B16555, Advises NRC of Six Discrepancies in Unit 3 SER (NUREG-1031) Identified During Our Configuration Mgt Program Review. Commitments,Encl

Advises NRC of Six Discrepancies in Unit 3 SER (NUREG-1031) Identified During Our Configuration Mgt Program Review. Commitments,Encl

ML20141H173
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	07/14/1997
From:	Mcelwain J NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
RTR-NUREG-1031 B16555, NUDOCS 9707220057
Download: ML20141H173 (6)

Text

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. .b. _ . . .,

• • \ Northeast ""I* F"'I "d""" M' '"'""* 6385 4 Y

$ Nuclear Energy - uaistone Nudear Power station ,

Northeast Nudear Energy Company

.. P.O. Ilus 128 3 .. Waterfoni, CT 06385-0128 I

(860) 447 1791 i Fax (860) 444 4277 )

'the Northeast Utilitie. System Jll l 41997 ,

Docket No. 50-423  ;

I B16555 l

!: l i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:' Document Control Desk

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i Washington, DC 20555 l 5

l e Millstone Nuclear Power Station,' Unit No. 3 Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG 1031) l i j j The purpose of this letter is to advise the NRC Staff of six discrepancies in the L Millstone Unit No. 3 Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG 1031) that were identified 3 during our Configuration Management Program review. The discrepancies involve Safety Evaluation Report descriptions that do not accurately match the actual as-built i plant or that'do not clearly describe the as-built plant. These discrepancies are not the result of post startup modifications or changes to the originally licensed facility. The .

l discrepancies were not identified during reviews performed upon receipt of the Safety J Evaluation Report. Each discrepancy was reviewed and no operability or reportability i

issues were identified. In addition, the FSAR was determined to appropriately reflect i the as-built ' plant or revised as appropriate. A description of each discrepancy is i

provided in Attachment 2.

! Our commitments are provided in Attachment 1a

Should you have any questions regarding this matter please contact Mr. David A. Smith at (860) 437-5840.-

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Very truly yours, [;

! I i NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY FOR: M. H. Brothers Vice President - Millstone Unit No. 3 dh i

((g g l[> % \l BY:

5 bM pohn 1. McElfain Recovery Officer - Millstone Unit No.1 I. cc: H. J. Miller, Region I Administrator J. W. Andersen, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3 A.' C. Cerne, Senior Resident inspecter, Millstone Unit No. 3 i .

W . D. Travers, PhD, Director, Special Projects Office

-9707220057 970714 F PDR ADOCK,05000423 P PDRi

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t' Docket No. 50-423 3 B16555 1

Attachment 1 i

Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Commitments i

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' July 1997 i

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U.S. NuclGar R@gulatory Commission B16555\ Attachment 1\Page 1 Enclosure List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by NNECO in this document.

Please notify the Manager - Nuclear Licensing at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments..

Commitment Committed Date None l l

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Docket No. 50-423 E16555-P A

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Attachment 2 i Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Safety Evaluation Report Discrepancies i

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! ' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16555\ Attachment 2\Page 1

.. Attachment 2 Safety Evaluation Report Discrepancies

1. Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Section 9.4.2, page 9-31, implies that the Fuel Building Ventilation System operates automatically during accident conditions

upon receipt of a containment isolation signal or a high exhaust contamination i signal. The SER states "The non-safety exhaust system operates during norma l i operation, while'the safety-related exhaust system operates during the fuel-

handling operation and accident conditions (containment isolation signal) or high j exhaust contamination."

! The Fuel Building Ventilation System mode of operation is manual and has '

always been manual. Technical Specification 3/4.9.12 correctly reflects the  ;

j manual operation of the Fuel Building Ventilation System. i

+ 1 j; 2. SER Section 9.5.6, page 9-74, implies that the emergency diesel generator air  ;

supply system is capable of starting the diesel five times from an initial receiver L pressure of 350 psig. The SER states "Each diesel generator has an i independent and redundant air starting system consisting of two separate full-capacity air starting subsystems, each with sufficient air capacity to provide a minimum of five consecutive cold engine starts from the low-low pressure alarm setpoint."

The diesel air start systam has a low pressure alarm but no low-low pressure alarm. The initial receiver pressure for the five starts of the emergency diesel generators is 425 psig, not the 350 psig implied by the statement in the SER.

The original FSAR states: "Each independent starting system is designed to be .

capable of starting the engine five times' from an initial pressure of 425 psig I without recharging the starting air tanks. ..... Each system is also capable of starting the engine once and reaching synchronous speed and voltage within 10 seconds from a starting air tank pressure greater than 350 psig." This information was also provided in our response, dated August 29,1983, to selected Requests for Additional Information.

3. SER Section 6.3.1, page 6-24, implies the interface between the reactor coolant system and the low pressure portions of the ECCS is comprised of three check valves in series. The SER states " Isolation of the low pressure portions of the ECCS at the interface with the high pressure RCS is provided by three check valves in series."

The as-built valve arrangement is two check valves in series prior to the code break.. This is consistent with Section 6.3 paragraph 111.11 of the Standard Review Plan because there are design provisions to allow periodic testing of the

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U.S. Nuclur R:gulatory Commission B16555\ Attachment 2\Page 2-

. check valves for ' leak tightness and the valves we periodically tested in accordance with Technical Specification 4.4.6.2.2.

4.' . SER Section 7.3.2.3, page 7-15, is misleading regarding feedwater line isolation.

SER Section 7.3.2.3 states " Redundant actuation systems are provided for each valve operator and receive closure signals from the two redundant ESFAS logic trains."-

SER Section 10.4.7 and the original FSAR Section 10.4.7.3 correctly address feedwater line isolation. The actual plant design has train A isolate the feed regulating valves and the bypasses, and train B isolate the feedwater isolation trip va,1ves and the chemical feed isolation valves.

5. SER Section 9.5.4.2 incorrectly refers to a differential pressure switch across the diesel engine skid-mounted duplex filter which actuates a high pressure alarm on a local panel and a local panel trouble alarm on the main control board. The actual design shows a local differential pressure indicator across the duplex filter :

and a pressure switch downstream of the filter which annunciates low fuel pressure on the local panel and a trouble alarm on the main control board. This error was the result of an error in FSAR amendment 14 which was used by the NRC in writing the SER.

An FSAR change has corrected this error.

6. SER Section 7.3.2.9 in the discussion of the reactor building closed cooling

- water system states: " Redundant pressure switches are located at the non-safety portion water supply header to detect a drop in pressure, which indicates

-a rupture of non-safety-related system piping. Low pressure automatically isolates component cooling water to the non-safety portions of the system."

There.are no pressure switches at the non-safety headers. The surge tank level switches are pressure switches that perform the isolation function.

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