ML20244E556

Insp Rept 50-318/89-15 on 890508-12.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Inservice Insp Program,Including 10-yr Plan, Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing,Primary & Secondary Water Chemistry Results & Erosion/Corrosion Control Program

ML20244E556
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	06/08/1989
From:	Chaudhary S, Winters R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20244E545	List: ML20244E542 ML20244E554 ML20244E556
References
50-318-89-15, NUDOCS 8906200390
Download: ML20244E556 (8)

See also: IR 05000318/1989015

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. -50-318/89-15

, Docket Nos. 50-318

License No. DPR-69

Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

Charles Center

P. 0. Box 1475

Baltimore, Maryland ~21203

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Facility Name: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2

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Inspection At: 'Lusby, Maryland

Inspection Dates: May 8- 12, 1989

Inspector: \ b ET

R. W. Winters, Reattor Engineer, MPS, EB,_ da'te

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DRS,. Region I

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Approved by: in/' 5['87

S. Chaudhary, Chief, Materials & Processes da te'

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Section, Engineering Branch, DRS, RI

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Inspection Summary: Routine unannounced inspection on May 8-12, 1989 Report

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No. 50-318/89-15)  ;

Areas Inspected: The inservice inspection program, including the ten year

plan, steam generator eddy current testing, primary and secondary water

chemistry results, and the erosion corrosion control program was reviewed.

Results: One violation concerning the certification of the licensee's

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nondestructive examination personnel was identified. No other deviations

or violations were found in the areas inspected.

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DETAILS

1.0 ' Persons Contacted

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company

H. Brust', Nuclear Materials Engineering

S. Buxbaum, Supervisor, Nondestructive Examination

P. Ca11anan, Quality Assurance Auditor

• P. Crinigan, General Supervisor, Chemistry

• C. Cruse, Manager, Nuclear Engineering

L. Decker, Nuclear Materials Engineering

• K. Hoffman, Nuclear Materials Engineering

• W. Lippold, General Supervisor, Technical Services Engineering

• A. Reed, Engineer, Metals Laboratory

L. Russell, Manager Calvert Cliffs

• B. Rudell, Supervisor, Nuclear. Materials Engineering

• D. Shaw, Licensing Engineer

• D. Van Petten, Nuclear Materials Engineering

Zetec Incorporated

W. Gray, Supervisor, Eddy Current Testing

NDE Technologies Corporation

T. Beiers, Lead Engineer, Eddy Current Evaluation

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• V. Pritchett, Resident Inspector

• Denotes those attending the exit meeting.

The inspector also contacted other administrative and technical

personnel during the inspection.

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2.0 Scope

The scope of this ir.spection was the review and observation of

activities in the following areas:

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steam generator eddy current examination

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the ten year inservice inspection (ISI) program

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the erosion corrosion control program 4

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NDE examiner certification program

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primary and secondary water chemistry results l

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"3 0 ' Steam Generator Eddy Current Examination Review

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Eddy Current Examination

The ISI.ofLthe steam generator tubes is conducted in accordance with

the unit's Technical Specifications. It is-not:part..of the ISI

program for the' balance of plant equipment and components. In

accordance with'the Technical. Specifications the' minimum number of

tubes required for the inspection was 6% of the active tubes in either

steam generator. This amounted to 508 tubes in steam generator 21 or

510 tubes in. steam generator 22.

The' licensee, however, opted to perform a 100% inspection of.the 8456

. active tubes in steam generator 21 and of the 8491 active' tubes in

' steam generator 22 using the standard bobbin coil EC technique.

As a result of this examination, six defectise and five' degraded tubes

were identified in steam generator 21, and.five defective and three

degraded tubes were. identified in steam generator 22. These tubes

were scheduled for plugging' These defective and degraded tubes placed

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'the steam generators 'in Category C-2. Category C-2 is defined as

follows:

One or more tubes, but not more than 1% of the total. tubes

inspected are defective, or between 5% and 10% of the total tubes

inspected are degraded tubes.

Of the six tubes-found defective in steam generator 21, all were.

suspected intergranular attack in the sludge pile region. Of the five

defective tubes in steam generator 22 two were suspected wear at the

vertical' middle support plate-(antivibration bar) and three were

suspected .intergranular attack in the sludge pile region.

In addition to the above testing, the licensee elected to perform

motorized rotating pancake coil (MRPC) inspections of selected tubes

in each of the steam generators. This technique was used both in the

U-bend region and from the first support plate into the tubesheet.

The NRC inspector cbserved selection of the tubes to determine-if

primary side intergranular. cracking was present at the top of the -

tubesheet as reported by another licensee. These tubes were selected

based on areas in the steam generator that indicated active areas of

degradation, i.e. areas of previously plugged tubes due to IGA at the

top cf the tubesheet. The inspector also observed the testing of

selected tubes using the MRPC.

Data Analysis

The inspector observed the analysis of the eddy current data and

interviewed the Level III analysts of the responsible organizations to

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determine the~ adequacy of the method. The eddy current data were

analyzed using a three step process as follows:

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Primary analysis-by individuals ' certified as at least a Level II

analyst in eddy current testing.

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A' screening.of the data by' computer using more. stringent

acceptance standards than those used by the, primary analyst.

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Secondary manual analysis by. individuals certified as, at least a

Level II enalyst in eddy current testing. The secondary analysis-

was performed by a company independent of.the company retained

for data acquisition and primary analysis.

.Following.these analyses, resolution of differences was accomplished

by a certified Level III analyst in eddy current examination'.

- Concl usi on_s

Based'on the' inspector's review of the steam generator eddy current

testing program and observation of the testing and data. analysis, the

inspector concluded that the licensee had performed testing and

evaluation-in' excess of the Technical Specification requirements.

Nineteen of the 9336 active tubes were plugged (8.as a preventive

measure). ' Use of the MRPC in tho U-bend regions and from the first

support plate into the'tubesheet indicate the' licensee's concerns for

defects found by other facilities.

4.0 Erosion / Corrosion Control Program

The licensee initiated an informal erosion / corrosion (E/C) program in

1979 to identify carbon steel systems where E/C existed, quantify the

extent of E/C, and to establish a decision making process for

inspecting or replacing components. The present formal program was

established in 1984.

The program is administered by the licensee's ISI group. These

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-engineers have classified various components in accordance with a

priority system based on steam moisture content or' flashing conditions

within the. system and fluid velocity, component geometry, operating

conditions, temperature / pressure, and plant and industry experience.

The total number of components in all three priorities (' A', 'B', or

'C') is approximately 3000 in Unit 2. During normal outages

approximately 250 components are inspected. Of these 250 components,

approximately 4094 are reinspection of components previously

identified as " Red Alert". A four step system is used to classify

inspected components as follows:

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Unacceptable - these components.have reached minimum wall

thickness or it is expected that they will reach minimum wall

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thickness during the next refueling cycle. Unacceptable

components are replaced except when detailed engineering

evaluation indicates that they will not reach minimum wall

thickness during the next operating cycle.

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. Red Alert - it is predicted that these components will last for

one, refueling outage-and will need-to be replaced during the next

l outage. Red alert components are scheduled for replacement.

during the'next refueling outage. However, prior to replacement

they.are-reinspected and a detailed evaluation prepared by

engineering.

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~ Yellow Alert it_is predicted that_these components will last

for two refueling' outages before requiring' replacement. Yellow

alert components are scheduled for reinspection during the second

outage after falling into the Yellow alert category.

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Acceptable - it is predicted that these' components.will not

require replacement until the~ third. outage as a mi_nimum. The

condition.of these components is recorded and inspection'

rescheduled as required.

-The licensee experienced a leak in the blowdown line from steam-

generator!22. The inspector noted that this blowdown line was in the

.E/C program ~where several areas had been inspected and identified as

having wall loss.significantly less than that of the failed piping.

The leak location was scheduled for inspection during the current

outage. The actual failure was at an area of acceptable undercut on

the pipe adjacent to the socket weld of the elbow. This undercut was

located in the area of most severe / erosion. A leak occurred when the

erosion met the undercut.

Conclusions

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The licensee's program for E/C is comprehensive and has been in

operation long enough to provide meaningful data on the

characteristics of the plant components. The failure of the program

to identify the steam generator blowdown line was traced to a welding

defect, not_to a breakdown in the E/C program. This particular

section of piping was scheduled for examination during the present

outage and presumably, this thin section in the piping would have been

identified and replaced. Additional information regarding this steam

i leak is covered in NRC IR No. 50-318/89-14.

5.0 Inservice Inspection Program Review

Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 are in the first period of the second 10

year inspection interval at this time. The ISI program is based on

l' the ASME Code, Section XI, 1983 Edition, Summer 1983 Addenda. The

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initial interval was adjusted so that the ISI program for each unit

would be coincident. This adjustment was approved by the NRC.

The inspector discussed the ISI program with the responsible engineer '!

and determined that the required inspections for the first period of

the second interval had been completed except for those components

that were dependent on other plant activities being completed, e.g.

the fuel moves being completed. l

6.0 NDE Examiner Certification Program

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In addition to the licensee's staff, contractors are used for varicus

types of NDE associated with ASME Section XI, the E/C program and

steam generator eddy current inspections. The licensee's staff was

technically capable of performing their assigned duties, and the staff

size appeared adequate to meet the scheduled work load. The inspector

selected staff NDE personnel qualification - certification records,

and records related to contractor NDE personnel. The records of

contractor personnel who had performed examinations at the site were

reviewed and it was verified that these individuals were properly

qualified and certified in accordance with the applicable requirements

of ASME Section XI and SNT-TC-1A. The inspector reviewed the

qualifications - certifications for a representative sample of the

indiv % als involved in the data analysis of the testing done on the

steam generators. These individuals were highly qualified and

properly certified.

. Licensee personnel were certified in the visual, liquid penetrant,

magnetic particle, and ultrasonic examination methods. Records of

selected individuals reviewed by the inspector to determine that their

certifications was in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section

XI, ANSI N45.5.6 - 1978, SNT-TC-1A, and the licensee's program. The

record packages were found to contain documentation of current visual

acuity, education, resumes, and various training records. However,

these records did not clearly show that the qualification, experience,

and training requirements were met prior to certification. Also, the

records did not indicate that the requirements for visual examiner

types VT-1, VT-2, VT-3 and VT-4 had been addressed. The licensee's

written program for certification did not address these visual

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requirements. In addition, the annual training requirements of the  !

licensee's program had not been met. The inspector noted that in one

case the certification for a visual examiner had expired. The

inspector discussed this with the individual and was informed that the

individual was not aware of his certification having expired since the l

licensee had discontinued the procedurally required practice of

issuing NDE examiner identification cards. The licensee issued a

nonconformance report to require investigation of the inspections

performed by this individual during the period his certification was

expired. These deficiencies are a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

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Criterion IX, and the licensee's written procedure requiring )

compliance to the ASME Code and SNT-TC-1A (89-15-01). -l

Conclusions i

The licensee maintains acceptable control of their NDE contractors and

L their certifications. However, certification records of the

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licensee's staff were found incomplete and lacking in organization. i

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.7.0 Primary and Secondary Water Chemistry

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-Water chemistry data were reviewed as part of this inspection. The

methods of collecting and verifying the accuracy of these data were

not included in the scope of the inspection. i

The inspector reviewed the primary water chemistry results for the

period from January, 1988 through March 1989 and observed that the

Boron / Lithium ratio was significantly above the licensee's

specification (CP-204) for 8 of the 14 months of full power operation.

This ratio is varied to maintain the pH in the required range of

6.8-7.5. During this period the pH was maintained within

specification except for short periods of time. The Iodine Dose

Equivalent was maintained at less than 0.1 uCi/gm which is

significantly below the Technical Specification limit of 5.0 uCi/gm.

In reviewing the secondary water chemistry results for the three

months preceding the shutdown for the present refueling outage the  ;

inspector observed that the licensee was achieving water quality i

results superior to the EPRI Guidelines. lypical results for this

period are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Secondary Water Chemistry History

Blowdown Sample

Parameter Calvert Cliffs EPRI Guide

Results

Cation Cond., uS/cm 0.11 0.8

Chloride, ppb 2 20

Sodium, ppb 5 20

Sulfate, ppb 2

8.0 Pressurizer Heaters

The licensee reported that 22 of the 120 heater assemblies in the

pressurizer in Unit 2 showed evidence of leakage. This evidence was

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indicated by boron buildup on the.outside of the heater assembly. The

assemblies consist of an inconel sleeve 1.158 inch 0.D._and .!

approximately 0.875 inch I.D. welded into the bottom head of the l

pressurizer on the inside with a partial penetration fillet weld. The i

heater assembly is welded to the outside of the sleeve to provide a  !

removable seal for heater replacement. Heaters showing evidence of

leakage are identified as shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2  !

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HEATER LOCATIONS SHOWING EVIDENCE OF LEAKAGE  !

H3 F3 D3 E2 M2 C2 C1 H1 F2 D2 B2 i

Al B1 D1 F1 K1 J2 G2 El G1 Z1 BB1

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In addition to the evidence of leakage found around the above heater  !

penetrations, other evidence of leakage was observed near the top of j

the pressurizer at the pressure tap located 7 1/2 from 0 toward 90 . l

At-the time of the inspection the pressurizer had not been opened to l

allow internal examination of these areas.  !

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Failure Analysis

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The inspector discussed the heater leaks with one of the plant ,

metallurgists and was informed that the licensee had provided samples

to the mobile metallurgical laboratory installed in a van to perform

analysis of these and other failures as required. The inspector ,

toured this facility and noted that it contained all of the equipment j

necessary for performing metallographic analysis including high and l

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low power optical microscopes with photographic capability. -j

metallographic sample preparation facilities, and a data link with the

main laboratory. This facility allows the licensee to perform j

controlled and timely failure analysis. 1

9.0 Management Meetings

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Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the

inspection at the entrance interview on May 8, 1989. The findings of i

the inspection were discussed with licensee representatives during the l

course of the inspection and presented to licensee management at the

May 12, 1989 exit interview (see paragraph I for attendees).

At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the

licensee by the inspector. The licensee did not indicate that

proprietary information was involved within the scope of this

inspection.

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