ML20210P014

Forwards Licensee Response to Facility Design & Operation for NRC Staff Questions Re Individual Operator Exam Appeals

ML20210P014
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	08/05/1999
From:	Conte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 9908120043
Download: ML20210P014 (5)

Text

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'o 8 475 ALLENDALE ROAD Y 8 KING oF PRUSSIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 4, . . . . . ,o August 5, 1999 MEMORANDUM TO: PUBLIC FROM: Richard J. Conte, Chief Human Performance and d Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Reactor Safety

SUBJECT:

HOPE CREEK APPEAL QUESTIONS The purpose of this memorandum is to docket in the PDR the licensee's technical response on facility design and operation for NRC staff questions related to individual operator . l exam appeals. Facility representatives indicated that there was no proprietary information in the attached, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790. l

Attachment:

Licensee Response to Appeal Questions Docket No. 50-354 l

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F s ATTACHMENT LICENSEE RESPONSE TO APPEAL QUESTIONS To: Richard Conte - NRC Branch Chief i From: Harlan D. Hanson Jr. - Operations Superintendent

Subject:

Response to Request for Information on 1998 NRC License Exam Date: 07/08/99 The following is provided at your request regarding the 1998 License Examination if any of this information is unclear or stimulates further questions, please l feel free to contact me at 809-339-3005 at your convenience. Thank you for your help and support in resolving this matter.

-(1) SRO #22/RO # 23 Lesson plan 0301-000.00H-000027-16 Core Spray Objective 12.b. states: ,

"Given a labeled diagram / drawing of the Core Spray System controls / indication bezel, IAW the Core Spray Lesson Plan: '

b. Assess plant conditions that will cause indicators to light or extinguish."

Page 23 of 53 of the lesson plan, paragraph 3.b. . states:

" the following white lights are provided on panel 10C618: One CSS Loop B high flow light, which illuminates when CSS Loop B flow exceeds the minimum flow valve closure setpoint of 775 gpm."

A drawing of the panel was not provided since the specific light was described in the question stem.

The CSS has a light that senses the "high flow" function, but this light is physically labeled as " Min Flow Bypass" on panels 10C617 and 10C618. The labels appear new (not yellowed with age as the others on the panel). The fact that the labels appear new was only identified several days prior to the administration of the written exam during a final readiness walk-down of the in-plant JPM's but after the exam had been delivered to the NRC. The Exam review team discussed this discrepancy between the Lesson Plan, the written exam and the actual plant configuration. Since the students were trained and had studied from the lesson plan and the description in the question stem supported the lesson plan A decision was made to leave the question 'as-is' based on the lesson plan.

There is only one flow related actuation signal in each Core Spray Subsystem that operates the loop min flow valve. The student should be capable of screening out distractors A & C based on the flow setpoint alone. Since distractors A&C would be screened out, this would also eliminate any confusion between the A & B Core Spray Loops. The remaining choices were related to B Core Spray Loop only.

This would leave a choice between answers B and D. Since the light was described as the "HIGH FLOW' light, the student should have been able to deduce that the light would come on with the condition indicated.

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2 The conditions of the stem have reactor pressure above the shutoff head of the Core Spray pumps.

The student should be able to recognize that the Core Spray loops would be in a low flow condition requiring the Min-Flow valves to be open. Since the loop flow would be below the HIGH FLOW'setpoint of 775 gpm, a high flow condition would not exist and the light in question would be extinguished. Based on the above, answer D is the only correct answer.

(3) SRO#72/RO#98 Based on system design, if the common air supply to the Fuel pool gate (s) catastrophically fails, check valves in the individual seal air supply tubing would prevent the other seals from deflating. See drawing M-53-1 sheet 2. For gate seal physical layout, HC.MD-FR.KE-0018(Q) page 14 of 15.

Likewise, if the common air supply was isolated and one gate seal had an air leak, then the remaining 3 seals would still remain inflated.

The question stem describes only one component failure. All other equipment is assumed to be working as designed.

Hope Creek station did experience a drain-down event from the closure of the V7068 valve as described in incident Report 94-082. However, this event was compounded by a pre-existing leak on at least one date seal, mis-operation of the seal isolation valves, and the apparent leak-through of the remaining check-valves.

Other considerations:

Normal water level in the Fuel Pool is 40 feet (25 feet above the top of active fuel in the fuel racks). The low level alarm setpoint is 3 inches below normal level. There are still 21 inches of water remaining above the Technical Specification minimum level of 23 feet when the FUEL POOL Hl/LO Level alarm annunciates.

(3) SROf86/RO#79 The question was intended for the student to recognize that a train isolation (manual or automatic) had taken place and that at least one of the train isolation valves had not reached the full closed position

. within the allowed 15 seconds. The close push button had not been (and does not need to be) pressed.

The push button was backlit blinking green.

The green closed light flashes (valve failure to close on command) only when:

1) there is a " train close command" to the train valves; and,

2) any of the associated valves are not full closed after 15 seconds have elapsed.. .

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The " train close command" may come from 3 sources.

1) Pushing the green CLOSE push button for the in-service recombiner train.

2) If the " train shutdown" signalis received while up.t.in REMOTE. the train shutdown signal originates from any of the following signals:

l High recombiner temp - 900F Feedgas cooler condenser Hi outlet temp - 200F  ;

ManualTrip '

Recombiner heaters off .

, 3) All associated local panel valve CLOSE push buttons are pressed while the train is in REMOTE The green blinking light will stop flashing and stay on continuously when all. associated valves reach full closed position.

1 Answer B is incorrect because NOT FULL OPEN limit switches are used for the similar red OPEN I push button blinking back-light scheme. j Answer C is incorrect because high flow is not a direct recombiner isolation signal.

Answer D is incorrect because high hydrogen concentration is not a direct recombiner isolation signal. Also, at least one of the valves must not ao fully closed after 15 seconds for the light to blink. Tha green blinking light does not necessarily indicate an automatic isolation signal by itself.

Therefore, answer A is the only con'ect answer.

(4) 99 SRO The student should be able to derive answer A based on several statements (described below) in the question stem and.a fundamental knowledge of the bases for those steps leamed from Objectives 5 and 6 of Lesson Plan 0302-000127-11, as well as global Terminal Objective # 3.

1) The stem only refers to one' room

2) The stem states the source of the water is from the fire suppression system, not a primary system discharging into the area l

3) The question limits the response to those actions reauired by EOP-103. Although HPCI may have {

been damaged by the fire and the operating crew would be consulting the ECG (Event Classification Guide) for additional required reports, it is clear that if the stem is adhered to, only 1 correct answer exists.

Therefore A is the only correct answer.

LP 0302-000127-11

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TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

Provided a scenario or plant / system status or previous plant condition, the trainee will be able to:

1.0 - Perform actions required to implement HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0103, for Secondary Containment Control. (14) 2.0 Recognize the entry condition (s) of HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0103, Reactor Building Ccntrol and utilize the flowchart to control reactor building parameters. (1-6) 3.0 Derive an expected actuation or continuation of the event based on basic knowledge presented during previous training. The trainee's response shall be consistent with and contain the essential elements identified on an answer key.

(1-6)

ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

R5. Define the term " Maximum Safe Floor Level".

R6. Given any step in the procedure, describe the reason for performance of that step and/or expected system response to control manipulations prescribed by the step.

EOP Required Knowledge generally includes:

1) EOP Entry conditions.

2) Definition of specific terms used in the EOP's.

3) Bases behind Notes and Cautions.

4) General strategy of each leg of the EOP's.

5) Specific Lesson Plan Objectives for each EOP Lesson Plan.

CC:

Don Jackson Bud Havens Steve Thompson I file u: