lnReference [8]hobe considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that "required post eventpressuneoontnollatypicailyprovldedbvpassNedevlces"andthat"nospecUDchlgh frequency component chatter review is required for this function."

2.4 CORE COOLING The core cooling systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that would prevent at least a single train of non-AC power driven decay heat removal from functioning. LaSalle credits their steam turbine-driven Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RClC) Pump to provide core decay-heat cooling.

The selection of contact devices for the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) overlaps with the RCS/Reactor Vessel Inventory Control Category. Refer to Section 2.2 for more information on the analysis of contact devices for these valves.

The selection of contact devices for RCIC was based on the premise that RCIC operation is desired, thus any SILO which would lead to RCIC operation is beneficial and thus does not meet the criteria for selection. Only contact devices which could render the RClC system inoperable were considered.

The largest vulnerability to RClC operation following e seismic event is contact chatter leading to a false RCl[ Isolation Signal or false Turbine Trip. Afalse steam line break trip has the potential to delay RClCoperatlon while confirmatory inspections are being made. Chatter lnthe contacts oftheRClClsoladonSlgnolRelayl/ZMA-K15,theStearnL/neHlghDlfferentialPressureTlrne DelayRelayl/2E51A-K47,theLeakDeteotionRelay1/2E3lArK2A^ortheTurbineExheusL Diaphragm High Pressure Relay 1/2E51A-K29; or coincident chatter in the Reactor Pressure Relays 1/2E5IA-K54 and 1/2ESlA-K55; may lead toaROC Isolation Signal and seal-in of I/2E51A,K15 [19, 20]. This would cause the RClC Isolation Valves to dose and the RClCTrlp and Throttle Valve totrip. Similar chatter ln the devices that drive those relays could also lead to seal-ln:l/2E3l-NO22/,I/2E31'NO22C,I/2E51-NO12/,l/2E51-NO12C and 1/2E32'ROOlC[l9, 21,20,22,23, 24]. (The four-second time delay associated with 1/2E51A-K47 will block chatter on differential pressure switch l/2E3l-NOI3AA,soitlsexduded.) The same rationale applies to the identical Division 3 devices: I/2E51A-K33, 1/ 2E51A-K48,1/2E5lArK33,l/3E3IA-K2B, 1/ 2E51A-K99,1/2E51A-K57,I/2E51A-K58,1/2E3I-NO228,1/2E31-NO22D,I/2E51-NOI28, I/2ES1-NO12O and 2/2E31-ROO2C[25,26,27,28].

Any chatter that may lead to the energization of the Trip and Throttle Valve Remote Trip Circuit is considered as SILO as it will close the valve and require a manual reset prior to restoration of the ROCsystem. Chatter in Turbine Trip Auxiliary Relay 1/2E51A-K8, or in the devices which control this relay; the Turbine Exhaust High Pressure Relay 1/2E51A-K6, the Pump Suction Low Pressure Relay 1/2E51A-K7, and the Isolation Signal Relays 1/2E5lA-K15, and 1/JE51A,K6O[15];

could cause seal-in ofK8 resulting lna turbine trip. Similar chatter in the contact devices that drive those relays (and not already covered in the RCIC Isolation Signal analysis) could also lead toa turbine trip: 1/2E51-NOO9A\1/2E51-NOO98, and 1/ 2 E5l-NOOG[29,3O].

LoSolle'sE5EL development ls documented lnMLI4353AO85[3l]. The contact devices selected as part of that effort appear ln Table B-2. For more information on the E3EL selection process and the complete ESEL refer to Ref. [31].

Page 11 of 91

Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 The /Cand DC power support systems were reviewed for contact control devices in SlU]

circuits that prevent the availability ofDCand AC power sources. The following AC and DC power support systems were reviewed:

° Emergency Diesel Generators,

° Battery Chargers,

° Unlnterruptable Power Supplies,

= EDG Ancillary Systems, and

° 3vvltchgeor, Load Centers, and W4CCs.

Electrical povver, especially DC, is necessary to support achieving and maintaining a stable plant condition following a seismic event. DC power relies on the availability ofAC power torecharge the batteries. The availability of AC power is dependent upon the Emergency Diesel Generators and their ancillary support systems. EPRl3OO2OO4396[Q] requires confirmation that the supply of emergency power ls not challenged bya SILO device. The tripping nf lockout devices or circuit breakers is expected to require some level of diagnosis to determine if the trip was spurious due to contact chatter orln response toan actual system fault. The actions taken to diagnose the fault condition could substantially delay the restoration of emergency power.

In order to ensure contact chatter cannot compromise the emergency power system, control circuits were analyzed for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG), Battery Chargers, Vital AC Inverters, and Switchgear/Load Centers/MCCs as necessary for Power Supply from EDGs to Battery Chargers and EDG Ancillary Systems. General information on the arrangement ofsafety-related AC and DC systems, as well as operation of the EDGs, was obtained from La3alle's UFSAR

[32]. LaSalle has five (5)EDGo which provide emergency power to their Class 1E loads ontheir two (2) units. The overall emergency power distribution is shown on the station One-Line Diagrams [12l,132,I23,124,125,128].

The analysis necessary to identify contact devices in this category relies on conservative worse-case initial conditions and presumptions regarding event progression. The analysis considers the reactor is operating at power with no equipment failures or LOCA prior to the seismic event.

The Emergency Diesel Generators are not operating but are available. The seismic event ls presumed to cause a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and a normal reactor SCRAM.

In response to bus undervoltage relaying detecting the LOOP, the Class 1E control systems must automatically shed loads, start the EDGs, and sequentially load the diesel generators as designed. Ancillary systems required for EDG operation as well as Class 1E battery chargers and inverters must function asnecessary. The goal nf this analysis lsto identify any vulnerable contact devices which could chatter during the seismic event, seal-in or lock-out, and prevent these systems from performing their intended safety-related function of supplying electrical power during the LOOP.

The following sections contain a description of the analysis for each element of the AC/DC Support Systems. Contact devices are identified by description in this narrative and apply to both divisions. The contact devices selected aa part of that effort appear ln Table B-1.

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l5CO348'RPT'DO2, Rev. O Correspondence N RS-16-176 Emercjency Diesel Generators The analysis of the Emergency Diesel Generatons,DGO OG1A,OG1B,DGJA, and DG28,lsdivided into two sections, generator protective relaying and diesel engine control. General descriptions of these systems and controls appear ln the UFSAR[32].

Generator Protective Relaying The DG 0 Circuit Breaker ACB1413 (ACB2413) is tripped by DG Lockout Relay 86DGO. If this lockout relay is tripped the circuit breaker will not close automatically during the LOOP [127, 128]. The Diesel Generator Lockout Relay 86DGO may be tripped by chatter in both engine and generator-related fault circuits. Chatter in engine-related fault circuits are covered below.

Chatter in the following generator protective and auxiliary relays may trip the lockout relay:

Differential Overcurrent 87, 87X; Neutral Ground 59, K59X1; Frequency 81, 81X; Overcurrent with Voltage Restraint 5IV,5IVX; Reverse Power 3Z,K32X; and Field Excitation 4O,K25[129, 130]. The lockout relays for the DG1A and DG 2A circuit breakers have identical control logic as DGO and are susceptible to chatter ln the same devices [l31,132,133,134,185,136].

The DG 1B Circuit Breaker ACB1433 and DG 2B Circuit Breaker ACB2433 are tripped by the Engine Lockout Relay K15, the Generator Lockout Relay K1, and the 86-N Normal Power Feed Lockout Relay [187,l38]. The engine lockout relay is covered below. The generator lockout relay may be tripped by chatter in the following protective relays: Differential Overcurrent K30A/B/C; Reverse Power K32; and Overcurrent with Voltage Restraint K35A/B/C coincident with Time Delay Relay K5[l39,14O]. The normal feed lockout relay may be tripped by chatter ln the uvercurrent relays 5l(A/8/C)[l4l,142].

Diesel Engine Control Tripping of the DG 0 Lockout Relay trips the generator breaker and energizes the engine shutdown solenoid [143, 144]. The engine fault devices that may trip the lockout relays are:

Failure to Start K39,K9; Engine OverspeedS8,K1O; Oil Pressure K11; and Oil Temperature Sl1, K12 [130]. The oil pressure switch changes state during engine start. Time delay relay K33 blocks the oil pressure fault during engine start. Chatter lnK33 may cause engine shutdown due toan erroneous oil pressure fault. Other than devices which could trip the lockout breaker, there are no SILO devices which would prevent diesel start after the period of strong shaking ends. The control logic for DG 1A and DG 2A is identical to DG 0 and is sensitive to chatter in the same devices [145,132,133,148,135,l33].

Tripping of either the generator or engine lockout relays onDG1BorDG2B will energize the engine shutdown relay. The engine fault devices which could trip the engine lockout relay on DG 1B or DG 2B are identical in design and nomenclature as the other three diesel generators

[147,14O].

Battery Chargers The Control Circuits for Battery Chargers contain a high voltage shutdown circuit [149] which is intended to protect the batteries and DC loads from output overvoltage due to charger failure

[150,151,152,153,154,155,156,157]. Chatter ln the contacts of these output relays may disable the battery chargers, and for this reason meet the selection criteria.

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I5CO948-RPT-O02, Rev. O Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Anal ysis of schematics for the Unlnterruptable Power Supplies [I58,159,l60,I61, 162,]63]did not indicate any SILO contact devices.

In order to start and operate the Emergency Diesel Generators, a number of components and systems are required. For the purpose of identifying electrical contact devices, only systems and components which are electrically controlled are analyzed. Information in the UFSAR [32] was used as appropriate for this analysis.

Starting A~

Based on Diesel Generator availability as an initial condition the passive air reservoirs are presumed pressurized and the only active components in this system required to operate are the air start solenoids [l64,l8S,l66,32, pp. 9.5-37], which are covered under the EDGengine control analysis ln Section above.

Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust The combust i on air intake and exhaust for the Diesel Generators are passive systems [164, 165, 166 32, pp. 9.5-42] which do not rely on electrical control.

1ube Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical lubrication oil pumps [I67,32, pp. 9.5-4O] which do not rely on electrical control.

Fuel Oil The Diesel Generators utilize self-driven pumps to supply fuel oil to the engines from the day tanks; and the system requires no electrical power to supply fuel to the diesel engine during starting and initial operation []3, pp. 9.5'32]. The day tanks are re-supplied using AC-powered Diesel 0l Transfer Pumps [168, I69]. Chatter analysis of the control circuits for the fuel oil transfer pumps [l7O,I71,I72] concluded they do not include SILO devices.

Cooling Wate The Diesel Generator Cooling Water System consists of two loops, engine water and cooling water [32, pp. 9.5'34]. Engine driven pumps are credited for engine water when the engine ls operating. Those mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control. Cooling water flow is provided bv the Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pumps [I73,I74,17S,I76,175,277]. These pumps are controlled by the DG start circuit via the speed switch auxiliary relay K18. This control circuit ls covered in Section above.

Ventilation Ventilation for each [OG room /s achieved via a vent fan [32, pp. 9.4-S4]. These components are controlled by room temperature [178,179,I8O]. Strong shaking may temporarily prevent fan operation however there is no SILO associated with this circuit and fan operation would occur normally after the period of strong shaking.

Switch-gear, Load Centers, and MCCs Power distribution from the EOGs to the necessary electrical loads (Battery Chargers, Uninterruptable Power Supplies, Cooling Water Pumps, Fuel Oil Pumps, and EDG Ventilation Page 14mu1

15 Rev. O Correspondence N R3-16-178 Fans) was traced to identify any SILO devices which could lead to a circuit breaker trip and interruption lnpower. This effort excluded the EOG output circuit breakers, which are covered 1n Section above, as well as com pone nt-specifi c contactors and their control devices, which are covered ln the analysis for each component above.

The medium- and low-voltage circuit breakers ln4l6OV Busses and 4MOVAC Load Centers which are supplying power to loads identified ln this section (battery chargers, EDG ancillary systems, eto.) have been identified for evaluation. These were breakers ln the following awltchgear cubldea/connportnnents:l4lY Cubicle 9;135X Compartments 1O2B,IO3A,IO3C and 1O3O;l35Y Compartments 2O28 and 204B;l42Y Cubicle 9;l36X Compartments 3O28,3O3A, and 3O4D; I38Y Compartments 4O28 and 4O48;14S Cubicle 5;24lY Cubicle 4; 235X Compartments IO2/\

lO2C,lO2D, and lO3B; 235Y Compartments 2O1C and 2O3B;242Y Cubicle 5;230K Compartments 3O1B,3O2C, and 3O313;236Y Compartments 4OIC and 4O3B; and 243 Cubicle 5

[I8I,I82,I83,184,185,I86,187](Ul),[188,189,190,191,192,193,194]/U2>. DC Distribution uses vulnerable Low Voltage Power Circuit Breakers in the following compartments:

lDC08E Compartment 313, lDC15E Compartment 313, lDCO2E Compartment 2B, and lE22-P301A CB'G and C8-9(2DCO8E'38,2DC1SE-38,2DCO2E-2B, and 2E22-P3OlAC8-6 and CB-9); for the Distribution Panel and MCC Feeds [l95,196,I97,l98,199,2OO,2Ol,2O2]. The circuit breakers that feed the battery charger outputs to the DC Buses (1DC08E-2A, 1DC15E-2A, 1DC15E-2D, IDCO2E-lA,2OCOOE-2A,2OCI5E-2A,2DCl5E-2C\2O[O2E-1A) use rugged Molded-Case Circuit Breakers per the walkdown described in Attachment 9.2, and thus are not selected for seismic evaluation. WqC[8s in low voltage Motor Control Center Buckets were considered rugged as The only circuit breakers affected bv protective relaying (not already covered) were those that distribute power from the 4160V Busses to the 4160/480V step-down transformers. An analysis of the control circuits for these circuit breakers indicates that chatter in the 51 Phase Overcurrent Relays or the 51G Ground Overcurrent Relay or 51N Neutral Overcurrent Relays in the trip circuits of these breakers could cause circuit breaker tripping [203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 2.6

SUMMARY

OF SELECTED COMPONENTS The investigation of high-frequency contactdevicasasdeacrbedebovevvasperfonnedinRef

[l8].A list of the contact devices requiring a high frequency confirmation ls provided /n Appendix 8, Table B-1. The identified devices are evaluated in Ref. [17] per the methodology/description of Section 3 and 4. Results are presented in Section 5 and Table B-1.

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15C0348-RPT-002 Rev.O Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Per Reference [8], Sect. 4.3, the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand onthe subject components in the horizontal direction is the LAS horizontal ground motion response spectrum (GIVIRS), which was generated es part of the LAS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report

[4] submitted to the NRCon March 31~ 2O14` and accepted bv the NRCon April 21,2O15[l4].

It is noted in Reference [8] that o Foundation Input Response Spectrum (FIRS) may be necessary to evaluate buildings whose foundations are supported at elevations different than the Control Point elevation. However, for sites founded on rock, per Ref. [8], "The Control Point GMRS developed for these rock sites are typically appropriate for all rock-founded structures and addltlonalFlRSeetlrnatesorenotdeemnadnecessaryfor1hehlQhfrequencyconfirnnatloneffort."

The applicable buildings at LAS are founded on rock; therefore, the Control Point GIVIRS is representative of the input at the building foundation.

The horizontal GIVIRS values are provided in Table 3-2.

3.2 VERTICAL SEISMIC DEMAND As described in Section 3.2 of Reference. [8], the horizontal GIVIRS and site soil conditions are used to calculate the vertical GIVIRS (VGW1RS), which ls the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the vertical direction.

The site's soil mean shear wave velocity vs. depth profile is provided in Reference. [4], Table 2.3.2-1 and reproduced below in Table 3-1.

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15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 3-1: Soil Mean Shear Wave Velocity Vs. Depth Profile Depth Depth Thickness, Vs, Vs30 Layer d,/Vs, E [d,/Vs,]

(ft) (m) d, (ft) (ft/sec) (ft/s) 1 5.5 1.7 5.5 663 8.30E-03 8.30E-03 2 11 3.4 5.5 663 8.30E-03 1.66E-02 3 16.5 5.0 5.5 663 8.30E-03 2.49E-02 4 22 6.7 5.5 663 8.30E-03 3.32E-02 5 27.6 8.4 5.5 663 8.30E-03 4.15E-02 6 33.1 10.1 5.5 663 8.30E-03 4.98E-02 7 38.6 11.8 5.5 663 8.30E-03 5.81E-02 8 44.1 13.4 5.5 663 8.30E-03 6.64E-02 9 49.6 15.1 5.5 663 8.30E-03 7.47E-02 815 10 55.1 16.8 5.5 663 8.30E-03 8.30E-02 11 60.6 18.5 5.500 663 8.30E-03 9.13E-02 12 66.1 20.1 5.500 663 8.30E-03 9.95E-02 13 72.1 22.0 6.000 1694 3.54E-03 1.03E-01 14 78.1 23.8 6.000 1694 3.54E-03 1.07E-01 15 84.2 25.7 6.000 1694 3.54E-03 1.10E-01 16 90.2 27.5 6.000 1694 3.54E-03 1.14E-01 17 96.2 29.3 6.000 1694 3.54E-03 1.17E-01 18 102.0 31.1 6.000 1694 3.54E-03 1.21E-01 Using the shear wave velocity vs. depth profile, the velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m (98.43ft) to the surface of the site (Vs30) is calculated per the methodology of Reference [8], Section 3.5.

• The time for a shear wave to travel through each soil layer is calculated by dividing the layer depth (d,) by the shear wave velocity of the layer (Vs,).

• The total time for a wave to travel from a depth of 30m to the surface is calculated by adding the travel time through each layer from depths of Om to 30m (F[di/Vs,]).

• The velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface is therefore the total distance (30m) divided by the total time; i.e., Vs30 = (30m)/F[d,/Vs,].

• Note: The shear wave velocity is calculated based on time it takes for the shear wave to travel 31.1m (102.Oft) instead of 30m (98.43ft). This small change in travel distance will have no impact on identifying soil class type.

The site's soil class is determined by using the site's shear wave velocity (Vs30) and the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the GMRS and comparing them to the values within Reference [8],

Table 3-1. Based on the PGA of 0.317g and the shear wave velocity of 815ft/s, the site soil class is C-Soft.

Page 17 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002 Rev.O Correspondence N R3-16-176 Once a site soil class is determined, the mean vertical vs. horizontal GIVIRS ratios (WH) at each frequency are determined by using the site soil class and its associated V/H values in Reference

[8], Table 3-2.

The vertical GIVIRS is then calculated by multiplying the mean V/H ratio at each frequency bvthe horizontal GK4RS acceleration at the corresponding frequency. It is noted that Reference [8O, Table 3-2values are constant between O.2Hz and 15Hz.

The V/H ratios and VGIVIRS values are provided ln Table 3-2of this report.

Figure 3-1 below provides a plot of the horizontal GIVIRS, V/H ratios, and vertical GIVIRS for LAS.

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15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 3-2: Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra Frequency (Hz) HGMRS (g) WH Ratio VGMRS (g) 100 0.317 0.94 0.298 90 0.324 1.01 0.327 80 0.331 1.09 0.361 70 0.341 1.18 0.402 60 0.354 1.24 0.439 50 0.373 1.28 0.477 45 0.389 1.3 0.505 40 0.404 1.23 0.497 35 0.426 1.13 0.481 30 0.454 1.03 0.468 25 0.486 0.91 0.442 20 0.507 0.79 0.401 15 0.574 0.7 0.402 12.5 0.635 0.7 0.445 10 0.695 0.7 0.487 9 0.686 0.7 0.480 8 0.664 0.7 0.465 7 0.627 0.7 0.439 6 0.572 0.7 0.400 5 0.517 0.7 0.362 4 0.491 0.7 0.344 3.5 0.480 0.7 0.336 3 0.461 0.7 0.323 2.5 0.428 0.7 0.300 2 0.403 0.7 0.282 1.5 0.330 0.7 0.231 1.25 0.284 0.7 0.199 1 0.232 0.7 0.162 0.9 0.214 0.7 0.150 0.8 0.193 0.7 0.135 0.7 0.169 0.7 0.118 0.6 0.143 0.7 0.100 0.5 0.118 0.7 0.083 0.4 0.094 0.7 0.066 0.35 0.082 0.7 0.058 0.3 0.071 0.7 0.049 0.25 0.059 0.7 0.041 0.2 0.047 0.7 0.033 0.15 0.035 0.7 0.025 0.125 0.029 0.7 0.021 0.1 0.024 0.7 0.016 Page 19 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 0.80 -- ---- 1.40 1

VGMRS I ~

0.70 1.30 HGMRS 1 ~

V/H Ratio (C-Soft) N 1.20 0.60 1.10 p 0.50 u

p 1.00 c~

0.40 0.90 a) v Q 0.30 0.80 0.20 0.70 0.10 0.60 0.00 0.50 0.1 1 10 100 Frequency [Hzj Figure 3-1 Plot of the Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra and V/H Ratios Page 20 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 3.3 COMPONENT VERTICAL SEISMIC DEMAND The component vertical demand is determined using the peak acceleration of the VGMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz and amplifying it using the following two factors:

• Vertical in-structure amplification factor AFsv to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the host building's foundation

• Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor AFC to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AFsv is derived from Figure 4-4 in Reference [8]. The in-cabinet vertical amplification factor, AFC is derived in Reference [8] and is 4.7 for all cabinet types.

3.4 COMPONENT HORIZONTAL SEISMIC DEMAND Per Reference [8] the peak horizontal acceleration is amplified using the following two factors to determine the horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum:

• Horizontal in-structure amplification factor AFsH to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the host building's foundation.

• Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor AFC to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.).

The in-structure amplification factor AFsH is derived from Figure 4-3 in Reference [8]. The in-cabinet horizontal amplification factor, AFC is associated with a given type of cabinet construction. The three general cabinet types are identified in Reference [8] and Appendix I of EPRI NP-7148-SL [13] assuming 5% in-cabinet response spectrum damping. EPRI NP-7148-SL [13]

classified the cabinet types as high amplification structures such as switchgear panels and other similar large flexible panels, medium amplification structures such as control panels and control room benchboard panels and low amplification structures such as motor control centers.

All of the electrical cabinets containing the components subject to high frequency confirmation (see Table B-1 in Appendix B) can be categorized into one of the in-cabinet amplification categories in Reference [8] as follows:

LAS Motor Control Centers are typical motor control center cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections. Each section is a relatively narrow cabinet structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 4.5 that allow the cabinet framing to be efficiently used in flexure for the dynamic response loading, primarily in the front-to-back direction. This results in higher frame stresses and hence more damping which lowers the cabinet response. In addition, the subject components are not located on large unstiffened panels that could exhibit high local amplifications. These cabinets qualify as low amplification cabinets.

LAS Switchgear cabinets are large cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections typical of the high amplification cabinet category. Each section is a wide box-type structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 1.5 and may include wide stiffened panels. This results in lower stresses and hence less damping which increases the enclosure response. Components can be mounted on the wide panels, which results in the higher in-cabinet amplification factors.

Page 21 of 91

15 Rev. O Correspondence No RS-18-176

• LAS Control cabinets are in a lineup of several interconnected sections with moderate width. Each section consists of structures with height-to-depth ratios of about 3 which results in moderate frame stresses and damping. The response levels are mid-range between MCCs and switchgear and therefore these cabinets can be considered in the medium amplification category.

Page 22 of 91

Rev O Correspondence N R5-16'I76 Per Reference [8], seismic capacities (the highest seismic test level reached by the contact device without chatter or other malfunction) for each subject contact device are determined by the following procedures:

(I) If a contact device was tested as part of the EPRI High Frequency Testing program [7],

then the component seismic capacity from this program is used.

(2) lfa contact device was not tested as part of[7], then one or more ofthe followi ng means to determine the component capacity were used:

(a) Device-specific seismic test reports (either from the station or from the SQURTS testing program.

(b) Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) capacities per [9], [10], [11], and (d Assembly (e~~ electrical cabinet) tests where the component functio n al performance was monitored.

(3) The exist i ng stat i on procedure is used for contact devices where operator action can resolve any inadvertent actuation of the essential components.

The high-frequency capacity of each device was evaluated with the component mounting point demand from Section 3 using the criteria in Section 4.5 of Reference [8].

A summary of the high-frequency evaluation conclusions is provi ded in Table B-1 in Appendix B of this report.

Page 23 of 91

Correspondence N RS-I6-176 5.1 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS LAS has performed a High Frequency Confirmation evaluation in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [l] using the methods lnEPRl report 3OO2OO4396[8].

The evaluation identified a total of 363 components that required seismic high frequency evaluation. As summarized in Table B-1 in Appendix B, 360 of the devices have adequate seismic capacity. The remaining 3 devices are adequate despite their seismic capacities' being less than seismic demand because any chatter in these 3 devices can be resolved by LAS operator actions.

5.2 IDENTIFICATION OF FOLLOW-Up ACTIONS No follow-up actions were identified.

Page 24 of 91

Correspondence N RS-16-176 NRC(E Leeds and M. Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.l,Z.S and 9.Suf the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession Number MLI2053A340 NRC (W. Dean) Letter to the Power Reactor Licensees on the Enclosed List. "Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the FukuyhlrnaDaAchlAouldent." October 27,2Ol5, ADAMS Accession Number MLI5194AOI5 8 NRC (J. Davis) Letter to Nuclear Energy Institute (A. Mauer). "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396, "High Frequency Program:

AppllcatlonGuldonoeforFunctlonalConOrrnatlonondFraQUlty.'"Septenmber17,2O15, ADAMS Accession Number ML1521MA5G9 4 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report ln Response tothe 5O.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic for LaSalle County Station, Unit 2 and 2 dated March 3I,ZOl4, ADAMS Accession Number 5 EPRlIOl5lO9, "Program on Technology Innovation: Seismic Screening ofComponents Sensitive to High-Frequency Vibratory K4otions." October 2OO7 G EPRl1OJ52B7, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic." February 2013 7 EPRl3OO2O02997, "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing 5umnmnary."

September 2014 8 EPRI 3002004396, "'High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation." July 2Ol5 9 EPRlNP-7l47-SL, -Seismic Ruggedness ofReloys." August 1992 lD EPRlNP'7l47'SLV2, Addendum I,"Selsmnic Ruggedness ofRe/ays", September 1993 Il EPRlNP-7147-6LV2, Addendum 2, "Seismic Ruggedness ofRelays", April l995 12 EPRlNP-7147S[lUG Advisory 2OO4'O2."RelayGERSCorreotlons." September 1O,ZOO4 13 EPRI NP-7148-SL, "Procedure for Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functlonallty",199O 14 NRC (F. Vega) Letter to LaSalle County Station (B. Hanson), "LaSalle County Station, Units I and 2 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 5[\ Section 5O.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the FukushlnmoOai-lchi Accident (TAC NOS. MF3881 and W1F38M2)" April 21,2O15,ADAMS Accession Number MLl5Ol3A132 Page 25ofm

25CO34B-RPT-OO2, Rev. O Correspondence N R3-16-178 15 Recommendations For Enhancing Reactor Safety inthe 21't Century, "The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insig hts from the FukushimaDaAchl Accident" July ~2011, ADAMS Accession Number MLLIl8818O7 16 NB I2-06, Rev. 2, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategi es (FLEX) Implementation Guide" 17 15CO348-CAL-001, Rev. 0, "'High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation ofRelays."

18 15CO348-RPT-OO1, Rev. 1, "Selection uf Relays and Switches for High Frequency Seismic Evaluatlon" 19 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4226AD Rev. AA, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E51) Part 4 ZO LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4226AD Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E51) Part 4 21 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4226AE Rev. AE, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E51) Part 5 22 LaSalle Drawing lE-2-4226AE Rev. AD, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl (E51) Part 23 LaSalle Drawing lE-1-4224AC Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Leak Detection System LD(E31)

Part 34 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4224AC Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Leak Detection System LD (E31)

Part 25 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4226AF Rev. AK, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E51) Part 6 26 LaSalle Drawing 2E-2'4226AF Rev. AA, Schematic Olograrn Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E51) Part 6 27 LaSalle DravvlnglE-l-4224AD Rev. O, Schematic Diagram Leak Detection System LD(E3l)

Part 28 LaSalle UrovvlngIE-2-4224AO Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Leak Detection System LD(E3l)

Part 29 LaSalle Drawi ng 1E-1-4226AC Rev. Z, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E5I) Part 3 30 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4226AC Rev. AA, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E51) Part 3 31 LaSalle County Station, Unit I and 2, "Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report" December 19,2O24,ADAMS Accession Number ML14353AO85 32 LaSalle Report, "Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UF3AR)," Revision 22, April 2O15.

33 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4201AB Rev. U, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB (1321C) Part 34 LaSalle Drawing IE 2'4202AH Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(82lC) Part O 35 LoSollc Oravvlng2E-2-42O2AB Rev. K, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(821C) Part 2 36 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4201AH Rev. H, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(B2lC) Part 8 Page 26oym

Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 37 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4201AN Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System N8/82IC1 Part 13 38 LaSalle Drawing 1 E-1-420IAP Rev. D, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System N8(B2IC) Part l4 89 LaSalle Dnavvlng1E-2-42O1AN Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System N8(B21C) Part I3 40 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4201AP Rev. C, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System N8(B2lC) Part l4 41 LaSalle Drawing lE-l-42OlAC Rev. AC, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(82IC) Part 42 LaSalle Dravvlng1E-l-42O1AD Rev. AG, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(82lC) Part 4 43 LaSalle Drawing IE-1-4201AE Rev. Z, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB (B21C) Part 44 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4201AF Rev. AD, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(82lC) Part 6 45 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4201AG Rev. W, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB (B21C) Part 46 LaSalle Dravvlng1E-l-42OlAJ Rev. l, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System N8(B22C) Part 9 47 LaSalle Drawing IE-I-42O1AKRev. H, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(B21C) Part 1O 48 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4201AR Rev. 1, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(82l[) Part lG 49 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4201AC Rev. U, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System N8(B2lC) Part 3 SO LaSalle DravvlnglE-2-42OlAO Rev. X, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(B21C) Part 4 51 LaSalle Drawing IE'2-4201AE Rev. l[Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(B21C) Part S SZ LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4201AF Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(B2IC) Part 6 53 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4201AG Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System N8(B21C) Part 54 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4201AJ Rev. E, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(B21C) Part 9 55 LaSalle Drawing lE-2-42O1AKRev. E, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(BJ1C) Part lO 56 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-420IAR Rev. F, Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System NB(82IC) Part 1§ 57 LaSalle Drawing lE-l-42O3AB Rev. \, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NB B21 Part 50 LaSalle Drawing 1E-l-42O3AC Rev. X, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NBB2l Part 3 Page 27 of 91

lSCO34Q-RPT-OO2, Rev. O Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 59 LaSalle Drawing lE-I-42O3AD Rev. \, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System N882l Part 4 50 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-42O3AE Rev. W, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NBB21 Part S 61 LaSalle Onavvlng 1E-I-4203AF Rev. X, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System N8 B21 Part 62 LaSalle DrovvlngIE-1-42O3AG Rev. X, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System N8B2l Part 7 63 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4209AH Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram Main 5teonn Nuclear Boiler System NB82l Part 8 64 LaSalle Dravvlng1E-l-42D3AJ Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram Main Stearn Nuclear Boiler System NBB21 Part 9 65 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-42O3AB Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NBB2I Part 2 66 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4203AC Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NBB2l Part 3 87 LaSalle Drawing IE'2-4203AO Rev. U, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System N8B22 Part 4 68 LaSalle Oravving1E-2-42O3AE Rev. U, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NB821 Part 5 89 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-42O3AF Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System N8B2l Part 5 70 LaSalle Drawing lE-2-42O3AG Rev. T, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System N8B2l Part 7 71 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-42O3AH Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NB821 Part 8 72 LaSalle DrevvlnglE-2'42O3AJ Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NB82I Part 9 73 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4232AB Rev. AA, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System PC821H Part 2 74 LaSalle Drawing IE-1-4232AC Rev. AF, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System PCB21H Part 3 75 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4232AD Rev. AG, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System PC821H Part 4 76 LaSalle Drawing IE-1-4232AE Rev. AD, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System PCB22H Part 5 77 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4232AB Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System PC82lH Part 2 78 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4232AC Rev. U, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System PC8J1H Part 3 79 LaSalle Drawing lE-2-4232AD Rev. \, Schematic Diagram Primary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation System PCB21H Part 4 80 LaSalleDravvlng1E-2'4232AERev.S,DchernaticDiagramnPrimaryContalnmentand Reactor Vessel Isolation System PCB2lH Part 5 Page 28 of 91

I5CO34M-RPT-OO2, Rev. O Correspondence N R3I8-176 81 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4203A Rev. L Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NB(B2l) Part 1I 82 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4203AM Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NB(B2l) Part 1Z 83 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4203AL Rev. F, Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System N8(B2l) Part 1l 84 LaSalle Drawing lE-2-42O3AM Rev. ], Schematic Diagram Main Steam Nuclear Boiler System NB (B21) Part 12 85 LaSalle Drawing M-57 Sheet 1 Rev. T,PbklDFeedvvater and Zinc QG LaSalle DnavvlnQ M-118 Sheet l Rev. O, P/&lD Feedvvater and Zinc 87 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4205BC Rev. J, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B33) Part 27 88 LaSalle OnavvlnQ 1E-2-4205BC Rev. J, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B33) Part 27 89 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4205AK Rev. J, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B33) Part lO 90 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4205AV Rev. J, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B33) Part 2O 91 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4205AK Rev. H, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B33) Part IO 92 LaSa)leDrovvinglE-2-42O5AVRev.H,SchennadcDiagrannReactorRocirculatlonSystennRN (B33) Part 2O 93 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4205BR Rev. H, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B33) Part 4O 94 La5alleOravvlnO1E-1'42O5CARev.F,3ohennatlcDlagrarnReaotorReolrculation3ysternRR

( 833) Part 49 95 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-42O58R Rev. G, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RQ (833) Part 4O 96 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4205CA Rev. E, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B33) Part 49 97 LaSalle Drawing IE-1-4205AJ Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B38) Part 9 98 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4205AU Rev. 1, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR

( 833) Part I9 99 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4205AJ Rev. K, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (B39) Part 9 100 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4205AU Rev. H, Schematic Diagram Reactor Recirculation System RR (833) Part 19 101 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4220BE Rev. O, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(E1Z) Part 29 102 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-422OBG Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(EI2) Part 31 103 LaSalle Drawing 1E'l'422UBH Rev. Q, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(E1Z) Part 32 Page 29 of 91

Correspondence N R5-16-176 104 LaSalle Drawing lE-2-422O8E Rev. K, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(El2) Part 29 IOS LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4220BG Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(El2) Part 3l 106 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-422OBH Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(E12) Part 32 107 LaSalle Drawing IE-1-422OBC Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH (E12) Part 27 I08 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4220BD Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(El3) Part 2B 109 LaSalle Dnavvlng1E-2-422OBC Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(E12) Part 27 110 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-422OBD Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH(EI2) Part 28 111 LaSalle Drawing M-97 Sheet 1 Rev. AO, MID Reactor Water Clean-Up 112 LaSalle Drawing M-143 Sheet I Rev. A[L MID Reactor Water Clean-Up 113 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4228AO Rev. O, Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System RT(G33) Part 4 114 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4228AK Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System RT(B33) Part l0 115 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4228AD Rev. E, Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System RT(G3S) Part 4 116 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4228AK Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System RT(G33) Part 1O 1I7 LaSalleDravving1E'I'422GANRev.S,SchernatlcDlagnammReaotorCorelsolatinnCoollng System Rl(E51) Part 13 118 LaSalle Drawing IE-1-4226AX Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl (E5I) Part 22 119 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4226AN Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl(E51) Part 23 120 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4226AX Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Rl (E51) Part 22 122 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4000B Rev. N, Single Line Diagram Part 2 Standby Generators and

~~~AR0M" 122 LaSalle Drawing 1E-l-4OOOD Rev. /, Single Line Diagram 48OV Substations on3xvhzhgear 14lX and 141Y Part 4 123 LaSaUeOnavvlng1E'1'4OOOERev.A^ 3lngleUneOlaQrann4QOVSubstatlonoon5vvhzhgear l42X,142Y and l43 Part 5 124 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4000B Rev. N, Single Line Diagram Stand-By Generators and 4160V Buses Part 2 125 LaSalle Drawing 1E-Z-4OODD Rev. /\ Single Line Diagram 48OV Substation onSvvltchgear 241X and 24IY Part 4 126 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4000E Rev. A, Single Line Diagram 480V Substations on Switchgear 242X, 242Y and 243 Part 5 Page 30 of 91

Correspondence N RS-I5'176 127 LaSalle Drawing lE-O-4412AA Rev. AE, Schematic Diagram 416OVSxvbchgear141YDiesel Generator O Feed ACBI413 System DG Part l I28 LaSalle Drawing 1E-O-4412A8 Rev. AD, Schematic Diagram 418OV3vvhzhgear24lY2AP04E 0ead Generator Feed AC8 2413 System DG Pert 2 129 LaSalle Drawing 1E-0-4412AG Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 0 Generator Engine Control System DG Part 130 LaSalle Drawing 1E-0-4412AH Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 0 Generator Engine Control System DB Part 8 131 LaSalle Drawing 1E-l-4OO9AA Rev. AB, Schematic Diagram 4I6OVSwbchgaar142YDiesel Generator lA Feed ACBI428 System DG Part l 132 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4009AG Rev. Q, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1A Generator Engine Control System DG Part 133 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4009AH Rev. R, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1A Generator Engine Control System DG Part 134 LaSalle Drawing lE-2-4OO9AA Rev. Y, Schematic Diagram 41GOVSvvltohgeor242Y2APO6E Diesel Generator 2A Feed ACB2423 System DG Part l 135 LaSalleDravvlng1E-2-4OO9AGRev.[,SchennaticDlagrarnOlesalGenerator2AGenarator Engine Control System DG Part 7 136 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4009AH Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Generator Engine Control System DG Part 137 LaSalle Drawing 1E-l-4223AD Rev. T, Schematic Diagram 416OVSvvltchgearI43 Feed from Diesel Generator 1B System DG (E228) Part 138 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4223AD Rev. T, Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 243 Feed from Diesel Generator 3B System HPE22B Part 4 193 LaSalle DravvnQlE-l'4223AG Rev. L Schematic Diagram H.P.[.S. Diesel Generator 1B Protective Relaying System HP (E22B) Part 140 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4223AG Rev. L 3ohernatlo Diagram H.P.C.5. Diesel Generator 2B Protective Relaying System HPE228 Part 7 141 LaSalle Drawing lE'I~4223A8 Rev. X, Schematic Diagram 416OV5vvitchgear143lAPO7E Normal Feed AC8l432 System HPE328 Part 2 142 LaSalle Drawing 1E-24223AB Rev. R, Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 243 2AP07E Normal Feed ACB2432 System HPE228 Part 2 143 LaSalle Drawing 1E-0-4412AE Rev. W, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 0 Generator Engine Control System DG Part 144 LaSalle Drawing 1E-0-4412AF Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 0 Generator Engine Control System DG Part 145 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4009AE Rev. T, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1A Generator Engine Control System DG Part 146 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4009AE Rev. P, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2A Engine Control System DG Part 5 147 LaSalle Drawing lE-l-4223AL Rev. R, Schematic Diagram HPCSOg-lB Generator Engine Control System HP(E2JB) Part 12 148 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4223AL Rev. U, Schematic Diagram HPCS Diesel Generator 2B Generator Engine Control System HP(E228) Part ll Page murm1

15 Rev.O Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 149 LaSalle Drawing lD-1575 Rev. 7,DSL, DSH(HVS) Voltage Alarm 150 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4008AA Rev. 1, Schematic Diagram 250V DC Battery Charger I 1DO03E5ystenm DC Part 2 151 LaSalle Drawing 1E-l-4OO8AB Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Division lI25VDC Battery Main Charger lAA(1DCO9E) System DC Part 2 152 LaSalle Drawing 1E-I-4008AK Rev. F, Schematic Diagram Division 2 125V DC Battery Main Charger lBA1OCI7E System OC 153 LaSalle Drawing lE-l-4223AS Rev. G, Schematic Diagram H.P.C.3.l25VDC Battery Charger lE22-SDO1 System HP(E22B) Part l7 154 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4008AA Rev. J, Schematic Diagram 250V DC Battery Charger 2 2DCO3E System DC Part 1 155 LaSalle DravvlngIE-2-4000AB Rev. J,Schematic Diagram Division 1 I25VDC Battery Main Charger 2AA(2DCO9E) System UC Part 2 156 LaSalle Drawing 2E-2-4OO8AKRev. F, Schematic Diagram Division 2 125V DC Battery Main Charger ZBA2DCl7E System OC Part 9 157 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4223AS Rev. G, Schematic Diagram H.P.C.S.125VOC Battery Charger 2E22-SOO1 System HPE228 Part I7 158 LaSalle Drawing lE-l-4OO7AB Rev. A^ Schematic Diagram lnverterUnlnterruptible Power Supply System lP Part l 159 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4OO7AC Rev. O, Schematic Diagram SCR Battery Charger Unlnterruptlb/e Power Supply System lP Part 2 I60 LaSalle Drawing 1E-l'4453AB Rev. D, Wiring Diagram Unlnterruptlb(e Power Supply Panel llPOlE Part 2 lGI LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4007AB Rev. A, Schematic Diagram Inverter Uninterruptible Power Supply System lP Part 1 I62 LaSa/leDraxvlnglE'2-4OO7ACRev.B,Schemmat/cDiagrannSCRBatteryCherQer Uninterruptible Power Supply System lP Part 2 I63 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4453AB Rev. C, Wiring Diagram Uninterruptible Power Supply Panel 2lPOlE Part 2 164 LaSalle Drawing M-83 Sheet 1 Rev. AV, P&ID Diesel Generator Auxiliary System 165 LaSalle Drawing M-83 Sheet 2 Rev. AF, P&D Diesel Generator Auxiliary System 166 LaSalle Drawing M-83 Sheet 3 Rev. BB, P&D Diesel Generator Auxiliary System 167 LaSalle Drawing M-83 Sheet Rev. G, P&D Diesel Generator Auxiliary System 168 LaSalle Drawing M-85 Sheet 1 Rev. AE, P&lD Diesel Oil System I69 LaSalle Drawing M-132 Rev. AC, P&lO Diesel Oil System 170 LaSalle Drawing 1E'O-4428AA Rev. U, Schematic Diagram Diesel Fuel Oil System DO Part 1 171 LaSalle Drawing lE'1-4O28AA Rev. V, Schematic Diagram Diesel Fuel Oil System DO Part 1 172 LaSolleDravving2E-Z'4O26AARev.R,Schennat/cDlagrarnDieselFuelOil3ystemDOPart1 173 LaSalle Drawing 1E-0-4412AC Rev. X, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator System DG Part 3

174 LaSalle Drawing IE-1-4009AB Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator System DG Part 175 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4223AR Rev. R, Schematic Diagram HPCS DG 113 Generator Engine Control System HP E22BPart 16 Page 32 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002 Rex.O Correspondence N RS15-178 176 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4OO9AB Rev. L, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator System DGPart 2

177 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4223AR Rev. 0, Schematic Diagram High Pressure Core Spray 0S28 Generator Engine Control System HP(E228) Part l6 178 LaSalle Drawing 1E-0-4433AA Rev. M, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room Ventilation System VD Part I 179 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4072AA Rev. N, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room Ventilation System VD Part l 180 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4O72AA Rev. K, Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator Room Ventilation System VD Part I 181 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-400OAK Rev. F, Key Diagram 4160V Switchgear 141Y IAP04E 282 LaSalle Drawing 1E-I-4OOO8N Rev. C\ Key Diagram 4OOVSvvitchgear 183 LaSalle Drawing IE-l-4O0J8P Rev. G, Key Diagram 4MOVSvvltchgearI35Y 184 LaSalle Drawing lE-I-4OOOAM Rev. E, Key Diagram 41GOVSvvltohOear 185 LaSalle Drawing 2E-l-4UOO8[l Rev. F, Key Diagram 48OVSxvltchgear 186 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4OOOBR Rev. H, Key Diagram 4MOVSvvitchQear 187 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4DOOAN Rev. C, Key Diagram 42GOVACSvvitchgear143 I88 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2~4OOOAK Rev. D, Key Diagram 415OVSvvltchgmar 289 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4DOOBN Rev. M, Key Diagram 48OV5wltchgeor 190 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4OOO8P Rev. G, Key Diagram 4OOVSvvltchgear2S5Y(2AP2OE) 191 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4OOOAW9 Rev. E, Key Diagram 41OOVSvvltchgear 192 LaSalle Drawing 2E-2-4OOOB[l Rev. O, Key Diagram 48OV3vvltchgear236X(2AP2lE) 193 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4OOOBR Rev. M, Key Diagram 48OV3vvi1chgear236Y(2AP22E) 194 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4OOOAN Rev. C, Key Diagram 4l50VSvvitchgear243 195 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4000FB Rev. T, Key Diagram 125V DC Distribution Essential Division 1 196 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4000FC Rev. 0, Key Diagram 125V DC Distribution Essential Division 2

197 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4000EB Rev. J, Key Diagram 250V DC Bus NOI IDCO2E and MCC I2lX1DCOSE 198 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4000FD Rev. M, Key Diagram 125V DC Distribution Essential Division 199 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4000FB Rev. 0, Key Diagram 125V DC Distribution Essential Division 1

200 LaSalle Drawing IE-2-4000FC Rev. P, Key Diagram 125V DC Distribution Essential Division 2 201 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4000EB Rev. M, Key Diagram 250V DC Bus NO. 1 2DCO2E and MCC 221X2DCO5E 202 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4000FD Rev. N, Key Diagram 125V DC Distribution Essential Division g

203 LaSelleOravvingIE'1-4OO5BCRev.H,SchernatloDiaQrann416OV3vvltchgear14IYFeedto Transformer 13SX and 136Y System AP Part 27 304 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4005BD Rev. H, Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 142Y Feed to Transformer l3GX and l3GY System AP Part 38 205 LaSalle Drawing 1E-1-4223AF Rev. G, Schematic Diagram 41GOV3vvltchgoar143 Feed to Transformer 143-1 System HP(E22B) Part G Page 33 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 206 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4005BC Rev. G, Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 241Y Feed to Transformers 235X and 235Y System AP Part 27 207 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4005BD Rev. J, Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 242Y Feed to Transformers 236X and 236Y System AP Part 28 208 LaSalle Drawing 1E-2-4223AF Rev. E, Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 243 Feed to Transformer 2E22-S003 System HP (E2213) Part 6 Page 34 of 91

15C0948-RPT-002 Rev.O Correspondence No RS-16'176 Representative Sample Component Evaluations The following sample calculation isextracted from Reference [171.

Notes:

I. Reference citations within the sample calculation are per the Ref. [17] reference section shown on the following page.

2. This sample calculation contains evaluations of sample high-frequency-sensitive components per the methodologies of both the EPRl high-frequency guidance [8] and the Page 35 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0 Sheet 42 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: AB 10/17/2016 se~rmn &Assodaccs Check: FG 10/17/2016 6 REFERENCES

1. Codes, Guidance, and Standards 1.1. EPRI 3002004396. "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation." July 2015.

1.2. EPRI 3002002997. "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing Summary."

September 2014.

1.3. EPRI Report No.: NP-7147-SL, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays", August 1991.

1.4. NEI 12-06, Appendix H, Rev. 2, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide."

1.5. GE Instruction Manual GEK-34166A, Instantaneous Auxiliary Relay Type HMA24A.

1.6. SQUG Advisory Memorandum, September 7, 2004, "SQUG Advisory 2004-02: Relay GERS Correction."

1.7. EPRI Report No.: NP-7147-SL, V2, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays Volume 2: Addendum 2" April 1995.

1.8. IEEE 344-1975 "IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

1.9. SQUG GIP 3A, "Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment", December 2001 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Documents 2.1. LaSalle Seismic Hazard and Screening Report Rev. 1, NRC Docket No. 50-373 and 50-374, Correspondence No. RS-14-068.

2.2. NRC Part 21 Report, Access No. ML010230240, "Seismic Qualification of electrically operated AK-15/25 circuit breakers."

3. Station Documents 3.1. LSCS-UFSAR, Rev. 21.

3.2. Calculation 028996 Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification of RCIC Instrumentation Panel 'A' H22-P017."

3.3. Calculation 262A7433 Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification Summary."

3.4. Calculation 262A7434 Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification Summary."

3.5. SOR Letter to KCI, dated January 12, 1996 "List of Obsolete Pressure and Vacuum Switch Models and Corresponding Replacement Models" (See Attachment F).

3.6. Binder EQ-LS105, Rev. 8, "SOR Pressure and Vacuum Switch Models 5N6, 6N6, 9N6, 121\16, 29N6, and 541\16".

3.7. Design Analysis No. L-002738, Rev. 1(inc. Minor Rev. 1A), "Seismic Qualification of SOR model 6N6-B5-U8-CIA-JJTTNQ and 54N6-8118-M9-CIA-JJTT-NQ pressure switches for application 1E51-N020,1(2)E51-N006, and 1(2)B21-N056A/B/C/D".

3.8. Calculation 262A7436 Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification Summary."

3.9. Calculation 262A7438 Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification Summary."

3.10. Document DC-SE-02-1-S, Rev. 3, "Seismic Response Spectra Design Criteria."

3.11. Calculation L-003846, Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification of Westinghouse Supplied Replacement Buckets, Motor Circuit Protector and Terminal Blocks For Safety Related MCCS."

3.12. Calculation L-003944, Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification of EDG Speed Switch P/N ES150213W and Power Supply Assembly."

3.13. Calculation L-003775, Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification of an Engine System Inc (ESI) Temperature Switch."

Page 36 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0 Sheet 43 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: AB 10/17/2016 sreve~<<,&a~dac~

Check: FG 10/17/2016 3.14. Calculation CQD-000831, Dated 11/05/1982, "Review of Safety-Related Equipment Qualification Report."

3.15. Calculation CQD-003648, Dated 09/03/1982, "Review of Seismic Qualification Reports for ITE Switchgear Units 1,2 AP01E, 02E, 04E, 06E, 08E, and 09E."

3.16. Calculation CQD-013254, Dated 03/28/1984, "Seismic Qualification of Battery Charger Model 3SD-260-200 (Tag Nos. 1,2DC03E)."

3.17. Calculation CQD-012383, Dated 02/14/1984, "Seismic Qualification of Battery Charger Tag

1. 1,2DC09E Model #3SD-130-200."

3.18. Calculation CQD-028932, Dated 12/10/1990, "Seismic Qualification of Diesel Generator Control Panels E22-P301A&B."

3.19. Calculation L-003904, Rev. 1, "Seismic Evaluation for Yokogawa DX Advanced Series Recorders and Seismic Mounting Evaluation in Control Room Panels."

3.20. Calculation EMD-033330, Dated 05/01/1981, "Seismic Qualification of HPCS Switchgear -

Metal Clad E22-S004."

3.21. Calculation EMD-006881, Dated 01/12/1977, "Seismic Certification - 480 V Unit Substation Transformer."

3.22. Calculation EMD-028572, Dated 02/24/1981, "Seismic Qualification of Division I Leak Detection Vertical Board (H13-P632)."

3.23. Calculation EMD-028565, Dated 02/24/1981, "Seismic Qualification of Low Low Set/Safety Relief Valve Division II Vertical Board (1-113-13645)."

3.24. Calculation CQD-000821, Dated 02/12/1982, "Seismic Qualification of HPCS Diesel Generator Protection Logic Vertical Board, Eq. #1,2H22-P028."

3.25. Calculation EMD-011085, Dated 11/23/1977, "Review of Seismic Qualification Report for D.C.

Distribution Equipment."

3.26. LOR-ODG03J-5-1, Rev. 3, "Diesel Generator 0 Loss of Field (Forty)."

3.27. LOR-1DG03J-5-1, Rev. 3, "Diesel Generator 1A Loss of Field (Forty)."

3.28. LOR-2DG03J-5-1, Rev. 3, "Diesel Generator 2A Loss of Field (Forty)."

4. Station Drawings 4.1. Drawing 1E-1-4201AC, Rev AC, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C) Part 3."

4.2. Drawing 1E-1-4201AN, Rev C, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C)

Part 13."

4.3. Drawing 1E-1-4201AJ, Rev I, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C)

Part 9."

4.4. Drawing 1E-1-4201AP, Rev D, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C)

Part 14."

4.5. Drawing 1E-1-4201AD, Rev AG, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C) Part 4.-

4.6. Drawing 1E-1-4201AE, Rev Z, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C)

Part 5."

4.7. Drawing 1E-1-4201AR, Rev I, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C)

Part 16."

4.8. Drawing 1E-1-4201AF, Rev AD, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C) Part 16."

4.9. Drawing 1E-1-4201AG, Rev W, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (B21C)

Part 7."

Page 37 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0 Sheet 44 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: AB 10/17/2016 su,,&assodates Check: FG 10/17/2016 4.10. Drawing 1E-1-4201AK, Rev H, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 10."

4.11. Drawing 1E-2-4201AC, Rev U, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 3."

4.12. Drawing 1E-2-4201AN, Rev C, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 13."

4.13. Drawing 1E-2-4201AJ, Rev E, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 9."

4.14. Drawing 1E-2-4201AP, Rev C, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 14."

4.15. Drawing 1E-2-4201AD, Rev X, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 4."

4.16. Drawing 1E-2-4201AE, Rev T, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (1321C)

Part 5."

4.17. DrawinglE-2-4201AR, Rev F, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 16."

4.18. Drawing 1E-2-4201AF, Rev Y, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 6."

4.19. Drawing 1E-2-4201AG, Rev R, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 7."

4.20. Drawing 1E-2-4201AK, Rev E, "Schematic Diagram Auto Depressurization System "NB" (621C)

Part 10."

4.21. Drawing NB-081, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT."

4.22. Drawing N13-132, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT (SUB 2)."

4.23. Drawing N13-133, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT (SUB 2)."

4.24. Drawing NB-134, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT (SUB 2)."

4.25. Drawing N13-135, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT (SUB 2)."

4.26. Drawing NB-136, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT (SUB 2)."

4.27. Drawing NB-137, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT (SUB 2)."

4.28. Drawing NB-138, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT (SUB 2)."

4.29. Drawing NB-083, Rev 0, "2 IN AND UNDER AS-BUILT."

4.30. Drawing 1E-1-3445, Rev AW, "Electrical Installation Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Equipment Room Plan El 731-0 Col 12-15 And J-N."

4.31. Drawing 1E-2-3445, Rev. AF, "Electrical Installation Auxiliary Equipment Room Plan Elevation 731-0 Columns 15-18 And J-N."

4.32. Drawing M-Index, Rev. AK, "General Arrangement Index."

4.33. Drawing M-7, Rev. AD, "General Arrangement Main Floor Plan."

4.34. Drawing M-8, Rev. U, "General Arrangement Main Floor Plan."

4.35. Drawing M-9, Rev. T, "General Arrangement Main Floor Plan."

4.36. Drawing 1E-1-4220BE, Rev. 0, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 29 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.37. Drawing 1E-1-4220BG, Rev. L, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 31 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.38. Drawing 1E-1-4220BH, Rev. Q, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 32 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.39. Drawing 1E-1-422061), Rev. O, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 28 Critical Control Room Drawing."

Page 38 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0 Sheet 45 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: AB 10/17/2016 stwewn&A%oaatm Check: FG 10/17/2016 4.40. Drawing 1E-1-4220BC, Rev. N, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 27 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.41. Drawing 1E-1-4228AD, Rev. D, "Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Clean-Up System "RT" (G33) Part 4.-

4.42. Drawing 1E-1-4228AK, Rev. M, "Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System "RT" (G33)

Part 10."

4.43. Drawing 1E-2-4220BE, Rev. K, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 29 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.44. Drawing 1E-2-4220BG, Rev. M, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 31 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.45. Drawing 1E-2-4220BH, Rev. N, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 32 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.46. Drawing 1E-2-4220BD, Rev. O, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 28 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.47. Drawing 1E-2-4220BC, Rev. N, "Schematic Diagram Residual Heat Removal System RH E12 Part 27 Critical Control Room Drawing."

4.48. Drawing 1E-2-4228AD, Rev. E, "Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System RT (G33)

Part 4."

4.49. Drawing 1E-2-4228AK, Rev. M, "Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System "RT" (G33)

Part 10."

4.50. Drawing 1E-0-4412AH, Rev. R, "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "0" Generator/Engine Control System "DG" Part 8."

4.51. Drawing 1E-0-4412AG, Rev. Y, "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "0" Generator/Engine Control System "DG" Part 7."

4.52. Drawing 1E-0-4401S, Rev. V, "Relaying and Metering Diagram Standby Diesel Generator "0"."

4.53. Drawing 1E-1-4005BC, Rev. H, "Schematic Diagram 141Y Feed to Transformer 135X & 135Y System "AP" Part 27."

4.54. Drawing 1E-1-4009AH, Rev. R, "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1A Generator/Engine Control System "DG" Part 8."

4.55. Drawing 1E-1-4009AG, Rev. Q "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "1A" Generator/Engine Control System "DG" Part 7."

4.56. Drawing 1E-1-4000QB, Rev. T, "Relaying & Metering Diagram Standby Diesel Generator "1A"."

4.57. Drawing 1E-1-4005BD, Rev. H, "Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 142Y Feed to Transformer 136X & 136Y System "AP" Part 28."

4.58. Drawing 1E-1-4223AL, Rev. R, "Schematic Diagram HPCS DG-1B Generator/Engine Control System "HP" (E22B) Part 11."

4.59. Drawing 1E-1-4223AG, Rev. L, "Schematic Diagram H.P.C.S Diesel Generator 1B Protective Relaying System HP (E22B) PT. 7."

4.60. Drawing 1E-1-4000PK, Rev. P, "Relaying & Metering Diagram 4160V SWGR. 143."

4.61. Drawing 1E-1-4223AF, Rev. G, "Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 143 Feed to Transformer 143-1 System "HP" (E22B) Part 6."

4.62. Drawing 1E-2-4005BC, Rev. G, "Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 241Y Feed to Transformer 235X & 235Y System "AP" Part 27."

4.63. Drawing 1E-2-4009AH, Rev. P, "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "2A" Generator/Engine Control System "DG" Part 8."

4.64. Drawing 1E-2-4009AG, Rev. Q "Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator "2A" Generator/Engine Control System "DG" Part 7."

4.65. Drawing 1E-2-4000QB, Rev. U, "Relaying and Metering Diagram Standby Diesel Generator 2A."

Page 39 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0 Sheet 46 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: AB 10/17/2016 sDevawn&Azodat" Check: FG 10/17/2016 4.66. Drawing 1E-2-4005BD, Rev. J, "Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear Feed to Transformer 236X & 236Y System "AP" Part 28."

4.67. Drawing 1E-2-4223AG, Rev. L, "Schematic Diagram H.P.C.S Diesel Generator 2B Protective Relaying System HP (E22B) PT.7."

4.68. Drawing 1E-2-4000PK, Rev. K, "Relaying and Metering 4160V Switchgear 243."

4.69. Drawing 1E-2-4223AF, Rev. E, "Schematic Diagram 4160V Switchgear 243 Feed to Transformer 2E22-S003 System "HP" (E22B) Part 6."

5. S&A Documents 5.1. 14Q4238-CAL-005, Rev. 1, "ESEP HCLPFs for Relays."

5.2. 14Q4238-RPT-005, Rev. 1, "LaSalle ESEP SEWS."

5.3. 15C0348-RPT-001, Rev. 1, "Selection of Relays and Switches for High Frequency Seismic Evaluation."

Miscellaneous Documents 6.1. TE Connectivity Qualification Test Report, Rev E, "Nuclear Environmental Qualification Test Report On Agastat EGP, EML, and ETR Control Relays By Control Products Division Amerace Corporation." (See Attachment H for select pages) 6.2. Barksdale Control Products Information Sheet, 2013, "Series B1S, 1325, BIT, 62T." (See Attachment M for select pages) 6.3. Report 60891, Rev. 1, "Seismic Qualification Report for Barksdale Pressure Switch P/N B2T-M12SS." (See Attachment N for select pages) 6.4. General Electric GEH-2058L, "Instruction Auxiliary Relays Hand Reset with Target Types HEA61 and HEA62."

6.5. General Electric GEK-28008D, "Instruction Auxiliary Relays HMAIIA-B-C-D-E-F."

6.6. Report No. 50090.1, Rev. 2, "Seismic Test Report for a GE Overvoltage Relay and ABB Overcurrent Relay." (See Attachment 0 for select pages) 6.7. Report No. 50093.1, Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification Report for G.E. Power Directional Relay."

(See Attachment P for select pages) 6.8. General Electric GEK-45484B, "Instructions Multi-Contact Auxiliary Relay Type HFA151" 6.9. Report No. 50084.7, Rev. 3, "Seismic Qualification Report for an Airpax Tachometer, LIE Pressure Switch, Ashcroft Pressure Gauge, McDonnel & Miller Liquid Level Switch, Fumas Relay, Struthers-Dunn Relays, Agastat Time Delay Relays and a GE Relay." (See Attachment Q for select pages)

Page 40 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0 Sheet 49 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and By: AB 10/17/2016

~ Relays Fragility Evaluation of Relay s&n4oaac~ Check: FG 10/17/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand Calculate the high-frequency seismic demand on the relays per the methodology from Ref. 1.1.

Sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components 1E51A K32 and 1E51A-K33 is presented below. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic demand for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

8.2.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand The horizontal site-specific GMRS for LaSalle County Generating Station (LAS) is per Ref. 2.1. GMRS data can be found in Attachment B of this calculation. A plot of GMRS can be found in Attachment C of this calculation.

Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz.

Peak acceleration of horizontal GMRS SAGMRS 0.5748 (at 15 Hz) between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (Ref. 2.1; see Attachment B of this calculation):

Calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the plant foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation.

Grade Elevation (Ref. 3.1, Sect. 2.4.2.3): ELgrade 710ft Reactor Building Embedment Depth embedrb := 44ft (Ref. 3. 1, Section 3.7.1.4)

Auxiliary Building Embedment Depth embedab := 54ft (Ref. 3. 1, Section 3.7.1.4)

Foundation Elevation (Reactor Building): Elfound.rb ELgrade embed rb = 666.00-ft Foundation Elevation (Auxiliary Building): Elfound.ab ELgrade embedab = 656.00-ft Relay floor elevation (Table 1.1): ELrelay 731ft Relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 are both located in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 731'-0".

Distance between relay floor and foundation: hrelay ELrelay Elfound.ab = 75.00-ft Page 41 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0 Sheet 50 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and 16% Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: AB 10/17/2016 stmruon@~assoclates Check: FG 10/17/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand (cont'd)

Work the distance between the relay floor and foundation with Ref. 1.1, Fig. 4-3 to calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor.

2.1 1.2 1 Slope of amplification factor line, mh : 40ft Oft = 0.0225. ft Oft < hrelay < 40fr Intercept of amplification factor line: bh := 1.2 Horizontal in-structure amplification factor:

AFSH(hrelay) (mh' hrelay + bh) if hrelay < 40ft 2.1 otherwise AFSH(hrelay) = 2.10 Calculate the horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor based on the type of cabinet that contains the subject relay.

Type of cabinet (per Ref. 4.1) cab := "Rigid" (enter "MCC", "Switchgear", "Control Cabinet", or "Rigid"):

Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor AFc h(cab) := 3.6 if cab= "MCC" (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-13):

7.2 if cab = "Switchgear" 4.5 if cab = "Control Cabinet" 1.0 if cab= "Rigid" AFc h (cab) = 1.0 Note: Per Ref. 3.3 and 3.4, the relay enclosures 1H13-13618, 1H13-13621, 21-113-P618, and 2H13-P621 are rigid in the 1Hz to 35Hz range. The sample relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 are mounted within host 1H13-13618. Therefore, the in-cabinet amplification factor for the sample relay components is 1.0.

Multiply the peak horizontal GMRS acceleration by the horizontal in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the relays.

Horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-12, Eq. 4-1a and p. 4-15, Eq. 4-4):

ICRSc.h AFSH(hrelay) .AFc.h (cab)

• SAGMRS = 1.205*g Note that the horizontal seismic demand is same for both relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33.

Page 42 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0 Sheet 51 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: AB 10/17/2016 so &~Assoclares seevenn Check: FG 10/17/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz.

Peak acceleration of horizontal GMRS SAGMRS = 0.574.g (at 15 Hz) between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (see Sect. 8.2.1 of this calculation)

Obtain the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the horizontal GMRS from Ref. 2.1 (see Attachment B of this calculation).

PGAGMRS 0.3179 Calculate the shear wave velocity traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface of the site (Vs30) from Ref. 1.1, p. 3-5 and Attachment D.

(30m)

Shear Wave Velocity: Vs30 d

E Visi where, di: Thickness of the layer (ft)

Vsi: Shear wave velocity of the layer (ft/s)

Per Attachment D, the sum of thickness of the layer over shear wave velocity of the layer is 0.1208 sec.

30m ft Shear Wave Velocity: 815--

Vs30 0.1208sec sec Page 43 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 1500348-CAL-001, Rev. 0 Sheet 52 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and 5ft Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: AB 10/17/2016 sreverwn&aaodac~

Check: FG 10/17/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand (cont'd)

Work the PGA and shear wave velocity with Ref. 1.1, Table 3-1 to determine the soil class of the site. Based on the PGA of 0.3178 and shear wave velocity of 815ft/sec at LaSalle County Generating Station (LAS), the site soil class is C-Soft.

Work the site soil class with Ref. 1.1, Table 3-2 to determine the mean vertical vs. horizontal GMRS ratios (V/H) at each spectral frequency. Multiply the V/H ratio at each frequency between 15Hz and 40Hz by the corresponding horizontal GMRS acceleration at each frequency between 15Hz and 40Hz to calculate the vertical GMRS.

See Attachment B for a table that calculates the vertical GMRS (equal to (V/H) x horizontal GMRS) between 15Hz and 40Hz.

Determine the peak acceleration of the vertical GMRS (SAVCMRs ) between frequencies of 15Hz and 40Hz. (By inspection of Attachment B, the SAVGMRs occurs at 40Hz.)

V/H ratio at 40Hz VH := 1.23 (See Attachment B of this calculation):

Horizontal GMRS at frequency of peak HGMRS := 0.404g vertical GMRS (at 40Hz)

(See Attachment B of this calculation):

Peak acceleration of vertical GMRS between SAVGMRS VH-HGMRS = 0.497*g (at 40 Hz) 15 Hz and 40 Hz:

A plot of horizontal and vertical GMRS is provided in Attachment C of this calculation.

Page 44 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0 Sheet 53 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and sit Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: AB 10/17/2016 5tntrmw ` g Check: FG 10/17/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand (cont'd)

Calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the plant fioundation elevation and the subject floor elevation.

Distance between relay floor and foundation h relay = 75.00-ft (see Sect. 8.2.1 of this calculation):

Work the distance between the relay floor a nd foundation with Ref. 1.1, Fig. 4-4 to calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor.

2.7-1.0 1 Slope of amplification factor line: my 100ft Oft 0.017 ft Intercept of amplification factor line: by = 1.0 Vertical in-structure amplification factor: AFSV := mv' hrelay + by = 2.275 Per Ref. 3.2, the host component 1H13-13618 is rigid in the 1Hz to 35Hz range. The sample relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 are mounted within host 1H13-13618. Therefore, the vertical in-cabinet amplification for sample relay components is 1.0.

Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor: AFC .v := 1.0 Multiplythe peakvertical GMRS acceleration between bythe vertical in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the relay.

Vertical in-cabinet response spectrum (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-12, Eq. 4-1b and p. 4-15, Eq. 4-4):

ICRSc.v := AFSV*AFc.v.SAVGMRS = 1.13*g Note that the vertical seismic demand is same for both relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33.

Page 45 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0 Sheet 54 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: AB 10/17/2016 Stversw & ftodatm Check: FG 10/17/2016 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.1 Relays A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic capacity of 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 relaycomponents are presented here. A table that calculates the high frequency seismic capacities for all of the Ref. 1.1 subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this ca Iculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

8.3.1 Seismic Test Capacity The high frequency seismic capacity of a relay can be determined from the Ref. 1.2 high-frequency testing program or other broad banded low frequency capacity data such as the Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS). Per Ref. 1. 1, Sect. 4.5.2, a conservative estimate of the high-frequency (i.e., 20Hz to 40Hz) capacity can be made by extending the low frequency GERS capacity into the high frequency range to a roll off frequency of about 40Hz. Therefore, if the high frequency capacity was not available for a component, a SAT value equal to the GERS spectral acceleration from 4 to 16 Hz could be used.

For the relay component 1E51A-K32, this model of relay was not tested as part of the Ref. 1.2 high-frequency testing program; therefore, GERS spectral acceleration from Ref. 1.6, Table 3-1 is used as the seismic test capacity.

For the relay component 1E51A-K33, this model of relay was tested as part of the Ref. 1.2 high-frequency testing program; therefore, test result from Ref. 1.2 is used as the seismic test capacity.

5.10 g 1E51A-K32 (Ref. 1.6, Table 3-1)

Seismic test capacity (SA*): SA' :=

15.80 1E51A-K33 (Ref. 1.2, Table 5-12) 8.3.2 Effective Spectral Test Capacity Relay 1E51A K33 was tested as part of Ref. 1.2 and tested to the relay's fragility threshold. Per Ref. 1.1, p. 4-16, add half of the test level increment of 1.258 to the seismic test capacity to calculate the effective spectral test capacity.

GERS spectral acceleration for the relay component 1E51A-K32 is used as the seismic test capacity. Therefore for the relay component 1E51A-K32 there is no spectral acceleration increase.

SA' 1

= 5.10 ) (IE51A-K32)

Effective spectral test capacity SAT := 1.25 .g (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-16): SA'2 + 2g (16.43 1E51A-K33 Page 46 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0 Sheet 55 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: AB 10/17/2016 sue°"&Awodets Check: FG 10/17/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.1 Relays (cont'd) 8.3.3 Seismic Capacity Knockdown Factor Determine the seismic capacity knockdown factor for the subject relay based on the type of testing used to determine the seismic capacity of the relay.

The knockdown factor for relay 1E51A-K32 is obtained per Ref. 1.1, Table 4-2. Relay 1E51A-K33 was tested to the EPRI High Frequency Test Program (Ref. 1.2) and tested to its fragility threshold. Work this information with Ref. 1.1, Table 4-2 to obtain the knockdown factor.

(lE51A-K32 (Ref. 1.1, Table 4-2)

Seismic capacity knockdown factor: Fk :_ 1.50 (1.56 1E51A-K33 (Ref. 1.1, Table 4-2) 8.3.4 Seismic Testing Single-Axis Correction Factor Determine the seismic testing single-axis correction factor of the subject relay, which is based on whether the equipment housing to which the relay is mounted has well-separated horizontal and vertical motion or not.

Per Ref. 1.1, pp. 4-17 to 4-18, relays mounted within cabinets that are braced, bolted together in a row, mounted to both floor and wall, etc. will have a correction factor of 1.00. Relays mounted within cabinets that are bolted only to the floor or otherwise not well-braced will have a correction factor of 1.2.

The sample relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 are mounted within host 1H13-P618. Per Ref. 1.1, pp.

4-18, conservatively take the FMS value as 1.0.

Single-axis correction factor FMS := 1.0 (Ref. 1. 1, pp. 4-17 to 4-18):

Page 47 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0 Sheet 56 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: AB 10/17/2016 so~ermn &nssodaces Check: FG 10/17/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.1 Relays (cont'd) 8.3.5 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration Calculate the effective wide-band component capacity acceleration of relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-5.

Effective wide-band component capacity SAT 3.400 ( IE51A K32 TRS := Fk F acceleration (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-5) MS 10.529 g 1E51A-K33 8.4 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.4, Appendix H Relays 8.4.1 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration Per a review of the capacity generation methodologies of Ref. 1.1 and Ref. 1.4, App. H, Section H.5, the capacity of a Ref. 1.4 relay is equal to the Ref. 1.1 effective wide-band component capacity multiplied by a factor accounting for the difference between a 1% probabdityof failure (Cl%, Ref. 1.1) and a 10% probability of failure (C10%, Ref. 1.4).

Per Ref. 1.4, App. H, Table H.1, use the C10% vs. Cl% ratio from the Realistic Lower Bound Case for relays.

Clo% vs. C1% ratio C10 := 1.36 Effective wide-band component capacity 4.624 ( 1E51A_K32 TRS14 := TRS C10 =

acceleration (Ref. 1.4, App. H, Sect. H.5) 14.319 g 1E51A-K33

(

Page 48 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 S&A Calc. No.: 15C0348-CAL-001, Rev. 0 Sheet 57 of 57

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays By: AB 10/17/2016 stmww,&agodam Check: FG 10/17/2016 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.5 Relay (Ref. L1)High-Frequency Margin Calculate the high-frequency seismic margin for Ref. 1.1 relays per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6.

A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 is presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic margin for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

TRS = 2.821 > 1.0, 0. K. 1E51A-K32 Horizontal seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6):

ICRSc h 8.735 > 1. 0, 0. K. (IE51A-K33)

TRS 3.008 > 1.0, O.K. 1E51A-K32 Vertical seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6): _

ICRSc v 9,313 > 1.0, O.K. (1E51A-K33)

Both the horizontal and vertical seismic margins for the relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 are greater than 1.00. The sample relays are adequate for high frequency seismic spectral ground motion fur their Ref. 1.1 functions.

8.6 Relay (Ref. L4)Hgh-Frequency Margin Calculate the high-frequency seismic margin for Ref. 1.4 relays per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6.

A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components 1E51A K32 and 1E51A-K33 is presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic margin for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1.1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

TRS1.4 _ 3.836 > 1. 0, 0. K. (IE51A-K32 Horizontal seismic margin (Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6):

ICRSc h 11.879 > 1.0, O.K. 1E51A-K33 TRS1.4 4.090 1E51A-K32

> 1. 0, 0. K.

Vertical seismic margin (Ref. 1. 1, Eq. 4-6): _

ICRSc v 12.666 > 1.0, O.K. 1E51A-03 Both the horizontal and vertical seismic margins for the relay components 1E51A-K32 and 1E51A-K33 are greater than 1.00. The sample relays are adequate for high frequency seismic spectral ground motion for their Ref. 1.4 functions.

Page 49 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 B Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function tNanuf. Model No. !D Type (ft) Capacity Result Timing Steam Line High 1E5 ETR14D3BC200 Auxiliary 1 1 Control Core Cooling Differential Agastat 1H13-P618 Rigid 731 GERS Cap > Dem K032 2 4002 Building Relay Pressure Relay Timing Steam Line High 2 ETR14D3BC200 Auxiliary 2 2 Control Core Cooling Differential Agastat 2H13-P618 Rigid 731 GERS Cap > Dem K0032 32 4002 Building Relay Pressure Relay Timing Steam Line High 1 ETR14D3BC200 Auxiliary 3 1 Control Core Cooling Differential Agastat 1H 13-13618 Rigid 731 GERS Cap > Dem K0048 48 4002 Building Relay Pressure Relay Timing Steam Line High 2 ETR14D3BC200 Auxiliary 4 2 Control Core Cooling Differential Agastat 2H13-P618 Rigid 731 GERS Cap> Dem K0048 48 4002 Building Relay Pressure Relay Timing Steam Line High 1E5 ETR14D3BC200 Auxiliary 5 1 Control Core Cooling Differential Agastat 1H13-P621 Rigid 731 GERS Cap > Dem K0477 4002 Building Relay Pressure Relay Timing Steam Line High 2 ETR14D3BC200 Auxiliary 6 2 Control Core Cooling Differential Agastat 2H13-13621 Rigid 731 GERS Cap > Dem K0047 47 4002 Building Relay Pressure Relay 1E51A- Auxiliary RCIC Isolation Auxiliary EPRI HF 7 1 Core Cooling GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-13618 Rigid Cap > Dem K033 Relay Relay Building 731 Test 2E51A- Auxiliary RCIC Isolation Auxiliary EPRI HF 8 2 Core Cooling GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-13618 Rigid 731 Cap> Dem K033 Relay Relay Building Test 1E51A- Auxiliary Reactor Low Auxiliary EPRI HF 9 1 Core Cooling GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-13618 Rigid 731 Cap' Dem K057 Relay Pressure Relay Building Test 2E51A- Auxiliary Reactor Low Auxiliary EPRI HF 10 2 Core Cooling GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-13618 Rigid CaP> Dem K057 Relay Pressure Relay Building 731 Test 1E51A- Auxiliary Reactor Low Auxiliary EPRI HF 11 1 Core Cooling GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-13618 Rigid Cap> Dem K058 Relay Pressure Relay Building 731 Test Page 50 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result 2E51A- Auxiliary Reactor Low Auxiliary EPRI HF 12 2 Core Cooling GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P618 Rigid 731 Cap> Dem K058 Relay pressure Relay Building Test 1E51A- Auxiliary RCIC Isolation Auxiliary EPRI HF 13 1 Core Cooling GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-P618 Rigid 731 Cap >Dem K060 Relay Relay Building Test 2E51A- Auxiliary RCIC Isolation Auxiliary EPRI HF 14 2 Core Cooling GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P618 Rigid 731 Cap > Dem K060 Relay Relay Building Test 1E51A- Auxiliary RCIC Isolation Auxiliary EPRI HF 15 1 Core Cooling GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-P621 Rigid 731 Cap > Dem K015 Relay Relay Building Test 2E51A- Auxiliary RCIC Isolation Auxiliary EPRI HF 16 2 Core Cooling GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P621 Rigid 731 Cap > Dem K015 Relay Relay Building Test 1E51A- Auxiliary Reactor Low Auxiliary EPRI HF 17 1 Core Cooling GE 12HFA151A2F iH13-P621 Rigid 731 Cap > Dem K054 Relay Pressure Relay Building Test 2E51A- Auxiliary Reactor Low Auxiliary EPRI HF 18 2 Core Cooling GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P621 Rigid 731 Cap > Dem K054 Relay Pressure Relay Building Test 1E51A- Auxiliary Reactor Low Auxiliary EPRI HF 19 1 Core Cooling GE 12HFA151A2F iH13-P621 Rigid 731 Cap > Dem K055 Relay Pressure Relay Building Test 2E51A- Auxiliary Reactor Low Auxiliary EPRI HF 20 2 Core Cooling GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P621 Rigid 731 Cap > Dem K055 Relay Pressure Relay Building Test RCS/Reactor High Drywell 11321C- Auxiliary Vessel Auxiliary EPRI HF 21 1 Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-P628 Rigid 731 Cap> Dem K004A Relay Inventory Building Test Low Level Relay Control RCS/Reactor High Drywell 2B21C- Auxiliary Vessel Auxiliary EPRI HF 22 2 Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P628 Rigid 731 Cap> Dem K004A Relay Inventory Building Test Low Level Relay Control RCS/Reactor High Drywell iB21C- Auxiliary Vessel Auxiliary EPRI HF 23 1 Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-P628 Rigid 731 CaP> Dem K008A Relay Inventory Building Test Low Level Relay Control RCS/Reactor High Drywell 2B21C- Auxiliary Vessel Auxiliary EPRI HF 24 2 Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P628 Rigid 731 Cap> Dem K008A Relay Inventory Building Test Low Level Relay Control Page 51 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation

!D Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result RCS/Reactor High Drywell 11321C-1 Auxiliary Vessel Axi Auxiliary EPRI HF 25 1 Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 1H13-P631 Rigid Cap >Dem K0046 Relay Inventory Building iliar 731 Test Low Level Relay Control RCS/Reactor High Drywell 2621C- Auxiliary Vessel Auxiliary EPRI HF 26 2 Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P631 Rigid 731 Cap> Dem K004B Relay Inventory Building Test Low Level Relay Control RCS/Reactor High Drywell 1621C- Auxiliary Vessel Auxiliary EPRI HF 27 1 Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 11-113-P631 Rigid 731 Cap> Dem K008B Relay Inventory Building Test Low Level Relay Control RCS/Reactor High Drywell 2B21C- Auxiliary Vessel Auxiliary EPRI HF 28 2 Pressure/RPV GE 12HFA151A2F 2H13-P631 Rigid 731 Cap> Dem 21C Relay Inventory Building Test Low Level Relay Control Turbine Exhaust 1 Auxiliary Auxiliary 29 1 Core Cooling Diaphragm High GE 12HMA24A2F 1H 13-P618 Rigid 731 GERS Cap > Dem 39 K0039 Relay Building Pressure Relay Turbine Exhaust 2 Auxiliary Auxiliary 30 2 Core Cooling Diaphragm High GE 12HMA24A2F 2H 13-15618 Rigid 731 GERS Cap> Dem K039 K039 Relay Building Pressure Relay Turbine Exhaust 1 Auxiliary Auxiliary 31 1 Core Cooling High Pressure GE 12HMA24A2F 1H13-P621 Rigid 731 GERS Cap> Dem 06 K0005 Relay Building Relay Turbine Exhaust 2ES Auxiliary Auxiliary 32 2 Core Cooling High Pressure GE 12HMA24A2F 2H13-P621 Rigid 731 GERS Cap> Dem K0066 Relay Building Relay Pump Suction 1E5 Auxiliary Auxiliary 33 1 Core Cooling Low Pressure GE 12HMA24A2F 1H13-P621 Rigid 731 GERS Cap > Dem K0077 Relay Building Relay Pump Suction 2 Auxiliary Auxiliary 34 2 Core Cooling Low Pressure GE 12HMA24A2F 2H13-P621 Rigid 731 GERS Cap > Dem 07 K0007 Relay Building Relay 1ES1A- Auxiliary Turbine Trip Auxiliary 35 1 Core Cooling GE 12HMA24A2F 1H13-15621 Rigid 731 GERS Cap > Dem K008 Relay Auxiliary Relay Building Page 52 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result 2E51A- Auxiliary Turbine Trip Auxiliary 36 2 Core Cooling GE 12HMA24A2F 2H13-P621 Rigid 731 GERS Cap > Dem K008 Relay Auxiliary Relay Building Turbine Exhaust 1 Auxiliary Auxiliary 37 1 Core Cooling Diaphragm High GE 12HMA24A2F 1H13-P621 Rigid 731 GERS Cap> Dem K0029 29 Relay Building Pressure Relay Turbine Exhaust 2ES2 Auxiliary Auxiliary 38 2 Core Cooling Diaphragm High GE 12HMA24A2F 2H13-P621 Rigid 731 GERS Cap > Dem K0299 Relay Building Pressure Relay 1E31- Pressure Reactor Pressure 6N6-BS-NX- Control Reactor LAS 39 1 Core Cooling SOR 1H22-P017 Cap>Dem N022A Switch Switch C1A-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building 673 Report 2E31- Pressure Reactor Pressure 6N6-B5-NX- Control Reactor LAS 40 2 Core Cooling SOR 2H22-P017 673 Cap > Dem N022A Switch Switch C1A-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report 1E31- Pressure Reactor Pressure 6N6-B5-NX- Control Reactor LAS 41 1 Core Cooling SOR 1H22-P017 Cap > Dem N022C Switch Switch ClA JJTTX7 Cabinet Building 673 Report 2E31- Pressure Reactor Pressure 6N6-BS-NX- Control Reactor LAS 42 2 Core Cooling SOR 2H22-P017 673 Cap > Dem N022C Switch Switch C1A-11TTX7 Cabinet Building Report 1E51- Pressure Pump Suction 54N6-B118-M9- Control Reactor LAS 43 1 Core Cooling SOR 1H22-P017 Cap > Dem N006 Switch Pressure Switch CIA JJTTNQ Cabinet Building 673 Report 2E51- Pressure Pump Suction 54N6-8118-NX- Control Reactor LAS 44 Core Cooling SOR 2H22-P017 Cap > Dem 2 N006 Switch Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building 673 Report 1E51- Pressure Turbine Exhaust 6N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 45 1 Core Cooling SOR 1H22-P017 673 Cap > Dem N009A Switch Pressure Switch C1A-1JTTX7 Cabinet Building Report 2E51- Pressure Turbine Exhaust 4N6-E45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 46 2 Core Cooling SOR 2H22-P017 673 Cap > Dem N009A Switch Pressure Switch CIA-TTX6 Cabinet Building Report 1E51- Pressure Turbine Exhaust 6N6-B3-U8- Control Reactor LAS 47 1 Core Cooling SOR IH22-P017 673 Cap > Dem N009B Switch Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTNQ Cabinet Building Report 2E51- Pressure Turbine Exhaust 6N6-B3-U8- Control Reactor LAS 48 2 Core Cooling SOR 2H22-P017 673 Cap> Dem N009B Switch Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTNQ Cabinet Building Report Turbine Exhaust 1E51- Pressure 6N6-B2-NX- Control Reactor LAS 49 1 Core Cooling Diaphragm SOR 1H22-P017 Cap > Dem N012A Switch C1A-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building 673 Report Pressure Switch Turbine Exhaust 2E51- Pressure 4N6-E45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 50 2 Core Cooling Diaphragm SOR 2H22-P017 673 Cap > Dem N012A Switch C1A-TTX6 Cabinet Building Report Pressure Switch Page 53 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation 1D Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result Turbine Exhaust 1E51- Pressure 6N6-62-NX- Control Reactor LAS 51 1 Core Cooling Diaphragm SOR 1H22-13017 673 Cap > Dem N012C Switch C1A-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report Pressure Switch Turbine Exhaust 2E51- Pressure 4N6-E45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 52 2 Core Cooling Diaphragm SOR 2H22-P017 Cap > Dem N012C Switch C1A-TTX6 Cabinet Building 673 Report Pressure Switch 1E31- Pressure Reactor Pressure 6N6-BS-NX- Control Reactor LAS 53 1 Core Cooing SOR 1H22-13029 673 Cap > Dem N022B Switch Switch ClA JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report 2E31- Pressure Reactor Pressure 6N6-BS-NX- Control Reactor LAS 54 2 Core Cooling SOR 2H22-P029 673 Cap > Dem N022B Switch Switch C1A-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report 1E31- Pressure Reactor Pressure 6N6-B5-NX- Control Reactor LAS 55 1 Core Cooling SOR 1H22-P029 673 Cap > Dem N022D Switch Switch CIA-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report 2E31- Pressure Reactor Pressure 6N6-B5-NX- Control Reactor LAS 56 2 Core Cooling SOR 2H22 13029 673 Cap > Dem N022D Switch Switch C1A-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report Turbine Exhaust 1E51- Pressure 6N6-62-NX- Control Reactor LAS 57 1 Core Cooling Diaphragm SOR 1H22-P029 673 Cap > Dem N012B Switch ClA JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report Pressure Switch Turbine Exhaust 2E51- Pressure 4N6-E45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 58 2 Core Cooling Diaphragm SOR 2H22 P029 673 Cap > Dem N012B Switch CIA-TTX6 Cabinet Building Report Pressure Switch Turbine Exhaust 1E51- Pressure 6N6-62-NX- Control Reactor LAS 59 1 Core Cooling Diaphragm SOR 1H22-P029 673 Cap > Dem N012D Switch CIA-JJTTX7 Cabinet Building Report Pressure Switch Turbine Exhaust 2E51- Pressure 4N6-E45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 60 2 Core Cooling Diaphragm SOR 21-122-13029 673 Cap> Dem N012D Switch C1A-TTX6 Cabinet Building Report Pressure Switch RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 61 1 1BN2 SOR 1H22-13026 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039C Control RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 62 2 26N2 SOR 2H22-13026 761 Cap>Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039C Control Page 54 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 63 1 i6N21- SOR 1H22-P026 761 Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-1JTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039D Control RCS/Reactor PS_

Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 64 2 2BN21- SOR 2H22-P026 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039D Control RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 65 1 iBN21- SOR 1H22-P026 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039E Control RCS/Reactor PS_

Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 66 2 2BN21- SOR 2H22-P026 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039E Control RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 67 1 iBN21- SOR 1H22-P026 761 Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039K Control RCS/Reactor 9N6-B45-NX-PS Pressure Vessel RPV High CIA,IJTTX6 / Control Reactor LAS 68 2 2BN21- SOR 2H22-P026 761 Cap >Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch 29N6-B45-U1- Cabinet Building Report N039K Control C1A-JJTTNQ RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 69 1 1BN21- SOR 1H22-P026 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039P Control RCS/Reactor PS_

Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 70 2 2BN21- SOR 2H22-P026 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039P Control Page 55 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 13-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type Type (ft) Capaci Result RCS/Reactor PS LAS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor 71 1 1BN2 SOR 1H22-P026 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039S Control RCS/Reactor PS LAS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor 72 2 2BN2 SOR 2H22-P026 761 Cap>Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch CIA-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report NQ39S Control RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 73 1 1BN2 SOR 1H22-P026 ~p>Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building 761 Report N039U Control RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 74 2 2B SOR 2H22-P026 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report 9U N039U Control RCS/Reactor 9N6-B45-NX-PS Pressure Vessel RPV High C1A JJTTX6 / Control Reactor LAS 75 1 IBN21- SOR 1H22-P075 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch 29N6-B45-U1- Cabinet Building Report N060U Control C1A-JJTTNQ RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 76 1 SOR 1H22-P076 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch CIA-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report 39CC N039CC Control RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 77 1 16N21- SOR 1H22-P076 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039DD Control RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 78 1 1 SOR 1H22-P076 761 Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJ TTX6 Cabinet Building Report 039EE N039 Control Page 56 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 79 1 1BN21- SOR 1H22-P076 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch CIA-1JTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039KK Control RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 80 1 1BN21 SOR 1H22-P076 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039PP Control RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 81 1 16321- SOR 1H22-P076 761 Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039SS Control RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High 9N6-B45-NX- Control Reactor LAS 82 1 16321- SOR 1H22-P076 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch C1A-JJTTX6 Cabinet Building Report N039UU Control RCS/Reactor 9N6-B45-NX-PS Pressure Vessel RPV High CIA JJTTX6 / Control Reactor LAS 83 1 1BN21- SOR 1H22-P076 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch 29N6-B45-U1- Cabinet Building Report N06000 Control C1A-JJTTNQ RCS/Reactor Timing 1621C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qualifica 84 1 Control Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K054A Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing 2B21C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qualifica 85 2 Control Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K054A Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing 16 21C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Quali fiq 86 1 Control Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K055A Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control Page 57 of 91

15C0348-RPT-0021, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result RCS/Reactor Timing 2B21C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qualifica

$7 2 Control Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K055A Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing 11321C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qualifica 88 1 Control Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K056A Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing 2B21C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qual~ca 89 2 Control Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K056A Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing 1621C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qual~ra 90 1 Control Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K057A Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing 2B21C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qual~p 91 2 Control Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K057A Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 1621-1B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 92 1 Control F013D Solenoid Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K066A Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "C" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 2821-2B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qual~ca 93 2 Control F013D Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K066A Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "C" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 1621-1B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifip 94 1 Control F013S Solenoid Agastat Type GP 11-113-P644 731 Cap > Dem K068A Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "C" Open Relay Control Page 58 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. 1D Type (ft) Capacity Result RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 2621-2B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 95 2 Control F013S Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K068A Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "C" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 11321-1B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 96 1 Control F013C Solenoid Agastat Type GP 11-113-P644 731 Cap > Dem K069A Inventory Building tion Test Relay "C" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 2B21-2B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 97 2 Control F013C Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K069A Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "C" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 11321-1B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 98 1 Control F013E Solenoid Agastat Type GP 11-113-15644 731 Cap > Dem K070A Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "C" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 21321-2B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 99 2 Control F013E Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K070A Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "C" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 1621-1621C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 100 1 Control F013K Solenoid Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K071A Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "C" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 2621-2B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 101 2 Control F013K Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K071A Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "C" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 1621-1621C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 102 1 Control F013P Solenoid Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K072A Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "C" Open Relay Control Page 59 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 2621- Qualifica 2B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary 103 2 Control F013P Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K072A Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "C" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 11321- Qualifica 1621C- Vessel Control Auxiliary 104 1 Control F013U Solenoid Agastat Type GP 1H13-P644 731 Cap > Dem K075A Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "C" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 21321- Qualifica 2B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary 105 2 Control F013U Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 731 Cap> Dem K075A Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "C" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Qualifica 1B21C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary 106 1 Control Agastat Type GP 11-113-P644 731 Cap > Dem K076A Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Qualifica 2B21C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary 107 2 Control Agastat Type GP 2H13-P644 731 Cap>Dem K076A Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Qualifica 1B21C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary 108 1 Control Agastat Type GP iH13-P645 731 Cap > Dem K054B Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing 2B21C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qualifica 109 2 Control Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 731 Cap > Dem K054B Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing 1B21C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qualifica 110 1 Control Agastat Type GP 1H13- 731 Cap > Dem K055B Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control Page 60 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 13-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. 1D Type (ft) Capacity Result RCS/Reactor Timing 2B21C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qualifica 111 2 Control Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 731 Cap> Dem K055B Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing 11321C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qualifica 112 1 Control Agastat Type GP 1H13-P645 731 Cap > Dem K056B Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing 2B21C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qualifica 113 2 Control Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 731 Cap > Dem K056B Inventory Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing 1621C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qualifica 114 1 Control Agastat Type GP 11-113-P645 731 Cap > Dem K057B Inventory Seal-In Relay Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing 2B21C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qualifica 115 2 Control Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 731 Cap>Dem K057B Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 1821-1621C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 116 1 Control F013D Solenoid Agastat Type GP 1H13-P645 731 Cap > Dem K066B Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "B Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 21321-2B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 117 2 Control F013D Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 731 Cap> Dem K066B Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "B" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 11321-iB21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 118 1 Control F013S Solenoid Agastat Type GP 11-113-P645 731 Cap > Dem K068B Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "B" Open Relay Control Page 61 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 21321-2B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 119 2 Control F013S Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 731 Cap > Dem K068B Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "B" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 1621-1B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 120 1 Control F013C Solenoid Agastat Type GP 11-113-15645 731 Cap > Dem K069B Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "B" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 21321-2B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualfca 121 2 Control F013C Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 731 Cap > Dem K069B Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "B" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 11321-1621C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 122 1 Control F013E Solenoid Agastat Type GP 11-113-P645 731 Cap > Dem K070B Inventory Building tion Test Relay "B" Open Relay Control

- RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 21321-2B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 123 2 Control F013E Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 731 Cap > Dem K070B Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "B" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 1621-1B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 124 1 Control F013K Solenoid Agastat Type GP 11-113-13645 731 Cap > Dem K071B Inventory Building tion Test Relay "B" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 2621-2B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 125 2 Control F013K Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 731 Cap > Dem K071B Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "B" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 11321-1B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 126 1 Control F013P Solenoid Agastat Type GP 1H13-P645 731 Cap> Dem K0726 Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "B" Open Relay Control Page 62 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 6-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 21321-2B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 127 2 Control F013P Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 731 Cap > Dem K072B Inventory Cabinet Building tion Test Relay "B" Open Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 11321-1B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 128 1 Control F013U Solenoid Agastat Type GP iH13-P645 731 Cap> Dem K075B Inventory "B" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing Valve 2621-2B21C- Vessel Control Auxiliary Qualifica 129 2 Control F013U Solenoid Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 731 Cap > Dem K075B Inventory "B" Open Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing 11321C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qualifica 130 1 Control Agastat Type GP iH13-P645 731 Cap > Dem K076B Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control RCS/Reactor Timing 2B21C- Vessel ADS Low-Low Set Control Auxiliary Qualifica 131 2 Control Agastat Type GP 2H13-P645 731 Cap > Dem K076B Inventory Seal-In Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Relay Control 1E31A- Steam Leak Control Auxiliary Qualifica 132 1 Relay Core Cooling Agastat Type GP 1H13-P632 768 Cap > Dem K002A Detection Relay Cabinet Building tion Test 2E31A- Steam Leak Control Auxiliary Qualifica 133 2 Relay Core Cooling Agastat Type GP 2H13-P632 768 Cap > Dem K002-A Detection Relay Cabinet Building tion Test 1E31A- Steam Leak Control Auxiliary Qualifica 134 1 Relay Core Cooling Agastat Type GP 1H13-P642 768 Cap > Dem K002B Detection Relay Cabinet Building tion Test RCS/Reactor 2E31A- Vessel Steam Leak Control Auxiliary Qualifica 135 2 Relay Agastat Type GP 2H13-P642 768 Cap > Dem K002B Inventory Detection Relay Cabinet Building tion Test Control RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High Control Reactor SQURTS 136 2 26 Barksdale BiT-M12SS-GE 2H22-P075 761 Cap>Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N06OU 0U Control Page 63 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High Control Reactor SQURTS 137 2 26321- Barksdale B1T-M12SS-GE 2H22-P076 761 Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N039CC Control RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High Control Reactor SQURTS 138 2 26321- Barksdale BiT-M12SS-GE 2H22-P076 761 Cap > Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N039DD Control RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High Control Reactor SQURTS 139 2 26321- Barksdale BiT-M12SS-GE 2H22-P076 761 Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N039EE Control RCS/Reactor PS SQURTS Pressure Vessel RPV High Control Reactor 140 2 26321- Barksdale 61T-M12SS-GE 2H22-P076 761 Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N039KK Control RCS/Reactor PS SQURTS Pressure Vessel RPV High Control Reactor 141 2 20321- Barksdale B1T-M12SS-GE 2H22-P076 761 Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N039PP Control RCS/Reactor PS SQURTS Pressure Vessel RPV High Control Reactor 142 2 26321- Barksdale BiT-M12SS-GE 2H22-P076 761 Cap> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N039SS Control RCS/Reactor PS SQURTS Pressure Vessel RPV High Control Reactor 143 2 20321- Barksdale B1T-M12SS-GE 2H22-P076 761 Cap >Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building Test N039UU Control RCS/Reactor PS Pressure Vessel RPV High Control Reactor SQURTS 144 2 20321- Barksdale BiT-M12S5-GE 2H22-P076 Test ~P> Dem Switch Inventory Pressure Switch Cabinet Building 761 306000 Control Page 64 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result RCS/Reactor 42 Valve 1E12- Motor Vessel 135Y-2 Reactor LAS 1 0/1E12- Contactor F016A Opening N/A N/A Control 710 Cap > Dem 145 (1AP76E) Building Report Inventory F016A Contactor Center Control RCS/Reactor 42 Valve 1E12- Motor Vessel 135Y-2 Reactor LAS 146 1 O/1E12- Contactor F017A Opening N/A N/A Control 710 Cap > Dem Inventory (1AP76E) Building Report F017A Contactor Center Control RCS/Reactor 42 Valve 1E12- Motor Vessel 136Y-1 Reactor LAS 147 1 O/1E12- Contactor F016B Opening N/A N/A Control 710 Cap > Dem Inventory (1AP82E) Building Report F016B Contactor Center Control RCS/Reactor 42 Valve 1E12- Motor Vessel 136Y-1 Reactor LAS 148 1 O/1E12- Contactor F017B Opening N/A N/A Control 710 Cap> Dem Inventory (1AP82E) Building Report F017B Contactor Center Control RCS/Reactor 42_ Valve 1E12-F009 Motor Vessel 136Y-1 Reactor LAS 149 1 O/1E12- Contactor Opening N/A N/A Control 710'-6" Cap > De Inventory (136Y-1 Building Report F009 Contactor Center Control RCS/Reactor Motor CR1/1E12 Vessel Valve 1E12-F009 136Y-1 Reactor LAS 150 1 Relay N/A N/A Control 710 -6 Cap > Dem

-F009 Inventory Opening Relay (1AP82E) Building Report Center Control RCS/Reactor 42 Valve 1E12-F008 Motor Vessel 135X-1 Reactor LAS 151 1 O/1E12- Contactor Opening N/A N/A Control 761 Cap> Dem Inventory (1AP71E) Building Report F008 Contactor Center Control RCS/Reactor 42- Valve 2E12- Motor Vessel Reactor LAS 152 2 0/2E12- Contactor F016A Opening N/A N/A 2AP76E Control 710'-6 Cap > Dem Inventory Building Report F016A Contactor Center Control Page 65 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 13-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation 1D Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result RCS/Reactor 42- Valve 2E12- Motor Vessel Reactor LAS 153 2 O/2E12- Contactor F017A Opening N/A N/A 2AP76E Control 710'-6" Cap > Dem Inventory Building Report F017A Contactor Center Control RCS/Reactor 42 Valve 2E12- Motor Vessel Reactor LAS 154 2 O/2E12- Contactor F016B Opening N/A N/A 2AP82E Control 710'-6" Cap > Dem Inventory Building Report F016B Contactor Center Control RCS/Reactor 42_ Valve 2E12- Motor Vessel Reactor LAS 155 2 O/2E12- Contactor F017B Opening N/A N/A 2AP82E Control 710'-6" Cap > Dem Inventory Building Report F017B Contactor Center Control RCS/Reactor 42 Valve 2E12-F009 Motor Vessel Reactor LAS 156 2 O/2E12- Contactor Opening N/A N/A 2AP82E Control 710'-6" Cap> Dem Inventory Building Report F009 Contactor Center Control RCS/Reactor Motor CR1/2E12 Vessel Valve 2E12-F009 Reactor LAS 157 2 Relay N/A N/A 2AP82E Control 710'-6" Cap> Dem

-F009 Inventory Opening Relay Building Report Center Control RCS/Reactor 42 Valve 2E12-F008 Motor Vessel Reactor LAS 158 2 O/2E12- Contactor Opening N/A N/A 2AP71E Control 761 Cap > Dem Inventory Building Report F008 Contactor Center Control AC/DC 86DGO / Diesel Auxiliary Power DG 0 Lockout Control EPRI HF 159 0 OHS- GE Type HEA ODG02JB Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem Relay Support Relay panel Test DGS003A Building Systems AC/DC 86DGIA / Diesel Auxiliary Power DG 1A Lockout Control EPRI HF 160 1 1HS- GE Type HEA 1DG02JB Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem Relay Support Relay Panel Test DGS003A Building Systems AC/DC DG 1B Engine Diesel 1E22- Auxiliary Power 1E22- Control EPRI HF 161 1 Fault Lockout GE Type HEA Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem K015 Relay Support p301B Panel Test Relay Building Systems Page 66 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. knit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC DG 1B Generator 1E22-P028 Diesel 1E22- Auxiliary Power Vertical EPRI HF 162 1 Fault Lockout GE Type HEA (1H22- Generator 710'-6'" Cap> Dem K001 Relay Support Board Test Relay P028) Building Systems AC/DC 86DG2A / SBM- Diesel Auxiliary Power DG 2A Lockout Control EPRI HF 163 2 2HS- GE 12HEA61C236X 2DG021B Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem Relay Support Relay 2 Panel Test DGS003A Building Systems AC/DC DG 2B Engine Diesel 2E22- Lockout Power 12HEA62B234X 2E22- Control EPRI HF 164 2 Fault Lockout GE Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem K015 Relay Support 2 P301B Panel Test Relay Building Systems AC/DC DG 2B Generator 2E22-PO28 Diesel 2E22- Lockout Power Vertical EPRI HF 165 2 Fault Lockout GE Type HEA (21-122- Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem K001 Relay Support Board Test Relay P028) Building Systems AC/DC Diesel K10 / Rotary Power DG 0 Overspeed Control EPRI HF 166 0 P&B MDR-137-8 ODG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem 0DGK010 Relay Support Relay panel Test Building Systems AC/DC DG 0 Differential Diesel 87X / Auxiliary Power Control EPRI HF 167 0 Overcurrent P&B MDR-137-8 ODG021B Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem ODG087 Relay Support panel Test Auxiliary Relay Building Systems AC/DC Diesel 81X / Auxiliary Power DG 0 Frequency Control EPRI HF 168 0 P&B MDR-137-8 ODG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem ODG081X Relay Support Relay Panel Test Building Systems AC/DC Diesel K9 / Auxiliary Power DG 0 Failure to Control EPRI HF 169 0 P&B MDR-137-8 ODG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem ODGKO09 Relay Support Start Relay Panel Test Building Systems AC/DC Diesel K11 / Auxiliary Power DG 0 Low Oil Control EPRI HF 170 0 P&B MDR-137-8 ODG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem ODGK011 Relay Support Pressure Relay Panel Test Building Systems AC/DC DG 0 Oil Diesel K12/ Auxiliary Power Control EPRI HF 171 0 Temperature P&B MDR-137-8 ODG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem ODGK012 Relay Support panel Test Relay Building Systems Page 67 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC DG 0 Field Diesel K25 / Auxiliary Power Control EPRI HF 172 0 Excitation Failure P&B MDR-137-8 ODG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem ODGK025 Relay Support Panel Test Relay Building Systems AC/DC Diesel K10/ Rotary Power DG 1A Control EPRI HF 173 1 P&B MDR-137-8 iDG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem lDGK010 Relay Support Overspeed Relay panel Test Building Systems AC/DC DG 1A Diesel 87X / Auxiliary Power Differential Control EPRI HF 174 1 P&B MDR-137-8 iDG02J6 Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem lDG087 Relay Support Overcurrent panel Test Building Systems Auxiliary Relay AC/DC Diesel 81X / Auxiliary Power DG 1A Frequency Control EPRI HF 175 1 P&B MDR-137-8 1DG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem 1DG081X Relay Support Relay panel Test Building Systems AC/DC Diesel K9 / Auxiliary Power DG 1A Failure to Control EPRI HF 176 1 P&B MDR-137-8 1DG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem lDGK009 Relay Support Start Relay panel Test Building Systems AC/DC Diesel K11 / Auxiliary Power DG 1A Low Oil Control EPRI HF 177 1 P&B MDR-137-8 iDG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem 1DGK011 Relay Support Pressure Relay panel Test Building Systems AC/DC DG lA Low Oil Diesel K12 / Auxiliary Power Control EPRI HF 178 1 Temperature P&B MDR-137-8 1DG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem 1DGK012 Relay Support panel Test Relay Building Systems AC/DC DG 1A Field Diesel K25 / Auxiliary Power Control EPRI HF 179 1 Excitation Failure P&B MDR-137-8 iDG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem lDGK025 Relay Support Panel Test Auxiliary Relay Building Systems AC/DC K10 / Diesel Overspee Power DG 16 1E22- Control EPRI HF 180 1 1E22- P&B MDR-131-1 Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem d Relay Support Overspeed Relay P301B Panel Test K010 Building Systems AC/DC Diesel K9 / 1E22- Auxiliary Power DG 1B Failure to 1E22- Control EPRI HF 181 1 P&B MDR-131-1 Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem K009 Relay Support Start Relay P301B Panel Test Building Systems Page 68 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation

!D Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC K11 / Diesel Auxiliary Power DG 1B Low Oil 1E22- Control EPRI HF 182 1 1E22- P&B MDR-131-1 Generator 710'-6 " Cap > Dem Relay Support Pressure Relay p301B Panel Test K011 Building Systems AC/DC K12 / DG 1B Low Oil Diesel Auxiliary Power 1E22- Control EPRI HF 183 1 1E22- Temperature P&B MDR-131-1 Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem Relay Support P301B Panel Test K012 Relay Building Systems AC/DC Diesel K10 / Rotary Power DG 2A Control EPRI HF 184 2 P&B MDR-137-8 2DG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem 2DGKO10 Relay Support Overspeed Relay panel Test Building Systems AC/DC DG 2A Diesel 87X / Auxiliary Power Differential Control EPRI HF 185 2 P&B MDR-137-8 2DG02JB Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem 2DG087 Relay Support Overcurrent panel Test Building Systems Auxiliary Relay AC/DC Diesel 81X / Auxiliary Power DG 2A Frequency Control EPRI HF 186 2 P&B MDR-137-8 2DG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem 2DG081X Relay Support Relay panel Test Building Systems AC/DC Diesel tF K9/ Auxiliary Power DG 2A Failure to Control EPRI 187 2 P&B MDR-137-8 2DG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem 2DGK009 Relay Support Start Relay panel Building Systems AC/DC Diesel K11/ Auxiliary Power DG 2A Low Oil Control EPRI HF 188 2 P&B MDR-137-8 2DG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem 2DGK011 Relay Support Pressure Relay panel Test Building Systems AC/DC DG 2A Low Oil Diesel K12/ Auxiliary Power Control EPRI HF 189 2 Temperature P&B MDR-137-8 2DG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem 2DGK012 Relay Support panel Test Relay Building Systems AC/DC DG 2A Field Diesel K25/ Auxiliary Power Control EPRI HF 190 2 Excitation Failure P&B MDR-137-8 2DG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem 2DGK025 Relay Support panel Test Relay Building Systems AC/DC Diesel S8 / OSTS- Speed Power DG 0 Overspeed Stewart & 81381-D-STC- Control LAS 191 0 ODG02J6 Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem DG076 Switch Support Switch Stevenson 4240 Panel Report Building Systems Page 69 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation 1D Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC DG 1A Diesel S8 / 1STS- Speed Power Control LAS 192 1 Overspeed ESSB-4AT 1DGO2JB Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem DG076 Switch Support Start Panel Report Switch Building Systems AC/DC DG 1B Diesel S8/ 1E22- Overspee Power Stewart & 81381-D-STC- 1E22- Control LAS 193 1 Overspeed Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem J901 d Switch Support Stevenson 4240 P301B Panel Report Switch Building Systems AC/DC Diesel S8/ 2STS- Speed Power DG 81381-D-STC- Control LAS 194 2 Overspeed GE 2DG02JB Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem DG076 Switch Support 4240 Panel Report Switch Building Systems AC/DC DG 2B Diesel S8 /2E22- Overspee Power Stewart & 81381-D-STC- 2E22- Control LAS 195 2 Overspeed Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem J901 d Switch Support Stevenson 4240 P301B Panel Report Switch Building Systems AC/DC DG 0 Differential Diesel 87/ Auxiliary Power Control 196 0 Overcurrent ABB SA-1 ODG02JA Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem ODG008 Relay Support Panel Relay Building Systems AC/DC DG 1A 87/ Diesel Auxiliary Power Differential Control 197 1 ABB SA-1 1DG02JA Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem 1DG008 Relay Support Overcurrent Panel Building Systems Relay AC/DC DG 2A 87/ Diesel Auxiliary Power Differential Control 198 2 ABB SA-1 2DG02JA Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem 2DG008 Relay Support Overcurrent Panel Building Systems Relay AC/DC K59X1 / DG 0 Neutral Diesel Auxiliary Power Control Qualifica 199 0 ODGK059 Ground Auxiliary GE 12HMA1166 ODG021A Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem X Relay Support Panel tion Test Relay Building Systems AC/DC K32X / DG 1A Reverse Diesel Auxiliary Power Control Qual~ca 200 0 ODGK032 Power Auxiliary GE 12HMA11B6 ODG02JA Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem X Relay Support Panel tion Test Relay Building Systems AC/DC K59X1 / DG 1A Neutral Diesel Auxiliary Power Control Qualifica 201 1 1DGK059 Ground Auxiliary GE 12HMA1166 iDG02JA Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem Relay Support Panel tion Test X Relay Building Systems Page 70 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC DG 1A Reverse Diesel K32X / Auxiliary Power Control Qualifica 202 1 Power Auxiliary GE 12HMA11B6 iDG02JA Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem 1DG032 Relay Support Panel tion Test Relay Building Systems AC/DC DG 2A Reverse Diesel K32X / Auxiliary Power Control Qualifica 203 2 Power Auxiliary GE 12HMA11B6 2DG02JA Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem 2DGK32X Relay Support Panel tion Test Relay Building Systems AC/DC Diesel 59/ Overvolta Power DG 0 Neutral Control LAS 204 0 GE 121AV51D1A ODG02JA Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem ODG005 ge Relay Support Ground Relay Panel Report Building Systems AC/DC Diesel 59/ Overvolta Power DG 1A Neutral Control LAS 205 1 GE 121AV51D1A lDG02JA Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem 1DG012 ge Relay Support Ground Relay Panel Report Building Systems AC/DC Diesel 59/ Overvolta Power DG 2A Neutral Control LAS 206 2 GE IAV51D 2DG02JA Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem 2DG012 ge Relay Support Ground Relay Panel Report Building Systems AC/DC 51VX / DG 0 Diesel Time Power Agastat / Control 207 0 ODG051V Overcurrent 7012PB ODG03J Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem X Relay Support Amerace Panel Auxiliary Relay Building Systems AC/DC DG 0 Failure to Diesel K39 / Time Power Control 208 0 Start Time Delay Agastat E7012PD002 ODG03J Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem ODGK039 Relay Support Panel Relay Building Systems AC/DC Diesel K33 / Time Power DG 0 Engine Start Agastat / Control 209 0 7012PE ODG03J Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem ODGK033 Relay Support Time Delay Relay Amerace Panel Building Systems AC/DC S1VX / DG 1A Diesel Time Power Agastat / Control 210 1 lDG051V Overcurrent 7012P4 lDG03J Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem X Relay Support Amerace Panel Relay Building Systems AC/DC DG 1A Failure to Diesel K39 / Time Power Control 211 1 Start Time Delay Agastat E7012PD002 1DG03J Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem 1DGK039 Relay Support Panel Relay Building Systems Page 71 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC DG 1A Engine Diesel K33 / Time Power Agastat / Control 212 1 Start Time Delay 7012PE 1DG03J Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem lDGK033 Relay Support Amerace Panel Relay Building Systems AC/DC K39 / Time DG 16 Failure to Diesel power 1E22- Control 213 1 1E22- Delay Start Time Delay Agastat E7012PDO02 Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem Support P301B Panel K039 Relay Relay Building Systems AC/DC K33 / Time DG 1B Engine Diesel power 1E22- Control 214 1 1E22- Delay Start Time Delay Agastat E7012PD Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem Support P301B Panel K033 Relay Relay Building Systems AC/DC K6/ Time 1E22-P028 Diesel Power DG 1B Time Vertical 215 1 1E22B- Delay Agastat Model 7012 (11-122- Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem Support Delay Relay Board K006 Relay P028) Building Systems AC/DC 51VX / DG 2A Diesel Time Power Agastat / Control 216 2 2DG051V Overcurrent Model 7012 2DG03J Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem X Relay Support Amerace Panel Relay Building Systems AC/DC DG 2A Failure to Diesel K39/ Time Power Amerace Control 217 2 Start Time Delay E7012PDO02 2DG03J Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem 2DGKO39 Relay Support / Agastat Panel Relay Building Systems AC/DC Time DG 2A Engine Diesel K33 / Power Control 218 2 Delay Start Time Delay Agastat 7012PE 2DG03J Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem 2DGKO33 Support Panel Relay Relay Building Systems AC/DC K39 / Time DG 2B Failure to Diesel power Amerace 2E22- Control 219 2 2E22- Delay Start Time Delay E7012PDO02 Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem Support / Agastat P301B Panel K039 Relay Relay Building Systems AC/DC K33/ Time DG 2B Engine Diesel Power Amerace 2E22- Control 220 2 2E22- Delay Start Time Delay 7012PD Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem Support / Agastat P301B Panel K033 Relay Relay Building Systems AC/DC K6/ Time 2E22-P028 Diesel Power DG 2B Time Amerace Vertical 221 2 2E22B- Delay Model 7012 (21122- Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem Support Delay Relay / Agastat Board K006 Relay P028) Building Systems Page 72 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 13-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC S11/ DG 2A Oil Diesel Temperat Power 9025-BGW- 1E22- Control LAS 222 1 1E22- Temperature Square D Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem ure Switch Support 2259 Series P301B Panel Report N517 Switch Building Systems AC/DC 511 / DG 2B Oil Diesel Temperat Power 2E22- Control LAS 223 2 2E22- Temperature Square D 9025 Model Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem ure Switch Support P301B Panel Report N517 Switch Building Systems AC/DC Diesel 32/ Power Power DG 0 Reverse Control LAS 224 0 GE 121CW51A2A ODG02JA Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem ODG002 Relay Support Power Relay Panel Report Building Systems AC/DC Diesel 32/ Power Power DG 1A Reverse Control LAS 225 1 GE 121CW51A2A 1DG02JA Generator 71O'-6" Cap > Dem 1DG009 Relay Support Power Relay Panel Report Building Systems AC/DC Diesel 32/ Power Power DG 2A Reverse Control LAS 226 2 GE 121CW51A2A 2DG02JA Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem 2DG009 Relay Support Power Relay Panel Report Building Systems AC/DC Diesel 40(1440- Protective Power DG 0 Field Control Operator 227 O GE Type CEH ODG02JA Generator 710'-6" N/A DG003) Relay Support Excitation Panel Action Building Systems AC/DC Diesel 40(1440- Protective Power DG 1A Field Control Operator 228 1 GE Type CEH 1DG021A Generator 710'-6" N/A DG010 Relay Support Excitation Panel Action Building Systems AC/DC Diesel 40(2440- Protective Power DG 2A Field Control Operator 229 2 GE Type CEH 2DG02JA Generator 710'-6" N/A DG010) Relay Support Excitation Panel Action Building Systems Differenti AC/DC DG 16 K30A 1E22-P028 Diesel al Power Differential Vertical EPRI HF 230 1 (1487- GE 12PVD21B1A (1H22- Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem Overcurre Support Overcurrent Board Test DG1B) P028) Building nt Relay I Systems Relay Differenti AC/DC DG 16 K30B 1E22-P028 Diesel al Power Differential Vertical EPRI HF 231 1 (1487- GE 12PVD21B1A (11-122- Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem Overcurre Support Overcurrent Board Test DG1B) P028) Building nt Relay Systems Relay Page 73 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation 1D Type System Function Manuf. Model No. 10 Type (ft) Capacity Result Differenti AC/DC DG 16 K30C 1E22-P028 Diesel al Power Differential Vertical EPRI HF 232 1 ( 1487- GE 12PVD21BIA {1H22- Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem Overcurre Support Overcurrent Board Test DG1B) P028) Building nt Relay Systems Relay Differenti AC/DC DG 2B K30A 2E22-PO28 Diesel al Power Differential Vertical EPRI HF 233 2 (2487- GE 12PVD21B1A (2H22- Generator 710`-6" Cap> Dem Overcurre Support Overcurrent Board Test DG26) P028) Building nt Relay Systems Relay Differenti AC/DC DG 26 K306 2E22-P028 Diesel al Power Differential Vertical EPRI HF 234 2 {2487- GE 12PVD21B1A {2H22- Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem Overcurre Support Overcurrent Board Test DG26) P028) Building nt Relay Systems Relay Differenti AC/DC DG 26 K30C 2E22-P028 Diesel al Power Differential Vertical EPRI HF 235 2 (2487- GE 12PVD21B1A (21-122- Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem Overcurre Support Overcurrent Board Test DG26) P028) Building nt Relay Systems Relay AC/DC DG 0 Oil Diesel S11 / OTS- Temperat Power Control LAS 236 0 Temperature Square D 9025-BCW-32 ODGOIK Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem DG041 ure Switch Support Panel Report Switch Building Systems AC/DC DG lA Oil Diesel 511 / 1TS- Temperat Power Control LAS 237 1 Temperature Square D 9025-BCW-32 iDG01K Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem DG041 ure Switch Support Panel Report Switch Building Systems AC/DC DG 1B Oil Diesel S11 / 2TS- Temperat Power Control LAS 238 2 Temperature Square D 9025-BCW-32 2DGO1K Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem DG041 ure Switch Support Panel Report Switch Building Systems AC/DC 51V DG 0 Diesel Power Control 239 0 (1451- Overcurre Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B ODG02JA Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem Support Panel DG015A) nt Relay Relay Phase A Building Systems AC/DC Siv DG 0 Diesel Power Control 240 0 (1451- Overcurre Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B ODG02JA Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem Support Panel DG015B) nt Relay Relay Phase B Building Systems AC/DC 51V DG 0 Diesel Power Control 241 0 (1451- Overcurre Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B ODG02JA Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem Support Panel DG015C) nt Relay Relay Phase C Building Systems Page 74 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC 51V DG 1A Diesel Power Control 242 1 (1451- Overcurre Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B 1DG02JA Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem Panel DG016A) nt Relay Relay Phase A Building Supems AC/DC 51V DG 1A Diesel Power Control 243 1 (1451- Overcurre Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B 1DG02JA Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap >Dem Support Panel DG016B) nt Relay Relay Phase B Building Systems AC/DC 51V DG 1A Diesel Power Control 244 1 (1451- Overcurre Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B 1DG02JA Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem Support Panel DG016C) nt Relay Relay Phase C Building Systems AC/DC K35A DG 1B 1E22-PO28 Diesel Power Vertical 245 1 (1451V- Overcurre Overcurrent GE 121JCV51B21A (11122- Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem Support Board DG1B) nt Relay Relay P028) Building Systems AC/DC K35B DG 1B 1E22-P028 Diesel Power Vertical 246 1 (1451V- Overcurre Overcurrent GE 1211CV51B21A (11122- Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem Support Board DG1B) nt Relay Relay P028) Building Systems AC/DC K35C DG 1B 1E22-P028 Diesel Power Vertical 247 1 (1451V- Overcurre Overcurrent GE 121JCV51B21A (1H22- Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem Support Board DG1B) nt Relay Relay P028) Building Systems AC/DC 51V DG 2A Diesel Overcurre Power Control 248 2 (2451- Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B 2DG02JA Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem nt Relay Support Panel DG016A) Relay Phase A Building Systems AC/DC 51V DG 2A Diesel Overcurre Power Control 249 2 (2451- Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B 2DG02JA Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem nt Relay Support Panel DG016B) Relay Phase B Building Systems AC/DC 51V DG 2A Diesel Overcurre Power Control 250 2 (2451- Overcurrent GE IJCV-51B 2DG02JA Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem nt Relay Support Panel DG016C) Relay Phase C Building Systems AC/DC K35A DG 2B 2E22-P028 Diesel Overcurre Power Vertical 251 2 (2451V- Overcurrent GE 12JCV51B21A (21122- Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem nt Relay Support Board DG2B) Relay P028) Building Systems Page 75 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 13-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC K35B DG 2B 2E22-P028 Diesel Overcurre Power Vertical 252 2 ( 2451V- Overcurrent GE 12JCV51B21A (2H22- Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem nt Relay Support Board DG2B) Relay P028) Building Systems AC/DC K35C DG 2B 2E22-P028 Diesel Overcurre Power Vertical 253 2 (2451V- Overcurrent GE 12JCV51621A (2H22- Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap > Dem nt Relay Support Board DG2B) Relay P028) Building Systems AC/DC 51G Ground 141Y Feed to Power 202D6141UL 141Y Reactor LAS 254 1 (1451- Fault 135X Ground ABB Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem Support Type GR-5 (1AP04E) Building Report AP055) Relay Fault Systems AC/DC 51N 141Y Feed to Overcurre Power 135X Reactor LAS 255 1 (1351- 135X Neutral GE IAC-60B Switchgear 710'-6" Cap> Dem nt Relay Support (1AP19E) Building Report AP082) Overcurrent Systems AC/DC SiG Ground 141Y Feed to Power 141Y Reactor LAS 256 1 (1451- Fault 135Y Ground ABB GR-5 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem Support (1AP04E) Building Report AP057) Relay Fault Systems AC/DC 51N 141Y Feed to Overcurre Power 135Y Reactor LAS 257 1 (1351- 135Y Neutral GE IAC-60B Switchgear 710'-6" Cap> Dem nt Relay Support (1AP20E) Building Report AP083) Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 51G Ground 142Y Feed to Power Reactor 258 1 (1451- Fault 136X Ground ABB Type GR-5 Switchgear 731 Cap > Dem Support 1406E)

(1AP Building Repo 1po rt AP071) Relay Fault Systems AC/DC 51N 142Y Feed to Overcurre Power 136X Reactor LAS 259 1 (1351- 136X Neutral GE IAC-60B Switchgear 731 Cap> Dem nt Relay Support (1AP21E) Building Report AP090) Overcurrent Systems AC/DC SiG Ground 142Y Feed to Power 142Y Reactor LAS 260 1 (1451- Fault 136Y Ground ABB Type GR-5 Switchgear 731 Cap > Dem Support (1AP06E) Building Report AP073) Relay Fault Systems AC/DC 51N 142Y Feed to Overcurre Power 136Y Reactor LAS 261 1 (1351- 136Y Neutral GE IAC-60B Switchgear 731 Cap> Dem nt Relay Support (1AP22E) Building Report AP091) Overcurrent Systems Page 76 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Lockout Power 143 Switchgear 143 Reactor LAS 262 1 86N/1432 N/A N/A Switchgear 687 Cap> Dem Relay Support Lockout Relay (1AP07E) Building Report Systems AC/DC Normal Feed to 51(1451- Overcurre Power 143 Reactor LAS 263 1 GE IAC-51A Switchgear 687 Cap > Dem AP034A) nt Relay Support (1AP07E) Building Report Overcurrent ent Systems AC/DC Normal Feed to 51(1451- Overcurre Power 143 Reactor LAS 264 1 GE IAC-51A Switchgear 687 Cap > Dem AP034B) nt Relay Support (1AP07E) Building Report Overcurrent ent Systems AC/DC Normal Feed to 51(1451- Overcurre Power 143 Reactor LAS 265 1 GE IAC-53A Switchgear 687 Cap > Dem AP035) nt Relay Support (1AP07E) Building Report Overcurrent ent Systems AC/DC 51(1451- Overcurre Power 143 Feed to 143- 143 Reactor LAS 266 1 GE IAC-51 Switchgear 687 Cap > Dem AP074A } nt Relay Support 10vercurrent (1AP07E) Building Report Systems AC/DC 51(1451- Overcurre Power 143 Feed to 143- 143 Reactor LAS 267 1 GE IAC-51 Switchgear 687 Cap> Dem AP074B } nt RelayY Support pp 1 Overcurrent (1AP07E) Building Report Systems AC/DC 51G Ground 241Y Feed to Power 202D6141UL 241Y Reactor LAS 268 2 (2451- Fault 235X Ground ABB Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem Support Type GR-5 (2AP04E) Building Report AP055) Relay Fault Systems AC/DC 51N Ground 241Y Feed to power 235X Reactor LAS 269 2 (2351- Fault 235X Neutral GE IAC-60B Switchgear 710'-6" Cap> Dem Support (2AP19E) Building Report AP082) Relay Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 51G Ground 241Y Feed to Power 241Y Reactor LAS 270 2 (2451- Fault 235Y Ground ABB Type GR-5 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem Support (2AP04E) Building Report AP057) Relay Fault Systems AC/DC 51N Ground 241Y Feed to power 235Y Reactor LAS 271 2 (2351- Fault 235Y Neutral GE IAC-606 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem Support (2AP20E) Building Report AP083) Relay Overcurrent Systems Page 77 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC 51G Ground 242Y Feed to Power 242Y Reactor LAS 272 2 (2451- Fault 236X Ground ABB Type GR-5 Switchgear 731 Cap > Dem Support (2AP06E) Building Report AP071) Relay Fault Systems AC/DC 51N 242Y Feed to Overcurre Power 236X Reactor LAS 273 2 (2351- 236X Neutral GE IAC-60B Switchgear 731 Cap> Dem nt Relay Support (2AP21E) Building Report AP090) Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 51G Ground 242Y Feed to power 242Y Reactor LAS 274 2 (2451- Fault 236Y Ground ABB Type GR-5 Switchgear 731 Cap > Dem Support (2AP06E) Building Report AP073) Relay Fault Systems AC/DC SiN Ground 242Y Feed to Power 236Y Reactor 731 LAS 275 2 (2351- Fault 236Y Neutral GE IAC-60B Switchgear Cap> Dem Support (2AP22E) Building Report AP091) Relay Overcurrent Systems AC/DC Lockout Power 243 Switchgear 243 Reactor LAS 276 2 86N/2432 N/A N/A Switchgear 687 Cap > Dem Relay Support Lockout Relay (2AP07E) Building Report Systems AC/DC Normal Feed to 51(2451- Overcurre Power 243 Reactor LAS 277 2 SG 243 GE IAC-51B Switchgear 687 Cap > Dem AP034A) nt Relay Support (2AP07E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC Normal Feed to 51(2451- Overcurre Power 243 Reactor LAS 278 2 GE IAC-51B Switchgear 687 Cap> Dem AP034B) nt Relay Support (2AP07E) Building Report Overcurrent ent Systems AC/DC Normal Feed to 51(2451- Overcurre Power 243 Reactor LAS 279 2 SG 243 GE IAC-53A Switchgear 687 Cap> Dem AP035) nt Relay Support (2AP07E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 51(2451- Overcurre Power 243 Feed to 243- 243 Reactor LAS 280 2 GE IAC-516 Switchgear 687 Cap> Dem AP074A nt RelaySu Support 10vercurrent (2AP07E) Building Report Systems AC/DC 51(2451- Overcurre Power 243 Feed to 243- 243 Reactor LAS 281 2 GE IAC-516 Switchgear 687 Cap > Dem AP074B nt RelaySu Support 10vercurrent (2AP07E) Building Report Systems Page 78 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation

!D Type System Function Manuf. Model No. !D Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC K32 1E22-P028 Diesel Power Power DG 1B Reverse Vertical 282 1 (1432- GE 12GGP53B1A (1H22- Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem Relay Support Power Relay Board DG16) P028) Building Systems AC/DC K32 2E22-P028 Diesel Power Power DG 2B Reverse Vertical 283 2 (2432- GE 12GGP53B1A (2H22- Generator 710'-6" GERS Cap> Dem Relay Support Power Relay Board DG2B) P028) Building Systems AC/DC 250V Battery Power Overvolta Power Battery Auxiliary LAS 284 1 K2 Charger Conv. 3SD-260-200 1DC03E 710'-6" Cap> Dem ge Relay Support Charger Building Report Overvoltage Prod.

Systems 1AA Battery AC/DC Charger Power Overvolta Power Battery Auxiliary LAS 285 1 59K1 Overvoltage Conv. 3SD-130-200 1DC09E 710'-6" Cap > Dem ge Relay Support Charger Building Report Fault Module F- Prod.

Systems 55-2285 1BA Battery AC/DC Charger Power Overvolta Power Battery Auxiliary LAS 286 1 59K1 Overvoltage Conv. 3S-130-200D 1DC17E 731 Cap> Dem ge Relay Support Charger Building Report Fault Module F- Prod.

Systems 55-2285 AC/DC 1C Battery Power Overvolta Power Charger Battery Auxiliary LAS 287 1 K4 Conv. 3SD-1306-SOD 1DC19E 687 Cap > Dem ge Relay Support Overvoltage Charger Building Report Prod.

Systems Fault AC/DC 250V Battery Power Overvolta Power Battery Auxiliary LAS 288 2 K2 Charger Conv. 3SD-260-200 2DC03E 710'-6" Cap > Dem ge Relay Support Charger Building Report Overvoltage Prod.

Systems 2AA Battery AC/DC Charger Power Overvolta Power Battery Auxiliary LAS 289 2 59K1 Overvoltage Conv. 3SD-130-200 2DC09E 710'-6" Cap > Dem ge Relay Support Charger Building Report Fault Module F- Prod.

Systems 55-2285 2BA Battery AC/DC Charger Power Overvolta Power Battery Auxiliary LAS 290 2 59K1 Overvoltage Conv. 3S-130-200D 2DC17E 731 Cap > Dem ge Relay Support Charger Building Report Fault Module F- Prod.

Systems 55-2285 Page 79 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation 1D Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC 2C Battery Power Overvolta Power Charger Battery Auxiliary LAS 291 2 K4 Conv. 3SD-130B-SOD 2DC19E 687 Cap> Dem ge Relay Support Overvoltage Charger Building Report Prod.

Systems Fault AC/DC Diesel Overspee Power DG 2B 2E22- Control LAS 292 2 K10 N/A N/A Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem d Relay Support Overspeed Relay P301B Panel Report Building Systems AC/DC Diesel K9 Start Power DG 2B Failure to 2E22- Control LAS 293 2 N/A N/A Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem Relay Support Start Relay P301B Panel Report Building Systems AC/DC Diesel Pressure Power DG 2B Low Oil 2E22- Control LAS 294 2 K11 N/A N/A Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem Relay Support Pressure Relay P301B Panel Report Building Systems AC/DC DG 2B Low Oil Diesel Temperat Power 2E22- Control LAS 295 2 K12 Temperature N/A N/A Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem ure Relay Support P301B Panel Report Relay Building Systems CB-6 / AC/DC Diesel 1E22- Circuit Power Feeder Breaker 1E22- Control LAS 296 1 GE TEB122100 Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem P301A- Breaker Support from 1C Battery P301A Panel Report Building CB6 Systems CB-9 / AC/DC Feeder Breaker Diesel 1E22- Circuit Power 1E22- Control LAS 297 1 from 1C Battery GE TEB122100 Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem P301A- Breaker Support P301A Panel Report Charger Building CB9 Systems CB-6 / AC/DC Diesel 2E22- Circuit Power Feeder Breaker 2E22- Control LAS 298 2 GE TEB122100 Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem P301A- Breaker Support from 2C Battery P301A Panel Report Building CB6 Systems CB-9 / AC/DC Feeder Breaker Diesel 2E22- Circuit Power 2E22- Control LAS 299 2 from 2C Battery GE TEB122100 Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem P301A- Breaker Support P301A Panel Report Charger Building CB9 Systems AC/DC 141Y Feed to 51(1451- Overcurre Power 141Y Reactor LAS 300 1 1 ABB CO-4 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem AP054A) nt Relay Support (1AP04E) Building Report Overur cur rent Systems Page 80 of 91

15CO348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 13-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. !D Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC 141Y Feed to 51(1451- Overcurre Power 141Y Reactor LAS 301 1 135X ABB CO-4 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem AP054B) nt Relay Support (1AP04E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 141Y Feed to 51(1451- Overcurre Power 141Y Reactor LAS 302 1 135Y ABB CO-4 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem AP056A) nt Relay Support (1AP04E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 141Y Feed to 51(1451- Overcurre Power 141Y Reactor LAS 303 1 135Y ABB CO-4 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem AP056B) nt Relay Support (1AP04E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 142Y Feed to 51(1451- Overcurre Power 142Y Reactor LAS 304 1 136X ABB CO-4 Switchgear 731 Cap> Dem AP070A) nt Relay Support (1AP06E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 142Y Feed to 51(1451- Overcurre Power 142Y Reactor LAS 305 1 136X ABB CO-4 Switchgear 731 Cap> Dem AP070B) nt Relay Support (1AP06E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 142Y Feed to 51(1451- Overcurre Power 142Y Reactor LAS 306 1 136Y ABB CO-4 Switchgear 731 Cap> Dem AP072A) nt Relay Support (1AP06E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 142Y Feed to 51(1451- Overcurre Power 142Y Reactor LAS 307 1 136Y ABB CO-4 Switchgear 731 Cap > Dem AP072B) nt Relay Support (1AP06E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 241Y Feed to 51(2451- Overcurre Power 241Y Reactor LAS 308 2 235X ABB CO-4 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem AP054A) nt Relay Support (2AP04E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 241Y Feed to 51(2451- Overcurre Power 241Y Reactor LAS 309 2 235X ABB CO-4 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap> Dem AP054B) nt Relay Support (2AP04E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 241Y Feed to 51(2451- Overcurre Power 241Y Reactor LAS 310 2 235Y ABB CO-4 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem AP056A) nt Relay Support (2AP04E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems Page 81 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft} Capacity Result AC/DC 241Y Feed to 51(2451- Overcurre Power 241Y Reactor LAS 311 2 235Y ABB CO-4 Switchgear 710,-6" Cap > Dem AP05613) nt Relay Support (2AP04E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 242Y Feed to 51(2451- Overcurre Power 242Y Reactor LAS 312 2 236X ABB CO-4 Switchgear 731 Cap > Dem AP070A) nt Relay Support (2AP06E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 242Y Feed to 51(2451- Overcurre Power 242Y Reactor LAS 313 2 236X ABB CO-4 Switchgear 731 Cap> Dem AP07013) nt Relay Support (2AP06E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 242Y Feed to 51(2451- Overcurre Power 242Y Reactor LAS 314 2 236Y ABB CO-4 Switchgear 731 Cap > Dem AP072A) nt Relay Support (2AP06E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems AC/DC 242Y Feed to 51(2451- Overcurre Power 242Y Reactor 315 2 236Y ABB CO-4 Switchgear 731 LAS Cap> Dem AP0726) nt Relay Support (2AP06E) Building Report Overcurrent Systems 1E31- Steam Leak DX-112 Control Auxiliary LAS 316 1 Switch Core Cooling Yokogawa 11-113-P632 768 Cap > Dem R001C Detection Switch 2/A3/C3/S-S Cabinet Building Report RCS/Reactor 2E31- Vessel Steam Leak DX-112 Control Auxiliary LAS 317 2 Switch Yokogawa 2H13-P632 768 Cap > Dem R001C Inventory Detection Switch 2/A3/C3/S_S Cabinet Building Report Control 1E31- Steam Leak DX-112 Control Auxiliary LAS 318 1 Switch Core Cooling Yokogawa 11-113-13642 768 Cap> Dem R002C Detection Switch 2/A3/C3/S-S Cabinet Building Report RCS/Reactor 2E31- Vessel Steam Leak DX-112 Control Auxiliary LAS 319 2 Switch Yokogawa 21-113-P642 768 Cap> Dem R002C Inventory Detection Switch 2/A3/C3/S-S Cabinet Building Report Control AC/DC Diesel 81/ Auxiliary Power DG 0 Frequency Control EPRI HF 320 0 ABB Type ITE-81 ODG021A Generator 710'-6" Cap > Dem ODG007 Relay Support Relay Panel Test Building Systems Page 82 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Diesel 81/ Auxiliary Power DG 1A Frequency Control EPRI HF 321 1 ABB Type ITE-81 iDG021A Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem 1DG014 Relay Support Relay panel Test Building Systems AC/DC Diesel 81/ Auxiliary Power DG 2A Frequency Control EPRI HF 322 2 ABB Type ITE-81 2DG02JA Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem 2DG014 Relay Support Relay panel Test Building Systems AC/DC AC61413 ITE Circuit Circuit Power DG 0 Circuit 141Y Reactor EPRI HF 323 1 / 1AP04E- Breaker 5HK350 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem Breaker Support Breaker (1AP04E) Building Test 3 pp LTD.

Systems AC/DC Feeder Circuit ITE Circuit 52/ Circuit Power 141Y Reactor EPRI HF 324 1 Breaker to 135X Breaker 5HK350 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap>Dem 1AP04E-9 Breaker Support Su (1AP04E) Building Test

& 135Y LTD.

Systems AC/DC AC61423 ITE Circuit Circuit Power DG 1A Circuit 142Y Reactor EPRI HF 325 1 / 1AP06E- Breaker 5HK350 Switchgear 731 Cap > Dem Breaker Support Breaker (1AP06E) Building Test 3 LTD.

Systems AC/DC Feeder Circuit ITE Circuit 52/ Circuit Power 142Y Reactor EPRI HF 326 1 Breaker to 136X Breaker 5HK350 Switchgear 731 Cap>Dem 1AP06E-9 Breaker Support (1AP06E) Building Test pp & 136Y LTD.

Systems AC/DC ACB2413 ITE Circuit Circuit Power DG 0 Circuit 241Y Reactor EPRI HF 327 2 / 2AP04E- Breaker 5HK350 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem Breaker Support Breaker (2AP04E) Building Test 10 pp LTD.

Systems AC/DC Feeder Circuit ITE Circuit 52/ Circuit Power 241Y Reactor EPRI HF 328 2 Breaker to 235X Breaker 5HK350 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem 2AP04E-4 Breaker Support (2AP04E) Building Test

& 235Y LTD.

Systems AC/DC ACB2423 ITE Circuit Circuit Power DG 2A Circuit 242Y Reactor EPRI HF 329 2 / 2AP06E- Breaker 5HK350 Switchgear 731 Cap > Dem Breaker Support Breaker (2AP06E) Building Test 11 LTD.

Systems AC/DC Feeder Circuit ITE Circuit 52 / Circuit Power 242Y Reactor EPRI HF 330 2 Breaker to 236X Breaker 5HK350 Switchgear 731 Cap > Dem 2A52 / Breaker Su Support (2AP06E) Building Test

& 236Y LTD.

Systems Page 83 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 13-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC 52/ Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 135X Reactor LAS 331 1 1AP19E- Breaker from GE AK-50 Switchgear 710,-6" Cap >Dem Breaker Support (1AP19E) Building Report 102B 141Y Systems AC/DC 52 / DG 0 Cooling Circuit Power 13SX Reactor LAS 332 1 1AP19E- Water Pump GE AK-25 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem Breaker Support (1AP19E) Building Report 103A Circuit Breaker Systems AC/DC 52/ Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 135X Reactor LAS 333 1 1AP19E- Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem Breaker Support (1AP19E) Building Report 103C 135X-2 Systems AC/DC 52 / Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 135X Reactor LAS 334 1 1AP19E- Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem Breaker Support er (1AP19E) Building Report 103D 135X-3 Systems AC/DC 52 / Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 135Y Reactor LAS 335 1 1AP20E- Breaker from GE AK-50 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap >Dem Breaker Support (1AP20E) Building Report 202B 141Y Systems AC/DC 52 / Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 135Y Reactor LAS 336 1 1AP20E- Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap> Dem Breaker Support (1AP20E) Building Report 204B 135Y-2 Systems AC/DC 52 / Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 136X Reactor LAS 337 1 1AP21E- Breaker from GE AK-50 Switchgear 731 Cap > Dem Breaker Support (1136X Building Report 3028 142Y Systems AC/DC 52 / DG 1A Cooling Circuit Power 136X Reactor LAS 338 1 1AP21E- Water Pump GE AK-25 Switchgear 731 Cap > Dem Breaker Support (1AP21E) Building Report 303A Circuit Breaker Systems AC/DC 52/ Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 136X Reactor LAS 339 1 1AP21E- Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 Switchgear 731 Cap > Dem Breaker Support (1AP21E) Building Report 304D 136X-3 Systems AC/DC 52 / Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 136Y Reactor LAS 340 1 1AP22E- Breaker from GE AK-50 Switchgear 731 Cap >Dem Breaker Support (1AP Y Building Report 4026 142Y Systems Page 84 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC 52 J Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 136Y Reactor LAS 341 1 1AP22E- Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 Switchgear 731 Cap> Dem Breaker Support (1AP22E) Building Report 404B 136Y-1 Systems AC/DC 52 / Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 235X Reactor LAS 342 2 2AP19E- Breaker from GE AK-50 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap> Dem Breaker Circus Support Su (2AP19E) Building Report 1038 241Y Systems AC/DC 52 / DG 0 Cooling Circuit Power 235X Reactor LAS 343 2 2AP19E- Water Pump GE AK-25 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap > Dem Breaker Support (2AP19E) Building Report 102A Circuit Breaker Systems AC/DC 52 / Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 235X Reactor LAS 344 2 2AP19E- Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap> Dem Breaker Support (2AP19E) Building Report 102C pp 235X-2 Systems AC/DC 52 / Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 235X Reactor LAS 345 2 2AP19E- Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap> Dem Breaker Support (2AP19E) Building Report 102D 235X-3 Systems AC/DC 52 / Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 235Y Reactor LAS 346 2 2AP20E- Breaker from GE AK-50 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap >Dem Breaker Support Su (2AP20E) Building Report 2038 241Y Systems AC/DC 52/ Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 235Y Reactor LAS 347 2 2AP20E- Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 Switchgear 710'-6" Cap> Dem Breaker Support (2AP20E) Building Report 201C 235Y-2 Systems AC/DC 52/ Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 236X Reactor LAS 348 2 2AP21E- Breaker from GE AK-50 Switchgear 731 Cap > Dem Breaker Support (2AP21E) Building Report 303B 242Y Systems AC/DC 52 / DG 2A Cooling Circuit Power 236X Reactor LAS 349 2 2AP21E- Water Pump GE AK-25 Switchgear 731 Cap> Dem Breaker Support (2AP21E) Building Report 302C Circuit Breaker Systems AC/DC 52/ Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 236X Reactor LAS 350 2 2AP21E- Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 Switchgear 731 Cap> Dem Breaker Support (2AP21E) Building Report 3018 236X-3 Systems Page 85 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC 52 / Feeder Circuit Circuit Power 236Y Reactor LAS 351 2 2AP22E- Breaker from GE AK-50 Switchgear 731 Cap >Dem Breaker Support (2AP22E) Building Report 403B 242Y Systems AC/DC Feeder Circuit 52 / Circuit Power 236Y Reactor LAS 352 2 2AP22E- Breaker to MCC GE AK-25 Switchgear 731 Cap> Dem Breaker Support (2AP22E) Building Report 401C pp 136Y-1 Systems AC/DC ACB1433 Circuit Power DG 1B Circuit 143 Reactor LAS 353 1 /1 GE AM-4.16-350 Switchgear 687 Cap > Dem Breaker Support Breaker (1AP07E) Building Report 003 Systems AC/DC 52/

Circuit Power Feeder Circuit 143 Reactor LAS 354 1 1AP07E- GE AM-4.16-350 Switchgear 687 Cap > Dem Breaker Support Breaker to 143-1 (1AP07E) Building Report 005 Systems AC/DC ACB2433 Circuit Power DG 2B Circuit 243 Reactor LAS 355 2 / 2AP07E- GE AM-4.16-350 Switchgear 687 Cap > Dem Breaker Support Breaker (2AP07E) Building Report 003 Systems AC/DC 52/

Circuit Power Feeder Circuit Reactor LAS 356 2 2AP07E- GE AM-4.16-350 243 Switchgear 687 Cap >Dem Breaker Support Breaker to 243-1 (2AP07E) Building Report 005 Systems AC/DC Feeder Circuit 52/

Circuit Power Breaker to Distribution Auxiliary LAS 357 1 1DCO2E- GE AK-25 1DCO2E 710'-6" Cap > Dem Breaker Support Distribution Panel Building Report 2B Systems Panel 121Y AC/DC Feeder Circuit 52/

Circuit Power Breaker to Distribution Auxiliary LAS 358 1 1DC08E- GE AK-25 iDCOBE 710'-6" Cap> Dem Breaker Support Distribution Panel Building Report 3B Systems Panel 111Y AC/DC Feeder Circuit 52/

Circuit Power Breaker to Distribution Auxiliary LAS 359 1 1DC15E- GE AK-25 lDC15E 731 Cap > Dem Breaker Support Distribution Panel Building Report 3B Systems Panel 112Y AC/DC Feeder Circuit 52/

Circuit Power Breaker to Distribution Auxiliary LAS 360 2 2DCO2E- GE AK-25 2DCO2E 710'-6" Cap> Dem Breaker Support Distribution Panel Building Report 2B Systems Pane1221Y Page 86 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table 6-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Floor Component Evaluation No. Unit Building Elev. Basis for Evaluation

!D Type System Function Manuf. Model No. ID Type (ft) Capacity Result AC/DC Feeder Circuit 52/

Circuit Power Breakerto Distribution Auxiliary LAS 361 2 2DC08E- GE AK-25 2DC08E 710'-6" Cap> Dem Breaker Support Distribution Panel Building Report 3B Systems Pane1211Y AC/DC Feeder Circuit 52/

Circuit Power Breaker to Distribution Auxiliary LAS 362 2 2D GE AK-25 2DCi5E Cap > Dem Breaker Support Distribution Panel Building 731 Report 3B 36 Systems Pane1212Y AC/DC K59X1 / DG 2A Neutral Diesel Auxiliary Power Control EPRI HF 363 2 2DGK059 Ground Auxiliary GE 12HFA151A2H 2DG03J Generator 710'-6" Cap> Dem X Relay Support Panel Test Relay Building Systems Page 87 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency Confirmation VALVE* PAID SHEET UNIT NOTE 2821-F013C M1 16 1 2 SRV 21321-17013D M116 1 2 SRV 21321-17013E M116 1 2 SRV 21321-17013F M116 1 2 SRV 2821-F013H M116 1 2 SRV 2821-F013 K M1 16 1 2 SRV 2821-F013L M116 1 2 SRV 21321-F013M M1 16 1 2 SRV 2821-F013P M116 1 2 SRV 2821-F013R M116 1 2 SRV 2821-F013S M116 1 2 SRV 21321-170M M116 1 2 SRV 2821-F013V M1 16 1 2 SRV 2821-F022C M116 2 2 MSIV Inboard 2821-F028C M116 2 2 MSIV Outboard 2821-F022D M116 2 2 MSIV Inboard 2821-F028D M116 2 2 MSIV Outboard 21321-F022A M116 2 2 MSIV Inboard Page 88 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency Confirmation VALVE* MID SHEET UNIT NOTE 21321-F028A M116 2 2 MSIV Outboard 21321-F022B M116 2 2 MSIV Inboard 2821-F028B M116 2 2 MSIV Outboard 21321-F011 B M118 1 2 21321-F01013 M118 1 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2621-F011 A M1 18 1 2 2821-F010A M1 18 1 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 21333-F067A M139 1 2 2833-F060A M139 1 2 21333-F023A M139 1 2 2833-F067B M139 2 2 21333-F06013 M139 2 2 2B33-F023B M139 2 2 2E21-F005 Downstream of Simple Check Valve (no need to M140 1 2 be included) 2E21-F006 M140 1 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E22-F005 M141 1 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Downstream of Simple Check Valve (no need to 2E22-F004 M141 1 2 be included) 2E12-F017A M142 1 2 Page 89 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency Confirmation VALVE* PAID SHEET UNIT NOTE 2E12-F016A M142 1 2 2E12-F041A M142 1 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E12-F042A Downstream of Simple Check Valve (no need to M142 1 2 be included) 2E12-17050A M142 1 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Downstream of Simple Check Valve (no need to 2E12-F053A M142 1 2 be included) 2E12-F017B M142 2 2 2E12-F016B M142 2 2 2E12-FO41 B M142 2 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Downstream of Simple Check Valve (no need to 2E12-F042B M142 2 2 be included) 2E12-F050B M142 2 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included)

Downstream of Simple Check Valve (no need to 2E12-F053B M142 2 2 be included) 2E12-F009 M142 3 2 2E12-F008 M142 3 2 2E12-F041C M142 3 2 Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2E12-FO42C M142 3 2 Downstream of Simple Check Valve (no need to be included) 2G33-F101 M143 1 2 Page 90 of 91

15C0348-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-176 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency Confirmation VALVE* P&ID SHEET UNIT NOTE 2G33-F001 M143 1 2 2G33-F102 M143 1 2 2E51-F063 M147 1 2 2E51-F008 M147 1 2 21321-F016 M-116 7 2 21321-F019 M-116 7 2 2821-F067C M-116 7 2 21321-F0671D M-116 7 2 21321-F067A M-116 7 2 2821-F067B M-116 7 2

• Note that the evaluation of these valves and Unit 1 valves are discussed in Section 2.2 of this report as well as in report 15C0348-RPT-001(Ref. 18).

Page 91 of 91