ML20141J708
| ML20141J708 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1997 |
| From: | Jaudon J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9708210102 | |
| Download: ML20141J708 (17) | |
Text
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/$ < coq *o uNrrED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION J f k REGloN 11 5 Il " [T E 1,' E Eoi E E l January 14,1997 MEMORANDUM TO: File 11W -
FROM: hns P, Ja o , Director i Division of Reactor Safety
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART PANEL FOURTH MEETING HELD JANUARY 8,- 1997 '
-=
The Crystal River Restart Panel met at the Crystal River site on January 8,1997. The following Panel members and others were present:
Panel Members: Johns P. Jaudon, Ril, Chairman Frederick J. Hebdon, NRR, Vice Chairman Kerry D Landis, Ril Stephen J. Cahill, Ril Laksminaras Raghaven, NRR Others: Robert P. Schin, Ril The Panel noted that the Plant status was cold shutdown (Mode 5) with a steam bubble in the pressurizer, The Senior Resident inspector advised that there was work in progress on some valves and that a Train (A) outage was scheduled to be9 1n January 13,1997.
The Chairman pointed out that the licensee had announced several personnel selections, these were:
Roy Anderson as Senior Vice President; he is expected to be onsite in late January and relieve March 3,1997.
John Cowan as Site Vice President; he is expected onsite by early February 1997.
Dave Kunsemiller as Director of Site Support; he is on site and should relieve by the end of January 1997.
John Holden as Director of Engineering; the onsite date was not known by the board.
The Panel discussed Licensee Event Report 96-22, which reported a potential design issue that potentially could result in the simultaneous failure of circuits both in the control room and the remote shutdown facility. It was reported that the licensee had determined to conduct a broader review of Appendix R issues because of this potential design issues. The NRR Panel members noted that there was a restart item to resolve some Appendix R exemption requests and that action on these requests should be coordinated with review of the licensee's review to assure that the total context of Appendix R issues was understood. I:
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9708210102 970114 PDR ADOCK 05000302 P PDR M.lli
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2-The Restart Panel noted that FPC was'still developing recovery milestones and that the scope of the design changes was not completely finalized in some areas.
s Th6co was a lengthy discussion on whether or not the licensee's plan to review past 10 CFR 50.59 reviews of modifications and to develop time lines for the Emergency Diesel Generation system, the Emergency Feedwater system, Building Spray system, Low Pressure - 1 Injection system and High_ Pressure injection system and to perform'a failure modes analysis -
of DC power would get the licensee to a point to concWde that the safety systems at Crystal ;
River met their design basis requirements.' The Restart Panel decided to discuss this with- '
the licensee at the public meeting scheduled for January 9 onsite in order to_ assure that they understood the Panel's concems in this area. '
The Restart check list of open items was reviewed, Findings from recent reports were added and characterized. ' It was further determined that duplicate items, coded as Non Restart
- because the item was coded as Restart under another classificatio'n, should be further coded to show that there was another item on the same subject that was coded restart. This was. ,
' accomplished and the revised Restart Open item checklist is enclosed (Attachment A).
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The NRR representatives discussed the lack of technical s(ecfications for Low Temperature
- Overpressure Protection, which is already coded as a Restart item. It was noted that NRR has not yet sent correspondence to the licensee on this subject, although the lice 'see is-aware that the item in on the Restart Open item Checklist.
The need to schedule available inspection resources effectively was discussed. The Panel-
- decided that the inspection activities of the resident inspectors, the project engineer, and DRS inspectors should be carefully coordinated. Panel members K. Landis and C. Casto, '
Branch Chiefs from DRP and DRS respectively, were tasked to develop a tentative inspection .
l~ plan to a'ssure that items ready for inspection were promptly inspected. The due date for_ this tentative plan is January 23. This plan is to become a living schedule modified as necessary _
U Dates for future meetings were scheduled as follows:
) - In Region ll - January 23,1997 (10:00 am)
- - At Crystal River - February 12,1997 (8
- 00 am)-
4 -
Attachment:
A. Restart Open item Checklist '
L '
- - Docket 50-302
- -
l : cc w/att: L. A. Reyes, RA/Ril E. W. Merschoff, ADRA/ Ril J. R. Johnson, DRP/Ril S. A. Varga, NRR L
5
' This discussion wee heed January 9,1997, with FPC at the putille meeting-i i1
Attachment A CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST R ITEMS (TO BE INSPECTED BY THE NRC BEFORE RESTART)
Status as of January 13, 1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met on November 13, 1996, and developed seven general areas under which the restart issues will be grouped. Those seven areas are:
1.
Knowledge of design and licensing bases and adequacy of design margin
- 2. Regulatory knowledge and perspective
- 3. Operator performance and knowledge
- 4. Marginally effective engineering crganization 5.
Management oversight; including quality assurance, self assessment, and corrective action
- 6. Corrective actions for NRC violations
- 7. Other ISSUE DESCRIFTICII AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICE 3ESBS COISBNTS NRC STATUS STATUS LICEIISER'S RESTART LIST OF DESZtat-REIATED ISSUES (D.I.s) spor 10/28/96 Itr from FPC)
CR3 D.I. 1 HPI pump recirculation to the makeup tank 1 RI D-1 See URI 96-01 02, IFI R 96-17-02, IR 96-12 CR3 D.I. 2 MPI system modifications to improve SSLOCA margins 1 RI D-2 See URI 96-01-02, LER R 96-06, IR 96-12 CRJ D.I. 3 I.PI pump mission time 1 Lenahan/ D-3 See URI 96-201-01, I.1 R NRR 96-12 CR3 D.I. 4 Reactor hailding spray pump 18 NPSM 1 Lenahan D-4 See URI 96-201-02, IR R 96-12 CR3 D.I. 5 Emergency feedwater system upgrades and diesel generator load impact 1 Schin D-5 See URI 96-12-01: EEI R 96-12 02. IR 96-12 CR3 D.I 6 Emergency diesel generator loading 1 Fillion D-6 See EEI 96-12-02, IR R 96-12 CR3 D.I. 7 Failure modes and effects of loss of DC power 1 Fillion D-7 See URI 96-12-01, LER R 96-07, IR 96-12 CR3 D.I. 8 Generic Letter 96-06 (Thermal overpressure protection for Containment piping, penetrations. and coolers) 1 Lenahan/ D-S See IR 96-12 R Crowley h
Attachment A
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Zssus DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD 1R/SEE LICENSEE CObedENTs NRC status status LICENSEE *S va-am RESTART issues RM3 29/30 Seismic monitoring of HR Rad Monitor 1 Lenahan D-19 R BIOST NPSH NPSH concern with ECCS pumps when SFP pumps are nanning in 1 Thomas D-19 sus and secire R FIVE AREA'4 oF G==4 assuaNG mesus, swa s m IPAP ar- -ED INSPECTIogs AIS RIE BR- -ED ADDITICIES Managesent - NRC inspect Problem Identifications focusing on GA audits Oversight - 5 Crowley/ OP-2, OP-3 Inspect New PC system IPAP and the problem reor>rtino system. - Increased inspection of QA Thomas R Problem Ar.alysis and Evaluations focusing on root cause Bera== ended evalumtions.
Inspection Marginally - NRC inspect Engineering Problem Identificatica and 4 Schin OP-4 Effective Resolutions with emphasis on licensee evaluations for OP-6 50.59 R Engineering storificant issues and work backlogs.
Organisation
= IPAP - Also inspect Quality of Engineerings with emphasis on 40 CFR 59.59 screenino and safety evaluations, accuraev of tne Reen==*nded M , and management oversicht.
Inspection Lack of - NRC inspect Engineering Safety Focuss focusing on proper Adequate identi ficat f ort of discrepanciep with the olant's design basis 1 Schin OP-1, OP-8, R Knowledge of in t he correct ive act son system. D-13, D-15 the Design - Also inspect Enganeering Problem Identification and D-16 Basis - IPAP Resolutions focusing on programs for identifying desian basis Bern==-nded issues and capturina them in t he correct ive act ion program.
Inspection, - Also inspect Quality of Engineerings focusing ce sonst civitv/understandino by the emtineerina/licensina staff of the plant
- e desson basis.
- Also assess the desian marain, including the licensee's
- eurant of crandition* reviews lack of - NRC inspect 50.59s, operability, reportab!11tv Sensitivity 2 Schin OP-5, OP-4 R for the Need to Comply Cith Regulations -
IPAP Recn===nded Inspection Operator i Performance - - NRC inspect Kafety Focuss focusing on communication w'3hin, 3 RI I IPAP .
operations, en===micat ion with other sit e groucs, and l R
ove rt ime Re - aded Inspection 2
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ISSUE DESCaIPTION ARIA NEC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE CC00(ENTS NRC STATUS STATUS I3EEPECTOR FOLtCNCP SYSTIJ URI $5-02-02 Control room habitability envelope leakage. Excessive 1 Schin leakage paths through doors, dampers, and drains due to See TIA 95003: FPC TS R design errors and lack of surveillances/ preventive Change Request No. 208 maintenance of 4/28/96; LERs 96-04, 94-10, 95-01, 95-04-01, 95-09; irs 95-02, 95-09, 95-11, 95-16, 95-21: FPC ltis, of 5/26/95 and 10/23/95 URI 96-01-02 Discrepancies in the high pressure injection design basis 1 analysis RI D-9 See CR3 D.I. 1: R CR) D.I. 2
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CDiscrepanciae{in f.ha EDBD anditha FSAR regardita3'the! ~J 1; - ;Crowiry;.-]' - l1R 96-19E
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prevention'of'postbi4Ch boren precipitatica- "
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> ' " ' 'LSee'~ EEI' 96-19 ' "
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R." C b URI 96-05-02 Design concerns with main steam line hangars used in seismic 1 Lenahan and other dynamic load applications R URI 96-06-03 Mon-safety related transfer switch used in ES status 1 Fillion andicating licht circuitry R
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Myp ((single: failure] Emergency Feedwater'. low;NPSM gNg;gg ', / ' ' ' ' ' to both pumpe v.( 6 giy (due. (IT .Sching to' postulatedi -
f_IR 96-19? ;.Dy175 T ' '
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- ~ 03,N04 A05W -bda URL 96-17-03 Failure to c h et required Technical Specification 4 Fillion See MPA SL601 (CL 96-surveillance testing on safety related circuitry (CL 96-011 013 R
URI 96-201-01 Iong term plant cooldown following a small break I.CCA 1 Crowley/ D-3 See CR3 D.I. 3s See IR assuming a single failure in the decay heat drop line NRA 96-11. NRR taking R
responsibility for this item.
URI 96-201-02 NPSM for building spray pump haa very little margin, and some 1 Lenahan calculation factors were nonconservative D-4 See CR1 D.I. 4 R URI 96-201-03 Operating curves 16, 17, and le in OP-103B are not validated 4 Hopper by licensee 0-1 R URI 96-201-04 Monsafety-related positioners on safety-related valves 1 Thomas A-7, D-10 See IR 96 R
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- c. .~ a URI.!96-20145t water? systemh ' eatdoadsid!d
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binput! heat--(OP-101BJCurve'151 s - ncr. consider maximus
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URI 96-201-07 EDG not protected against water spray from failure of fire 1 Fillion R protection deluge system in EDG room LER 95-13-01 Design deficiency may cause makeup tank vortexing resulting 1 Mellan LER 95-13-00 closed in in failure to meet Appendix R requirements IR 96-06 R
LER 96-18-00, Failure to verify RB penetrations closed per TS LER 96-10-01 1 RI O-2 R EEI 96-10-01 Four examples cf failure to follow refueling procedure FP-203 3 Hopper **
R EEI 96-10-02 Failure to assure root cause analysis and corrective actions 5 Hopper **
taken to preclude repetition were adequate after refuel R incident (no PR issued)
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ISSUE DESCRIPTICRI asma NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE CCDOGNTS NRC STATUS STATUS EEI 96-12-02 EDG loading USQs due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 avaluationes 4 Schin/ R-2, D-6, D- Enforcement conference three examples (one modification & two procedure changes) Fillion R
14, D-15, 1/24/96. See CR3 D.I.
OP-5 5: CR3 D.I. 6 EEI 96-12-03 Inadequate corrective actions for 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation errorst two eeamples 5 Schin Enforcement conference R 1/24/96 q- EEI 96-12-04 Use of unverified calculations to support modifications. 4 Schin OP-6 Enforcement conference R NaC inspect licensee's extent cf condition reviews.
1/24/96 EEI 96-19-01 Three inadequate procedures for containment penetration 4 R1 Enforcement conference surveillances R 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-02 Inadequate corrective actions for inadequate contairmnent 1 penetration surveillances RI Enforcement conference R 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-03 EFW NPSM 050 due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluaticLa 1 Schin for a modifiestion Enforcement conference R 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-04 Failure to update applicable design documents to incorporate 1 Thomas Enforcement conference R EFw design information (EFP-2 assumed operati..g when ETP-1 trips at 5008 aCS pressurel 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-05 Failure to include applicable design information in the 1 Thomas Enforcement conference design input requirements for an EFW modification (EFP-2 R continuing to operate after EFP-1 trips at 5008 RCS pressure 1/24/96 and hydraulic requirements)
EEI 96-19-06 EFW USQ due to removing the autcmatic open signal from ASV. 1 Thomas 204, reducing the reliability of EFP-2 Enforcement conference R 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-07 Inadequate 50.59 evaluation for post-14CA boron precipitation control 1 Crowley Enforcement conference R 1/24/96, verify procedures and documentation adequate prior to restart.
EEI 96-19-04 Error in design calculations for SW system heat loads 1 Crowley Enforcement conference R 1/24/96 EA 95-16 Use of non-conservative trip setpoints for safety-related (was EEI 95- equipment (SLIII).
6, 1 Mellan See IR 95-16, IR 95-21 R Additional examples identified in IR 95-02-04) 16.
EA 95-126, Nine instances where operators violated procedures for MJr NOW I.A (was pressure / level (2III).
6, 3 Schin See IR 96-04 R EEI 95-22-01)
EA 95-126 Conduct of unauthorized tests of MUT without 10 CFR 50.59 6, 3 Schin mov I.s (was evaluation (SLIII). Additional examples (four tests) See IR 96-04 R EEI 95-22-02) identified in 1/18/96 letter titled EA 95-126 and EA 96-1858.
(See Unr 96-04-0s EA 95-126, Failare to take adequate corrective actions for operator 6, 5 Schin 3a0V I.C.1 concerns regarding CP-103B, Curve 8, for MIT pressure / level R (was EEI 95- limits (SLIII) 22-03)
EA 95-126 Corrective acticas for an inadequate Curve 8 (two STI's and a 6, 5 RI NOT I.C.2 O-1 R (was EEI 95- revised CL:rve SA 6 88) ware also incorrect (SLIII) 22-03)
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Issc5 DasCELIPTIQat ARRA Inc LEAD IR/SEE LICENSEE COBSEEarFS NRC sTAIUS STATUS EA 95-126, NOV 1.D.1 Design controls failed to ensure adequate safety margin for 6, 1 RI OP-6 HPI pumps for certain LOCA scenarios (SLIII) R (was EEI 95-22-04)
EA 95-126, Swapover of ECCS pumps' suction from BWST (at five feet) to R I.D.2 6, 1 RI reactor building sump was inadequate (SLIII) R twas EEI 95-22-04)
EA 95-126 EOPs allowed vgle LPI pump to supply two MPI pumps, with 6, 1 RI NOV II.A (was insufficient la for LPI pump (SLIIIS R EEI 95-22-048 EA 95-126, Failure to take adequate corrective actions for tank 6, 5 RI NOW II.B (was volumes / level / suction point (SLIV) R EEI 95-22-03)
EA 95-126, NOW II.C (was Failure to ensure fire water storage tank contained adequate 4, 1 RI volume of water (SLIV) R EEI 95-22-03)
VIO 93-16 *;7 Inadequate EOP and AP procedures 6, 3 Hopper 0-3 See IR 96-04, IFI 96- R v
04 03, IR 96-08 VIO 55-16-03 Inadequate procedure for operation of the makeup pump 1A 6, 1 cooling water RI R
VIO 95-21-03 Failure to isolate the class 1E from the non-class 1E 6, 1 Thomas /
alectrical circuitry for the A8 purge and mini-purge valves RI R VIO 96-01-01 Inadequate corrective action for HPI flow indication problem 6, 5 RI R
VIO 96-01-06 Failure to correctly translate design basis of SW system into 6, 1 RI procedures, drawings, and instructions R VIO 96-04-02 Failure to take prompt corrective actica in revising 6, 5 Hopper procedure VP-580, Plant Safety Verification (for STAS). VP- R 540 contained cuttated and incorrect information.
VIO 96-05-01 Failure to create a PR and CCR for damaged main steam line 6, 5 hangars Lenahan, Raghavan R VIO 96-05-05 Failure to follow procedures for updating design basis documents 6, 4 Crowley CP-8 R
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VIO 96-05-07 Inadequate receiving inspections for battery chargers (veni r 6, 4 testal Schin R VIO 96-05-04 Failure to follow puzchasing procedures for inverters 6, 4 Schin R VID 96-06-02 No procedare for domineralized water flush performed by operators on boric acid addition lines 6, 3 RI R VID $6-06-04 leo evaluation on non-FSAR vital battery charger configuration 6, 4 RI R VI3 96-06-07 PR not initiated to resolve CREYS test failure 6,. 5 Lenahan R VIS $6-08-02 Corrective action not taken on make-up system audit findings 6, 5 R1
& excessive vibration on spent fuel pool pump cooling fan motor R
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ISSUE DESCRIPTION mh MRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE CC3OODPTS NRC STATUS STATUS VIO 96-09-03 Failure to perform & 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for 6, 3 Thomas changes to procedures described in the FSAR for controlling dissolved hydrooen concentration in the RCS a
VIO 96-09-04 Failure to update operating curves to reflect 1981 power uprate 6, 4 Thomas R
VIO 96-09-05 Failure to incorporate derign change of MUV-64 into operations procedures 6, 4 Thomas / Licensee Crowley R Denied Vio VIO 96-09-06 Taree examples of design control errors terroneous 6, 4 M. Miller calculation inputs aret ISI M M ary) OP-8 R VIO $6-09-07 Untimely corrective actions for the EFIC system concerns and problems 6, 5 Thosaas R
VIO 96-11-04 Reactor building sump not constructed in accordance with (, 1 RI approved construction drawings R VIO 96-15-02 Failure of reactor coolant pump oil collection system to 6, 7 W. Miller retain oil leaking from reactor coolant pump R IFI 95-15-01 Design requirements for nitrogen overpressure (service water) 1 L. Mellan Need to review R licensee's calculation
& conclusion. See IR 95-21 IFI 96-03-15 Evaluate the licensee's revised TS Basco and related 10 CFR 50.59 analysis for NPI flow indicators 2 RI R
IFI 96-11-02 Potential for HPI/LPI recirculation resulting in make-up tank overflow 1 RI See CR1 D.I. 1 R IFI 96-11-04 Adequacy of 10 CFR 50 Appendix 2 fire study and documentation 1 W. Miller E
ZFI 96-201-11 Design basis for decay heat / core flood / reactor coolant piping temperature 1 Lenahan Identified in IPAP R IFI 96-201-12 geport as IP-96-201-01 Conduit slaing criteria - jamming ratio not considered 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-02 IFI 96-201-13 Cable aspacities - several cables exceed rating, fr.cluding DHP-1 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-03 IFI 96-201-14 EDG protective trips not bypassed during emergency mode of operation 1 Fillion D-12 Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-04 IFI 96-201-15 Verification of motor starting data 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-05 IFI 96-201-16 Cbordination of Second Icvel undervoltage relay (SLUR) 1 Fillion setting vs. inverter operation Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-06 IFI 96-201-17 Coordination of SIER and fuse protection 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R report as IP-96-201-07 MULTI-PZ. ANT ACTICMf3 MPA SL507; GL 95-07 Pressure locking and thermal binding of safety-related gate valves. 2 '4RR Currently in staff review. An RAI is outstanding.
Espected completion 9 R
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Iss05 DEsCRIPTIcef AREA NRC LEAD IR/sER LICENSEE CCeesarfs NRC status sTarus MFA 4L601s Testing of safety-related logic circuits - 2 GL 96-01 Fillion R-1 11/96 - the licensee Licensee response in staff review. More details are R required. This issue requires attention. has identified testing deficiencies that must be fixed prior to resta rt MPA SL503; Circumferential cracking of SG tube flaws.
GL95-03 2 Blake/NRR Licensee response in staff review. R I
LICENSE
- s/ RELIEF RsQUESTs CCHE Control complex habitability envelope - Including TIA 95-03 2 Schin/NRR need to be addressed. Licensee submittal does not provide adequate Ts action.
R i
v.=== IssoEs LTOP Current TS does not address LTOP prevention or mitigatiot. 2 On the basis of GL 58-11, the licensee submitted information R, system branch will R to demonstrate that LTOP in B&W plants have less than 1 in send letter to 100 reactor years probability of occurrence and as a result licensee that they per GL 88-11 non-appendix G methodology can be used for PT have to submit TS.
curves. Such a PT curve would provide for higher LTOP enable pressure and temperature and would provide operational flexibility. Staff denied the request in 1995 and requested a
1997 revised response. The licensee expects to respond late Appendix R Appendix R design basis issues review by FPC consultant. NRC review open Appendix R issues to assure that there are no N. Miller /' D-11 R NRR restart or operability issues imbedded in them.
Operator NRC review operator workarounds list to assure that there are uorkarounds R1 M-2 See VIO 96-09-01 no restart or operability issues contained in them R USQs - Licensee request and NRC review and issue license amendments NBR R-2, R-4 for all Unreviewed Safety Cuestions (USQel R USQ EDG toad Uprate Fillion/ R-2 See EEI 96-12-02, CR) R NRR D.I. 6 USQ ASV 204 Thomas / R-4 See EEI 96-19-04, CR3 R NER D.I. 5 0S0 DH-45-FI Crowley/ R-5 See URI 96-201-05 A NRR USQ EDG Lnad List Update Fillion/ R-6 See EE1 96-12-02, CR3 R NRR D.I. 6 USQ ITS 3.0.3 relief for LPI/DH to allow modification of air operators for DCV 17. 18, 177, 170 Thomas / R-7 See URI 96-201-04 R NRR IIRT Conduct Appendix an IIJtT J to 10 or seek CFR 50 an Amendment to utilize Method S or NRR R 50.54f Letter NRC review licensee's 50.54f letter response (due 2/9/97) on design bases NER R a
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155lE DE5CRIPTION AnEA leC LEAD IR/5ER LIGmSE STATUS ComENT1 Inc 5TATUS LER M- 5 41 Deficiency ta anderstandtag of teduitcal regatrements leads to LER M - 5 03. 2 LER M-500 closed in IR manconseroative RP5 setpotat ans potential asolation of T5 N (D) tfR M - 5 04, W 16. See (A 95-16.
tft 94-06-05 LIA E OS-DO mataal release 6 -Sag sulfar stoator delivery causes acta.atton of taatc 7 '
qas monttar resulting ta cuatrol room amergency wentilation actuation See IR %-11.- N (I)
LER E 13-C1 leadeemte proceere causes b cooltag ieter th to askese pump 1 resuittag ta operattan outside the design bests tfR %-10-00 closed in IR N (I) l E t6. See also 18195- <
11-02. VIO %-16-03 LfR 5 17-80 SW fb to control room coolers controlled by air operated sale iAtch cth1d fast open 1 See IR W16. V!O % N (D) 06 LER b 18-00. Imadegate T5 acte alloed eland entry tato 15 LCD LIR W 18-01 2 tra Wts-c?
See NCV 5 18-05. N(O LIR E 19-00 Leet tastr:mentatton for SW th to ABCus tacapele of acasurtag 90 spa 1 See IR %-18. #(D LER E23-01 Inconsistent dessen =< =retons cause buildtag spray fb rates to be tta W 23-42 1 outstae ersign basss tER E23-00 closed in IR N (I)
%-04 LfR 5 25-88 Inadeedte isolation of safety / mon-safety related circuits efa W 25-81 1 See 110 W 21-03. N (D)
LIR E28-80 S6T wacinas breder has tandegate retter capacity tra W ?s-01 1 See it 95-21. N (1)
LIR E SI-SI IFIC control circs.sts etsrouted. Apper.11a R ccmcara 1 LER %81-00 closed to IR N (I)
% 04: See also NCV 5 01-03 aft E 82-08 matpurge salve has safety / mon-safety related circuits utthod isolation 1 See V10 W 21-03. # (1)
LER E03-06 RC5 cnoidam rate enceeded artag coolenm 3 See tRI %-21-04.
tIa %e3-at N (!)
LIR 544-00 CDE control dampers foised et-ma*4 & ledsag 1 See URI 95-02-02. IR E N (D) 21 Lit 5 45-01 SW flow to RBCus could esceed destya 1 tfR %05-00 closed ta IR N (D)
% 04 See also VIO W 01-01 LIR WE00 tel tastrament error could result la se! pump nauna 1 tra % E-et See IR E 20. IR E 04 N (D)
CA3 0 f 2 LER % 87-00 c tfa %-87-01 te! itae Ju rr4/LDOP/ loss of de bus could have taadeoste tel fh 1 See It %Gl. CH3 D.I. 2.
tastnmentation N (D) ifR 5 00-00 Ashsgimus T5 ante results la mot perforunas RC5 led survestlance prior to 2
- Meer ? m (5)
LIR 5 39-08 Failure to reattach fastnment tahing to seisste sioports after 1 amanticattan leaes to operation oisside estyi basis See 1R1503-06. IR %- N (1) 05 LfR E 10-OS Low fb to SW systes cooled camponents causes geration oest.:e deste 1 bests See VIO E 16-03. # (D)
LIR E ll-as personnel error causes testtag dersciency res.sittag ta condttton 1 orometten ty taorond TS U1 %41 tssues) See th fL601 (CL %-01). # (D) i 10 e
ar
!$2K E SCRIPTION aRfA tutC LEAD 1R/5ER LICINSEE STATUS CDeOT5 NRC STATUS LER % 12-00. (berattom outside oesign tasts caused by httery chrgers hetag 4 LIR % 22-01 Saadegate test results accepted ta error See VIO96 05-07 N (0) tfa % 12-G?
LIR %-13-00 Operator error resulted la the taedvertent actuation of KP-1A 3 See Ncv 96-03-02. N (1)
LER W 15-00 Persor.ael errors cause cable separatton/tsolatta conceras resulting in 1 operatte outside tre design tasts (tomte gas annttors) See IR 5 04. W (1) 112 5 16-00 OtEWS filter testtag did not meet 75 specs 2 El N (5)
LER W 19-00 Non-safety related suttch used la safety related wirtag for [5 status 1 Ityts See $1 %-%C3. N (D)
LfR 96-20-00 threetewd safety Sarstions conceratag IIE overloadtag caused by 4 interoretattan of reautatory reaware cats R-2. D-6. D-14 See 1E1 W 12-02. N (D) 0-15 (P-5 LIR % 23-00 Personnel error leads to atssed surwsitances resuittag ta violation of 2 See 110 W 15-01.
Technical Spectftcattais (atssed remote shurche panel IFW pump pressure N (D) instriment cNmet chece LIR %24-00 Planc modtfscation causes amanalyzed condition regardtag energency 1 fecenter See $ 1 % 12-01. N (D)
LIR % 25-00 Personnel error causes testtag deftetency resuttlag to condition 1 prohtanted by Tectascal spectfications (12 contacts sa 15 logic wre not See PPA R601 (a %-01). N (D) tetag tested)
V!O 94-25-01 g' Failwe to prcoerly control the Control Cmples Habitability [avelope e (drmr t:1orted anen for maintenance ertl
- 6. 7 See $ 1 5 02-02. N (D)
W 3 94-27-02 Fattwe to make te 10 CFR 50.73 reports to the NRC witata the regatred tsar 6. 2 CP-4 See IR 562. IR 95 08. N (1) v3 94-27 03 Fatlwe to make one reg 4 red la CFR 50.72 report to the astC wtthis tre rewired ttee 6. t (P-4 See IR W C8. N (I)
V3 %-01-05 Te emamples of fattwe to sedate F5AR as required by la CFR 50.711e3 6. 4 W (5) v 3 96-02-01 Failure to estatata 4.2 footcandles ta the protected area 6. 7 l See IR %C7 N (5)
W3 5 02-04 Fattwe to matatata secondary alara station operable and imedemate ctnoensator, apesures 6. 2 N (5) v 3 5 03-11 Fallwe to folio, radiation work permit requirements 6. 7 N (5)
V 3 % C3-12 Fatlure to report the transport of a radioactively contaminatea nadtet<hal offsete 6. 2 N (5) v3 %C3-13 mescorted visttor persormel w6thta the protet.ed area 6. 7 N (5)
V D % C5-64 Licensee approved ecy cwrent acceptance criteria different from T5 renuirener.ts 6. 2 m (5)
VD%%M FatIwe to itsely mottfy the E of a condition outside the Appendia R 6. 2 tscenstag des 19e basis N (5) v3 % C7-01 Fallwe to protect safeguards taformation 6. 7 N (5) 11
\ .
I5SE Ct5CR17T138 ARIA MIC LEAD 1R/SER LICDe5EE STATUS Cae(uis as C STATUS v10 %-87-C2 Fallwe to complete screentag elements for Fitness fw Ddy Personnel 6. 7 N (5) v!O E 09 01 Fastwe to falls a aatstenance procedtre resulttag ta the saadwertent 6. 7 tattiattan of the enntrol room emertwec, wents tatson sustem N (5) v!O W O9-02 tmescwted utsttr personnel withta the protected area 6. 7 N (5)
CIO % 11-01 laaoegste =crt tastrictions to prevent the inadvertent start of the A EDG 6. 7 N (5)
VIO E11-0 personnel performing acrt on the reactw butidtag sump without loggtag 6. 7 onto a clearance as remtred tw axroved Wt N (5)
V!D E 15-01 Fastwe to perform a required 15 savestlance for the remote shutdown 6. 2 canel N (5)
Ift 94-18-09 Review periodic vertftcation plans - POf ICL 89-10 stem) 2 See IR %-11. IR W21; N (I)
See Gt 89-10 If! 95-02-05 Resonance motse ta vtctatty of its-25 7 m (5)
IFl 5 08-83 Emergency reerattag Proced.re indste program 3 See la W 16. VIO 93-15-07 * (5)
Ifl 5 11-01 SCBA requirements fw personnel artag a tonic gas release 2 m (5)
DI E15-82 Destys reqatrements tw asnamic IDCA effects 1 See IR E21 and TIA 96- N (5) 013 IFI W 15-83 Dessgi requirements for reAtor coolant pimp cooler fallwe 1 See IR 95-21 and TIA 95- N (5) 014 If! E 15-04 Code rewtrement fr thermal rettef salves om decay beat remo.a1 heat e=w 1 i See IR 95-21 and TIA %- N (5) 014 IF! W 15-05 Relief values removed from heat emchangers 1 See IR 95-21 and TIA % N (5) cla DI E 21-02 stadtfication to the stand >y fee &ater pts, rectrca. latten Inne 1 m (5)
If! 5 03-16 Review of PtAR EC?-09-01, tel flan ladscators, tastallattan pactage and I r tertional testtaa results n (5)
ITI E 04-43 Effect of setpotat calculations on IIP revistans I See VIO 93-15-67 m (D)
D 1 E SS-06 Large breat loss of coolant analysts generte caicerns I a (5) yEE-ES SurtisenciesLkitecatass fire'horrier[prh ~ $d atk [dg6[lph
- 4) + - 7 ;q qq ,- g (( g3 [_li h(C[
DI W C8-c2 Aeacta buildtag cavity cooltag ptstag thermal retter protection 1 See 0.1. 8. GL %C6 m (D) 171 96-15-03 Actions taken to resolve post-acctdent recrtticality conceras de to 1 IRR reviewing, generte saw laraltred baron dilution a (G) sssue
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ISSK DESCRIPTION ASEA tRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE STATU5 CDefETS NRC STATUS MATI-pUWT ACTIONS WA M105; Setsate 0411ficattom of agaspoent. Licensee's criterta and procechres CL 87-02 2 Egected czupletten n (5) approved. Some issues are penstag and maste be resolved tara adtt k ascer.
(sche bled for nar 97). Licensee s field ws!Ldmes results are carrently an staff rewtew WA Mill (!PD: IPE and IFEEE - Tlese are la staff review. not a restart stan. 2 w aa8118 (!Pff D m (5)
WA #1602; IntCB ftwesent of heavy leads over spent fuel pool
%-a? 2 M (5)
- t aceasce response == staff rewtew This .em.!d not be a restart issue WA R208; Thermolag - LtCensee plans to 44e neCattss CL 92-08. 80 92- 2 See IR 96-01; IA 96 16 m (1) tan alternate metertal). some reanalysts of APPEE!I R. and some la enemotion. f tre barrier tests of necattss tacluding Aspecity tests are la staff restew Tras also ser not be restart issue Wad 1201: Reactor vessel structral tategrtty. RAI to Ittensee on 7/22/96. Caly a 2 (L 92-01 Rev 1 data base issue, act a restart stan. m (5) koo 1 WA R604; Borafles degradation. Licensee response is just ta. Staff restem to CL 96-04 2 N (5) rr= w nce. Ints may save to be addressed prter to restart because of senstitutty to socat fel cool issues WA : Kiv testtag & survestlance. Yhts staa is closed wtth the exception of IFI CL EFIS : See IFl 94-18-09 M (1)
Wl8-09 on periodsc vertf tcation. = ditch as to be fallamed 60 after a new gemerte commmascattan is 1sted tFCDFI asostuT/nft!EF REGLESTS a G. 1.97 AG 1.97 tastrumentation - SJ lastriments r #> N tars etc - category change. License 2 anesuserat new be approved twyg. m (5)
Stametric Stonetric eremption to allow tr%.ecurtty badges offstte - Staff restew 2 securst, s& is e=pected to be crmptete s:e m (5)
Care Flood Relief request RE: Core flood aczzle - Staff needs more tafo. Ptswell ncnte 2 m (5) seco til saformed CT5G T.&es 015G taae testtag - Licensee proposed a revised GT5G tde acceptance 2 See 110 E05-04 m (5) criterta OTafR 155tK5 Pressartzee Durtag Befuel 9 a s.b-surface flaw esas discovered. The incensee performed moule flaw 2 N (5) better taspection artag AIS and found the flaw to be acceptable. The new taspection results sa rees:ed flaw stie and conseeaently acceptance criteria 6Alch is based on ratto of flaw to tatchmess) changes Staff rewtew in progress 3C Loco Piptag in a sarvey taspection. the staff noted that certata branch pipes off the Analyses 2 N (5) primary coolant loop mere mot analyzed as Cm1r Class 1 pipe it.e.. no fattpse analysts) as regstred by the CoGe. Need NRR techSICal brancWs octalon om this 13 Q_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' ' ' ^^~~
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m for issues include: IFS. SIMS. MRtG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants). Resident's OIL.
PM's CIL NOTE: Open allegations. 01 investigations. and emerging / draft issues are listed separately.
LIST OF ACRONYNS USED AP Abnormal Operating Procedure BWST Borated Water Storage Tank C Closed CCHE Control Complex Habitat' it; *' ' lope CFR Code of Federal Regula -
CR3 D.I. Crystal River 3 Design :,.ce.
CREYS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System EA NRC Escalated Enforcement Action ED80 Engineering Design Basis ntv,m t ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EEI NRC Escalated Enforcement Item E0P Emergency Operating Procedure FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report .
GL NRC Generic Letter ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test (of the Reactor Building)
IFI NRC Inspector Followup Item LER Licensee Event Report LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPI Low Pressure Injection LTOP Low Temperature Overpressure Protection MPA NRC Multi-Plant Action-MLN Makeup Valve N (D) Not an NRC Restart Ites (because the. issue is duplicated by a restart ites)
N (G) Not an NRC Restart Item (because it;is a generic issue affecting multiple operating plants and is being addressed by MtR)'
N (I) Not an NRC Restari. Ites (because previous inspection of the issue.is adequate for restart)
N (S) Not an NRC Restart Item (because resolution of the issue is not needed for safe. restart)
NOV MtC Notice of Violation NPSH Net Positive Suction Head
. .; 14-
OCR Operability Condition Report OP Operating Procedure PR Problem Report R NRC Restart Item R3 Reactor Building RCS Reactor Coolant System RMG Radiation Monitor SFP Spent fuel Pool TIA NRC Task Interface Agreement (between NRC offices)
TS Technical Specifications URI NRC Unresolved Item USO Unreviewed Safety Question VIO NRC Violation OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCLNENT NAME: S:\DRS\EB\CRISSUE1.350 r
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