ML20141J720
| ML20141J720 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1997 |
| From: | Jaudon J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9708210110 | |
| Download: ML20141J720 (17) | |
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.* *o NUCLEAR RE U T Y COMMISSION
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January 28, 199 MEMORANDUM T0: File Joh L W FROM: P. Jaudon. Dir ctor Div ion of Reactor Safety
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART PANEL FIFTH HEETING HELD JANUARY 23, 1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met at Region II offices on January 23, 1997.
The following Panel members and others were present:
Panel Members: Johns P. Jaudon. RII. Chairman Frederick J. Hebdon. NRR. Vice Chairman Kerr D. Landis. RII Ste ien J. Cahill RII Lak minaras Raghaven. NRR Charles Casto. RII Others: Harold 0. Christensen RII Robert P. Schin. RII Billy R. Crowle Glen M. Tracy.OED0 y. RII The Chairman noted that H. Christensen would replace C. Casto on the panel effective February 3. 1997. This was because Mr. Christensen was replacing Mr. Casto as the Engineering Branch Chief, when Mr. Casto was transferred to the Division of Reactor Projects.
The planned inspection activities and rational for how restart items are to be inspected and closed was discussed. The initial inspection, scheduled for January 27 - 31, 1997, will be performed by several ins)ectors who have assigned responsibilities on the restart check list. T1e intention is to have the inspectors review their assigned items and determine the status of the items and the licensee's schedule for completion. The inspection plan for the initial inspection was presented to panel for review.
The panel also discussed the licensee's preparation of packages for each
-inspection item. The packages should accumulate documentation of licensee corrective actions for each item and will be used in the inspection process to aid in closure of the items. It was noted that at the time of the last Restart Panel meeting, the packages had been started, but only minimal
-information had been accumulated. The panel re-emphasized the r.eed for good packages to facilitate inspection and timely closure of open issues.
The Restart check list of open items was reviewed and updated. A number of I items were moved from N classification N (Non-restart) to R (Restart). ph b 1' 97o821011o 97o12e PDR ADOCK 05000302 G PDR I )
2 Two new item. TIAs 96 013 and 96 014 were added to the list as rest st items.
The revised Restart Open item Check List is enclosed as (Attachment A). 1 Dates for future meetings were scheduled as follows:
At Crystal River - February 12, 1997 (NRC only 8:00 AM)
(Licensee - 12:00 PM) in Region II March 3, 1997 0 10:00 am At Crystal River The week of March 17. 19971
Attachment:
A. Restart Open Item Checklist '
r Docket 50-302 f cc w/att: L. A. Reyes, Ril E. W. Merschoff. Ril J. R. Johnson, Ril S. A. Varga. NRR G. M. Tracy. OEDO R. Zimmerman, NRR J. A. Zwolinski NRR D. M. Collins, RIl B. Schin. DRS B. Crowley. DR,S Panel Member
' To be coordinated with the bimontNy MCAP meeting.
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- Attachment A CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST R ITEMS (TO BE INSPECTED BY THE NRC BEFORE RESTART)
Status as of Jarnaary 26 1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met on November 13, 1996, and developed seven general areas under which the restart issues will be grouped. Those seven areas are:
- 1. Knowledge of design and licensing bases and adequacy of design margin
- 2. Regulatory knowledge and perspective
- 3. Operator performance and knowledge
- 4. Marginally effective engineering organization
- 5. Management oversight; including quality assurance, self assessment, and corrective action
- 6. Corrective actions for NRC violations
- 7. Other a
~ ISSUE DESCRIPTICE AREE MRC LERD IR/SER I.IONSam CoseeHTS ENtC STATUS STATUS LICESISWE'S RESTART LIST OF DESItar-REEATED ISSE (D.I.s)fper 10/28/96 Itr from FPC)
CR3 D.I. 1 HPI pump recirculation to the makeup tart' 1 RI D-1 See W I 94-01-02 IFI R 96-17-02, IR 96-12 CR3 D.I. 2 MPI system modifications to improve SBIDCA margins 1 RI D-2 See URI 94-01-02. 12R R 94-06 IR 94-12 CR3 D.I. 3 LPI pump mission time 1 Ienahan/ D-3 See URI 94-201-01. IR R IIRR 95-12 CR3 D.I. 6 Reactor building spray pump la IrPSH 1 Lenehan D-4 See IRI 96-201-02 IR R 96-12 CR3 D.I. 5 Emergency feedwater system upgrades and diesel generator load 1 Schin D-S See URI 96-12-01s EEI R impact 96-12-02, In 94-12 CR3 D.I. 6 Emergency diesel generator loading 1 Fillion D-6 See EEI 96-12-02. IR R 96-12 CR3 D.I. 7 Failure modes and effects of loss of DC power 1 Fillien D-7 See tStI 96- 12 -01. 12R R 96-07 IR 96-12 CR3 D.I. 8 Generic Letter 96-04 (Thermal overpressure protection for 1 Lenahan/ D-S See IR 96-12 R Contairment piping, penetrations, and coo 7eral Crowley l
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ISSUE DESCRIPTICIt amma K LahD 2R/SM LICEISEE N ISC
.- .n.-
LICEISER*S OT W RESTART ZT M RMG 29/30 Seismic monitoring of MR Rad peonitor 1 Ienahan D-19 R t
38fST WPSM NPSN concern with ECCS pimups when STP pumps are running in 1 Thomas bus and Recir- D-19 R PIyg ammae OF wswvam. COIICMN, WITE IPAP - _- _ INSPSCTICIr ASED RIT N ABOTTTtMS Management - !sRC inspect Problem Identifications focusing on On audits S Crowley/ CP-2. CP-3 Inspect Isew PC system E i
Oversight - and the problem recor*incr system. - Increased inspectaan of CA The I
IPAP Problem Analysis and Evaluations focusing on root cause aw_.M evaluations Inspection j Marginally' - EERC inspect Engineering Problem Identification and 4 Schin OP-4 50.59 R Effective Resolutions with eephasis on licensee evaluations for Engineering significant issues and work beestloos.
OP-4 Organization
- IPAP - Also inspect Quality of Engineering with enyhasis en p CF1t 59.59 screenino and safety evaluations, accuracy of tne Kecoeunended FSAR, and egnagement oversteht.
Inspection i
tack of - - NRC inspect Engineering Safety Focuss focusing on proper 1 Schin OP-T. OP-S. R Adequate identification of diser==~les with the olant's dessen basis Knowledge of in the corrective action system. D-13. D-15.
the Design D-16
- Also anspect Engineering Problem Identification and Basis - IPAP Resolutions focusing on proerans for identifyinu design basis A -.,.M issues and capturiner them in the corrective action eroaram.
Inspection - Also inspect Qual 1(y of Engineerings focustng on sensitivity /understandinct by the enaineerina/licensimr staff of the clant's dessan basas.
- Also assess the dessen margin, including the licensee's
- er*ent of condition reviews Lack of - NRC inspect M. operability, reportab!!ity 2 Schin
- to Couply i With Kegulations -
- IPAP k
- :M Inspaction Ope ator - leRC inspect Safety Focust focusing on commmunication within 3 RI Performance - operat1N. commuunication with other site groups, and R IPAP overt a me 1 Reconenended a
rnspection l
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'==u=a ISSUE DESCR2PTIos mama trRC LEAD 22/SER LICENSEE CN HgtC STRTUS STRT5'S INSPECTOR FOLtOWUP SYST1DE URI 95-02-02 Control room habitability envelope leakage . Excessive 1 Schin leakage paths through doors, dagers, and drains due to Sae TIA 95003: FPC TS B design errors and lack of surveillances/ preventive Change Bequest No. 208 maine enance of 8/28/96 LEps 96-04, 94-10, 95-01, 95-04-G1, 95-09; irs 95-02, 95-09, 95-11, 95-16 95-21s F9C ltrs.
cf 5/26/95 and 10/23/95 URI 96-01-02 Discrepancies in the high pressure injection design basis 1 RI D-9 See G 3 D I. 1: R analysis CR3 D.I. 2 URI 96-04-51 Discrepancies in the EDBD and the FSAR regarding the' 1 Crowley
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IR 96-19 See EE1 95-19-07. R, C prevention of post-14CA boren precipitetten 01 96-05-02 Design concerns with main steam line hangars used in seismic 1 Lenahan, and other dynamic load applications See vio 94-05-01: R Raghavan Coordinate with L.
R@ ,-.
URI 96-06-03 Non-safety relateta transfer switch used in Es status 1 Fillion indicating light circuitry R UKI 96k12-011 Bnergency Feedwater low SPSR to'both puTo due to postulated [ 1.
single failure ; ' ' ' ' ~ ~
IR 96 D-17 See CR3 D.I. Si ..
R, C CR3 D.I. 7s'EEI 94-19 /
- 41. -04/ -05, 04 OI 96-17-03 Failure to conds.ct required Technical Specification 4 Fillion See MFA SL601 iGL 94- R surveillance testing on safety related circuitry (CL 96-019 ott OI 96-201-01 Iong tern plant cooldown following a small break IDCA 1 Crowley/ D-3 See CR3 D.I. 3: See IR R assuming a single failure in the decay heat drop line NRR 94-11. NRA taking responsi.bility for this itae.
URI 96-201-02 NPSM for building spray pu m has very little margin and some 1 Lenahan D-4 See CR3 0.1. 4 m calculat ion f actors were nonconservative URI 96-201-03 Operating curves 16, 17, and 18 in OP-103B are not valida*ed 4 Ncyper by licensee 0-1 R URI 96-201-04 Nonsafety-related positioners on safety-related valves 1 Thomas R-T, D-19 See IR 94-08 R tDtI 96+201-05: Service ' water' system heat leade' did' not consider maximum 1 Cr.wley 22 94-19" O-1 '
input heat'$0P-ID39. Curve 15)' See EEI P4+19-08 R. C -
URI 96-201-07 EDG not protected against water spray free failure of fire 1 Fillion protection deloce system in EDG room R LER 95-13-01 Design deficiency may cause makeup tank verteming resulting 1 Mellen in f ailure to meet Appa-nfim R require =ents LER 95-13-00 closed in R in 94-06 LER 96-18-00, Failure to verify RB penetrations closed per TS 1 R1 0-2 R LER 96-1e-01 EEI 96-10-01 Four examples of failure to follow refueling procedure FP-203 3 Hesper ** R l' EEI 96-10-02 Failure to assure root cause analysis and corrective actions 5 Mcpper ** R taken to preclude repetition were adequate after refuel i
incident (no PR issued) k 3
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ISSUE DRSCRIPTIow noen Nec LRaD IR/SER LIC WSER CCBeamrTS 3RC STATUS STATUS EEI 94-12-02 EDG loading USQs due to inadequate le CFR 50.59 evaluations: 4 Schia/
three examples tone modification & two procedure changes) R-2. C-4. D- Enforcement c m ference R F1111cn 14. D-15. 1/24/96. See CR3 D.I.
CP-5 St CR3 D.I. 6 EEI 96-12-03 Inadequate corrective actions for 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation 5 Schin errorst two czasples Enforcement conference R 1/24/94 EEI 96-12-04 Use of unverified calculations to support modifications. 4 Schin CP-6 NRC inspect licensee *s entent of condition reviews. Enforcement conference R 1/24/96 GEI 94-19-01 Three inadequate procedures for contairunent penetration 4 RI surveillances Enforce ==nt conference R 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-02 Inadequate corrective actions for inadequate contairunent 1 RI penetretton surveillances Enforcenert conference R 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-03 EFW NPSM USQ due to inadequate 10 CFR 59.59 safety evaluation 1 Schin for a modification Enfercammet conference R 1/2**96 EEI 96-19-04 Failure to update applicable design documents to incorporate 1 Thomas Enferecuent conference R EFW design information (EFP-2 assumed cperating when EFP-1 1/24/96 trips at 5003 RC"'pressurel EEI 96-19-05 Failure to inclade applicable design information in the 1 Thomas Cesign input requirements for an EFW modification (EFP-2 Enforcement conference R contirmaing to operate after EFP-1 trips at 5008 RCS pressure 1/24/94 and hydraulie requirements)
EEI 96-19-06 E7w USQ due to removing the autosnatic open signal from ASV- 1 TWe Enforcempet conference R 204, rWing the reliability of EFP-2 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-07 Inadequate 50.59 evaluation for post-14CA boren precipitation 1 Crowley Enforcement conference a contrul 1/24/96 irerify procedures and documentatien adaquete prior to raw-art .
EEI 96-19-08 Error in design calculations for SW system heat loads 1 Crowley Enforcement conference R I/24/96 EA 95-16 Use of non-conservative trip setpoints for safety-related 6. 1 Mellen See IR 95-16. ID 95-21 twas EEI 95-- equipment (SLIII). Additional exaeples identified in IR 95- R 03-04) 16.
EA 95-126 Nine instances where operators violated procedures for MUT 6 3 Schin See IR 96-04 R NOV I.A twas pressure / level (SLIII).
EEI 95-22-01)
EA 95-126, Nov I.B twas Conduct of unauthorized tests of MUT without le CFR 50.59 6. 3 Schin See IR 96-04 R evaluation (SLIII). Additional examples (four testel EEI 95-22-02) identified in 1/18/96 letter titled EA 95-126 and EA 96-1851.
(Sac Ua! 96-04-Os) t t
EA 95-126 Failure to take adequate corrective actices for operator 6. 5 Schin R '
N0Y I.C.1 concerns regarding CP-1039. Curve 8, for WJT pressure / level twas EEI 95- limits (SLIII) j 22-03)
EQ 95-126 Corrective actions for an inadequate Curve 8 Itwo STI's and a NOV I.C,2 4. 5 RI O-1 R twas EEI 95-revised Curve SA & 899 were also incorrect (SLIII) 22-03) t 1
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=:mmut ISKDE DESCRIPTIoar asen nc LRhD IR/SER IJC3usRE CtsserTS sinc STATUS STmTUS EA 95-126 Design controle failed to ensure adequate safety margin for 6, 1 RI CP-6 900Y I.D.1 HFI purps for certain 14CA scenarios (SLIII) R (was EEI 95-32-04)
E4 95-126 Swapover of ECCS p: sups' suction from BttST (at five feet) to 6 I RI 900W I.D.2 reactor building susy was inadequate (SLIII) R (was EEI 95-7t2-04)
EA 95-126 EOPs allowed single I.PI pump to supply two MPI pumps, with 6. 1 RI ff0Y II.A (was insufficient ItPSM for LPI pump (SLIIII R EEI 95-22-04)
EA 95-126 Failure to take adequate corrective actions for tank 6. 5 RI R NOV II.B (was volumes / level / suction point (SLIV)
EET 95-22-03)
EA 95-126 Failure to ensure fire water storage tank contained odegaate 6 1 RI NOV II.C (was volume of water (SLIV) R EEI 95-22-035 5 VIO 93-16-07 Inadequate ECP and AP procedures 6. 3 Hopper 6-3 i See IR 96-04 IF1 96- R 04-01 TR 96-es VIO 95-16-03 Inadequate procedure for operation of the makeup punp 1A 6, 1 RI cooling water a VIO 95-21-03 Failure to isolate the class 1E from the neo-class IE 6. I h s/ R electrical circuitry for the RB purge and eini-purge valves RI VIO 96-01-01 Inadequate corrective action for NPI flow indication problem 6. 5 RI R VIO 96-01-06 Failure to correctly translate design basis of Sit system into 6, 1 RI a procedures, drawings, and instructierts VIO 96-04-02 Failure to take prompt corrective action in revising 6. 5 Repper procedure VP-540, Plant Safety Verification (for STAS!. YP R Sao contained outdated end incorrect information.
VIO 96-05-01 Failure to create a PR and OCR for damaged main steme line 6. 5 Imnahan. See CPI 96-05-02; hangers Raghaven R
Cbordinste with L.
R-=-.
WIO 96-05-05 Failure to follow procedures for updating design basis 6, 4 Crowley documents CP-8 R VIO 96-05-07 Inadequate receiving inspections for bettery chargers (vendor 6. 4 Schin t est s) R VIO 96-05-08 Failure to follow purchasing procedures for inverters 6. 4 Schin R WIO 96-06-02 Sto procedure for deminerallred water flush performed by RI
- 6. 3 R operators on borte acid addition lines VIO 96-06-04 18o evaluation on non-FSAR vital bettery charger configuration 6. 4 RI R VIO 96-06-07 PR not initiated to resolve CREYS test failure 6. 5 Ienahan R 5 '
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ISSUR DESCRIPTION asen asBC LR&D IR/SEE LICBISER C%Bs WFIS IgitC I mwS srmwS VIO 96-08-01 Corrective action not taken on make-up systee audit findings 6. 5 RI
& excessive vibration on spent fuel pool pump cooling fan a motor VIO 96-09-03 Failure to perform a 19 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for 6, 3 Thess R changes to procedures described in the FSAR for controlling dissolved hydroecn cwneentration in the RCS VIO 96-09-04 Failure to update operating curves to reflect 1981 power 6, 4 Themos tiprate a VIO 96-09-05 Failure to incorporate design change of Mt?r-64 into 6. 4 Thourss/ Licensee operatiwMs procedares R Crwiey rented Y1o VIO 96-09-06 Three examples of design centrol errers (n . - ,-. 6. 4 M. Miller CF-6 calculation input s and ISI boundaryl R UIO 96-09-07 thstimely corrective actions for the ErIC system concerns and 6, 5 Thomas problems R VIO 96-11-C4 Reactor building sump not constructed in accordance with 6 1 RI approved construction drawirres R VIO 96-15-02 Failure of reactor coolant pump cil collection system to 6. 7 W. Miller retain oil leakir-g f rom reactor ecolant pump R IFI 95-15-01 Design requirements for nitrogen overpressure (service water) 1 L. Mellen aseed to review R liceasee's esiculation
& conclusion. See IR 95-21 IFI 95-15-02 Design requirements for dynamic LOCR effects 1 See IR 95-21 and TIA R 94-013 IFI 95-15-03 Design requirements for reactor coolant pisep cooler failure 1 See IR 95-21 and TIA R 95-014 IFI 95-15-04 Code requirement for thermal relief valves on decay heat 1 See IR 95-21 and TIA R remoral heat exchanerars96-014 IFI 95-14-05 Relief valves removed frtue heat exchangers 1 See IR 95-21 arad TIA R 96-014 IFI 96-03-15 Evaluate the licensee *s revised TS Bases and related 10 CI1t 2 RI R 50.59 analysis for MFI flow indicators IFI 96-17-02 Potential for MFI/LFI recirculation resulting in make-top tank 1 RI See CR3 D.I 1 R overflow IFI 96-17-04 Adequacy of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire study and documentation 1 W. Miller R IFI 96-201-11 Design basis for decay heat / core flood / reactor coolant piping 1 Lenahan Identified in IFAF R tewperature
.m; as IF-96-201-01 IFI 96-201-12 Conduit sizing criteria - janseing ratio not considered 1 Fillion Identified in IFAF R
, y,. . i as IF *6-201-00 IFI 96-201-13 Cable ampacities - several cables exceed rating, including 1 Fillion Identified in IFAF R tstP-1 r, i me 17 94-201-0)
IFI 96-201-14 EDG protective trips not bypassed during emergency mode of 1 Fillion D-12 Identified in IFAF R operation i + .t as IT-96-201-04 6
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mamma.
1' ISSUE DESCRIPTIost ASEA suc LARD IR/ Sam LIC Wees m suic
. STATUS . Tai IFI 96-201-15 Verification of motor starting data 1 Fillion Identified its IFAP R
{ r % i as IF-96-201-05 IFI 96-201-16 Coordination of Secord level undervoltage relay (SLUR) 1 Fillion setting vs. inverter operation Identified la IPAP R i as IF-94-201-06
, IFI 96-201-17 Coordination of SMR and fuse protection 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R
. w i as IF-94-201 C7 i
asDLTI-PLANT ACTICusS MPA #L507: Pressure locking and thermal binding of safecy-related gate 2 MR CL 95-07 valves. Carrently in staff review. An RAI is outstanding.
Erpected etmpletion?
R MPA #1401: Testing of safety-related logie circuits - 2 FU11on GL 96-01 Licensee response in staff review. More details are R-1 11/96 - the 11cermee a reTaired. This issue requires attention. has identified testing i
deficiencies that enast i be fiaed prior to reetart MPA #L503 Circumferential cracking of SG tube flaws. 2 CL95-03 Licensee response in staff review. Blake/IERR R LICEleSE - ./ RELIEF RSQUESTS j
CCHE control complex habitability envelope - Including TS-20s and 2 Schinhuta R TIA 95-03 need to be addressed. Licensee sutzeittal does not prowfde adequate TS action.
j USQs Licensee request and NRC review and issue license amendments 1stR R-2. E-4 for all threviewed Safety O.nestions (Usost R
' USQ EDG Load Uprete Fillion/ R-2 See trI 94-12-02. CR3 R 1ssa D I. 4 USQ AST 204 Thomes/
R-4 See EEI 96-19-04. CR3 R 1sRn D.I. 5 i
i USQ Dif-45-FI Crowley/ R-5 See URI 96-251-05 R h "I USQ EDG Load List Update Fillion/ R-4 See EEI 96-12-42, CR3 R 1sent D.I. 6 USQ ITS 3.0.3 relief for LPI/Dit to allow modification of air operators for UCT 17, 1s, 177, 17e Thomes/ R-T See URI 96-201-04 R NR1r a
IIJtT Conduct an 11JtT or seek an _La to utilize Method 8 cf Appandiu J to 10 CFR 50 IEtR 5
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ISSUR DESOtIFTICK agugh gmC IJImp IR/SEEt LICEMEBE Mumanes ugt STATUS g=myss N TSSUBS LTOP Current TS does not address LTOP prevention or mitigation. 2 R. system branch will R On the basis of CL 80-11, the licensee submitted information send letter to to demonstrate that LTDP in SMt plants have less than 1 in liceansee that they 100 reactor years probsbility of m-.w. and as a result have to submit 75.
per GL 38-11 non-appendix G methodology can be used for 77 curves. Such a PT curve would provide for higher L10P enable pressure and temperature and would proeide operaticnal flexibility. Staff denied the request in 1995 and requested a revised response. The licensee expects to reopend late 1997
%wndia R Appendix R design basis issues review by FPC consultant. Witc W. Miller / D-11 R review open Appendix R issues to assure that there are no sett restart er cparability issues tweedded in etwee.
Operator 14tC review operator workarotands list to assure that there are RI M-2 See VIO 96-99-07 R workarounds no reste-t or operability iseues contained in thee 50.54f letter setc review licensee's 59.54f let*.er response Edue 2/3/97) on anta R design beses License verify license conditions are met RI R Cbndit ions RC' Loop In a survey inspection. the staff noted that certain branes pipee off the ers==ry coolane loop -ere set an=Ireed as code 2 mmR R Piping class 1 pipe u.e.. no fati ,ue an=Iysimi == required by the Analyses C"d'~ "*** """ *******"* *'*"'"'" * *"**" ** ****
Sources for issues include: IFS, SIMS, NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants), Resident's OIL, PM's OIL NOTE: Open allegations, OI investigations, and emerging / draft issues are listed separately.
8
CRYSTAL RIVER a ISSUES CHECKLIST N ITEMS (INSPECTION PRIOR TO RESTART IS NOT NEEDED)
Status as of January 24, 1997 ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA IRC LDO it/SER LICDr5EE STATUS C350fTS NPI staTts LICENSEE *$ RESTARf LIST Or DESIGI-RELATED ISSUES (D.I.s)(per 10/28/96 Itr free FPC) a i
_ ertaat usecare s e8***'-9t? M tfEE45EE*$ OTHER RESTART iTD6 UTSG 7 tees Adequacy of 015G tabe stress-retteved rolled joints is oestioned. tWOG 7 See iteensea precursor analysts of a Davis-Besse pulled 015G t4ee. current test data. and Iteited n (G) fleid escertence cmf1tct with test data from 1972 =hich *gualtfted* a Card PC %-5077 ef i stress-retteved rolled joint 11/6/96. (as TIA)
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l FTVE AREA $ OF CDITf181fMG CDsCElgt. WITM IPA" RECDeOCED TW5PECTIDI ME) Rif RECDe0 RED METTIONS Pf5PECTOR F0tt0WUP SYSTEN tf ~ 95-021-04 Encessive coohbn rate 3 See CR3 D.I. 1. N G)
IQI 96 03-04 Measur:q of percent through-wall indications w'th as irquaitfled 7 croce&re See IR 96-06. Genarte n (G) tssue being addressed by 1W2 (ce TIA)
URI %-03-05 Eddy current sample egension based on degreens tite percentages 7 See la gr,-06. m (5) i tFI %-06-10 Justifica+1on for renovat of Therno-tag protection fran the sarce range 1 testrwantatien E G)
IDI 95-07-03 Incorrect information provided by contractors 7 "
u G)
OI %-201-06 Preferred offsite electrical ptner source with plant shrt ews (500 to 1 switchyard) is not gtettfted. mate: tbtti this tssue is resolved. a G)
Itcensca is not usin7 500 tv switmyard as an electrical twner sarte.
! LRI %-201-09 Testing to quaitfy relays beycrus manufacturers' ratings mes inadequate 1 M G)
LER 93-02-02. Switeyard cable fatture caused degraded voltage of Class 1E electrica! 7 tfR 93-07-03 buses and actuation of EDG tER 93-CZ-01 closed in It n (1)
%-04 9
===r ISSUE DE50tIPTION AREA MtC LEAD IR15ER LIEW5EE STAft$ COMENTS IRC STsTts LER 94- 5 01. Deficiency in isiderstandtng of technical requirenwts leads to 2 tER 94-06-00 clesad in IR N G)
LIR 94-%-03. nonconservattre PP5 setpotnt and potential violatton of T5 5 16. See EA %-16.
LER 94-05-04 tER 94- W OS LER 95-09-00 Mtotaal release dtring sulfir diovide delivery causes actuatim of tonic 7 5e= IR W il. N(D gas eranttor resuittag in control rtr= avmjancy vaattiattres acti.atton LER E-10-01 Inadequate procedure causes low cooling water flow to makein pwp 1 tElt E15-00 closed in IR N(D resulting in cperation outside the daste basis W 16. See also URI 95-11-02. WTO W 16-03 LER 95-17-00 SW flow to control room coolers cetro11ed by afr tversted valves etch 1 See IR W16. VfD % N (D) could fatl cran 06 LER 95-18-00 Inadequate 75 note allowed delayed entry into 75 LCD 2 See O E 18-05. k(D LER 95-18-01.
tER W 18-02 LER W 19-00 Leak instrumentation for SW flow to PK12s incapable of measuring 90 gas 1 See IR E ls. ,
LER E 23-01. Inconsistent desip asstsptions cause buildtng spray flow rates to be 1 LIR E23-00 closed tw IR N(D tER E 23-02 outsida design tasis % 04 LER 95-25-00 Inadequate isolation of safety /non-safety related circuits 1 Sae VIO15-21-03. N (D)
LER 5 25-01 LER E 28-00. BW5T wactrJe breaker has inadeguate reitef capacity 1 See IR E 21. N(D LER % 28-01 LER %-01-01 EFIC control circuits etsrouted: 4pendia R ctricern 1 LER 96-01-00 closed te IR N (I)
%-44 See also NCV W 01-C3 L[R %-02-00 M1ntpurge valve has safety /non-safety related circutts without isolation 1 See VIO 95-21-03. N(D LER E 03-00. RCS coofdswi rate exceeded during coolawn 3 See (FI 95-21-04 N(D LER %-03-01 LER E 04-00 CDE control damers found damagad & leaking 1 See tRI 95-02-02. IR W N (D) 21 LER %-05-01 SW fic> to 8BC17s could exceed deste 1 LER W OS-00 closed ta IR N (D) 96-04 See also VIO %
01-01 LER 96- 5 00 WI instruuant error could result in WI pwp ruiout 1 Saa IR 95-20. IR WO4 N (D)
LER %0001 C1t3 0 i ?
LER %-07 00. WI Itne SBLOCA/LOCPiloss of dc bus could have inadeguate WI flow 1 See IR E 01. CR3 D.I. 2. N (D) tER % 07-01 instrunantatten LIR E 08-00 Arbiguous TS note results in not performing RCS leat surveillance prior to 2 m (5)
Phoa 2 LER E 09-00 Failere to reattach instrtsment tibing to scistic steparts after 1 See tRI 503-06. IR % N(D modificattm leads to oraratten outstda dast r t'asts 05 LIR W 10-00 tow flow in SW system cocied ctroonents causes coeration outside deste 1 See VIO E 16-03. N (D) basis LER 5 11-00 Personnel error causes testing deficiency resulting in conditten 1 See W A #L601 (GL 5 01). N (D) protnbited tv tmroved T5 ta WC1 tssuasi 10
4 ,
mummr.
ISSUE DEsot1PT13t JeEA Int LEA 0 IR/SER 1.1CEuSEE STATt15 CDoEuT5 unc STargs LUI E 12-00 Operation outside desip basis caused by battery chargers having 4 See VID E 05-07 LER % 12-01. tnadequate test results accepted ten errtr m (D)
LER % 12-02 l LER W 13-00 Operator error resulted in the inadvertent actuaticy of DCP-1A 3 See NCV 503-02. a ([]
LIR %-15-00 Personnel errtrs cause cable separatim/isolaticri concerns resulting in 1 See IR % 04.
operation outstoa tte design basis itosic ges monitors) 5 (1)
- LER %26-00 CREV5 ftiter testing did not meet T5 specs 2 RI a (5)
LER %-19-00 Non-safety related switch used in safety related wiring for Es status Ittts 1 See tRI %%C3. m (D)
, LER %-20-00 Unreviewed safety questtcris concerning EDG overloading caused by 4 R-2. D-6. 0-14 5 1r.terpretation of regstatory requiremmets See EEI %22-02. N (D) 0-15 OP-5 i
LER %-23-Da Personnet error leads to missed sweet 11ances resulting in violation of 2 See VIO W 15-01. N (D)
Tectvitcal Specifications (etssed remote shutdtnas panel ETW pimp presswe 1 instrwent channel ctwct)
LER % 24-00 Plant modtftcation causes manalyzed condition reg *rding emergency 1 feasseter See tRI J6-12-01. N (D)
LER 96-25-00 Persomet error causes testing deficiency resulting in condition 1 See W 4 R 601 (GL 96-01). N (D)
- prohibtted t:y Tectvitcal Spectf tcaties (12 contacts in E5 logic were act
} t+1ng tested)
VIO 94-25-01 Fa11 r e to preparty c e trol the Control Caspie Habitability Envelope 6. 7 (eaar blotted opan for maintenance =ert) See tRI %02-02. N (D)
, VIO 94-27-02 Fa11re to make two 10 CFR 50.73 reports to the IstC within the reautred 6. 2 CP-4 t1w See IR 95-02. IR 95-06. m (I)
VIO 94-27-03 Fa11are to ade one required 10 CFR 50.72 report to the IstC within the 6. 2 W-4 See IR % 08.
required ttw e (1)
VfD %-01-05 Two examples of fatture to tpJete FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) 6. 4 m (5) j U20 E C2-01 Failure to maintain 0.2 footcandles in the protected area 6. 7 See IR E 07 m (5) i VIO %-02-04 Failure to matntain sectridary alarm station operable and inadequate 6. 2 c:mpensatory maasures m (5)
VIO E 03-11 Failre to follow radiation work permit requirements 67 # (5)
V10 %-03-12 Fat!ure to report the transport of a radicactively contaminated individual 6. 2 offstte m (5)
! UIO E 03-13 thescorted visitor perscrviel w'La de protected area 6. 7 j N (5)
- , VIO % 05-04 Licensee approved eddy cwrent a 4.ce criteria different from TS 6. 2 1 rewrawnts m (5) 4 VIO %-06-06 Failure to timely nottfy the istC of a condition outside the 4pendia R 6, 2 Licensing dasign basis m (5) 1 l UID E 07-01 Failure to protect safegt aeds '%.istion 6. 7 j -
4 (5) 1 1
11 i
1
-, , . . . . . -, -.._n.. ,. , _ .
t a ISSUE IE50tIPT10N AREA IRC LEAD 1R/50t LICENSEE STAitl5 C!pWENTS 8AC STATUS VIO % 07-02 Failure to complete screening elemmts for Fitness for Duty Perscrriet 6. 7
. m G)
VIO E 09-01 Failure to folicne a maintenance procedure resulting in the inadvertent 6, 7 initiation of tha control rear energmcy ventilatim svstm 5 G)
VIO E 09-02 thescor* d Msitor persomel within the protected area 6. 7 m (5)
VIO % 11-01 Inadequate nort instructions to prevent the inadvertent start of the A EDG 6. 7 m G)
VIO %-11-03 Personnel performing =crt m the reactor building sump without logging 6. 7 ento a clearance as required t>y approved W 4 (5)
VIO E 15-01 FaGure to perform a required T5 survet11ance for the remote shutdown 6. 2 panel N (5)
IFI 94-18-09 Review periodic verificatim plans 80f -(GL 89-10 iten) 2 See IR E ll. IR E 21: a (I)
Sea GL 80-10 IFI E 02-05 Resonance noise in vicinity of Itv-25 7 m G)
IFI E 06-03 Emergmcy (herating Procedure igxiate program 3 See IR 95-16. VIO 93-16-07 W G)
IFI 95-11-01 SCBA requirements for personnel esing a tonic gas release 2 m G)
J IFI 95-21 02 Modificaticri to the staney feedeter pwp recirculation line I a G3
- IFI %-03-16 Review of MAR E 02-09-01. IFI flow indicators. Installation package and I t
functional testing results m G)
IFI E 04-03 Effect of setpoint calculations on E(P revisions 1 See V10 93-16-07 m (D)
IFI %-05-06 Large break loss of coolant analysis generic concerns 1 m G) h fhh N k k es k f 4 IFI 96-08-02 Reactor building cavity cooling piping thermal relief protection 1 See D.I. 8. GL E 06 m (D) i' IFI W 15-03 Actions taken to resolve post-accident recriticality concerns &e to 1 localized bor m c lution IRR reviewing. gmeric 88W N (G) issua 12
f .
ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA MtC LEAD IR/SER LICDr5Et STATUS CDe(NTS MtC STAM5 MULTI-PtANT ACTIONS W A fB105: Seismic qualificatim of equipnent. Licensee's criteria and procedures 2 Encetted corpletion N (5)
GL 87-C2 approved. Some tsses are pending and would be resolved thru audit Decenter.
(sche M ed for Mar 97). Ltcensee s fleid waltdtnn results are currently in staff review W A fB!!! (IPE): IPE and IPEEE - These are in staff review. Not a restart ites. 2 4 (5)
MPAM118 (IPE(E)
MPA D 602; NRCB Movemant of heavy loads over spent fupl pool 2 h (5)
%-02 - ticensee rescrrse in staff review This to:rto not be a restart issur MPA ft208: Thersolag - Ltcensee plans to use Mecattss 2 See IR 96-01: IR %-06 m (5)
GL 92-06: BU 92- (an alternate material). see reanalysts of APPOOII R. and some 01 e=epption. Fire barrter tests of Mecattss including Appacity tests are in staff review This also may not to restart issup W Af L201: Reactor vessel structural integrity. RAI to licensee on 7/22/96. Only a 2 N (3)
GL 92-01 Rev 1. data base issue, not a restart item.
Stcp I W A fl604: Boraflex degradation. Licensee response is just in. Staff rewtew to 2 m (5)
GL %-04 ctnnence. This may have to be adressed prior to restart because of sansttivtty to spent fuel pnol issues WA . POf testing & surveillance. This ttee is closed with the enception of IFI 2 See IFI 94-18-09 N (!)
GL STTO 94-18-09 on periodic vertficatim. =Atch is to be follamed up after a new wic carmnication is issuad LICENSE M fM[ MENT /REtiEF RE0 TESTS R G. 1.97 RG 1.97 instementation - SJroot montters etc - category Change. License 2 N (5)
Instrurents amarmant may tw aTrovad by Oprember Qtometrics & Btonetric ewenption to allo.e talting security badges offstte - Staff rewtew 2 4 (5)
Sacurity is owpacted to tw complete sotv, Core Flood Reitef request RE: Core flood nozzle - Staff needs more info. PM wtll 2 N (3)
Cl*rrie 6eap Rf! informad CT5G Tibes OT5G tibe testing - Licensee proposed a revised 075G ttee acceptance 2 See VIO %-05-04 m (5) critaria OTIER 155tES Pressurtzer Otring Refuel 9 a s e surface flaw was discovered. The Itcensee performed 2 4 (5)
Nozzle Flaw better inspection during R10 and found the flaw to be accr_ptable. The new inspection results in reduced flaw stre and consequently acceptsoce crtterta (Jiich is based on ratto of flaw to thickress) changes Staff rewtew in progress.
Criticattty The Itcensee did not carry a previously i, crowed enewetten from part 70 2 N (3)
Monitor (70.24?) requirements to Part 50 itcense. Need legal interpretati e of the status of .,e ewasetton Sources for issues include: IFS. SIMS. NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power P lants). Resident's Oil.
PM's OIL 13
NOTE. Open allegations. OI investigations. and emerging.ocaft issues are listed separately.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AP Abnormal Opera'..ng. Procedure BWST Borated Water Storage Tank-
'C- Closed.
CCHE . Control' Complex Habitability Envelope CFR. Code of Federal Regulations CR3 D.I. Crystal River 3 Design Item
-CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System EA' NRC Escalated Enforcement Action EDBD Engineering Design Basis Document i ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System
.EDG Emergency Diesel' Generator EET NRC Escalated Enforcement Item E0P- Emergency Operating Procedure FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report GL~ NRC Generic Letter ILRT. Integrated Leak Rate Test (of the Reactor Building)
IFI .NRC Inspector Followup Item LER Licensee Event Report LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPI . Low Pressure Injection LTOP Low Temperature Overpressure Protection MPA NRC Multi-Plant Action MUV Makeup Valve-N (D) Not an NRC Restart Item (because the issue is duplicated by a restart item)
N (G) Not'an NRC Restart Item (because it is a generic issue affecting multiple operating plants and is being addressed by NRR)
N (I) Not an NRC Restart Item (because previous inspection of the issue is adequate for restart)
N (S) Not an NRC' Restart Item (because resolution of the issue is not'needed for safe restart)
NOV - NRC Notice of Violation NPSH Net Positive Suction Head OCR Operability Condition Report OP Operating Procedure PR Problem Report R NRC Restart Item RB Reactor Building RCS Reactor Coolant System RMG Radiation Monitor SFP Spent Fuel Pool -
14
! e TIA NRC Task Interface Agreement (between NRC o)..ces)
' TS -
Technical Specifications
-URI NRC Unresolved Item-US0 Unreviewed Safety Question VID ~ NRC Vi01ation 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DRS\EB\CRISSUE1.350 15
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